Vilnius University

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Eastern European and Russian Studies Programme

DANIJEL KORSA
2nd year

**FRAMING OF 'NORMAL NATIONALISM'
IN ALEXEI NAVALNY'S LIVEJOURNAL BLOG**

MASTER'S THESIS

Tutor: Dr. Vladas Sirutavičius

2018
Vilnius

MASTER'S THESIS FLYLEAF

Conclusions of the tutor of the Master's thesis (concerning the public defence):

....

....

....

....

(date)   (name, surname)   (signature)

The Master's thesis has been submitted to the Commission of Defence:

....

(date)   (signature of the secretary of the Commission of Defence)

Reviewer of the thesis:

....

(name, surname)

Evaluation of the Commission of Defence:

....

Head of the commission:

Members of the commission:

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ENTRY

This research analyzes how Russian political activist – Alexei Navalny – frames "normal nationalism" in his personal *LiveJournal* blog from 2013 until 2017. The research methodology combines both case study and frame analysis methods, in order to reveal how significant nationalism in A. Navalny's blog is and what nationalism Navalny constructs.

The problem of the research derives from the origins of A. Navalny's political career, when his rhetoric was fond of harsh nationalistic and xenophobic elements. This fact is often overlooked as Navalny enjoys global recognition as an anti-corruption crusader in Russia.

Confirmation

I confirm that I am the author of submitted thesis: *Framing of 'Normal Nationalism' in Alexei Navalny's LiveJournal Blog,* which has been prepared independently and has never been presented for any other course or used in another educational institution, neither in Lithuania, or abroad. I also provide a full bibliographical list which indicates all the sources that were used to prepare this assignment and contains no unused sources.

Danijel Korsa

INDEX

INTRODUCTION

Background and relevancy of the topic:

Alexei Navalny is an oppositional leader in Russia. Although such statement might look inapplicable to Russia due to its undemocratic, tightly controlled and manually managed political system, there is an agreement of such Navalny's role in (or rather outside) the system by both internal and external actors[1]. Navalny's charisma, abilities to attract supporters in almost every age category[2], mobilize large masses, conduct various functioning political campaigns mixed with a good sense of satire in his communication undoubtedly played a huge role in his development as a politician or, at least, a political actor who is able to make his voice heard in spite of a blockade on mass media in the Russian Federation. The blockade that is majorly in place due to his well-known stance against Russia's president Vladimir Putin and the political system he has built since his accession to the Kremlin in 2000.

As Alexei Navalny is able to openly criticize and challenge the whole political system of Russia and V. Putin himself, he managed to create a monopoly of ability to act this way while, at the same time, living in a city that he has lived in since his younger days. Attempts and efforts of other political actors or better-known activists to lead such a lifestyle eventually ended up because of murders[3], imprisonments[4], harassments[5], severe beatings[6], or political exiles[7], mainly to the West. Although A. Navalny also has a rather broad experience of such practices,[8] his brother, Oleg, has been unfairly convicted and jailed since 2014[9], while Alexei Navalny himself has a history of previous convictions which legally is the reason why he was not able to stand as a candidate on the presidential election of March 2018. However, compared to aforementioned measures taken against

---

[1] Veronika Bondarenko, "Meet Alexei Navalny — the Russian opposition leader challenging Putin", 2017 <http://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-alexei-navalny-vladimir-putin-russia-protests-2017-3> [Accessed on 2017.11.30]

[2] Андрей Перцев, "Навальный открыл кошелек", 2013 <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/11/13_a_5751869.shtml> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

[3] Alexander Winning, "Russian opposition leader Nemtsov shot dead in Moscow", 2015 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nemtsov/russian-opposition-leader-nemtsov-shot-dead-in-moscow-idUSKBN0LV2LA20150227> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

[4] Institute of Modern Russia, "The List of Persons Recognized as Political Prisoners by Russia's Memorial Human Rights Center" <https://imrussia.org/en/projects/political-prisoners/649-the-list-of-persons-recognized-as-political-prisoners-by-russias-memorial-human-rights-center> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

[5] RFE/RL, "Russian Police Investigate Feces Attack On Kremlin Critic Latynina", 2016 <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-attack-journalist-fecal-matter-kremlin-critic/27936709.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

[6] Ellen Barry, "Russian Journalist Beaten in Moscow", 2010 <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/world/europe/07russia.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

[7] Nanook.lt, "While the Red is On" <https://nanook.lt/while-the-red-is-on/index.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

[8] Harriet Agerholm, "Russian opposition activists blinded in acid attacks", 2017 <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russian-opposition-activists-blinded-acid-attacks-vladimir-putin-moscow-kremlin-alexei-navalny-a7712056.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

[9] RFE/RL, "Human Rights Court Says Navalny Unfairly Convicted In 'Yves Rocher Case'", 2017 <https://www.rferl.org/a/aleksei-oleg-navalny-yves-rocher-case-echr-unfairly-convicted/28799784.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

other political activists, A. Navalny is still free (although on a prolonged probation period[10]) and able to continue his work as a head of an *Anti-Corruption Foundation*.

A position of a persistent critic of Putin and the whole Russian political system made A. Navalny well-respected and acknowledged not only within the Russian opposition-inclined public[11], but also in the West, majorly as an anti-corruption crusader in Russia[12,13]. Western community openly supports A. Navalny in his endeavors[14]. However, Navalny's political views and values of his are not properly examined and analyzed on an academic level. Russian and Western media more often than not portray[15,16] A. Navalny as a political activist with a consistent political agenda that is mainly focused on anti-corruption endeavors, and usually Navalny's political views are left unquestioned. His attitudes and positions on various questions and issues were constantly reflected in his personal blog (together with other social media platforms) where he managed to accumulate a huge portion of his supporters and a general popularity[17]. Even though television is one of the most used sources of news information for the Russians, this research focuses only on the Internet media – Navalny's personal blog. Navalny is unable to share his ideas on television due to repressions of the free speech in the Russian traditional media. As *Freedom House* puts it, Russia remains a country with a large array of media outlets, but limited access to critical or independent coverage and diverse political viewpoints[18]. Internet – social media and blogs – is used by 31% of the Russians as a media source, compared to 72% of those who read official news outlets on the Internet (that are more censored compared to the social media and blogs) and 65% who prefer TV as their main source of news information[19]. Media consumption on the Internet has been constantly growing in Russia: there is a 66% growth in Internet media consumption in the period of 2015-

---

[10] TASS, "Court prolongs Navalny's probation period in Yves Rocher case", 2017 <http://tass.com/society/959162> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

[11] rus.DELFI.lv, "Он вам не Димон. Что известно о массовых протестах в Москве и других городах России", 2017 <http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/abroad/on-vam-ne-dimon-chto-izvestno-o-massovyh-protestah-v-moskve-i-drugih-gorodah-rossii.d?id=48668187&page=4> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[12] Miriam Elder, "Trial of corruption crusader Alexei Navalny divides Russia", 2013 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/13/alexei-navalny-trial-russia> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[13] Ryan Chilcote, "Russia's anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny takes on Putin -- and looks to the future", 2017 <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-anti-corruption-crusader-alexei-navalny-takes-on-putin-looks-to-the-future/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[14] Time.com, "The World's 100 Most Influential People: 2012", 2012 <https://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2111976_2112167,00.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.10]

[15] Oliver Carroll, "Russia's Last Opposition Hero", 2017 <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/07/russias-last-opposition-hero/> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

[16] Carl Schreck, "Russia's Erin Brockovich: Taking On Corporate Greed", 2010 <https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1970475,00.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

[17] Masha Egupova, "The Navalny Case: An Offline Power of Online Activism in Russia", 2011 <https://mashavladivostok.wordpress.com/2011/03/19/the-navalny-case-an-offline-power-of-online-activism-in-russia/> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

[18] Freedom House, "Freedom of the Press 2017 Report. Russia", 2018 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/russia> [Accessed on 2018.05.03]

[19] Deloitte, "Media Consumption in Russia. Growth in media consumption during large sport events." Moscow: Deloitte CIS Research Centre, 2017.

2017[20]. This correlates with an actively growing number of Internet users in Russia: the number has grown from 70 million Internet users in 2011 to more than 100 million users in 2016[21].

There are some attempts of the media, both Russian and global, to reveal Alexei Navalny's values that were present in his discourse in the very beginning of his political career[22,23]. Most of them mention his inclination towards nationalism during his first political steps because of his involvement with the annual nationalistic *Russian March* where xenophobic rhetoric and slogans are a usual practice[24]. As Navalny tries to disassociate himself from marginal nationalists and labels himself a "normal nationalist"[25], consistency of his ideas of nationalism becomes questionable. It is important and valuable to examine how A. Navalny frames "normal nationalism" as he is becoming more and more visible Russian politician and, theoretically, could be in power in the future, especially taking into consideration his rather successful Moscow mayoral election campaign where he received 27.24% of votes in his favor, where his main rival was a systemic candidate Sergey Sobyanin who won by getting 51.37% of votes. Also, Navalny is largely supported, among others, by youth[26] who, so far, have no right to vote due to their age. Such a young mass of supporters could potentially be used in the future if Navalny manages to maintain their support until they become eligible to vote. In this way, it is important to be acquainted with Navalny's views and values, even the past and the current – possibly changed – ones.

This research focuses on the period of 2013-2017, and builds up on an academic research of Natalia Moen-Larsen who analyzed the personal blog of Alexei Navalny with a task to reveal his stance on nationalism during the timeframe of 2006-2012[27]. There, a content analysis of all of his blog entries from 2006 until 2012 was conducted. Posts that feature discourse on nationalism are sampled for an in-depth analysis to find out a) to what extent Alexei Navalny has used his blog on LiveJournal to articulate ideas of nationalism, b) how he constructs it, c) how he articulates the Russian identity, and d) how he constructs the image of "others". In this research, the

[20] Deloitte, "Media Consumption in Russia. Growth in media consumption during large sport events." Moscow: Deloitte CIS Research Centre, 2017.

[21] Internet Live Stats, "Russia Internet Users" <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/russia/> [Accessed on 2017.12.10]

[22] Kevin Rothrock, "How Alexey Navalny Abandoned Russian Nationalism", 2017 <https://globalvoices.org/2017/04/25/how-alexey-navalny-abandoned-russian-nationalism/> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

[23] Sean Guillory, "Russian Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny: Uniting Nationalists and the Urban, Educated Middle Class", 2011 <http://exiledonline.com/russian-opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-uniting-nationalists-and-the-urban-educated-middle-class/> [Accessed on 2017.12.06]

[24] Kathrin Hille, "Russia: Nationalism on the march", 2013 <https://www.ft.com/content/63b7857e-42dc-11e3-8350-00144feabdc0> [Accessed on 2017.12.06]

[25] Alexei Navalny, "Про Тесака", 2007 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/142157.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.06]

[26] Roman Goncharenko, "Alexei Navalny: The opposition leader captivating Russia's youth", 2018 <http://www.dw.com/en/alexei-navalny-the-opposition-leader-captivating-russias-youth/a-42359515> [Accessed on 2018.04.21]

[27] Natalia Moen-Larsen, "Normal' nationalism": Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and "the Other." *East European Politics*, 30(4), 2014, 548-567.

author builds up on the aforementioned research and analyzes how Navalny frames 'normal nationalism' during the 2013-2017 timeframe. In this way, building up on this research makes it possible to reveal a more complete picture of Navalny's ideas of nationalism and to make more justified generalizations and conclusions because of the broad timeframe – beginning from 2006 and ending in 2017 –, taking into account both researches. Thus, the author aims to answer the question of how significant framing of "normal nationalism" in A. Navalny's personal *LiveJournal* blog is during the research timeframe of 2013-2017.

Problem of the research:

Although Alexei Navalny is one of the most known oppositionist of the Kremlin, his ideas of nationalism and their consistency have been scarcely questioned and analyzed.

Question of the research:

How significant is framing of nationalism in A. Navalny's personal blog during the timeframe of 2013-2017?

Tasks:

1. Conduct a content analysis of Alexei Navalny's *LiveJournal* personal blog in the period of 2013 to 2017;
2. Sample blog entries that feature framing of ideas of nationalism;
3. Conduct a frame analysis in order to examine how A. Navalny frames ideas of nationalism and what nationalism he constructs;
4. Analyze whether A. Navalny's framing of 'normal nationalism' differs throughout the whole timeframe of 2006-2017 and, if so, reveal the differences.

Research methodology:

Case study and frame analysis method. The research is based on the framing theory.

1. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
AND APPLICATION OF FRAMING IN MEDIA DISCOURSES

1.1 Concept of political communication

Political communication is an interactive process concerning the distribution of information among politicians, the news media and the public. The process operates down-wards from governing institutions towards citizens, horizontally in linkages among political actors, and also upwards from public opinion towards certain authorities[28].

| Exogenous Conditions | | Message Source | → | Contents of Media Messages | → | Effects |

Figure 1. *Structure of political communication*[29]

Figure 1 shows how under certain social, economic and political conditions political actors (such as parties, groups, social movements, new candidates etc.) distribute messages whether by direct channels, newspapers, radio or, as it is becoming more and more popular today, via the Internet. These messages may have effect on knowledge, attitudes or behavior. Usually some feedback of these messages exists, as public's or, in some cases, other political actor's reaction to the message.

Obviously, in order to reveal a specific communication strategy of a certain political artist, all these aspects can be analyzed, which means that to get a full picture of an actor's political communication strategy it is necessary not only to perform content analysis (or any type of other analysis) of the message itself, but also analyze what means of communication the actor uses, what

---

[28] Pippa Norris, *Political Communications. For Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Harvard: Harvard University, 2004, 1.
[29] The same.

effect does the communication have, what feedback is given and what is the potential auditorium of the political actor.

There are researchers who state that political communication includes not only verbal or text messages: for example, Brian McNair defines political communication simply as *purposeful communication about politics*.

This incorporates:

1. All forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives.

2. Communication addressed *to* these actors by non-politicians such as voters and newspaper columnists.

3. Communication *about* these actors and their activities, as contained in news reports, editorials, and other forms of media discussion of politics[30].

In short, *all* political discourse is included in this definition, meaning all elements of communication which might be said to constitute a political 'image' or identity[31]. Therefore, all these types of communication may be analyzed in order to reveal specific communication strategies of a particular political actor.

Despite earlier importance of newspapers, radio and television for political communication, nowadays the Internet seems to offer more versatile ways of communicating for political actors, whether it is communication to potential supporters or even debate-like communication between political actors. Internet offers not only blogging, writing articles that, with correct media management strategies, can reach a lot of potential supporters for free, but also video hosting and even blogging, that allows political actors to share their opinions or react to various events. Also, blogging platforms allow actors to share their opinions and demonstrate support for certain people or events by simply reposting something with or without commenting[32].

---

[30] Brian McNair, *An Introduction to Political Communication.* New York: Routlege, 2011, 4.
[31] The same, 5.
[32] Stefan Stieglitz, Linh Dang-Xuan, *Political Communication and Influence through Microblogging – An Empirical Analysis of Sentiment in Twitter Messages and Retweet Behavior*. 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012, 1.

1.2 Internet blogs as a media platform

Internet blogs are usually described as frequently modified web pages that feature dated entries where content (text, pictures, video/sound material and alike) is published regularly and, usually, is displayed in reverse chronological order[33]. Moreover, blogs can be interpreted as a mix of a diary, a web site, and an online community[34]. The original purpose of blogging has been the creation, distribution and sharing of information. Usually, blogs are simply personal journals or diaries that are voluntarily published online, and can be frequently updated with links to other bloggers and to relevant information on the Internet. Interconnection between bloggers and the whole array of related texts is known as *the blogosphere*. By October 2011, there were an estimated 173 million blogs online[35], although the exact number of blogs is impossible to state because of the especially dynamic and decentralized nature of the *blogosphere*.

John Barger in 1997 originally used a term – Weblog – to name logging the web[36]. Weblog, as a term, derives from an early description of something in between a log and diary that is published on the Internet. A weblog is defined as a "frequently updated personal journal on a website, intended for public viewing" by the *Dictionary of Media Studies*[37]. The contracted term, *blog*, comes from the name *Web* (or Internet) *Log*, it was first pronounced by Peter Merholz in 1999[38]. Blogging began its incarnation in the late 1990s as a means for individuals to publish simple, online personal diaries where bloggers incorporate events and thoughts about the world outside the web into their blogs[39]. Authors of blog articles have ever since been simply defined as bloggers.

Blogs enable, in their writers, a freedom of expression which may not be as readily available in other media[40]. In a sense of a discourse, use of the new media creates opportunities for alternate narratives that challenge the mass media to create new forms of expression. In this way, voters are able to make decisions not only based on information derived from traditional information sources, but they can find alternative sources, such as blogs that are able to provide a platform for alternative information, i.e. political actualities that are not discussed in countries

---

[33] Denise Sevick Bortree, "Presentation of Self on the Web: an ethnographic study of teenage girls' weblogs." *Communication & Information*, 5(1), 2005, 25-39.

[34] Theresa R. Embrey, "You Blog, We Blog: A Guide to How Teacher-Librarians Can Use Weblogs to Build Communication and Research Skills." *Teacher Librarian*, 30(2), 2002, 7-9.

[35] Mediakix.com, "How many blogs are there in the world?", 2017 < http://mediakix.com/2017/09/how-many-blogs-are-there-in-the-world/> [Accessed on 2017.11.19]

[36] Jenna Wortham, "After 10 Years of Blogs, the Future's Brighter Than Ever", 2007 <https://www.wired.com/2007/12/after-10-years-of-blogs-the-futures-brighter-than-ever/> [Accessed on 2017.11.26]

[37] Bloomsbury Publishing, *Dictionary of Media Studies*. London: A & C Black Publishers Ltd, 2006, P. 255

[38] The Economist, "It's the links, stupid", 2006 <http://www.economist.com/node/6794172> [Accessed on 2017.11.26]

[39] Jeremy B. Williams, Joanne Jacobs, "Exploring the use of blogs as learning spaces in the higher education sector." *Australasian Journal of Educational Technology*, 20(2), 2004, 232-247.

[40] Dana Hull, "Blogging between the lines." *American Journalism Review*, 28(6), 2006, 62-67.

where spread of information is strictly controlled. As Andrew Rosenbloom puts it, bloggers, in such environments, create a some kind of underground culture of information sharing: *Even as their comments arouse controversy and skepticism, they've* [bloggers] *added depth to the way the related issues are discussed and reported, especially by the traditional mass-market media*[41]. Naturally, blogs of political activists or organizations have become a source for political scientists[42,43]. One of the reasons is that blogs, which are usually available in a print format, offer codified data that could rather easily be prepared for various political analyses. Because most bloggers freely express their opinions on any topic, and often criticize the media or political actions, debunk *fake news* on the media, report on corruption or other malpractices conducted by politicians, bloggers are often named as watchdogs of the society[44,45].

Blog data is by nature primary data which is not subject to the influence or interference of the researcher, assuming that the blogger is not aware of the research when writing. Writing of bloggers, which have an interpretive and subjective style, is opinionated and often unbiased, as they are free to express their own views, expecting no tangible consequences. In addition, as the need for introspection is one of the motivator to blog, personal accounts in blogs are typically candid and genuine, providing valuable insight into the issues present on individuals' minds. Although a blogger can be a member of a news organization or other media, bloggers are usually independent writers[46]. Nevertheless, blogs inescapably are part of the media in general.

---

[41] Andrew Rosenbloom, "The Blogosphere." *Communications of the ACM*, 47(12), 2004, 30-33.
[42] Jane B. Singer, "The political j-blogger. 'Normalizing' a new media form to fit old norms and practices." *Journalism*, 6(2), 2005, 173-198.
[43] Axel Bruns, "Methodologies for mapping the political blogosphere: An exploration using the IssueCrawler research tool." *First Monday*, 2007, 12(5).
[44] Antoinette Pole, *Blogging the Political – Politics and Participation in a Networked Society*. New York: Routledge, 2010, P. 118.
[45] Richard Davis, *Typing Politics – The Role of Blogs in American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, P. 119.
[46] David Domingo, Ari Heinonen, "Weblogs and Journalism. A Typology to Explore the Blurring Boundaries." *Nordicom Review*, 29(1), 2008, 3-15.

1.3 Framing theory and political communication in media

Communication theorists and scholars, sociologists were interested in mass media's ability to influence people's behavior, to tell people what to think about and how to think about various objects and ideas[47]. Used broadly in TV industry (mainly news), framing is seen in the same way the print media repeat or use culturally familiar symbols in a news discourse[48]. Scientists agree that the presentation of events in news is very important to how they are perceived by the general public. C. De Vreese notes that "a frame is an emphasis in salience of different aspects of a topic. While agenda-setting theory deals with the salience of issues, framing is concerned with the presentation of issues. <...> Frames are parts of political arguments, journalistic norms, and social movements' discourse. They are alternative ways of defining issues, endogenous to the political and social world"[49]. The concept of framing derives from both sociology and psychology and is said to originate from the sociologist Ervin Goffman who is often seen as the one who initially introduced the framing approach to media studies. He discusses framing as an interpretive framework that helps individuals to process information[50]. For Goffman, "frames are not consciously manufactured but are unconsciously adopted in the course of communicative processes"[51]. Framing is already embodied within all social interaction and movements, so it is beyond the question of why frames exist and how they are constructed.

In 1990, the communication scholar James Tankard approached the concept of frame as "a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration"[52]. In order to explain the term, Tankard describes the frame concept as a picture frame of an imaginary building: according to him, the picture frame stands for the emphasizing of certain material and specifically drawing attention of the viewer to it. Frames that are present in the media studies serve the same function. The shape and color of a frame suggests a tone for viewing the isolated material, which can be a picture, a photo, or any other piece. The same is happening with the framing of messages, where frames suggest a certain way of interpretation. The frame of a house is its organizing and supporting structure, while frames in the field of communication serve as an organizing idea of a message[53].

---

[47] Om Gupta, *Encyclopaedia Of Journalism and Mass Communication* (5 vols.). Isha Books, 2006, 41.

[48] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication*, 1993, 43(4), 51-58.

[49] Claes H. de Vreese, *News framing: Theory and typology*. Information Design Journal + Document Design. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing company, 13(1), 2005, 23.

[50] Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1974, 23-25.

[51] The same, 32.

[52] James W. Tankard, et al, "Media Frames – Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement." Presentation at an Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication," Boston, 1991.

[53] Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy Jr., August E. Grant, *Framing Public Life. Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*. London: Routledge, 2001, P. 98.

Robert Entman's work is one of the most well-known studies of framing theory. His work was taken as a starting as his vision of framing has been used in media analysis and communication researches, thus it is the most relevant to the current thesis. Since the purpose of this research is to analyze Navalny's blog, a media platform, framing will be defined according to R. Entman. According to him, "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described."[54]

In Entman's definition, the word salience means making a piece of information more noticeable, more meaningful or memorable to audiences. Salience is "achieved by highlighting bits of information through placement, repetition, and associating them with culturally familiar symbols"[55]. An increase in salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory. Frames, therefore, work to enable some ideas to stand out in texts, others less so, or others even entirely invisible[56].

The way information is put together within a specific structure empowers framing and determines how news readers are to perceive the given information. In a journal article, R. Entman outlined that "analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location-such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel-to that consciousness"[57].

For Entman, frames are "manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments"[58]. In addition to the functions frames possess, Entman also identified that frames have at least four locations in the communication process:

- The communicators (in this case, Navalny) who "make conscious or unconscious framing judgments";
- The text (in this case, blog posts) which may or may not contain a certain frame;
- The receiver (followers of the blog) who reads the blog and whose conclusions after reading or being exposed to the story may or may not reflect the story's frames;

---

[54] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication*, 1993, 43(4), 52.
[55] The same, 53.
[56] Robert M. Entman, "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents." *Journal of Communication*, 1991, 41(4), 6-27.
[57] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication*, 1993, 43(4), 52.
[58] The same, 55.

- The culture in which both the communicator and the receiver live and exchange meaning[59].

Consequently, Entman's theory is adopted as the fundamental framework of this thesis. This research will focus its attention on the nationalism-related frames that Alexei Navalny consciously or unconsciously uses in his blog post, in other words, the interest is only in one part of the communication process which consists of the message presented in a communications channel.

Dietram Scheufele synthesized practically all field of framing research and generalized it by identifying four processes of framing:

- Frame building, which focuses on the dynamics of how speakers, such as media outlets, choose specific frames in communication;
- Frame setting, which affects the salience and concerns the influence of frames in communication or frames in thought. It gives the frame greater importance by stressing values, facts and various considerations;
- Individual level effects of framing, which refers to the impact of frames in thought on subsequent behaviors or attitudes;
- Journalists/producers as audiences, which looks at how actions of citizens affect the initial frame-building process[60].

While analyzing media frames as dependent variables, theorists claim that at least five factors can influence how content creators could frame a certain issue – social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines and ideological or political orientations of journalists[61].

The aim of this research will be to identify those frames chosen by Alexei Navalny when reflecting on some events or just sharing his views on specific topics that cover nationalism, thus the focus of the study will be the *frame building* process.

[59] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication*, 1993, 43(4), 52-53.
[60] Dietram A. Scheufele, "Framing As a Theory of Media Effects." *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), 1999, 103-122.
[61] The same, 109.

1.3.1 Frame typology

Many sociology and political scholars have offered different classification categories in order to understand frames and frame types. Identifying the types of frames helps researcher to make better decisions based on theoretical evidence when conducting a framing analysis so the results obtained are clear, consistent and replicable. Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon distinguish between episodic and thematic frames. The episodic frames refer to the coverage of an event or issue, which is reported as specific or particular, whereas the thematic coverage places the event in somewhat general context[62]. Stephen D. Reese described that certain frames are pertinent only to specific topics or events. Such frames may be labeled as issue-specific frames, for example, as nationalism is related to topics where identities, nationalities, different peoples are concerned[63].

Some specific frames that are often used, especially in news coverage, have been identified by scientists:

- *Responsibility frame.* This frame presents an issue or a problem and attributes responsibility for its causes or resolution to a certain individual or social group.

- *Human interest frame.* In this case, an individual story or some kind of emotional angle is included in presenting certain event, issue, or problem. This way news becomes more personalized, dramatic, and more emotional.

- *Conflict frame.* In case of this framing, a conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions is accented.

- *Morality frame.* In case of morality framing an event, covered in media, is placed in a context (in negative framing case – against) moral injunction or religious principles present in the society.

- *Economic consequence frame.* This frame represents an event, a problem or an issue by accenting existing or possible economic consequences it will have for individual, a social group, an institution, a region or a state[64].

Such classification helps to identify frames that are being used in mass media and, consequently, can be used in blogs. Identification of these particular frames makes blog content analysis more valid and trustworthy, since from abstract search of any frames a researcher looks for specific keywords that can reflect the use of these frames in certain coverage. Using these basic

---

[62] Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon, "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion. A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing." *Communication Research*, 20(3), 1993, 365-383.

[63] Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy Jr., August E. Grant, *Framing Public Life. Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*. London: Routledge, 2001, P. 284.

[64] Holli Semetko, Patti M. Valkenburg, "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News." *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 2000, 95-96.

frames, it is possible to frame certain events, individuals or social groups in such a way that it would strongly affect public's opinion about them in either negative or a positive way.

2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

2.1 Content analysis of political communication

According to Vincent J. Duriau et al., content analysis is a class of research methods at the intersection of the qualitative and quantitative traditions. It is promising for rigorous exploration of many important but difficult-to-study issues of interest to organizational researchers in areas as diverse as business policy and strategy, managerial and organizational cognition, organizational behavior, human resources, social-issues management, technology and innovation management, international management, and organizational theory[65].

William Benoit suggests a different definition: according to him, content analysis is the measurement of dimensions of the content of a message or message in a context. Content analysis can be employed to describe a group of related messages, draw inferences about the sources that produced those messages, or draw inferences about the reception of those messages by their audience. Content analysis was developed explicitly as a research tool for investigating the nature of communication generally, as well as mass communication[66].

Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption[67].

In qualitative content analysis, data is categorized using categories that are generated, at least in part, inductively (i.e., derived from the data), and in most cases applied to the data through close reading. There is a disagreement in the literature on the precise definition of qualitative content analysis; these differences are about how the data is analyzed once it has been sorted into categories. For some authors, qualitative content analysis always entails counting words or categories (or analyzing them statistically if there is sufficient sample size) to detect and highlight patterns in the data, then analyzing those patterns to understand what their meaning is. Qualitative content analysis is defined more broadly by some researchers in order to also include techniques in

---

[65] Vincent J. Duriau, Rhonda K. Reger, Michael D. Pfarrer, "A Content Analysis of the Content Analysis Literature in Organization Studies: Research Themes, Data Sources, and Methodological Refinements." *Organizational Research Methods*, 10(1), 2007, 5-34.

[66] William L. Benoit, "Content Analysis in Political Communication." Book: E. Page Bucy, R. Lance Holbert (ed.), *The sourcebook for political communication research: methods, measures, and analytical techniques*. London: Routledge, 2011, 268-279.

[67] Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, Frederick G. Fico, *Analyzing media messages: Using quantitative content analysis in research*. 2nd edition. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005, 25.

which the data are analyzed solely qualitatively, without the use of counting or statistical techniques[68].

Benoit offers a multidimensional perspective on the role of content analysis of communication:


Figure 2. *Benoit's multidimensional model of content analysis of communication*[69]

Benoit's content analysis model suggests that in order to analyze content properly, such aspects must be considered as source of the message, the media used to spread it, the audience targeted by the message, and the context of the message.

Subject of content analysis in political communication involves researching news articles, magazines, advertisements, speeches, press releases, social media, blog posts and much more. The volume of available text has expanded significantly in the digital age: it happened partly due to the rapid move to store and distribute documents in electronic text databases. The easiest way to acquire text in this form is from online databases. Text data stored on Web sites can also be extracted with automated scraping methods that make acquiring data easier and faster[70].

Qualitative content analysis requires a special attention to trustworthiness of research in order to achieve unbiased process and reliable results. Scientists note that qualitative document analysis remains one of the most common, yet methodologically misunderstood components of political science research. While analysts are accustomed to incorporating manifestos, speeches, media reports, and other documents as evidence in their studies, few approach the task with the

---

[68] Jane Forman, Laura Damschroder, "Qualitative content analysis." *Advances in Bioethics*, 11(1), 2008, 40.

[69] William L. Benoit, "Content Analysis in Political Communication." Book: E. Page Bucy, R. Lance Holbert (ed.), *The sourcebook for political communication research: methods, measures, and analytical techniques*. London: Routledge, 2011, 270.

[70] Provalis Research, "The power of words: content analysis for political science", 2016 <https://provalisresearch.com/blog/content-analysis-for-political-science/> [Accessed on 2017.06.20]

same level of understanding and sophistication as when applying other, more quantitative methods[71].

Qualitative analysis of political documents requires as much rigor as any other methodology, and attention to trustworthiness must be paid throughout the research process.

As scientists point out, "qualitative researchers generally lack this type of commonly agreed to and 'objective' tool. Rather, they must rely on their ability to present a clear description, offer a convincing analysis, and make a strong argument for their interpretation to establish the value of their conclusions"[72].

Thus, it can be concluded that qualitative analysis of certain communication expressed as written or transcribed text is as trustworthy as results presented are well supported by valid arguments. It can also be noted that if analysis involves evaluation of certain text "emotion" expressed by certain words that have emotional "weight" and express some kind of feeling it would be useful to note intonation (e.g., <harshly>) where it is clear and obvious that an actor is using intonation to emphasize a certain phrase or express certain emotion.

In regards to formulating proper qualitative content analysis methodology, four aspects of this process must be noted:

- *Authenticity*. Authentic research will offer accurate reading and analysis of documents. Authenticity of qualitative research is not based against objective standard, so does deeply rely on ability of an analyst to subjectively but authentically analyze the document(s);

- *Portability*. Analyst insights must extend beyond specific case or study. External validity is ensured if the analysis method and strategy used can be transferred to another research with a different topic, and still be considered valid.

- *Precision*. An analyst must ask himself, would he reach same general conclusions, if he read the documents once again under similar conditions? An affirmative answer would confirm that analysis was precise.

- *Impartiality*. Research validity is premised on the capacity of an analyst to produce relatively unprejudiced, unbiased knowledge about topic of an analysis. Results can

---

[71] Jared J. Wesley, "The Qualitative Analysis of Political Documents." Book: Bertie Kaal, Isa Maks and Annemarie van Elfrinkhof (ed.), *From Text to Political Positions: Text analysis across disciplines*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014, 135-160.

[72] Jarol B. Manheim, Richard C. Rich, *Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science*. 5th edition. Toronto: Longman, 2002, 317.

be considered impartial and valid, if findings can be traced directly to data contained in documents, and if the preponderance of evidence corroborates those findings[73].

To conclude, in order to perform a valid and reliable qualitative content analysis, a researcher must read the materials as accurately as possible, not to base readings on any standard in order not to affect authenticity of conclusions, the methodology must be clearly defined and portable to other research topics, texts and other materials should be read thoroughly and preferably, two or three times under similar conditions in order to ensure that the evaluation is not affected by some momentarily circumstances, and a researcher must stay impartial to the topic at hand. The findings must be supported by citation, arguments, and it must be possible to trace the findings directly to data that is being analyzed. Most of the data analyzed must support the findings that researcher comes up with, rather than just separate isolated individual parts of material.

In the context of this research, the aim of the content analysis is to "quantify salient and manifest features of a large number of texts, and the statistics are used to make broader inferences about the processes and politics of representation"[74], quantitative content analysis is the first stage of textual analysis as it sketches out a general picture of the main features of selected blog posts. The method is to count what is in the coverage rather than to analyze the implicit meaning of the content. It does not explore the internal meanings and relationships between the texts, but only provides general answers to certain research questions and functions as a filter to justify the sample and select data for further in depth analysis, such as frame analysis.

---

[73] Jared J. Wesley, "The Qualitative Analysis of Political Documents." Book: Bertie Kaal, Isa Maks and Annemarie van Elfrinkhof (ed.), *From Text to Political Positions: Text analysis across disciplines*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014, 149.

[74] David Deacon et al., *Researching Communications. A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis*. 2nd edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007, P. 8.

2.2 Frame analysis

The frames used in a message can be detected and studied through framing analysis. A frame, according to Myra Ferree and David Merrill, is "a cognitive ordering that relates events to one another and a way of talking and thinking about things that link idea elements into packages"[75].

In mass communication research, framing analysis can be located somewhere in between discourse analysis and content analysis, usually combining qualitative and quantitative methods[76]. Hence, the frame analysis should be used in conjunction with other methods.

There are two ways to approach framing analysis: a) framing implementation, which is when authors attach frames to their messages and texts to purposefully guide interpretation of the reader; b) media researchers can also take the approach on framing from the opposite side: in this way, they try to deconstruct the frame(s) that has been attached to the message by the author. After highlighting certain frames, a researcher is able to make conclusions on what message the author wanted to share, how he wanted to transmit it and what were the author's intentions. This research focuses on the latter way to approach the frames that are featured in Navalny's blog.

In general, framing analysis studies can be divided in two distinguishable categories: media studies in which media content is the subject of inquiry, and audience or "interpretative" studies in which a message recipient's schema or framework for understanding messages is the subject of inquiry. Media framing studies examine manifest content resulting from the construction of mediated messages[77]. This thesis is a media content framing study. Consequently, this study focuses on the category of media content framing studies rather than audience framing studies and will be limited to analyze frames featuring ideas of nationalism found within Navalny's blog posts.

Literature also identifies inductive and deductive analysis as two approaches used to examine media content. If a researcher uses an inductive analytic approach to study media content, the researcher approaches the media content without categories or with loosely prescribed categories for identifying content. The goal of inductive analysis is to uncover the whole array of all possible frames which are present in mediated messages. The inductive approach starts with an open view and aims to reveal the range of possible frames that emerge from analyzing the sample. Such an analysis allows researchers to account for manifest message content that might not be

---

[75] Myra Marx Ferree, David A. Merrill, "Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: Thinking about Social Movements in Gendered Frames." *Contemporary Sociology*, 29(3), 2000, 454-462.

[76] Kimberly A. Neuendorf, *The content analysis guidebook*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2002, 52-53.

[77] Claes H. De Vreese, Jochen Peter, Holli A. Semetko, "Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News." Political Communication, 18(2), 2001, 107-122.

examined in previous research. In contrast, the deductive approach is based on a pre-defined set of frames[78].

This study uses both deductive and, in part, inductive analytic approaches. A frame of nationalism was first pre-defined in the mass media, academic articles and opinions of other political and social actors. Then, the author conducts an inductive qualitative content analysis of Navalny's blog posts in the period of 2013-2017 to identify frames that feature ideas of nationalism and to sample such entries by distinguishing them from the array of other messages that consist of frames that are not relevant to the current thesis for an in-depth frame analysis.

2.2.1 Definition of nationalism

As this research builds up on a N. Moen-Larsen's research on the same topic and issue, theoretical framework of nationalism is also the same. There, the author notes that studies of nationalism phenomenon in the Russian Federation distinguish between ethno-nationalism and Eurasianism[79]. The author states that "the nationalism currently dominant in Russia is almost exclusively ethnic".

The other distinction of nationalism mentioned in the article is the one related to patriotism, which, in turn, is tightly connected to the idea of the greatness of the Russian people. Its main idea is that the Russians are great because of their (Soviet's) sacrifice in the World War II and achieved victory over the Nazis. Thus, it is considered to be created under Stalin's reign and is now treated as a legacy of the Soviet past[80].

Nationalism in Russia has also been researched from a perspective of relation to fascism and right-wing politics. It mainly equals nationalism to fascism or Nazism[81].

The last one approach of nationalism mentioned in the article is the one that analyzes nationalism's relation to xenophobia. There, it is stated that the society in Russia supports nationalism that expresses discontent with immigrants, both legal and not[82].

Natalia Moen-Larsen states in her research that Navalny, during the timeframe of 2006-2012, *constructs nationalism as a combination of patriotism, ethno-nationalism, migrant-phobia, and anti-fascistic discourse*. Thus, this research is also analyzing what kind of nationalism and how Navalny frames it during the timeframe of 2013-2017 and verifies whether and, if so, how it differs from the initial timeframe.

---

[78] Holli Semetko, Patti M. Valkenburg, "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News." *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 2000, 94.

[79] Natalia Moen-Larsen, "Normal' nationalism": Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and "the Other." East European Politics, 30(4), 2014, 550.

[80] Natalia Moen-Larsen, "Normal' nationalism": Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and "the Other." East European Politics, 30(4), 2014, 551.

[81] The same.

[82] The same.

3. THE CASE OF ALEXEI NAVALNY

3.1 Overview of A. Navalny's phenomenon

Alexei Navalny is a political activist. He is generally considered the strongest leader within Russia's highly fractured anti-Kremlin opposition, thus attracting the greatest Russian and foreign media interest (*Time* magazine named him one of the world's 100 most influential people in 2012[83]).

Navalny was born on June 4, 1976 in Butyn, a military town 40 miles southwest of Moscow, spending his childhood summers in Ukraine. Navalny fully moved to Moscow in 1993 to study at the People's Friendship University in the Faculty of Law. He received his degree five years later and moved on to study economics – securities and stock exchanges – at the Russian Federation's Financial University from 1999 to 2000. In 2010, Navalny studied abroad as he won a six-month scholarship to study at Yale University's World Fellows Program.

When Vladimir Putin officially became president in 2000, Navalny took his course towards politics. Navalny began his political journey as a liberal: after returning to Russia from the US, he joined *Yabloko*, a Russian liberal and generally pro-Western political party, in 2000 when he was 24 years old. He was able to quickly make the way to upper echelons of the party by effectively managing Moscow's electoral campaign in the nationwide parliamentary election in 2003, becoming a member of the *Yabloko's* federal council[84].

Navalny took a more nationalist turn after *Yabloko*'s failures in the legislative elections of 2003 and 2007. In 2007, he was expelled from the party because of Navalny's nationalistic past and, generally, for nationalism[85]. Such accusations could have been made because Navalny was one of the establishers of the "Russian National Liberation Movement" (known by its Russian acronym – "NAROD" – a word which translates to "the people"), which stood for democratic nationalism and developed anti-immigration, anti-Muslim and pro-ethnic Russian rhetoric and also collaborated with the banned Movement Against Illegal Immigration, and Great Russia. Navalny has also attended far-right *Russian Marches* since they began in 2006, at the time the only sizeable annual anti-Putin parades where slogans such as "Russia for the Russians" and "Stop Feeding the Caucasus" were a norm. Moreover, Navalny has experience of organizing the march[86]. However,

---

[83] Time.com, "The World's 100 Most Influential People: 2012", 2012 <https://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2111976_2112167,00.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

[84] Grigorii Golosov, "Navalny steps into the ring", 2013 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/grigorii-golosov/navalny-steps-into-ring> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

[85] BBC.com, "Яблоко" выдвигает Явлинского и отвергает Навального" <https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2011/12/111218_yabloko_yavlinsky_presidency > [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

[86] Alexander Bratersky, "Russian March Resists Navalny", 2011 <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-march-resists-navalny-10629> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

Navalny was sure that his demand of the resignation of *Yabloko*'s leader – Grigory Yavlinsky – was the true reason why he was expelled from the party[87].

3.1.1 Blogging and anti-corruption crusade

After cutting ties with *Yabloko*, Navalny oriented towards his anti-corruption crusade. His personal blog (*navalny.livejournal.com*), created in 2006 on a *LiveJournal* blogging platform, quickly became one of his main instruments for sharing government corruption cases. The platform accumulated a huge audience increase, thus letting the blog become one of the most followed political blog on the Russian-language Internet: in September 2013, the blog was rated as the most visited, influential and active on the platform[88]. In Russia, where media is highly censored by the government, Internet information-sharing platforms such as *LiveJournal* help Internet users to bypass media censorship by, for example, following blogs of oppositional politicians or political activists. In 2014, Navalny's blog, among other opposition Internet sources, was blocked on a governmental level[89].

A kick-start of Navalny's popularity happened in November, 2010, when Navalny published[90] *Transneft's* confidential financial documents on his blog. The documents revealed that during the construction of the Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, almost 4 billion US dollars were stolen by state-controlled *Transneft* and its key managing personnel[91].

In December 2010, Navalny launched a "RosPil" project which focused on monitoring corrupt practices in the government procurement processes (*pilá* in Russian, or *sawdust* in English, can be used in Russian slang to name corrupt practices, especially in connection with the state budget) and also let people report on suspicious purchases on the project's website. Navalny was motivated to do such activities because he managed to become a minority shareholder in state-controlled enterprises, such as *Sberbank, Rosneft, Gazprom*, *VTB Bank*, *Surgutneftegaz,* and the mentioned *Transneft*, thus had access to various financial and administrative documents, which uncovered malpractices of these enterprises[92]. By doing so, he tried to launch a transparency campaign in the largest and key Kremlin-controlled energy enterprises to shed a light on the systematic cases of corruption. This knowledge and experience made Navalny grasp what happens

---

[87] Echo of Moscow, interview with Navalny dated 19th August, 2013 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/razbor_poleta/1137394-echo/> [Accessed on 2017.12.03]

[88] BFM.ru, "В сентябре самым популярным блогером стал Алексей Навальный", 2013 <https://www.bfm.ru/news/231893?doctype=news> [Accessed on 2017.12.03]

[89] Amar Toor, "Russia blocks opposition websites amid heightened tensions in Ukraine", 2014 <https://www.theverge.com/2014/3/14/5507692/russia-blocks-opposition-websites-amid-tensions-in-ukraine> [Accessed on 2017.12.30]

[90] A. Navalny's LiveJournal blog, "Как пилят в Транснефти", 2010 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/526563.html> [Accessed on 2017.11.29]

[91] BBC.com, "Russia checks claims of $4bn oil pipeline scam", 2010 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11779154.16J> [Accessed on 2017.11.29]

[92] Yale World Fellows, "Alexey Navalny", 2010 <https://worldfellows.yale.edu/alexey-navalny> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

to those who cross the way for such activities. On the other hand, such experience helped Navalny to become a well-known anti-corruption activist and blogger, the most commonly used description of his activities and Navalny personally after establishing the *RosPil* project. In 2010, a case against "RosPil" was initiated for "illegal use of state symbols" in the logo of the project where a satirized version of the Russian double-headed eagle state emblem was pictured. The case was never decided.

Navalny consequently continued on his anti-corruption mission. This topic covers a broad range of social and economic issues, such as rigged elections, money laundering by the elites, a power vertical created by Vladimir Putin and alike. Navalny was not as known oppositional activist as after mass protests of 2011, called the *Bolotnaya* events, thanks to which Russia's familiarity with Navalny significantly increased: in 2011, only 6% of Russians knew who A. Navalny was, while in 2012 he was recognized by 35% of the respondents[93]. The wave of massive protests was sparked because of numerous claims by Russian and foreign journalists and political activists that the whole Duma election process of 2011 was flawed and elections were rigged[94]. These protests ended up being one of the biggest in Moscow since the 1990s and the fall of the Soviet Union. Navalny, along with 300 other demonstrators, was captured by the police for not obeying police orders and for organizing, as government named it, unsanctioned protests. Such action of the Russian government was acknowledged as disproportionate by the European Court of Human Rights[95]. After his imprisonment for 15 days, he was able to speak at the protest in Moscow on December 24, 2011. During his speech, which was listened by approximately 60,000-80,000 people, Navalny chanted one of the most identifiable catchphrases of his – "a party of crooks and thieves" – specifically having in mind the *United Russia* party, led by then-president Dmitry Medvedev[96]. During this period, Navalny and his messages were able to spread throughout the Russian-language Internet and the blogosphere. He managed to use the situation to become one of the primary faces of the opposition to the Kremlin.

Navalny also created the *Anti-Corruption Foundation* (Russian acronym *FBK*) in 2011, solely financed by donations from its supporters. The staff includes 30 people, who research and investigate cases of corruption and unlawful enrichment, prepare documents for legal processes for Russia's Investigative Committee, the Department of Justice and the Public Utility Services[97].

---

[93] Levada-Center, "Aleksey Navalny", 2017 <https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/03/20/aleksey-navalny/> [Accessed on 2018.01.17]

[94] Miriam Elder, "Russian police and troops clash with protesters in Moscow", 2011 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/06/russian-police-troops-moscow-protest> [Accessed on 2017.12.26]

[95] European Court of Human Rights, "Disproportionate sanction against Russian opposition activists for participating in spontaneous demonstration." *Juridical Current*, 17(4), 2014, 277-279.

[96] Miriam Elder, "Russian anti-Putin protests draw thousands to Moscow again", 2011 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/24/russia-europe-news> [Accessed on 2017.12.09]

[97] Anti-Corruption Foundation, "About Us" <https://fbk.info/english/about/> [Accessed on 2017.12.09]

In 2012, Navalny attempted to create his own political party – *People's Alliance* – which immediately faced numerous challenges from the government[98]. The other party with a similar name was created and officially approved, while Navalny's *People's Alliance* had been declined before. The name was changed to *Party for Progress* but, despite meeting formal requirements, the official registration as a party never happened because of the declines by the government due to the "mistake in constituent documents"[99].

In 2013, the day after Navalny registered his candidacy in the race for the position of Moscow mayor, Navalny was found guilty of misappropriation of nearly half a million dollars in connection to timber and was sentenced to five years in prison. In this way, he was forced to withdraw his candidacy, but a crowd of approximately 2,500-5,000 people gathered around the Moscow Duma demanding immediate Navalny's release[100]. On July 19, the Kirov court unexpectedly released him with only a travel ban but allowed Alexei to return to Moscow and even continue his mayoral campaign. This fueled speculations by political analysts that the case was politically motivated[101]. With the help of a serious effort demonstrated by Navalny and his team during the campaign, he managed to get nearly a third of the vote (27.24 percent[102]) in the election, the highest result ever for any opposition candidate in more than a decade[103]. Kremlin-leaned candidate, Sergei Sobyanin, managed to get 51.37 percent[104] of the vote, thus eliminating the possibility of the second round and won in the first one. However, Navalny's team insisted that the inauguration should be cancelled because, according to the team's data, the mayor polled around 49 percent, thus the second round should have happened[105]. Despite the fact that Navalny was second, it was a significant and rather successful result which demonstrated that he managed to combine creative use of the Internet and traditional face-to-face interactions with his supporters on the streets of Moscow. According to polling data from the *Levada-Center*, Navalny's countrywide name recognition leaped from thirty-seven percent in the beginning of 2013 to fifty-four percent at the

[98] The Russian Legal Information Agency, "Navalny's party lost registration over confusing name", 2014 <http://www.rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20140122/270513672.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.12]
[99] The Russian Legal Information Agency, "Mistake in constituent documents prevents registration of Navalny party's branches", 2014 <http://www.rapsinews.com/news/20140409/271111291.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]
[100] David M. Herszenhorn, "Leading Putin Critic Is Freed Pending Appeal After Protests", 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/world/europe/judge-frees-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-during-appeal.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]
[101] Michael Weiss, "Rights in Russia." *World Affairs*, 176(4), 2013, 75.
[102] The Central Election Commission of Russia, "Выборы Мэра Москвы", 2013 <http://www.moscow_city.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/moscow_city?action=show&root=1&tvd=27720001368293&vrn=27720001368289&region=77&global=&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=27720001368293&type=222> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]
[103] Vladimir Kara-Murza, "Politics in Russia." *World Affairs*, 176(5), 2014, 51.
[104] The same.
[105] Naharnet.com, "Navalny Files Mass Complaints over Moscow Poll", 2013 <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/97807> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

end of the year[106]. It was clear that such result was unexpected for both the Kremlin and political analysts of Russia, and perhaps even the people who gave their votes to Navalny.

Two months later, Navalny, together with his brother Oleg, were accused of defrauding a number of clients of a private courier company between 2008 and 2011. The court found the brother guilty and sentenced him to three and a half years in prison, while Navalny received a sentence of the same duration, but it was suspended and Navalny was put under a house arrest. On October 17, 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Aleksei Navalny and his brother Oleg were unfairly convicted of financial crimes at trial in the case of 2014[107]. Different approaches to sentences of Navalny and his brother made Navalny accuse the government of holding his brother as a hostage for his political activities. Upon his release, Navalny refused to abide by his house arrest[108].

In December 2016, Navalny announced[109] his intention to run for president in the March 2018 election, but his criminal convictions have stripped him of right to run for the Russian presidency – or any other public office. In February 2017, a Russian court retried Navalny for his 2013 charges and again found him guilty, thus legally barring him from running for president in March 2018[110]. Despite thousands of Russians endorsed Navalny to continue his fight for his right to be a candidate[111], Russia's Supreme Court on January 6, 2018, turned down an appeal by Navalny and his lawyers to overturn the highly controversial ruling, conclusively depriving him to be an official candidate and appear on the ballots[112].

Navalny has released a series of anti-corruption videos since announcing his plans for taking a part in an upcoming presidential election. One of the most popular – "Don't Call Him Dimon" – accuses Russia's Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, of possessing far more wealth than his governmental salary could theoretically allow him to accumulate. The 50-minute video on

---

[106] Levada Center, "Aleksey Navalny", 2017 <https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/03/20/aleksey-navalny/> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

[107] Radio Free Europe, "Human Rights Court Says Navalny Unfairly Convicted In 'Yves Rocher Case'", 2017 <https://www.rferl.org/a/aleksei-oleg-navalny-yves-rocher-case-echr-unfairly-convicted/28799784.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

[108] Karoun Demirjian, "Putin foe Alexei Navalny avoids jail but decries Kremlin for punishing his brother", 2014 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/2014/12/30/8b069390-8fa2-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html?utm_term=.43ef7c458267> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

[109] Roland Oliphant, "Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny announces bid for the Kremlin in 2018 presidential election", 2016 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/13/russian-opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-announces-bid-kremlin/> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

[110] Alec Luhn, "Alexei Navalny: Russian opposition leader found guilty of embezzlement", 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/alexei-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-found-guilty-embezzlement> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

[111] The Guardian, "Thousands of Russians endorse Navalny to challenge Putin in 2018", 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/24/russians-navalny-opposition-putin-2018> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

[112] Laurens Cerulus, "Russia's high court upholds election ban against Alexei Navalny", 2018 < https://www.politico.eu/article/russias-high-court-upholds-election-ban-against-alexei-navalny/> [Accessed on 2018.01.06]

Youtube has been viewed more than 25 million times since it was published in March 2017[113]. Accusations showed in the video fueled public discontent with the state's corruption levels, thus resulting in a wave of protests in June 2017.

[113] Alexei Navalny's *Youtube* channel, "Он вам не Димон", 2017 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

4. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

As is mentioned in the introductory part of the thesis, A. Navalny's connections to nationalists raise questions about consistency of his views and, in part, ideology. This thesis builds up on a study of Natalia Moen-Larsen who analyzed A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism in his *LiveJournal* blog in the period of 2006, when it was created, until 2012. There, the author categorizes blog entries into two categories – the ones that are "relevant", and the ones that belong to the group of "other". Then, she proceeds to analyzing the first – "relevant" – blog posts and finds out that A. Navalny uses the term of "normal nationalism", explains it, cites his general thoughts on nationalism, its role in the Russian Federation, and points out the dichotomy that A. Navalny makes between ethnical Russians and members of their imagined community, and the others who do not belong to the Russian imagined community.

As this study builds up on the aforementioned study, the timeframe of this research begins in 2013 and ends in April, 2017. The main reason why the research ends in the middle of 2017 is because A. Navalny moved his blog from the *LiveJournal* platform to his personal website – Navalny.com – on April 9, 2014, after access to *LiveJournal* blog in Russia was banned[114]. This transition did not stop Navalny from posting similar posts like he had been posting in the *LiveJournal* blog, thus, posts from the website since the moving are also included in the research[115]. However, the focus of Navalny and the *FBK* team switched more to creating video content for the *Youtube* platform. As video content began to dominate over the posts presented in a text format, the research ends in April of 2017, when posts with video content began to show up: if posts with a video content were skipped, it would distort the research because of the inability to analyze frames that are present in the videos.

First of all, an inductive content analysis of all blog entries from 2013 to 2017 (April) was conducted: all blog entries – a total of 2271 posts – were read by the author. Blog posts in *LiveJournal* are sorted by date, thus, blog posts are coded by adding a number of total blog posts per day to the relevant date (e.g. 2013.01.01 – 3, the latter number meaning total blog posts that were written on January 1, 2013). Next to the aforementioned number, relevant citations with "nationalistic" discourse were added. Relevant citations from the blog posts featuring frames of nationalist ideas are present in separated documents which are included within the annex of the thesis. Although author's ideas about nationalistic discourse influence the selection of blog posts for the analysis, a broad concept of nationalism – explained in the 2.2.1 part of the thesis – has been

---

[114] Alexei Navalny, "navalny.com", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/922158.html> [Accessed on 2018.04.10]

[115] Last post of Navalny on *LiveJournal* platform is dated July 9, 2014. Since April 9, 2014, they have been duplicated on both the new website and the blog on the *LiveJournal* platform, until July 9, 2014.

applied in order to include as much variation as possible and to make the selection as accurate as possible.

As the aforementioned research of N. Moen-Larsen also focused on the same topic of Navalny's nationalism and this research builds up on it, the criterion used for determining the entries relevant for further analysis was that the entry explicitly mentioned one or several of the following topics: nationalism, Russianness, the people, any ethnic group, any geographical continent or country, any republic in the Russian Federation, or the issue of migration[116]. Furthermore, the author uses Navalny's description of, how he calls himself, a "Russian nationalist" to look for frames that feature ideas of nationalism within the blog posts: open discussion about problems of the North Caucasus region, of illegal migration, ethnic crimes, and problems of the Russians as the most divided nation of Europe[117].

A number of relevant blog posts − featuring frames of ideas of nationalism based on the mentioned criteria − is 61. Compared to the period of 2006-2012 (see Figure 1), it is evident that Navalny framed ideas of nationalism less frequently: during the first six years of blogging, Navalny wrote 261 blog posts that featured ideas of nationalism[118], while the next five-and-a-half years, analyzed in this research, featured only 61 relevant blog posts. It can be concluded *a priori* that Navalny has not been using his blog for framing of ideas of nationalism, although such discourse appears in the blog.

Figure 1, *Percentage of total blog posts, 2006-2012*

N. Moen-Larsen, 2014

[116] Natalia Moen-Larsen, "Normal' nationalism": Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and "the Other." East European Politics, 30(4), 2014, 553.

[117] Kalle Kniivilä, "Навальный: «Я и есть русский националист»", 2011 <http://www.glasnost.se/2011/navalnyj-ya-i-est-russkij-nacionalist/> [Accessed on 2018.04.23]

[118] Natalia Moen-Larsen, "Normal' nationalism": Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and "the Other." East European Politics, 30(4), 2014, 555.

Figure 2, *Percentage of total blog posts, 2013-2017*

Danijel Korsa, 2018

During the years of 2013-2017, a clear trend can be seen – Navalny shares his ideas of nationalism significantly less frequently than during the previous years (see Figure 2). The current research allows the author to state that framing of nationalism has become almost non-present in the blog of Navalny. Nonetheless, it is still present, thus, worth examining in order to analyze if and how the framing of "normal nationalism" differs from the one present during the first years of writing the blog, when it featured harsh nationalistic and even xenophobic attitude towards the non-Russians. And, ultimately, to be able to conclude whether nationalism is significant in Navalny's discourse on the blog.

Figure 3, *Trend of Nationalism-related content in Navalny's blog*

Danijel Korsa, 2018

Analysis shows that framing of "normal nationalism" in Navalny's discourse within his blog(s) is evidently declining. In the last years of the analysis, Navalny narrows his frame of ideas of nationalism to implementing the visa regime with Central Asia and Transcaucasia countries, and

constructs the Russian identity as European. All of this is present in the program of the presidential campaign[119].

The analysis of the results is structured by breaking down "normal nationalism" into several frames that are discerned by the author from the whole array of textual data derived from the blog[120]. The frames include – a) illegal migration, b) Crimea, c) Russian March, d) Chechnya, e) Russian identity.

4.1 Illegal migration

Issue of illegal migration remains dominant in the timeframe of this research. Navalny advocates implementation of the visa regime with the republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and South Caucasus throughout the whole period of both researches. Such harsh stance was fueled by "too many illegal migrants in Moscow" who live on socially unfair conditions. The biggest obstacle to overcome this is, according to Navalny, the ruling party *United Russia*, as it is interested in granting citizenship for illegal migrants who, in turn, give their votes for the ruling party. This happens because such "Tajiks and Uzbeks are quiet, obedient, and illiterate – a source of cheap labor and votes during elections"[121]. He also adds that the current visa-free regime and millions of "slave-migrants" is one of the political and economic pillars of Putin's regime. However, Navalny states that the Russian Federation needs a law which would automatically grant people of Russian (or of other indigenous peoples of the RF) nationality a Russian citizenship, taking as an example Georgia and Israel[122]. In this case, a question of illiteracy is not brought up.

Navalny formulates and suggests his migration policy which consists of: a) decrease a number of migrants; b) introduction of visa regimes; c) implementation of the strategy of increasing labor productivity; d) granting visa-free entry only to highly qualified employees; e) fighting against the emergence of ethnic ghettos[123].

Furthermore, illegal migrants are framed by Navalny as drug importers. Although he does not present any evidence stating that drugs are imported specifically by illegal migrants from Central Asia, he only invites readers to look into the fact that Russia is a country with the highest heroin use in the world, and states that it ends up in the country "with migrants":

---

[119] Alexei Navalny, "Программа Алексея Навального", 2018 <https://2018.navalny.com/platform/> [Accessed on 2018.05.05]

[120] Relevant citations are available in the annex and links to full texts are present together with the citations.

[121] Alexei Navalny, "где страна для Микрюкова?", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/766371.html> [Accessed on 2018.04.30]

[122] The same.

[123] Alexei Navalny, "что произошло в Бирюлёво", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/868200.html> [Accessed on 2018.04.30]

Ага, в этом месте можно возмутиться: ну не все же мигранты везут героин. Не все, тем не менее, давайте взглянем в лицо фактам: Россия находится на первом месте в мире по потреблению героина и попадает он сюда именно с мигрантами (October 14, 2013[124]).

Such stance completely omits the possibility that drugs are imported into Russia not with the help of migrants – Navalny states that migrants explicitly are to blame for it, thus, framing of migrants is biased and negative.

In the beginning of 2014, Navalny began to compare his vision of needed migration policies to the ones that are present in Europe in order to "live like in Europe", framing Europe as Russia's "significant other" and an example to follow:

Хотим жить как в Европе? Давайте принимать цивилизованные европейские шаги по ограничению миграции. Визы - не панацея, но это базовый и фундаментальный шаг. Без этого невозможно сделать ничего (February 10, 2014[125]).

Illegal migrants from Central Asia and Transcaucasia are portrayed as Muslim males from rural areas, uneducated, and Navalny frames them as potential terrorists. It does not differ from the frame of illegal migrants in N. Moen Larsen's research:

Иммигранты в Россию на 90% — молодые мусульмане-мужчины из сельской местности, то есть та самая среда, из которой вербуются террористы. Источники миграции: Узбекистан и Таджикистан — страны, скажем прямо, границы которых весьма прозрачны и близки к очагам агрессивного исламизма (November 16, 2015[126]).

One of the main arguments advocating the implementation of the visa regime with the aforementioned countries is to secure Russia from a free entrance to the country of "Islamic extremists" who can use open borders of the ex-Soviet neighboring countries for such purposes:

Кто-то скажет: это на борьбу с терроризмом, иначе ИГИЛ придёт к нам в дом. Так если не хотим, чтоб ИГИЛ пришёл к нам в дом, то надо границу со Средней Азией укреплять, вводить визовый режим и тд. Исламистские экстремисты могут попадать в Россию совершенно беспрепятственно, пользуясь прозрачными границами между

---

[124] Alexei Navalny, "Голосуй за визовый режим со странами Средней Азии и Закавказья", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/868564.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.01]

[125] Alexei Navalny, "экспериментально установлено: больше агрессии и нажима", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/906483.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.01]

[126] Alexei Navalny, "Где проходит «оргия толерантности»?", 2015 <https://navalny.com/p/4547/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

Афганистаном и бывшими республиками СССР, которые, в свою очередь, имеют
прозрачные границы с нами (October 14, 2016[127]).

After the official announcement[128] that Navalny begins his presidential campaign for 2018 presidential elections, he repeated that his ideas regarding the visa regime with the countries of Central Asia are included in his presidential program:

Конечно, моя программа содержит и все те идеи, которые я продвигал раньше: от введения визового режима со странами Средней Азии и Закавказья до списка идиотских законов, подлежащих отмене (December 13, 2016).

Illegal migrants are generally framed by Navalny as uneducated Muslim males. His main objective during the whole timeframe is to convince his readers that the visa regime with the countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia must be implemented. It can be safely concluded that if Navalny manages to be in power in the future, one of his policies would definitely include more control of immigration to the Russian Federation.

[127] Alexei Navalny, "Авиагруппа в Сирии навсегда, а зарплаты врачам - нет", 2016 <https://navalny.com/p/5096/> [Accessed on 2018.05.07]
[128] Alexei Navalny, "2018. Я буду участвовать в выборах и хочу стать вашим голосом", 2016 <https://navalny.com/p/5162/> [Accessed on 2018.04.30]

4.2 Crimea

Occupation and annexation of Crimea happened during the timeframe of this research. This set of events caused numerous disputes in Russia between the supporters of Russia's decision to incorporate the peninsula to the Russian Federation and those who oppose it, splitting between nationalists, die-hard Kremlin supporters, and to those who prioritize international law first. Thus, a position of Navalny on this issue is of significant importance in order to have a complete picture of Navalny's ideas of nationalism.

On March 12, 2014, when the course of action in the peninsula was shaping, Navalny expressed his position on Crimea in a separate long blog post. There, he says that the fact that Crimea belongs to Ukraine is unjust and blames Nikita Khrushchev for it:

То, что Крым случайно "достался" Украине - это неправильно, несправедливо и обидно любому нормальному жителю РФ. Крым был передан незаконным волюнтаристским решением самодура Хрущева (March 12, 2014[129]).

He also adds that the need for Russia to pay for its use of the Black Sea Fleet makes him "go insane" (*Необходимость ещё и платить «аренду» за базу Черноморского флота вообще бесит*[130]).

Although Navalny *wishes* that Crimea belonged to the Russian Federation, he does not advocate imperialistic policies towards it nor calls for supporting of a possible annexation of the peninsula before it actually happened. His main idea is that Russia must take care of its own territory and not conquering foreign land:

Империализм - зло и глупость. Он вредит интересам народа России. Главный интерес русских не в захвате земли, а в нормальном управлении той землёй, которая уже есть (March 12, 2014[131]).

Navalny completely denies the notion spread by the Kremlin that Russia needs to send its troops to Crimea "to defend Russians". He states that such position is hypocritical because Russians in other areas have suffered far worse and were betrayed and sold by the Russian government.

Глупо отрицать то, что в Крыму есть огромное количество людей, желающих присоединения к России и/или расширения своей автономии, но заявления о том, что в Крым нужно ввести войска «для защиты русских" - это бред и лицемерие со стороны тех, кто все

---

[129] Alexei Navalny, "Развёрнутая позиция по Украине и Крыму", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/2014/03/12/> [Accessed on 2018.05.01]

[130] The same.

[131] The same.

эти годы последовательно предавал и продавал русских оптом и в розницу везде (от Туркмении, предавая их интересы ради газовых контрактов, до Чечни) (March 12, 2014[132]).

In an October 9th post, Navalny states that "the main task of a Russian nationalist is to take care of Russians who suffer from alcoholism, to take care of empty lands in Russia, and not having issues with Ukraine[133]. It can be concluded that Navalny, before the actual annexation of Crimea happened, did not express support in favor of the possible outcome that would incorporate the peninsula into the Russian Federation.

However, when it was beginning to be evident that the peninsula will soon be incorporated to the Russian Federation, Navalny began to change his tone. On March 17, 2014, he was not surprised that 85% of Russians would like to see Crimea as part of Russia, adding that he, too, would like to, but there is "only a question of the price of such decision and the consequences it would bring"[134]. He elaborates on a possible outcome in a post dated March 27, 2014, by elaborating that the incorporation would mean long-term negative consequences for Russia, lessening its international influence, and would force NATO with its anti-missile defense systems to appear closer to the borders of the Russian Federation[135]. He does not, so far, stress the element of the international law when discussing the issue of Crimea – he operates only within the logic of cost and benefit. Ideas of nationalism are not present at this period concerning the issue of Crimea.

Only on October 16, 2014, did Navalny finally admit the violation of international law in Crimea. But, "despite this, reality is that Crimea has become a part of the Russian Federation. <…> It remains a part of Russia and will never be part of Ukraine again in the nearest future". However, in the post of the same day Navalny writes that "there is nothing worse than such imperialistic chauvinism for the Russians" and that Russians should first of all be concerned about taking care of their internal areas, rather than occupying the Baltic states, Ukraine, or Donbas[136].

After the annexation, Navalny treats Crimea as de-facto Russian and does not question a possibility to restore Crimea's status as part of Ukraine. He states that there is *no legal or political*

---

[132] Alexei Navalny, "Развёрнутая позиция по Украине и Крыму", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/2014/03/12/> [Accessed on 2018.05.01]

[133] Alexei Navalny, "Про тактику борьбы, Новороссию, Украину, Зимбабве, Русский марш, доктора Хайдера, Путина, реднеков и хилл Билли", 2014 <https://navalny.com/p/3867/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[134] Alexei Navalny, "Социологическое исследование ФБК: Украина и Крым.", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/915621.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[135] Alexei Navalny, "так выглядит международная изоляция", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/919116.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[136] Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2014.10.15, 2014 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/focus/1417522-echo.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

possibility to give back Crimea: he gives the peninsula a status similar to Jerusalem and believes that this issue will be present for 200 years[137].

Navalny's familiarity with the word *normal* makes his come-back when discussing the issue of Crimea. There, he suggests that justice, in a political sense, can be restored by conducting a normal referendum, not like the one we have seen.

С точки зрения политики и восстановления справедливости, то, что нужно сделать сейчас в Крыму, это провести нормальный референдум. Не такой, как был, а нормальный. И как решат люди, так оно и будет (16 October, 2014[138]).

The same point of view is repeated again in 2016, right after the official announcement that Navalny begins his presidential campaign for 2018 presidential elections:

Что касается Крыма, не существует никакого другого варианта вообще начать решать эту проблему и что-то думать о ней, составлять дорожную карту, кроме проведения нормального референдума. Здесь моя позиция не изменилась. Значит, даем время всем агитировать сколько угодно, абсолютно честный свободный референдум. Мы понимаем реальное волеизъявление жителей Крыма, после этого начинаем что-то делать (December 15, 2016[139]).

Thus, it can be concluded that Navalny tries to balance between interests of nationalists and liberals: he cannot state that Crimea must be returned back to Ukraine as it would mean a loss of support from nationalists, and he cannot straightly support the annexation as it would mean supporting the Kremlin and would hurt relations with liberals within Russia and the Western society as a whole. As Navalny states, "a significant part of people in Russia are thinking imperialistically, want to conquer everything, revive the Soviet Union. Either way, common grounds with these people must be found. I know that these people, regarding a lot of questions, will support me"[140].

---

[137] Михаил Зыгарь, "Алексей Навальный о том, зачем разоблачать воровство, почему чувства верующих в России нельзя оскорбить и как надо пересмотреть итоги приватизации", 2015 <https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/harddaysnight/aleksej_navalnyj_o_tom_zachem_razoblachat_vorovstvo_pochemu_chuvstva _verujuschih_v_rossii_nelzja_oskorbit_i_kak_nado_peresmotret_itogi_privatizatsii-380865/> [Accessed on 2018.05.06]

[138] Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2014.10.15, 2014 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/focus/1417522-echo.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[139] Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2016.12.14, 2016 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/1891326-echo/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

[140] Republic.ru, "Навальный: «Остается только хлопать друг друга по плечу и помнить, что другой страны у нас нет»", 2014 <https://republic.ru/russia/navalnyy_ostaetsya_tolko_khlopat_drug_druga_po_plechu_i_pomnit_chto_drugoy_strany_u _nas_net-1168842.xhtml> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

He also reminds that he "has put a lot of effort to depolarize positions of liberals and nationalists, and always thought of this as one of his main political missions"[141].

---

[141] Republic.ru, "Навальный: «Остается только хлопать друг друга по плечу и помнить, что другой страны у нас нет»", 2014 <https://republic.ru/russia/navalnyy_ostaetsya_tolko_khlopat_drug_druga_po_plechu_i_pomnit_chto_drugoy_strany_u_nas_net-1168842.xhtml> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

4.3 Russian March

The first Russian March took place on 4 November 2005 and was the first legal far-right mass meeting in modern Russian history[142]. It is an annual public mass demonstration in several major Russian cities under the slogans "it is our country", "Stop feeding the Caucasus", "Russia for Russians, Europe for Whites!" and "Glory to the Russian Nation!", attached to the Day of National Unity[143]. Navalny has been an active participant of these marches but he tries to distance himself from radical and marginal nationalists, stressing that he was there "to make the Russian March better"[144].

After Moscow mayoral election of 2013, Navalny stopped his participation at the march, although he has been attending every previous march since 2007. According to him, after rather successful mayoral campaign and result, a balance between various groups that support Navalny was found, being one of the reasons why he had received a significant amount of votes. Thus, his participation at the march would cause lots of interpretation: Navalny openly admits that the Kremlin propaganda would put effort to use the chance to portray Navalny as a nationalist among other radicals, given Navalny participated in the march:

Я по-прежнему поддерживают Русский Марш как идею и как мероприятие, готов помогать информационно или ещё как-то, но в новой ситуации сам участвовать не могу.

Может кто-то станет иронизировать, но после московских выборов я чувствую большой груз ответственности и должен соблюдать тот политический баланс, который и позволил мне (нам) получить значительный результат (November 2, 2013[145]).

Nevertheless, he frames the Russian march as a normal phenomenon and expresses his support of it. He stops mentioning slogans such as "Stop feeding the Caucasus": what remains in the frame of the Russian march is only equality before the law and respecting human rights.

У националистов идёт крайне сложный и болезненный процесс идеологического размежевания и конечно же мы все должны поддержать тех, кто выступает с идеями

---

[142] RIA Novosti, ""Русский марш". События прошлого года", 2006 <https://ria.ru/spravka/20061031/55271836.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.07]

[143] Times of Malta, "Thousands shout racist slogans in 'Russian March'", 2011 <https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20111105/world/Thousands-shout-racist-slogans-in-Russian-March-.392307> [Accessed on 2018.05.07]

[144] The same.

[145] Alexei Navalny, "Русский Марш", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/877154.html> [Accessed 2018.05.07]

равенства перед законом и соблюдения прав человека. Таких очень много и большинство на PM [Russian March – Ed.] *должны быть именно такими* (November 4, 2013[146]).

However, when sharing his ideas about the future of Crimea in 2015, Navalny states that his reasons for supporting Russian march always remained the same, explicitly mentioning the issue of illegal migration:

Все, что я говорил на «Русском марше», я могу повторить сейчас. Я участвовал в «Русском марше» и говорил, что я против нелегальной миграции, я и сейчас говорю против нее (January 22, 2015).

Navalny's decision to stop his participation at the annual Russian marches marks a breaking point of Navalny's shift towards transforming into a "catch-all" type of politician. Alexei's framing of migrants also shifts from portraying them as drug-importers to socially unprotected ones, calling for the situation to change to better conditions for them:

Я требую простых вещей – чтобы они сюда въезжали по визе, по разрешению на работу, и тогда у каждого мигранта будет страховка, и если ему, не дай бог, придавят чем-то ногу на стройке, его не бросят в канаву помирать, а он пойдет в больницу и получит лечение (May 29, 2015[147]).

Navalny values his efforts to build bridges between liberals and nationalists, thus, in order to sustain support of the latter, he still strongly advocates the visa regime with Central Asia. At the same time, by stopping his participation at the Russian marches, he does not give 'liberals' and the Kremlin a chance to blame him for being nationalist.

---

[146] Alexei Navalny, "новый ответ "Мандаринок" рэперу Сяве (ну почти)", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/877373.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.09]
[147] Михаил Соколов, "Война на Украине затягивает Россию в пропасть", 2015 <https://www.svoboda.org/a/27040936.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.09]

4.4 Chechnya

Navalny, since his active participation in the Russian Marches, has been known for using nationalistic slogans such as "Stop feeding the Caucasus". Republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia are often the main causes for Navalny's criticism of illegal migration in Moscow and other cities in Russia. The Chechen Republic (Chechnya) is worth a separate mentioning: Navalny emphasizes the fact that Chechnya receives a lot of funding from the central government, and the Republic "lives thanks to money of all of the Russians" who, in turn, suffer from under-funding and live in bad social living conditions.

И что вся эта остальная страна живёт гораздо беднее (см. слайд два), чем Чеченская республика, которую она кормит. Чеченская республика живёт за счет всей остальной страны (June 25, 2013[148]).

According to Navalny, in Chechnya there is a limited rule of law compared to the rest of Russia, and its leader – Ramzan Kadyrov – is a personalized cause of the problem. R. Kadyrov is seen as a political figure that has become rich because money of the Muscovites and other Russians are sent to the Republic by the central government.

в Чечне весьма слабо соблюдается даже тот минимальный набор законов, который работает в остальной России. Все эти Черхиговы и Кадыровы стали долларовыми мультимиллионерами в нищей республике на ВАШИХ деньгах. Видно же, нет тут никакого бизнеса. Просто бюджетные деньги, которые вы им прислали (September 3, 2013[149]).

Navalny treats Chechnya as a highly separatist Republic with its own Sharia army. The Republic, he says, would secede as soon as Vladimir Putin ends his reign and thus, an ISIS-like state would emerge close to Russia.

Путин создал страну, которая держится только на нем. Нынешняя Чечня, которую мы вооружили, позволив создать шариатскую армию, как только Путина не станет, отделится в один миг, и у нас рядом возникнет бандитское государство типа ISIS (October 9, 2014[150]).

---

[148] Alexei Navalny, "занимательные слайды и индивидуальный потолок Алькантара", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/814734.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.10]

[149] Alexei Navalny, "Избирателям Собянина и Кадырова", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/851425.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.10]

[150] Republic.ru, "Навальный: «Остается только хлопать друг друга по плечу и помнить, что другой страны у нас нет»", 2014 <https://republic.ru/russia/navalnyy_ostaetsya_tolko_khlopat_drug_druga_po_plechu_i_pomnit_chto_drugoy_strany_u_nas_net-1168842.xhtml> [Accessed on 2018.05.10]

It can be concluded that Chechnya and the Chechens represent Navalny's main group of non-Russians, or, simply put, *the others*. Compared to the framing of the Chechens during the 2006-2012 timeframe, when Navalny openly referred terrorism as a lifestyle for Chechens[151], it has become milder during the 2013-2017 timeframe, mainly focused on the unfair central budget spending for the Republic.

---

[151] Natalia Moen-Larsen, "Normal' nationalism": Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and "the Other." East European Politics, 30(4), 2014, 561.

4.5 Russian Identity

Navalny constructs Russian identity as a European one. He openly states that in his 2014 blog post:

Вот лично для меня Россия — это Европа. Я за Россию, потому что за Европу, и за Европу, потому что за Россию. Не думаю, что это сильно оригинальный подход (September 24, 2014[152]).

A. Navalny makes a dichotomy between Europe and the West. By doing so, he states that the Russians, on a mental level, relate themselves to Europe rather than with the West which includes such countries as the USA, the UK, New Zealand, and Australia:

Запад, как мы знаем, гораздо более широкое понятие, оно включает в себя и США, и Великобританию, и Новую Зеландию с Австралией. Однако русские, я в этом уверен, на ментальном уровне связывают себя именно с Европой (January 12, 2017[153]).

When writing about the issue of Crimea, Alexei mentions that he does not see any difference between the Russians and the Ukrainians:

Я не вижу разницы между русскими и украинцами вообще никакой (October 16, 2014[154]).

In this way, it can be concluded that Navalny combines a civic nationalism with an Eurasianist one, which emphasizes the greatness of imperial or Soviet past. It shows that Alexei is a proponent of a dynamic and changing framing of nationalism, and adopts double standards for different nations: he strongly supports the visa regime with the countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, while he advocates visa-free regime with the countries of the so-called near abroad, which refers to the newly independent republics that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Мы должны в первую очередь добиваться на федеральном уровне введения визового режима со странами Средней Азии и Закавказья – без этого не сработает уже ничего дальше.

---

[152] Alexei Navalny, "Русский Мир Украины против Золотой Орды Путина. Кросс-таблицы нашего соцопроса", 2014 <https://navalny.com/p/3840/> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]

[153] Русская Фабула, "Алексей Навальный: «Самое вредное, что можно сейчас придумать в стране — это имперский проект»", 2017 <https://rufabula.com/articles/2017/01/12/interview-navalny-2017> [Accessed on 2018.05.12]

[154] Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2014.10.15, 2014 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/focus/1417522-echo.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]

И с Белоруссией этого не нужно. У нас проблема с миграцией именно из стран Средней Азии и Закавказья (August 24, 2013[155]).

In Alexei's vision, countries of the near abroad and Russia should integrate and merge into a union on the grounds similar to the European Union's, with open borders between the states, preserved national languages and traditions:

Европейский Союз – одно государство? И да, и нет. С одной стороны, просто для населения есть принципиальные вещи: сел в машину, приехал, границы вообще не увидел. С другой стороны, у каждого свой язык, каждый надел свои национальные костюмы, пляшет свой народный танец. И то же самое должно произойти с Россией и Украиной (October 16, 2014[156]).

In the same interview, Navalny mentions that he treats Belarus and Ukraine as part of the "Russian World" (rus. Русский мир), a concept developed by the Kremlin to use its compatriots' policy as a way to exert soft power on neighboring countries[157]:

Мы присоединили себе Крым с двухмиллионным населением. Мы потеряли, к сожалению, возможно навсегда 40-миллионное украинское государство. Мы очень сильно осложнили и испугали Белоруссию, тоже часть русского мира, хотя, наверное, белорусам это не понравится. Прибалтику, Казахстан и так далее (October 16, 2014[158]).

Russians are framed as the most divided nation in Europe. He goes on to use arguments of the "Russian World" by suggesting to implement simple procedures for anyone with Russian roots to receive a passport of the Russian Federation, taking Israel as an example of a good practice:

Русские — крупнейший разделенный народ Европы. Давайте начнём с того, что дадим им возможность стать гражданами своей родины в уведомительном порядке, вне зависимости от их настоящего проживания. Пришёл, показал свидетельство о рождении дедушки-бабушки, где написано «русский» — вот тебе паспорт без разговоров. Израиль

---

[155] Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny dated 2013.08.23, 2013 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/1139878-echo/> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]
[156] Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2014.10.15, 2014 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/focus/1417522-echo.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]
[157] Andis Kudors, "Russian Public Relations Activities and Soft Power", 2010 <https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006249299> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]
[158] Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2014.10.15, 2014 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/focus/1417522-echo.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]

лучше других продемонстрировал как замечательно это может работать. Давайте брать пример. Не надо собирать территории, надо собирать людей. (January 12, 2017[159]).

The Russian identity is constructed as an identity of a European nature. Ethnic identity of the Russians is dominating in Navalny's discourse: the dissolution of the Soviet Union marks a geographical split between ethnic Russians, and Navalny's vision is to ultimately unite the ethnic Russians into a union similar to the European Union.

---

[159] Русская Фабула, "Алексей Навальный: «Самое вредное, что можно сейчас придумать в стране — это имперский проект»", 2017 <https://rufabula.com/articles/2017/01/12/interview-navalny-2017> [Accessed on 2018.05.12]

CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this research was Alexei Navalny's framing of nationalism in his personal blog during the years of 2013-2017. The main task of this research was to continue and supplement Natalia Moen-Larsen's research on how A. Navalny constructs "normal nationalism" in his *LiveJournal* blog. Lack of a full picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism besides his globally-known specialization on anti-corruption was the problem of this research. Below are the main concluding points of the research that were revealed by fulfilling the tasks of the thesis:

- Completed inductive content analysis resulted in 2271 read blog posts by the author;
- 61 blog entries were sampled for an in-depth frame analysis as they featured frames and discourse on nationalism;
- A. Navalny's ideas of nationalism become milder than they were in the beginning of his political career;
- A. Navalny frames nationalism as a combination of patriotism, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-fascistic discourse;
- End of a rather successful campaign for A. Navalny of Moscow mayoral elections of 2013 marks a breaking point when Navalny starts to adopt a catch-all logic, in order to maintain and balance support of him by both liberals and nationalists;
- Frames and discourse on nationalism become almost non-existent in A. Navalny's personal blog in the years of 2013-2017, compared to 2006-2012.

Completion of this thesis has supplemented N. Moen-Larsen's research of 2014 by expanding the timeframe from 2013 to the April of 2017. In this way, empirical value of this study is a more complete picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism – from 2006 until 2017.

This research creates guidelines for possible future investigations. First of all, a similar investigation could be initiated, but with a focus on other social media platforms that are actively used by A. Navalny. One of these could be his *Youtube* channel where he and his anti-corruption investigation team upload popular videos that could possibly feature more frames of nationalist ideas. Detaching from A. Navalny, conclusions of this research raise a question of whether and, if so, how other politicians and/or political activists with right-wing origins change their discourses on nationalism in relation to time and increasing popularity and/or visibility, especially taking into consideration current political developments in Central Europe.

IŠVADOS

Šiame darbe tiriamas nacionalizmas, įrėminamas Aleksėjaus Navalno asmeniniame tinklaraštyje 2013-2017 metais. Pagrindinė šio darbo užduotis yra atsispirti nuo ir papildyti Natalia Moen-Larsen tyrimą, atliktą 2014 m., autoriui siekiant išsiaiškinti, kaip A. Navalnas įrėmina „normalųjį nacionalizmą" savo *LiveJournal* tinklaraštyje. Kadangi Navalnas kritikuoja Kremlių ir aktyviai užsiima antikorupcine veikla Rusijoje ir už jos ribų, jo nacionalistinės idėjos dažniausiai paliekamos už paraščių – būtent tai ir yra šio darbo problema.

Įgyvendinus šiame darbe iškeltus uždavinius pagrindiniam darbo klausimui atsakyti, galima teigti:

- Buvo perskaitytas ir išanalizuotas 2271 tinklaraščio įrašas;
- 61 įrašas atrinktas detaliai įrėminimo analizei atlikti dėl juose esančio diskurso nacionalizmo tematika;
- A. Navalno nacionalizmo idėjos tampa švelnesnės lyginant jas su Navalno politinės karjeros pradžios retorika;
- A. Navalnas įrėmina nacionalizmą kaip patriotizmo, etninio nacionalizmo, ksenofobijos ir antifašizmo derinį;
- Ganėtinai sėkmingos politinės 2013 m. Maskvos mero rinkimų kampanijos pabaiga žymi lūžį, kai A. Navalnas pradeda taikyti *catch-all* logiką savo diskurse siekdamas išlaikyti pasiektą balansą tarp jį palaikančių liberalų ir nacionalistų;
- Nacionalizmo įrėminimas ir diskursas praktiškai išnyksta iš A. Navalno asmeninio tinklaraščio 2013-2017 m. laikotarpiu, palyginus su 2006-2012 m.

Šis baigiamasis darbas papildo N. Moen-Larsen 2014 m. atliktą darbą praplėsdamas tyrimo laikotarpį nuo 2013 iki 2017 metų balandžio mėn. Tokiu būdu, empirinė šio darbo vertė yra galimybė matyti pilnesnį A. Navalno nacionalizmo diskurso paveikslą – nuo 2006 iki 2017 m.

Taip pat šis darbas palieka vietos ateities tyrimams. Pavyzdžiui, toks pat tyrimas gali būti atliktas analizuojant kitas socialines medijas, aktyviai naudojamas A. Navalno. Viena tokių galėtų būti *Youtube* platforma, kurioje A. Navalnas ir jo korupciją tirianti komanda dalinasi ypač greitai išpopuliarėjančiais video siužetais, kuriuose taip pat gali būti įrėminamas nacionalizmas. Atsiribojant nuo A. Navalno, šio darbo išvados kelia klausimą, ar – ir, jei taip, kaip – kiti dešiniųjų pažiūrų politikai ar politinės jėgos keičia savo diskursą nacionalizmo klausimais bėgant laikui ir toms jėgoms populiarėjant ir matomumui didėjant, ypač turint omenyje dabartines tendencijas Vidurio Europoje.

LIST OF LITERATURE

1. Agerholm, Harriet, "Russian opposition activists blinded in acid attacks", 2017 <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russian-opposition-activists-blinded-acid-attacks-vladimir-putin-moscow-kremlin-alexei-navalny-a7712056.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

2. Alexei Navalny's *Youtube* channel, "Он вам не Димон", 2017 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

3. Anti-Corruption Foundation, "About Us" <https://fbk.info/english/about/> [Accessed on 2017.12.09]

4. Barry, Ellen, "Russian Journalist Beaten in Moscow", 2010 <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/world/europe/07russia.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

5. BBC.com, "Russia checks claims of $4bn oil pipeline scam", 2010 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11779154.16J> [Accessed on 2017.11.29]

6. BBC.com, "Яблоко" выдвигает Явлинского и отвергает Навального" <https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2011/12/111218_yabloko_yavlinsky_presidency > [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

7. Benoit, William L., "Content Analysis in Political Communication." Book: E. Page Bucy, R. Lance Holbert (ed.), *The sourcebook for political communication research: methods, measures, and analytical techniques*. London: Routledge, 2011, 268-279.

8. BFM.ru, "В сентябре самым популярным блогером стал Алексей Навальный", 2013 <https://www.bfm.ru/news/231893?doctype=news> [Accessed on 2017.12.03]

9. Bloomsbury Publishing, *Dictionary of Media Studies*. London: A & C Black Publishers Ltd, 2006, P. 255

10. Bondarenko, Veronika, "Meet Alexei Navalny — the Russian opposition leader challenging Putin", 2017 <http://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-alexei-navalny-vladimir-putin-russia-protests-2017-3> [Accessed on 2017.11.30]

11. Bortree, Denise Sevick, "Presentation of Self on the Web: an ethnographic study of teenage girls' weblogs." *Communication & Information*, 5(1), 2005, 25-39.

12. Bratersky, Alexander, "Russian March Resists Navalny", 2011 <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-march-resists-navalny-10629> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

13. Bruns, Axel, "Methodologies for mapping the political blogosphere: An exploration using the IssueCrawler research tool." *First Monday*, 2007, 12(5).

14. Carroll, Oliver, "Russia's Last Opposition Hero", 2017 <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/07/russias-last-opposition-hero/> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

15. Cerulus, Laurens, "Russia's high court upholds election ban against Alexei Navalny", 2018 < https://www.politico.eu/article/russias-high-court-upholds-election-ban-against-alexei-navalny/> [Accessed on 2018.01.06]

16. Chilcote, Ryan, "Russia's anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny takes on Putin -- and looks to the future", 2017 <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-anti-corruption-crusader-alexei-navalny-takes-on-putin-looks-to-the-future/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

17. Davis, Richard, *Typing Politics – The Role of Blogs in American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, P. 119.

18. De Vreese, Claes H., *News framing: Theory and typology*. Information Design Journal + Document Design. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing company, 13(1), 2005, 23.

19. De Vreese, Claes H., Peter, Jochen, Semetko, Holli A., "Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News." Political Communication, 18(2), 2001, 107-122.

20. Deacon, David et al., *Researching Communications. A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis*. 2nd edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007, P. 8.

21. Deloitte, "Media Consumption in Russia. Growth in media consumption during large sport events." Moscow: Deloitte CIS Research Centre, 2017.

22. Deloitte, "Media Consumption in Russia. Growth in media consumption during large sport events." Moscow: Deloitte CIS Research Centre, 2017.

23. Demirjian, Karoun, "Putin foe Alexei Navalny avoids jail but decries Kremlin for punishing his brother", 2014 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/2014/12/30/8b069390-8fa2-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html?utm_term=.43ef7c458267> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

24. Domingo, David, Ari Heinonen, "Weblogs and Journalism. A Typology to Explore the Blurring Boundaries." *Nordicom Review*, 29(1), 2008, 3-15.

25. Duriau, Vincent J., Reger, Rhonda K., Pfarrer, Michael D., "A Content Analysis of the Content Analysis Literature in Organization Studies: Research Themes, Data Sources, and Methodological Refinements." *Organizational Research Methods*, 10(1), 2007, 5-34.

26. Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny dated 2013.08.23, 2013 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/1139878-echo/> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]

27. Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2014.10.15, 2014 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/focus/1417522-echo.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

28. Echo of Moscow, Interview with A. Navalny on 2016.12.14, 2016 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/1891326-echo/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

29. Echo of Moscow, interview with Navalny dated 19th August, 2013 <https://echo.msk.ru/programs/razbor_poleta/1137394-echo/> [Accessed on 2017.12.03]

30. Egupova, Masha, "The Navalny Case: An Offline Power of Online Activism in Russia", 2011 <https://mashavladivostok.wordpress.com/2011/03/19/the-navalny-case-an-offline-power-of-online-activism-in-russia/> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

31. Elder, Miriam, "Russian anti-Putin protests draw thousands to Moscow again", 2011 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/24/russia-europe-news> [Accessed on 2017.12.09]

32. Elder, Miriam, "Russian police and troops clash with protesters in Moscow", 2011 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/06/russian-police-troops-moscow-protest> [Accessed on 2017.12.26]

33. Elder, Miriam, "Trial of corruption crusader Alexei Navalny divides Russia", 2013 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/13/alexei-navalny-trial-russia> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

34. Embrey, Theresa R., "You Blog, We Blog: A Guide to How Teacher-Librarians Can Use Weblogs to Build Communication and Research Skills." *Teacher Librarian*, 30(2), 2002, 7-9.

35. Entman, Robert M., "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents." *Journal of Communication*, 1991, 41(4), 6-27.

36. Entman, Robert M., "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication*, 1993, 43(4), 51-58.

37. European Court of Human Rights, "Disproportionate sanction against Russian opposition activists for participating in spontaneous demonstration." *Juridical Current*, 17(4), 2014, 277-279.

38. Ferree, Myra Marx, Merrill, David A., "Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: Thinking about Social Movements in Gendered Frames." *Contemporary Sociology*, 29(3), 2000, 454-462.

39. Forman, Jane, Damschroder, Laura, "Qualitative content analysis." *Advances in Bioethics*, 11(1), 2008, 40.

40. Freedom House, "Freedom of the Press 2017 Report. Russia", 2018 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/russia> [Accessed on 2018.05.03]

41. Goffman, Erving, *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1974, 23-25.

42. Golosov, Grigorii, "Navalny steps into the ring", 2013 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/grigorii-golosov/navalny-steps-into-ring> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

43. Goncharenko, Roman, "Alexei Navalny: The opposition leader captivating Russia's youth", 2018 <http://www.dw.com/en/alexei-navalny-the-opposition-leader-captivating-russias-youth/a-42359515> [Accessed on 2018.04.21]

44. Guillory, Sean, "Russian Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny: Uniting Nationalists and the Urban, Educated Middle Class", 2011 <http://exiledonline.com/russian-opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-uniting-nationalists-and-the-urban-educated-middle-class/> [Accessed on 2017.12.06]

45. Gupta, Om, *Encyclopaedia Of Journalism and Mass Communication* (5 vols.). Isha Books, 2006, 41.

46. Herszenhorn, David M., "Leading Putin Critic Is Freed Pending Appeal After Protests", 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/world/europe/judge-frees-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-during-appeal.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

47. Hille, Kathrin, "Russia: Nationalism on the march", 2013 <https://www.ft.com/content/63b7857e-42dc-11e3-8350-00144feabdc0> [Accessed on 2017.12.06]

48. Hull, Dana, "Blogging between the lines." *American Journalism Review*, 28(6), 2006, 62-67.

49. Institute of Modern Russia, "The List of Persons Recognized as Political Prisoners by Russia's Memorial Human Rights Center" <https://imrussia.org/en/projects/political-prisoners/649-the-list-of-persons-recognized-as-political-prisoners-by-russias-memorial-human-rights-center> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

50. Internet Live Stats, "Russia Internet Users" <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/russia/> [Accessed on 2017.12.10]

51. Iyengar, Shanto, Simon, Adam, "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion. A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing." *Communication Research*, 20(3), 1993, 365-383.

52. Kara-Murza, Vladimir, "Politics in Russia." *World Affairs*, 176(5), 2014, 51.

53. Kniivilä, Kalle, "Навальный: «Я и есть русский националист»", 2011 <http://www.glasnost.se/2011/navalnyj-ya-i-est-russkij-nacionalist/> [Accessed on 2018.04.23]

54. Kudors, Andis, "Russian Public Relations Activities and Soft Power", 2010 <https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006249299> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]

55. Last post of Navalny on *LiveJournal* platform is dated July 9, 2014. Since April 9, 2014, they have been duplicated on both the new website and the blog on the *LiveJournal* platform, until July 9, 2014.

56. Levada Center, "Aleksey Navalny", 2017 <https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/03/20/aleksey-navalny/> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

57. Levada-Center, "Aleksey Navalny", 2017 <https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/03/20/aleksey-navalny/> [Accessed on 2018.01.17]

58. Luhn, Alec, "Alexei Navalny: Russian opposition leader found guilty of embezzlement", 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/alexei-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-found-guilty-embezzlement> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

59. Manheim, Jarol B., Richard C. Rich, *Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science*. 5th edition. Toronto: Longman, 2002, 317.

60. McNair, Brian, *An Introduction to Political Communication.* New York: Routlege, 2011, 4.

61. Mediakix.com, "How many blogs are there in the world?", 2017 < http://mediakix.com/2017/09/how-many-blogs-are-there-in-the-world/> [Accessed on 2017.11.19]

62. Moen-Larsen, Natalia, "Normal' nationalism": Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and "the Other." *East European Politics*, 30(4), 2014, 548-567.

63. Naharnet.com, "Navalny Files Mass Complaints over Moscow Poll", 2013 <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/97807> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

64. Nanook.lt, "While the Red is On" <https://nanook.lt/while-the-red-is-on/index.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

65. Navalny, Alexei, "2018. Я буду участвовать в выборах и хочу стать вашим голосом", 2016 <https://navalny.com/p/5162/> [Accessed on 2018.04.30]

66. Navalny, Alexei, "navalny.com", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/922158.html> [Accessed on 2018.04.10]

67. Navalny, Alexei, "Авиагруппа в Сирии навсегда, а зарплаты врачам - нет", 2016 <https://navalny.com/p/5096/> [Accessed on 2018.05.07]

68. Navalny, Alexei, "Где проходит «оргия толерантности»?", 2015 <https://navalny.com/p/4547/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

69. Navalny, Alexei, "где страна для Микрюкова?", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/766371.html> [Accessed on 2018.04.30]

70. Navalny, Alexei, "Голосуй за визовый режим со странами Средней Азии и Закавказья", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/868564.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.01]

71. Navalny, Alexei, "занимательные слайды и индивидуальный потолок Алькантара", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/814734.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.10]

72. Navalny, Alexei, "Избирателям Собянина и Кадырова", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/851425.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.10]

73. Navalny, Alexei, "новый ответ "Мандаринок" рэперу Сяве (ну почти)", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/877373.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.09]

74. Navalny, Alexei, "Про тактику борьбы, Новороссию, Украину, Зимбабве, Русский марш, доктора Хайдера, Путина, реднеков и хилл Билли", 2014 <https://navalny.com/p/3867/> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

75. Navalny, Alexei, "Про Тесака", 2007 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/142157.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.06]

76. Navalny, Alexei, "Программа Алексея Навального", 2018 <https://2018.navalny.com/platform/> [Accessed on 2018.05.05]

77. Navalny, Alexei, "Развёрнутая позиция по Украине и Крыму", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/2014/03/12/> [Accessed on 2018.05.01]

78. Navalny, Alexei, "Русский Марш", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/877154.html> [Accessed 2018.05.07]

79. Navalny, Alexei, "Русский Мир Украины против Золотой Орды Путина. Кросс-таблицы нашего соцопроса", 2014 <https://navalny.com/p/3840/> [Accessed on 2018.05.11]

80. Navalny, Alexei, "Социологическое исследование ФБК: Украина и Крым.", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/915621.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

81. Navalny, Alexei, "так выглядит международная изоляция", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/919116.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

82. Navalny, Alexei, "что произошло в Бирюлёво", 2013 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/868200.html> [Accessed on 2018.04.30]

83. Navalny, Alexei, "экспериментально установлено: больше агрессии и нажима", 2014 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/906483.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.01]

84. Navalny's LiveJournal blog, "Как пилят в Транснефти", 2010 <https://navalny.livejournal.com/526563.html> [Accessed on 2017.11.29]

85. Neuendorf, Kimberly A., *The content analysis guidebook*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2002, 52-53.

86. Norris, Pippa, *Political Communications. For Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Harvard: Harvard University, 2004, 1.

87. Oliphant, Roland, "Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny announces bid for the Kremlin in 2018 presidential election", 2016 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/13/russian-opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-announces-bid-kremlin/> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

88. Pole, Antoinette, *Blogging the Political – Politics and Participation in a Networked Society*. New York: Routledge, 2010, P. 118.

89. Provalis Research, "The power of words: content analysis for political science", 2016 <https://provalisresearch.com/blog/content-analysis-for-political-science/> [Accessed on 2017.06.20]

90. Radio Free Europe, "Human Rights Court Says Navalny Unfairly Convicted In 'Yves Rocher Case'", 2017 <https://www.rferl.org/a/aleksei-oleg-navalny-yves-rocher-case-echr-unfairly-convicted/28799784.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

91. Reese, Stephen D., Gandy Jr,.Oscar H., Grant, August E., *Framing Public Life. Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*. London: Routledge, 2001, P. 98.

92. Republic.ru, "Навальный: «Остается только хлопать друг друга по плечу и помнить, что другой страны у нас нет»", 2014 <https://republic.ru/russia/navalnyy_ostaetsya_tolko_khlopat_drug_druga_po_plechu_i_pomnit_chto_drugoy_strany_u_nas_net-1168842.xhtml> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

93. Republic.ru, "Навальный: «Остается только хлопать друг друга по плечу и помнить, что другой страны у нас нет»", 2014 <https://republic.ru/russia/navalnyy_ostaetsya_tolko_khlopat_drug_druga_po_plechu_i_pomnit_chto_drugoy_strany_u_nas_net-1168842.xhtml> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

94. Republic.ru, "Навальный: «Остается только хлопать друг друга по плечу и помнить, что другой страны у нас нет»", 2014 <https://republic.ru/russia/navalnyy_ostaetsya_tolko_khlopat_drug_druga_po_plechu_i_pomnit_chto_drugoy_strany_u_nas_net-1168842.xhtml> [Accessed on 2018.05.10]

95. RFE/RL, "Human Rights Court Says Navalny Unfairly Convicted In 'Yves Rocher Case'", 2017 <https://www.rferl.org/a/aleksei-oleg-navalny-yves-rocher-case-echr-unfairly-convicted/28799784.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

96. RFE/RL, "Russian Police Investigate Feces Attack On Kremlin Critic Latynina", 2016 <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-attack-journalist-fecal-matter-kremlin-critic/27936709.html> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

97. RIA Novosti, ""Русский марш". События прошлого года", 2006 <https://ria.ru/spravka/20061031/55271836.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.07]

98. Riffe, Daniel, Stephen Lacy, Frederick G. Fico, *Analyzing media messages: Using quantitative content analysis in research.* 2nd edition. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005, 25.

99. Rosenbloom, Andrew, "The Blogosphere." *Communications of the ACM*, 47(12), 2004, 30-33.

100. Rothrock, Kevin, "How Alexey Navalny Abandoned Russian Nationalism", 2017 <https://globalvoices.org/2017/04/25/how-alexey-navalny-abandoned-russian-nationalism/> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

101. rus.DELFI.lv, "Он вам не Димон. Что известно о массовых протестах в Москве и других городах России", 2017 <http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/abroad/on-vam-ne-dimon-chto-izvestno-o-massovyh-protestah-v-moskve-i-drugih-gorodah-rossii.d?id=48668187&page=4> [Accessed on 2018.05.02]

102. Scheufele, Dietram A., "Framing As a Theory of Media Effects." *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), 1999, 103-122.

103. Schreck, Carl, "Russia's Erin Brockovich: Taking On Corporate Greed", 2010 <https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1970475,00.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.05]

104. Semetko, Holli, Valkenburg, Patti M., "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News." *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 2000, 95-96.

105. Semetko, Holli, Valkenburg, Patti M., "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News." *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 2000, 94.

106. Singer, Jane B., "The political j-blogger. 'Normalizing' a new media form to fit old norms and practices." *Journalism*, 6(2), 2005, 173-198.

107. Stieglitz, Stefan, Dang-Xuan, Linh, *Political Communication and Influence through Microblogging – An Empirical Analysis of Sentiment in Twitter Messages and Retweet Behavior. 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012, 1.*

108. Tankard, James W., et al, "Media Frames – Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement." Presentation at an Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication," Boston, 1991.

109. TASS, "Court prolongs Navalny's probation period in Yves Rocher case", 2017 <http://tass.com/society/959162> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

110. The Central Election Commission of Russia, "Выборы Мэра Москвы", 2013 <http://www.moscow_city.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/moscow_city?action=show&root=1&tvd=27720001368293&vrn=27720001368289&region=77&global=&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=27720001368293&type=222> [Accessed on 2017.12.17]

111.   The Economist, "It's the links, stupid", 2006 <http://www.economist.com/node/6794172> [Accessed on 2017.11.26]

112.   The Guardian, "Thousands of Russians endorse Navalny to challenge Putin in 2018", 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/24/russians-navalny-opposition-putin-2018> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

113.   The Russian Legal Information Agency, "Mistake in constituent documents prevents registration of Navalny party's branches", 2014 <http://www.rapsinews.com/news/20140409/271111291.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.20]

114.   The Russian Legal Information Agency, "Navalny's party lost registration over confusing name", 2014 <http://www.rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20140122/270513672.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.12]

115.   Time.com, "The World's 100 Most Influential People: 2012", 2012 <https://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2111976_2112167,00.html> [Accessed on 2017.12.10]

116.   Times of Malta, "Thousands shout racist slogans in 'Russian March'", 2011 <https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20111105/world/Thousands-shout-racist-slogans-in-Russian-March-.392307> [Accessed on 2018.05.07]

117.   Toor, Amar, "Russia blocks opposition websites amid heightened tensions in Ukraine", 2014 <https://www.theverge.com/2014/3/14/5507692/russia-blocks-opposition-websites-amid-tensions-in-ukraine> [Accessed on 2017.12.30]

118.   Weiss, Michael, "Rights in Russia." *World Affairs*, 176(4), 2013, 75.

119.   Wesley, Jared J., "The Qualitative Analysis of Political Documents." Book: Bertie Kaal, Isa Maks and Annemarie van Elfrinkhof (ed.), *From Text to Political Positions: Text analysis across disciplines*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014, 135-160.

120.   Wesley, Jared J., "The Qualitative Analysis of Political Documents." Book: Bertie Kaal, Isa Maks and Annemarie van Elfrinkhof (ed.), *From Text to Political Positions: Text analysis across disciplines*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014, 149.

121.   Williams, Jeremy B., Jacobs, Joanne, "Exploring the use of blogs as learning spaces in the higher education sector." *Australasian Journal of Educational Technology*, 20(2), 2004, 232-247.

122.   Winning, Alexander, "Russian opposition leader Nemtsov shot dead in Moscow", 2015 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nemtsov/russian-opposition-leader-nemtsov-shot-dead-in-moscow-idUSKBN0LV2LA20150227> [Accessed on 2018.03.29]

123.   Wortham, Jenna, "After 10 Years of Blogs, the Future's Brighter Than Ever", 2007 <https://www.wired.com/2007/12/after-10-years-of-blogs-the-futures-brighter-than-ever/> [Accessed on 2017.11.26]

124.   Yale World Fellows, "Alexey Navalny", 2010 <https://worldfellows.yale.edu/alexey-navalny> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

125.   Зыгарь, Михаил, "Алексей Навальный о том, зачем разоблачать воровство, почему чувства верующих в России нельзя оскорбить и как надо пересмотреть итоги приватизации", 2015 <https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/harddaysnight/aleksej_navalnyj_o_tom_zachem_razoblachat_vor ovstvo_pochemu_chuvstva_verujuscih_v_rossii_nelzja_oskorbit_i_kak_nado_peresmotret _itogi_privatizatsii-380865/> [Accessed on 2018.05.06]

126.   Перцев, Андрей, "Навальный открыл кошелек", 2013 <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/11/13_a_5751869.shtml> [Accessed on 2017.12.02]

127.   Русская Фабула, "Алексей Навальный: «Самое вредное, что можно сейчас придумать в стране — это имперский проект»", 2017 <https://rufabula.com/articles/2017/01/12/interview-navalny-2017> [Accessed on 2018.05.12]

128.   Русская Фабула, "Алексей Навальный: «Самое вредное, что можно сейчас придумать в стране — это имперский проект»", 2017 <https://rufabula.com/articles/2017/01/12/interview-navalny-2017> [Accessed on 2018.05.12]

129.   Соколов, Михаил, "Война на Украине затягивает Россию в пропасть", 2015 <https://www.svoboda.org/a/27040936.html> [Accessed on 2018.05.09]

ANNEX

1 annex, *2013 nationalism-related citations*

2013.01.16	1	Нам давно необходим закон, что граждане, чья национальная принадлежность относится к русским или другим коренным народам РФ, не имеющим собственной государственности, должны иметь автоматическое право на гражданство РФ. Показывай любой документ свой, или одного из родителей, где указана национальность - заезжай. Как это сделано в Израиле или Грузии, например.	Ясно, что пока у власти Путин и "Единая Россия", такого закона не будет, этим нужно только таджикам с узбеками гражданство давать. Они тихие, покорные, неграмотные. Статей про милицейские квартиры размещать не будут. Источник дешёвой рабочей силы и голосов на выборах.	нельзя русского депортировать из России. Ну нельзя и всё. Всё теряет смысл тогда. Нет никакого государства тогда у нас. Есть Диснейленд для олигархов и высших чиновников.
2013.05.01	1	номенклатурные хари единороссов и чиновников, аферисты из мэрии, депутаты ГД и "лидеры" "профсоюзов" - то есть жульё, хапнувшее советскую профсоюзную собственность, и наживающееся на ней много лет Чтобы номенклатурные рожи не шли в одиночестве, для массовки сгоняют таджиков/узбеков из ДЕЗов, студентов за деньги и бюджетников за отгул.			
2013.06.10	2	Значит теперь любое заявление о всем очевидном вытеснении русского населения со Ставрополья - межнациональная рознь. "открытый призыв к межнациональному противостоянию в регионе". А любого, кто вспомнит о преступлениях Кадырова, будут привлекать за голословные обвинения в			

		совершении тяжких преступлений.			
2013.06.25	2	И что вся эта остальная страна живёт гораздо беднее (см. слайд два), чем Чеченская республика, которую она кормит. Чеченская республика живёт за счет всей остальной страны. И что вся эта остальная страна живёт гораздо беднее (см. слайд два), чем Чеченская республика, которую она кормит.			
2013.07.08	2	это город Пугачёв Саратовской области, где местные жители подняли восстание и требуют выселить из города всех чеченцев.			
2013.08.20	4	Собянин и его штаб натурально (это не преувеличение) нанял каких-то северокавказских бандитов, которые нападают на агитмашины нашего штаба (видео с показаниями свидетелей выложим). То есть прям на девятках без номеров какие-то дагестанцы с битами.			

2013.08.24	2	в Москве слишком большое количество нелегальных мигрантов мы должны в первую очередь добиваться на федеральном уровне введения визового режима со странами Средней Азии и Закавказья – без этого не сработает уже ничего дальше И с Белоруссией этого не нужно. У нас проблема с миграцией именно из стран Средней Азии и Закавказья. Эти люди, к сожалению, живут на положении рабов США строят стену с Мексикой, и даже Обама голосует за эту стену с Мексикой, а у нас говорят «Давайте приезжайте». Кроме того, нужно понимать, что к ним приезжают (все-таки, это важная вещь) люди из Мексики, христиане и, все-таки, из более продвинутой страны. К нам сюда приезжает сельское население очень отсталых среднеазиатских стран, преимущественно мусульманских. лезгинка на Манежной площади – это административное правонарушение			
2013.09.03	6	Так боитесь второго тура, что уже надо ночью вешать чужие наклейки на памятник Высоцкому? в Чечне весьма слабо соблюдается даже тот минимальный набор законов, который работает в остальной России. Все эти Черхиговы и Кадыровы стали долларовыми мультимиллионерами в нищей республике на ВАШИХ деньгах. Видно же, нет тут никакого бизнеса. Просто			

		бюджетные деньги, которые вы им прислали. Голосуете за Собянина - голосуете за то, что деньги москвичей и других жителей России аккуратно упаковываются в трансферты и через липовые тендеры выдаются Рамзанам Сайд-Эмиевичам и крышующим их Рамзан Ахмадовичам.			
2013.10.14	2	Даже не криминальные, а ожидаемые последствия концентрации мигрантов, вроде 50% детей не говорящих на русском в ближайших школах, сами понимаете, восторга у "коренных" не вызывают. Нужно понимать, что чем больше кошмара вносит в жизнь местных жителей место компактного проживания мигрантов, тем больше там могут заработать "силовики" и местные власти. Это закон. Все знают: вот там создано криминальное гетто, люди оттуда безнаказанно совершают преступления, потому что платят власти взятки. Власть за них и против нас. Это тоже закон.	Пока в России не будет проведена реформа правоохранительных органов и реформа суда, создающая условия для их независимой профессиональной работы, события, подобные бирюлёвским, будут повторяться. Это фундаментальная вещь номер один. Фундаментальная вещь номер два. главный виновник беспорядков в Бирюлёво вот: Putin Парадоксально, но тех самых "нелегальных мигрантов", о	У России должна быть ясная и чёткая политика в этой области: 1) мы стремимся сократить количество мигрантов, 2) мы вводим визовые режимы, 3) мы реализуем стратегию повышения производительности труда, 4) свободно приезжают только высококвалифицированные сотрудники, 5) мы всеми силами боремся против возникновения этнических гетто (как на этой овощебазе).	Ага, в этом месте можно возмутиться: ну не все же мигранты везут героин. Не все, тем не менее, давайте взглянем в лицо фактам: Россия находится на первом месте в мире по потреблению героина и попадает он сюда именно с мигрантами.

			которых все пишут просто не существует. Они все легальные. Визового режима нет и в Россию можно приезжать/уезжать даже без загранпаспорта.	
2013.10.15	3	Миллионы нелегальных мигрантов - это для нас проблема, а для них это самые лучшие избиратели и граждане. В том же посте выше я пишу, что ничто из этого невозможно без судебной реформы и реформы правоохранительных органов. Мало того, вообще ничего невозможно улучшить без смены политической системы. Визовый режим со странами Средней Азиии Закавказья - базовая мера, которую можно и нужно применить уже в этой политической системе.	Внешнеполитическое влияние конечно надо расширять, но точно не ценой роста преступности и социальной напряженности. Зачем нам иллюзорное "внешнеполитическое влияние", если для него нужно создавать предпосылки для погромов внутри страны.	Я считаю, что крайне важно обозначить и формализовать введение визивого режима со странами Средней Азии и Закавказья как ключевое и практическое политическое требование.
2013.10.18	2	Крах режима Путина - это здорово, и я его тоже очень жду, но и до этого я хотел бы (в компании с большим количеством других людей) выразить свою позицию: въезд в Россию из стран Средней Азии и Закавказья должен быть в разрешительном порядке, а не свободном.	И, кстати, хочу сказать, что безвизовый режим и миллионы рабов-мигрантов - это один из политических и	

			экономических столпов того самого "режима Путина".	
2013.10.28	2	Мы привыкли их обзывать нелегальными мигрантами, но штука в том, что они не более нелегальные, чем мы с вами. Россия официально позволяет въехать сюда любому количеству граждан Средней Азии и Закавказья. Если, гипотетически предположить, что завтра все жители Узбекистана захотят приехать в Москву, то они возьмут и приедут. Совершенно легально.			
2013.11.02	1	моего участия в Русском Марше. Я участвовал в каждом с 2007 года, на последнем не был - лежал с температурой и читал "комментарии" "политологов" о том, что болею я конечно не по настоящему. Русский Марш явление объективное, у него есть предпосылки: миграция, социальное расслоение, политический и правовой оффшор на Кавказе, высенснение националистов из политики и тд	Я по прежнему поддерживают Русский Марш как идею и как мероприятие, готов помогать информационно или ещё как-то, но в новой ситуации сам участвовать не могу. Может кто-то станет иронизировать, но после московских выборов я чувствую большой груз ответственности и должен соблюдать тот политический баланс, который и позволил мне (нам) получить значительный результат. Объединительный	Моё участие в Русском Марше сейчас превратится в адову кинокомедию: как Бонифаций в окружении детей, буду идти в толпе из 140 фотографов и операторов, старающихся снять меня на фоне зигующих школьников. Естественно, наши "кремлёвские друзья" сделают всё, чтобы этих зигующих вокруг меня было всегда много. Ну а потом "телеведущий" "Соловьёв" и "журналист" "Киселёв" ещё три месяца будут крутить это в федеральном телеке, рассказывая "быстро объединились же либералы с фашистами, почуяв сладковатый запах погромов. Задрожали	

			процесс и взаимодействие со всеми группами сейчас важнее, чем разъяснительная работа (вот смотрите, я пошёл на РМ и никто меня не съел, и я никого не съел, 95% - совершенно нормальные люди).	нетерпеливо в предчувствии выбитых дверей в винные лавки" и тд
2013.11.04	1	РМ, где объяснил, что в этот раз в нём не участвую, но , тем не менее, считаю его правильным политическим событием, нуждающемся в поддержке и демаргинализации. А может не будем ничего запрещать? Свободная политическая конкуренция. Все попадают в парламент, ведут непростой диалог, формируют коалиционное правительство, действующее в интересах большинства избирателей. Именно это я хочу увидеть и именно поэтому я противник загона в подполье любой идеологии.	У националистов идёт крайне сложный и болезненный процесс идеологического размежевания и конечно же мы все должны поддержать тех, кто выступает с идеями равенства перед законом и соблюдения прав человека. Таких очень много и большинство на РМ должны быть именно такими.	Мои идеи и взгляды в той их части, которую почему-то принято считать "националистической повесткой" ясны и понятны: - закон для всех один. Милиция не проверяет законопослушного кавказца просто за то, он кавказец. Но и не отпускает правонарушителя потому, что у него дядя прокурор какого-нибудь Ножай-юртовского района и друг Кадырова. - бюджетное равенство или хотя бы стремление к нему.

2014.01.16	2	Кто-то заключает фиктивный брак, чтобы помочь получить гражданство таджику-мигранту. Чиновник оформляет фиктивный развод, чтобы не попасть под действие законодательства.
2014.01.18	1	Надо сказать, что Иванов просто из кожи лез, защищая интересы своего босса в проблемном для них районе Сокол - "собянинские узбеки-верхолазы" спускались с крыш домов и срезали растяжки "За Навального" с балконов жителей района по несколько раз в день.
2014.02.10	3	Хотим жить как в Европе? Давайте принимать цивилизованные европейские шаги по ограничению миграции. Визы - не панацея, но это базовый и фундаментальный шаг. Без этого невозможно сделать ничего.
2014.03.11	1	Хранители духовности, ценностей и ориентиров, блин. Им, значит, деньги в швейцарском банке, а нам духовность, цивилизационная общность и «трудовые ресурсы из Азии».
2014.03.12	2	Position on Ukraine and Crimea
2014.03.17	1	Крым в России очень любят. Как видим, 85% людей хотели бы видеть его частью РФ, в этом ничего удивительного. И я бы хотел - вопрос только цены и последствий.
2014.03.19	1	Единственный в списке реальный ворюга-коррупционер, причастный к действиям на Украине (провальной их части - в Киеве) - это Сурков. Он точно мультимиллионер, но деньги его скорее всего лежат где-то в ближневосточных банках, где вся чеченская мафия их держит.
2014.03.24	1	Говорят-говорят, но этим русским лучше не становится. Они самые, вроде, русские-прерусские. Глаза у них голубые и волосы светлые, живут они на исконной русской земле.
2014.03.27	3	нет никаких сомнений, что и жители Крыма и жители РФ поддерживают объединение, но долгосрочные последствия для России будут негативными и ослабят её международное влияние, приведут к форсированному расширению НАТО, развёртыванию ПРО и тд.
2014.04.16	1	русским было нанесено трагическое поражение. Не просто поражение даже, а поражение сопряженное с национальным унижением. В первом чтении принят закон, в котором написано: русским запрещается выбирать мэров городов, в которых они живут.
2014.05.07	3	Жуликов прогоним, а Россия вернёт себе лидерство в космической отрасти. Добрые бородатые русские космодесантники с ружьями Гаусса высадятся на Омикрон Персей-8 и будут пожимать руки местным жителям, повязывать им георгиевские ленточки, но не отнимать территорию, а угощать кулебякой и расстегаями.

2014.05.19	2	Политическая позиция крымских татар и самого Джемилёва мне никогда не нравилась и сейчас не нравится
2014.05.26	1	Реальный стратегический интерес России на Украине - чтобы все оставили всех в покое и дали жить, как им хочется. Спокойно покупали наш газ и другие товары. Не препятствовали нашему экспорту. Кто хочет говорить на русском - говорит, кто не хочет - не говорит. Одним нравится Москва, другим Варшава. Одни едят фаршированную рыбу, другие сало. Кто хочет - отдыхает в Крыму, кто не хочет - в Одессе. Политики спорят между собой на дебатах, а когда нужно выяснить, кто круче и формировать правительство - все идут на честные выборы.
2014.07.14	2	Раз Крым стал частью России, то, понятное дело, мы должны его развивать. Но, всё-таки, есть ощущение, что остались в России места, где деньги на развитие нужны больше, чем Крыму.

2014.07.28	3	Я тоже поздравляю всех мусульман с Ид Аль-Фитром и рассчитываю на то, что наши традиционные российские мусульмане (татары, башкиры, дагестанцы и тд) должны согласиться с тем, что подобные штуки на улицах Москвы явно показывают нам, в том числе, кризис миграционной политики. Это не здОрово и не здорОво - такой приток иностранного религиозного населения в большой город, который (хорошо это или плохо - другой вопрос) большой религиозностью не отличается. Тем, кто уже придумывает комментарий со словами "мигранты есть везде", я расскажу про Барака Обаму. Он, хоть и демократ, близкий к либералам, совсем распоясался. Предлагает детей нелегальных мигрантов депортировать Видите, до каких злодейств доходит просвещенная Северная Америка. Нам до этого далеко. Нам не детей высылать, а хоть кого-нибудь не пускать. У нас ведь со Средней Азией и Закавказьем безвизовый режим, и фактически нелегальных мигрантов оттуда нет. Все легально приехали. Граждане США не хотят пускать к себе без виз людей из Гондураса, Гватемалы и Сальвадора, а мы почему-то - проходной двор для граждан Узбекистана, Таджикистана и тд. И это при том, что в США едут не злобные ваххабиты с героином, а всего-лишь добрые католики с кокаином. Давайте не будем обижать детей (как Обама), а начнём со взрослых и элементарной, базовой меры, без которой невозможна миграционная политика - введение визового режима с теми странами, откуда к нам едут праздновать Ид аль-Фитр.
2014.07.29	3	Разве от этого Земля налетит на небесную ось? Или Крым обратно отберут? Ничего не изменится в худшую сторону, наоборот, общественное мнение в европейских странах смягчится.
2014.08.06	4	Значит поток мигрантов постоянно растёт, да? Дайте-ка подумаю.... мммм.... возможно в нашу страну ломанулись французы, норвежцы и шведы… Непохоже. Скорее всего, к нам продолжают ломиться жители Средней Азии. Вернее, «ломиться» это совсем не подходящее слово. Ведь жители Средней Азии и Закавказья, в отличие от немцев, французов, норвежцев, шведов или американцев, приезжают к нам без виз. Просто билет купил и спокойно въехал.

2014.09.10	4	Ну и, конечно, хочу напомнить, что все эти эффектные ночные рейды против мигрантов - вещь совершенно бессмысленная, покуда мы не приняли базовых решений и мер, ограничивающих бесконтрольную миграцию жителей Средней Азии и Закавказья в Россию. Введение визового режима - главная из них.
2014.09.24	4	Вот лично для меня Россия — это Европа. Я за Россию, потому что за Европу, и за Европу, потому что за Россию. Не думаю, что это сильно оригинальный подход.
2014.10.09	1	Я против империализма в принципе. Войну с Украиной я ни в коем случае не поддержу. У Владимира Соловьева всегда был один ответ на вопрос, почему я не появляюсь в его передачах: «Я нациков на эфир не зову!» Для них я был нациком, когда говорил о правах русских в Казахстане, когда говорил, что русских продали за газ в Туркмении, где их просто превратили в бессловесных скотов. Когда я	Путин создал страну, которая держится только на нем. Нынешняя Чечня, которую мы вооружили, позволив создать шариатскую армию, как только Путина не станет, отделится в один миг, и у нас рядом возникнет бандитское государство типа ISIS.	Империалистического плана национализм – худшее, что можно сейчас выбрать для страны. У нас гигантская страна с пустующими площадями, люди спиваются. Население сокращается. Задача русского националиста – заботиться об этих людях. Какая к черту Украина? Поезжайте, посмотрите Смоленскую область! Вот где надо народ спасать.

Я потратил много усилий, чтобы сблизить позиции либералов и националистов. Всегда считал это одной из своих политических миссий, хоть и приходилось жертвовать частью сторонников и с той, и с другой стороны.

Безусловно, значительная часть людей в России придерживается империалистических воззрений, хочет все захватывать, возвращать Советский Союз. Но ничего, и с этими людьми надо находить общий язык. Я знаю, что по многим вопросам они будут со мной.

говорил, что в Чечне раньше жило 400 тысяч русских, а сейчас – ноль, значит, я был фашистом и нациком. А сейчас все эти жулики, клеймившие меня за употребление слова «русский», стали великими защитниками национальных интересов. И, что интересно, продолжают игнорировать русских в Туркмении, русских в Казахстане и так далее.						

2014.10.16	2	Я считаю, что, несмотря на то, что Крым был захвачен с вопиющим нарушением всех международных норм, тем не менее реалии таковы, что Крым сейчас является частью РФ. И давайте не будем обманывать себя. И украинцам я сильно советую тоже не обманывать себя. Он останется частью России и больше никогда в обозримом будущем не станет частью Украины.	С точки зрения политики и восстановления справедливости, то, что нужно сделать сейчас в Крыму, это провести нормальный референдум. Не такой, как был, а нормальный. И как решат люди, так оно и будет.	Я не вижу разницы между русскими и украинцами вообще никакой. Интеграция – естественный процесс. Но нельзя сейчас просто присоединить к себе Украину, заодно Белоруссию, Прибалтику, Казахстан. Этого просто не получится. Это нереально, это утопия, это бред.	Европейский Союз – одно государство? И да, и нет. С одной стороны, просто для населения есть принципиальные вещи: сел в машину, приехал, границы вообще не увидел. С другой стороны, у каждого свой язык, каждый надел свои национальные костюмы, пляшет свой народный танец. И то же самое должно произойти с Россией и Украиной.	мы присоединили себе Крым с двухмиллионным населением. Мы потеряли, к сожалению, возможно навсегда 40-миллионное украинское государство. Мы очень сильно осложнили и испугали Белоруссию, тоже часть русского мира, хотя, наверное, белорусам это не понравится. Прибалтику, Казахстан и так далее. То есть мы теряем наши естественные козыри. Наличие такого большого дружественного народа как украинцы, Украина, это был колоссальный стратегический козырь России в будущем России, в развитии России. Сейчас мы его утеряли и утеряли просто из-за каких-то амбиций,	И я по-прежнему являюсь сторонником введения визового режима, и я по-прежнему считаю, что с точки зрения развития России, русского мира и как угодно, тема нелегальной иммиграции в сто раз более важная, чем любая Украина.	нет ничего более вредного интересам русского народа, чем этот империалистический шовинизм. Не в интересах русских заниматься захватом ближайших республик, в интересах русских – заниматься борьбой с коррупцией, борьбой с алкоголизмом, и так далее. Решением внутренних проблем. В интересах русских сделать так, чтобы по-прежнему поступающая колоссальная нефтяная рента работала на русских. А захватывать Прибалтику, Украину или Киев или Донбасс русским не нужно.

					глупостей.		

2014.12.24	3	Вологодская область - самая большая по проценту русских, и явно всё делается для того, чтобы они не жили и не размножались в Вологодской области.						

| 2015.01.2 2 | 4 | Чечня, конечно, является частью России. Но при этом то, что происходит в Чечне, меня совершенно не устраивает. И я вижу, что она часть Российской Федерации в плане формальном – мы отправляем туда деньги, там существуют всякие атрибуты власти российской, висят портреты Путина. Но по сути своей это отдельный регион, где создается шариатское государство, создается шариатская армия, где реальные загоны Российской Федерации не действуют, где отрицается принцип, закрепленный в Конституции, что у нас светское государство. Там какие-то ходят люди, нет проблем, что у них есть | Все, что я говорил на «Русском марше», я могу повторить сейчас. Я участвовал в «Русском марше» и говорил, что я против нелегальной миграции, я и сейчас говорю против нее. | Я говорю о том, что присоединение Крыма было незаконным. В стратегической перспективе никому ничего хорошего это не принесет. Крым развиваться не будет, превратится в территорию типа Северного Кипра, от этого нам будут только проблемы.

Сейчас, и это уже вторая часть, не нравится, например, украинцам и многим либералам, я говорю, что не существует ни политической, ни юридической возможности Крым вернуть обратно. И эта проблема Крыма, которая создана – это будет | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

		религиозное чувство и они любят своего пророка. Но всю республику выгонять в рабочий день, чтобы доказывать это – это что-то неправильное. Кроме того, когда глава субъекта Российской Федерации объявляет своими личными врагами тех, кто поддерживает публикацию карикатур, это говорит о том, что у нас внутри страны создано маленькое государство, которое отрицает принципы Российской Федерации. И это абсолютно неприемлемо и приведет к большим проблемам в будущем.		проблема единого Иерусалима. Мы будем 200 лет все это обсуждать с Украиной, и уже будут наши внуки и правнуки, и никто ни о чем не договорится. Крым станет одной из таких спорных территорий в мире, которая будет отравлять жизнь и России, и Украине, и Европе еще долгие-долгие годы.			
2015.03.22	1	Мне эти все новости особенно весело читать: я сам в комментариях соловьёвых-киселёвых ещё					

		недавно был «мерзавцем нациком» за позицию по визам для жителей Средней Азии и Закавказья и участие в Русском Марше, а сейчас я «либерал-мерзавец».					
2015.05.29	1	Но проблему Крыма нельзя решить быстро. Его нельзя просто вернуть.	Значит, проблема Крыма должна решаться в первую очередь проведением референдума, которого там не было. То, что там было, я не считаю референдумом. Но в настоящий момент там 3 миллиона граждан России, у них есть паспорта, и вот так вот просто щелкнуть пальцем и сказать – отдайте…	Первое и единственное, что можно начать делать, – это провести честный референдум с длительным периодом подготовки, где и Украина, и крымские татары, то есть все заинтересованные стороны продолжительное время смогут вести агитацию. Потом мы проводим референдум. По итогам этого референдума можно принимать решение.	Безусловно, многие вопросы политической повестки, которые считаются традиционно националистическими, я постоянно поднимаю. В первую очередь это, конечно, касается проблем миграции. Я выступаю за введение визового режима со странами Средней Азии. Я считаю, что это абсолютно нормально. Это европейская практика, которой я требую в России.	я многие годы посвятил, в том числе, налаживанию неких мостов между националистами, либералами и демократами.	я требую простых вещей – чтобы они сюда въезжали по визе, по разрешению на работу, и тогда у каждого мигранта будет страховка, и если ему, не дай бог, придавят чем-то ногу на стройке, его не бросят в канаву помирать, а он пойдет в больницу и получит лечение.	Я считаю, что власти и предприятия должны давать нормальные, честные квоты, при этом они должны повышать производительность труда. Если где-то может работать механизм, а не 10 мигрантов, пусть работает механизм. И какая-то часть мигрантов должна остаться, она должна здесь работать по визе, их нужно легализовать. Но вот эта вакханалия, когда каждый человек просто может взять и приехать... Понимаете, я не могу просто сесть в

							keičia toną iš migrantai-narkomanai į migrantai-neapsaugoti socialiai	самолет и поехать в Германию. А почему каждый житель Узбекистана может то же самое сделать со страной?
2015.10.28	3	«Русские» Белова-Дёмушкина оставались единственной более-менее крупной неподконтрольной Кремлю националистической организацией. При всей одиозности это была организация (и лидеры), пытавшаяся переформатироватьс я в сторону современного европейского национализма и говорить о реальных интересах русских и России, а не о всей						

		этой имперской чуши про захват соседних стран.					
2015.11.16	2	Исламисту из Узбекистана, чтобы попасть в Москву, нужно просто купить билет.	Иммигранты в Россию на 90% — молодные мусульмане-мужчины из сельской местности, то есть та самая среда, из которой вербуются террористы. Источники миграции: Узбекистан и Таджикистан — страны, скажем прямо, границы которых весьма прозрачны и близки к очагам агрессивного исламизма.	Нам бы здесь хотя бы европейские меры ввести, а уж потом мечтать о том, как сделать лучше.			

2016.01.22	3	Что такое митинг, прошедший в Грозном? Это и позорище, это и курам на смех, это и наглые угрозы, это и античеченское мероприятие, это и антирусское мероприятие, но для меня в первую очередь это коррупция.	Как известно, Чечня практически ничего не зарабатывает и живёт за счёт остальной России.	
2016.01.30	1	И есть просто исторические факты о том, что большое количество украинцев, русских, жителей Прибалтики воевали в том числе на стороне Гитлера. Огромное количество, в частности, чеченцев это делало. Этот вопрос нужно изучать.	Я считаю, что, конечно, захват Крыма был незаконен. С формальной точки зрения это было незаконно. Второе, тот референдум, который был проведен, это никакой не референдум. Третье, судьба дальнейшая Крыма должна быть проведена через нормальный референдум под контролем мирового сообщества, который будет проведен с согласия и России, и Украины. Что этот референдум покажет, так тому и быть.	Моя позиция никак не изменилась. Она как была сформулирована с самого начала, так я и остаюсь. Я считаю, что это проблема, к сожалению, на годы и она не то, что ничем не отличается, она схожа с проблемой Северного Кипра, Фолклендских островов и огромного другого количества таких территорий в непонятном статусе. Я не думаю, что эта проблема решится даже в ближайшие десятилетия. Но в любом случае ключ к решению этой проблемы заключается в проведении референдума.
2016.05.05	4	Только хочется внести сразу важную правку: не надо никаким выходцам из Средней Азии «проникать» на территорию России. Нужно просто по своему национальному паспорту купить билет и сесть на самолёт — и можно везти сюда инструкции хоть от ИГИЛ, хоть от никарагуанских контрас. Никакого контроля, никакой проверки бэкграунда и связей, никакого серьёзного анкетирования, никакой вероятности отказа.	Вероятность проникновения террористов из Норвегии я оцениваю как более низкую. Вероятность ввоза героина из Исландии я оцениваю как более низкую. Вероятность потока беженцев из Люксембурга я оцениваю как более низкую по сравнению с Узбекистаном. Только с Норвегией, Исландией и Люксембургом у нас есть барьеры и границы, а с Узбекистаном — нет.	

2016.08.21	1	И от себя добавлю: Казань и Уфа, Татарстан и Башкирия — вот примеры того, как живёт нормальное, а не средневековое и дикое мусульманское общество. Ислам — преобладающая религия, но ни паранждей, ни бурок на улице не встретить. И отлично, так и должно быть.
2016.08.24	2	Белова сажают по одной причине — он представляет ту часть националистического движения, которая не подлегла под Путина и выступила за национальные интересы, а не прославляла войну с Украиной и не билась в имперском угаре. Белов и его соратники последовательно выступали за объединение усилий между националистами и либералами. Этого Кремль не хочет больше всего.
2016.10.14	1	Кто-то скажет: это на борьбу с терроризмом, иначе ИГИЛ придёт к нам в дом. Так если не хотим, чтоб ИГИЛ пришёл к нам в дом, то надо границу со Средней Азией укреплять, вводить визовый режим и тд. Исламистские экстремисты могут попадать в Россию совершенно беспрепятственно, пользуясь прозрачными границами между Афганистаном и бывшими республиками СССР, которые, в свою очередь, имеют прозрачные границы с нами.

2016.10.21	3	Дотационная республика с нищим, социально незащищенным населением.	В реальной жизни националистов прессуют сильнее, чем либералов. Все националистические партии запрещены, активистов распихали по тюрьмам. Причём делается это ещё беспредельнее, чем с обычными активистами — те хоть могут шум в медиа устроить, а этих пакуй да лупи в камере так, что рёбра трещат.	Нельзя быть националистом и не любить Путина. Нельзя быть консерватором и не любить Путина. Сначала пройдите на ток-шоу и скажите там, что самые наиглавнейшие интересы русских — война в Сирии и на Украине. Что надо и образованием, и здравоохранением пожертвовать, последнюю рубашку продать, а Асаду помочь. После этого можете идти митинговать ... в поддержку В.В. Путина и его мудрой политики. Русские марши на другие темы в России запрещены.
2016.12.13	1	Конечно, моя программа содержит и все те идеи, которые я продвигал раньше: от введения визового режима со странами Средней Азии и Закавказья до списка идиотских законов, подлежащих отмене.		
2016.12.15	2	Что касается Крыма, не существует никакого другого варианта вообще начать решать эту проблему и что-то думать о ней, составлять дорожную карту, кроме проведения нормального референдума. Здесь моя позиция не изменилась. Значит, даем время всем агитировать сколько угодно, абсолютно честный свободный референдум. Мы понимаем реальное волеизъявление жителей Крыма, после этого начинаем что-то делать.		

2017.01.12	4	сейчас в 2017 году окончательно ясно: какой бы ни был националист, демократический, либеральный, сермяжный или посконный — твоё место в тюрьме если ты не являешься единственно допустимым для Кремля видом националиста: националист лакейский.	Запад, как мы знаем, гораздо более широкое понятие, оно включает в себя и США, и Великобританию, и Новую Зеландию с Австралией. Однако русские, я в этом уверен, на ментальном уровне связывают себя именно с Европой.	Русские — крупнейший разделенный народ Европы. Давайте начнём с того, что дадим им возможность стать гражданами своей родины в уведомительном порядке, вне зависимости от их настоящего проживания. Пришёл, показал свидетельство о рождении дедушки-бабушки, где написано «русский» — вот тебе паспорт без разговоров. Израиль лучше других продемонстрировал как замечательно это может работать. Давайте брать пример. Не надо собирать территории, надо собирать людей.	В свое время немало сделал для продвижения национал- и народно- демократических идей, пусть их трактовка и может носить самый широкий смысл. Если оглядываться на 2011-2012 год, то, на мой взгляд, было важно, чтобы национал-демократы выступали в едином оппозиционном фронте с либеральными демократами. Кроме того, важнейшей задачей было консолидировать прогрессивную часть русских националистов, отделив их от имперцев и проводников агрессивного квазипатриотизма кремлевского разлива.