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Hedged Performatives in Written Academic Discourse of Medicine and Humanities

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Abstract

The present thesis focuses on the pragmatic analysis of hedged performatives in British National Corpus (BNC) and its two sub-corpora of written academic discourse of medicine and humanities. The aim of the paper is to examine the contrast between the use of hedged performatives in the two above-mentioned fields. The procedure chosen to identify hedged performatives was the 'hereby' test which allowed to distinguish 548 written occurrences of hedged performatives, to study the most frequent modal verb and performative verb combinations, and also to determine the functions these hedged performatives perform (hedging, boosting, and discourse marking functions). The results reveal the difference between the distribution of hedged performatives within modal verbs presented in the analysis and how common it is to use them in written academic discourse of medicine and humanities. The data indicate that hedged performatives are not a frequent phenomenon in both academic fields, however, it is more common to use hedged performatives in the field of humanities than it is in the field of medicine. Furthermore, the analysis of most frequent performative verbs notes that these verbs are usually used similarly in both academic fields. The most frequent groups of verbs refer to the assured confirmation that a particular statement is true (*claim, argue, etc*.), to perform the act of supposing that a particular statement is probably true (*predict, speculate, etc*.), to identify distinct points of the claim (*classify, list, etc*.), and to express negative opinion or rejection (*reject, object, etc*.). Finally, the three-part functional analysis demonstrates that in both academic fields the dominant function is boosting function, shield (hedging) function is more common in the field of medicine, and discourse marking function is more frequent in the field of humanities.

Keywords: Hedged Performatives, Modal Verbs, Performative Verbs, Written Academic Discourse, Humanities, Medicine, Theory of Speech Acts, Illocutionary Force.

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I.   Introduction

1.1 Performatives

The relation between modal verbs and performatives in the construction of hedged performatives is one of the key aspects in the present study. Due to this reason, it is important to understand what performative verbs are and what do they mean. Austin's (1962) research put the basis for speech act theory where he introduces the term 'performative utterance' and argues that utterances are not only statements, but also the acts of performing. Thus, he distinguishes between the two main speech acts (an expression which not only conveys information, but also performs an action at the moment of speaking which is in a direct relation with performative verbs) as performatives and constatives. Constatives can be described as statements which describe or constitute some fact which can be true or false (ibid., 46). On the other hand, performatives can be described as utterances "whose illocutionary force is made explicit by the verbs appearing in them" (Condoravdi & Lauer, 2011, 149) or simply as verbs which, when used, describes the action of doing rather than simply saying something (Austin, 1956, 22):

1) I (hereby) promise you to be there at five. → is a promise

2) I (hereby) order you to be there at five. → is an order.

(Condoravdi & Lauer, 2011, 149)

The instances 1) and 2) represent an action already encoded in the verb which makes that verb a performative. These utterances are assertions which guarantee that it is indeed true (Condoravdi & Lauer, 2011, 149). Austin (1956) introduces the instance *I shall be there* and explains that by producing such utterance the hearer might not be sure if this utterance is a promise, an intention, or a guess. Because it causes uncertainty, there was a need to make the utterance precise and clear. That is why explicit performative verb was introduced – "to make clear exactly which it is, how far it commits me [the speaker] and in what way" (ibid., 27).

Following Austin's research, Searle (1969) provides another approach to the field of pragmatics and speech act theory. Distinctly from Austin's focus on performatives, Searle (1969) examines illocutionary acts in more detail. The author states that it is important to concentrate on speech acts as "all linguistic communication involves linguistic acts" and that "the unit of linguistic communication is … rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act" (ibid., 16).

These two studies are the basis for the speech act theory and provide distinct insights on performatives and how they differ from other verbs. Because these studies were indeed influential, the speech act

approach was used in later studies. For instance, in his study, Fraser (1975) indicates that he is following Searle's (1969) distinction and examines illocutionary acts in the light of the speaker's positions and the level of illocutionary force certain hedged performatives have. The author observes that "certain verbs and syntactic constructions 'convey hedged performatives – that is, they modify the force of a speech act'" (Fraser, 2010, 18). Thus, both studies on speech act theory are directly related to the study of hedged performatives. It is reasonable to claim that hedged performatives can be considered as a specific type of speech acts and can be studied through the speech act theory as well as through the point of meaning or function.

1.2 Theoretical representation of hedged performatives

Some of the most relevant studies related to the field of hedged performatives are important to determine as they might assist in understanding this complex phenomenon. The advancement in the study of hedged performatives cannot be assigned to only one scholar. The most influential studies made are those of Lakoff (1972), Fraser (1975), Schneider (2010), and Panther & Thornburg (2019) which will be further discussed in more detail due to the impact made on the development of hedged performatives.

The first researcher to discuss the phenomenon is Lakoff (1972). In his study, Lakoff (1972) determines hedges as 'words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness – words whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy' (ibid., 471). The idea conveyed throughout his study is that concepts encoded by natural language do not have certain set boundaries. Due to this reason, utterances can neither be fully true nor false, but rather are true and false to a certain extent (ibid., 183). Even though he did not develop the concept of hedged performatives, however, in his research, he touched upon the expressions where hedges interact with performatives. For instance, he introduces the instance *Technically, I said that Harry was a bastard* where adverb *technically* cancels the implicature that what is said is what is meant (ibid., 490).

Lakoff's (1972) concept of hedges might differ from how hedging is conceptualized in the following studies, however, he was one of the first researchers to study the concept and to introduce some interesting observations about hedges. He discussed how hedges prove that semantics is not independent of pragmatics and analysed hedges interacting with performative verbs which put the basis for further research. Thus, he should be considered as one of the most essential and core researchers in the development of hedging and its semantic study.

The pragmatic study of hedges started in 1980s, later than the semantic study of this field. Semantic hedging is related to Lakoff (1972) while pragmatic hedging, on the other hand, is related to Fraser (1975) and his study of hedged performatives. Fraser (1975) introduced the notion of hedged performatives which involve the usage of modals and semimodals and also result in illocutionary force of the speech act. Illocutionary force Fraser (1975) discusses refers to the speaker/writer's intention in

performing the utterance which is directly related to the function hedged performative has. Hedged performatives can be described as a linguistic item within the larger concept of hedging. Hedged performatives are more specific linguistic phenomenon that usually consist of personal pronoun 'I' + modal verb + performative verb. Fraser (1975) was the founder of the concept and explained it as the linguistic component "where certain performative verbs such as *apologize, promise*, and *request* when preceded by specific modals such as *can, must*, and *should*, result in an attenuated illocutionary force of the speech act designated by the verb" (Fraser, 2010, 18).

Thus, hedged performatives do include modals and other verbs which can function like modals. As Fraser (1975) explains, it can be standard modals (*can, could, must, might, may, shall, should, will, and would*), indirect versions of modals (*can/be able to, must/have to, and will/intend to*), and forms that appear to function as modals (*want to, would like to, and wish to*). The modal which most commonly occurs in strongly performative instances is 'must' and its function is to relieve the speaker of some of the responsibilities and consequences. On the other hand, 'must' can co-occur in a weakly performative manner in those cases where 'must' is used to avoid responsibility and where it is difficult to understand why the speaker would want to avoid the consequences of the utterance (1975, 196-197). 'Must' usually appears with performative verbs of 'request'. In addition, Fraser claims that the second most commonly used modal with performative verbs is 'can'. It appears with all performative verbs except the verbs of 'request'. It is usually followed by an adverbial such as *now, finally, at least, etc*. Normally, if 'can' is accompanied by an adverbial, it is regarded as strongly performative and if it is not – 'can' is considered as weakly performative.

The study Fraser (1975) conducted presents some observations of conversational principles to account for hedged performative instances. He further analyses distinct modal verbs and what meaning they might carry when used in hedged performatives. It differs from Lakoff's (1972) approach in that view that Fraser (1975) discusses pragmatic angle of hedged performatives and also provides the opportunity to analyse hedged performatives in the light of strong/weak illocutionary force and in the light of different principles and meanings they can carry.

Following previous research, Schneider (2010) analysed the case of hedging as a marker of pragmatic competence in spoken discourse. He claims that hedging is one of the rhetorical strategies that might pose problems to second-language speakers who by not using hedging might cause impoliteness or inappropriateness. By hedges, Schneider identifies that he refers to 19 distinct linguistic items one of which is hedged performatives (ibid., 24). Hedged performatives are discussed together with one of the discourse effects, politeness to be exact. Naturally, his analysis was based on the politeness strategy introduced by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) and their idea of 'face' as a unite phenomenon throughout different cultures which determines human beings universally. The notion of 'face' they use

refers to every individual's feeling of self-worth or self-image and something which can be "lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction" (1975, 61). The general concept of 'face' is then distinguished into 'positive-face' and 'negative-face' where hedging is seen as one of 'face'-preserving politeness strategies. Schneider (2010) analyses hedging as negative politeness strategy which includes hedged performatives as a marker of illocutionary force and as a face-preserving strategy. According to Schneider (2010), in their study, Brown and Levinson attempt to analyse performative hedges in the light of the illocutionary force. However, he claims that their attempt has not been completely successful because they mainly analysed hedges rather than hedges which modify a performative verb.

Schneider's (2010) study is relevant as he emphasises that hedged performatives might be considered as one of the items falling under the broad category of hedging. Even though his study mainly focused on hedging, some important observations were made regarding previous studies on hedged performatives and the lack of research in the field.

The most recent approach was introduced by Panther & Thornburg (2019). In their research, the authors analyse hedged performatives as a specific class of speech acts and conduct corpus-based (COCA) study for their comparative results. The authors present the view that hedged performatives can be analysed by combining both speech act theory (theory which claims that the meaning of expressions can be explained through the performance of speech acts) and Fraser's pragmatic analysis. Panther & Thornburg discuss that when speech act theory and pragmatic analysis are combined, hedged performatives can have three distinct interpretative possibilities: 1) illocutionary force preserving hedges, 2) illocutionary force cancelling hedges, and 3) conceptual/pragmatic incompatibility between illocutionary force and hedge (ibid., 176). The main focus in their research was on force preserving hedges and how hedges relate to performatives.

The relation between hedges and performative verbs was discussed through the instances with modal verbs 'can' and 'must'. Similarly as Fraser (1975), Panther & Thornburg (2019) analyse the two most common modal verbs in English language and try to identify the function they have. For 'can', the authors introduce the instance *Yes, we can* which was the slogan Barack Obama used in his 2008 presidential campaign. This example was chosen in order to illustrate that the modal verb 'can' is used to identify confidence, or, as authors name it, "'positive' orientation" (ibid., 187). Thus, it is reasonable to say that 'can' can be assigned to assertive speech acts (schema provided by the authors → *S can assert that p*) (ibid., 189). In contrast, Panther & Thornburg (2019) claims that the modal verb 'must' refers to "'negative' orientation" (ibid., 189) because it conveys property of obligation which brings negative emotions and evaluation. As an example, the authors provide the utterance *I must inform you that there are only 30 seats available for this wonderful rare event!* and it is explained as the fact that limited space is available to *wonderful rare event* might signal negative evaluation by the addressee and might cause

a feeling of displeasure or disappointment. In conclusion, the authors claim that these two modal verbs and their relation with performatives can determine such values as good vs. bad, attitudes such as willingness vs. reluctance, and emotions such as contentment vs. discontentment which all contribute to the general meaning of hedged performatives.

The approach offered in this study is indeed interesting and few similar studies can be found. Panther & Thornburg (2019) take two previous studies and combine two distinct points of analysis in order to have a new perspective. Their analysis of the two most common modal verbs highlights how their meanings can differ in terms of values, attitudes, and emotions, and identifies why such distinction is present. The relation between hedged performatives and their performative function is the key aspect in the study.

1.3 Functions: hedging, boosting, discourse marking

There are some distinct approaches to analyse the functions hedged performatives have due to different perspectives of the phenomenon. Fraser (1975), for instance, introduces the analysis according to the meaning hedged performative has and invents several different principles which could be applied to distinct modal verbs. In addition, as per sub-section 1.2, Panther & Thornburg (2019) analysed hedged performatives with modal verbs 'can' and 'must' according to their meanings in terms of values, attitudes, and emotions. On the other hand, the most relevant distinction for this study is presented by Kaltenböck (2019) as this study concentrates on the functions hedged performative has rather than on the extended study of the meaning it might carry. Even though Kaltenböck (2019) adapts these functions in spoken language study, these functions can as well be interpreted while analysing written discourse. He claims that hedged performatives have three discourse functions which are:

1) Shield (hedge);
2) Booster (emphasis);
3) Discourse marker.

(ibid., 604)

Hedging function is described as one of the writer-oriented features under the category of stance. According to Salager-Meyer (1997), "hedges are crucial in academic discourse because they are a central rhetorical means of gaining communal adherence to knowledge claims" (1997, 128). In the case of academic discourse, hedging is a tool to aid the speaker or writer in negotiating their claims, to convince the audience that some claims and a specific viewpoint made in the research are indeed correct. It is usual in those cases, where a writer is not completely certain about the argument which was made or simply presents one's personal judgement.

Another function to mention is boosting function. Hyland (2014) describes boosters as constructions which express certainty in an utterance, show that a writer is involved in the discussed topic, and represent solidarity with the reader (2014, 9). Hedged performatives which have this function are used to boost, emphasise, or strengthen the claim, to assert the reader of the claim's validity, to help the writer to present their work with assurance, and to limit the space left for different interpretations.

The last function Kaltenböck (2019) emphasises is discourse marking. Hedged performatives acting as discourse markers usually refer to the speaker's degree of intersubjectivity. Here intersubjectivity relates to the speaker/writer's attention to the addressee through the wide range of linguistic expressions one of which is discourse markers. According to Kaltenböck (2019) "HPs [hedged performatives] frequently collocate with other discourse markers and function as discourse structuring devices for the purpose of stalling, turn-taking, floor-keeping, etc." (ibid., 604).

Thus, it can be concluded that shields, boosters, and discourse markers do have different functions in the discourse. This three-part functional categorisation is relevant to this research and will be used in order to identify which function is most likely to be used in the selected written academic fields of medicine and humanities. Other classifications related to the meaning will not be discussed in detail as they are not the aim of the present thesis. However, some principles (Fraser, 1975) will be touched upon in the empirical analysis of the thesis.

1.4 The purpose of the research

It is reasonable to assume that hedged performatives as a phenomenon are a useful tool in spoken and written English discourse due to the functions they have. There are different discussions in regard to how hedged performatives are used in soft sciences and hard sciences. It is believed that in hard sciences "it is common for writers to downplay their personal role to highlight the phenomena under study, … and generality of findings" (ibid., 13) which means that the outcome of the research would not change irrespectively of the writer's observations as it is usually based on formulas and very accurate information. On the other hand, soft sciences rely on personally projecting the author and their arguments. Due to this reason, it is believed that soft sciences should have more pragmatic devices such as hedged performatives. In addition, the previous research lacks the precision on exploring hedged performative use in different disciplines of written English language and determining their functions in the discourse. That is why this study will focus on hedged performatives and their use in the written academic discourse of medicine and humanities.

The **subject** of the present paper is hedged performatives used in the fields of humanities and medicine. The **aim** of this research is to examine the contrast between the usage of hedged performatives in the written academic discourse of medicine and humanities.

In order to accomplish the aim, the following **objectives** have been raised:

1. To identify high frequency hedged performatives in written academic discourse of medicine and humanities;
2. To define and investigate their functional profile and usage patterns;
3. To identify similarities and differences of the use of hedged performatives in written academic discourse of medicine and humanities.

Before moving on to the discussion of the data, the methods used to collect and analyse data will be presented. In addition, certain criteria for the classification were applied which will be further discussed in the next part.

II. Data and Methods

2.1 Source of data and criteria for classification

The present thesis is a corpus-based study and it is essential to choose a source which would allow to analyse different usage patterns of the research subject. British National Corpus (BNC) is suitable for such study as it allows to analyse written academic discourse of English language and also due to its broad scope of fields and contexts they provide. There were no previous studies which would analyse hedged performatives in this particular corpus and would concentrate on two academic fields of medicine and humanities to be exact. Due to this reason, two distinct fields were chosen in order to see how hedged performative usage differs, what are dominant patterns researchers tend to use, and make the comparison between the two sub-corpora.

Table 1. BNC sub-corpora sizes

Academic discourse	Number of words in the sub-corpus
Medicine	1,412,808
Humanities	3,296,072

The above table presents the size of both analysed sub-corpora. The sub-corpus of written academic medical discourse is more than 2 times smaller than the written academic discourse of humanities. The search was done by using phrases 'I' + certain modal verb and 'we-exclusive' + certain modal verb. 'We-exclusive' is determined as a plural personal pronoun which is used instead of singular form because there are several scholars working on the research or one author rather prefers to use 'we' instead of 'I'.

(1) ***We wish to respond*** *to the correspondence concerning our report on decreasing semen quality.* (BNC, w_ac_med)

(2) *Naturalists shower us with intriguing accounts, both anecdotal and experimental, and their range tends to put in perspective the sense, if any, in which **we might wish** to claim that some were consciously purposive and others not.* (BNC, w_ac_hum)

In the utterance in (1), 'we' is used to refer to several different authors who were conducting the research, thus they must use the plural personal pronoun in order to signal the collective work. On the other hand, (2) represents 'we-inclusive', where plural form either refers to the writer and the immediate readership of the text or to the human beings in general, which is signalled by the use of 'us' in the

beginning of the sentence. Thus, the instances with 'we-inclusive' could not be included in the present analysis as it does not qualify with the aim of the present thesis. Some other uses which were as well omitted were direct citations, instances which did not include a performative verb, and any ambiguous cases of 'we' in order to avoid possible misinterpretation. Each hedged performative collected from the corpus had around 200-word context which would allow determining the function hedged performative has.

Another aspect to consider is to determine which hedged performatives should be included in the analysis. Because hedged performatives are constructed with the help of three components (personal pronoun 'I' or 'we-exclusive' + modal verb + performative verb), it is important to determine one of them, namely modal verbs, which would allow diminishing the scope. In this research analysis the decision was made that it would be useful to not only look into standard modal verbs, but to compare them with the forms which appear to function as modals. Similar analysis between different modal verbs is conducted by Fraser (1975) who introduces several distinct types of modal verbs and also claims that it is necessary to look into their differences because not all modals co-occur equally well with performative verbs. Thus, this research followed Fraser's (1975) study and concentrated on the following modal verbs discussed by the author:

1) Standard modals: personal pronouns 'I' and 'We' + *must, shall, will, would, might, could, should, can*;
2) Periphrastic versions of modals and forms which function like the modals: personal pronouns 'I' and 'We' + *want to, wish to, be going to, intend to, would like to*.

There were 13 distinct modal verbs included in the research which allowed to investigate and compare the use of hedged performatives in two academic fields and also to determine which modal verbs are more common and which are being avoided. The instances used in the empirical analysis section from the sub-corpus of medicine will be referred to as 'med' and from the sub-corpus of humanities will be referenced as 'hum'. All hedged performative instances together with the context taken from BNC will be listed in appendices and will be divided according to the academic field they were located.

Furthermore, the second component used in hedged performatives is a performative verb. As discussed in the introduction part, not all verbs are indeed performative, thus it is necessary to distinguish them in order to know which instances in BNC are hedged performatives and which are not. There are several possibilities to determine whether a verb is performative or not one of which is the 'hereby' test which will be applied in the present analysis. The test is simply to insert the word 'hereby' which "serves to indicate that the utterance (in writing) of the sentence is, as it is said, the instrument effecting the act of warning, authorizing, &c." (Austin, 1962, 57) and is one of the criteria to check if a certain verb is indeed

performative. It is so as 'hereby' carries the meaning that some action indicated next to this adverb is performed at the time of speaking. However, there is certain criticism regarding the application of this particular test. For instance, Austin (1962) claims that 'hereby' test is useful, but absolute criteria to determine the performative utterance is mood and tense. In addition, Thomas (1995) agrees that 'hereby' test is indeed useful; however, the author specifies that it is not infallible (ibid., 32).

The empirical analysis was divided into several sub-sections to distinguish different points of analysis. The first step was to overview the number of instances found in BNC and to check the normalised frequency due to the unequal number of words in each sub-corpus. The normalised frequency was calculated per 100,000 words as the size of each sub-corpus was greater than 1,000,000 words and the number of instances found in BNC was comparatively low. The next step was to examine which modal verb + performative verb combinations were the most frequent. Each modal verb was discussed in its dedicated sub-section and differences were provided. The last distinction was made according to the function hedged performatives perform. Three categories, introduced by Kaltenböck (2019), were chosen which are hedging, boosting, and discourse marking. The dominant function was introduced and compared to the other two functions within both academic fields.

2.2 Research methods

In order to achieve the objectives of the present thesis, the following research methods were applied to the gathering of data: qualitative, quantitative, and comparative. The qualitative research methods were used in analysing and synthesising the theoretical research necessary to comprehend the main notions discussed in the present thesis, such as hedged performatives, its role in the discussed academic fields, and the functions they perform.

The quantitative research methods were applied to collect the numerical data according to the above-mentioned distinctions and generate the total number of instances, their normalised frequencies in selected sub-corpora and to conduct the functional analysis of hedged performatives according to three-part functional analysis. In addition, statistical data was provided in each dedicated sub-section where differences were analysed. And lastly, the comparative method was used to compare the results from the sub-corpus of medicine and the sub-corpus of humanities. The results related to frequency, performative verb usage, and functions hedged performatives perform were discussed and their differences were reviewed. The present analysis is based on BNC corpus data. Due to this reason, this paper can be regarded as a corpus-based study.

III.   Empirical analysis

3.1 Overview: the frequencies of hedged performatives in medicine and humanities

After distinguishing hedged performatives from all the occurrences provided by BNC, the following numbers were collected:

Table 2. The overview of hedged performatives found in BNC

Academic discourse	All corpus hits	All cases of hedged performatives	Normalised frequency per 100,000 words
Medicine	434	83	5.9
Humanities	3331	460	14.0
Total	3765	543	11.6

The above table represents all the instances found in BNC under the categories of written academic discourse of medicine and written academic discourse of humanities. 3,765 instances of personal pronouns 'I' and 'We' + selected modal verbs were provided (column 1) from which only 83 instances were located in the field of medicine and 460 instances in the field of humanities. The recurrence of hedged performative constructions in both fields seems to be quite distinct as it differs around 8 times, thus the normalized frequency should be calculated. Hedged performatives in academic discourse appear to be not very frequent. As per the last column, which identifies the normalised frequency of how many hedged performatives were located within the sub-corpora of medicine and humanities per 100,000 words, the observation can be made that hedged performatives appear only 11.6 times per both fields. The general frequency, as per the above table, is proven to be different in both sub-corpora. One can observe that in medical discourse the frequency is lower more than 2 times if compared to humanities which proves that soft sciences tend to use more hedged performatives than hard sciences and that the difference is statistically significant.

The instances calculated and presented in the below figure illustrate the number of both 'I' and 'We' personal pronouns found in sub-corpora. The first two columns represent the sub-corpus of humanities while the next two refer to the sub-corpus of medicine.

Figure 1. *Normalised frequency of hedged performatives in the use of 'I' and 'We'*

The written academic discourse of medicine was analysed, and the results show that hedged performatives with first-person singular personal pronoun were used only 2.2 words per 100,000 words (31 times) and plural was used 3.9 words per 100,000 words (52 times). In contrast, sub-corpus of humanities had more various instances and there were 6.6 words per 100,000 words (219 instances) found with personal pronoun 'I' while 7.3 words per 100,000 words (246 cases) were found with personal pronoun 'We'. The difference shows that it is more common to use 'we-exclusive' rather than singular personal pronoun in hedged performative cases in both academic fields. It can either be used when the research is done by more than one author or if the author prefers to use a plural form instead of singular to refer to oneself.

While comparing the instances found in the discourse of medicine and humanities, there are some differences not only in the frequency but also in combinability patterns of personal pronoun and modal verb constructions which appeared as hedged performatives:

Table 3. The division of instances according to the modal verb and discourse field

Cases	I (medicine)	I (humanities)	We-exclusive (medicine)	We-exclusive (humanities)	Total
Must	0.2 (3 instances)	0.2 (6 instances)	0.2 (3 instances)	0.6 (20 instances)	1.2
Shall	**0**	**1.9** (63 instances)	**0**	**0.2** (8 instances)	**2.2**
Want to	0.1 (1 instance)	0.7 (22 instances)	0	0.1 (3 instances)	0.8
Wish to	0.3 (4 instances)	0.2 (5 instances)	0.3 (4 instances)	0.03 (1 instance)	0.7
Will	0.1 (1 instance)	1.0 (33 instances)	0.1 (1 instance)	0.2 (6 instances)	1.3
Be goint to	0	0.03 (1 instance)	0.1 (1 instance)	0	0.1

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Indend to	0	0	0	0.03 (1 instance)	0.0
Would like to	0.2 (3 instances)	0.2 (5 instances)	0.1 (2 instances)	0.1 (4 instances)	0.6
Would	**0.9** (13 instances)	**1.4** (46 instances)	**0.8** (12 instances)	**0.6** (21 instances)	**3.8**
Might	**0**	**0.2** (7 instances)	**0**	**1.3** (42 instances)	**1.5**
Could	0	0	0.5 (7 instances)	0.7 (24 instances)	1.2
Should	0	0.2 (7 instances)	0.1 (1 instance)	0.3 (11 instances)	0.6
Can	**0.4** (6 instances)	**0.7** (24 instances)	**1.5** (21 instances)	**3.0** (100 instances)	**5.7**
Total	2.2	6.6	3.7	7.3	

In general, the prevailing modal verbs in hedged performative constructions while considering both fields were 'would' and 'can'. 'Shall' was more frequent within the field of humanities while 'can' was common within both fields. For instance, 'shall' with the performative verb in academic research of humanities was used 71 times in total while in the medical field it was not used at all. Similarly, one can look into 'I can' and 'We can' combinations and their contrast. 'I' + 'can' appears 0.4 times in medicine and 0.7 times per 100,000 words in humanities while 'we' + 'can' is used 1.5 times in medicine and 3.0 times per 100,000 words in humanities. The difference is quite distinct per both personal pronouns analysed which is more significant with plural 'we'. Thus, it can be concluded that humanities have the leading number of instances almost in all cases with both personal pronouns 'I' and 'We'. To justify this claim, it is important to mention that there were no hedged performatives in the medical field with 3 out of 13 modal verbs and 4 out of 13 modal verbs had less than 3 hedged performative instances with modals discussed in the present research.

3.2 Most frequent hedged performative variations

Hedged performatives are comprised of personal pronoun + modal verb + performative verb. Modal verb together with performative verb usually determines the meaning of the claim. For instance, Fraser (1975) determines that certain modal + performative verb combinations have their own meaning such as 'must' + *suggest* in *I must suggest that you take it down* conveys the principle of obligation fulfilment (1975, 194). Thus, it is relevant to determine what combinations are most frequent in the present research in order to understand on what occasions they may usually be used. Each instance will be presented in its dedicated sub-sections.

3.2.1 Can

'Can' can be considered as the leading modal verb in this analysis. Usually, this modal verb has one meaning which was distinguished by Fraser as:

1) Principle of expressed ability: 'given nothing to suggest the contrary, whenever someone indicates that he has a new ability to act one can infer that he intends to exercise this ability' (1975, 201).

There were 151 BNC instances found which means that the use of 'can' was several times bigger than the use of any other modal in the list. As a consequence, the list of combinations, presented in the below table, is broader:

Table 4. Performative verbs with modal verb 'can' in both fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Number of times performative verb was used	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
Accept	2	Accept	5
Add	1	Appeal	1
Assume	2	Apply	2
Begin	1	Argue	1
Classify	1	Assess	1
Comment	1	Assume	6
Distinguish	2	Begin	3
Excuse	1	Call	12
Make	1	Cite	2
Predict	1	Claim	2
Promise	1	Conclude	7
Rule	3	Confirm	1
Say	3	Contemplate	1
Speculate	3	Declare	1
Suggest	1	Define	1
Tell	1	Deny	1
		Describe	2
		Disregard	1
		Distinguish	2
		Emphasise	1
		Find	5
		Hypothesise	1
		Identify	5
		Judge	2
		List	1
		Make	4
		Move on	1
		Note	1
		Offer	3
		Point to	3
		Recognise	1
		Regard	2
		Represent	1
		Say	33
		Specify	2

		Speculate	2
		Suppose	1
		Tell	5

In general, the majority of performative verbs used with modal verb 'can' appear to represent the act of stating something. In academic discourse, *say, argue, claim, tell, etc.* are used in order to show that based on opinion or some additional evidence the writer confirms that something is true or can be regarded as true in certain circumstances. *Predict, speculate, assume, contemplate, etc.* represent the category of performative verbs which refer to the action of supposing that something is true without having the necessary evidence. It can also be based on some previous research to form one's opinions about something based on given facts. Furthermore, *distinguish, classify, list, specify, etc.* are verbs which identify some sort of division or emphasise distinct categories of some notion. *Deny*, for instance, expresses the fact that something is not true or that the author rejects the argument.

The results indicate that sub-corpus of medicine consists of 6 hedged performative cases with first-person singular personal pronoun and 21 cases with plural. On the other hand, sub-corpus of humanities includes 24 instances with 'I' and 100 instances with 'We'. The numbers are quite distinct, however, even though the field of medicine had only 27 instances in total, it was still the most common modal verb in this analysis. The most frequent performative verbs which appeared with modal verb 'can' in medical writing were *rule, say*, and *speculate* which had 3 hedged performative instances each. Similarly, hedged performatives with 'can' were most common in humanities as well with 124 cases. The most frequent performative verbs were *say* with 33 instances, *call* with 12 instances, and *conclude* with 7 instances.

(3)   *Furthermore, **we can assume** that this mechanical effect is similar for all preparations tested and does not greatly influence the results of the mucosal concentrations.* (med)

(4)   *If we look at the effects of corruption on program performance **we can identify** three broad categories.* (hum)

In general, hedged performatives occurring with modal verb 'can' can be the markers of expressed ability to perform an act which is defined by the performative verb used as this modal verb in itself contains the meaning of being able to perform some act. For instance, (3) contains the combination of 'can' + *assume* which express the writer's ability to assume that something is true. It represents the claim that after conducting some level of the research or study the authors are able to give the assumption which is based on some evidence and their personal judgement. The facts which were probably provided in previous sentences allow to base their conclusions and make it more plausible. When using modal verb 'can', the authors construct the possibility to both project themselves and their readers into their arguments. Similarly, the emphasis is made in (4), the only difference is that authors refer to the act of

identifying some categories based on the research done on the effects of corruption. Their argument signals well assured personal judgement which allows the reader to have a complete trust in what is said. These cases show how modal verb can aid to perform emphasis on the argument and 'can' normally manifests confidence and assertiveness.

To conclude, one can say that modal verb 'can' is the most relevant modal in the academic discourse of medicine and especially humanities. This modal verb might be used both as a shield and as a booster and according to Fraser (1975), its meaning is related to expressing the ability to perform an act.

3.2.2 Must

As previously mentioned, the modal verb 'must' combined with certain verbs can have different meanings. Fraser (1975) determines three distinct meanings which are the following:

1) Principle of obligation fulfilment: 'given nothing to suggest the contrary, whenever someone has an obligation to perform some action one can infer that he will perform that action';
2) Principle of unspecified time: 'given nothing to suggest the contrary, whenever the time of an action is left unspecified one can infer that the agent is expected to perform the action at the earliest chance';
3) Principle of efficiency: 'given nothing to suggest the contrary, whenever a further utterance would be redundant one can infer that the speaker need not make the utterance but that he will operate as if he had made it and will expect the hearer to operate similarly'.

(ibid., 194-195)

Thus, the instances collected from BNC might be analysed taking into consideration the meanings related to these principles:

Table 5. Performative verbs with modal verb 'must' in both academic fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Number of times performative verb was used	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
Claim	1	Accept	3
Disagree	1	Acknowledge	1
Distinguish	1	Add	1
Emphasise	2	Admit	4
Take	1	Affirm	1
		Allow	1
		Begin	1
		Choose	1
		Conclude	2
		Confess	2
		Distinguish	1
		Emphasise	2
		Make	1
		Note	1
		Regret	1
		Reject	1
		Say	1

		Warn	1

Similarly as with 'can', many performative verbs act as statements of truthfulness, supposition, and division. The main difference is that there were no hedged performatives with *deny*, but instead, it was more appropriate to use 'must' with *disagree* or *reject*. Both academic fields under analysis use quite similar categories of performative verbs to perform writer's position towards the argument.

In medical academic writing, the results show that there were 3 cases of hedged performatives used with the personal pronoun 'I' and the same number used with the personal pronoun 'We'. On the other hand, academic writing in the field of humanities had 6 instances with 'I' and 21 instances with 'we'. *Emphasise* was the most common in the written medical field which appeared 2 times and other verbs were used only once. In comparison, humanities had 4 hedged performatives with *admit*, 3 with *accept*, and 2 with *conclude*, *confess*, and *emphasise*.

(5) ***We must emphasise*** *that non-randomised comparisons of heparin and no heparin in ISIS-2 may be subject to substantial bias.* (med)

(6) ***We must conclude***, *therefore, that the duty to support just institutions, where it has to do with just authorities, is parasitical on the normal justification thesis, and not an alternative to it.* (hum)

In the instances (5) and (6), 'must' acts as a verb for obligation fulfilment which signals the speaker's commitment to the argument. This modal verb is usually used to strengthen the commitment which allows to gain reader's acceptance of the argument. Both 'I' and 'We-exclusive' indicates that the statement is rather personal perspective and followed by 'must' it signals strong identification of individual viewpoint. In general, modal verb 'must' followed by any performative verb can be considered as having strong illocutionary force in both medicine and humanities and is mostly used as a marker of strong personal attitude.

Performative verbs used with modal verb 'must' appear to normally have assertive function and fall under the first principle which is obligation fulfilment. The constructions presented in table 5 can be used to strengthen the obligation as is presented in the above instances (5) and (6). The reader might acknowledge speaker's certainty and commitment by acknowledging the use of modal verb 'must'.

3.2.3 Shall/Will/Be going to/Intend to

'Shall', 'will', 'be going to', and 'intend to' were presented and analysed together as they have a similar meaning which is a reference to the future act. Fraser (1975) analysed them together and distinguished one main meaning these 4 modal verbs might carry:

1) Principle of asserted intention: 'given nothing to suggest the contrary, whenever a speaker asserts his intent to perform some act one can infer that he will actually perform the act'.

(ibid., 205)

The two more common modal verbs of this category which are used in academic writing were 'shall' and 'will'. Fraser (1975) considers that 'shall' is synonymous to other 3 modal verbs presented in this sub-section and identifies that it sometimes can appear in hedged performatives.

Table 6. Performative verbs with modal verb 'shall' in the academic discourse of humanities

Performative verbs in medicine	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
-	Adopt	1
	Analyse	1
	Apply	1
	Argue	22
	Begin	3
	Call	13
	Comment	1
	Conclude	2
	Designate	1
	Dispute	1
	Distinguish	1
	Find	2
	Maintain	3
	Make	2
	Note	1
	Offer	1
	Present	1
	Question	1
	Refer	1
	Restrict	2
	Say	1
	Suggest	3
	Take	2
	Term	1

'Shall' has occurred most times if compared to other modal verbs which will be presented in this sub-section. It is worth mentioning that 'shall' only appeared in hedged performatives found in sub-corpus of humanities and no instances were found in the field of medicine. Some performative verbs used with this modal verb can be assigned acceptance or approval meaning and they are as follows *adopt, apply, designate, etc*. Together with 'shall', these performative verbs refer to the writer's approval of the argument. *Question*, for instance, is a marker of one's negative attitude towards the claim which signals that the statement is arguable. There are obviously recurrent performative verbs, such as *argue* or *say*, and some new verbs which apply to the same category of confirming that the statement is true. Such verbs are *note* and *present*. The above-mentioned performative verbs allow the writer to communicate

their position towards the argument, the intended meaning, and also the level of space left for further interpretations.

Some more common co-occurrences were with performative verbs *argue* (23 hits, 33% of all instances), *call* (13 hits, 18% of all instances), and *suggest* (3 hits, 4% of all instances). Other (32 hits, 45% of all instances) verbs, such as *question, present*, and *offer* were found only once or twice:

(7) ***I shall argue*** *for the importance of this history for all three kinds of difference -- sexual, cultural, and semiotic -- as they figure in current theory.* (hum)

(8) ***I shall suggest*** *that there is a sense in which the very notion of a homosexual sensibility is a contradiction in terms.* (hum)

'Shall', as presented in the above utterances (7) and (8), has the meaning of presenting one's intention to perform some act in the near future. Modal verb 'shall' is considered as an expression of strong assertion and intention, thus due to this reason it is possible that writers tend to use this modal in order to make their claim more credible. It can be associated with the boosting function as in the example (7) where the claim is emphasised and certain level of assertion is assigned to the utterance. One can use 'shall' with personal pronouns 'I' and 'we' in a piece of writing to say that one is going to discuss or explain something in a near future. The audience can make an inference that the action will be indeed completed.

Comparably, we can mention the second modal verb in this sub-section which is 'will'. In the same way as other modal verbs under this sub-section, 'will' is carrying the meaning of planned future intention.

Table 7. Performative verbs with modal verb 'will' in both academic fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Number of times performative verb was used	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
Restrict	2	Add	2
		Adopt	1
		Argue	5
		Assume	2
		Begin	3
		Call	7
		Characterise	1
		Concede	1
		Conclude	2
		Define	1
		Make	1
		Offer	3
		Point out	1
		Propose	1
		Recognise	1
		Restrict	2
		Suggest	3
		Take	1

The data show that in total there were only 2 cases of hedged performatives used in written academic discourse of medicine and each personal pronoun had 1 instance. Both hedged performatives were used with performative verb *restrict* which is a marker of one's limitation towards some sort of action. On the contrary, the sub-corpus of humanities had 33 instances with 'I' and only 6 instances with 'We'. The most frequent verbs in this category were *call* with 7 uses, *argue* with 5 uses, and *restrict, begin,* and *offer* with 3 uses in hedged performatives.

(9)   ***I will argue***, *however, that a) and b) are apparent rather than real.* (hum)

(10)   ***I will suggest***, *as a first example of this, a book by Suzanne Lowry, on Princess Diana, called The Princess in the Mirror (1985).* (hum)

In both (9) and (10), the utterances indicate the intent to perform a particular illocutionary act at some point in the future which is followed by the hearer's inference that the act will indeed be completed. 'Will' can be used based on some evidence or to indicate the expectation for some future action. For the cases with modal verb 'will', there is a possibility for a writer to neutralise the implied performative force of the utterance by using a disclaimer which will instantly signal no intent to complete the action (Fraser, 1975, 206). Such disclaimers could be presented through the use of *unless, if*, or alike, however, no such instances were found in the present analysis.

In addition, Fraser (1975) included two other modal verbs into this group that are 'be going to' and 'intend to'. However, there were too few examples, thus no distinction with frequencies was necessary, but instances are still worth mentioning. 'Be going to' appeared next to such verbs as *say* in humanities and *make* in medicine while 'intend to' only appeared once in medicine with *regard.* In total, there were only 3 hedged performative instances found in the corpus.

Thus, in general, modal verbs under this category have a clear reference to some future intended actions which are described by performative verb collocating with the modals. The dominant modal verb used to refer to some intended future acts is 'shall', next is 'will', and 'be going to' as well as 'intend to' are almost never used in both academic fields of medicine and humanities.

3.2.4 Would/Might/Could/Should

This sub-category of modal verbs is described as having similar meanings when used in hedged performative constructions. Even though Fraser does not mention any principle, he claims that these modal verbs are usually used when the speaker feels like offering his opinion (both when asked and when not being asked) (1975, 208). Thus, this type can be named as principle of offering one's opinion at the time of writing.

As per table 3, it can be claimed that 'would' co-occurs the most, with 'might' behind, then goes 'could' and the last is 'should'.

Table 8. Performative verbs with modal verb 'would' in both fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Number of times performative verb was used	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
(Dis)Agree	4	Add	5
Add	2	Agree	3
Advise	2	Argue	10
Advocate	1	Call	5
Argue	2	Claim	2
Ask	1	Classify	1
Conclude	1	Come	1
Recommend	5	Commit	1
Remind	1	Dismiss	1
Say	1	Insist	2
Suggest	5	Mention	1
		Prefer	1
		Propose	3
		Regard	3
		Say	7
		Suggest	4
		Warn	1
		Wish	4

The results indicate that 13 cases of hedged performatives used in first-person singular and 12 instances used in first-person plural were found in the field of medicine. The most common performatives were *recommend, suggest, and (dis)agree*. Together with *suggest, recommend* brings another category of performative verbs which determines opinion-based recommendation. In contrast, humanities had 46 instances with 'I' and 21 instances with 'We'. This sub-corpus had the largest number of *argue* with 10 and *say* with 7 co-occurrences out of 67 total instances. Other performative verbs, such as *add* and *call,* were used 5 times. In humanities, hedged performatives were usually used as statements referring to the statement being true as 'can' and 'must'.

(11) *In summary, **I would argue** that there is no clear indication for angioplasty as the primary procedure for acute myocardial infarction, particularly in the light of the mortality results following thrombolytic treatment.* (med)

(12) ***We would recommend** a similar response definition in future studies of the treatment of TIH.* (med)

'Would', in the above examples, identifies writer's intent to provide personal opinion towards some argument. Differently from 'will', 'would' can be used in the arguments which are referring to the present time of writing as in above-mentioned instance (11). In (11), the person who is using a

performative verb *argue* is signalling the reader that it is distinctly an opinion leaving a room for objection or for the fact that this argument could be false. For instance, the construction 'I argue' would be more assertive, definite, and non-questionable if contrasted with the one which contains a modal verb 'would'. If there is space for different interpretations, it is usually due to the lack of commitment towards the proposition and writer uses hedging to create it. Similarly, the instance provided in (12) points out to recommendation which is primarily based on one's assessment and judgement towards the conducted study, but not on the fact that is completely correct due to the expressed opinion. *We would recommend* can be seen as synonymous to *we will recommend* in this particular instance as it refers to some suggestions for the future study. However, 'would' seems to be more uncertain as 'will' signals higher level of commitment towards the argument while 'would' leaves more space for the interpretation and for the refusal of such proposition.

The second most used modal verb in this sub-section is 'might'. In total, it was used 157 times and is the fourth most common modal verb in this research. However, as per table 9, it can be observed that BNC did not have any instances in the field of medicine which would have been applicable to this research.

Table 9. Performative verbs with modal verb 'might' in both fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
-	Accept	1
	Add	7
	Admit	1
	Adopt	1
	Allow	1
	Argue	2
	Ask	1
	Assume	1
	Begin	2
	Call	4
	Classify	1
	Comment	1
	Conclude	1
	Describe	1
	Find	2
	Formulate	1
	Hold	1
	Identify	1
	Note	2
	Object	1
	Place	1
	Say	7
	Speculate	1
	Take	2
	Tell	1
	Term	1

	Wish	3

Thus, all the instances with 'might' were only collected from the field of humanities and performative verbs with which it co-occurred are listed above. The majority of performatives are functioning similarly as mentioned in the previous sub-sections, however, 'might' appears with wish as well which determines the desire to perform an act described by the argument. 'Personal pronoun + might + *say/add'* were the most frequent combinations with 7 instances each which comprises 14% of all instances respectively. Other more common performative verbs were *call* with 3 occurrences and *wish* with 3.

(13) ***We might suggest*** *that in conceiving the rule for + 2, we somehow already conceived all the instances, and this is what makes it the case that the' correct' interpretation is correct.* (hum)

(14) *... they are not,* ***I might add****, of the kind I thought I would come to when I began working on it.* (hum)

Similarly as (13) and (14), the above utterances refer to offering certain opinion. However, 'might' creates more distance as it seems to be even more uncertain than 'would'. The instance in (13) refers to the desire to make a suggestion, but by adding 'might' it represents the lack of commitment to the statement thus leaving the reader not convinced. The instance in (14) represent one of the few instances where hedged performatives are used as discourse markers, but its meaning and purpose can still be considered similar to other modal verbs in this sub-section. *I might add* is presented as filler, phrase in isolation, which does not contribute to the overall meaning of the sentence and if discarded, would not change the idea in the sentence. It is rather used for the emphasis or can be considered as a marker to the shared knowledge.

The two less frequent modal verbs found hedged performatives are 'could' and 'should'. There are no instances of 'could' with first-person singular personal pronoun in both academic fields but 7 cases with first-person plural personal pronoun were found in sub-corpus 1 and 24 cases in sub-corpus 2. The use of this modal verb is 2 to 3 times smaller if compared to other modals already presented in this sub-section.

Table 10. Performative verbs with modal verb 'could' in both fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Number of times performative verb was used	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
Confirm	1	Ask	1
Find	2	Call	3
Identify	2	Define	2
Specify	2	Describe	1
		Distinguish	2

		Hypothesise	1
		Identify	1
		Insist	1
		Make	2
		Replace	2
		Require	1
		Say	4
		Suggest	1
		Take	1

Specify, identify, and *find* were the most frequent performatives in the field of medicine with 2 cases each where *specify* and *identify* refer to the act of making the argument more specific and *find* refers to a discovery made by the research. As it is usual in the academic discourse, humanities used such verb as say most frequently due to the fact that it refers to an opinion or some additional evidence of the writer who confirms that something is true or can be regarded as true in certain circumstances. 'Could' + *say* was the most common option in the written academic discourse, however, it appeared only 4 times which comprise 13% of all instances. *Call* was only used 3 times each which comprise 10% of all instances.

(15)   ***We could call*** *this a 'defeasible' or 'prima facie' justification; it is weaker than that provided by indubitability, because it countenances the possibility that there be reasons against a basic belief.* (hum)

(16)   *On the one hand **we could insist** that the creatures had to be conscious of their goals; that the salmon, for example, smells its home stream.* (hum)

In a similar way as 'might', 'could' seems to carry a certain level of uncertainty which is greater than compared with 'would'. It indicates that something is possibly true and that the possibility depends on other conditions. *We could call* in (15) instantly describes that justification is probable, but not certain. This might be due to the lack of available information on the terminology provided in the argument which might cause the writer to show less commitment. On the other hand, 'could' can act as an assertive modal verb as in (16). Even though it does not have equally strong illocutionary force as *we insist,* the phrase *we could insist* suggests strong personal judgement in the argument as it contains strong performative verb. It can definitely be judged by the immediate audience, but it is likely that the audience would agree with the claim as writer presents the argument with the confidence.

The distant fourth is 'should'. It is unevenly distributed in the discussed academic fields with only 1 case in medical discourse and 24 instances in humanities. It was one of the five least used modal verbs within the scope of this research even though the similar meaning and function can be attributed to 'should' as it was attributed to other 3 modals presented in this sub-section. 'Should' and 'must' can be both used in the instances where one must express obligation or requirement, but 'must' is restricted to this only meaning while 'should', for instance, is different because it might signal probability, some level of

obligation, or can be used as recommendation. This modal does have a broader scope of possibilities of its usage which are presented in the below table.

Table 11. Performative verbs with modal verb 'should' in both fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Number of times performative verb was used	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
Move on	1	Accept	1
		Add	1
		Ask	3
		Begin	1
		Call	1
		Draw	1
		Emphasise	2
		Make	1
		Mention	1
		Note	1
		Reject	1
		Say	2
		State	1
		Take	2

The only instance in medicine was 'we + should + *move on'*. 'Move on' refers to the transition from one point to another and can be used in academic discourse to link separate ideas. Other performative verbs were located in the field of humanities, however, hedged performatives with modal 'should' appeared to be not very common. The majority of the instances found were used only once while *ask, emphasise, say*, and *take* were more common with 2 to 3 occurrences. *Emphasise* and *draw* can refer to the group of verbs which refer to attracting attention to a particular claim and they are used in order to signal the audience that a certain argument is more important than the other.

The following performative verbs were located in sub-corpus 2 together with 'should': *ask* (3 hits, 14% of all instances), *emphasise* (2 hits, 10% of all instances), and other not very common instances such as *reject, accept, state,* etc:

(17) *But I think **I should** , finally, **draw** attention to a difference between what might be called facts of physical nature and facts of human nature.* (hum)

(18) *... **I should emphasise** that I am here using the term' entity' in the broadest possible sense ...* (hum)

With such adverbs as *perhaps* or constructions *I/we think* used just before hedged performatives the writer can create some additional ambiguity towards one's claims. When it is used in such instances as in (17), writer combines 'should' with *I think* to construct the hedging function with clearly states lack of commitment. Hedged performatives combined with such phrases tend to double the uncertainty or

make the expression less definite or more polite. Similarly as with *draw*, 'should' + *emphasise* refers to the expressed opinion that the argument must be emphasised in order to inform the audience of its importance.

It can be concluded that modal verbs which fall under this sub-category are usually related to the certain level of probability and the speaker's opinion. These opinion-related modals can be used in the situations where writer might wish to leave some space for different interpretation or even for the possibility that the statement is not completely correct. Thus, it is more logical to use modal verbs in order to show that the utterance is more related to personal judgement than it is a non-negotiable claim. The most common of the four is 'would' while the least used option is 'should'. For the modal verb 'should', it is important to emphasise that it can act in a similar manner as 'must' in the expressions of obligation but can also be attributed the meaning of probability or recommendation.

3.2.5 Want to/Would like to/Wish to

'Want to', 'would like to', and 'wish to' were described as performatives that might be treated as modals (Fraser 1975, 202). The author distinguishes their primary meaning as a request for permission which is the main principle of the modal verbs presented in this sub-section:

1) Principle of permission seeking: 'given nothing to suggest the contrary, whenever a speaker requests permission to act, one can infer that he will act, once given the permission' (ibid., 203).

Thus, 'want to', 'wish to', and 'would like to' are already the markers of desire as they include the verb which signals it. In academic writing fields which were analysed in this research, the most frequent is 'want to'. 'Would like to' and 'wish to' were less common and were found equal number of times.

Table 12. Performative verbs with modal verb 'want to' in both fields

Performative verbs in medicine	Number of times performative verb was used	Performative verbs in humanities	Number of times performative verb was used
Emphasise	1	Argue	1
		Ask	1
		Begin	2
		Draw	3
		Emphasise	2
		Find	1
		Identify	1
		Make	3
		Mention	1
		Say	2
		Suggest	4
		Take	2
		Undertake	2

The field of medicine only had one instance of hedged performative in the sub-corpus and it occurred with performative verb *emphasise* which refers to identifying importance or giving more attention to one's claims. There are several performatives in the field of humanities which also have this meaning, however, the most frequent was *suggest* as per (19) which refers to the writer's recommendations. 'Want to' was indeed not common in medical written language and only appeared once with first-person singular personal pronoun. Sub-corpus of humanities consisted of 25 instances in total with 22 cases with singular and only 3 with plural personal pronoun. Some of the instances found in BNC are as follows:

(19)   *... **I want to suggest** some ways of thinking about television genre, which, though they will not deal with particular programme categories, may open out some more complex ways of thinking about the aesthetics and poetics of television.* (hum)

(20)   ***I want to emphasize** the element of logical and historical consequence rather than sheer temporal posteriority.* (hum)

(19) and (20) represent the intent to perform an act of suggesting and emphasising certain arguments and, similarly as other hedged performatives, allow the writer to emphasise one's personal opinion. 'Want to' in itself indicates strong desire for something to happen, thus it is reasonable to say that the instances provided above reflect strong illocutionary force even though it is based on writer's attitude towards the proposition.

The least likely to be used in written academic discourse of medicine and humanities are 'would like to' and 'wish to'. In total, there were 14 instances found in BNC with each modal verb. There were too few instances for the comparison, however, they are still important to the thesis. 'Would like to' collocated with such verbs as *point out, add, express, mention*, etc. and had a total of 5 hedged performative instances in medicine and 9 instances in humanities. In contrast, 'wish to' appeared with *reassure, respond, suggest, maintain*, and some others and had 8 hedged performatives in medicine while 6 instances in humanities.

Modals presented in this sub-section normally appears with performative verbs with which they construct the expression of speaker's desire. It can function both as a shield or a booster which signals speaker's level of certainty and commitment. The more frequent function is shield (hedging) function, but there were a few instances of boosting (emphasising) function as well.

In general, the conclusion can be made that due to having a larger sub-corpus and a wider range of hedged performative cases, the performative verbs recorded in the field of humanities were more diverse. There were 91 distinct performative verbs distinguished in humanities and most common were *say* with

59, then *call* with 55, and *argue* with 42 occurrences. In contrast, the total number of performative verbs found in medicine is more than 2 times lower than in humanities. There were 39 distinct performative verbs distinguished in sub-corpus 1 and the most frequent were *suggest* with 6 and *recommend* with 5 occurrences. The majority of performatives appear to function as confirmation that according to the author a particular statement is true. *Claim, say*, or *argue* can be used to show the writer's position. Furthermore, another more frequent group of verbs, such as *predict, speculate*, or *assume*, in the analysis was the one which refer to the act of supposing that something is true. The claim can be based on some evidence or have no evidence at all and such verbs then show personal judgement rather than a non-negotiable claim. *Distinguish, classify*, or *list* are performatives which act as identification of certain division or emphasise on some distinct categories. It is used when the writer would like to make a distinction of different points or classifications. Some categories of performative verbs were not common and were not used with all modal verbs. For instance, *deny, reject*, or *object* refer to the expressed negative opinion about the claim and rejection of the argument. *Wish*, on the other hand, imposes the desire to perform some mentioned act and is a marker of the writer's attitude. The above-mentioned groups were predominant in both academic fields under analysis, only the number of co-occurrences slightly differs.

3.4 Functions

As already discussed in the introduction, hedged performatives have certain functions they can perform. Different authors might use some different approaches to study them and adapt various classifications; however, this paper will only apply three-part classification introduced by Kaltenböck (2019) who claims that it is possible to identify three distinct functions of hedged performatives: 1) shield (hedging), 2) boosting (emphasis), and 3) discourse marking.

Table 13. Three-part functional classification and its normalised frequency per 100,000 words

	Shield	Booster	Discourse marker
Medicine	2.8	3.0	0.1
Humanities	5.6	7.1	1.3

Table 13 introduces the number of instances each function has. In both written academic fields hedged performatives are usually used for boosting, to strengthen the claim. Around 51% of all instances appear to have the boosting function in a sentence. They were distinguished according to the meaning hedged performative had and looking into the qualities boosters should contain. Thus, when analysing the instances in BNC, it was important to remember that boosting function acts as emphasise which allows

writers to express their higher level of certainty towards the argument. Boosters put an emphasis on shared information, signal to higher level of force, and display commitment to statements. As opposed to hedging, boosting function restrict the negotiating space available to the audience. Thus, in the analysis the above-mentioned statements were taken into consideration while distinguishing the instances which have boosting function. Following are some of the instances which were categorised as boosters:

(21) ***I must emphasise*** *that I was not asked to determine the capacity to give consent, but simply to complete the paperwork.* (med)

(22) ***I can promise*** *you, however, that if you walk around for three weeks with a chest pain, fearing a heart attack at the age of 43, and you are told you have a hiatus hernia you feel a great relief. It was then natural for me to celebrate.* (med)

In general, instances having modal verb 'must' were mostly boosters. This might be due to the fact that 'must' in itself implicates the meaning of certainty, emphasise, obligation, expression of opinion that is very likely. In medicine, there were 6 cases of hedged performatives collected from BNC and all appeared to have boosting function. Similarly, as in sub-corpus of medicine, in humanities there were 27 instances of hedged performatives with modal verb 'must' and boosters comprised 85% of all instances. In (21), the author expresses strong personal assessment and modal verb aids at strengthening and emphasising the argument. Due to the above-mentioned observations, it is reasonable to assume that any weaker modal verb would change the level of commitment in a negative way. 'Can' + *promise,* as in (22), shows writer's involvement and emphasise on the performative verb. This instance indicates the higher level of writer's assertive judgement. In written academic discourse of medicine, there were a total of 9 cases with modal verb 'can' while in humanities there were 60 cases acting as boosters.

The second comes shield function which can also be called hedging. This function consists of 41 % of all analysed instances. They were distinguished according to the meaning hedged performative carries and looking into the qualities shields, or hedging, should have. In general, hedging function shows the lack or withdrawal of writer's commitment and is usually used in cases where writer is not completely sure about the accuracy of the claim or presents one's beliefs. The function hedging has is that it indicates the degree of confidence the writer assigns to a certain claim and it determines the space for different interpretations. Hedged performatives might be presented with some adverbs, such as *perhaps*, or constructions *I think* before the performative construction which signals the uncertainty of the claim.

(23) ***I would recommend*** *that you use a thrombolytic agent of choice.* (med)

(24) *Before beginning our discussion, however,* ***we should perhaps emphasise*** *once more the distinction between an error and a variation.* (hum)

Modal verb 'might' was usually found in the instances where hedged performatives act as shields. There were no instances of 'might' in sub-corpus of medicine, however, in sub-corpus of humanities, there were 40 instances out of 50 where hedged performatives had the function of hedging. As in (23), 'would' + *recommend* present a lower degree of confidence signalling to the audience that the claim can only be considered as questionable personal judgement. With 'should', for instance, there were no hedging function found in the instances from medical academic discourse. In humanities, there were 9 instances out of 20 which were classified as having shield function. One of the instances from the field of humanities is (24). Here, as mentioned above, modal verb is accompanied by an adverb *perhaps* which creates additional uncertainty towards the proposition. If writers, for instance, cannot report their research with confidence, they must express their arguments more cautiously by using hedged performatives and, as in (24) hedges such as *perhaps*.

The last function discussed by Kaltenböck is discourse marking. Only around 8% of instances in the present research were identified as having this function. 'Shall' was one of the modal verbs which had the dominant number of instances of discourse markers. In general, the modal verb 'shall' used in humanities had 16 instances of hedged performative used as a discourse marker while the rest 30 instances distributed unevenly throughout other modal verbs. Discourse markers make no change to the general meaning and act more as fillers, links between ideas. Thus, hedged performatives which applied to this description were ascribed to the function of discourse marking. Several instances of discourse marking function can be found below:

(25) *In their understandable anxiety to save what could be saved of Greek life by cooperating with the Romans, Polybius and,* **we must add***, Posidonius, had left unexplored the most solid substructures of the Roman-Italian complex.* (hum)

(26) *I argued earlier that there was no necessary connection between the two families of notions (of access and repair), and the present example suggests,* **I would claim***, that there is no factual connection either.* (hum)

(25) and (26) were considered as discourse markers as they both act as fillers in a sentence. They are used to emphasise, to involve the reader, however, do not contribute to the general meaning of the sentence. As these hedged performatives are in a way isolated, it would not be possible to assess their meaning and ascribe them to neither of other two functions.

The results show that boosting function is most frequent in both written academic fields, however, the dominant function is not that distinct in medicine as it is in humanities. In sub-corpus of medicine, there were 42 instances assigned the boosting function and 40 instances assigned hedging function. On the other hand, in sub-corpus of humanities, there were 235 cases which had boosting function and 186

which had hedging function. The boosting function comprises around 51% of all instances in both academic fields, hedging function comprises 48% in the field of medicine and 40% in the field of humanities, and discourse marking function comprises around 1% in the field of medicine and 9% in the field of humanities. The conclusion can be made that boosting function is equally frequent in both fields, hedging function is more frequent in medicine than in humanities, and discourse marking function is almost never used in medicine, but is more common in humanities.

3.5 Comparison with previous studies

The results of this present research can be compared with several previous empirical works related to the functions analysed in this thesis. For instance, Hyland (1998a) examined 56 research articles from seven journals in eight distinct disciplines. After he analysed the compiled corpus, the results show that boosters were less frequent than hedges and appeared 5.88 times per 1,000 words while hedges appeared 14.60 times. Furthermore, Hyland (1998a) also identified disciplinary differences which are the following:

Table 14. Hyland's distinction of disciplinary differences (ibid., 357)

Discipline	Boosters per 1,000 words
Applied Linguistics	6.2
Biology	3.9

The results show quite distinct disciplinary differences between humanities/social sciences and other sciences. In his analysis, Hyland found that soft sciences contained about 2.5 times as many hedges and boosters than hard sciences and he provided an argument that it is due to the 'preference for impersonal strategies' (1998a, 371). In comparison, the present analysis identifies that in the field of medicine, boosters appear only 0.03 times per 1,000 words while Hyland (1998a) identifies 3.9 words per 1,000 words. On the other hand, the results in humanities in the present paper show that boosters only appear 0.07 times per 1,000 words while Hyland (1998a) results with 6.2 words in applied linguistics only. The difference is indeed significant as statistically Hyland found more boosters in his analysed papers within the smaller corpus.

In addition, Peacock (2006) conducted the analysis of 216 published research articles in six distinct disciplines. The author analysed boosters only and found 11,517 boosters in the compiled corpus.

Table 15. Peacock's distinction of disciplinary differences (ibid., 69)

Discipline	Boosters per 1,000 words	Boosters per paper
Language and Linguistics	10.98	72

Peacock suggests that the list of boosters which was analysed in the study was longer and more comprehensive than the ones before. Due to this reason, there are differences in the frequency in different disciplines. For instance, Peacock (2006) found that the category of Language and Linguistics was the dominant category with 10.98 instances per 1,000 words while in Hyland's (1998a) study Applied Linguistics was behind Philosophy and Marketing with 6.2 instances per 1,000 words. Peacock's (2006) study did not focus on the field of medicine, thus only the findings in humanities can be compared. The results show that Peacock's corpus consists of 1,259,187 words and there were 72 boosters found per 1 analysed paper which equals 10.98 boosters per 1,000 words. The findings in the present thesis differ around 10 times which signals the lower use of hedged performatives in general and that even though booster function was the dominant one in the present thesis it is still not frequent if compared with other studies.

Another study to mention is Takimoto's (2014) study on hedges and boosters in English academic articles. As per the author, this study was inspired by Hyland's 1998 study and similarly as discussed above the study consisted of 56 research articles from seven journals in eight disciplines in three study fields of cultural sciences, social sciences, and natural sciences. The results show that around 70% of all hedges and boosters occurred in humanities and social sciences with philosophy papers being the dominant field in their usage. Takimoto's results show the dominance of hedges while the number of boosters was around 2 times lower in all analysed disciplines. For instance, the data in the field of linguistics identify that hedges appear 23.46 times and boosters appear 11.9 times per 1,000 words. Thus, Takimoto's analysis differs not only in the total normalised frequencies which are noticeably higher, but it also differs because boosting function is predominant in the present paper while Takimoto claims that hedges are significantly more frequent in his research.

Modal verbs in English academic discourse were analysed by Hardjanto (2016) who was looking into the hedging function it performs. According to the author, modal verbs are more frequent in soft sciences than in hard sciences, but the use of the same modals in health sciences in comparison with soft and hard sciences does not show any significant difference.

Table 16. Hardjanto's distinction of disciplinary differences per 10,000 words (ibid., 41)

Modal auxiliaries	Linguistics	Medicine
May	15.8	9.3
Would	8.5	5.5
Will	5.9	2.1
Might	2.6	6.4
Could	1.7	4.7
Should	3.4	1.6
Can	1.0	0.3
Must	0.1	0
Total	38.9	29.9

Table 16 represents individual differences between the use of modal verbs which have hedging function. It seems that, for instance, hedging function had a total of 38.9 instances per 10,000 words in the field of linguistics while 29.9 instances in the field of medicine. The most frequent modal in both fields was 'may'. In comparison, the results in the present thesis show that the most frequent modal verb in both fields was 'can' while Hardjanto claims that 'can' is one of the less frequent modals in academic discourse. As per the table above, another difference is that 'might' and 'could' seem to be more common in the field of medicine, however, the analysis conducted in BNC seems to confirm that the majority of modal verbs are more frequently used in humanities.

The previous studies done on hedging and boosting show different results in terms of frequency and dominant function. The present thesis had significantly lower frequency in terms of both sub-corpora. Also, what is worth considering, it seems that hedging was more common in previous studies and boosters were less common. In contrast, the analysis in this paper confirmed that boosting function was the dominant one. This is probably due to the more extensive list of items under analysis in the previous studies as the present research analysed 13 distinct modal verbs which appeared in hedged performatives only.

IV. Conclusions

The analysis of hedged performatives in the fields of medicine and humanities in terms of the meaning and function suggest several conclusions according to the set objectives:

The categories of 'Written Academic Medicine' (W_ac_medicine) and 'Written Academic Humanities' (W_ac_hum_arts) were chosen that consisted of 1,412,808 and 3,296,072 words, respectively. By employing the 'hereby' test and omitting direct citations and instances with 'we-inclusive' from the two-sub-corpora, the data shows that the total number of 548 instances of hedged performatives were located. 83 hedged performatives were located in the sub-corpus of medicine and 460 expressions in the sub-corpus of humanities. As two sub-corpora are quite distinct in the size, the normalised frequency was necessary for the comparison of the data. The results identified that written academic medical discourse uses approximately 6 hedged performatives per 100,000 words, and humanities uses around 14 per 100,000 words.

The overall analysis of hedged performatives allows to study the meaning of hedged performatives by the modal and performative verb used in the expression. The total number of identified performative verbs is 91 in humanities and 39 in medicine. The majority of performatives appear to function as confirmation that according to the author a particular statement is true. *Claim, say*, or *argue* can be used to show the writer's position. *Predict, speculate*, or *assume* is the group of performatives that refers to the act of supposing that something is true. The claim can be based on some evidence or have no evidence at all, and such verbs then show personal judgement rather than a non-negotiable claim. *Distinguish, classify*, or *list* are performatives that act as identification of certain division or emphasise on some distinct categories. It is used when the writer would like to make a distinction of different points or classifications. Other groups of performative verbs were not frequent in neither of the analysed sub-corpus. The above-mentioned groups were predominant in both academic fields under analysis, only the number of co-occurrences slightly differs.

The three-part functional analysis suggests that the division between the two academic fields under analysis is not that distinct. According to the results of the analysis, it was identified that the boosting function comprises around 51% of all instances in both academic fields, hedging function comprises 48% in the field of medicine and 40% in the field of humanities, and discourse marking function comprises around 1% in the field of medicine and 9% in the field of humanities. The conclusion can be made that boosting function is equally frequent in both fields, hedging function is more frequent in medicine than in humanities, and discourse marking function is almost never used in medicine, but is more common in humanities.

Finally, the analysis of the previous studies on the boosting and hedging functions presents the visible difference if compared to the present research. Hyland (1998a), Peacock (2006), Takimoto (2014), and Hadjanto (2016) studied how hedges and/or boosters distribute in distinct academic disciplines that allowed to compare these studies with the present thesis. The distinction was mainly made between soft and hard sciences to investigate the disciplinary differences between them. The previous studies on hedging and boosting show different results in terms of frequency and dominant function. The comparison identifies that the present thesis had significantly lower number of overall instances and due to this reason, the normalisation of numbers reveal the significantly lower usage. Furthermore, previous studies identify that hedging is more common than boosters; however, the analysis in the present paper confirm vice versa.

V.   Summary

The present paper focuses on the pragmatic analysis of hedged performatives in British National Corpus (BNC), sub-corpora of written academic discourse of medicine (sub-corpus 1) and humanities (sub-corpus 2) to be exact. The aim of the thesis is to examine the contrast between the usage of hedged performatives in two distinct academic fields. Such angle was chosen due to the lack of previous analysis done on the pragmatic use of hedged performatives and their function in academic discourse. The following objectives were raised in order to accomplish the aim:

1. To identify high frequency hedged performatives in written academic discourse of medicine and humanities;
2. To define and investigate their functional profile and usage patterns;
3. To identify similarities and differences of the use of hedged performatives in written academic discourse of medicine and humanities.

The methods for data selection mainly rely on the 'hereby' test (Austin, 1962). The test allows distinguishing whether a certain verb is a performative and if it qualifies to be included in the analysis of hedged performatives. The present thesis is a corpus-based study and qualitative, quantitative, and comparative research methods were used in order to achieve the aim of the thesis.

After the analysis in BNC, there were 3,765 instances found, however, not all of them qualified to be included in the analysis. Omitted instances were direct quotations, instances where personal pronoun 'we' was used inclusively, and instances with verbs which are not performative. Thus, the total number of hedged performatives distinguished in both academic fields was 548: 83 instances in the field of medicine and 465 instances in the field of humanities.

The data indicate that hedged performatives are not a frequent phenomenon neither in medicine nor in humanities. This pragmatic phenomenon can be more frequently found in sub-corpus 2 with 14.1 instances per 100,000 words while only 5.9 instances per 100,000 words in sub-corpus 1. Hedged performatives can be also classified according to the modal verbs used in the phrase and the meaning they might carry (Fraser, 1975). Accordingly, 5 distinct categories were distinguished which are 1) can (principle of expressed ability), 2) must (principle of obligation fulfilment), 3) shall, will, be going to, intend to (principle of asserted intention), 4) would, might, should, could (principle of offering opinion), and 5) want to, would like to, wish to (principle of permission seeking). The analysis of most frequent performative verbs notes that these verbs are usually used similarly in both academic fields. The most frequent groups of verbs used to refer to the assured confirmation that a particular statement is true (*claim, argue, etc.*), to the act of supposing that a particular statement is probably true (*predict, speculate, etc.*), to identify distinct points of the claim (*classify, list, etc.*), and to express negative opinion or rejection (*reject, object, etc.*). These performative verbs were found in both fields of medicine and

humanities. Finally, the three-part functional analysis was adapted to categorise the instances according to the pragmatic function they perform (Kaltenböck, 2019). The results demonstrate that in both academic around 51% of instances in both fields appear to have boosting function. The following function was shield (hedging) which comprises 48% in the field of medicine and 40% in the field of humanities, and discourse marking function comprises around 1% in the field of medicine and 9% in the field of humanities. After all aspects in the analysis were discussed, it was important to finally conduct a comparative analysis between two sub-corpora which confirms that not all modal verbs have the ability to collocate with performatives verbs equally well and due to this reason some modal verbs are less frequent than others. In general, the empirical analysis confirms that hedged performatives are less common in written academic discourse of medicine than in written academic discourse of humanities.

VI. Santrauka

Šiame magistro darbe nagrinėjama sušvelnintų performatyvų pragmatinė vartosena rašytinėje akademinėje medicinos ir humanitarinių mokslų kalboje. Šios mokslo sritys buvo analizuojamos Britų Nacionaliniame Tekstyne (toliau – BNC). Darbo tikslas yra ištirti sušvelnintų performatyvų vartosenos skirtumus dviejose minėtose akademinėse srityse. Tokia kryptis pasirinkta todėl, nes sušvelnintų performatyvų vartosena moksliniame diskurse yra mažai ištirta bei stinga atliktų tyrimų. Užtikrinti, jog darbo tikslas būtų tinkamai atliktas, buvo iškelti trys uždaviniai:

1. Nustatyti sušvelnintų performatyvų vartosenos dažnumą rašytinėje akademinėje medicinos ir humanitarinių mokslų kalboje;
2. Apibrėžti ir ištirti jų funkcinį profilį ir vartojimo modelius;
3. Nustatyti sušvelnintų performatyvų vartosenos panašumus ir skirtumus akademinėje medicinos ir humanitarinių mokslų kalboje.

Darbo metodologija iš esmės grindžiama „hereby" testu (Austin, 1962), kuris leidžia atskirti ar tam tikras veiksmažodis yra performatyvus ir ar yra tinkamas naudoti sušvelnintų performatyvų analizėje. Šis magistro darbo analizė paremta tekstyno tyrimu ir taip pat naudoja kokybinį, kiekybinį ir palyginamąjį tyrimo metodus.

Atlikus BNC analizę buvo rasti 3 765 pavyzdžiai, tačiau ne visi galėjo būti įtraukti į tyrimą. Tokie pavyzdžiai buvo tiesioginės citatos, pavyzdžiai, kuriuose buvo naudojamas neperformatyvus veiksmažodis bei pavyzdžiai su asmeniniu įvardžiu „mes", kuris buvo naudojamas ne tik kaip įvardis nurodantis autorių, bet taip pat įtraukiantis ir skaitytoją. Atrinkus tik tinkamus pavyzdžius analizei iš viso buvo nustatyti 548 sušvelninti performatyvai: 83 pavyzdžiai medicinoje bei 465 pavyzdžiai humanitariniuose moksluose.

Rezultatai rodo, jog sušvelninti performatyvai iš tiesų nėra plačiai naudojami šiose dviejose mokslo šakose. Šie pragmatiniai žymikliai dažniau randami humanitarinių mokslų akademinėje rašytinėje kalboje su 14,11 žodžio 100 000 žodžių kontekste, kai tuo tarpu medicinos mokslų akademinėje rašytinėje kalboje yra randami 5,87 žodžio 100 000 žodžių kontekste. Modalinio veiksmažodžio, vartojamo sušvelnintuose performatyvuose, reikšmė gali būti kitas aspektas šioje analizėje (Fraser, 1975). Pagal Fraser'io pateiktą reikšmių analizę galima išskirti 5 modalinių veiksmažodžių kategorijas: 1) *can* (išreikšto gebėjimo principas), 2) *must* (įsipareigojimo vykdymo principas), 3) *shall, will, be going to, intend to* (užtikrino ketinimo principas), 4) *would, might, should, could* (nuomonės siūlymo principas), ir 5) *want to, would like to, wish to* (leidimo patvirtinimo principas). Šie modaliniai veiksmažodžiai buvo dažniausiai vartojami su tokiais performatyviais veiksmažodžiais, kurie nusako patvirtinimą, kad tam tikras argumentavimas yra teisingas (*claim, argue, ir kt*.), kurie naudojami

nusakyti, jog tam tikras pasisakymas yra tikriausiai teigingas, tačiau nėra iki galo patvirtintas (*predict, speculate, etc*.), kurie išskiria keletą aspektų apie aptariamą objektą (*classify, list, etc*.) bei kurie nurodo autoriaus neigiamą požiūrį į argumentą (*reject, object, etc*.). Šie perfomatyvūs veiksmažodžiai buvo dažniausiai pastebimi tiek medicinos, tiek humanitariniuose moksluose. Paskutinis aspektas, kuris buvo naudojamas šio darbo analizėje, yra trijų dalių funkcinė analizė leidžianti suskirstyti pavyzdžius pagal tai, kokią funkciją jie atlieka (Kaltenböck, 2019). Rezultatai parodė, kad dažniausiai naudojama funkcija abiejose mokslo šakose yra pabrėžiamoji, ją sudaro 51 % visų rastų pavyzdžių. Kita funkcija yra sušvelninamoji, ji sudaro 48 % visų pavyzdžių medicinoje bei 40 % humanitariniuose moksluose. Paskutinė funkcija yra diskurso žymėjimas, ji sudaro tik 1 % medicinos šakoje ir 9 % humanitarių mokslų šakoje.

Išanalizavus auksčiau pateiktus aspektus buvo galima nustatyti skirtumus tarp išanalizuotų akademinių diskursų. Galima teigti, jog ne visi modaliniai veiksmažodžiai turi vienodai gerą ryšį su performatyviais veiksmažodžiais, todėl kai kurie iš jų yra mažiau vartojami. Apibendrinant, empirinė darbo analizė patvirtina, jog sušvelninti performatyvai humanitarinių mokslų akademinėje rašytinėje kalboje yra naudojami dažniau, o medicinos akademinėje rašytinėje kalboje yra pastebimi rečiau.

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VIII. Data Sources

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Appendices

BNC instances found in sub-corpus 1 (medicine)

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They did not refer me, and strangely I did not insist; as patients do not want to hear bad news. " Thank goodness, I'm not having a heart attack " was my reaction. A barium meal confirmed a hiatus hernia but the chest pain continued to infiltrate my left arm. I was so overjoyed with the diagnosis that I celebrated with a huge meal, a bottle of champagne and a large cigar. Afterwards I had my myocardial infarction in my office, feeling a complete idiot. But, I must claim, as a patient, that when a doctor tells you there is nothing wrong with your heart, and it is backed up by four colleagues who diagnose a hiatus hernia, the feeling of relief is enormous. # THE MORNING AFTER # While still in hospital I decided to pass my knowledge gleaned through stupidity to other people.

The patients were all detained under the Mental Health Act, required urgent surgery or invasive investigation, and were, in the opinion of the surgical team, unable to give informed consent. On each occasion I felt that insufficient effort had been made by the surgical teams to decide on the capacity to give informed consent, and I was dismayed at the immediate assumption of incapacity because the patient had been sectioned. I must emphasise that I was not asked to determine the capacity to give consent, but simply to complete the paperwork. My understanding of the law is that an adult patient who is capable of doing so must give consent to any medical treatment if that treatment is to be lawful. At the time of the decision the patient needs a capacity commensurate with the gravity of that decision. If the patient lacks the requisite capacity, then the doctors must act in what they perceive to be his or her best interests <...>.

Research should be done by experts to ensure useful results. The subjects of research can be suggested by those closest to the problem. With improved conditions more general practitioners may wish to combine these roles. Otherwise, Exe Directory is a way of matching the supply and demand of research ideas. In this way every general practitioner could shape and contribute to the future research and development of primary care. Any contributions can be sent to the address below. # Editor, -- I must disagree with Graham Butland's generalising statements about general practitioners lacking plans for development and decision making due to the' dependency culture' related to their methods of payment. General practitioners have always had to manage and plan their businesses and are constantly adapting to changes in medical care. Survival has always involved flexibility. Although family health services authorities may have been oblivious to these activities, this does not indicate their absence. Before 1990 many general practitioners were improving the quality of care of their patients in a spontaneous <...>.

<...> it does not follow that surgery is not worthwhile for the 80 year old. Paradoxically, the older person might be willing to take a higher risk of death during surgery than a younger person. Indeed surgery, offering, in simplified terms, either a quick death or good health, may be particularly attractive to the old. Some people aged 80 would not consider major surgery worthwhile because their life is near to close, but others would judge quite differently. If our interest is what is of benefit to the individual patient we must take these differences into account, and in general that means allowing the patient to decide. # Carrying out surgery on an old person is the wrong allocation of resources # Old people might be denied surgery on the grounds that the available resources are better spent on younger people. But what ethical principles should guide the allocation of resources? We shall briefly discuss some of the main theories of allocation that have been suggested and examine their implications for elderly people with aortic stenosis.

What evidence is there to decide among the approaches? Table 1 illustrates a comparison of the results and complications of angioplasty for unstable angina and chronic stable angina. " The technical achievement of opening a vessel measured angiographically was similarly successful for both groups of patients. However, it must be noted that the incidence of acute myocardial infarction in unstable angina is about 9%, but much lower in chronic stable angina (Table 1). Many North American studies record lower rates of infarction than the currently illustrated British experience. However, we must distinguish early angioplasty, with the higher incidence of acute MI versus those for whom the angioplasty can be delayed, where the incidence of acute MI is much lower. (deleted:figure) Thus, we may conclude that, " Yes, it is possible to get the vessel open, " but note the inherent risk, particularly early on, of acute myocardial infarction and death. This mortality risk is much lower for chronic stable angina but a similar number of patients in both groups will go on to coronary artery bypass <...>.

Furthermore, no significant differences between treatments were found for recurrent ischaemia or non-fatal reinfarction. The ISIS-2 trial, although not designed to assess the effects of heparin, also provided subgroup data for patients who received subcutaneous or intravenous heparin at the discretion of the treating physician. Mortality among streptokinase-treated patients was 8.3% for those who also received intravenous heparin and 9.0% for those receiving subcutaneous heparin. Neither mortality rate was as low as that achieved by the combination of streptokinase and aspirin without heparin (8.0%). We must emphasise that non-randomised comparisons of heparin and no heparin in ISIS-2 may be subject to

substantial bias. If the decision to use heparin was related to severity of infarction, mortality could be falsely high in the heparin-treated groups. Conversely, because early death prevents the use of heparin altogether, mortality may be falsely high in the no-heparin groups. Despite the paucity of randomised trial data showing a mortality benefit of heparin as adjunctive therapy to thrombolysis, routine treatment of acute myocardial infarction in many parts of the world includes <...>.

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<...> realise that if early ventricular fibrillation is survived the ultimate outcome is unaffected. It does not correlate with the risk of a big infarct. Interestingly sudden electrical death is more likely following right coronary artery occlusion. I usually say to patients who have had an inferior infarct that once in hospital the worst is over; the main cause of mortality then is pump failure and one of the striking contributions of thrombolytic therapy, to be dealt with later, is its ability to open up coronary arteries and prevent myocardial damage, pump failure and all the complications. I want to emphasise that if the acute care of myocardial infarction is to be effective, it has to be very acute care. Adequate resuscitation facilities must be provided and taken to the patient; in particular this applies to defibrillation. Many people worry about the imagined complexity of defibrillators. There has been a fascinating increase of interest over the last year by general practitioners in the use of defibrillators. There is no new data to encourage this, but it is due to the concern about the acute care of myocardial <...>.

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If operative mortality is to be of any use as an indicator of quality in cardiac surgery a system of risk stratification must be in place. The purpose of our paper was simply to show that the Parsonnet system can be applied easily and effectively to cardiac surgical practice in Britain. That we found a lower mortality than expected is not relevant to the paper's message. I wish to reassure Andrew Allan and Andrew T Forsyth that our trial was indeed prospective. David J Spiegelhalter suggests that the Parsonnet system overstates risk. Whether or not that is the case, the system remains an excellent method of stratifying patients into well defined risk groups. Kenneth M Taylor and Peter K H Walton mention other methods of risk stratification such as PANECAN (the pan-European cardiovascular network) and bayesian analysis. For such methods to gain widespread acceptability they must be comparable to the Parsonnet system in ease of implementation <...>.

<...> are common it is important that doctors respect the needs of those who may require particularly sensitive handling. Maybe much could be learnt from my experience, which did go badly wrong. # Editor, -- I was heartened by the sensitivity of Penelope Campling's editorial on working with adult survivors of child sexual abuse. Even though child abuse -- mainly the sexual variety -- has been a more open subject in the past few years, I have not seen many articles of this nature in professional magazines. Though not wishing to detract from Campling's writing, I wish to point out that many of the reactions, feelings, and transferences that she mentions also apply to those who were not sexually abused but' only' emotionally abused. The sexual act does violate the child, but the real damage is done to the psyche, wherein lies the trauma -- the memory, the damage to self esteem. Similar damage is done by repeated emotional abuse, and I believe that the true damage done by this is only beginning to be seen.

Such planning requires continuing, adequately resourced, and interactive collaboration between the professional, technical, and management arms of the NHS. Calling in Sir Bernard Tomlinson to throw together a salvage package as market forces take their toll can not replace the well resourced, experimentally oriented planning apparatus so vital to the long term health and development of a real national health service. # Editor, -- Jane Smith's editorial on improving health care in London raises some important issues in relation to the London Implementation Group to which I wish to respond. Smith questions whether the group will be able to explain what is happening to staff and patients and says that it' smells too much of hole in the corner deals.' As a former regional chairman I recognise the value and importance of open communication. Change is always hard but clearly is even harder if the reasons for it are not explained. I expect the improvements in services that Londoners should see in the coming years to speak for themselves, but there is no room for complacency <...>.

The implementation group wants to work closely with the health unions and staff and professional organisations. Arrangements will include a clearing house to help match staff with vacancies and special provisions for retraining. There is also likely to be ring fencing of some key posts. I do not underestimate the challenge that lies ahead for the London Implementation Group. I am confident that we can meet the challenge and will do so best by taking the professions, public, and staff with us. # Priorities in first aid # Editor, -- I wish to protest about some of the teaching in the latest edition of the First Aid Manual by the St John Ambulance, the St Andrew's Ambulance Association, and the British Red Cross. Dealing with resuscitation, it instructs (p 32):' If the casualty's breathing and pulse its italicshave stopped, you must first phone for help, then my italicscombine artificial ventilation with chest compression.' Similarly (p 61), first aiders are taught to begin the rescue of someone who has collapsed from <...>.

<...> Bailey's confidence that urinary infection is unimportant in the pathogenesis of reflux nephropathy and believe that deep tissue infection in general requires longer treatment than uncomplicated lower tract infection. We did not recommend either long or short treatment for acute pyelonephritis, and consider that serial clinical and microbiological assessment is more important than didactic adherence to a predetermined treatment schedule. The consequences of inadequately treated infection in pregnancy -- acute pyelonephritis and premature delivery -- are serious enough to warrant a cautious therapeutic approach and careful microbiological follow up. # Screening for abdominal aortic aneurysms # Editor, -- We wish to reply to C P Shearman and colleagues' comments regarding our letter since they contain several inaccuracies. In our evaluation of the case for screening for abdominal aortic aneurysms we considered over 100 publications on the subject before we chose the best available evidence for inclusion in the decision analysis -- this is not the' narrow range' claimed by Shearman and colleagues. The unpublished results of the Birmingham community aneurysm screening project were considered along with those of other, larger projects. In common with other series, <...>.

Indeed, according to the results for Birmingham, about 2% of people have an aneurysm large enough to be considered for surgery. This figure is directly comparable with those reported from other parts of Britain. Our analysis showed serious deficiencies in the case for screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm as it currently stands. Far from jeopardising the establishment of future studies, our work points to important questions for research. The answers should enable purchasers of health care to make an informed decision on the subject. # Decreasing quality of semen # Editor, -- We wish to respond to the correspondence concerning our report on decreasing semen quality. One of the letters seems to support our conclusion, whereas the two others focus on possible methodological difficulties. The data of Jean Ginsburg and Paul Hardiman confirm our findings of declining semen quality. They suggest that the deterioration may be even greater than was apparent from our study as they found not only an appreciable and continuing decline in sperm concentration but also an increased percentage of morphologically abnormal and immotile sperm.

The next most common class of drugs used was benzodiazepines, which accounted for 584 admissions. Benzodiazepines, of course, are prescription only drugs, and an overdose is far less likely to cause death. Combining paracetamol with methionine, as Bray suggests, may not be the answer, but surely the manufacturers of paracetamol should take a more responsible attitude by at least placing a more specific warning of the effects of overdose on the packaging. # Editor, -- Gary P Bray makes several suggestions to reduce the number of deaths from paracetamol overdose. We wish to add a French one. As in Britain, paracetamol is one of the most commonly used analgesics in France. As a consequence the incidence of paracetamol poisoning is high, but liver failure is uncommon and fatal cases are rare (<10 a year). The explanation is simple. People who overdose in a suicidal attempt may take one or several drugs but generally ingest at most one pack of each. Accordingly, the content of each pack of paracetamol was legally limited to 8 g at the beginning <...>.

The pathogenesis, diagnosis, natural history, and treatment of the disease is discussed briefly with emphasis on the importance of early diagnosis -- preferably by magnetic resonance imaging. Early diagnosis often depends on the gastroenterologist considering the possibility of oesteonecrosis. # Aseptic (avascular) osteonecrosis is an adverse effect of systemic steroid treatment. Osteonecrosis has been recognised during or after steroid treatment in several conditions such as renal homotransplants, lupus erythematosus, asthma, etc whereas osteonecrosis is reported only rarely during treatment with systemic steroids in ulcerative colitis and Crohn's disease. We wish to draw attention to this rarely diagnosed but bery serious complication to systemic steroid treatment of ulcerative colitis and the importance of magnetic resonance imaging for early recognition. # Case report # A 21 year old athletic man who was a painter and had a history of good health was admitted to hospital with suspected ulcerative colitis. The diagnosis of ulcerative pancolitis was confirmed endoscopically with biopsy. Treatment was started with systemic prednisolone 40 mg twice daily and mesalazine 500 mg thrice daily.

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PLAB examination on the basis of one misdemeanour by an unqualified American citizen? It is quite clear that most Canadian and American graduates speak perfect English, and it seems rather pointless to expect them to take an examination that consists of a test of English and of basic medical knowledge that they already have. The more likely reason for this move is a' tit for tat' reaction. American and Canadian licensing authorities require British graduates to take the' FEMGEMS' and the evaluating examination of the Council of Canada respectively. It seems rather ironic that we are going to make life more difficult for the vast majority of English speaking North American graduates when under European Community regulations we now grant full registration to doctors from several European countries. Such doctors are able to work in Britain with full registration even though their English may be poor. I wonder how long it will be before Australian graduates are required to take a test of English? This action seems to be a retrograde step that will hinder the exchange of medical graduates between the English speaking communities on either side of <...>.

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Royal College of General Practitioners is that it seems to equate general practice exclusively with being an NHS general practitioner. There are other forms of general practice. History indicates that general practice is not so demanding that unqualified people can not pass themselves off as principals for many years and get away with it. I wonder how many years unqualified people could pass themselves off as consultant thoracic surgeons, for example, without detection. Pretending that general practice is something that it is not runs the risk of people remarking on the emperor's new suit of clothes. I would therefore ask for a sense of proportion over the future of general practice, along with some breadth of vision and tolerance for alternative types of general practice. I do not want to have to found a Royal College of Ships' Surgeons to carry on practising my brand of general practice. # Risk stratification for open heart surgery # Editor, -- If operative mortality is to be of any use as an indicator of quality in cardiac surgery a system of risk stratification must be in place.

<...> the anxiety and other factors which are arrhythmogenic and could cover the patient after thrombolytic therapy. Also, I was not sure of the significance of your information regarding prolonged rest post-infarction. In my experience most people who suffer a myocardial infarct have been under pressure with associated exhaustion and fatigue for a prolonged period. Four to six weeks spent post-infarction recuperating from that would appear to be money and time well spent, when considering someone's life with 20 or 30 years remaining. # Professor de Bono # With regard to diazepam, I would agree absolutely. The only point that I would make is that if you are giving an opiate it will have many of the same effects and if I had to choose, I would probably prefer the opiate to diazepam. I do reinforce the need for a period of recuperation. Whether that period should be spent in bed followed by a prolonged holiday or whether it should be spent returning to a degree of post-infarct fitness will be discussed later.

The patients who develop late complete heart block, perhaps in the coronary care unit, usually associated with a diaphragmatic infarction, do not respond to atropine. Thrombolysis is not indicated, and these people need a temporary pacing catheter. The patients with anterior infarction may collapse later, usually preceded by bundle branch block, and then into complete heart block-these patients also require a temporary pacemaker. # Audience # As a general practitioner from Northern Ireland, do you recommend that when I go back home tonight I put Eminase in my bag? # Dr Adgey # I would recommend that you use a thrombolytic agent of choice. The two with which I have experience which have very high patency rates are either rt-PA or anistreplase. I would say to you that you must have a defibrillator available should your patient reperfuse on the way to hospital and develop ventricular fibrillation, because having salvaged the myocardium, it is a shame to lose the patient and we can not yet tell which patient will develop ventricular fibrillation and which will not.

The overall in-hospital mortality was 8.5% but with triple vessel disease it was 25%. This high mortality risk occurred in patients opened, for the most part within six hours of infarction, and all were opened within 24 hours. There was a 15% incidence of serious complications; death, bypass surgery and occlusion. Patency at 48 hours is about 85% and, interestingly, this is similar to the patency rate 48 hours after thrombolytic treatment, but the latter has a higher frequency of residual stenosis. In summary, I would argue that there is no clear indication for angioplasty as the primary procedure for acute myocardial infarction, particularly in the light of the mortality results following thrombolytic treatment. The proposal has been put forward that angioplasty may be helpful in patients with coronary occlusion and cardiogenic shock or for those with marked impairment of ventricular function. There are only anecdotal reports of the treatment for these groups and so we must await larger studies in order to define a treatment strategy.

<...> all will get aspirin and we will then randomise 12,500 units of subcutaneous heparin for 7 days (instead of intravenous heparin) versus no heparin. It is easier than intravenous heparin to give and it has been shown in randomised studies from McMaster University in Canada that it is as effective. # Dr Fox # I have a slightly different interpretation of the present policy. Whilst we do not have clear evidence that heparin confers benefit we do know that where one is administering TPA and aspirin and heparin there is some evidence of an increase in side effects. I would therefore add a word of caution and agree with Professor Sleight that we must have that data before we develop a general policy. We do have sufficient data that a straightforward regime of thrombolysis and aspirin works, but I would advise holding off on the heparin until more data is

available. # Professor Sleight # I agree. In ISIS 2 a lot of people received heparin, although not randomised, in addition to aspirin and thrombolysis and they appeared to have a lower mortality than those who did not get <...>.

<...> complaints, and obviously not a malingerer, that individual should have thrombolysis as rapidly as possible. I think the GP is the best individual to give it, even with the risk of developing ventricular fibrillation. The GP should have his defibrillator with him. I am not advocating thrombolysis in the absence of that, but provided that is available and he keeps his head and the family respect the GP, then he should be giving thrombolysis. # Professor de Bono # In Leicestershire we are trying to produce an agreed policy between each practice and cardiologist, and I would entirely agree that you can not give a blanket yes or no. There are some practices who could and should be giving thrombolytic therapy, there are others that can not and should not. That has to be an individual decision.

It is worth emphasising the importance of Staphylococcus saprophyticus as the second commonest pathogen causing cystitis and acute pyelonephritis in sexually active women, particularly in the spring and summer months. This organism often grows in low numbers, and many laboratories still regard it as a contaminant. Figure 2 in the paper looks like a classic example of unilateral reflux nephropathy rather than chronic pyelonephritis. It is now doubtful whether urinary tract infection has any role to play in the production of this renal lesion. Fetal ultrasound studies suggest that this damage may occur in utero. I would not agree that augmentin has been highly effective in the management of patients infected with urinary tract pathogens resistant to amoxycillin. Several workers have reported disappointing results in a high incidence of gastrointestinal side effects. My and colleagues' data has shown that for uncomplicated acute pyelonephritis five days of treatment with either an aminoglycoside, a lactam, or a quinolone is highly effective. There is no good evidence that long courses of treatment for acute pyelonephritis are indicated. The quinolones now seem to be the antimicrobial agents of choice <...>.

<...> such directive might be is uncertain; it is unclear whether health care staff are required to carry out the terms of the directive or whether those who act in good faith with the terms of the directive are immune from civil or criminal prosecution. There is, apparently, no case law on this point. I was unable to find any legal basis under current English law whereby a psychiatrist might give consent (or otherwise) for a patient to have an invasive surgical procedure. Speaking to colleagues informally, I find that this situation is not uncommon. I would remind the surgeons involved in such instances that they, and not the duty psychiatrist, are in the best position to know if an operation is in the best interests of the patient.

Weakened district planning of health services -- District health authorities have to plan health services for populations, maximise efficiency in the use of resources, and address inequalities in provision. The more that their budget is diverted to fundholding practices, the more their capacity to do so will be undermined, to the detriment of important areas of service for all patients. It may be argued that fundholding allows us to discharge these responsibilities ourselves in respect of our own practice population, and that we are capable of doing the job better than a large purchasing authority. I would suggest that this is not so. Few of us have the time, training, or expertise to do this job properly, even if it were possible to do it for a population as small as 10 000 people -- which it is not. Some general practitioners are developing a high degree of expertise in purchasing: their skills would be better used in providing properly supported and remunerated guidance to purchasers at district level.

A study of 15 practices in London and the home counties showed variation of over 400% in drug budgets, over 300% in hospital inpatient treatment budgets, and 150% overall. Similar variation was identified nationally. It seems unlikely that variations of this magnitude will prove to be correlated with need or deprivation. If it were consistent the government would have to view these variations too as evidence of inefficiency. It has been claimed that fundholding' has revealed rather than created these variations.' I would suggest that it has done rather more than just reveal them. It has reinforced them by building them into practice budgets. Higher spending practices were rewarded for their inefficiency and the more efficient penalised by lower budget allocations. The implication that' easy money' was made available to some fundholders was reinforced by reports in January 1992 that some were expecting six figure savings from their hospital treatment budgets by the end of the financial year. These expectations are rumoured to be confirmed by an Audit Commission report on fundholding <...>.

<...> uncertainty remains about the balance to be struck between the market and hierarchy, between economic forces and political considerations in the determination of health policy. Politics has predominated hitherto, but its future role is unknown (and probably undecided). Even if this had been determined there would still be formidable technical obstacles to be overcome in realising the managed market in health care, given that the project is unprecedented and unpiloted. Under these circumstances, attempting even an interim assessment of just a few facets of change may appear premature (not to mention hubristic). I would argue that the uncertainties that make evaluation difficult also make it imperative. Given the scale and complexity of the reforms final analysis may never be possible. However, on the basis of the limited data available, and in the areas that have been considered it seems probable that substantial and largely unrecognised costs have been incurred. What is less certain is whether they have been, or will be, offset by corresponding gains.

The duration of treatment for chronic prostatitis is more difficult, as a bacteriological aetiology is not always clear cut. Single dose treatment was first used for asymptomatic bacteriuria in pregnancy. The authors claim that single dose treatment has not yet been proved adequate in this context. There is good evidence from the old literature and more recent studies to show that single dose treatment is highly effective in this context and is also a useful guide as to how to manage the woman for the remainder of the pregnancy. # Authors' reply, -- We would not disagree with the more complicated criteria for the diagnosis of urine infection in different kinds of patient referred to by Dr Bailey. They are more explicit than, but have the same implication as, the more general guidelines we made. We also agree over the importance of Staphylococcus saprophyticus, to which we referred, and the difficulty posed by chronic prostatitis. We do not share Dr Bailey's confidence that urinary infection is unimportant in the pathogenesis of reflux nephropathy and believe that deep tissue infection in general requires <...>.

<...> that their work is to be taken seriously. Editors, like scientists, are human and do err. The spirit of fairness, however, mandates that we should treat all papers equally and with candour. # Editor, -- Michael E Dewey raises several important issues in his review of problems encountered by authors when dealing with journals. Many of us have had similar experiences. Most of his examples relate to inefficiency or lack of feedback rather than abuse of power (except, perhaps, the issue of the editor as author). To his list we would add that authors should have the right of reply when a journal has published correspondence critical of their publication. Authors can also encounter some more serious difficulties. Several years ago we wrote a paper in which we detailed a serious case of abuse of editorial power. A brief outline of the events is that the editor of a major medical journal (a) republished a previously published paper solely in order to attack it in an editorial; (b) did this without the authors' permission, while stating <...>.

<...> but also the ionic composition and the solubility of bile acids in the water compartment of faeces. These factors and their interrelationships require elucidation in these patients. Nevertheless, we propose that the increased concentration of bile acids and increased daily excretion may predispose to the development of polyps. This could result from bile acid mediated effects on cellular proliferation through several possible pathways as already discussed. The differences observed in cancer patients are more difficult to explain, as the faecal bile acid profiles of cancer patients in our study were different from those of polyps and controls. We would suggest that an altered metabolism (possibly related to gut transit time) may occur at the large polyp or cancer stage. This, with or without an increased absorption of faecal secondary bile acids may account for the differences observed in both faecal and biliary bile acids. Neither the ratio of lithocholic acid: deoxycholic acid, or lithocholic acid:deoxycholic acid total faecal bile acid were significantly increased in patients with colorectal cancer or polyps. This suggests that such indices are unlikely to provide useful markers for the identification of colorectal cancer <...>.

<...> were identified in the colectomy specimen; nevertheless we now rarely perform pouch construction at the time of colectomy because of the possibility of unrecognised Crohn's disease. We also believe that preliminary colectomy results in safer pouch surgery, because patients are no longer on steroid medication, are well nourished, and there is no co-existing sepsis. As a consequence of this policy loop ileostomy is now used in only 22% of operations. In those cases with indeterminate colitis, only time will tell whether these patients behave as those with ulcerative colitis or true Crohn's disease. We would not routinely recommend restorative proctocolectomy knowingly for patients with Crohn's colitis because the failure rate is high and most will eventually develop recurrence of disease in the anal canal or in the small bowel. So far

two of 10 patients with a diagnosis of Crohn's disease have already developed recurrence in the small intestine. Nevertheless some of the patients with an intact pouch have had a relatively satisfactory short term outcome. Most of these patients are loath to consider a permanent ileostomy at the moment.

<...> to do well and have a bowel frequency of less than four in 24 hours without any impairment of continence. By contrast, some patients seem to have a frequency that is rarely less than 10 in 24 hours and need to take antidiarrhoeal agents and modify their diet. The one symptom that is invariably improved by restorative proctocolectomy is that of urgency. Indeed these results justify the operation even in distal disease where urgency is the principal symptom. Retaining the anal mucosa sometimes results in bleeding from the involved mucosa but discrimination may be improved by avoiding mucosectomy. We would usually advise mucosectomy for dysplasia or coexisting colorectal cancer, however, as we do in polyposis. Elderly patients should not necessarily be denied the operation if they are fit and have normal anal function. Even patients with diabetes mellitus complicated by autonomic neuropathy are not necessarily a contraindication to restorative proctocolectomy. The functional results of patients who have lost up to 50 cm of small bowel raises the question as to whether repeated pouch construction is justified in those patients whose pouch has had to be removed because of ischaemia.

<...> variety of conditions affecting the extrinsic nerves and the central nervous system may result in tachygastria, ranging from children with cerebral palsy, to motion sickness, anorexia nervosa, and vatotomy. In these conditions, with the exception of cerebral palsy, the tachygastria is usually paroxysmal, and the increased frequency is somewhat variable. We were impressed that the tachygastria in our patients with neuropathic pseudoobstruction was both persistent and raised consistently in the fasting state. We were unable to explore systematically the electrical control activity in the postprandial state because of the patients intolerance to food. We would suggest that in neuropathic pseudoobstruction it is more likely that the tachygastria is induced by loss of intrinsic inhibitory innervation which may normally modify the frequency of polarisation of the plasmalemmal membrane of the gastric smooth muscle cells. The presence of a continuously irregular frequency such that no dominant frequency could be shown was found in the three patients with a proven myopathy and in two patients with a manometric pattern suggestive of muscle disease. Electrical control activity is caused by the entrainment of the fluctuations of the transmembrane potentials of individual smooth <...>.

<...> for exfoliative cytology has been shown to improve the sensitivity of the technique but is time consuming. Of more practical value is the use of a cytology brush, either percutaneously or endoscopically which greatly improves the number of viable cells for analysis and may be carried out without removal of the guide wire used for stent insertion. A prospective study comparing exfoliative and brush cytology has not yet been reported. A satisfactory alternative or addition to biliary brush cytology is direct biopsy of the stricture using small forceps under fluoroscopic control. The results from this technique remain preliminary. We would conclude from this study that exfoliative cytology for biliary strictures is simple to perform, highly specific, able to provide a diagnosis when other methods fail and should, therefore, be carried out routinely. # Complications and limitations of injection sclerotherapy in portal hypertension # The pioneering work of Whipple in 1945 began an era of portosystemic shunt surgery for portal hypertension which remained the primary form of treatment for nearly 30 years even though the consequences of portal diversion such as liver atrophy and encephalopathy were soon recognised.

The surgical exposure is satisfactory and not unduly prolonged in even the largest patients and the technique does not interfere with any subsequent transplant operation. There is a greater choice in the management of the patient with less urgent bleeding from recurrent varices after sclerotherapy. Repeat sclerotherapy may be effective for small oesophageal varices while liver transplantation may be indicated in the patient with deteriorating liver function. A selective distal splenorenal shunt should be considered for patients with intact splenic and left renal veins and a mesocaval vein graft for the remainder. We would therefore suggest that surgery should still be considered for the management of portal hypertension, particularly in the following circumstances: # (1) # Uncontrollable bleeding during the initial course of sclerotherapy; # (2) # Life threatening haemorrhage from recurrent varices; # (3) # Bleeding from ectopic varices not accessible to sclerotherapy; # (4) # Uncontrollable bleeding from oesophageal ulceration secondary to injection sclerotherapy; # (5) # Severe, symptomatic hypersplenism; # (6) # For patients who live <...>.

Although this particular adverse reaction of intravenous amiodarone is rare, it remains important because of the popularity of amiodarone for the treatment of severe life threatening cardiac arrythmias. Amiodarone, with its lack of negative inotropism, broad spectrum of action, and high efficacy is the only drug of its kind available for use in life threatening arrythmias in patients with severe left ventricular impairment. We feel that the occurence of acute hepatitis with the intravenous preparation does not necessarily preclude the subsequent use of the oral preparation in these patients. We would advocate caution, however, and recommend careful monitoring of hepatic and renal parameters. # Intestinal epithelial cells contribute to the enhanced generation of platelet activating factor in ulcerative colitis # Abstract # Generation of platelet activating factor by intestinal mucosal epithelial cells and lamina propria mononuclear cells was evaluated to elucidate the possible role of this mediator in the pathogenesis of inflammatory bowel disease. Epithelial and lamina propria mononuclear cells were isolated from surgical specimens from control, Crohn's disease, and ulcerative colitis patients. Platelet activating factor was extracted <...>.

As the DNA predictive test is the most accurate predictor of not inheriting the gene, screening beyond 30 years will probably be necessaryin about 50% of subjects, especially if there is late onset in the family. Screening may not be necessary annually, but at least one colonoscopy to the caecum should be performed as polyps may only be present more proximally. Multiple biopsies may be another way to show evidence of FAP (microadenomata), but this will add to the risk of the procedure and a negative result may still not allow total reassurance. We would certainly recommend ophthalmic and dental screening as in our experience over 80% of affected patients manifest retinal changes and or dental features. It is important for current risk estimation with a negative bowel test that a more accurate incidence curve is compiled. This may mean combining data from many centres of subjects who are shown on at least one occasion at the start of regular screening not to have polyps. In the meantime more prolonged screening beyond 30 years will be required in a number of at risk individuals.

<...> low serum phosphate and low TmP correlated with a poor response when length of response was examined, whereas TmCa correlated with a fall in CCa from day 0 to day 6, and accord with other studies that used this response criterion. The acute fall in blood calcium and maintenance of normocalcaemia are both important in the treatment of TIH. Sodium load during rehydration determines calcium excretion, but has no long-term effect. Sustained response relies on the use of specific antihypercalcaemic agents, so the length of normocalcaemia should be measured to evaluate response to these agents. We would recommend a similar response definition in future studies of the treatment of TIH. It is not entirely clear why a high PTHrP concentration is associated with a poor response to treatment. Our earlier study of bisphosphonate treatment in patients with TIH showed that a fall in plasma calcium does not stimulate tumour production of PTHrP. In the present study, the poor response patients who had post-treatment calcium clearance estimations show that pamidronate effectively inhibited bone resorption, but did not correct the tubular defect.

<...> naevi and use of these photographs to detect change suggesting development of melanoma has been essential in this study. Only one of the surveillance-detected melanomas was suspected by the patient. The value of surveillance is also supported by the thickness of the tumours at detection; only 2 were thicker than 1.5 mm and both of these, on review of photographs, showed a greater degree of inflammation at 6 months before clinical suspicion and excision than any of the thinner melanomas. Although we and others have previously described inflammation as a clinical characteristic of benign but atypical naevi, we would recommend caution in dismissing persistently inflamed melanocytic lesions as benign, and suggest excision. In-situ or level-1 melanomas were not included in calculations of relative risk, since it is not clear whether all in-situ lesions progress to invasive melanomas. The lack of an appropriate animal model makes it impossible to investigate this question further at present. If even a proportion of in-situ lesions are progressive, our calculations are an underestimate of the magnitude of the relative risk.

- Would like to:

<...> with potentially the most to lose in the rationing process, do not participate in discussions about rationing who should? By holding an expensive meeting on a weekday the Royal College of Physicians denied a voice to the very groups that most

need to participate in the debate. Could this have been the intention? # Working with adult survivors of child sexual abuse # Editor, -- I was struck by the subtitle of Penelope Campling's editorial on working with adult survivors of child sexual abuse:' Much can be learnt from what goes wrong.' I would like to draw attention specifically to the trauma of vaginal and rectal examinations for adult survivors. I am the daughter of a doctor and was sexually abused throughout my childhood. I have been through a long period of psychotherapy dealing with this abuse and continue to find internal examinations traumatic. In September 1989 I was taken into hospital with the classic symptoms of acute appendicitis. An understanding female house officer took a history and examined me.

The depth and extent of this understanding have been shown in some work of exceptional quality and insight. We believe that the integrated workbook assignment embodies the ideals of our curriculum and, in particular, has considerable potential for continuing the General Medical Council's recommended strands of ethics, law, behavioural science, and communication skills throughout the clinical course. # Harvard's' new pathway' # Editor, -- As one who taught on Harvard's' new pathway' during the two pilot years, as well as on its traditional courses, I would like to make some comments. The success of any programme rests on the faculty's enthusiasm and support. Teaching well takes time and often yields little tangible reward. Harvard's new pathway got through its pilot years relying on the motivated staff and fellows. This staff may not be available at many medical schools. The greatest change in the curriculum with courses similar to the new pathway is seen in the preclinical faculty. Preclinical staff usually have busy schedules and may not be particularly well oriented to clinical matters.

Neanderthal man reflected not a separate line in the evolution of Homo but rickets in man living during the Wurm ice age. A more comprehensive description of the bones would probably reinforce one explanation or the other. Did any of the femora excluded from the Christ Church study show hip or knee deformities, bowing, or other stigmata of childhood rickets? My observer bias forbids any attempt at interpreting Lees' fig 1. # Paracelsus # SIR, -- As an addition to Professor Feder's thoughtful article on Paracelsus (May 29, p 1396), I would like to draw attention to one most important finding of this giant predecessor of medicine. In his third' defension' from August 19,1538, he declared' Everything is a poison, the dose alone makes a thing not a poison'. This statement contains a central concept of modern experimental and clinical pharmacology and toxicology -- namely, the dose-effect relationship, a principle of relevance not only to theoreticians but also to clinicians. It appears to be the most durable consequence of, and could well be considered to be <...>.

Doctors who diagnose child sexual abuse from their observations of a patient may be wrong. Sexual abuse may not be the abuse that took place. Emotional abuse may be the underlying trauma (and this often comes with a fear of being physically harmed). As an adult survivor of both types of abuse and a professional dealing with others coming to terms with their abuse, I know. I am delighted to see people like Campling dealing with this subject with such caring. # Bronchospasm during disulfiram-ethanol test reaction # Editor, -- We would like to add some comments to the case report of E Zapata and A Orwin dealing with bronchoconstriction and hypertension experienced by a 45 year old man taking alcohol and disulfiram. We investigated the role of acetaldehyde in causing respiratory distress in subjects with impaired hepatic acetaldehyde dehydrogenase activity or receiving treatment with disulfiram by giving alcohol to guinea pigs. Intravenous administration of acetaldehyde elicited a prompt rise in blood pressure and increase in bronchial resistance associated with augmentation of blood histamine concentration. Antihistaminic agents significantly antagonise acetaldehyde actions.

<...> been completely eliminated, massive regurgitation is unlikely to occur, but avoiding ventilatory pressures greater than 20 cm H_2O (not always practical in a trauma situation) avoids leaks around the cuff and minimises gastric dilatation. A I J Brain reported in an address to the Royal Society of Medicine that work is currently underway on developing a laryngeal mask that incorporates a separate channel through which a nasogastric tube can easily be passed. # Editor, -- Moira E O'Meara and J Gareth Jones comprehensively describe many aspects of the laryngeal mask pertinent to anaesthesia. We would like to add comments about its use relevant to non-anaesthetists. Although the laryngeal mask does not protect the airway against gastric contents, it has potential for use in resuscitation and emergency medicine when intubation is impossible and a patent airway can not be maintained with a face mask. In this situation during anaesthesia the laryngeal mask has been life saving. Several studies have shown that unskilled staff rapidly acquire the skill to insert the mask.

- Could:

It will be seen at once that these statements are more specific and precise than aims, which raises an important question. What degree of precision is necessary? Objective (1) could be written in more detail. We could specify in which hand the draw-sheet is to be held, which arm the nurse is to use to support the patient, the degree of tension to be applied to the draw-sheet to make it taut and smooth. We could specify what words the student will say to the patient and even at what point she is to smile. There is, in fact, no single answer to this question. The degree of precision in objectives will depend on the intentions

of the teacher, the experience of the student and the nature of the activities involved. If the teacher's intention is to give a general overview or introduction to a topic, then less detail will be needed. Where students are already experienced then perhaps some very precise <...>.

We therefore studied leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in young people in the rural home areas of workers at Scottish oil terminal and offshore sites. # Methods # oil industry workers # We concentrated on the three largest groups of workers in the oil industry (' oil workers') in northern Scotland in the late 1970s: construction workers of the oil terminal at Sullom Voe (Shetland); construction workers of the Flotta oil terminal (Orkney); and offshore workers on rigs and platforms. We could not identify all such workers as complete records have not survived and instead used the closest approximations possible -- namely, records incorporating home address of all those (more than 17000) attending the medical centre at the Sullom Voe oil terminal in Shetland during its construction phase (believed to represent a high proportion of all but short stay workers); 3500 construction workers at the Flotta oil terminal in Orkney (incomplete data); and more than 10000 offshore workers, being all those who obtained an offshore survival certificate <...>.

Its use in HIV infection stems from anecdotal reports of clinical benefit after high dose ascorbic acid and from subsequent in vitro experiments showing suppression of HIV replication in chronically infected T lymphocytes. There are no published trials proving its clinical efficacy. Despite little definite evidence supporting the use of high dose ascorbic acid, it is widely favoured by doctors and patients as healthy, natural, and without appreciable side effects. Reported contraindications include renal insufficiency, chronic haemodialysis, some forms of iron overload, and previous oxalate stone formation. We could find no reference to caution in people at risk of glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency. However, there have been two case reports of haemolytic crises caused by ascorbic acid. One concerned a black American man given 80 g ascorbic acid intravenously for burns; he subsequently developed acute haemolysis and renal failure and died. The second report concerned two boys in India who developed acute haemolysis after a' binge of fizzy drinks' containing 4-6 g ascorbic acid. Glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase is an extremely polymorphic enzyme, essential in the metabolism of <...>.

<...> evidence to suggest reversion to almost normal intestinal mucosa occurs in these adbominal reservoirs after 15 years. Several divergent but characteristic pathological changes have been previously shown within the pouch mucosa. These include mucosal prolapse, pseudopyloric metaplasia, mucosal ischaemia, and granulomata. None of these features were seen in the current study despite extensive mucosal sampling, suggesting that all are relatively unusual. The pathological changes of mucosal prolapse deserve particular mention. A syndrome of anterior mucosal prolapse, so called anterior strip pouchitis, has been described with the characteristic pathological features of mucosal prolapse. We could not find any changes in any reservoir in anterior wall biopsy tissues, suggesting that this is a rare feature in the pouch. Inflammation in the proximal limb was also unusual. In the one patient in this series with this feature, there was marked active inflammation with expression of colonic phenotypic markers. Although clearly unusual, it would be important to document the presence of this inflammation as it may be of considerable significance to the surgeon considering pouch reconstruction on removal.

Because the endoscopical findings in RP often include serpiginous ulcerations, fissures, and ileitis proximal to the pouch, the syndrome has often been attributed to underlying Crohn's disease, the diagnosis of which had presumably been' missed' both clinically and pathologically up to and including the time of colectomy. There has been no systematic study, however, to discover if this assumption is correct. We therefore sought clinical and pathological features that might test this concept and help us identify risk factors for the development of RP. The only distinguishing clinical features we could identify in the RP group were male preponderance and an increased frequency of extraintestinal manifestations. We are not aware that a male preponderance has been previously seen in association with any form of pouchitis. Lohmuller et al reported that among 671 patients with chronic ulcerative colitis, if preoperative extraintestinal manifestations had been present, pouchitis occurred in 39% of cases, but in only 26% if no extraintestinal manifestations had been present. They also showed by lifetable analysis that the risk of pouchitis at 5 years was 44% if preoperative extraintestinal <...>.

<...> recurrence rates in 86 patients who had had 96 episodes of gall stone dissolution (in 10, recurrent stones were dissolved with a further course of oral bile acid treatment). On 36 occasions, the patients were treated with 300 mg ursodeoxycholic

acid/day, which resulted in a recurrence rate of 32 (18) % by LTA at seven and subsequent years, compared with 69 (12.4) % on the 60 occasions when no post-dissolution treatment was given (p<0.01). This protective effect of ursodeoxycholic acid was confined to patients aged 50 or less. Although we could not confirm this finding statistically, none of the small number of our patients aged less than 50 (n=18) who was treated with ursodeoxycholic acid, developed recurrence. In this study, the dose of ursodeoxycholic acid varied with body weight. Eighteen of 23 ursodeoxycholic acid treated patients took only 200 mg/day while two took 250 mg and only three took 300 mg/day. There were no obvious differences in recurrence rates as a function of ursodeoxycholic acid dose but with only five patients taking >200 mg/day, the number is <...>.

- Should:

<...> and hence staff expect that the balance of their tasks should be broadly the same for all.' At present funds are allocated to universities by the Universities Funding Committee on the basis of the research grants and scientific papers generated by departments. Some attention should also be paid to the amount and quality of teaching that goes on. The inclusion in NHS consultants' contracts of a formal commitment to teaching is a step in the right direction in that it acknowledges that most doctors teach to a greater or lesser extent. Having established that principle, however, we should move on and demand greater flexibility in interpreting that commitment. Within a department it must be possible for people who have particular interests and aptitudes for teaching to take on a greater share of the load. Nor should we expect the very few who do not want to teach to continue to do so when they might be more usefully employed in management, audit, service, or research tasks. # Status for teaching # Allowing doctors to choose whether to spend time in teaching, or research, or management <...>.

- Can:

<...> are little different in their referral behaviour from those outside London. Improving doctors' premises, which is essential, will undoubtedly lead to better care and promote the development of primary care teams but may not influence the doctors' referral behaviour and the need for acute beds in London. # Editor, -- Stanley Dische highlights the relative underprovision of radiotherapists (clinical oncologists) and medical oncologists by comparing London and south east England with Paris and the Ile de France. I support his view that the service provided in the Thames regions should not be reduced. I can not, however, accept his statement that' when allowance is made for university posts and the commitment to research there is no indication that London and the south east are better provided for than the United Kingdom.' The table shows the imbalance when the West Midlands is used for comparison. Clinical oncologists give most of the chemotherapy outside the Thames regions, and this is a considerable burden. The underprovision of clinical and medical oncologists remote from the south east of England is real, and the disparity can <...>.

By the time I had joined the BBC in 1969 I was three stone overweight, I drank a bottle of scotch a day and thought muesli and high fibre were feed for cattle. Sausages, bacon, eggs, chips, baked beans and fried bread was a man's diet. The mystic person who singularly failed to appear during a 20-year span of abuse was my doctor. Doctors of the 1940s and early 1950s failed to realise that heart attacks were going to become Britain's Number 1 killer disease. I can excuse them for not knowing all the facts that have now come to light but I can not forgive them or the government for failing to steer the health of the nation. People only wish to see doctors when they are sick, but the National Health Service has not encouraged people like me to seek preventative health advice. Heart attacks are caused by ignorance and indifference. I was not ill, but nearly died of my own neglect, I believe the medical profession and the National Health Service share some <...>.

Falk seems to be putting a large proportion of the blame onto doctors for failing to give him proper preventative medical care. I would expect that the day he was diagnosed as having a hiatus hernia he was not advised to have a large meal followed by a cigar and a large amount of alcohol. Surely, having gone completely against what is standard medical advice for a hiatus hernia, he would have done exactly the same had his heart been suspect. # Mr Falk # That is a fair comment, but I was being a little frivolous. I can promise you, however, that if you walk around for three weeks with a chest pain, fearing a heart attack at the age of 43, and you are told you have a hiatus hernia you feel a great relief. It was then natural for me to celebrate. I did say in fairness that most of the fault was my own. # Dr Carne # Many of your colleagues in the broadcasting field are well-known to me, how can I persuade them, when they go to the bar <...>.

Finally, concerning the alleged' miaow' preoccupation, Mozart wittingly indicated the form of the last movement of the parodic K298: Rondieaoux (for Rondeaux). There is no miaow. The next cattish tourettisms concerns the duet, K625, in which the soprano sings a constant' miau.' However, the words were written by Schikaneder; Mozart partially orchestrated Schack's score. Tourette's disorder is the latest Mozart's myth. It sounds like a disparagement disguised as a diagnosis. # Editor, -- Although I can not add to the debate about whether Mozart had Tourette's syndrome, I would like to explore three points raised by Benjamin Simkin's article. Firstly, as shown by one of the illustrations in this article, the last movement of Mozart's quartet in A major for flute, violin, viola, and cello (K298) is entitled' Rondieaoux.' While this is a bizarre, and probably unique, variant of' Rondo' or' Rondeau,' why Simkin translates it as' Rondomiaow'is <...>.

<...> be safe and effective and was established long before most of our present allopathic treatments. Unfortunately, anyone can describe himself or herself as a homoeopath. There are, however, proper training agencies and reputable bodies. Crawford comes from Glasgow, where there is a homoeopathic hospital and the Scottish College of Homoeopathy, which offer proper training and treatment. # Editor, -- Despite repeated inquiries I have been unable to discover the nature and contents of the remedy called Apitop-F. It is certainly not stocked by any of the main homoeopathic suppliers in this country and I can assume therefore that it is most likely not homoeopathic but a herbal product -- unless it has been imported from abroad, possibly Europe. The Faculty of Homoeopathy would certainly concur with Simon Crawford's view that it is absolutely unethical for any medicine to be sold as natural and especially as homoeopathic if it were to include pharmacologically active ingredients, whether hormonal or otherwise. Furthermore, the faculty would consider such behaviour unethical; it would most probably result in a referral to the faculty's disciplinary committee.

Sadly, there was no discussion or consultation, and the present confrontational atmosphere was allowed to develop. It is depressing to see the predicted problems materialising one after another, and even more damaging to morale when it becomes apparent that the message we are trying to get across -- that a so called free market is no way to ensure the satisfactory provision of health care to an aging population -- has not been appreciated by those in a position to make a difference. I work in a trust hospital which, as far as I can tell, has made a successful transition from directly managed status. Nevertheless, like everyone else we wonder how we can ever afford to replace the time expired capital equipment and infrastructure which was our legacy from the past 20 years of neglect. But if we are doing well someone else is doing badly -- that is what free markets are like. We can not afford to have failures in a health system which needs to use every hospital and every health care worker if it is to cope with the demands <...>.

- Will:

Developing primary and community care: a strategy # Remedy existing deficits # Provide non-standard services # Expand the concept of primary care # Mechanisms # Attract and retain good GPs # Make early retirement easier # Improve premises # Strengthen links between primary and secondary services # Train and develop staff # Offer new organisational arrangements # LETTERS # Alternative allergy and the GMC # Editor, -- There is scarcely an assertion in Richard Smith's editorial about the General Medical Council (GMC) with which I would not take issue. I will restrict myself, however, to dealing with the main thrust of the editorial. Smith asserts that' the GMC was founded to protect the public against quacks.' I disagree. It was founded to enable the public to identify qualified medical practitioners. It was given no powers in relation to those who are not so qualified, nor did the Medical Act 1858 prohibit the practice of medicine without registration. Many qualified members of the profession now practise, or refer patients to others who practise, treatments whose <...>.

These signs include data on circulation; the number of papers and letters submitted for publication, pages published, and advertisements placed; data from readers on which papers they read and what they like and dislike; citation data;' influence data' (like mentions of the BMJ in parliament or the New York Times); and financial data. These data matter much more to us than they do to readers or authors, and so we don't plan to publish them regularly -- unless readers tell us that they want them. For now we will restrict ourselves to data on decision making and publication times. By the end of 1992 the BMJ had received about 4350 papers and 3500 letters for publication during the year (exact data are not available because this editorial was written before Christmas). About half of the letters are published, usually without external peer review as we publish as

letters only those that relate to matters raised in the journal within the past six weeks.' Out of the blue' letters are considered as papers and submitted to full <...>.

BNC instances found in sub-corpus 2 (humanities)

- Must:

Though it must be remembered that this is no a priori scheme imposed upon the appearances, but rather an interpretation gradually distilled from them by prolonged contemplation. Whether Fry was justified in his interpretations of Czanne is not our present question. What is valuable is to see that here is a critic writing at the top of his bent. And Fry was straightforward about his own perceptions.' The critic, I hold, should be loyal enough to his own impressions to confess to what is probably due to his own defects. I must admit therefore that there is one passage in this otherwise consummate design (A Fruit Dish) of which the meaning escapes me. I can not see the necessity of the shadow cast by a half-opened drawer in the kitchen table., It is encouraging to find Fry underlining a point about critical writing -- that with a description of a work of art it can be useful to be given an explicit account of how the critic responds. Another point is also made explicitly.: his difficulty is assessing Czanne's work <...>.

Evelyn Underhill (author of divers fat books on mysticism), D. and myself. The name to give us pause here is that of G.W. Prothero. For Prothero is the demon-king of the Poundian pantomime, ever since Pound cast him for this role by printing, at the end of his essay on De Gourmont -- originally in the Little Review, then in Instigations (1920) -- the letter which Prothero wrote him in October 1914: Dear Mr. Pound, Many thanks for your letter of the other day. I am afraid that I must say frankly that I do not think I can open the columns of the Q.R. -- at any rate, at present -- to any one associated publicly with such a publication as Blast. It stamps a man too disadvantageously. Yours truly, G.W. Prothero Of course, having accepted your paper on the Noh, I could not refrain from publishing it. But other things would be in a different category. And Pound understandably gets all the mileage possible out of the ill-starred history of' QR': I <...>.

The White Doe of Rylstone (written 1807-8) is a very difficult poem, containing a sympathetic account of the Catholic Rising in the North in 1569. The rebel banner is made by the one Protestant daughter of the Catholic Norton family, who endures a lonely life after the failure of the rising and the death of her brothers and father. She is visited by a Doe, which radiates sanctity; the point of the poem, says Wordsworth, is' nothing less than the Apotheosis of the Animal'. I must confess that I have not the least idea what this phrase could mean in an orthodox Christian context. But the poem appears to commend long-suffering endurance and to suggest that mourners may be silently visited by Divine Grace. The relevance of this to Wordsworth's personal bereavement is clear. While The Excursion (1814) contains a Pastor and a Churchyard, the Christianity it offers is still minimal; Wordsworth himself says that it illustrates' the Bible of the Universe, as it speaks to the ear of the intelligent <...>.

<...> search for control and coherence needs balancing against a realism and tolerance born out of efforts to understand ourselves (and others) better. # 7 # Luce Irigaray's Critique of Rationality # Margaret Whitford # This paper is about a feminist philosopher, Luce Irigaray, whose work raises particular difficulties for the Anglo-Saxon reader unfamiliar with the Continental tradition of philosophy. I In attempting to elucidate, with reference to its context, one of the strands of her critique of Western metaphysics, I hope to make her work more accessible for discussion to a wider readership. I must emphasise that this paper is only attempting to deal with one aspect of Irigaray's thought and will inevitably touch on issues that I won't have space to develop. The work of Irigaray raises questions about the edifice of Western rationality. I would like here to approach these questions indirectly, to clarify their import by means of a detour through the concept of the imaginary. The term imaginary as a noun is current in French theoretical work, but not in English (except via Lacan, who gives the <...>.

<…> is another of those impossible data with which the historian of antiquity has to learn to live. Even on a far smaller scale the pilgrimages to Jerusalem of the third century B.C. must have represented important events. They provided a meeting

point for people who were increasingly diversified in language, manners, status and even political allegiance. The Babylonian Jews were loyal to the Seleucids; 8,000 of them fought off an attack of marauding Gaatians, according to the Second Book of Maccabees (8.20). Louis Finkelstein has shown to my satisfaction -- but not, I must admit, to everybody's satisfaction -- that the Midrash of the Passover Haggadah reflects these conflicts of political allegiance. Legends about the Babylonian and Persian period were revived -- or perhaps invented for the first time -- to encourage faithfulness to the Mosaic Law in the new conditions. The first part of the Book of Daniel (approximately chapters 1-6) and the Books of Esther and Judith are more likely to belong to the third than to the second century B.C. They combine edification with entertainment.

<...> and well educated singers available, with the cleanest vocal style, tell them nothing about how you want the performance to go, start them off and lo! the composer speaks through their innocent mouths. This is remarkably close to the situation envisaged by Opdebeeck for the English a cappella scene, one in which directors do not (or can not) impose their own musical personality, leading to performances which sound beautiful because the members of the choir have been excellently prepared by their training in the choral tradition but which all sound the same. However, I must confess that I do not find this to be a serious problem at least, not yet. These are still early days in which, it might be argued, the professional choirs and vocal consorts in England are engaged in a quest to discover how much' interpretation' the various early-music repertories actually require when a high level of accuracy in tuning and ensemble is guaranteed them. So far they have achieved by international consent beauty of sound; that is already a notable accomplishment.

Brentano draws our attention to a difference which seems to have escaped Locke, at any rate when he was writing Book II, Chapter I of the Essay. Outer observation is inherently fallible: one may not actually be perceiving what one thinks one is perceiving. This means that, strictly speaking, so-called outer perception is not really perception at all. One does not perceive external objects; one infers their existence from one's ideas of them. So, far from it being appropriate to assimilate inner perception to outer perception, as Locke does, we must acknowledge that mental phenomena are' the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense of the word is possible'. In this, Brentano is more consistently Cartesian than is Locke. Recapitulation. We began with a question: What have certain words -- believe, expect, hope, and so on -- in common? So far, we have mentioned two possible answers, those of Descartes and Brentano: Descartes's, in terms of mental activity, a distinguishing mark of the mental being that it <...>.

One owes them the duty to uphold and support them. But this has nothing to do with any issue concerning authority. Second, the duty involves more than a duty of obedience. One may be obligated to help fight opponents of the institution or help overcome obstacles to its successful operation in ways which one is not required by its laws to do. Third, the duty is owed to institutions which may have authority but only towards other people. For example, one may owe the duty to the just government of foreign countries. We must conclude, therefore, that the duty to support just institutions, where it has to do with just authorities, is parasitical on the normal justification thesis, and not an alternative to it. In other ways the duty to uphold and support just institutions is narrower than the duty corresponding to the right of a legitimate authority. One has a duty to obey those in authority over one even in circumstances in which disobedience does not imperil their existence or functioning.

Axelrod and Hamilton point out that reciprocal altruism could evolve without the need for individual recognition in a sessile organism; in principle, it could evolve in a plant. Thus, imagine a sessile species in which each individual has only one neighbour. Then the strategy' cooperate with your neighbour if he cooperates; otherwise defect' would be an ESS, although I have some difficulty in seeing how it would evolve in the first place. To summarise on the prisoner's dilemma, we must distinguish between sessile and mobile animals. For the former, since they play against only one or a few opponents, there is no need for learning; the genetically-determined strategy' cooperate with your neighbour if he cooperates; otherwise defect' can be stable. For reciprocal altruism in mobile animals, as demonstrated by packer in baboons, more is needed. Since each baboon interacts with many others, and since there may be a long delay between action and reciprocation, stability requires that a baboon should recognise individuals <...>.

<…> and urges that where there are rules to which people do in fact adhere for the most part, and which help maintain the social stability required for any kind of good to flourish, we are likely to come nearest to doing what is objectively right (in terms of its actual consequences) if we also stick to the rules, but that where the rules, however useful they would be if generally obeyed, are widely flouted we should make a direct judgement of what will have the best consequences. Where there are no established rules to guide decision we must make a direct judgement as to what will have the best consequences, concentrating on the more immediate and those we are personally most motivated to promote, as the remote future is highly unpredictable and we are unlikely to do much to promote what is not personally inviting. These however are directives as to

what is likely to be the right action; the actually right action is that which will actually, not merely probably, have the best consequences. We may note that although Moore thinks that in some sense <...>.

<...> social sanction will be, in the first place, some kind of social ostracism or discomfort; it may or may not be wished that it be associated with a legal penalty. Another possibility is that we call statements expressing attitudes with this particular sort of stridency moral statements and allow as ethical all statements which express attitudes towards conduct of a certain special seriousness and pervasiveness in their influence on one's own behaviour and such as one would like to find widely shared, but not necessarily to have supported by a social sanction. However that may be, we must now note that value statements in general, and ethical statements in particular, are distinguished by the attitudinist into two types. There are those which, like' Stealing is wrong', express a pure attitude, without any admixture of belief. Of course, my attitude may stem from my having certain beliefs, but these beliefs are not part of what is actually expressed by the sentence, and do not pertain to that which someone else must share with me, in order for it to be logically <...>.

Such authority could not be shared with, nor alienated to anyone; the notion was already fully developed under Philip the Fair by 1294:' the king of France is subject to no one', wrote Guillaume de Nogaret, expressing the doctrine which could make vassals subjects and was absolute. It did not, as has been claimed, need a Louis XI to act as its midwife in the fifteenth century. What was the theory -- did it really work in practice? To answer this question, we must first assess the significance of homage and fealty in the later thirteenth century: how important were they as expressions of subordination of one ruler to another? Did the obligations implied by them have any marked practical effects? Louis IX apparently thought the issue of homage highly significant. Joinville reported the king's reply to his counsellors who opposed the treaty with England of 1259:' it seems to me that what I give him Henry IIII am employing well, because he was not my man, and now he <...>.

<...> we are maintaining the conditionals of which we know, notably that if cc occurred, then even if certain things of a general class had also occurred, e would still have occurred. This is evidently in a way general. By asserting it, however, we are also committing ourselves to a general conditional proposition of a standard kind. We can not make the causal claim about cc and allow that other circumstances identical with cc have different upshots. If we take the starting of the wipers to be an effect of a given circumstance, we must accept that there is a type of circumstance which is connected with startings of wipers generally. What is true, to express the matter simply, if cc was a causal circumstance for e, is this: If any circumstance of the type of cc occurs, even if certain other events or conditions also occur, so does an event of the type of e. If the event does not occur, neither does the circumstance. We are committed to other such generalizations, less simple, one of them <...>.

<...> the activity of the ears being just as' physical' as that of the dancing limbs or the sensating nerves). But Adorno assumes that' the process of internalization, to which great music as a self-deliverance from the external world of objects owes its very origin, is not revocable in the concept of musical practice' (ibid: 133), and so he is bound to consider the' functionalism' of popular music as regressive, explaining it by reference to social-psychological defects. Against this -- or alongside the importance of conscious thought -- we must affirm the possibility of practice as critique; the legitimacy (however compromised) of subsuming' music', narrowly defined, within other social activities; and the necessity to consider its effects in relation to the structure of the' external socialworld'. Even in the sphere of bourgeois' art' music Adorno allots the listener a strictly limited role. It is the dialectically functioning relationship between musicians and listeners which accounts for the state and the viability of the musical language at a given time, and for <...>.

<...> the assumption that such " complexes of compresence " are unrepeatable, i.e. do not occur more than once, is an empirical proposition, not an analytic truth. Although this proposition is unlikely ever to be falsified, nevertheless one can not maintain that it can not in principle be false. This leads to some perplexing conclusions. Thus, according to Russell, since the possibility of a recurrence of the same " complexes of compresence " can not be excluded (there is no equivalent of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason to ensure their numerical uniqueness) we must accept that propositions about order in time, such as " If A precedes B, B does not precede A ", " If A is before B and B is before C, then A is before C ", etc. are merely empirical propositions and not inviolable a priori truths. Propositions about order in space too should be interpreted in the same manner. Thus, Russell argues, although it may make good empirical sense to say that a " complete complex of compresence <...>.

In physics it means " overlapping of qualities in space-time ". In a psychological context it means the compresence of simultaneously experienced qualities -- visual, acoustic, tactile, etc. -- which are part of one momentary experience (referred

to by Russell as " I-now "). Although the relation is the same in both cases, the psychological aspect of compresence has the epistemological priority and it is by considering the " private compresence " of the parts of one total momentary experience that we must begin in trying to explain the possibility of an objective order in physical space-time. But the concept of compresence is far from clear. If it implies that no time-lag is detectable between elements of an experienced " complex ", then this is true only in a very limited sense. Take, for example, the perceptual experience that I have while looking at this bunch of carnations arranged in a vase on the table in the middle of the room. I see this " complex " as one whole.

<...> and that this is in fact the " conceptual scheme " we use and rely on in making the world intelligible to ourselves. At the same time, it is strenuously denied that the idea of such a unitary spatio-temporal framework in any way necessitates a Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. Kant, as we saw, held that the unity of the phenomenal world can be accounted for only if space and time are interpreted as forms of our intuition, not as properties of things in themselves, but that for this very reason we must accept that there is an extra-phenomenal as well as a phenomenal side to reality, with things in themselves being inaccessible to cognition. The theory under discussion rejects this as a " doctrinal fantasy " of transcendental idealism. If noumenal things did exist, there would be no possibility of defining a " principle of individuation " for them in any case. As regards the phenomenal world, the meaningfulness of references to identical particulars presupposes the possibility of logically adequate criteria of re-identification, and such criteria, in turn,<...>.

This is a completely new kind of plastic expression. It is still in its infancy and not as abstract as it aspires to be.' Gleizes and Metzinger, themselves painters, and fascinated by purely formal pictorial problems, also began by seeing abstraction as the logical end, although they rapidly retreated and admitted the need, for the moment at least, of a certain coefficient of realism:'... the painting imitates nothing and... must justify its existence in itself... Yet we must admit that reminiscences of natural forms can not be absolutely banished, at least not yet. Art can not be raised to a pure effusion at a single onset.' Allard and Hourcade rigorously opposed any suggestion of abstraction in Cubist painting. Hourcade condemned it as un-French:' our tradition calls for a subject and the originality of Cubism lies precisely in its rejection of the anecdote in order to rediscover the subject'; and he repudiated the idea that all the painters of the Section d'Or had renounced natural <...>.

<...> rolls comprising crescendos and diminuendos, or simply beaten rhythms, which can be as complex or simple as one could wish. There is a mystery in many percussion sounds which can hardly be matched by the whole orchestra. The majesty of a large gong is unique, while a throbbing roll on a big bass drum can be so quiet that it can be felt rather than be heard, inducing a sense of the supernatural. Inevitably, composers have been quick to exploit percussion possibilities, and if anything we have suffered a period of over-use. So we must warn that percussion can easily be overworked and become tiresome. It is best therefore to err on the quiet side and to use percussion sparingly rather than to excess. The effect will be all the more telling. Finally, we have hardly mentioned many conventional accompanimental ideas which have been used thousands of times and have been invaluable in their time. The Chopinesque left-hand arpeggios, the repeated chords of Mozart and Beethoven, Strauss's waltz rhythms, popular song accompaniments (with bass on the downbeats, chords on <...>.

<...> blank stave throughout the song, with clefs and key signatures for a vocal bass line, and the words are surely those of a duet: A thousand thousand ways we'll find To entertain the hours; No two shall e'er be known so kind, No life so blest as ours. With the vocal bass line reconstructed (ex.2) the music makes perfect sense. In Act 4 the theatre score and the quarto are in total agreement: the only problem is the blank space left in the score for the Dance of the Four Seasons, which we must regretfully conclude is lost. Act 5 presents a new problem -- a movement which is both included in the score and indicated in the quarto, but in different places. The score places the grotesque number for six dancing monkeys as the second of a sequence of three orchestral numbers played during a spectacular scene shift: While the Scene is darken'd, a single Entry is danced; Then a Symphony is play'd; after that the Scene is suddainly Illuminated, and discovers a transparent Prospect of a Chinese <...>.

<...> Cicero attributed to Scipio Aemilianus and his friends the introduction of Socrates' teaching in Rome. As he says in De republica (3.5): " Scipio and his friends added to the native usage of our ancestors the teaching of Socrates coming from abroad. " Polybius could not have written his history as he did if he had not found in Rome an aristocracy which he could instinctively understand because he shared its attitude to life. The common basis was provided by the large-scale infiltration of Hellenistic thoughts and customs into Rome during the previous century. But we must allow for a certain amount of give and take. Plutarch reports in the Quaestiones Conviviales (IV, Proemium) one of the pieces of advice which Polybius was

supposed to have given to Scipio after he took charge of him: " Never return from the Forum until you have made a new friend of one of your fellow citizens. " This shows that Polybius grasped very early the system of " amicitiae ", that is of clientships, which supported the power of the Roman aristocracy.

Polybius concludes with a Homeric line which he would never have used for Rome, however suitable the adaptation might have been: " To Egypt is a long and dangerous road " (Odys. 4.483). For the same reasons we must regret that Posidonius did not try out on Rome that ethnographical style which makes his Celts live for ever -- a model to the French nation for any past and future extravagance. Neither Polybius nor Posidonius gives any serious thought even to the phenomenon which had changed the shape of their own lives: the Hellenization of Italian culture. True enough, they occasionally notice knowledge of Greek, adoption of Greek customs, and sympathy for Greek ideas in individual Romans. But this happens far less systematically than one would expect <...>.

It was Mommsen again who said that Polybius in the treatment of all the questions which concerned law, honour and religion was not only banal but also entirely false, " nicht bloss platt, sondern auch grundlich falsch ". In their understandable anxiety to save what could be saved of Greek life by cooperating with the Romans, Polybius and, we must add, Posidonius, had left unexplored the most solid substructures of the Roman-Italian complex. What they saw was important enough: the ethos of the Roman leading class, the methods of conquering and ruling, the technicalities of political and military organization. Furthermore, they were intimately acquainted with the Greek republics and Macedonian monarchies of their time, and realistically assessed their capacities to stand up against the Romans. That was enough to make them agents, not only historians, of the Roman expansion.

One explanation is only too obvious. They had no language in common. The Greeks were monolingual; the Jews were bilingual, but their second language, Aramaic, gave them access to Persians and Babylonians, even to Egyptians, rather than to Greeks. Yet language difficulties have never been insurmountable barriers. Perhaps we have to reckon with an element of chance. Herodotus did not happen to visit Jerusalem. A page of Herodotus would have been sufficient to put a battalion of biblical scholars out of action. Ultimately, however, we must perhaps admit deeper obstacles. Under the guidance of Nehemiah and his successors the Jews were intent on isolating themselves from the surrounding nations. They trusted in God and his Law, For the same purpose, the Greeks trusted their own intelligence and initiative, were unceremoniously aggressive and contributed everywhere to disturbing the peace of the Persian Empire on which the reconstruction of Judaism depended. One hundred and twenty years after Nehemiah and Pericles Greeks and Jews found themselves under the control of Alexander the Great -- a Greek-speaking Macedonian who <...>.

Egypt and Syria is assuming in his eyes apocalyptic proportions. Syria, or rather Antiochus, pollutes the Temple of Jerusalem on the eve of a final war which will give him victory over Egypt, but which will soon be followed by the deliverance of the Jews and by the Last Judgement: " And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life and some to reproaches and everlasting abhorrence " (12.2). It is of course very difficult for us to reconcile ourselves to such a perspective. But we must emphasize that Daniel is the only piece of contemporary evidence from the Jewish side: it gives us what at least one Jew thought the situation to be about 164 B.C., immediately after the reconsecration of the Temple but before the death of Antiochus IV was known. It is not the perspective of a man who is dominated by the fear and hatred of Hellenizers. There is a foreign rule which brought contamination with it: the contamination is over and the Last Judgement is in sight.

<...> at the festival of Dionysus in Athens and is said by Aristotle in his Poetics (c. 330 B.C.) to have originated in the Dionysiac dithyramb. Beyond this, however, its origin has hitherto been an insoluble problem: the explicit evidence of the ancients is notoriously inadequate and various different theories have been constructed from it. The main task is to establish the nature of the tragic chorus, since it is clear from the ancient tradition that tragedy originated in the chorus and once consisted of nothing but the chorus. For this reason, among others, we must reject A. W. Schlegel's interpretation of the chorus as the " ideal spectator " there being originally no spectacle for it to be spectator of. We should also reject (Hegel's) idea that it represents the populace as against the aristocratic heroes of the drama proper: in origin and essence, tragedy is

purely metaphysical and not sociopolitical. There is more value in Schiller's insights that the chorus is essentially anti-naturalistic and serves to uphold tragedy's ideal ground and poetic freedom.

They did not refer me, and strangely I did not insist; as patients do not want to hear bad news. " Thank goodness, I'm not having a heart attack " was my reaction. A barium meal confirmed a hiatus hernia but the chest pain continued to infiltrate my left arm. I was so overjoyed with the diagnosis that I celebrated with a huge meal, a bottle of champagne and a large cigar. Afterwards I had my myocardial infarction in my office, feeling a complete idiot. But, I must claim, as a patient, that when a doctor tells you there is nothing wrong with your heart, and it is backed up by four colleagues who diagnose a hiatus hernia, the feeling of relief is enormous. # THE MORNING AFTER # While still in hospital I decided to pass my knowledge gleaned through stupidity to other people.

The patients were all detained under the Mental Health Act, required urgent surgery or invasive investigation, and were, in the opinion of the surgical team, unable to give informed consent. On each occasion I felt that insufficient effort had been made by the surgical teams to decide on the capacity to give informed consent, and I was dismayed at the immediate assumption of incapacity because the patient had been sectioned. I must emphasise that I was not asked to determine the capacity to give consent, but simply to complete the paperwork. My understanding of the law is that an adult patient who is capable of doing so must give consent to any medical treatment if that treatment is to be lawful. At the time of the decision the patient needs a capacity commensurate with the gravity of that decision. If the patient lacks the requisite capacity, then the doctors must act in what they perceive to be his or her best interests <...>.

Research should be done by experts to ensure useful results. The subjects of research can be suggested by those closest to the problem. With improved conditions more general practitioners may wish to combine these roles. Otherwise, Exe Directory is a way of matching the supply and demand of research ideas. In this way every general practitioner could shape and contribute to the future research and development of primary care. Any contributions can be sent to the address below. # Editor, -- I must disagree with Graham Butland's generalising statements about general practitioners lacking plans for development and decision making due to the' dependency culture' related to their methods of payment. General practitioners have always had to manage and plan their businesses and are constantly adapting to changes in medical care. Survival has always involved flexibility. Although family health services authorities may have been oblivious to these activities, this does not indicate their absence. Before 1990 many general practitioners were improving the quality of care of their patients in a spontaneous <...>.

- Shall:

<…>with other cortical events relating to other sensory pathways, are the basis of consciousness and of our state of being' worlded'. In other words, according to the neurophysiological CTP, sensation, perception, experience, consciousness, are intimately related to, or even boil down to, large numbers of trains or patterns of nerve impulses. We perceive what is' out there' or what is' around us'as a result of the transfer of energy from objects or events to specialized parts of the body known collectively as' the sensory system'. I shall argue that this framework is explanatorily inadequate and that the inadequacy is inherited by theories developed within it. Such theories contribute nothing to explaining the mystery of perception. At best they re-describe perception in a manner that actually generates more problems than it solves. Neuroscience, which depends upon a materialist CTP for the explanatory force of its explanations of the mind, can not, therefore, sustain any claim to be explaining or advancing our understanding of the basis of perception, or of the mind.

<...> belief that our sensations are in some sense to be understood in terms of a set of stimulation levels (spiking frequencies) in the appropriate sensory pathways. And it would seem that physiologists -- working within the common-sense assumptions that we experience the world because it impinges upon our bodies and that what we experience is what, directly or indirectly, impinges on our bodies in the form of transferred energy -- have made considerable progress in explaining how' the diversity of working produceth the diversity of experience'. Or have they? In the discussion that follows, I shall question whether: (a) scientific, and in particular physiological, observations have provided any additional, independent evidence in support of the impingement theory of perception/experience; (b) the impingement theory, with its physiological embellishments, goes any

way towards explaining perception. One might expect, a priori, that no empirical (that is perception-based) observations could provide evidence in support of a metaphysical theory of perception; that perceptions would not enable us to get to the root of perception.

<...> that mythical weapon or those who prefer the comforting repetition or the ideological caress; who do not want to READ. Or, in the slogan of American aerobics teachers,' No Pain, No Gain'. It was a note often sounded in battles to come. MacCabe and Heath had studied in Paris, and Signs of the Times has its niche in postwar cultural history, marking the first major re-entry of French intellectual influences since Eliot's adherence to Remy de Gourmont and the French neoclassicists, half a century earlier. For the sake of convenience I shall apply the term la nouvelle critique to the complex of ideas emerging from the Paris of the 1960s, including many diverse strands: the' classical' structuralism of the early Barthes, the poststructuralism of his later work, the deconstructionism of Derrida, and whatever name one gives to the work of Foucault and Lacan, in taxonomic historiography and dissident psychoanalysis respectively. Frank Kermode was the first senior academic in English studies to take a sympathetic interest in la nouvelle critique, particularly its analysis of narrative.

Among Pound's associates in that vanished world, the most instructive figures, I'm inclined to think, are Frederic Manning and Allen Upward; but unfortunately we're still very far from recovering from oblivion the lineaments of either of these men. (Recovering them is a matter of great urgency; and a start has been made, but there's a long way to go -- especially with Upward, whom oblivion has enveloped with a completeness that is startling and significant.) Since Manning and Upward are in this way for the moment denied us, I shall make do with two other names: Maurice Hewlett and Laurence Binyon. And Hewlett is the one to start with, probably the best peg on which to hang a necessarily rash characterization of that literary world of late-Edwardian England which Fred Manning entered from Australia, and Pound from the United States. Not that Hewlett was a representative figure, if by that we mean a sort of undistinguished average. On the contrary he was taken to be something of a maverick and flutterer of dovecotes.

<...> from Pound's poetry and his criticism, it is plain that we can not do this. His anti-Semitism may be a separate issue (though many of course will deny even that); but his Fascism can not be, since it represents a disastrously false judgement made in the course of following through a conviction not self-evidently false -- about there being a connection between the health of letters and the health of the commonweal. It so happens that this troublesome question, or complex of questions, is not raised by the piece in Eliot's selection that I shall take to represent Pound's criticism at its irreplaceable best. This is the brief article (less than five printed pages) which originally appeared in Poetry for February 1918, under the title,' The Hard and Soft in French Poetry'. The title alone is enough to show that this piece, if it avoids giving offence in the ways just glanced at, will offend none the less. For hardness and softness in relation to poetry -- where have these qualities been defined?

Part 5 considered two contending theories of perversion and homosexuality, one deriving from psychoanalysis, the other from anthropological, sociological, and historical perspectives, in which Foucault's History of Sexuality was both a culmination and a new departure. Henceforth, primarily for convenience of reference (and so provisionally), I shall designate the second account materialist. This post-Freudian, materialist reinterpretation of sexual deviance diverges so considerably from the (-----) tradition that perversion comes to signify quite differently. This becomes even more so when deviance is regarded in the light of the pre-Freudian, pre-sexological histories of perversion. Two points made before are thereby worth reiterating: first, that the meaning of perversion is crucially context dependent; second that one objective of this book is to restore to the concept dimensions which were obscured within the (-----) traditions, though remaining <...>.

(Ben Okri discussing Othello and race,' Leaping Out')' Difference' is a fashionable concept. So too is' the other', that highly charged embodiment of difference. I propose a distrust of both concepts. Several kinds of difference figure in contemporary cultural theory but two especially: sexual difference (deriving usually though not invariably from psychoanalysis) and cultural difference, with each of these complicated by a third kind of difference which construes meaning and identity in terms of difference or, more exactly, differential relations. I shall call this third kind' semiotic difference'. The homosexual is significantly implicated in both sexual and cultural difference, and for two main reasons. First because he or she has been regarded (especially in psychoanalytic theory) as one who fears the difference of the' other' or opposite sex, and, in flight

from it, narcissistically embraces the same sex instead. Difference and heterogeneity are sanctified, homogeneity is distrusted. The eminent Kleinian psychoanalyst, Hanna Segal, has recently declared the adult homosexual structure <...>.

<...> for fulfilment in the realm of the foreign. Not necessarily as a second best: over and again in the culture of homosexuality, differences of race and class are intensely cathected. That this has also occurred in exploitative, sentimental, and/ or racist forms does not diminish its significance; it anything it increases it. Those who move too hastily to denounce homosexuality across race and class as essentially or only exploitative, sentimental, or racist betray their own homophobic ignorance. This crossing constitutes a complex, difficult history, one from which we can learn. I shall argue for the importance of this history for all three kinds of difference -- sexual, cultural, and semiotic -- as they figure in current theory. Although I concentrate in this chapter on sexual difference and on cultural and racial differences in the last chapter, it is worth remembering that in some contexts they interrelate. First a by now familiar digression via the early modern, where we find rather different conceptions of sameness and sexual difference.

The homosexual' knows intimately in himself the generality that he finds in the other':' in the homosexual act I remain locked within my body, narcissistically contemplating in the other an excitement that is the mirror of my own' (pp. 307,310). In normal or right sexuality, argues Scruton, we not only give recognition to the other's person in and through our desire tor him or her, we also accord them accountability and care in the process. Among many possible objections, I shall note in passing just three, chosen because each indicates limitations which Scruton shares with other advocates of sexual difference theory. It is ironic that by privileging sexual difference Scruton shows himself the victim of precisely the modern intensification of sexuality which in other ways he might regard as contributing to a legitimation of the perversions he repudiates. This is further apparent from the way he makes broad social and ethical dimensions of human relations (accountability and care) the necessary condition for normal or right sexuality.

<...> dictated, apparently, not by their sexuality as such but their transvestism and use of the dildo -- at once, I want to suggest, appropriations of masculinity, inversions of it, and substitutions for it. I have already explored in relation to Gide and others the kind of rebellion whose test they retrospectively failed, namely, transgression as a quest for authenticity: underpinning and endorsing the philosophy of individualism, it suggests that in defying a repressive social order we can dis-cover (and so be true to) our real selves. For convenience of reference I shall call this idea of transgression humanist. As I have tried to show, the significance for our culture of humanist transgression, this escape from repression into the affirmation of one's true self can hardly be overestimated. But its prevalence has led us to misconceive both the significance and practice of transgression in the earlier modern period, and also in some of our own contemporary subcultures. What intrigues me about that earlier period, especially its drama, is a mode of transgression which finds expression through the inversion <...>.

But still questions abound: is this sensibility transcultural, or historically rooted in the (varying) histories of the representation of homosexuality? Is it a direct expression of homosexuality, or an indirect expression of its repression and/or sublimation? Is it defined in terms of the sexuality of (say) the individual or artist who expresses or possesses it -- and does that mean that no nonhomosexual can possess/express it? I shall suggest that there is a sense in which the very notion of a homosexual sensibility is a contradiction in terms. I am interested in an aspect of it which exists, it at all, in terms of that contradiction -- of a parodic critique of the essence of sensibility as conventionally understood. Michel Foucault argues that in the modern period sex has become definitive of the truth of our being (above, Chapter 14).

The specifics aren't clear, but the contextual indications are that this would include American art from say, Pollock to Andr, not to mention a range of contemporary work on commodification stemming from Warhol. All of which says more about Callinicos, and the limits on his knowledge and interests, than it does about the work. Whither Brecht now, on the lure of the good old days; not to mention the nostalgia laid at the door of romantic anti-capitalism? I shall conclude briefly. The point is I think that the argument from here can go two ways. The first response is that it doesn't matter very much. Callinicos, defence of Marxism is erudite and compelling, and the fact that he runs out of steam over post-war art is of less moment than the fact that he takes the range of issues seriously enough to discuss them at all. Most sociologists, economists and politicians, after all, don't get that far.

One way would be to hold up a pencil at arm's length and measure their relative sizes as an artist might. Another would be to take photographs of the moon on the horizon, and in the meridian, without altering the camera settings, and compare the size of the moon on the two prints. It might be found that there was no difference. And yet the horizontal moon might look bigger than the meridian moon in the other, non-objective, sense of' looks'. The terms' objective' and' subjective'being over-worked, I shall refer to the' presentation appearance'and the' perceived-as appearance'. One can talk of an object presenting an appearance to an unoccupied point in space, and of the presentation appearance of an object itself being larger or smaller than the presentation appearance of another to that point. Whether it is larger or smaller will depend entirely on such factors as the relative size of the objects, their distance from the point, magnifying effects of the media, and soon.

The point of saying' AB looks shorter' is to exhibit one's sophistication in the matter. And the same goes for' The sea looks blue'. One does not say of a cornflower that it looks blue -- unless, of course, one wants to exhibit one's sophistication in the matter of colours being' secondary qualities'. The nonperspectival appearance, then, is identified by reference to a thought from which we wisely refrain, a' would-be' thought. Since it has this connection with thoughts I shall call it the epistemic or cognitive appearance. That one does not say of a cornflower that it looks blue is a linguistic point, not a psychological one. If someone, looking at a flower, said,' It's blue', on account of what he saw, drawing no inferences, and not lying, then it would be psychologically true to say that it looked blue to him even though it would be linguistically odd to say this if one had no reason to doubt that the flower <...>.

This is, in turn, picked up by the hearer's auditory organs. The speech sounds that stimulate these organs are then converted into a neural signal from which a phonetic representation equivalent to the one into which the speaker encoded his message is obtained. This representation is decoded into a representation of the same message that the speaker originally chose to convey. Despite his scientific-sounding terminology, Katz is not so very different from Locke. Both of them are captivated by what I shall call' the myth of the sense behind the sentence'. I do not mean that there is not a valid distinction to be drawn between sense and sentence; only that it is a mistake to think of the sense of an utterance as though it were something existing alongside the utterance but in the ethereal medium of the mind. We do not have to encode what we want to say from something else before we can say it, or decode it before we can understand it.

<...>material in what he says elsewhere in the Investigations and in other of his later writings for a many-sided and, I think, useful development of the comparison. Anyway, that is what I shall attempt in this essay. # AFTERNOON ON THE SUN # Consider the question,' How can I mean anything by' It's afternoon on the Sun'?' To see what lies behind it, ask,' What is the explanation of the meaning of' It's afternoon'?' We know very well what the correct explanation is. I shall call it the fact-presupposing explanation. The fact presupposed is that the Earth revolves on its axis so that places on the Earth have varying positions relative to the Sun. Were it not for this fact of nature we wouldn't have our time-of-day language. But, having it, it is a fact of grammar (in Wittgenstein's sense) that it is afternoon at a place on the Earth when at that place the Sun is past the zenith but not yet over the horizon.

That is, we can see that the answer we should give is,' You can't, short of giving an entirely new meaning to' It's afternoon', and why should you want to do that?' We can see why we can extend the use of' afternoon' to Mars but not to the Sun. The Sun can't be past, or not past, the zenith on the Sun. Suppose, now, that a different sort of explanation of the meaning of' It's afternoon' had been given. I shall call it an experiential explanation, because it is in terms of our experiences. We can imagine someone saying:' We understand' It's afternoon' from our own case, that is, from our experience on Earth of, for example, seeing the Sun more than half-way across the sky as we recline in our garden chairs after lunch. What is to stop us from generalising? Can't we at least suppose that we might have the same experience on the Sun?'.

They ought to do as he says because he says so. But this reason is related to the other reasons which apply to the case. It is not (like the rain in the example of my going to London) just another reason to be added to the others, a reason to stand alongside the others when one reckons which way is better supported by reason. The arbitrator's decision is meant to be based on the other reasons, to sum them up and to reflect their outcome. For ease of reference I shall call both reasons of this character and the reasons they are meant to reflect dependent reasons. The context will prevent this ambiguity from leading to confusion. Notice that a dependent reason is not one which does in fact reflect the balance of reasons on which it depends: it is one which is meant to do so. This leads directly to the second distinguishing feature of the example. The arbitrator's decision is also meant to replace the reasons on which it depends.

The arbitrator's decision is also meant to replace the reasons on which it depends. In agreeing to obey his decision they agreed to follow his judgment of the balance of reasons rather than their own. Henceforth, his decision will settle for them what to do. Lawyers say that the original reasons merge into the decision of the arbitrator or the judgment of a court, which, if binding, becomes res judicata. This means that the original cause of action can no longer be relied upon for any purpose. I shall call a

reason which displaces others a pre-emptive reason. It is not that the arbitrator's word is an absolute reason which has to be obeyed come what may. It can be challenged and justifiably refused in certain circumstances. If, for example, the arbitrator was bribed, or was drunk while considering the case, or if new evidence of great importance unexpectedly turns up, each party may ignore the decision. The point is that reasons that could have been relied upon to justify action before his decision <...>.

Sometimes authorities are understood to be limited by the kinds of acts which they can or can not regulate (given some restrictive ways of classifying acts). In this book authorities are said to be limited also by the kinds of reasons on which they may or may not rely in making decisions and issuing directives, and by the kind of reasons their decisions can pre-empt. The argument for the pre-emption thesis proceeds from another, which I shall call the dependence thesis. It says:all authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive. Such reasons I dubbed above' dependent reasons'. The examples of conscription and taxation were intended to give the dependence thesis some plausibility, and in particular to disprove the suggestion that dependence is the mark of adjudication. But doubts are bound to linger and further clarifications are required to dispel them.

<...>assuming that they always succeed in acting in the ideal way, but on the ground that they do so often enough to justify their power), and naturally authorities are judged and their performance evaluated by comparing them to the ideal. Remember also that the thesis is not that authoritative determinations are binding only if they correctly reflect the reasons on which they depend. On the contrary, there is no point in having authorities unless their determinations are binding even if mistaken (though some mistakes may disqualify them). The whole point and purpose of authorities, I shall argue below, is to pre-empt individual judgment on the merits of a case, and this will not be achieved if, in order to establish whether the authoritative determination is binding, individuals have to rely on their own judgment of the merits. Nor does the thesis claim that authorities should always act in the interests of their subjects. Its claim is that their actions should reflect reasons which apply also to their subjects, but these need not be reasons advancing their interests.

<...> while they provide reasons for different things, they share the same basic structure. If so, the fact that a dependence thesis is true of theoretical authorities is strong evidence to suppose that it holds for practical authorities as well. # 3. The Justification of Authority # The dependence thesis, it will be remembered, is a moral thesis about the way authorities should use their powers. It is closely connected with a second moral thesis about the type of argument which could be used to establish the legitimacy of an authority. I shall call it the normal justification thesis. It claims that the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. This way of justifying a claim that someone has legitimate authority, i.e. <...>.

<...>is only completed when every last cultural product is herded into this universal corral of taste where, to quote Bourdieu once more,' the most classifying privilege has the privilege of appearing to be the most natural one'. So much for the mainstream, but how successful were the left at staying afloat in, or even swimming against, this formidable rightward moving tide? # In search of an alternative # In turning to the left criticism of Distant Voices, Still Lives and A Very British Coup, we need to make a distinction between what I shall term the' core' and the' periphery'journals. The core here refers to those journals which exist to promote left political comment and whose cultural criticism might therefore be expected to be consistently oppositional. The periphery refers to practically anywhere (including the mainstream and' quality' press we have already looked at) that oppositional or, as is more likely, alternative criticism might occur. Given the number of left journals that declined to review Distant Voices, Still Lives, my summary of them will be all <...>.

<...> to distinguish two elements in Quine's thinking here: his commitment to naturalism and rejection of the need for epistemology to exercise' scruples about circularity'; and his list of acceptable sciences, which excludes all of the social and human sciences, cognitive psychology, etc. It is not obvious that the grounds for his naturalism would evaporate if he took seriously a wider variety of forms of discourse. I want to take seriously the suggestion that the sort of inquiry that Quine has in mind could be the heir to traditional epistemology -- although I shall not restrict the concerns of the latter to studying the relation of evidence to theory. I shall, therefore, pursue two issues. First, can Quine be forced to acknowledge that questions arise which demand transcendental reflection -- does his resistance to such issues flow naturally from his philosophy, or docs it require a stubborn closing of the mind? Secondly, can a naturalized epistemology provide the perspicuous self-conscious understanding of inquiry which we saw, in the last section, to lie behind some traditional theorizing<...>.

AI workers are, by and large, naive materialists and mechanists, and for them those are not positions to be justified, but simply assumptions that allow them to get on with the job of constructing mechanical analogues or simulations of ourselves, who are, in Minsky's memorable phrase,' meat machines'. One could argue that such a strong assumption of underlying mechanism is only the normal situation in the sciences: one that allows experimental, as opposed to philosophical, work to proceed. True enough but, as I shall argue below, AI is not an experimental science but an engineering technique or, if you want something more dignified, a practical task in the alchemical tradition, and what I have to say about its suggestiveness for investigating the nature of consciousness rests entirely on that fact. Again, the' normal' situation in the sciences is not a sure guide, as none of you needs to be reminded, when the brain and mind are the subjects of investigation, given the peculiar features that attach to the <...>.

<...>to say about its suggestiveness for investigating the nature of consciousness rests entirely on that fact. Again, the' normal' situation in the sciences is not a sure guide, as none of you needs to be reminded, when the brain and mind are the subjects of investigation, given the peculiar features that attach to the notion of consciousness and to its close relations, thought, feeling, privacy and so on. In what follows, I shall play fast and loose with these words and the subtle distinctions between them. That is to say, I shall not distinguish carefully such questions as: # Does X think? # Is X conscious? # Does X have essentially private inner processes? # Is X aware of a sensation of pain? # Is X aware of those trees in front of him? # Is X conscious he is giving an after dinner speech? When I write of consciousness I shall mean what is often called self-consciousness, rather than awareness of sensations or perceptions. Moreover, I shall not try to determine what kind of phenomenon consciousness<...>.

The matter of the paper is to present those areas of AI (some would say that is too parochial and what I shall put forward belongs more generally to Computer Science) where a mechanical analogue of consciousness might be sought in the future, and to argue that they are not the obvious places, and have not been subjected to much philosophical investigation. At the end, I shall turn your attention to three accounts of the nature of consciousness by philosophers acquainted with AI, and contrast what they have to say with my own account. I shall present the following notions in turn: # (i) # modularity # (ii) # implementation independence # (iii) # program-level reduction # (iv) # program inference. These are not really technical terms, but just convenient labels I shall use, though each is close to a well-understood technical concept. They are, I believe, some of the places to start our search for features of modern machines that might be suggestive as models or analogues of consciousness.

An initial objection against any easy identification of such a privacy with consciousness is that, when driving, say, the highest level commands to turn the car, keep the accelerator depressed, etc., would be' inscrutable from below' in the way discussed, but the level of those commands could never be identified with consciousness because, as Sartre liked to point out ad nauseam, we can drive' without thinking about it'and, moreover, at no danger to the public. This is correct, but nothing I shall say, when I come to draw conclusions, will amount to any such identification, only to necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for an explication of consciousness. So, if we are conscious in the sense of this analogy of levels, then it is of the uppermost level that we are conscious, but that does not require me to claim that we are always conscious of that level. Nor am I assuming that the top level of language, in the sense of programming language, coincides always<...>.

I now want to draw together the four aspects of intelligent machines set out above and three prima facie features of consciousness: these three seem to me necessary criteria for any explication of consciousness, and I will suggest that the aspects of such machines already described are interestingly related to these facts. They are not, of course, sufficient features and I shall make neither claims nor suggestions here as to the sufficiency of existing or possible machines for being conscious entities. # (a) Vacuity or' downwards opacity' # Dennett (see below) has in recent publications emphasized the relative emptiness of the contents of consciousness: all that is not there and which, for much of the workings of our bodies, can not be brought into the contents of consciousness. I would suggest that the two sorts of opacity in a computer that have been discussed here are <...>.

(a) Vacuity or' downwards opacity' # Dennett (see below) has in recent publications emphasized the relative emptiness of the contents of consciousness: all that is not there and which, for much of the workings of our bodies, can not be brought into the contents of consciousness. I would suggest that the two sorts of opacity in a computer that have been discussed here are at least potentially interesting explications of that fact: modularity and program-level reduction. When discussing Dennett and Sloman below, I shall argue that the opacity of one level of programming language to another is a better preliminary model of consciousness than the inaccessibility of the contents of one module from another. Different kinds of opacity within a program were discussed earlier and these would seem to have quite different correlates in the sphere of consciousness: the lower level of language is almost totally inaccessible from the higher level (unless special structural features are added to the language to make it accessible), in rather the way that the machine code of our <...>.

<...> consciousness does not have the consciousnesses of the homunculi as parts any more than two Siamese Twins that share digestive organs have the unity and separateness of their respective consciousnesses compromised. Again, we have to consider both modularity and program level as possible explications of this assumed unity of consciousness. In the case of modularity, there seems a natural explication if we take seriously Minsky's idea of a highest organizing module. It will be remembered that his other, earlier, intuitions about heterarchy pulled in the opposite direction, towards a monadology of separate partial sub-consciousnesses. I shall argue below, in connection with Dennett and Sloman, that our commonsense intuitions about the unity of consciousness are better preserved by analogy with program level than with program module. Before turning to the work of Sayre, Dennett and Sloman, I should at least mention one major question that has been left unasked in this paper, and intentionally so: namely, what properties would a machine have to have in order to be sufficient for us to deem it conscious?

<...>that Ullman builds implicit assumptions about the physics and geometry of the real world, and about biologically normal viewing conditions, into the computations carried out by the visual system. It is plausible that many species may have evolved such implicit computational constraints. That is, the animal's mind may implicitly embody knowledge about its external environment, which knowledge is used by it in its perceptual interpretations. Something of the sort seems to be true for migratory birds, who have some practical grasp of the earth's magnetic field or of stellar constellations; and, I shall suggest presently, the kingfisher may have some practical grasp of the refractive properties of water. A' practical grasp' of physical properties is not the same thing as the ability to articulate and reason about them by way of verbal symbols. So I am here attributing to the kingfisher' knowledge how' rather than' knowledge that'. (The view that the bird's ability to go straight to the fish is the exercise of a' bodily skill', <...>.

(And it is in any case a singularly unromantic name!) But otherwise the absence of specific characters defined in the third person underlines the universality and also the particularity of these poems. C. S. Lewis saw this point too: the poems express' simply love, the quintessential of all loves whether erotic, parental, filial, amicable, or feudal. Thus from extreme particularity there is a road to the highest universality.' The particularity derives, I shall argue, from their being poems imagined for a series of concrete life-situations; in literary-critical terms they are examples of that minimal dramatic form, the monologue. But the particularity, as Shakespeare formulates it, also creates intimacy. If a poet writes about' Stella', what she does, what her attributes are, by the use of the third-person form he has acknowledged a certain distance separating himself from his beloved.

<...> ground for denying that colour and value can be there independently of the consciousness of them. But this is only a ground for drawing a strong contrast between them and' primary qualities' like shape, for those who, like Mackie, take a strong realist line about the latter which I find unacceptable. But even without challenging such realism, I would argue that values, by being made dependent on consciousness, do not cease to be part of the fabric of the world. For consciousness is itself part of that fabric, and, or so I shall argue in Part Two, the value features which are found there are real properties of certain experiences (and indeed of the physical and social environment in our personal versions of it) which have an intrinsic prescriptivity. However, I shall partially echo Mackie in insisting that many values are only there as part of a shared social construction. Still, even these, to whatever extent they are not merely believed in, but have come to be actually felt in the world as we experience it, <...>.

<...>and being treated as a means to the satisfaction of someone else's desires. Only in the former case could a violation of autonomy conceivably be justified. Again, it might be argued that there can be nothing wrong for a person voluntarily to allow themselves to be treated as a means to the satisfaction of someone else's desires. If Justine, in the work of the eighteenth-century' pornographer', the Marquis de Sade, willingly submitted, what is wrong with her allowing herself to be treated in whatever fashion her persecutors wanted? I shall argue, later, that such treatment is wrong, not necessarily per se, but for other reasons. # HEGEL AND LOVE-MAKING # Most philosophers who have defended autonomy have exempted the private realm from the domain of its operation. Kant, for instance, quite explicitly did this. He reduced wives, children and servants to the status of' things' so far as their relation to husband/father in the family is concerned. He argued that the husband/father has the right to the possession of wife/children as<...>.

The attacks are based on empirical observation; most women and older children are actually quite as rational as most men while some men are actually less rational. If we agree that in that case women should be embraced by the liberty principle then so should children. I shall suggest that this does not follow because rationality is not in fact the grounds for the distinction in the first place. Partly to redress the balance and partly because talking about' children' covers such a wide range of potential images, I shall try to keep before my mind an ordinary 10-year-old of our society. She is the child of this paper unless I indicate otherwise. Throughout we should ask ourselves, does this (whatever is being said) apply to her? First of all, let us remind ourselves of the traditional picture of children drawn for us by some great philosophers of the past. One thing they

are all quite sure about is that children are not like adults; in particular they agree that children lack some capacity for rational <...>.

In this paper, I want to look at one kind of way in which some feminists have tried to conceptualise what it is for a woman to be' autonomous', and at the implications this has for ways of thinking about the human self. I shall argue that this conception is not only philosophically problematic, but also has an implicit politics which is potentially damaging. And I shall try to suggest some ways of beginning to think about' autonomy' which seem to me to be more fruitful and adequate, and to draw on different traditions of thinking about the self which have become influential in some recent feminist thinking. Feminist thinking does not, of course, exist in a vacuum, and in thinking about women's autonomy, feminists have drawn on different (and conflicting) approaches to questions about the human self, some of which have a long history.

And, of course, a central concern of feminism has been to identify and fight against the kinds of coercion to which women have been subjected, including things like physical violence and economic dependence. But it is at this point that an Aristotelian-type argument fails to be able to deal with the most difficult questions about autonomy. The Aristotelian view, as I have interpreted it,' works' only to the extent that it is assumed that there is no problem about what I shall call' the autonomy of desires'. Autonomy is defined as acting in accordance with desire (or intention). But what of the desires themselves? Are there desires (or intentions) which are not' autonomous', which do not originate from' within' the self, which are not authentic, not really' one's own'? Feminist writers have wanted, of course, to indict the various forms of brutality and coercion from which women have suffered.

The difference between the two arguments seems to be in the route they pursue thereafter. The first uses PC /k to show that you don't know anything of which you know that if it were true you would not be a brain in a vat. The second argues more generally that since we have made mistakes, or would make them in imaginary similar circumstances, we do not know now. How strong is the scepticism which the argument from error would create if successful? If, as I shall argue in 4.2, there is no separable area in which we make no mistakes, then the argument from error will be global rather than local. But it is not immediately obvious how to write a similar argument against the notion of justified belief. We can not argue straightforwardly that a false belief can not be justified. So unless we can say, as we said above for knowledge, that you can not claim your belief is justified unless you can tell the difference between cases where such beliefs are<...>.

Shope (1984) offers more than counterexamples. D. Lewis (1973) gives a pioneering account of truth-conditions for subjunctive conditionals (which he calls' counterfactuals') in terms of possible worlds. I discuss an important difference between Nozick and D. Lewis in Dancy (1984b). References to the internalism/externalism debate are given at the end of ch. 9. # Part II JUSTIFICATION # # 4 # Foundationalism # 4.1 CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONALISM # Perhaps the most influential position in epistemology is the one I shall call classical foundationalism. Discussion of justification, of what it is for a belief to be justified, begins with this theory; other theories will be described in terms of their relation to or divergence from this one. It offers a compelling picture of what the aims of epistemology are; in short it amounts to a definition of the epistemological enterprise. The classical foundationalist divides our beliefs into two groups: those which need support from others and those which can support others and need no support themselves.

The solipsist is in the position of claiming that he has a language in which he describes his present and past experiences, and perhaps speculates about the future. But this is a private language; no one else could learn it, because the experiences by appeal to which the terms in it get their meaning are private to the speaker. Wittgenstein argues effectively that such a private language is impossible. The solipsist can not have even that limited knowledge of his own experiences. The interpretation of the private language argument is highly contentious. I shall begin with an account due, in the main, to Saul Kripke (Kripke, 1981). How does the solipsist acquire his language? He claims to learn from his own case what, for example, pain is. He experiences a sensation of a certain sort, and decides to apply the word' pain' to every sensation like the first (every sensation of the same sort). Given that he remembers correctly what the original sensation was like, he has developed a concept of pain <...>.

He agrees that we can ask what justifies these beliefs; but to do so would mean that we no longer treated them as having this special status. The special status they have is not one which needs grounding or justification. It is just that we do treat them as propositions which need no justification but which can justify others. We don't ask or even think of asking what justifies them. If Wittgenstein can still be a foundationalist after the arguments of this chapter, it is clear that the ultimate prospects for foundationalism are not yet decided. I shall offer in chapter 7 a reason for rejecting all forms of foundationalism. # FURTHER READING # Wittgenstein (1953,143-242) on rule-following, and 243ff., on private languages. Hacker (1972, chs 7-10) gives a fuller account of Wittgenstein's position. Kripke (1982) is an expanded version of Kripke (1981), including

a chapter on Wittgenstein and other minds. Baker and Hacker (1984) explicitly attack Kripke's interpretation. Extreme behaviourism is normally associated with B. F. Skinner.

If we can, there might be two ways in which this would help. First, we might use it to persuade ourselves that the errors Wittgenstein found in classical foundationalism don't really infect all forms of foundationalism. Second, we might see something right about that theory of meaning or something wrong about it, and use this to determine our attitude to foundationalism in general; thus we might avoid the need to consider all the different varieties one by one. This is what my strategy will eventually be. I shall argue that the attractions of foundationalism, whatever they may be, do not derive from the theory of meaning which underlies it; in fact, the most acceptable form of theory of meaning is noticeably lacking in the features characteristic of foundationalism, and supports instead an alternative epistemology, coherentism. # 6.2 LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND THE EVIDENCE OF ONE'S SENSES # I suggested in 4.3 that foundationalism should be defined by its response to the regress argument: F 1: There are two forms of justification, inferential and non-inferential <...>.

Surely one has no choice but to be an empiricist as far as one's theory of linguistic meaning is concerned' (Quine, 1969, p. 81). And this thought furnishes a crucial argument in favour of foundationalism and its asymmetries. This is that empiricism leads to verificationism, and verificationism embodies the foundationalist asymmetries. Therefore one can not be an empiricist without being a foundationalist. I do not think that this conclusion is correct. Against it, I shall argue first that what Quine means by verificationism is not the only empirical theory of meaning, and second that a theory which abandons atomism at the observational level in favour of a more complete holism would be generally preferable both for empiricists and for others. We start with the three principles laid out in 6.2; VP, UP and MP. I said there that UP and MP followed' naturally' from VP, but this was not the whole truth. VP is about what it is for a sentence <...>.

There is no watershed, or' fall from grace'. What we do see, however, is a kind of stylistic specialization. Songs which integrate the techniques like' Milk cow Blues Boogie' (or' Mystery Train') in the Sun period or' Heartbreak Hotel' in the early Victor period, become less common. The techniques tend to diverge, romantic lyricism being channelled into ballads, boogification into a particular kind of rock' n' roll song which I shall call' mannerist'. Elvis's huge ballad repertoire needs little commentary here, save to stress that it began not with the move to RCA but at Sun,' Love Me Tender' (1956) and' That's When Your Heartaches Begin' (1957) being preceded by equally sentimental ballads cut for Sam Phillips; indeed, it began earlier -- when, as a boy, Elvis was entered for a talent contest at the Mississippi-Alabama Fair, it was the sentimental country and western number' <...>.

<...> x is a man " and " Nothing is a dragon "; employing expressions, that is, that correspond to what logicians call, " quantifiers ", and enable us to dispel any lingering illusion that existential propositions might have a subject/predicate structure. None of them do. The replacement of " existence predicates " with quantifiers along the lines indicated above represents a vital opening manoeuvre in a reductivist strategy. The intention behind it is to help unmask the metaphysical problems surrounding the " existence predicates " as essentially sham problems. But the manoeuvre, I shall argue, fails. # The doctrine of quantification and the reductivist strategy The doctrine that existential assertions, in effect, reduce to certain claims about relevant concepts and the doctrine of quantification both go back to Frege. The influence of these doctrines on modern analytical thought has been profound and lasting, and so, alas, have been the philosophical misconceptions which these doctrines tended to engender. Some of the reasons for these misconceptions will become apparent in a moment.

The epistemological version involves an assumption that all significant existential claims can be translated into claims about potential knowledge. Finally, the " syntactical " version of the argument involves an attempt to circumvent the need for any direct ontological or epistemological commitment by showing that what is being primarily " talked about " in existential propositions are syntactical properties of certain linguistic expressions. The argument, I shall maintain, is unsuccessful in all its versions. Nevertheless there are important factors that give a strong impetus to a reductivist reasoning. Let us consider the ontological version first. The world, the reductivist might argue, consists of certain entities and there properties and relations, and all facts, including' negative' facts, are literally facts about such entities. The notion of fact is apt to cause difficulties only if facts are treated as some special species of existences. But there are no such existences.

<...>" propositions which are true or false in virtue of being the propositions they are, but because they advertise certain claims which can equally successfully be conveyed implicitly, viz. by asserting the proposition or its negation, as the case may be. In short, rather than worrying about " eternal " propositions we should focus on implicit-versus-explicit truth-claims. This latter version of the redundancy thesis' certainly looks the more plausible of the two. The transference of emphasis upon truth-claims, in particular, seems to be a move in the right direction. Truth, as I shall argue later on (see Chapter 14) does not reduce to " true propositions " but demands an exploration of truth-claims. But of course it is not enough to point out that such claims can be made implicitly. Whether they are made implicitly or explicitly, the problem still remains of clarifying

their meaning. A mere elimination of explicit truth-claims -- assuming such a thing was possible -- would not in itself contribute anything towards clarifying the concept of truth.

<...>if they do not reduce to ascriptions of certain attributes to certain entities; if furthermore they can not be paraphrased simply in terms of knowledge, or translated into claims about the syntactical properties of certain expressions, the question is, how exactly should they be interpreted? What is it that makes them intelligible? What kind of facts do the propositions communicating such claims express? # Existential facts: an existentialist interpretation One well-known and well-publicised attempt in recent philosophy to address this problem in a " non-reductivist " spirit has gone under the name of Existentialism, and I shall now comment briefly on what I take to be the main features of the existentialist approach before outlining my own position. The main thesis of the existentialist approach is that in order to elucidate the full significance of ontological claims conveyed by existential propositions we ought to begin by focusing attention upon the one for whom the " problem of existence " presents itself in the first instance as a problem of his own existence.

Everything relating to an " external " world, including the existence of " others ", is subsumed under the general aspect of my own manner-of-being. An existentialist analysis, consistently pursued, thus yields in effect a subject-oriented description of the world, with peculiar reductivist implications of its own. As a theory of existence it is implausible and defective, and must be rejected. The only rational alternative, I shall argue, is to adopt a structuralist approach. Ontological claims as made explicit in existential propositions, I shall maintain, involve certain claims about the world as a whole, and the world is not just a horizon of my " existential projects "; nor is it a substance, or an aggregate of substances of this or that sort. Rather it represents a configuration of several different and mutually interlocking strands, in which substances appear as objects in an intersubjective context. It is a structure, and moreover a structure that " talks about itself "; with existential propositions being a principal instrument of its self-reference.

But does this enable us actually to decide in each case which predicates do and which don't apply to the item concerned? It seems fairly obvious that often such a decision will not be possible either because no clear decision procedures are available, or because of certain fundamental difficulties involved in applying such procedures. Yet while it may not be possible, in a given case, to come to a clear decision one way or the other, it can not, I shall argue, be coherently assumed that a decision is logically impossible and at the same time insisted that the object in question exists in an ontological sense. In other words, I shall dispute that ontological existents can be coherently treated in an uncritical metaphysical fashion as " things (existing unconditionally) in themselves ". Evidently unless both conditions discussed above are met no references to ontological existents can make clear sense. But although essential, these conditions are not sufficient to explain the full significance of such references. There are at least two other central issues that must be discussed before we can obtain a clearer insight into what is involved in regarding something as an ontological existent.

It is necessary, in addition, to explain the significance and the implications of the distinction between particularity and specificity involved in references to such topics. What makes it possible to ask meaningfully in respect of a given existent not only in what way it qualitatively differs from any other type of existent, but what makes it numerically, existentially unique? Where does the distinction between particularity and specificity have its roots? In the following, I shall argue that while this distinction is a vital conceptual ingredient in any meaningful references to object-topics qua ontological existents, it can not be " explained " in terms of the criteria under which such existents are numerically and qualitatively re-identified and distinguished from one another. By this I do not mean that the question of criteria is unimportant, or that the distinction remains meaningful even if there are no ontological objects at all to which it might be applied. On the contrary, I shall maintain that this distinction demands the existence of such objects <...>.

Which means that ontological object-categories have to be analysed in conjunction with certain experiential modalities. It is futile to try to clarify the idea of individuality via a " universal " principle of individuation of ontological existents. The idea of individuality and the idea of specificity have to be seen in conjunction with such ideas as the idea of possibility and the idea of unity of biographical time, both of which point to certain experiental modalities. All these ideas, I shall argue, are structurally interdependent, and their meaning can be fully elucidated only by exploring their structural interconnectedness. It is towards experiences, then, that we shall have to direct our analytical gaze. However, before embarking upon an analysis of experiences it is necessary to discuss the last of the three " ontological " categories mentioned earlier, i.e. the category of plurality. # 4. The Problem of Pluralism # Any identifying reference in respect of any topic presupposes a distinction between numerical and qualitative identity.

But where, then, we may ask, does this distinction have its origins? Or, to phrase the question in a Kantian style, what are the " conditions of its possibility "? The idea of individuality is inseparable from the assumption of the existence of individuals qua per se ontological items. Yet this idea is not explicable in terms of the criteria of individuation of such items. What is it,

then, that makes it intelligible? An answer to this, I shall argue, so far as an answer is possible at all, can be given only through an analysis of experiences from the point of view of the one who has the experiences; i.e. through a phenomenological analysis of the modes of experiencing. What is significant and highly important is that a demand for such a phenomenological analysis seems to result from the logical pressures built into the very concept of ontological existent. As a result of these pressures we are forced to modify somewhat our style of approach in order to <...>.

But the distinction between experiences and non-experiences is based on a phenomenological insight, not on any " external " criteria. We do not distinguish experiences from non-experiences as we might distinguish oranges from apples, viz. by indicating certain characteristics that might enable anyone, including those who have never tasted either fruit, to tell one from the other. Nor can experiences be interpreted quite simply as a species of natural states or events. Furthermore, it is, I shall argue, no less mistaken to regard experiences, as is sometimes done, as being analogous to " logical states " of certain sophisticated machines; unless such machines are endowed with so many human characteristics (including the capacity of " empathetic imagination ") that a comparison becomes trivial, and the word " machine " no longer means what it ordinarily means. The point is that the concept of an experience can not be fully clarified without an analysis of the actual modes of experiencing from the experiencer's own <...>.

<...>and this inevitably sets limits to what can be achieved by the respective philosophies of mind ". There are, first, two basic rival metaphysical theories, mentalist and materialist, and between them a number of hybrid ontological positions, incorporating in various proportions elements from both these views. Then there are theories which try to avoid any direct metaphysical commitment, but none the less conduct their analysis of experiences in terms of certain characteristics -- albeit a special type of characteristics -- of physical bodies. None of these " philosophies of mind ", I shall argue, are able to offer a satisfactory clarification of the concept of an experience. Given their basic categorial " frame of reference ", the central issue for most of them becomes one of defining the criteria of significant ascriptions of experiences -- which in practice invariably reduces to the problem of defining the general truth-conditions of ascribing experiences to others. But the concept of an experience can not be satisfactorily clarified in this way.

The definition of the term structuralism is best kept to this sort of generality, and the formula proposed by Barthes perhaps provides the best one. Structuralism, he says, is' a certain mode of analysis of cultural artefacts, in so far as this mode originates in the methods of contemporary linguistics' (1970: 412). So, any systematic extension of Saussurean concepts may, broadly speaking, be regarded as structuralist. This at once opens up a huge field of enquiry, but since our concern here is with literary theory, I shall restrict my discussion to structuralism's contribution to the study of literature and, in doing so, unfortunately run the risk of understating the effects of the new pluridisciplinarity on the approach to literature. Anthropology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, history, cybernetics, information theory, semiotics and, of course, linguistics have all left their mark on structuralist discourse about literature. The hegemony of the linguistic model (the premise of all structuralist thought) acquires a special significance in the sphere of literature.

The novel does not question the concept of' theory' so much as those theories which refuse to acknowledge the fact that they are' fantastic structures'in the mode of the hypothetical, and that their status as autonomous systems will always be compromised by their relation to their object. In the case of narratology, systems which fail to recognize the fictionality inherent in their constructs and strive to maintain a rigorous distinction between' houses of fiction' and' houses of theory'are subjected to subversive mimesis. In what follows I shall analyse how one such theory -- the narrative semantics of A. J. Greimas and the Lacanian theory of subjectivity with which it is associated -- is' played with' in this way. The gender stereotypes inherent in binary definitions of' male' and' female'are explored in Between, but structuralist theory as such does not come under attack. By contrast, a keen awareness of the sexist bias of many structuralist theorists is evident in Thru. In 1985 Brooke-Rose published an article entitled' Woman as a Semiotic Object <...>.

These two countries share a political culture, a conservative strategy of managing the social and economic changes of the post-1980 period by re-establishing the conditions for successful capital accumulation and' de-integrating' society (Krieger, 1986). For Krieger this involves increased racial polarization and poverty, and a corresponding erosion of some of the social rights instituted under the welfare state. Both Reagan and Thatcher administrations, he argues, have reversed post-war consensual and integrative politics in favour of the fragmentation and competition of the market. In the case of Britain at least, we shall argue that this strategy is grounded most recently in the imaginary space of the inner city. Further points of similarity include the exchange of policies and ideas (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich, 1989; Parkinson, Foley and Judd, 1988). Although the exchange was never exclusively one-way (e.g. Butler, 1981 on enterprise zones), the American experience initially served as a model for British efforts to regenerate cities on the part of both the state (Urban Development Corporations, the stream-lining of urban grants).

The first is his education: we find in the first two books of The Prelude those experiences which Wordsworth regarded as formative. The second was his residence in France during the French Revolution: this direct encounter with the main movement of the age led Wordsworth into constant political agony and debate, and it is significant that one of the main characters in The Excursion, his other long poem, is the Solitary, a despondent figure disillusioned by the failure of the Revolution. In this chapter we shall begin by examining these concerns in some detail. Wordsworth concludes The Prelude with tributes to his sister Dorothy, and to S. T. Coleridge, both of whom, in their different ways, helped him to resolve the personal crisis into which the events of the 1790s had led him, and I have given a short biography of each. There follow some accounts of Wordsworth by people who knew him, mainly in later life, as a way of pointing up, and perhaps correcting, the poet's own <...>.

If Protestantism was more Conducive than Catholicism to the expansion of science, one would expect this to manifest itself in a greater receptivity toward new and controversial ideas. This suggests that a good test would be to take a potent scientific innovation and compare its reception in Protestant and Catholic communities. It is suggestive, for example, that in Copernicus's native Poland, a sun-centered cosmology was taught in Protestant schools many years before it was taught to Catholics. Galileo was humiliated in Rome in a manner that has no exact parallel in Protestant countries. Accordingly, we shall begin with the Copernican innovation as a test case. This has the advantage that we can examine two major issues at the same time: the extent to which the Copernican revolution destroyed hallowed perceptions of humanity's place in the universe, and the extent to which Protestant audiences were more receptive. The results of the test are instructive, but as much for the complications they reveal as for any neat conclusion. # The Challenge of a Reformed Astronomy.

<...> that the hypotheses linking Protestantism to the expansion of science are necessarily false. But it does suggest the need for caution when faced with claims that a particular form of Christian piety was uniquely propitious. Certain developments in seventeenth-century science did prove more difficult for Catholic authorities to assimilate. A Copernican cosmology, as defended by Galileo, is the outstanding example. In the following chapter we shall encounter another: the recovery of an atomic theory of matter, which played a significant role in the mechanization of nature. But such is the fascination of the story that we shall find Catholic scholars in the vanguard of those who sought that very mechanization.

There is surely no doubt that we take them to involve the necessity relations and the relations of requiredness. In connection with time, our conception is not settled. This fact is consonant, to say the least, with the long philosophical dispute about causation and time, including the idea that causes might not only be simultaneous with their effects but might come after their effects. (Dummett, 1954) If we are subject to uncertainty, there is room for decision, as distinct from discovery. The definition we shall adopt here, in the tradition of Hume and many others, is one that takes causal circumstances and hence causes to precede their effects in time. It allows us the conclusion that has just been contemplated: that the difference between causal items and their effects has its basis not only in the consideration that causal circumstances fix uniquely the occurrence of their effects, but also in the consideration that causal circumstances precede their effects. The definition is adopted, of course, not merely for the reason that it gives <...>.

The determinism to be considered here, then, like other determinisms, has to do with all of the realm of the mental as widely conceived. While it is true that we have until now been concerned with consciousness, and used the term " mental events " in the ordinary way so as not to include all that may be included in the mental, the rest of the subject-matter of that domain is not thereby excluded from our coming reflections. That is not to say that we shall take dispositional mental facts or what is called the unconscious or the subconscious to be " another realm of consciousness " that we shall suppose there is consciousness and then inaccessible consciousness and then the brain, the latter involving dispositional mental facts. If there is a similarity between mental events and the given dispositional facts that both enter into the explanation of behaviour-that is no sufficient reason for blurring the distinction between them, for etherealizing the dispositional facts.

The notion of identity has its source in a " fiction of the imagination ", whereby an object is represented as invariable through a supposed variation of time. But nothing can be shown to remain absolutely invariable over any length of time; so how can we be certain that identity can be legitimately applied to anything? # Non-meanings as topics of discourse # Home's criticism of identity assumptions He continues his argument thus. If we analyse what is involved in acts of " re-identification ", we shall find that such acts are based, and depend entirely, on the occurrence of certain similar or similarly connected perceptions. What we in effect register when pronouncing something to be " the same x " are merely certain similarities. All our experience of " material objects ", in the final analysis, reduces to our having series of similar, or similarly connected, perceptions. But this means that there can be no justification for supposing that anything remains identical " per se ".

<...> stick signals can not be said, at least after 1781, to have' co-ordinated'chorus and ballet, if that implies' heard as a matter of course'; the evidence shows that no audible signal was thereafter heard as a matter of course. If the present article can not

answer every question raised by Carse, it will answer this one:' did they at the Opraor did they not beat time with a baton throughout the whole opera?' (p.311). By textual analysis of documents it is possible to build up an impression; we shall conclude that Paris was a significant cradle of modern conducting. While some use will be made of an article on early ensemble direction by David Camesi, it is the case that the author did not primarily concern himself with French evidence. # Disdain for the stick # Using the word' conducting' without qualification makes for unhistorical assumptions. One way to tackle these is to recall the words of musicians who were disturbed by unitary control.

- Want to:

Within the last two decades, a new approach to this subject has assumed great influence. This new approach is known as cognitive neuropsychology, and it attempts to explain the impairments which neuropsychological patients unfortunately experience within the vocabulary of cognitive psychology. One of my main goals in this chapter is to describe the nature of cognitive neuropsychology, and to account for its pre-eminence. However, this is a book about the philosophy of mind rather than experimental psychology, and the main point that I want to make is rather more philosophical than psychological. Consequently, I am going to start off by outlining some of the philosophical beliefs about the nature of mind which underpin contemporary research in the cognitive sciences, including cognitive neuropsychology. This will involve a brief discussion of the approach known in contemporary philosophy as functionalism. The basic theme of this chapter will be that the success of cognitive neuropsychology provides strong grounds for believing that functionalism, or something very close to it, is actually true.

One patient pronounces every letter in a word separately, which suggests a problem of graphemic parsing. Another patient could name letters but could not sound them out, suggesting a problem at the level of grapheme to phoneme assignment. I have gone into such detail about individual patients to try to convince you first, that it can be misleading to categorize patients too narrowly into groups, and second, that the dual-route model I described can accommodate a wide variety of data from different individual cases. There is an equally important additional point that I want to make. Since brain damage can produce these very precise differences between patients, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is one part of the brain that has the precise function of carrying out each piece of information processing that is specified within the cognitive model. It seems to me to be perverse in the extreme to attempt to resist the claim that the brain is literally carrying out these functions. Cognitive neuropsychology thus provides powerful evidence that the level of analysis which functionalists use to describe brain processes <...>.

These data are of great theoretical significance within cognitive neuropsychology. For instance the strength of the priming effect suggests that covert recognition reflects the otherwise intact operation of the normal face recognition system when it is cut off from some centre of consciousness (Young and De Haan, 1988) rather than the operation of a separate, subsidiary face recognition system. This in turn opens up some fascinating questions about the role of consciousness itself in memory and perception. What I want to emphasize here is the impact of these findings for a phenomenologist. If all that exists in reality are low-level physical processes in the brain on the one hand, and the high-level products of phenomenological awareness on the other, then how is PH's covert recognition of faces to be conceptualized? You could ask PH to introspect into the contents of his phenomenological awareness when he is looking at faces for as long as you liked, but there would be no insight that any recognition is occurring.

But the question remains: why were those two Frenchwomen in the sixteenth century found so threatening? One of them was sentenced to be burned alive, and the other hanged, punishments dictated, apparently, not by their sexuality as such but their transvestism and use of the dildo -- at once, I want to suggest, appropriations of masculinity, inversions of it, and substitutions for it. I have already explored in relation to Gide and others the kind of rebellion whose test they retrospectively failed, namely, transgression as a quest for authenticity: underpinning and endorsing the philosophy of individualism, it suggests that in defying a repressive social order we can dis-cover (and so be true to) our real selves. For convenience of reference I shall call this idea of transgression humanist.

That sorrow hangs over the discontinued struggles of the SI. The belligerence of their message and the violence of their appeal to negation and revolt is now passed over in silence and their works appear as if they were blank sheets to the privileged audiences of the present day. # II # What I have argued so far is that the Situationists are ill-served by these publications, and that this is partly due to the influence of a certain pessimism which haunts contemporary cultural politics. What I want to argue now is that there is a sense in which the symptom of this pessimism exist in the movement itself. The Situationists were idealists in the sense that they perceived themselves apart from the spectacle, always managing to be' other-than-spectacular', as Levin puts it, so that this became a pre-condition of Situationist practice. Their self-image was that of the chosen few for

whom the spectacle provided an inexhaustible supply of objects (and people) to hate, and whilst the apparent ease with which they targeted <...>.

From this it follows that we can not be dealing with the same concept of experience here. It is a different though related concept. It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he had had this experience. And if this sounds crazy, you need to reflect that the concept of seeing is modified here. Formulated in words suggested by this quotation, the question I want to find an answer to is: are there logical conditions of someone's having the experience of seeing something as, say, blue? I prefer the formulation: are there logical conditions of something's looking blue to someone? It is clear what Mill's answer would have to be:' Yes, since to see that something is a certain colour is to be aware of the mere resemblance between a present sensation and a remembered past one.'

<...> in what Wittgenstein says, and not accepting what would be Mill's reason for an affirmative answer, I think an affirmative answer is the right answer. I must now try to show that it is. The first step is to distinguish between two senses of' something's looking blue'. One sense is an obvious one, but the other is not obvious, and possibly for that reason, although they are radically different senses, their difference is not recognised and people suppose they are dealing with an unambiguous expression. Perhaps the distinction I want to draw can be seen more clearly if we start with an example involving size rather than colour. Berkeley, in his New Theory of Vision, remarks that' the apparent magnitude of the moon, when placed in the horizon, is much greater than when it is in the meridian'. One can ask: does he mean that the horizontal moon, perhaps owing to some magnifying effect of the earth's atmosphere, actually presents a larger appearance than the meridian moon, or does he mean merely <...>.

Suppose, however, that as I say it it strikes me that the word bank is ambiguous. (We happen to live near a river bank.) Then I attend to the words I have uttered, and, in so doing, I put myself, as a thinker, outside what I have said, and perhaps prepare to say something further, such as' to cash a cheque'. I have seen how what I said could be misunderstood, misinterpreted. The point I want to make is this. The fact that one can always see what one has said as a string of words, which might be interpreted in this way or that, does not entail that whenever one says something there is an accompanying interpretation going through one's head. When one uses some expression, such as' I'm going to the bank', there are usually not two things, one that one is saying and one that one is thinking.

It makes sense. Let's hope he consults Lincoln University and they send him to me." I feel faint with curiosity." Let's hope he makes his mind up soon.' But it was to be some considerable time before any more was heard of the letters or of Sir George. APS Centres of Postmodernism # Postmodernism and contemporary fiction in Britain # Randall Stevenson # I want to emphasize the element of logical and historical consequence rather than sheer temporal posteriority. Postmodernism follows from modernism, in some sense, more than it follows after modernism. (Brian McHale) So many novelists still write as though the revolution that was Ulysses had never happened... Nathalie Sarraute once described literature as a relay race, the baton of innovation passing from one generation to another. The vast majority of British novelists has dropped the baton, stood still, turned back, or not even realised that there <...>.

Questions of genre, of the organization of repetition and difference, seem fundamental to television, not only as an institution and a discourse, but also as a form of subjectivity. The understanding of that subjectivity, though it is qualified by ethnography and empirical study, is still a central problem for theory. Starting from a point further back in the development of a theory of television than that from which Steve Neale begins for cinema, I want to suggest some ways of thinking about television genre, which, though they will not deal with particular programme categories, may open out some more complex ways of thinking about the aesthetics and poetics of television. The article, then, is exploratory rather than definitive, inciting theory rather than assuming it, attempting to open up some territory or to clear some ground rather than to fortify a final position. I want to begin with a question which Neale does not explicitly address, but which seems to me to be a particular blind-spot which has determined the shape of television critical theory: the question of value. # Adorno's reproach # With or without Horkheimer, with or without the Frankfurt School, the name of Adorno has come to stand in cultural criticism for an immediately knowable, instantly impeachable thought-crime:' cultural pessimism'.

<...> in precisely their own terms (' using the devices of familiarity and straightforward dismissal to avoid the labour of conceptualization'), been turned into myth. While it may not now be possible fully to recover their critique of mass culture from the totalizing force of its own negative rhetoric, it is at least possible to regret the ease with which it has been adopted as the convenient apostasy of a new rhetoric, operating as a kind of semaphore, signalling correct positions across great distances with a simplified and purely functional code. Here, briefly, I want to take their critique seriously as a way of identifying the issue of value, of resisting the more celebratory aspects of an accommodation to the logic of commodification and consumption, and of recovering some of the ground lost or forfeited by critique. Fredric Jameson, in his recent study,

finds in Adorno's cultural critique, one crucial thematic differentiation between' genuine art' and that offered by the Culture Industry: <...>.

<...> the' verbal' (style, mise-en-scene) or the' syntactic' (narrative structure): there is very little close textual analysis of television fiction, and there is no scholarly history of the development of television form to compare with the histories which have emerged of early cinema. This may be an effect of the uncertainty around television's textuality; but it is now an extremely limiting effect for the development of theory. With respect to the distinction between historical and theoretical genres, my concern here is with theoretical genres. For what follows, I want to suggest, first, that the study of observable, historical television genres -- the largely elementary, predominantly thematic categories of television schedules -- needs to be underpinned by a much more complex understanding than we presently have of the theoretical genre of' television narrative fiction' to which they belong; and, second, that that understanding may best be approached by placing television narrative fiction in some definite historical and theoretical relationship to a yet wider generic category: that of novelistic discourse.'

What they demonstrate, yet again, is the inappropriateness of theories which go no further than cinema, and frequently no further than film theory of the seventies, for an understanding of television's articulations of the novelistic. The significance of understanding these differences in their various material and historical forms seems to me to lie in the way they point to the differences of television's subjectivities. The understanding of specific forms of subjectivity and specific processes of identification has always been mysteriously lacking or sadly disappointing (or depressingly familiar) in television theory. Here I want to draw attention to an article by Beverle Houston,' Viewing television: the metapsychology of endless consumption', which seems to me to be one of the few serious attempts to theorize television subjectivity, and one which deserves more attention. In it, Houston attempts to relate the familiar interruptions of television narration to questions of desire, differentiating the production of the subject specific to television from that of cinema: It may be said that the social work of the cinema is to naturalized certain sense of individual <...>.

Generic playfulness in television is as likely to fall within the characteristically modernist desire for a modernization of expression as it is to constitute a postmodern avant garde, and the two should not be confused. At the same time, the process of generic change is not simply an aesthetic question but is crucially inflected by the pressures and constraints of industry and institution. The relationship between industry and genre is widely accepted, though less widely researched. Here, I want to identify one feature of that relationship which seems to me to be crucial in understanding generic transformation in television, and the specific and different forms it takes in the US and the UK: the organization of the schedule. At this precise stage of the development of UK television, defined by a limited number of channels (satellite and cable are not yet definitive) and by a continuing, fragile respect for the traditions of public service, the schedule is still organized to allow the public to choose between <...>.

He was only clear about the classification as he worked through the foundations of his pragmatism and metaphysics in the 1890s, but it represents the systematization of a set of views that he had been groping towards since the 1860s. It is reflected in two themes that he stressed then, in work reported in the influential set of three papers appearing in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in the late 1860s. The material in these papers is prefigured in several sets of lectures delivered in Cambridge, Mass., from 1865 on. The first of the themes I want to mention -- a resolute opposition to the psychologism of Mill and others -- is stressed at the beginning of each series of lectures. He groups himself with Hamilton, Boole, Herbart, etc. in holding that logic does not depend upon psychology -- it studies the' products of reasoning' (terms, propositions, arguments) directly, and employs an objective notion of validity defined in terms of an objective notion of truth.

It is useful, tentatively, to distinguish two elements in Quine's thinking here: his commitment to naturalism and rejection of the need for epistemology to exercise' scruples about circularity'; and his list of acceptable sciences, which excludes all of the social and human sciences, cognitive psychology, etc. It is not obvious that the grounds for his naturalism would evaporate if he took seriously a wider variety of forms of discourse. I want to take seriously the suggestion that the sort of inquiry that Quine has in mind could be the heir to traditional epistemology -- although I shall not restrict the concerns of the latter to studying the relation of evidence to theory. I shall, therefore, pursue two issues. First, can Quine be forced to acknowledge that questions arise which demand transcendental reflection -- does his resistance to such issues flow naturally from his philosophy, or docs it require a stubborn closing of the mind?

Or are differences only superficially cultural? Was Margaret Mead (1935) right to see woman as' an infinitely malleable clay figure upon which mankind has draped ever varying period-costumes'? And was Simone de Beauvoir (1972) justified in believing that, because women' live dispersed among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic condition, and social standing to certain men -- fathers or husbands -- more firmly than they are to other women', they can have no common identity or history? I want to suggest that whatever anthropological and economic truths are embodied in these and

similar statements, the fact is that there are indeed certain systematic differences in the lives of women and of men, and that this fundamental contrast in life-experience does indeed account for and to some extent also justify a difference in their moral outlook and assumptions. This is not simply a matter of those aspects of women's sexual lives that are so often cited in evidence as disqualifying women from running the affairs of nations, or even from <...>.

And I shall try to suggest some ways of beginning to think about' autonomy' which seem to me to be more fruitful and adequate, and to draw on different traditions of thinking about the self which have become influential in some recent feminist thinking. Feminist thinking does not, of course, exist in a vacuum, and in thinking about women's autonomy, feminists have drawn on different (and conflicting) approaches to questions about the human self, some of which have a long history. I want to begin by going back to an argument that Aristotle put forward in the Ethics, since I think that the point at which his argument breaks down can illuminate the nature of the problem some feminist thinking has faced. Aristotle's argument concerns the question of what it is that makes an action' voluntary', done of a person's own free will, and in order to answer this question, he distinguished between actions whose origin was' inside' a person, and those whose origin was <...>.

A local ethical scepticism, for instance, tends very quickly to spread out and become a general scepticism about the unobserved or about the possibility of scientific knowledge. The problem is to find a convincing argument for local ethical scepticism which has no expansionist tendencies. If local scepticism tends to collapse into global scepticism, this may be an advantage, since global sceptical arguments are generally more convincing and effective than their local counterparts. And the same is true of the second distinction I want to draw. Some sceptical arguments attack the notion of knowledge directly but leave other related notions, crucially that of justified belief, untouched. Thus I might argue that to know you must be certain, but that one can never be really certain and hence one can never really know. Ignoring for the moment the force of the word' really' in this argument, we can still feel confident that even if we give up talking of knowledge, granting that a necessary condition for knowing is unfulfilled, <...>.

<...> are a particular problem in writing, particularly for non-native speakers, and we will see further examples of this. One of the hardest problems to confront, though, is the correct use of " the " (the definite article), a word which has no direct equivalent in many languages. Here are some sentences (written by people whose first language is not English) where we would not have used " the ": No movement in the British literary history before Aestheticism... Art deals with the non-existent, unreal, abstract and decorative images. I want to undertake the postgraduate study in Britain. Now here are two cases where we think " the " should have been used (indicates where we would put " the "): In 1950s the Theatre of the Absurd developed.... and were part of the hierarchic domesticity which society, bourgeoisie in particular, acted upon. Even though we can be quite sure that we would use " the " in these examples, it remains difficult to explain exactly how we decide.

<...> study, etc., rather like the classification of decades or social classes. But this intuitive classification does not exist in an analogous way. So the only justification for saying " the postgraduate study " would be if the writer had already named a group of types of study (so creating the classification), and then compared the postgraduate element with an element of undergraduate studies. Thus something of the effect of using " the " with postgraduate study might be seen in the following (still slightly unidiomatic) example: Of the two phases of study which I want to pursue, I want to undertake the postgraduate study in Britain and the undergraduate study in America. Our discussion of these examples suggests that you can use " the " if you have already created a situation where you are naming a group of which the " the " phrase indicates a subgroup. Consider in this light the following modification to one of the other examples given above; all we have done is to add a group of things (" kinds of images ") of which the relevant phrase <...>.

It can not serve as a term that describes objectively a specific set of conditions. Conceptually, it is a term that is linked not to one social problem but to a host of economic, social and political issues. Linguistically, it is a signifier with no referent and a multiplicity of significations. But it is precisely this problematic relationship between language and reality that instead of rendering the term theoretically redundant exemplifies one of the problems implicit in all urban social theory but addressed only occasionally. We want to say quite explicitly that the language with which the problems of contemporary urban life are addressed is necessarily problematic. It is not just that the academic protocols of putative objectivity, cross referencing and theoretical vocabulary sit uneasily beside political polemic which reads so differently from the equally strict conventions of focused brevity in the local government or consultant's report, although these issues of style are themselves not minor. It is also that the perspectives necessarily adopted by very different interest groups, some of which we have tried to <...>.

I find it difficult to connect the commonsense properties of consciousness (vague as they may be), with the notions of repair and debugging (fundamental as those are to any account of intelligent mechanisms). It is reliably claimed, for example, that

certain yogis are able to take control of their physiological functions (heart-beat rate, digestion, etc.), utterly inaccessible to most of us. They can, if these claims are true as they seem to be, debug their' digestive program', or slow their hearts considerably. But would We want to say that these abilities, striking though they are, have any particular connection with consciousness? If a yogi could tell us at any given moment what his digestive organs were doing, in chemical terms, and some constant monitoring apparatus attached to his intestines confirmed everything he said, then we might want to say yes; for the performance would seem to show just that immediate awareness of goings-on that we think of as intuitively necessary for a Conscious process.

<...> about the invitation my justification would have been defeated, you have a duty to give some account of why the (unknown to me) truth that my wife has refused the invitation does not somehow redress the balance. Either way the defeasibility proposal needs to be altered. The problem seems to lie, as it lay for the requirement that there be no relevant falsehood, in the way in which new true beliefs can be added piecemeal and overturn the existing justification, while there remain yet further truths waiting in the background to overturn the overturning. First we want to ask anyway whether there isn't likely always to be some truth which, if it alone were added and all others excluded, would defeat my justification. Even if this won't always happen, it will certainly happen often enough for the range of my knowledge to be considerably reduced, and this itself is some sort of an objection. Second, we need to find a way to counter the way in which the piecemeal addition of further truths seems to switch me into knowledge and out again.

- Wish to:

<...> that an assertion that p provide grounds for believing (rather than:express) that the speaker believes that p. Now whenever I speak, this provides grounds for believing that I have vocal chords; but it does not express that fact. Is it not just as strange for me to state out loud' p, but I don't have any vocal chords'? If one believes the second conjunct, one must invoke an unusual explanation for the sounds emanating from my mouth. Likewise in the case of Moore's paradox. What I wish to suggest is that filling the structural lacuna makes structured talk without higher-order thought look much less likely. Even if one were to concede to McDowell that there could be traffic in simple message types before the Gricean hump, I wish to maintain that one would have to be over the hump (or at least capable of being in such states as are involved in the hump) before one's language could evolve syntactic structure of the kind yielding infinite generative capacity.

He still sees only a fraction of what the experts can see, but the pictures are definitely making sense now and so do most of the comments made on them. A common response to the claim that I am making about observation, supported by the kinds of examples I have utilized, is that observers viewing the same scene from the same place see the same thing but interpret what they see differently. I wish to dispute this. As far as perception is concerned, the only thing with which an observer has direct and immediate contact are his or her experiences. These experiences are not uniquely given and unchanging but vary with the expectations and knowledge of the observer. What is uniquely given by the physical situation is the image on the retina of an observer, but an observer does not have direct perceptual contact with that image. When the naive inductivist, and many other empiricists, assume that there is something unique <...>.

<...> such inferences are not always logically entirely unimpeachable, given the above premisses, the pluralist case becomes difficult to defend and on balance the only reasonable option seems to be Spinoza's own unitarist alternative, viz. that there is only one substance which is in fact identical with the whole of reality, and that the only plurality there is or can be is the plurality of " attributes and modifications ". It will be necessary however to consider in more detail certain general logical features of monistic reasoning, and I shall do this in a moment. First, I wish to make a few preliminary critical observations about the formulation of the monist thesis. The immediate difficulty that one encounters is this. If substance is identical with the whole of reality, it is not any discrete thing; but if it is not any discrete thing, it is not clear what sense can possibly be attached to the assertion that there is " only one " substance. To claim that there is only one substance sounds like an answer to the question " How many substances are there? ".

<...> have used the same scheme but with an' arioso' narration more melodically defined and extended than was the old recitative. Other composers, such as Debussy and Janek, so as to heighten the drama, have virtually abandoned aria and written continuous dramatic arioso, which hovers between narration and lyrical expansion as the situation demands. With less gifted composers this can result in opera which never becomes worth listening to, because the music never reaches and holds lyrical peaks. However, we are not concerned with opera here, but with words. I wish to make the student look again at the words he wishes to set. Are they narrative, or lyrical? If they are exclusively narrative they are useless for song writing. If they have adequately emotional words they can be used. But even with poems we have to be careful. Not all poems are sufficiently lyrical, and they may be overburdened with wordy information: This kind poetry is far too prolix to be successfully set to music. It would be far preferable to use only a few words <...>.

<...> not lose sight of the fact that need does not always exist only in the inner areas of a city.' Jill Knight, Hansard Vol 1 17; 1 July 1987,535) The number of' unemployed' is never on its own an adequate description of the forms of economic restructuring that are occurring, even when such figures are calculated with integrity. Once it is accepted that the inner city is an idea rather than a place it is tempting to ask which interests really do benefit from the recurrence on the political agenda of the urban crisis. We wish to suggest here not a conspiracy theory but a coincidence of interests that embodies these beneficiaries. It consists of a fortuitous, almost accidental, alliance between a particular fraction of development capital and New Right political reformers, not always particularly clearly articulated, which has in the last few years managed to don the cloak of inner city concern. The social reformers who staffed the think tanks that fed into the right wing of the Conservative Party and who advocated the restructuring of education, the dismantling of the welfare state <...>.

- Be going to:

I like Auntie Kate' to stand for. Our conception of how language relates to reality is such that we can not see' I like Auntie Kate' as itself a bit of Auntie-Kate-liking behaviour. Language mirrors, but is not itself a part of, reality. But consider the following. We can distinguish between using an expression and attending to an expression. Do you see what I mean? There; I have just used the expression' Do you see what I mean?' and now you are attending to it, perhaps wondering what I am going to say about it. It is a bit like using spectacles to see with, and taking them off and looking at them. I want to connect this up with something I said earlier:' We are not foreigners in our own language; we are at home in it.' The connection is this. In so far as I am using an expression, as distinct from attending to it, I am at home in it.

- Intend to:

<…> intervals within the octave, with the strongest on the left moving to the weakest on the right: Apart from the unison, it will be seen that consonances consist really of only three intervals (5ths and major and minor 3rds) and their inversions. The inversion of the unison (the octave) is omitted, because it is largely avoided in twelve-note music through its tendency to dominate as a tonal centre. Though we have begun by stating that some consonances are stronger than others, the difference is not striking, and for the sake of simplicity we intend to regard them as equal for this method of creating harmony. However, the remaining intervals have very different qualities: Dissonances based on the major 2nd and its inversions (minor 7th and major 9th) are milder than the harsh effect of the semitone and its inversions (major 7th and minor 9th). Again, we are only really concerned with two intervals and their inversions, but it must be noticed that one is much more dissonant than the other.

- Would:

<...> their causal relations to sensory inputs, motor outputs and to one another -- this' computational theory of the mind'is a very satisfying general account of the mind-body relationship. It implies, of course, that as long as they have the right kind of causal relations, other machines, apart from brains, can possess mentality; and it also implies that the study of artificial intelligence and computational modelling is the royal road to understanding mentality. The Language of Thought, is, for my money, the major text of the' cognitive science' movement. I would say that there are two major problems with the mental-sentence thesis which both lead -- one ultimately, the other directly -- to the kind of developmental questions I shall be raising shortly. The first problem arises once we admit that in order for a' system' (I shall use this neutral term) to think, its thoughts must have reference: that is to say, they must refer to things regarded by the system as existing and enduring independently of itself.

This is not just a point I am making in passing. The input/central distinction is something on which I shall be heavily reliant when I come to my positive thesis. This is now due. # Constructivism and development # The constructivist theory of mind regards thinking on an analogy with action; just as the representation theory takes an analogy with drawing and writing. Moreover, to the same extent that the representational theory is non-developmental (recall the Fodor's argument against learning), the constructivist theory is developmental. I would not say that the developmental view is a consequence of the thoughtaction analogy exactly, because there could be constructivist theories that do not mention development. It is certain, though, that the constructivism that has received the most attention in psychology and philosophy has been the developmental theory of Jean Piaget. Although, as I say, constructivism and the developmental view are separable, constructivism invites a developmental perspective on thinking in the following sense. On the representational theory nothing can be prior to a mental representation <...>.

<...> going to be the last word in the debate between the constructivists and the nativists. # Cognisance after infancy # Piaget's claim that thinking is a kind of internalized action, exemplified in the (-----) theory of infant learning mentioned above, is really a global assumption in search of some refined, detailed and testable expression. One way of stating this global assumption is this: what the child has to acquire is the ability to direct, inhibit, and co-ordinate his thoughts, as he earlier had to direct, inhibit and co-ordinate his actions. This is, I would argue, a powerful idea which makes the phenomena of mental development more intelligible to us. What I shall do now is try to back up this last statement by sketching some of the characteristics of childish thought, showing how they can be explained in constructivist terms. They all concern, in different ways, the appearance-reality distinction, because cognisance must be understood in terms of our drawing this distinction in every area of our mental life.

<...> they were not allowed out of the room until they had an answer!) and if their usual tendency to interpret questions phenomenally is a trivial and weak effect then this social pressure should obliterate it. The result was that the social pressure had no effect at all. In children between four and eight years of age there was absolutely no difference between the number of realist answers produced by the pairs and by the control, solo children. They knew the realist option but did not take it as a way out of a social impasse, because, I would argue, the phenomenalist tendency of thought is too strong. What dominated their judgements was the salience of the illusion -- that was' most up front in consciousness'. Many readers who know nothing else about Piaget's work will know of his experiments on' conservation'. These simple but extremely robust observations concern children's knowledge that although a substance or display is changed perceptually -- in other words, that the appearance of an object may change <...>.

Typically, three-year-olds, but not four-year-olds, say that Mary will look for the coin where it really is -- in the blue box. Does the child regard mind and reality as existing in a state of perfect correspondence? That's surely putting it too high. But there is a salience problem here. Recall that it was three-year-olds who had difficulty with Flavell's (-----) problems; and indeed further experiments have shown that there is a strong statistical correlation between performance on the appearance-reality and on the false belief task. Where is the salience effect? I would say that the child is capable -- more or less -- of recognizing that other people have mental states different to his own. Indeed it would be difficult to imagine how children were able to use language to communicate if no such conception were present. Moreover in other kinds of false belief experiment (by Henry Wellman) where three-year-olds watch a puppet make a mistake in searching, the children are quite capable of explaining the failure in terms of what the puppet is wrongly thinking.

The difficulty here is the same as the one already encountered with the attempt to relate evoked potentials to conscious events. We only have the subjects' external behavioural indicators (verbal or non-verbal) of their experiences and we have no way of validating these indicators. So we end up dissociating one piece of behaviour from another: in' blindsight', the verbal response' No, I did not see the light' is dissociated from the ability to move the eyes towards the light. This, I would argue, though not all would agree, may tell us something interesting about the way the brain compartmentalizes different aspects of visual processing and it may tell us that subjects are more conservative about admitting to seeing a very degraded image than about trying to move their eyes to it, but it sheds little light on the actual experiences the patients are having when we show them a light. There is an elegant circularity in trying to prove that behaviour can be dissociated from conscious awareness by using behaviour to indicate <...>.

<...> that has been explained might the Weber-Fechner Law and the Muller doctrine -- connecting the quantity and modality of energy with the quantity and modality of sensation -- have any explanatory value. The specific observations of neurophysiologists, correlating stimulus properties, neural activities and the characteristics of subjective reports of sensation, contribute to explaining how' the diversity of working produceth a diversity of experience'only if we have already explained how' working' produceth' experience'at all. Or how energy impinging on the nervous system is transformed into information in, or addressed to, the nervous system. I would argue that physiologists of perception, working within the framework created by the Muller Doctrine and the Weber-Fechner Law are in a position of dotting the i's and crossing the t's in a text that has not yet been written. This is only the beginning of the neurophysiologist's metaphysical problems. For the materialist version

of the CTP is beset with many difficulties that ultimately make its claim to have explanatory force somewhat vacuous. I should like to deal briefly with the most important of these.

We might be reading this morning's dreary inconclusive state of play over secondary picketing. And the sense in which there is no arriving in The Possessed is very like that in which there is no reading tomorrow's newspaper. We can only imagine it. When we do we tend to imagine outcomes. For The Possessed, outcomes (including Dostoevsky's healed man at the feet of Jesus) are consoling myths. Never trust the artist, trust the tale. And the tale images tomorrow's newspaper as empty or thwarted futurity. I would add open futurity, the future of the open road. After the dying Stepan Verkhovensky has taken the sacrament he says' however, tomorrow -- Tomorrow we shall all set off.' Certainly we are all on the move, if only mentally, and perhaps the open road of Stepan's' gentle and unresentful heart' will see him to Spasov before nous les autres. But in its very nature a possibility is not an outcome.

The idea of' revolution' can set the pulses racing, for a time at least, and in 1980 it was invoked by Catherine Belsey:' Only by closing the doors of the English department against theoretical challenges from outside can we continue to ignore the' Copernican' revolution which is currently taking place, and which is radically undermining traditional ways of perceiving both the world and the text.' Belsey's Critical Practice, like MacCabe's study of Joyce, is fairly aggressive in its tone. I would agree that the doors of the English department should not remain closed to theoretical challenges, and in this book I am trying to respond to them. But applying a mildly deconstructive reading to her words, it is worth remarking that' revolution' is an ambivalent trope. On the one hand, it denotes an absolute, once-and-forall change: the Copernican revolution, or the French or Russian Revolutions.

<...> one interesting moment he reflects on his responsibilities as a teacher in a very serious-minded way: I wouldn't advocate a university that would be cut off from society. We know that we have to train people towards a profession. I'm against some sorts of professionalization, but it would be silly to think that the university should have nothing to do with any profession. You have to train people to become doctors or engineers or professors, and at the same time to train them in questioning all that -- not only in a critical way, but I would say in a deconstructive way. This is a double responsibility: two responsibilities which sometimes are not compatible. In my own teaching, in my own responsibilities, I think I have to make two gestures simultaneously: to train people, to teach them, to give them a content, to be a good pedagogue, to train teachers, to give them a profession; and at the same time to make them as conscious as possible of the problems of professionalization.

To identify English as peculiarly problematical should not weaken the general defence of humane values in education, and may in the longer run help to strengthen them. A successful military campaign may require giving up some tactically untenable territory. Having taught English Literature for a long time in universities, on both sides of the Atlantic, and having spent some years pondering the questions raised in this book, I have come to some very tentative conclusions about what might be done; they are not, I might add, of the kind I thought I would come to when I began working on it. In the wake of the MacCabe affair in 1981, an editorial in the Times Higher Education Supplement said that a fissiparous discipline such as English had a number of hard choices in front of it: it could become even more pluralistic and diffuse, with accompanying pedagogic problems; it could repressively impose one favoured approach; or it could split. Raymond Williams came to think that a splitting of the discipline was increasingly likely, since cultural materialism and radical semiotics were <...>.

Fascinating as this is, it is surely with relief that we return from thus checking printed source against printed source, cross-referring and tentatively identifying, to the open air of' the roads of France'. And indeed I would insist on this: the first requirement for a study of Pound is a set of maps (preferably half an inch to the mile) of at any rate certain regions of France, Italy and England; the second requirement is a set of Michelin Green Guides for France and Italy, and (if one is American) similar guides to the South of England. In this, the case of Pound is no different from other writers, or it is different only in degree.

If the atmosphere were not so charming, it would be less of a temptation. In postwar Britain, the clothes, accents, and diction of the siblings may have changed, but, so far as I can judge, the suffocating insular coziness is just the same. Here, as often

with the author of Thankyou, Fog, we may well suspect that Auden generalizes about English life too much on the basis of his own late-Edwardian childhood in a comfortable rentier household. And yet I wouldn't dismiss out of hand Auden's claim that what he says of our family life holds as true of Coronation Street as of Lowndes Square. In any case, enveloped though it is in ingratiating compliments to us on how charming we are in the bosoms of our families, the indictment is quite firm and it is unsparing:' Suffocating insular coziness'. Most of all worth remembering is the trenchant declaration:'... no art, major or minor, can be governed by the rules of social <...>.

<…> have been profoundly determining of our own culture and consciousness, and their influence can not be erased; even deconstructed, they continue to exert an influence. It is not just that there survive undeconstructed residues of, say, Romanticism and modernism, or that the constructed forms echo still within the deconstructed (although they clearly do survive in these ways); it is also that they exert an influence in and as their newly deconstructed state. The recent past informs the post/modern, even or especially as the latter is changing our understanding of that past. I would say rather that, both despite and because of the obvious and considerable differences, post/modernism is helping us to understand again what the early modern period already knew but in a quite different form: identity is essentially informed by what it is not. It also helps us to see that if (as was apparent in the early seventeenth century) identity is clearly constituted by the structures of power, of position, allegiance, and service, then any disturbance within, or of, identity could be as dangerous <...>.

<...> suggested that the homosexual experience of passing for straight leads to a' heightened awareness and appreciation tor disguise, impersonation, the projection of personality, and the distinctions to be made between instinctive and theatrical behaviour' (' Camp and the Gay Sensibility', 45). Richard Dyer remarks, in relation to Babuscio, that the gay sensibility' holds together qualities that are elsewhere felt as antithetical: theatricality and authenticity... intensity and irony, a fierce assertion of extreme feeling with a deprecating sense of its absurdity' (Heavenly Bodies, 154). I would add that camp is oft en also a turning of the second set of categories -- theatricality, irony, and a sense of the absurdity of extreme feeling -- onto the first, such that the latter -- authenticity, intensity, the fierce assertion of extreme feeling -- if they remain at all, do so in a transformed state. In this respect camp, as Andrew Ross observes, anticipated many of the recent debates of sexual politics: <...>.

<…> my action could result only in a gross violation of the order of things. In the 1960s psychiatry was attacked for being a form of social policing which, with the aid of pseudo-scientific categories, mystified socially desirable behaviour as natural, and undesirable behaviour as the result of abnormal psychosexual development (a deviation from' The Way to Healthy Manhood'). R. D. Laing wrote in The Divided Self: Psychiatry can so easily be a technique of brainwashing, of inducing behaviour that is adjusted, by (preferably) non-injurious torture.... I would wish to emphasize that our' normal'' adjusted' state is too often the abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our true potentialities, that many of us are only too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt the false realities. (p. 12, my emphasis) Orton goes further than Laing, for his plays transgress accepted norms at every point yet refuse to replace them with' our true potentialities'; Laing is still preoccupied with the authentic self, the repressed human essence.

<…> there can be no reconciliation, no Hegelian' recognition', no simple, sentimental promise of a humanistic'' world of the You'' (pp. xx -- xxi). He suggests that such tendencies occur here as an overcompensation for the closed consciousness or' dual narcissism, to which Fanon attributes the depersonalization of colonial man; that' it is as it Fanon is fearful of his most radical insights' (p. xx). I would regard Fanon's humanism otherwise. Certainly it is quite different from the timid and time-serving humanism all too familiar within' Eng. Lit.'. More importantly, it is also utterly different from, and indeed envisioned in direct opposition to, the colonial history of humanism. A reassessment of Fanon's humanism has become necessary for reasons similar to my reconsideration of Gide's and others' essentialism in sexual politics.

Perhaps Wittgenstein read Piaget. I do not know. Anyway, this is what Wittgenstein says: It is misleading to talk of thinking as a mental activity. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw

your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be the agent in writing. If again we talk about the locality where thinking takes place we have a right to say that this locality is the paper on which we write or the mouth which speaks. And if we talk of the head or the brain as the locality of thought, this is using the expression <...>.

Admitting this, it might nevertheless be claimed that a person's consenting entails, as a matter of the meaning of' consent', not only that he acted in the way I have described, but that his action has the purported normative consequences. Against this interpretation lies the evidence that we can and do say, when appropriate, things like' Of course he consented to the operation, but that does not entitle you to perform it since he is just a child' (or he did not know how dangerous it is). I would, therefore, suggest that consent is to be explained by reference to its purported normative consequences only. On what grounds is it ever justified to regard consent as having its purported normative consequences? In special circumstances there may be a variety of occasional reasons that make the consent valid. Most common, perhaps, are those cases where the person to whose rights the agent consented was misled, through the agent's fault, into believing that the consent was valid and acted reasonably on this belief to his detriment <...>.

Mention of the transversal space explored by Celati provokes a more general consideration of place and time in contemporary Italian narrative, starting from the marshy area where fiction borders with reportage. Italy has at the moment no Bruce Chatwin or Paul Theroux, and the history of Italian travel-writing belongs more to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than to the nineteenth or twentieth, but it is possible to discern an interest in the imaginative and expressive possibilities of travel-writing in the work of some contemporaries who are not travel-writers as such. I would particularly mention two books by Antonio Tabucchi: a collection of' fragments' centred on the Azores entitled Donna di Porto Pim (Woman of Porto Pim 1983) and a quest-novella whose protagonist moves the length and breadth of India, Notturno indiano (Indian nocturne 1984). In Donna di Porto Pim, the archipelago is represented by a variety of means: the memory of the narrator and the inhabitants; stories; legends; document; biography; a map; a historico-topographical description; fiction; <...>.

<...> to Bakhtin's, is defined by the centrality of a logic of causation to which character is central, and to which space and time are always subordinate:' In the Hollywood style the systems do not play equal roles: space and time are almost invariably made vehicles for narrative causality'. The novelistic of classical Hollywood cinema, that is, develops a chronotope in which time is cut to the economy of narrative causation and motivation, and space is the scene of narrative action. As a starting point for thinking about the novelistic of television, I would propose a chronotope which, while retaining the centrality of character, frees space and time to a much greater extent from the strict service of narrative logic. More precisely, I would propose a chronotope, definitive for the development of a specific televisual novelistic, for which the foundational element is an interruptable time. It should also be added immediately that this chronotope, this regime of space and time, is much less determinate than that of classical Hollywood, less regimented by the precise divisions of labour and skills <...>.

This limits, or complicates to a high degree, the explanatory force of a psychoanalytic discourse whose terms are founded on an Oedipal moment of lack, castration and desire. At the same time, this point of difficulty, like the difficulty surrounding value, needs to be thought through rather than thought around, complimented and qualified by ethnography rather than simply disqualified by it. Thinking, then, of the novelistic discourse as a definite and historically extensive genre, I would suggest that the specific contribution which cinematic variations of the discourse made to the genre may have been the cut. While the subordination of time and space to narrative causality is shared with many literary forms, and while many twentieth-century literary and artistic forms adapt to their own purposes the principles of montage and the manipulation of time and space learned from cinema, the cut as a fundamental figure of the rhetoric and the immediate experience of narrative -- field/reverse-field where the slash represents a cut, or the conventional point-of-view structure <...>.

<...> I suspect, the most obvious of choices, so perhaps some explanation is necessary. It is part of the accumulated folk wisdom of gay male subcultures that the homosexuality of an individual will reveal itself primarily through matters of taste -- not good or bad taste but particular taste, a fondness for certain cultural artefacts above others, a set of preferences that proclaim one's sexual affiliations as clearly as any sloganeering T-shirt. For British gay men, at least those of my

acquaintance, loving Brief Encounter is one such marker. One reason for this, I would suggest, is that Brief Encounter is not simply the tearful tale of heterosexual romance that it appears to be: beneath, or alongside, or overlapping this narrative is another, quite specifically related to the homosexuality of its author. Employing the naively biographical paradigm of Gay Authorship, Brief Encounter shows Noel Coward displacing his own fears, anxieties and pessimism about the possibility of a fulfilled sexual relationship within an oppressively homophobic culture by transposing them into a heterosexual context.

<...> indeed, constitutes almost a declaration of independence on Lean's part from his fruitful but by 1945 no doubt increasingly constricting association with Coward's writing.' The hegemonic assurance of that' no doubt' speaks volumes -- the Author was dead, long live the auteur. Or, in terms of the concerns of this article, the gay writer had been effaced, leaving a blemish-free heterosexual text. # Authorship, biography and sexuality # Victor: I'm glad I'm normal. Amanda: What an odd thing to be glad about. While I would insist on the centrality of Noel Coward's sexuality to the patterns of meanings that I see in Brief Encounter, I would not wish for one second to hold him up as any kind of gay martyr. The mythologies of tragic sacrifice that have coalesced around gay writers like Oscar Wilde and Joe Orton tend only to impede a fully contextual understanding of how their sexuality and textuality inform each other. I have no desire to add Coward to that mythology, besides which he was, judging by the biographies and <...>.

If ideals or values are essentially statements of faith which can not be logically sustained then much of our examination will be concerned with persuasion rather than with facts in themselves. It is how the facts are used that should form the touchstone of our discussion. I assume' ideology' will be used in the loose non-technical sense, of denoting a system of ideas concerning society, held by people. In this context, dominant means prevailing or the majority view. I would not wish to get too involved in debating this exact point since one must be aware of its vagueness. However, the fact is that some people use this notion and that is more important than what it really is. Perhaps, one may even get some answers!

People were encouraged to say as much as they wanted to in answer to these questions, and I later categorised their responses according to the kinds of consequences they envisaged: effects on children, effects on the community generally, and effects on them personally (or their immediate families). Only two people said that there would be no difference of any kind if there were no school in the community. Of the rest, twenty mentioned various kinds of community-level effects which I would classify as affecting the local way of life. None of these way of life effects was seen as positive for the community. Because of the level of generality of most published statements about the social importance of rural schools, I am concerned to investi gate in some detail the question of how schools are important to a community. Therefore despite the very real difficulties of trying to force' emic' data into analytical categories of my own devising, I have classified my informants' communityoriented responses into nine categories <...>.

The' Lucy' poems have received a great deal of critical attention (see, for example, F. R. Leavis in Revaluation); it is because the' Matthew'poems are so frequently ignored that I have chosen one of them for special comment. NOTE. This poem is part of a cycle and will become clearer if The Fountain is studied in conjunction with it. TEXT. The earliest printed text -- from Lyrical Ballads (1800) -- is given here. Later versions are' improved' in several places, and I would agree that the later reading of the penultimate line --' With a bough' -- is a real improvement. FIRST IMPRESSION. This is another attempt to imitate true ballad style, but this time it is more like a medieval ballad --' bright and red /Uprose the morning sun' sounds like The Ancient Mariner. Although graves and a dead girl are at the centre of the poem, no melancholy feelings can completely overlay the initial impression of life and good health, conveyed by' bright', <...>.

The students were rapidly becoming the most vocal critics of reform as it was being implemented by the government led by Deng Xiaoping. It seemed as if the younger generation did not trust the judgement of the leadership. The students in the 1980s were also concerned with the fate of China and their own future security. This was all very worrying for the reformers in the government who though applauding the young people's sense of nationalistic duty rejected their misgivings about the open-door policy. The September demonstrations appeared very much like a single-issue movement, but I would argue that other concerns were raised, including the lack of political reform in China. Their international position would improve, it was suggested, if there were some form of democracy. After all, Japan had democratic structures and procedures, as well as

a far higher standard of living for most of its people. At the end of the Second World War, Japan and China were both rundown but China had become the poor neighbour, a condition the students were not satisfied to accept without questions.

But new solutions were still being developed and meanwhile students with personal problems had to seek each other' s help. The discussions of youth problems on the pages of Zhongguo Qingnian did not offer realistic advice according to many students.' It's out of touch with our lives', they said. Females were particularly vulnerable in the' falling in love craze' and could suffer more than the males as a result of their romantic encounters. The reasons, I would argue, are not just due to any innate biological features of females, but have social causes just as the' craze' itself. The' myth' of sexual equality in China had been shattered during the reform decade with women facing discrimination in the workplace on a greater scale.' Go back to the kitchen', was the plea of the male-dominated management and administration in commerce and industry. The workforce in many work units was being trimmed in order to improve efficiency and save money.

However, they can not depart too far from it; men can be swayed by beliefs, but not too far. Of course, one group in society may be able to impose its will on another. Returning to my brief of animal intelligence, animals can and do act as members of a group against other conspecific groups. The groups are usually composed of genetic kin, but not always. The cohesion of the group may be cemented by joint display activities, as in the cacophony of a troop of howler monkeys. However, I would not claim that these displays have any culturally mediated symbolic meaning, as do the myths and rituals which bind human groups. Perhaps the main consequences of the lack of high intelligence in animals is that they are not as good as we are at fooling themselves. # INTENTIONALLY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE Neil Tennant # INTRODUCTION # I beg my reader's forbearance for beginning my own paper with such a long quotation from another.

<…> of the higher-order beliefs and intentions involved in a Gricean or sub-Gricean mechanism (cf. Bennett). In doing so he might find himself in the company of evolutionary epistemologists such as Riedl (1979), whose over-arching theory of life as an' erkenntnisgewinnender prozess' seems to require a unitary notion of knowledge or information, information that can be stored in a genome at one end of the evolutionary spectrum, as well as be expressed, at the other end, by scientific theories that make the world a less strange place to live in. But what I would wish to suggest is that other considerations of an evolutionary kind lend weight to the view McDowell is challenging. To do so I must sketch the bare outlines of the opposing views on the conceptual issues, to see which one harmonises more with evolutionary conjectures about language. (In this paper I can not go very far into the available wealth of fact and conjecture in the neurophysiology of language, psycholinguistic theories of language acquisition, and comparative studies of man and other primates.

<…> the' lower activities' are inscrutable at the' higher level', given that, after a road accident, say, I can by conscious effort retrain myself to walk properly? We are returning, by another route, to Minsky's suggestion that the evolutionary role of consciousness has been to give access to modules or levels, otherwise inaccessible, so as to debug, reprogram or retrain them. I argued earlier that there was no necessary connection between the two families of notions (of access and repair), and the present example suggests, I would claim, that there is no factual connection either. I have the ability to retrain my walk, say, precisely because the muscular sub-movements of walking (flexing toes and feet, moving calves, etc.) are neither in' another module' of activity (i.e. from the' conscious'module, if there is one) nor at an inaccessible level of translation of commands.

<…> that the aspects of such machines already described are interestingly related to these facts. They are not, of course, sufficient features and I shall make neither claims nor suggestions here as to the sufficiency of existing or possible machines for being conscious entities. # (a) Vacuity or' downwards opacity' # Dennett (see below) has in recent publications emphasized the relative emptiness of the contents of consciousness: all that is not there and which, for much of the workings of our bodies, can not be brought into the contents of consciousness. I would suggest that the two sorts of opacity in a computer that have been discussed here are at least potentially interesting explications of that fact: modularity and program-level reduction. When discussing Dennett and Sloman below, I shall argue that the opacity of one level of programming language to another is a better preliminary model of consciousness than the inaccessibility of the contents of one module from another. Different

kinds of opacity within a program were discussed earlier and these would seem to have quite different correlates in the sphere of consciousness: <...>.

Equally, the presence of a pronoun does not prove a relationship. Thus while we could take 123 as being about the Poet's constancy to his Friend, even though we have neither Thou nor He form referring to the Friend (' No, Time, thou shalt not boast that I do change/... I will be true despite thy scythe and thee'), in Sonnet 116 the Friend seems to have receded into the background while the poet stands up for all men; Although the poet's love is included in the affirmation, I would agree with Ingram and Redpath in seeing the poem rather as' a meditative attempt to define perfect love'. This said, the number of sonnets which are not specifically about a human relationship is remarkably small. The single philosophic-religious poem is 146: While we can easily relate this sonnet to the meditative tradition, or to Stoic-Christian mortification patterns, it is an outsider in the Sonnets, which are otherwise a collection of love-poems. This poem is not even a palinode to love.

<…> and also agree that they seem therefore initially intelligible as being there in a manner not intrinsically bound up with our responses to them. He is surely also right that philosophical reflection gives adequate ground for denying that colour and value can be there independently of the consciousness of them. But this is only a ground for drawing a strong contrast between them and' primary qualities' like shape, for those who, like Mackie, take a strong realist line about the latter which I find unacceptable. But even without challenging such realism, I would argue that values, by being made dependent on consciousness, do not cease to be part of the fabric of the world. For consciousness is itself part of that fabric, and, or so I shall argue in Part Two, the value features which are found there are real properties of certain experiences (and indeed of the physical and social environment in our personal versions of it) which have an intrinsic prescriptivity. However, I shall partially echo Mackie in insisting that many values are only there as <...>.

<…> as it were acquires the right to treat the images on its pages in whichever way he chooses. Thus he is able to treat the woman as infinitely desirous of sex, as wanting nothing so much as to satisfy his desires. A second objection that will be brought is that it is odd to treat another as a rational being, in the Kantian sense, in erotic relations, of all places. It will be objected that love-making necessarily includes an irrational, a Dionysian, element that is obscured by what I am saying at the moment. I would argue, however, that love-making ought not to be treated as drawing only on the irrational side of a person's nature. Part of the process of treating another well, in love-making, is attempting to satisfy her/his desires, and this, of necessity, involves the ability to recognise them. In turn, this presupposes treating the other as a person, as, at least partly, a rational being.

<...> admitted to Melby' privately and with great reluctance that hatred of the French outweighed all other considerations in the thinking of all Vietnamese, whatever their political persuasions'. If it did, and even allowing for Melby's overwhelming dilemma, it is a little surprising to read his conclusion that, if the French were really serious about decolonization and that if military force was properly applied, they could at least hold the lid on the Indo-Chinese kettle for the predictable if only relatively limited future. Beyond that his proposals were extraordinary even if they were conditional. I would propose the following: a French undertaking for Vietnamese independence within a specified period of five, ten, twenty, or thirty years... A Vietnam national army would be rapidly created to assume responsibility for the internal situation and as this progressed French forces would withdraw to border areas or where unnecessary depart. Civil administration would be increasingly a Vietnamese responsibility. All such agreements would have a US guarantee and such supervision as necessary. Assumably the US would pay most of the bills...

And of course we have seen that Wittgenstein wanted to show it impossible that there should be beings who behave like us but have no sensations or different sorts of experiences from ours. And he wanted to make similar remarks about our initial belief that though we use the same language and agree on the words with which to describe the colours of the objects around us, still we might for all we know see the objects completely differently; an object that causes in me what I call a sensation of red may cause in you what I would call a sensation of blue, though we can never know this since we will continue to agree on what to say and on how to act in our differently coloured environments (we will all stop at a red traffic light, for instance).

According to Wittgenstein, this initial belief is as incoherent as the solipsist's claim to be able to set up a private language, since it relies upon too great a gap between our behaviour (including linguistic behaviour) and internal mental life.

What he must do is to formulate an assertion which contradicts our own, and give us his instruction for testing it. If he fails to do this, we can only ask him to take another and perhaps a more careful look at our experiment, and think again. Popper's emphasis on the conscious decisions of individuals introduces a subjective element that clashes somewhat with Popper's later insistence on science as' a process without a subject'. This matter will be discussed more fully in later chapters. For the present, I would prefer to reformulate Popper's position on observation statements in a less subjective way, thus: An observation statement is acceptable, tentatively, at a particular stage in the development of a science, if it is able to withstand all the tests made possible by the state of development of the science in question at that stage. According to the Popperian position, the observation statements that form the basis with respect to which the merit of a scientific theory is to be assessed are themselves fallible.

<...> and that the agrarian economy was already incorporated into the capitalist system were restated and developed, and the argument that the revolution in Latin America could only be socialist reasserted. This theoretical position seemed to be vindicated in 1954 by the prompt CIA-organised counter-revolutionary response to the radicalisation of the Communist-supported Arbenz government in Guatemala. This defeat of the most successful application of Communist party popular front tactics appeared to demonstrate that opposition forces within Latin America (backed up by the United States) were too powerful for such a strategy to be ultimately successful. In this context, I would argue that while the unleashing of widespread revolutionary activity in Latin America in the 1960s must obviously be attributed to the impact of the 1959 Cuban revolution, this event was essentially a catalyst, which supplied a model and a source of inspiration to a radicalised generation who were already looking for an alternative to the Soviet theory of' revolution in stages'. # 1959-1975 # The years 1959 to 1975 witnessed a consolidation of radical trends. perhaps the single most important effect of the Cuban revolution was that it proved <...>.

<...> assurances that the wealthy had nothing to fear, and therefore provoked a swift backlash of opposition within Cuba. Indeed several members of Castro's own cabinet found it unpalatable. Foreign Minister Agramonte was not the only person to be dismissed on 12 June. Elena Mederos, Minister of Social Welfare, Luis Orlando Rodriguez, Minister of the Interior, Angel Fernndez at the Ministry of Justice and Sori Marin at the Ministry of Agriculture, all of whom had at least partially opposed the Agrarian Reform, were also replaced (Thomas: 1977, p. 447). I would argue that it was this domestic response- signalling that even moderate and gradual reform was unacceptable to the Cuban elite -- which was the most immediate cause of the shift in Castro's strategy. The Agrarian Reform also, inevitably, provided the already hostile sectors of the US press and Congress with specific ammunition, and it was at this stage that the cries of' Communist' first began to be heard. More significantly, the State Department evinced the first sign of active hostility to Cuba by pressurising the British government <...>.

<...> the only universal ideal was that the new music should be completely unlike whatever was heard before. Within that every composer tried to be different, mistaking novelty for originality and quality. Naturally enough, a confused situation arose, during which old conventions such as melody and harmony were jettisoned. The success or failure of this operation is certainly not under discussion here, my reason for bringing it in being simply to point out that music, even good music, can be written which does not abide by standard formal principles. However, I would say that any branch of art -- be it music, painting, sculpture, literature, drama, or poetry -- which abandons formal principles to the point of formlessness is doomed to failure: form allows a sense of completeness in a work of art, one that can be grasped by us and held in our memories. The fact that much modern art is quite unmemorable -- and modern music particularly so -- is perhaps a result of formal weakness, and is certainly the reason for its perishable quality.

However, as modulating notes (e.g. sharpened leading-notes) are particularly important at cadence points, it is well to provide for these in the melody. In some music (e.g. the bourre just mentioned) modulation is such a prominent feature -- it relieves the monotony of excessive repetition -- that inevitably the melody must be written with the underlying harmonies in mind.

The same is true where harmonic colour is to be a prominent feature of the music. Harmony has a special fascination for many of us, but once again I would warn students against thinking of harmonies before they have conceived the melody. The theme must not lose its freedom of flight, or be allowed to decline into a secondary role, of inferior interest to the harmony. In addition, students must be warned not to try to write complete harmony simultaneously with the melody. Many students tie themselves in knots in only four bars, and can then go no further because they have concentrated on complex harmonizations and ignored the thematic flow.

It is a well-known problem whether Joel -- or at least this section of Joel -- belongs to the post-exilic period. Yavan is mentioned in the last chapter of Isaiah, 66.19, among the peoples to whom God will reveal his glory. This is probably a late sixth-century text. Finally, Yavan appears in the Messianic promise of Zechariah 9.13: " I have raised up thy sons of Zion, against thy sons of Greece. " But this text clearly belongs to the period after Alexander, though I would not commit myself to a Maccabean date. The few biblical texts with the mention of Yavan which can be dated with prod ability before 336 B.C. know the Greeks only as traders -- or more generically as one of the nations of the world. The Greeks are known, but they appear rather remote and insignificant. In the pre-Hellenistic sections of the Bible there is no notion that can be ascribed to Greek influence: indeed there is no certain Greek word. The first certain Greek words in the Bible are <...>

A reflex would be the paradigm case here. To take Fodor's nice example, imagine that you are chatting to an old friend. That this person should harbour aggressive feelings towards you is unimaginable, but then suddenly, she goes to poke you in the eye -- and you blink. The blinking was a reflex which could equally well have been set off by a puff of wind or a flash of light. The causal chain between stimulus and response had a kind of inevitability, an independence from processes which we would normally regard as mental: it by-passed our knowledge of the friend's personality, history, and basic assumptions about human motivation, the orderliness of conduct, and so forth. Now if the reflexive processes were not autonomous in just this way, if they were determined' top down' by our thoughts then we would not have blinked. This much is not controversial. But Fodor goes on to argue that much of what can be said about reflexes can also be said about processes which we would normally regard as' cognitive' rather than' neurological'or' behavioural': the parsing of heard sentences, for example. There is something reflexive rather than rational, automatic rather than deliberative, circumscribed and autonomous rather than holistic about parsing a sentence such as' She met John before Mary arrived at the airport' in the way we do (with the pronoun she not referring to Mary but to some other female).

Mental development, on the constructivist view, consists in the elaboration of this knowledge; so that if there is one central difference between the mental processes of the baby, the child, and of the adult it is in terms of how self-world dualism is manifest in (and to) the subject. The representational theory of mind treats the explanation of mental life as a kind of engineering problem; it starts from the inside, from the representational state, and asks how mental states interact with one another to produce something that we would call' knowledge'; the representational theorist proceeds like a sceptical philosopher who thinks that what figures in our mental life is not reality but our mental representations of it (recall my saying the Fodor described his position as' methodological solipsism'). The constructivist starting-point could not be more different, and might be said to be' biological' where the representational theory is' engineering' -- or' machinological'. Constructivists do not admit such scepticism: the existence of an external world is one of <...>.

Far from being an endorsement of discrimination, an excess of difference would disarticulate its very terms. The instance of homosexuality is not incidental here since' perverse, desire figures centrally in Barthes's influential theories of difference and textuality. Like Wilde, Gide, and others, Barthes uses perverse desire to animate and inform his aesthetic and linguistic theories, and it is in terms of language and art that such strategies would in part operate. In his inaugural lecture he imagines a utopian plurality of languages on which we would draw' according to the truth of desire': This freedom is a luxury which every society should afford its citizens: as many languages as there are desires -- a utopian proposition in that no society is yet ready to admit the plurality of desire. That a language, whatever it be, not repress another; that the subject may know without remorse, without repression, the bliss of having at his disposal two kinds of language; that he may speak this or that, according to his perversions <...>.

<...> is often true of them that unless interfered with they will go on voluntarily to perform various actions. But, if Aquinas is right, they do not act intentionally, intending a goal which is the reason for their actions. (Kenny 1975: 21) This cuts the Gordian knot. It builds on the argument in the preceding section where it was argued that because the cat sees and tries to extricate the ball stuck in the tree, it thereby manifests only those minimal beliefs that we would attribute directly to a human being in similar circumstances. We would disallow any involving the mediation of language, including, of course, the belief that it believes. But, to repeat and stress, the minimal attributions involve different language-games since the claim that the child Mary believes the ball is stuck, or that she desires it, is made of a being who does use language and the judgement carries with it this enhanced contextual implication. In the case of dumb animals, infants, and sufficiently deprived adults, the grounds of the attribution will be the similarity of <...>.

<...> School, but becoming virtually ubiquitous after a proclamation by Edward VI in 1548 ordering its use in all grammar schools -- it was undoubtedly used by Shakespeare -- we find that a pronoun is said to be' a parte of speeche, much lyke to a noune, whyche is used in shewyng or rehersyng'. That is, pronouns which' shew' are called' Demonstratives, because they shew a thynge not spoken of before', while those that' rehearse'are called' relatives', because they relate or refer back to something already mentioned -- we would call them antecedents. Further,' A pronoune hath thre persons': These are the traditional grammatical definitions of the pronoun, as first made by Dionysius Thrax in the second century BC, and systematized further by Priscian (c. AD 500), whose account Lily is quoting word for word. Later English theorists of grammar bring out more clearly the implications of' shewing' and' rehearsing', distinguishing which of the pronoun's functions are substitutive (' rehearsing') and which not.

It is through the conception of historical time as a continuum that the past becomes a coherent object. For Hirst this means that there can be no Marxist' science of history' that can be opposed to the essentialism and teleology of a philosophy of history. Althusser's mistake, according to Hirst, was to attempt to construct another philosophy of history; but any theory of history, he contends, can not do without teleology, spirituality (the realization of the Idea), and the continuum. On the other hand, we would add that the lesson of Hegel's, Marx's, and Sartre's attempt also suggests that history can not be coherently essentialist and teleological either. Hirst's straightforward characterization of Althusser's work as' a failure' does not acknowledge the constant tension in the historical project itself. If Sartre's endeavour to ground the Marxist science of history suggests that the Hegelian totality and continuum can only work by a continual labour of excluding the partial and discontinuous, Althusser's effort to constitute a differentiated history shows that <...>.

<...> deal with man's new homelessness in the world, his exposure, as Foucault puts it, to the finitude of the event, which attempted to draw all these heterogeneous histories together again: either men sought for some fundamental law through which a new general history could be constituted, or historicity as such was defined in terms of' man' -- whether as progress, economic laws, or cultural totalities. The creation of man as centre was effected by defining him against other, now marginalized groups, such as women, the mad, or, we would add, the allegedly sub-human' native'. This move formed the basis for the human sciences which, through their organization around the figure of man, once more brought about a unity to History. We shall examine the relation of this new humanism to the history of Western colonialism in a later chapter: it is not a question that Foucault himself elaborates in the course of what is claimed to be an, ethnology of Western culture'.

<...> contrast, discontinuity is not the core experience, and relationships are not perceived as violent. Jaggar (1983) sums up the position as follows:' The standpoint of women generates an ontology of relations and of continual process' (p. 376). There are serious problems with this kind of content-based assertion, as Grimshaw (1986) points out in her discussion of' the maleness of philosophy'. Firstly, it ignores those male, often misogynist, philosophers who have emphasised relations and continual processes. She cites Hegel and Bradley as examples. We would also point out that prior to the seventeenth-century scientific revolution the universe was seen, by European men, as a great chain of being, connected rather than atomistic, necessarily related to humanity, rather than being a' neutral domain of facts, of contingently correlated elements, the tracing of whose correlations will enable greater and greater manipulation and control of the world' (Taylor, 1985, p. 134).

<...> neither merely the assertion that women too should be seen as included under or capable of whatever norms are suggested by the theory, nor merely the assertion that what is seen as feminine should be valued too, or given equal status with what is male. Rather, what is needed is a critique of the polarisation of masculine and feminine qualities, and in particular a critique of the way in which such qualities may be interpreted or clustered. (pp. 47-8) Grimshaw emphasises that femininity or masculinity are not fixed, nor are they independent of each other. We would add that to suggest giving equal status to what is currently thought to be feminine or masculine is to ignore the way in which one is defined by the other. In our culture to give equal status is a contradiction in terms, so long as gender is an expression of power relations and the male continues to be the superior term. We are saying, in short, that a feminist perspective in philosophy is necessarily critical. Like any other philosophy it is specific to its circumstances.

<...> banneret, those senior knights whose swallow-tailed pennons had been cut to the square banners of their new rank. In England, too, the members of the highest nobility, from dukes to earls, gave service and exercised commands throughout the war. Edward III always recognised the importance of noble support in his wars, and, both in his reign and in that of his grandson, Richard II who succeeded him in 1377, the nobility led from the front. We should be careful, however, to emphasise that the nobility (or noblesse, as we would term it in a French context) also had its high, middling and lower ranks. The highest nobility were only very few in numbers, so that when we speak of their hold upon military commands we must, consciously or not, include those who had inherited relatively low noble rank or who had only risen that far through their own efforts. These men were, largely, in a class apart, for even the English knight could be a man of importance in the county society in which he <...>.

As elsewhere, a too zealous objector is hoist by his own petard. Fifthly, to introduce something not so far mentioned, the objection may include the idea that if our causal thought did rest on the given conception of a causal circumstance, we should be able to do well at prediction better than in fact we do. Causal circumstances in a way guarantee their effects. But it does not at all follow from the fact that causal circumstances in a sense guarantee their effects that we can predict those effects better than we do. To do so we would require knowledge which in fact we lack. # 1.6.3 Condition-Sets and Backgrounds # The objection just considered is linked to another, or rather, to a positive proposal as to condition-sets and their effects. We may be told that what we understand of an event e, if it is taken as an effect, is that there existed a certain set of conditions -- say sc -- such that since it existed, e occurred, and e would still have occurred so long as " the usual background " or <...>.

<...> remark could be promoted to form the basis of a general argument against the conditional theory of knowledge.) Third, the argument from error can not be attacked for relying on PC k. This is not because PC k is valid, particularly. Even if it were valid, I can see no reason for supposing that the argument relies upon it. Nozick anyway could not hold that it does, because his position relies on the independent proof it provides that you don't know you are not a brain in a vat. Without that proof, we would hold it against the conditional theory that it can not even show that we know that we are not brains in a vat. With it, Nozick can and does find independent support for his theory; he wants to say that the theory gets things right here. But if the argument from error does rely on PC k, which on his theory is invalid, he lacks that independent support and with it a considerable degree of plausibility.

The origins of a positive, class orientated usage -- something' popular' as the type specifically produced by the lower classes -- lie in this period also; and this has become one of the common twentieth-century senses. In music, the quantitative usage (' well favoured') seems to have come to the fore in the eighteenth century -- alongside the development of a (bourgeois) commercial market in musical products; and when, in the first half of the nineteenth century, songs for the bourgeois market (including what we would now call' drawing-room ballads') were described as' popular songs', the intended implication seems to have been that they were good (that is, well liked by those whose opinion counted). Older senses survived, too; and, under the impact of Romanticism,' popular songs' could in the nineteenth century also be thought of as synonymous with' peasant','national'and' traditional'songs.' Later in the century,' folk' took over these usages from' popular' <...>.

<...> terms (as Noam Chomsky has suggested), but that social behaviour lends itself to analysis in broadly linguistic terms. The real question in structuralist theory is how literally the linguistic model should be applied. The three examples discussed

in this section suggest that the most fertile and productive uses of the linguistic model are the most analogical and metaphorical ones. Todorov's analysis of the Decameron tales is based on a very rigorous and literal use of linguistic categories. He begins by dividing narrative up into semantic, syntactic and verbal aspects. The semantic aspect is what we would otherwise call its content, and the verbal aspect is Todorov's term for the language in which the stories are told. The syntax of narrative is the relation between the events and is the main concern of Todorov's study. As in a linguistic analysis, he begins by finding out what the basic units of combination are (by analogy with the phonemes, morphemes, etc. which constitute the basic units of language).

<...> and it is well to alternate it with other contrasting episodes which use very different textures.' Statement and change' is again the rule. # Vocal and choral forms # The span of possibilities here is enormous: we can follow Stravinsky in adapting Medieval forms; we can write songs which are pure melody; or we can use a form which ignores musical values, taking the guise of a word-drama. We have already discussed the possibilities under vocal music, and it would be useless to repeat the arguments. The only thing we would say is that we must have a clear vision of our formal and stylistic intentions before we begin. Even the choice of words must be made with our musical intention in mind, to ensure that they are apt. (I once asked a gifted student to bring me a setting of the Kyrie. He returned with a symphonic battle piece, and when I asked if he realized the significance of the words he admitted he did not know what they meant!)

<...> more concerned here with what might be called the roast beef of scoring than with the confectionery. The normal layout of the string orchestra is in four-part harmony, the double bass either doubling the cellos or being silent. We would here stress the importance of giving plenty of rests to the double basses. Few things are more fatiguing to the ear than the incessant doubling of the bass at the octave below, in season and out of season. No organist in his senses would use sixteen-foot tone throughout an extended work, so why should the orchestrator? We would advise the beginner never to write his cello and bass parts on the same stave: if he does, he will almost surely fall into the error of over-using the double bass, his mind's ear, which acts through his eye, being almost certain to fail to register the lower octave. Moreover, we do not wish to give the impression that the cello and bass always work in double harness: on the contrary, they can be used independently to a quite large extent, though discretion and <...>.

Possibly a little touch like this has more meaning for us belonging as we do to a mechanical age, than it would have had for our ancestors, who were unaccustomed to the click of an electric switch and its attendant results! The possibilities of the small orchestra are so immense -- almost infinite -- that it would be profitless to add further examples, especially Ex. 21 (deleted:figure) (deleted:figure) as there is an unlimited number of models to be found among the works of the great masters of orchestration from Haydn to the present day. We would earnestly advise the student to' get the miniature score habit' (to use advertisers' jargon). All sorts of odd moments occur during the day, in which a page or two of a score can be read and hints stored away for future use. Apart from all else the concentration required to hear mentally an orchestral passage while seated in a bus or train or standing in the Underground can not fail to be beneficial.

<...> nothing but Greece) would seem to be prompted by a desire to enhance his scholarly image; for no other kind of book (she decided) would have satisfied his " scholar's conscience. " # NEW PLANS, WAR, PHILOSOPHICAL CREDENTIALS # By the spring of 1870 the new project had its first name. In April Nietzsche announced to Rohde: " The theme and title of the coming book Zukunft-buch, perhaps with allusion to Wagner's Zukunftsmusikis " Socrates and Instinct ". " From our knowledge of Nietzsche's earlier thinking on that subject, we would naturally take such a title to imply a central concern with tragedy and its demise, but it is certainly significant that the word " tragedy " is not itself part of the title. Nietzsche, it seems, was at a transitional stage. He had not yet finally committed himself to subordinating all his other interests to tragedy, but was still toying with ideas of a wider scope. The book, as we gather from a plan in his notebooks of the same period, was to deal with four <...>.

When you use someone else's ideas or words, you need to say where they come from. Traditionally it was the practice to provide a footnote for every reference made in an essay, whether for a quotation or for a paraphrase. In many cases, this loads down an essay with so many notes that it becomes difficult to read. For this reason, the footnote-reference system has been

widely displaced by other accepted techniques, such as the system which we now describe, and which we would we would recommend. In the Harvard system (often referred to as the " author -- date " style), references to a particular work are made in the form of a parenthesis, giving the author's name, the date of the publication referred to or quoted from and the relevant page number(s). This system works effectively, so long as the work in question can be clearly identified in the booklist or bibliography attached to the essay or dissertation <...>.

- Would like to:

<...> surrounded by the monuments of the New Right and by the debris of the swinging past to which he had once been a contributor. The two Patrick books are stations in a progress -- what Amis has encouraged us to call Lucky Jim's turn to the right. This is a progress which has found its haven in the achievements of Mrs Thatcher, and the Patrick of the Eighties will have to deal with that. It will be difficult for him to be baleful about the Millennium. I would like to say a last word about Amis's voices, and about the long words which have been or might be laid on his confident art -- a terminology for which he is unlikely to be grateful. There is a poem by his friend Philip Larkin, entitled' Letter to a Friend about Girls', which was never published during Larkin's lifetime but was retrieved for the Collected Poems of 1988. It is dated December 1959, and may therefore have been written at the time that Take a girl <...>.

It is not the rural bus, post office, shop or pub, important as all these can be in safeguarding a village's identity. It is above all the school which is felt to embody the idea of the village as something alive and enduring. Without it young families are reluctant to stay or settle, and the vitality and diversity of village life will almost inevitably decline. (11/9/78). I would like to draw your attention to several characteristics of statements of the kind listed above. First, they are couched in extremely general terms. They don't refer to particular cases of primary school closure in any particular location. Rather, they consist of statements about the nature of villages, country parishes and communities. The view expressed in the cliche that' the school is the heart of the community' is apparently held to apply to rural life in general. Indeed, the pamphlet called Schools Under Threat makes <...>.

But here I prefer only to draw attention to those basic principles which underlie all matters of form, whether in short phrases, large movements, or even gigantic symphonies, leaving aside the study of conventional forms (sonata form, binary form, etc.) which the student can find better illustrated elsewhere. Here we are concerned with the basic principles, on which all else depends and which may eventually be applied to longer movements as well as to short sections. Before we begin, however, I would like to point out that a great deal of contemporary music has been written which belies much or all of what I have to say. This kind of music, of which I contributed my own part, deliberately aimed at beginning anew, ignoring the conventions of the past; the only universal ideal was that the new music should be completely unlike whatever was heard before. Within that every composer tried to be different, mistaking novelty for originality and quality. Naturally enough, a confused situation arose, during which <...>.

A book on composition bases itself on the assumption that the reader is already familiar with conventional harmonic principles. However, it has been my experience that composition students do not sufficiently exploit their harmonic knowledge, often using only a limited vocabulary. Later, we will be looking at ways of expanding our vocabulary in adventurous ways, but for the moment I would like to make recommendations based on my observations over many years of student limitations, mainly in a diatonic field. We will be dealing with more chromatic harmony later on, in Chapter 10. I believe harmonic poverty is often caused by a student's perfectly natural inability to think of more than one thing at a time. So I repeat: write a melody first, then harmonize it later. Many poor harmonizations are written because the student is trying to think of melody and harmony together, and inevitably both <...>.

<...> while the ending could be a non-canonic coda. Writing canonic music is easier if we follow a golden rule: never go far with a leading voice without adding the consequent. For as soon as the consequent begins, it governs all that the leading voice can do. It is best to write no more than a bar of the leading voice before adding the consequent and assessing the result. If we follow this rule, most problems disappear. We will be discussing contrapuntal writing again in Chapter 12. For the time being, I would like to repeat my warning against an excess of counterpoint. Inevitably, writing counterpoint has great intellectual appeal. It can be fascinating, but the allure of intellectualism can carry us away to the point of deliberately courting obscurity. I was once deceived as to the value of counterpoint. The first book I ever studied was Prout's Strict Counterpoint, which bestows on polyphony an aura of mysterious excellence. Then I saw that a D. Mus. degree required the composition of a fugue in eight parts, and when I <...>.

In the relevant text something different is in question every time: here a glass (deleted:figure) cube, there an inverted open box, there a wire frame of that shape, there three boards forming a solid angle. Each time the text supplies the interpretation of the illustration. But we can also see the illustration now as one thing now as another. -- So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it. Here perhaps we would like to reply: The description of what is got immediately, i.e. of the visual experience, by means of an interpretation -- in an indirect description,' I see the figure as a box' means: I have a particular visual experience which I have found that I always have when I interpret the figure as a box or when I look at a box. But if it meant this I ought to know it. I ought to be able to refer to the experience directly, and not only <...>.

<...> serial usage is arranged so that in the first half, the' O',' I',' R', and' RI' versions are all used at once, as follows: Violin 1 --' O'beginning on C; Violin 2 --' R'of the same series as that of Violin 1; Viola --' RI'of the series beginning on B; Cello --' I'of the series beginning on B. Naturally, as the second half of the variations is a retrograde of the first half, all the above are then reversed. We would like to draw attention to the very simple rhythmic structure of this double canon. Both canons are made of similar material: cells of one, two, or three quavers, and the use of one or two crotchets. This material is not distinguished and memorable -- perhaps deliberately, for the fugitive, enigmatic effect permeates the entire symphony. This subtle, indeterminate quality was Webern's ideal. (We will return to this subject later.) Having introduced the reader to a fairly complex canonic structure we must <...>.

At first we outlined as our objective the elimination of the main characteristics of conventional tonal music by the following means: (1) we should avoid the use of conventional scale patterns; (2) we should eliminate triadic chord formations, including not only major and minor chords, but also 7th, 9th, and diminished 7th chords; (3) chord sequences resembling conventional cadences should also be avoided; and (4) the total-chromatic should be used continuously. Serialism itself is normally certain to achieve these objectives. However, we would like to express the view that triads need not be so ruthlessly confiscated. In the right context, at the right moment, they can sound to marvellous effect, and if this suits a composer's aesthetic he should not hesitate to cultivate their occasional use (cf. Example 86). Later in the section on' Free twelve-note music' we discussed twelve-note harmony, particularly in connection with two different methods which can be combined into one comprehensive system: (1) conflicting notes, and (2) interval <...> .

The second of these choices was the one that most feminists adopted, and as a result the next decade was marked by an increasing self-confidence on the part of feminists about their place in philosophy. This led to a fourth type of work which discussed the nature and limits of philosophy itself and whether there was any place for women in it, and considered whether the basic assumptions of philosophy included or excluded women. Here we would just like to mention briefly some of the studies that came out between 1980 and 1986, which attempt to develop accounts that would be either specifically feminist or draw upon a women's point of view. Under the heading of political philosophy, feminist philosophers begin by arguing with the tradition, trying to reconcile feminist insights with already existing systems of thought such as liberalism or Marxism, and go on to attempt to define a new perspective in philosophy. In The Politics of Reproduction (1981), Mary O'Brien <...>.

- Might:

<...> turn it into the Queen of the Sciences never looked like succeeding. To identify English as peculiarly problematical should not weaken the general defence of humane values in education, and may in the longer run help to strengthen them. A successful military campaign may require giving up some tactically untenable territory. Having taught English Literature for a long time in universities, on both sides of the Atlantic, and having spent some years pondering the questions raised in this book, I have come to some very tentative conclusions about what might be done; they are not, I might add, of the kind I thought I would come to when I began working on it. In the wake of the MacCabe affair in 1981, an editorial in the Times Higher Education Supplement said that a fissiparous discipline such as English had a number of hard choices in front of it: it could become even more pluralistic and diffuse, with accompanying pedagogic problems; it could repressively impose one favoured approach; or it could split. Raymond Williams came to think that a splitting of the discipline was increasingly <...>.

<...> out and become a general scepticism about the unobserved or about the possibility of scientific knowledge. The problem is to find a convincing argument for local ethical scepticism which has no expansionist tendencies. If local scepticism tends to collapse into global scepticism, this may be an advantage, since global sceptical arguments are generally more convincing

and effective than their local counterparts. And the same is true of the second distinction I want to draw. Some sceptical arguments attack the notion of knowledge directly but leave other related notions, crucially that of justified belief, untouched. Thus I might argue that to know you must be certain, but that one can never be really certain and hence one can never really know. Ignoring for the moment the force of the word' really' in this argument, we can still feel confident that even if we give up talking of knowledge, granting that a necessary condition for knowing is unfulfilled, we can happily continue to talk about justified belief, distinguishing some beliefs as justified or as more justified than others and others as less justified or even completely <...>.

<...> of contamination necessarily present in the procedure, why should we insist that the input to the procedure be completely sterile, i.e. devoid of any taint of falsehood? But the main objection to classical foundationalism is that there are no infallible beliefs. The fallibilist holds, correctly in my opinion, that we are nowhere entirely immune from the possibility of error. Are our beliefs about our present sensory states infallible? Champions of infallibility tend to concede that there is room for a mistake in the description of one's sensory states (see Ayer, 1950). I might mistakenly describe my sensory state as being an experience of pink (things look pink to me here) when in fact it is an experience of orange. But this is dismissed as a merely verbal error. Of course I can be mistaken about the meanings of the words I use, but this will not show that I have any mistaken beliefs about my present sensory states. On the contrary, I must know how things look to me: my only error lies in choosing the wrong words to describe <...>.

<...> a meaning to the term' pain' by pointing (mentally) to a sensation, is one which only works when we already have a background of conceptual knowledge, and can not be used to construct such knowledge from a blank sheet. Suppose that I point at a chair and say' By' chair' I mean that', nothing in what I have done creates the desired meaning for the word' chair'unless I can further characterise what it is about the object I am pointing to that I am taking as relevant; for example, I might say' that sort of furniture', and this would improve matters, but I have to have the concept of furniture first. Equally with a sensation, saying' by' pain' I mean that' will only achieve the desired effect if we have some means of separating characteristics which are to be relevant from those which are not. In virtue of what are the duration, intensity, location, cause and ownership of the sensation to be deemed irrelevant? In general, then, ostensive definition <...>.

<...> would not in itself contribute anything towards clarifying the concept of truth. As it happens, explicit truth claims are not entirely dispensable. Take again our earlier example " What A says is true ". The suggestion was that this should be paraphrased as " A says that p, and p ". But conceivably I might be particularly anxious to emphasise that A is not stating a falsehood that he is a reliable witness, say, which might be important in certain circumstances. Or suppose I wished to challenge what A said. I might him " What you say is false ". How will he reply to this charge? He might say " Things are exactly as I said they are ". But suppose I insisted that he was uttering a falsehood. Then the only defence left to him is to answer " No, what I say is the truth ". There is no way in which he could emphasise the veracity of his testimony except by literally asserting it. Let us now return to the topic of " existence predicates <...>.

<...> in the park " meant, or what " oak " meant, or what the meaning of the sentence as a whole was, I would have to explain to him the meaning of these expressions with the help of some other expressions which he could understand. Moreover we can discuss the meaning of what is being said even if it so happens that there are no trees in the park, or if all the trees happened to be the same age and none of them was an oak. None of this renders any of the expressions meaningless. Thus I might say to someone " Let's go and find out which is the oldest tree in the park ", without fearing that I may have said something unintelligible just because neither of us is certain what the outcome of our search will be. The content of what I say can be analysed, commented on, communicated to third parties. I can assert of the oldest tree in the park (if there is such a tree) that it is an oak, but I can also say of the sentence <...>.

<...> course, all this is true. It is moreover true that names are often deliberately chosen for their descriptive content. Columbus had an excellent reason for naming the island where he first landed after crossing the Atlantic " San Salvador ". In fact, it is fairly safe to assume that all proper names started their denotative careers as descriptions of one sort or another, although in many cases the link with the original descriptive content subsequently became severed or obscured. What is more, proper

names are normally introduced into discourse by means of descriptive phrases. Thus I might say " The man over there is John ". I might of course only gesture and say " John ", but unless my gesture means, or can be understood to mean, " the man over there ", or something akin to this, " John " will fail to communicate anything. But if descriptive phrases are necessary to introduce names or things that can be seen and pointed at, they are clearly even more necessary in respect of objects that can not be seen, or no longer <...>.

<...> 1937 but has penetrated into affairs of state, legislation, and decisions over the destinies of individuals with frequency. A significant aspect of the religious hegemonic role can be seen in the translation of religious preoccupations into law via the concept of natural law. This mediation of ethics makes indirect one's access to the problem of the relationship between the religious faith of some and the morality of the many, particularly on the issue of the freedom of the individual versus the intervention of the state. In this respect, it is useful to pay attention to what we might now term the human rights' issue as one examines the handling of public -- private morality in the Irish constitution. The first constitution of the Southern state was the Constitution of the Irish Free State of 1922. Under the treaty with the United Kingdom, the twenty-six counties which were to become the independent state were to remain within the British Empire with dominion status, and the British monarch was to remain head of state. These principles were embodied in the constitution.

<...> Raskolnikov is incorrigibly patrician and rare at heart (which is one reason why the Epilogue does not convince), even if I have overstressed the Hamletish side to him. Nevertheless his crime, like the tawdry footloose elimination of Shatov, springs from unsteadiness (shatost). The word appears twice in Dostoevsky's letter to Katkov outlining Crime and Punishment, in the phrase' unsteadiness of ideas' -- which is natural since a drama of reflection is about to unfold: thinking is Raskolnikov's work, as he tells the maid Nastasya. Unsteady work, we might add. Moreover the surname Shatov appears once in the notebooks relating to Crime and Punishment. But nothing further. It's as if the name were waiting for the man, and for the novel which will transpersonalize or socialize the murderous concept:' social unsteadiness, as Shatov says' and as we read in the Possessed notebooks. And in his definitive text the novelist voices social unsteadiness as empty groupings and vapid motions. Von Lemke's cut-outs are phantom human concourses (theatre, station, church) <...>.

<...> the former has often worked to undermine the latter and, in the process, challenged the very nature of the aesthetic, fashioning in the process new and sometimes oppositional mutations of it. The search for the nature of the distinctively gay sensibility can be productively redirected as an exploration of the limitations of the aesthetic as conventionally understood, especially the way it is said to transcend the socio-political, and used in support of the proposition that discrimination is the essence of culture. Further, rather than seeking such a sensibility in an' inner condition', we might more usefully identify it outwardly and in relation to other strategies of survival and subversion, especially the masquerade of femininity, and the mimicry of the colonial subject. What it might be found to share with the first is a simultaneous avoidance and acting out of the ambivalence which constitutes subordination, and a pushing of that ambivalence to the point of transgressive insight and possibly reinscribed escape. As for the colonial context, Homi Bhabha argues that here mimicry is both a strategy of colonial subjection -- an appropriation, regulation <...>.

<...> else, too, when he considers the suggestion that, even though the senses take us no further than appearances, perhaps the understanding can penetrate further to the inner natures of things. Of course, he denies that it can. But he expresses this by saying that we' can proceed no farther by reasoning than to things which must be exposed again to experience or which can be evidenced by means of some appearance'; and this seems to suggest something new. It seems to allow that, although we must begin and end with appearances, we might find it possible and advantageous in doing so to interpose conjectures about their hidden causes. But, so far as the Exercises goes, all of this is underplayed. Gassendi does not develop the thought that' the labours of the most outstanding philosophers... need not be considered useless just because they have not produced an Aristotelian knowledge for us so far; for they have produced another sort which is more true and useful, namely knowledge from experience and the appearance of things.'

Epistemic appearances are concept-dependent. Perspectival appearances, on the other hand, are not concept-dependent. Since they are objective the question of whether or not someone possesses a concept does not arise. (4) Epistemic appearances are

true or false of their objects. A cornflower appears to be blue, and it is blue. The sea appears to be blue, but it is not really blue; it merely reflects the sky. AB appears to be shorter than BC, but is not; the appearance does not correspond to reality; the appearance, we might say, is nonveridical. If most experiences were nonveridical -- or, to put it another way, if seeing did not usually justify believing -- we probably would not survive for long. Nature has seen to it that for the most part we see things as they are, and so have little occasion to say,' It appears to be....' Epistemic appearances can be true or false of objects by virtue of being identified by reference to would-be thoughts about them. Perspectival appearances are not so identified <...>.

<...> of inside with outside, of micro with macro. Such an enterprise may prove both impractical and unlikely to yield any major new theoretical insights. It might be possible to approach the problem from another angle: specifically to direct our attention to intentional social behaviour in relation to the outside world, to look at the ways that people cope, deal and come to terms with the non-routine, the out-of-the-ordinary, to document the character of the dynamic between the familiar world and the external processes typical of people in different groups, categories, communities and societies. We might begin by asking: what knowledge do people have about processes beyond the boundaries of familiar reality? How is this knowledge gained? How do people recognise unfamiliar processes when they encounter them? How do they feel their way about on the frontiers of their familiar world? What resources do they have for dealing with the unfamiliar, and how do they use them? In other words, what is the nature of social knowledge and social action in relation to those processes which people define as more or less external <...>.

Sir Walter thinks he has captured something (the soul, the imagination?) which he associates with joy and his kind of pleasure. His life of action is surely contrasted with the contemplative life of the shepherd and poet, who realize that Man's past and present state (' what we are, and have been') is doomed, because it is based upon cruelty and the confining of imagination -- surely this is the Cup of Stone, almost a Cap of Stone, laid upon' the living well'. At this point we might call in evidence William Blake's teaching: The' milder day' remains a puzzle which can not be solved from within the poem. We have the additional reference in The Recluse (see p. 109) and a further reading of that poem shows that the Wordsworths approached Grasmere in a mood of mystical elation verging on trance. At this time the poet's' Creed' included belief in a new state of being, a redemptive process brought about in slow tranquillity without sudden conversions or a Last Judgment <...>.

<...> the' subconscious mind' -- this phrase had not yet come into the language, and Wordsworth's' workings of the spirit' -- he has many other phrases -- are not always seen to refer to this. In the light of this passage we can interpret one of Wordsworth's gnomic sayings --' The Child is Father of the Man' -- and can understand what the attractive childhood episodes are doing in Books i and ii; they are now seen to be similar' spots of time... enshrined... for future restoration'. Philosophically, we might comment on the extraordinary qualities of Wordsworth's perceptions. He seems at times to be reassuring himself of his grip upon a world of his own devising. In a note dictated to Isabella Fenwick about the Immortality Ode, Wordsworth said that in childhood I was often unable to think of external things as having external existence, and I communed with all that I saw as something not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature. Many times while going to school have I grasped at a wall <...>.

<...> correlation between the strongest position in the most developed hierarchies and the best contacts for obtaining exotic goods. Much of the exchange was probably in the form of reciprocity bound up with gift-giving as Grierson implies (1959). One of the implications of the Kentish monopoly of certain materials and sources is that other areas must have been either dependent on the Kentish elite for such goods, or sought their own exotic goods by making contacts with elites elsewhere, that is, entering into an entirely different network. Given the pre-eminence and advanced economic development of Kent, we might conclude that the exchange of prestige items was directed towards the areas with the most marked social differentiation. Such an advanced social and administrative development is certainly apparent in seventh century Kentish law-codes; but it is odd that these make little provision for economic transactions. This may only reflect the nature and purpose of the law-codes, but it may also point to the undeveloped nature of institutionalised commerce or the manner in which such exchange was connected only with those who issued and administered the law.

<...> final authority over what state it was in that we normally concede to humans: when Jones, on the neurosurgeon's table, insists that he is in pain, we tend to allow his authority even though the neurosurgeon says that, given the position of the brain probe at that moment, he should not be. If a computer printed out that its memory was suffering from a certain kind of fault, we might be persuaded from past experience to go on examining its hardware for faults, even though we found none in the initially plausible places. We might, to speak anthropomorphically, allow it to insist that its memory was going and, if we did, we would allow it the authority in question. Closer perhaps to the title of this section, we might come to allow that the computer really was paying tax refunds (because it said it was), even though all detective work on its machine code program was consistent with it being occupied directing the trajectories of inter-continental ballistic missiles. If we did come to allow such authority, or privacy, <...>.

<...> and Bernard Rollin's police dog are the sorts of example particularly favoured by enthusiasts anxious to elevate the moral status of animals. They are allegedly instances of rational action; of using means to achieve ends. But it is vital, before we canonise the creatures, to note that acting for an end (requiring teleological explanation) is almost a defining feature of the living world as a whole. Naturalists shower us with intriguing accounts, both anecdotal and experimental, and their range tends to put in perspective the sense, if any, in which we might wish to claim that some were consciously purposive and others not. However, there is a useful terminology to hand in the distinction between purpose, which betrays intent, and function, which does not. Chickens are pecked by their social superiors in order to maintain a rigid status quo within the flock. The kangaroo rat, like many desert rodents, conserves water by remaining underground by day to avoid the heat of the sun, emerging to feed only by night. J.H. Fabre, the famous French entomologist <...>.

But, to repeat and stress, the minimal attributions involve different language-games since the claim that the child Mary believes the ball is stuck, or that she desires it, is made of a being who does use language and the judgement carries with it this enhanced contextual implication. In the case of dumb animals, infants, and sufficiently deprived adults, the grounds of the attribution will be the similarity of the pre-linguistic prototypes to the developed human paradigm. We might even wish to speak of animal intention, but if we do so it will be in terms of its' natural' expression:' What is the natural expression of an intention? -- Look at a cat when it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape' (PI 647). The cat will see a bird and pursue it, to that extent knowing what it wants; but it will not know why it is doing it, and to that extent what it <...>.

<...> right then to say' The chicken is distressed by its close confinement, is a dual acknowledgement of sympathy at the presence of behavioural prototypes similar to those of distressed people, and a strong veterinary hint of a possible cure; but no more. Were the chicken a 5-year-old child cramped in a tiny cupboard, our judgement would carry implications of a different order, for the child would be capable of knowing, under normal circumstances, that she was distressed and why. Clark's introduction of death is even less convincing and here, I think, we might even object to the use of the same form of words for animals and human beings. That the calf is afraid of death, let alone its fleeing it as the greatest of evils, seems misleadingly to ascribe to it a self-conscious grasp of death and evil, possible only of beings capable of language. Yet if we deny the creature this understanding, which even Clark himself seems to acknowledge, yet insist with him that it nonetheless fears death, then it is in the distinctly paradoxical position of fearing <...>.

They exhibit the pre-linguistic sensations of pain and the ancestral tokens of human attributes such as deliberative intent, rational planning, choice, desire, fear, anger, and some beliefs, where our guiding criteria are the close similarity of their behavioural patterns, in like circumstances, to our own. Only in an evolutionary context are these tokens the beginnings, let us say, of planning or choice. Their anger or fear antedates even that of the young infant who is in the process of integrating its pre-verbal behaviour with ill-formed vocal utterances (although we might well wish to stretch a point and allow the inclusion of the Ameslan apes, particularly Lucy, up to, but not beyond, this point). What we observe, however we dignify it, is the pre -linguistic prototype and it will include the gestural and vocal' primitive forms' of language observed in the vast majority of higher species. Clearly animals, unlike plants, are conscious; but self -consciousness, like hope, ambition, remorse, and envy, come only with the capability of <...>.

The most important point of departure, however, is that rights, whether moral or legal, can involve correlative duties. Citizens' rights can be forfeit if we fall foul of the law. My right to the first move at chess carries with it the duty to continue with the game, and so on. Animals obey orders, the guard-dog does its duty, but as we saw in Chapter 5, such attributions involve a language-game only reminiscent of the human paradigm. In more extreme manner we might wish to register our displeasure at the felling of a row of fine trees for a road-widening project by saying that they had the right to be left in peace. McCloskey is right, up to a point, in claiming that in cases such as these we have changed the concept:' What we are ascribing and according are not rights in the ordinary sense of rights' (1975: 416). But the idea of a continuum of language-games employing the same word, whose contexts recall more or <...>.

This reversal of the argument will clearly not assist the cause of animals. The comparison with human imbeciles can serve to show animals in a more creditable light. They are, as we have frequently observed, capable of feats of sentience and locomotion that surpass anything of which we are capable. The rather weary drawing of parallels between animals and instances of human retardation diverts attention from their true source of value to us. Animals may be primitive beings but they are not thereby defective ones. In this sense, animals (and we might add primitive peoples and even the environment) are sui generis; they are perfect of their kind. I can make the point more contentiously. The vast amount of medical research devoted to the early detection and treatment of foetal abnormalities is witness to the fact that society would prefer that there were no retarded babies born. This does not imply that existing defectives should be done away with, nor that we should condemn the decision of a couple, whose foetus is at risk, that to have a retarded <...>.

<...> or other hostile environment to undergo hardship and trials which, if successfully endured, allow them to return to society at a higher level, as adults. In his pioneer study Les Rites de passage (1908), Arnold van Gennep defined three stages within such rituals:sparation, separation from society; marge, the transitional period of testing, outside society; and agrgation, the reincorporation of the individual into society in his new status. No such event occurs in Shakespeare, of course, and my use of this model is meant to stimulate thought about how we might classify the many shifts between verse and prose that take place in Shakespeare, most frequently in the middle-period plays. One preliminary point that may still need to be made is that the switches between the two media are not arbitrary, but motivated according to a series of conventions practised by other Elizabethan dramatists. The motivation, however, can come from a number of sources. The ones I have so far mentioned might be called mimetic, that is, the distinctions king/servant, sane man/madman, are distinctions that <...>.

<...> the lowest and meanest stile, utterly devoyde of anye shadowe of hie and loftye speeches'. Day divides epistles into the categories' general', which are' familiar letters' passing between people of' long acquaintance or auntient familiarity'; and' speciall', which' do admit both higher stile and more orderlye deliverance', since they bear' a resolute purpose and intendment seriously to discourse, aunswere, implye or avoyde, any certain matter or causes, importing the present affaires whereupon the direction is framed'. In this second category we might place the first seventeen sonnets, with their persuasion to marriage, a sequence that may in fact draw some of its arguments and images from a model epistle, Erasmus's Encomium Matrimonii, Englished by Sir Thomas Wilson as An Epistle to perswade a yong Gentleman to mariage, devised by Erasmus, in the behalfe of his freend. Angel Day transposed the exercise for the opposite sex in An Epistle Swasorie, wherein a Gentlewoman is councelled to mariage. These are clearly more formal models than those which the modern <...>.

Although it would be possible to pursue the question of history in terms of such analyses of the forms of historicity, such an enquiry would take us on a very different path from that prompted by our original question, namely if poststructuralism can apparently be faulted by reference to a history which it neglects, where in Marxism can this history be found? Since Sartre and Althusser there have been a number of possibilities: for some, the absolute historicism of the Frankfurt School has become increasingly attractive, although in its current manifestation in the work of Habermas we might say that history has been eclipsed far more effectively than by any comparable French philosopher. If Althusser gave us history without a subject, Habermas gives us subjects without history. Otherwise there have been two possibilities which effectively continue the lines of descent from Hegelian historicism and the history of science. The most notable representative of the latter has been Michel Foucault, who has remorselessly continued the critique of totalizing forms of history and the disavowal of a general philosophy of history in favour of strategic' genealogical' analyses.

<...> most extreme, someone's capacity to choose which course of action to perform is removed from them. Thus, if a person is given a drug which gets rid of any resistance he/she might have had to being taken into captivity, then, in a very strong sense, his/her autonomy has been violated. But, in a slightly weaker sense, someone may lose their autonomy if the opportunity for them to exercise their capacity to choose is removed. Thus, a person who becomes a slave loses this opportunity. A particular sort of slavery, what we might call moral slavery, occurs if a person is forced to act according to someone else's moral values. All the above types of violation of a person's autonomy involve what Kant described as treating the person as a means to someone else's end, and not as an end in themselves. We ought, he said, to' treat humanity whether in your own person, or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end <...>.

The problem here seems to be this: am I saying that a child is responsible if and only if we declare her to be so, given that she knows what she is doing? This view has some historical clout. Given the knowledge it is always possible to hold someone responsible for their actions. Children were still being imprisoned and deported when Mill wrote that disclaimer. Is it then just a matter of fashion, of the times in which we live? Not entirely; to begin with we might take a pragmatic line in the light of new knowledge about the long-term effects of such treatment on a child's subsequent development. We might argue that while we can hold her responsible, the consequences of so doing turn out to be unacceptable. But the horror which writers such as Dickens expressed at the cruelty of his times was prompted by no such knowledge. Dickensian child victims grow into upright citizens if they grow up at all. What Dickens saw was what most of us see, the inhumanity of <...>.

<...> effective global argument of this type. It is not just that we clearly do understand something; rather we know in advance that it is only by understanding the sceptic's argument as we are clearly expected to, that we could be led to believe that we understand nothing. And even if we don't understand the argument, we surely understand the conclusion; and so the conclusion must be false. This short way with the global argument can be copied with any global sceptical argument, whether it attacks knowledge alone or justified belief as well. Thus we might say that the sceptic implicitly claims to know his conclusion that knowledge is impossible, or that he claims that his premises justify his belief that justified belief is impossible. The former suggestion seems unconvincing, but the latter is quite effective. What is the point of arguing that justified belief is impossible, for if you were right there could be no reasons for your conclusion? These defences against the sceptic attempt to avoid detailed examination of the arguments put forward and focus instead merely on the conclusion.

So what on earth could depend on our success or failure to discover necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge? In many ways I sympathize with the general tenor of this complaint, as may quickly become apparent. What sustains me in the search for a response to Gettier is the feeling that it may be possible to find an account of what knowledge is which will have a substantial effect on what we are to say about justification in later parts of this book. This could happen in either or both of two ways. We might find an account of what knowledge is which would suffice to undermine crucial sceptical moves, and hence confirm the possibility that some of our beliefs are justified; the account to which I give tentative support in chapter 3 has pretensions in this direction. Or we might hope to define justification in terms of knowledge. For instance, we might suppose that a belief is justified iff in certain circumstances (to be spelled out) it would be knowledge. (Jennifer Hornsby gave me this idea.)

<...> rather obviously avoided, so far as I could, offering even the most tentative diagnosis of the defect in the tripartite analysis which Gettier exposed. This is because the different responses to Gettier all stem from different diagnoses of the way in which the tripartite analysis is lacking; once we know what is missing, it should be quite a simple matter to add it. # The Presence of Relevant Falsehood # The most obvious diagnosis is simply that the initial belief that p, from which the true justified belief that q is inferred, is false. So we might add to the tripartite analysis the fourth condition that nothing can be known which is inferred from a false belief, or from a group of beliefs of which one is false. This simple suggestion has two defects. First, variants on the Gettier theme can be written in which, though there is falsehood, there is no inference. Suppose that I believe that there is a sheep in the next field because of what I see. I am not inferring from what I see that there is a sheep <...>.

<...> i.e. we can live with them and do not have to find some way to stop them. For instance, the regress generated by the remark that there is a point between every pair of points may be virtuous, even when we take it to concern points in time rather than in space. Equally we might accept the temporal regress caused by supposing that for each moment in time there is a moment that precedes it, or the causal regress derived from the propositions that every event has a separate cause and that every cause is an event. We might even accept the regress caused by the suggestion that when we believe that p we believe that p is probable (the regress comes by taking q =' p is probable'). Can we not then simply accept that justification continues ad infinitum? I think that the regress of justification, once it has been allowed to start in the way I have outlined, is vicious in the sense that it will show that no belief is ever actually justified. There is a bad reason for thinking this, <...>.

This easy remark (see (b) above) begs the question against the relevant argument. Nor is it any use to insist that you can conceive of what it is like for a knee which is not yours to be hurting. A pain conceived of as being in another body is not yet conceived of as hurting another person. And in fact, if the argument above is sound, to conceive of a knee other than yours hurting in the way in which yours hurts is to conceive of it as hurting you. We might admit, then, so far as that goes, that you can conceive of its hurting you in someone else's knee (a new sense of' His knee is hurting me') but you can not conceive of its hurting anyone else there. The sceptical argument therefore claims that you can not make sense of the idea of a subject of experience other than yourself. You can not conceive of experiences which are not yours (generalising now from the simple example of pain) and you can not <...>.

This means, of course, that the advantages against the sceptic are not so dramatic as was claimed. But something would still have been gained, for we would not be claiming to know on the basis of experience the nature of a world which is independent of experience. Phenomenalism narrows the gap between the world we experience and our experience of it. I have expressed phenomenalism so far as if all phenomenalists agree that observation statements report the nature of the reporter's own sensory states. But such a phenomenalism is only one form of reductionism. We might instead hold that observation statements report the nature of the immediately surrounding world, and define all other statements in terms of these (taking them as conditional upon the location of the observer). This would be a similarly reductionist theory, compatible with the demands of empiricism and the verification principle, but it would not perhaps have all the metaphysical and epistemological attractions of the traditional theory. A crucial problem for phenomenalism of either sort is that few philosophers have attempted, and none have remotely succeeded, in showing <...>.

<...> carry the argument further, it might be suggested that' A Whiter Shade of Pale' adapts the genre of' soul ballad'created by Sam Cooke, Ray Charles, Otis Red ding and others; it is rather similar, in fact, to Percy Sledge's' When a Man Loves a Woman'. Once again there is a congruence of codes -- from Baroque music and from soul music -- but once again, also, the non-congruent elements in each source act to reorientate the effects of the other.' A Whiter Shade of Pale', we might speculate, marks a trend within the counterculture which sees itself as, so to speak,' sensuously spiritual' (Bach mediated by soul singing) and is' immanently oppositional'vis--vis bourgeois culture (rock made baroque). As this discussion of four songs shows, there are links between the music and elements of counter cultural ideology; at the same time, though, there are many references to mainstream cultural traditions. There are unifying factors -- an ethos of' personal' expression, for example – but <...>.

Clearly, the observations made by Darwin during his voyage on the Beagle, for example, would have been inconsequential for science had they remained Darwin's private experiences. They became relevant for science only when they were formulated and communicated as observation statements capable of being utilized and criticized by other scientists. The inductivist account requires the derivation of universal statements from singular statements by induction. Inductive as well as deductive reasoning involves the relationships between various sets of statements and not relationships between statements on the one hand and perceptual experiences on the other. We might assume that perceptual experiences of some kind are directly accessible to an observer, but observation statements certainly are not. The latter are public entities, formulated in a public language, involving theories of various degrees of generality and sophistication. Once attention is focused on observation statements as forming the alleged secure basis for science, it can be seen that, contrary to the inductivists' claim, theory of some kind must precede all observation statements and observation statements are as fallible as the theories they presuppose.

The main idea here is that existential propositions can be paraphrased in terms of propositions about knowledge. Thus the claim that there are F-things is said to reduce to the claim that " x is an F " can be converted into a knowable proposition by substituting an appropriate object-term for x. But a moment's reflection is sufficient to show that no such reduction is possible. This does not mean, incidentally, that we have to accept that (Ex) Fx can be meaningfully claimed to be true irrespective of the possibility of knowledge. We might very well take the view that " x is an F " must in principle be convertible into a knowable proposition, without thereby implicitly accepting that " (Ex) Fx " and " " x is an F " is convertible into a knowable proposition " are equisignificant. They clearly are not. Lastly, the reductivist argument fails in its " syntactical " version too. The strategy employed here, to begin with, is to insist that all existential propositions of the natural language be replaced by properly quantified <...>.

<...> no particular can be in two places at once presupposes the (logical) possibility of a unique designation by means of co-ordinates of every single position in space, i.e. the possibility, in principle, of setting up an all-embracing co-ordinate system; making it possible to differentiate unambiguously every point in space from any other from a given origin. But what individuates the origin? We might try to define the origin in terms of some other frame of reference. But this will only raise the problem of a new origin, and so with every other system that we might adopt. It follows that there can be no individuation, in an absolute sense, of any origin, and hence of any place. Spatial determination by means of co-ordinates, alone, can not ensure the metaphysical uniqueness of any existent. And if so, we can not, without qualifications, assert that no particular can be in two places at once. This can not be asserted as a metaphysical proposition; as something, that is, which is true of the world of existents irrespective of the <...>.

However, the problem is that, if this is true, there is nothing whatever that I, in my capacity as a subject of experiences, can coherently and unequivocally say about myself as a corporeal subject (not even that I do have a body); and hence that, strictly speaking, the theory itself can not be clearly stated! # A restatement of the materialist theory A more effective argument, on the other hand, can (or so it seems) be constructed in support of the materialist theory. For example, we might begin by first attacking the mentalist notion of " privileged access ". The mentalist assumes that mental states are irreducibly mental in virtue of the fact that in all their essential aspects they can be known only by " introspection ". But surely there are no acts of introspection " that could in any intelligible sense be said to be identifiable independently of their objects, analogous to " acts of extrospection ". To say " I am in pain " is not to enunciate the knowledge of the proposition that I <...>.

The concept of structure is replaced in Derrida's writing by the concept of a chain of signification which avoids the dangers implicit in the notion of structure: by being open-ended and non-teleological it does away with any idea of a commanding entity within the system, and by having a temporal as well as a spatial dimension it can not itself be reduced to the status of entity or object. All this may seem rather general and abstract, so at this point we might ask where literature fits into Derrida's scheme and how Derrida might be relevant to literature. Derrida himself writes with as much ease and penetration about literary texts as about philosophical ones. But it is perhaps primarily in his assertion that' Il n'y a pas de hors texte' (' There is nothing outside the text/nothing except text') that he may seem most relevant to literary theory, for in this claim one hears echoes of the principles of a number of the major theories of literature that have <...>.

<...> orchestra when a series of emphatic detached chords is desired. Ex. 3 (deleted:figure) All the chords in this example are easy and effective. Note that the actual spacing of the piano chords is not adhered to in the arrangement. The first chord would sound lamentably thin if laid out as it stands in the original, and the last two would be hopelessly thick and stodgy if literally transcribed. On the piano such chords have a fine percussive effect. On strings, and indeed on any orchestral combination, they would sound dull and muddy to a degree. We might thus formulate two rules such as the following: # (i) # When transcribing a passage from piano score in which the two hands are spaced far apart, fill in the gap in your arrangement.

Why was an' incongruous' singing poet thrust into The Fairy Queen? For comic relief, obviously; but we also suspect a topical reference worth considering as evidence in the dating game. Thomas Durfey (illus.1) was identified as the real-life model long ago, though why this good-natured, reputedly moderate drinker merited such treatment has never been explained. Curtis

Price asks:' would Purcell have poked such cruel fun at one of his chief collaborators?'; we might add that Durfey was on good terms with Thomas Betterton the producer and Josias Priest the choreographer: a send-up without his consent seems highly unlikely. A series of publications subjecting him to merciless ridicule appeared in 1691 -- note the date. Here are relevant extracts from the longest and nastiest, WIT for MONEY: OR, POET STUTTER. A DIALOGUE BETWEEN Smith, Johnson, and Poet Stutter. Containing Reflections on some late Plays; and particularly, on Love for Money, or, The Boarding-School' Stutter <...>.

Literary critics vary in how technical they think literary criticism should be. Running through the history of literary criticism is a series of debates over the connection (or contrast) between literature and philosophy, and between the aesthetic imagination and science. The result is a range of different genres of literary criticism and literary theory, to some extent distinguished by register. One of the important differences between the registers involves the use of TECHNICAL TERMS. The term " donor ", for example, is specific to a genre which we might call " writing about narrative in a tradition following Vladimir Propp "; and the term " the Imaginary " is specific to the genre " recent (-----) criticism ". Sometimes the same term means different things in different genres -- for example " discourse " has one meaning in the genre of " post-structuralist literary theory " but a different meaning in the genre of " stylistics ". Then again, there are other genres which try to avoid using any technical terms at all, in the belief that literary studies <...>.

<...> important and sensible condition upon her offers to do Wilekin's will: (" if your request is reasonable I shall do your will ") (52-3) she immediately undercuts herself: (" And even if you say something shameful to me I shall blame you in no way at all ") (55-6) Ironic, then, is Wilekin's immediate comment: (" Indeed, lady, you speak as a gracious person ") (61) as, indeed, in the sense of " like " rather than " being ". We might note that the adjective hende, which we shall find extensively exploited in Chaucer's Miller's Tale, is also used of Dame Sirith, when she is first mentioned in the text, in line 154. It is in fact when Margery is put on the spot, to produce her shocked rejection of Wilekin's advance, that the clever pitching of her character is revealed. The immediate rebuff is in conventional and predictable terms: <...>.

<...> his innocence/ignorance in a play of irony for the tale's readers/listeners to respond to as they think fit, picks up upon and develops into a crude pun: " " taille " " here is polysemous, reflecting two homonyms, taille, " tally, bill ", whereby line 416 reads: " I am your wife; notch it up on my account " and taille, " tail ", thus " rear parts, genitals ", thus giving something like: " I am your wife; notch it up on my crotch " Here, we might note, the wife enunciates the aggressive sexual joke that Freud supposed to originate with the man. The subtler of the recent readings of the Shipman's Tale keeps the merchant in the position of target figure by treating him not as a realistic character, but as a functional one: a figure representing the interplay of more abstract themes and factors affecting human life. His apparent personality as an ungeneralized individual is a literary illusion; he is regarded instead as an object of a form of general moral evaluation and <...>.

The character of the Nun's Priest is a complex of knowledge, attitude and sympathy: knowledge of learning, literature and the ars praedicandi (" art of preaching "), attitudes of detachment from but understanding of the rarefied world of speculative learning, and of sympathy towards the commoner run of humanity for whom this learning is mystifying and in practical terms irrelevant. Helen Cooper notes that the inferrable character of the Nun's Priest is the same as the inferrable character of Chaucer. We might say that the Nun's Priest represents a human character standing at the intersection of various areas of human activity and experience mirrored within the text, and that the important attributes of the construct that this character is are not least life and humanity themselves; the real individual and communal life that has to compromise between animalistic anarchy (i.e. the fabliau world? -- cf. Janette Richardson's commentary on animal imagery in the Shipman's Tale, and that to be found in the Miller's and Reeve's Tales <...>.

<...> period instruments Rameau's period, that is all the re-orchestrations and other changes Chapuis published in 1903. True, there have been plenty of conductors more recently who have used new or revised editions. Yet not all have been so fastidious: of the last eight Rameau recordings I have reviewed in Early music, four have been based on the Oeuvres compltes, three derived from the most unreliable volumes. Ironically enough, Rameau was among the most resourceful and imaginative composers of his time in his treatment of the orchestra, and the least in need of what we might call d'Indification.

Unfortunately the Oeuvres compltes remains the most easily accessible full-score edition of most of his operas. Having hinted at its defects on several occasions, I feel the time is now right for a more detailed examination of the various editorial' improvements'. And since the central figure in all this was Vincent d'Indy, I shall go on to present evidence that appears to explain his motives both in' improving' Rameau and in concealing what he had done. For simplicity's sake, my examples <...>.

<...> whom have some Oxbridge connection. It would be tiresome (and perhaps invidious) to list them. It would include, for example, virtually all the English countertenors who have enjoyed successful professional careers since the time of Alfred Deller. The same Oxbridge colleges figure over and over again in the biographies of these and many other singers. As for the directors of early-music ensembles, it is well known that David Munrow and Christopher Hogwood first met in Cambridge. (All Munrow's singers in the early years had experience in cathedrals or Oxbridge chapels.) We might add Peter Phillips (St John's College, Oxford), Andrew Parrott (Merton College, Oxford) and Harry Christophers (Magdalen College, Oxford), to name no others. Virtually all the cathedral choirs whose recordings are known abroad are directed by former Oxbridge students of one kind or another, most of them former organ scholars. Outstanding among these at present are David Hill (St John's College, Cambridge) and James O'Donnell (Jesus College, Cambridge).

Much of their repertory is being recorded for the first time (or very nearly so), and it may be that some current recordings will sound exploratory, even tentative, to future generations who will have the privilege to take things further. Until very recently, the English a cappella ensembles involved in this work have had almost no competition and they are therefore ready to benefit from any new sounds or new musical ideas that choirs and vocal consorts in other countries can produce for them to hear and admire. We might also add that critics whose judgement is no less to be respected than Olivier Opdebeeck's are able to discern a contrasting' personality' in different performances of the same piece by different English choirs, even when a high percentage of the singers is the same in each case. The differences are there for an experienced ear to find, as many reviewers of recordings by the institutional choirs of cathedrals and Oxbridge chapels will surely admit with particular alacrity. In an essay on the early-music revival in Europe and America <...>.

- Could:

Rather than being eternal and having motion because of their fall through the void, the atoms are, for Gassendi, created and directed in their motion by God. Finite in number, the limited material world they make up is not all there is, for, besides an infinite God, we have immaterial souls. He was sympathetic to the Epicurean ideal of a tranquil mind. He believed that the study of nature was conducive to this, but he rejected the connection of this ideal with atheism. The fact that we could only hypothesize via' indicative' signs about the natures of things should not lead to discontent. There are things which God has not given us to know, and we must learn to accept this patiently. Gassendi has argued that, despite what the sceptics say, it is possible, by inferring back, to arrive at some truth about hidden things. It is, he says, the province of physics and the other sciences to seek the truth in their own areas. But logic, which he <...>.

<...> parties in relation to some issue regarding which the success of one sets the other back. Various aspects of the parties' life, resources, and activities will be helpful to them in the conflict, but many of these are resources and activities that they will have possessed or engaged in or wished to posses or to engage in in any case, even if they did not take part in the contest. Some of the activities and resources are such that the parties engage or wish to engage in them or possess them only because of the conflict. We could therefore distinguish between comprehensive and narrow neutrality. Comprehensive neutrality consists in helping or hindering the parties in equal degree in all matters relevant to the conflict between them. Narrow neutrality consists in helping or hindering them to an equal degree in those activities and regarding those resources that they would wish neither to engage in nor to acquire but for the conflict.' Neutrality'is used in ordinary discourse to indicate sometimes narrow and sometimes comprehensive neutrality. Sometimes various intermediate courses of conduct are seen as required by neutrality.

For Quine, our substantive conceptions do not have this independence of the special sciences. When we raise questions about truth and reality, we carry with us presumptions derived from the special sciences, and thus can not achieve transcendental

reflection. As is well brought out in a recent paper, the views of Carnap's which Quine opposed involved the claim that conventionally adopted analytic linguistic frameworks provided criteria of reality, which set up the standards according to which any question that might arise was settlable (Ricketts 1982). By denying that we could empirically identify the linguistic framework employed by other agents (or, indeed by ourselves), Quine challenged the claim that we can have a substantive prior conception of truth which can be used to formulate questions for transcendental reflection. But let us look directly at Quine's discussions of transcendental arguments and transcendental reflection. In a recent paper, Stroud argues that Quine can be forced to acknowledge questions which can not be answered by his naturalized epistemology (Stroud 1981). Stroud grants that if we want to know <...>.

But Kenny's notion of' immediate goals' is not free of ambiguity. Clear examples of it would be the cat leaping for its ball, or a lion in pursuit of a zebra. But must a foraging hyena be conscious of the food it has not yet uncovered, or a homing salmon aware of its destination as it begins the laborious trip upstream to its natal stream to spawn; both exemplars of goal-seeking behaviour? There are two possibilities. On the one hand we could insist that the creatures had to be conscious of their goals; that the salmon, for example, smells its home stream. Or, on the other, it could be claimed that these were long-term objectives and that the animal was conscious only of intermediate ends; the hyena was following the promptings of its hunger. Scientific observations might contribute towards a decision but Kenny's notion need not carry this degree of precision because of the second, much more important, distinction.

<...> is one that the reader ought always to be alert to, for each decision signals an element of dramatic meaning that we can yet recover. #' MUTUAL RENDER': I AND THOU IN THE SONNETS # In his Sonnets Shakespeare achieved the rather remarkable feat of turning to new and individual ends a genre that had flourished throughout Europe for several centuries and was in effect beginning to die at the time when he wrote, in the mid 1590s. At the risk of stating the obvious, we could describe the situation presented in the Renaissance love-sonnet as one in which the poet adores, often from afar, a woman who either surpasses the worth of the poet to such a degree that union with her is inconceivable, or else rejects his advances with scorn and cruelty. This tradition had been reanimated by Sir Philip Sidney in his Astrophil and Stella, but even he, pioneer and inventor though he was, was content to reproduce the standard man-woman relationship while devoting his energies to creating an idiomatic English-speaking voice <...>.

In this context, we may note, attempts to account for poststructuralism in terms of the aftermath of the events of May 68 seem positively myopic, lacking the very historical perspective to which they lay claim. Contrary, then, to some of its more overreaching definitions, postmodernism itself could be said to mark not just the cultural effects of a new stage of' late' capitalism, but the sense of the loss of European history and culture as History and Culture, the loss of their unquestioned place at the centre of the world. We could say that if, according to Foucault, the centrality of' Man' dissolved at the end of the eighteenth century as the' Classical Order'gave way to' History', today at the end of the twentieth century, as' History'gives way to the' Postmodern', we are witnessing the dissolution of' the West'. # Marxism and the question of history # Marxist literary criticism has not produced a new theory in over twenty years. Not since Macherey's A Theory of Literary Production of <...>.

This process of supplementation, this' overabundance of the signifier' that always goes beyond itself, is the result of a lack, or absence at the centre or origin, which must always be supplemented. Thus the argument that' history' is what' poststructuralism'lacks, itself repeats totalization's own structure of supplementarity according to which history functions both as an excess and a lack in the origin. Insofar as it sets up such a process of necessary and constant supplementation, we could say that the impossibility of totalization produces a writing-effect whose process of perpetual deferral unremittingly provokes more writing. It is thus no longer a question of being able to produce a new concept of history, which, as Derrida puts it,' is difficult, if not impossible, to lift from its teleological or eschatological horizon. History can not be done away with any more than metaphysics: but its conditions of impossibility are also necessarily its conditions of possibility. This means, as Rodolphe Gasch observes, that <...>.

<...> and of providing instead alternative accounts which insist on heterogeneity and resistance in historical texts. An identification is then implicitly or explicitly made with parallel forms of political struggle in our own day. In other words, where yesterday's historian looked for the history of an oppressed working class, today's historian looks for marginalized groups, and those who have transgressed social norms. Whether they actually were subversive becomes irrelevant to the extent that they can now be retrieved to offer a potential that has a contemporary, that is twentieth-century, political relevance. To this extent we could say that the cultural materialists re-assert a form of reflection theory, where history has become a mirror in which contemporary political priorities have been substituted for the former certain ground of Marxist analysis. The cultural materialists are inclined to separate the self-contradictory differences isolated by the new historicists into a more conventional political paradigm of opposing classes, of hegemony and subversion. Similarly, though Foucault is often invoked, there is a marked tendency to continue to utilize theoretical categories such as ideology, consciousness and the subject.

To return to one of our initial examples, consider the belief that it is the position of the car's heater that accounts for the driver's left knee being warm. In believing this we believe that some causal circumstance necessitated the temperature of his knee. We could by measurement give a numerical specification of each of the parts of the causal circumstance-the operation of the heater, its relative location, and so on-and also such a specification of the effect. Or rather, we could replace our imprecise proposition with a precise one, numerically expressed. A further step, or rather a great deal of research, would be greatly more significant in terms of the question we are considering. This would bring us to something akin to the fundamental propositions of science. We could replace what we have with a proposition relating variation in the operation of the heater, variation in its relative position, and so on, with variation in the temperature of the driver's knee. This generalization would of <...>.

If we set out to frame hypotheses about the chosen part of consciousness, we do so at our peril, flying in the dark. By way of a quite proper analogy, suppose there were a certain amazing truth, that all and only the members of one species of tree, say Turner's Oak, could be described in a given language by sentences of a certain deep structure, or simply a rare surface-grammatical sequence: indefinite article, a curious gerund, preposition of a certain sort, and so on. We could then define this splendid species of tree as that which falls under statements made by sentences of the given grammatical sequence in the given language. The definition would be wholly uninformative and make error likely. There are other conceptions of consciousness which also owe their existence to the pursuit of certain virtues. One is the familiar conception in terms of behaviour. It is very possible to sympathize in good part, if not entirely, with the psychologists and philosophers who were sceptical or uncertain of the worth of introspection as <...>.

Our weaker move admitted this, but the stronger move denies it. The stronger position denies the existence of evidence-transcendent truth and evidence-transcendent differences, and so denies the sceptic the contrast he needs between his two hypotheses. If the difference suggested is one which could make no difference to us, then it is empty and does not exist. The weaker move, then, says that there is a difference which does not matter. The stronger move says that there is no difference to matter. We could call the former a realist position; the realist believes that there are evidence-transcendent truths, truths whose obtaining lies beyond our powers of recognition. The stronger move could be called anti-realist; it denies the existence of evidence-transcendent truth and holds that differences which we are in principle incapable of recognizing do not exist. Anti-realism of this sort does not arise gratuitously, nor is it intended initially as a method of countering scepticism. But its general thrust is clear.

It is worth noticing, however, a consequence of this justification of clause 3; this is that a belief is not generally considered to be justified by the mere fact that it is true, for otherwise clause 3 would be unnecessary. If I decide on the toss of a coin which investment will provide the greatest yield, and fortunately turn out to be right, we suppose that my choice is vindicated by the outcome perhaps, but not justified by it; I had no real justification for making the choice I did. (Alternatively we could distinguish between two forms of justification, justification before the event and justification after it, and run the tripartite definition in terms of the former; but then the question would be whether these really are two forms of the same thing.) What

are the problems for the tripartite definition? One might think that clause 2 is insufficient: to believe that p is not so strong as to be certain that p, and to know one must be certain, not just believe. The best reason for wanting <...>.

Even if this won't always happen, it will certainly happen often enough for the range of my knowledge to be considerably reduced, and this itself is some sort of an objection. Second, we need to find a way to counter the way in which the piecemeal addition of further truths seems to switch me into knowledge and out again. We might achieve the second task by altering our account of defeasibility so that instead of talking about some one other truth (which caused the problem of piecemeal addition) we talk about all truths whatever. Thus we could require as our fourth condition that our justification would remain even when every truth is added to our belief set, all at once. This new notion of defeasibility seems to allow (probably) that I now know that my children are playing in the garden, because the second added truth negates the defeating powers of the first. But there remain problems for this new notion of defeasibility. First, in talking of adding all truths at once we seem to have moved firmly into the realm of fiction.

I shall support can in fact be seen as a generalization from it. # 2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS # The various proposals considered in the previous section were presented as if they were additions to the tripartite analysis, it being admitted that Gettier had shown that analysis to be insufficient. But we can find among them at least one which can be seen as a direct defence of the tripartite analysis. Any proposal which amounts to a new theory of justification may succeed in showing that in the Gettier cases the relevant true beliefs were not justified at all. And we could take the causal theory in this way. The causal theory could be telling us that a belief is only justified when caused (directly or indirectly) by the facts. It would then be adopting route 1, as distinguished in 2.2. (Some versions of the reliability proposal could also be seen in this light.) Moving this way, then, we would be starting from a causal theory of justification; the causal theory of knowledge would simply be one of its consequences <...>.

The classical foundationalist supposed perhaps that infallible beliefs would be of type 2. In the absence of infallibility, what similar moves are available? C. I. Lewis used to claim that basic beliefs were' certain' or' incorrigible' (Lewis, 1952 and 1946, ch. 7); it is not always clear whether he thought of these as the same as being infallible or not. In similar vein others (Descartes, perhaps) have held that they are or could be' indubitable'. We could define incorrigibility and indubitability thus: # A belief is incorrigible if and only if no one could ever be in a position to correct it. # A belief is indubitable if and only if no one could ever have a reason to doubt it. Is either of these two properties able to provide us with a slightly weaker but still attractive form of classical foundationalism? In my view, once we have admitted that our beliefs about our sensory states are not infallible and may be false, incorrigibility would be <...>.

A belief is indubitable if and only if no one could ever have a reason to doubt it. Is either of these two properties able to provide us with a slightly weaker but still attractive form of classical foundationalism? In my view, once we have admitted that our beliefs about our sensory states are not infallible and may be false, incorrigibility would be a vice rather than a virtue. The thought of some basic beliefs being incorrigibly false is too horrific to countenance. Equally, we could ask how a fallible belief could be indubitable. For the basic beliefs stand in inferential relationship with more interesting beliefs about public objects, and these beliefs are certainly dubitable; there is always a possibility that someone should have a reason to doubt them. But, if so, it is hard to see how the dubitability of the non-basic beliefs which they support would not rub off onto the basic ones which support them; surely falsehood in a non-basic belief would be a reason to doubt the basic beliefs which <...>.

<...> these beliefs are certainly dubitable; there is always a possibility that someone should have a reason to doubt them. But, if so, it is hard to see how the dubitability of the non-basic beliefs which they support would not rub off onto the basic ones which support them; surely falsehood in a non-basic belief would be a reason to doubt the basic beliefs which support it, once we have admitted that basic beliefs can be false. So neither incorrigibility nor indubitability can provide us with an alternative form of foundationalism. But other possible forms remain. We could suggest that there could be beliefs of type 1 if there were beliefs which were justified by appeal to the facts and that a belief could be so justified if it was caused by the facts. Austin mooted the idea that on occasion what justifies my belief that there is a pig before me is just the pig (Austin, 1962,

pp. 115- 16). But this idea is not easily generalizable unless we suppose that the justification is achieved less by appeal to the pig than by appeal to the <...>.

This move should call to mind some remarks made in 2.4 about the causal theory of knowledge. We accepted there the idea that facts can be causes; the difficulty there that universal facts can not cause universal beliefs doesn't matter here, because universal beliefs are unlikely to be basic. Another possible version of foundationalism holds that there are some beliefs which are given us as' data', and which are fully justified unless something arises to defeat their justification (cf. the use of defeasibility in 2.3). We could call this a' defeasible' or' prima facie' justification; it is weaker than that provided by indubitability, because it countenances the possibility that there be reasons against a basic belief. But it still accepts both F 1 and F 2. A final version has already been mooted. Weaker than the last, it holds that beliefs given us as' data' are never fully justified merely for that reason, but that all such beliefs are already partially justified, quite apart from any further support <...>.

Strong verification is conclusive verification; a statement is conclusively verifiable if, once we have the best possible evidence for it, there remains no possibility that the statement be false. Weak verification is less than conclusive. A weakly verifiable statement is not itself strongly verifiable, but is confirmable or disconfirmable by appeal to other statements which are conclusively verifiable; that is, strongly verifiable statements can count as evidence for or against it. This distinction can help us to give the best version of logical empiricism. We could insist that' verifiable' in VP 1 means' strongly verifiable'. But this would rule out so many of our statements as insignificant that it would be self-defeating. On the other hand empiricists are not normally tempted to suppose that there are no strongly verifiable statements at all. Rather, they take it that statements which simply report the evidence of one's senses, whatever that may be, can be conclusively verified when one's senses do in fact produce that evidence. It seems then that the <...>.

<...> we can confirm that all the conventional classical music examined seems to be built in sentences, each of which comprises two phrases of the' question and answer' type. There is always a first sentence in which the first phrase demands continuity, the second then providing repose. Further, in all the music examined, a second sentence, similarly made of two phrases, always comes to a point of temporary finality. (This double-sentence structure will be obvious from our analysis of thematic forms at the end of this chapter.) We could therefore make a rule that' melodies should begin with two sentences, each comprising two phrases etc.', but we must refrain from doing so. Many melodies of the last hundred years could not possibly be made to fit into such a restrictive rule -- in fact many of us would avoid the feeling of regularity and' squareness' that such a classical scheme produces. In the past, too, there were exceptions. For example, Vivaldi liked to use three-phrase sentences. Contrast or repetition?

Our first decision should be whether we want to write a traditional strophic song (each verse identical in length and metre), or music which is not chained to such a rigid form. With strophic song the musical form is very much governed by the poetic form. If we wish, we can establish one melody for the first verse and merely repeat it in the others, possibly varying some factor such as accompaniment, volume, colour, etc. Alternatively, we could make a more subtle form by using different music in one or two of the verses, alternating the musical setting to give a form such as ABABA or ABACA (supposing there are five verses). In this traditional kind of song there is usually a well-defined tonal scheme, melodic phrases are symmetrical with repetitions of rhythmic outlines, and it is the melody which is all-important. As the same melody is used more than once for different words, no kind of' word painting' can take place, <...>.

Selected and arranged by Lady Sybil Scott Oxford. At the Clarendon Press. 1918 The first problem is: how to record the name of the author. Should it be " Scott, Lady Sybil " or just " Scott, Sybil "? We would be inclined to use the first, because it gives a better sense of the feel of the anthology; but this is a fairly arbitrary decision, where rule-books do not help. How should we list the author's role? We could say simply " (edited) " but perhaps we should take the title page at its word and say instead " (selection and arrangement) ". Is the publisher Oxford University Press or Humphrey Milford or Clarendon Press? (Actually, it is Oxford University Press, but we can be sure of this only because we already know something about

this publisher.) Finally, is the place of publication London (the first in the list under the publisher's name) or Oxford? Again, we <...>.

It is a passage in Cos fan tutte set to Dorabella's words:' See the fire in his eyes that seem to shoot off flames and darts.' The strokes are also consistent throughout two bars of accompanying semiquavers in the violas and basses. The staccato should be of the' hail' type. Turning to the third category, of strokes that serve to separate clearly a single note from a group of slurred notes that either precede or follow, we could call them' separation strokes' We find strokes in such patterns as shown in ex.3a so overwhelmingly, that we can identify sporadic dots as shrunken strokes. Illustrations are given in ex.3b from the D minor String Quartet for an upbeat, and ex.3c from Die Zuberflote for a downbeat. Though once in a while such separation strokes may have a slight accentual implication as perhaps in ex.3c in the majority of cases they do not. Their purpose seems to be simply that of differentiating a clear staccato separation from the <...>.

- Should:

<...> the unique act of aesthetic expression. Nevertheless, this, in one way or another, is what we then require the student to do; the ineffable is to be transformed into efficient communication, whether in seminar discussion, an essay, or an examination answer. Fact and reason are to be reached after. The contradiction has long been lived with in practice, and students become adept in faking responses. Nevertheless, it points to a flaw in the aesthetic defence of literary education, and one which implicitly encourages culturalist claims to take it over. I should add that my own understanding of literature is largely in aesthetic terms; at least, of poetry; where fiction and drama are concerned, aesthetic approaches can, at best, only be partial. The idea of aesthetic education, as formulated by Schiller, seems an entirely noble one; the difficulty is in accommodating it to contemporary pedagogy. This dilemma has been present since the beginnings of institutionalized literary study. It was nicely illustrated in F. H. Townsend's satirical addition to Wordsworth's address to the cuckoo <...>.

<...> in philosophical logic: namely, that the meaningfulness of some of the things we say is dependent on contingent facts of nature -- such as that the Earth revolves on its axis, and that we moan with pain and react as we do to others who moan. One reason why the' Other Minds' problem was so important for Wittgenstein was because he could not dissolve it without revising the view he had taken on this point when he wrote the Tractatus. The expression' facts of nature' is one which Wittgenstein himself uses. But I think I should , finally, draw attention to a difference between what might be called facts of physical nature and facts of human nature. Wittgenstein uses the expression' form of life' in the latter connection. That the Earth revolves on its axis is, of course, a fact that has very important implications for our lives. But it is not itself a fact of our lives. That we moan with pain and react as we do to others who moan, on the other hand, is a fact of <...>.

<...> that they are better at complying with the dependent reasons. Take a simplified situation. I regularly confront a decision, for example, whether or not to sell certain shares, in varying circumstances. Suppose that it is known that a financial expert reaches the' right' decision (whatever that may be) in 20% more cases than I do when I do not rely on his advice. Should I not, when confronting such decisions, carry on as before but take his advice as a factor counting in favour of the decision he recommends? Perhaps I should always take the case for his solution as being 20% stronger than it would otherwise appear to me to be. Perhaps some other, more complicated formula should be worked out. In any case would not the right course require me to give his advice prima facie rather than pre-emptive force? The answer is that it would not. In cases about which I know only that his performance is better than mine, letting his advice tilt the balance in favour of his solution will sometimes, depending on my rate <...>.

In the case of modularity, there seems a natural explication if we take seriously Minsky's idea of a highest organizing module. It will be remembered that his other, earlier, intuitions about heterarchy pulled in the opposite direction, towards a monadology of separate partial sub-consciousnesses. I shall argue below, in connection with Dennett and Sloman, that our commonsense intuitions about the unity of consciousness are better preserved by analogy with program level than with program module. Before turning to the work of Sayre, Dennett and Sloman, I should at least mention one major question that has been left unasked in this paper, and intentionally so: namely, what properties would a machine have to have in order to be sufficient for us to deem it conscious? I simply do not know, at least not if the properties are to be non-trivial, and more

than an acceptance of certain machines into the category of human beings by fiat or polite convention. One might guess that a substantive discussion of this issue would centre on the question of linguistic <...>.

<...> basis of science are secure and reliable because their truth can be ascertained by direct use of the senses. Further, the reliability of observation statements will be transmitted to the laws and theories derived from them, provided the conditions for legitimate inductions are satisfied. This is guaranteed by the principle of induction that forms the basis of science according to the naive inductivist. I have already mentioned that I regard the naive inductivist account of science to be very wrong and dangerously misleading. In the next two chapters, I will begin to say why. However, I should perhaps make it clear that the position I have outlined is a very extreme form of inductivism. Many more sophisticated inductivists would not wish to be associated with some of the characteristics of my naive inductivism. Nevertheless, all inductivists would claim that in so far as scientific theories can be justified, they are justified by supporting them inductively on the basis of some more-or-less secure basis provided by experience. Subsequent chapters of this book will provide us with plenty of reasons for doubting that claim.

<...> purporting to be about fictional things are to be accepted as meaningful, then it is only on condition that they can be paraphrased into propositions about non-fictional things; for example, into propositions about persons who are thinking, alleging, claiming, etc. something fictional. The scene is thus set for large-scale reductivist paraphrases, which in different ontological theories take on different forms, depending upon what kind of entities are regarded as basic. A central feature of all such theories is the distinction between that which exist sin a fundamental sense, i.e. the basic entities (I should emphasise that I am here using the term' entity' in the broadest possible sense) and that which is regarded as existing in a secondary, derivative, or parasitic sort of way. Only the basic entities are said to qualify as genuine ontological objects; all other objects are merely quasi-objects, i.e. they are explicable as logical constructions from ontologically fundamental items, and can be treated as a sort of convenient logical artefacts. In general, anything that is not a basic entity is either a feature of <...>.

<...> of statistical material. We do not have to decide whether to keep in bulk or alternatively to sample, particular instance papers which electronic data handling techniques now make potentially useful to the historian in ways that they simply were not before. The issues raised by handling census and other survey data as described by several speakers at this seminar are not so central to the management of our collections. A fundamental question in this area which does concern curators and readers at the British Library involves the nature of the text itself. Digital technology has introduced (or perhaps I should say that it has reintroduced, for the first time since the establishment and dominance of printing) the unstable, or infinitely variable, text. I will offer you a few examples of what this means for the British Library, in particular in its role as the provider of sources for historical research. # 13.2. Digitised publication as a replacement for print: the case of the Ordnance Survey # One issue which has yet to be resolved is that of the provision of large-scale Ordnance Survey mapping.

<...> thinking fails, by our lights, in so far as one thought is not balanced (' in equilibrium with' in Piaget's jargon) by another. The child's cognisant acts have the character of perceptions: if an act is done it can not be undone (' reversed' in the jargon) and so there is no going back and taking another perspective on the question or practical problem. So children are not little realists or little phenomenalists, nor does it really make sense to say that they' waver' between the two. We should say that their thoughts are captured by salient information where they should be centrally directed, inhibited and co-ordinated. In a somewhat more subtle form, these tendencies continue into later childhood. Martin Braine found that if children between five and six years of age are shown a standard visual illusion -- such as a stick in water appearing to be broken, by light refraction -- they will distinguish correctly between' looks?' and' really?' questions, but that if they are asked the neutral question' <...>.

<...> ready as Eliot to insist that all critical judgements and pronouncements are relative -- relative, above all, to the date at which they are made. Already in 1928 he was protesting that his own pronouncements at the time of the Imagist manifesto were tailored to the specific needs of 1914, and should not be taken as binding fourteen years later. To minds of absolutist temper like Leavis and Winters, this was contemptible; and undoubtedly it is next to impossible to establish criticism as an academic discipline on grounds so sandy and shifting. But perhaps the moral we should draw is that criticism is not, and can

not be, such a discipline (though literary history is, or may be). A great mystery is why Eliot, who was more of a relativist than Pound, should have been accepted by the academic establishment whereas Pound was not. Instead of defining' hardness' in poetry, Pound rapidly cites three poets where he finds the quality in question: Gautier, Hrdia, Albert Samain. He distinguishes among them, cursorily, as he cites them <...>.

<...> Brounker, then President of the Society. The other is Francis Bacon, with the title' Artium Instaurator' (' Instigator of Skills'). One could imagine the room to be one in Bacon's House of Solomon, about which Joseph Glanvill remarked that it was' a prophetic scheme of the Royal Society'. The influence of Bacon on the Royal Society is frequently testified to by its members. Sprat says that he' had the true imagination of the whole extent of this enterprise, as it is now set on foot'. We should take this to refer not only to Bacon's schemes for collaboration in natural philosophy, schemes actually embodied in the existence of the Royal Society, but also to his very conception of that subject. Abraham Cowley compares Bacon to Moses, leading the way through a barren wilderness bereft of knowledge, and pointing out the promised land. In Bacon's books, Sprat says,' are every where scattered the best arguments, that can be produced for the defence of Experimental Philosophy; and the best directions,<...>.

<...> we think along these lines then we will be sorely tempted to say that although the child does not have to observe his behaviour to be able to say,' I like Auntie Kate', there is something else he must observe, something inner and private, a' feeling' he has somehow identified as a liking-Auntie-Kate feeling. That is, we are tempted to say that when he says,' I like Auntie Kate' he is reporting his observation, by introspection, of a private object, an Auntie-Kate-directed feeling of liking. We think we should not accept' I like Auntie Kate' as a valid communication unless we allow for an answer to the question,' How does he know?' or' What observation justifies him in saying that?' And we posit an inner private object to be what the child knows and what he uses the words' I like Auntie Kate' to stand for. Our conception of how language relates to reality is such that we can not see' I like Auntie Kate' as itself a bit of <...>.

Traditionally it has two main uses: by the Marxists to describe the type of society which preceded' capitalist' society; by legal historians to describe a particular kind of legal relationship. In Marc Bloch's great book, Feudal Society, the word is used to describe the whole range of social customs and organization of the upper classes of society, among whom the feudal bond, in the narrow sense, was powerful. The feudal bond established in the first place a special relationship between the lord and a man whom we should call a cavalry officer, whom they called a vassal. It enabled the lord both to recruit a knight and to reward him. The vassal knelt before his lord, and placed his hands between his: and so became his man. This was the act of homage. Then he rose and swore a solemn oath to keep faith, to be true to his lord. By this act he performed fealty. These oaths, and the bond they established, had their origin in the relation of lord <...>.

<...> Judged on purely intuitive grounds, therefore, an association between creativity and madness can, with equal certainty, be enthusiastically embraced or vigorously rejected, depending upon one's perspective. Which of these apparently contradictory views is nearer to the truth? Is a trace of insanity a necessary prerequisite for originality? Or is the idea merely a piece of folklore belief, sustained over the centuries by an inexact understanding of the quality of lunacy and destined to go the way of other popular myths, such as phrenology, astrology, and Mesmerism? We should state at the outset that it is not the purpose, nor within the scope, of this book to try to answer such questions in their entirety. This is partly because, for reasons to be discussed later, we shall be confining ourselves to a certain class of creative person, viz authors: it would therefore be presumptuous of us to extrapolate from our conclusions to other forms of originality. Our scope is also even further limited by the set of authors on whom we have chosen to concentrate.

<...> beliefs can get to be knowledge (by being caused by the facts), the conditional theory is willing to countenance any way, causal or not, which preserves the truth of the two subjunctive conditionals. In fact the conditional theory adopts some of the best points of several of the theories found wanting in the previous chapter. For instance, it is close to Dretske's version of the' conclusive reasons' approach. (b) We considered whether the causal theory of knowledge either rested on or made available a causal theory of justification. So we should ask the same questions of the conditional theory. Can we offer a conditional definition of (deleted:formula), thus: This would be to hold that a justified belief is one which tracks the truth.

But the same sort of difficulty arises. A false belief may nevertheless be justified. If so, is consistent with (deleted:formula). But (deleted:formula) &; p) is inconsistent with (deleted:formula) a false belief does not track the truth. Hence the conditional definition of justification fails. Such a theory would have been attractive, however <...>.

The loop will never succeed in removing the conditionality. The regress argument therefore drives us to suppose that there must be some justification which is non-inferential if we are to avoid the sceptical consequence of admitting that no beliefs are ever actually justified. And the claim that there are two forms of justification, inferential and non-inferential, is the core of any form of foundationalism in the theory of justification. There is a variety of possible responses to the regress argument, apart from straight capitulation. A central one will be suggested in 9.1. Meanwhile we should ask if the regress is as damaging as it might seem. Not all infinite regresses are vicious. Some are virtuous, i.e. we can live with them and do not have to find some way to stop them. For instance, the regress generated by the remark that there is a point between every pair of points may be virtuous, even when we take it to concern points in time rather than in space. Equally we might accept the temporal regress caused by supposing that for each moment in time <...>.

What is wrong with this argument? A typical objection against it might be that it involves an attempt to settle a metaphysical issue without first clarifying the conditions under which such an issue can be meaningfully discussed. Surely, it might be said, we ought to begin by asking questions not about the ontological features of properties but about the logical characteristics of predicates. It is improper to ask whether relations can be " assimilated " to properties or whether all properties might not after all be explicable in terms of " qualitative properties ". We should ask, rather, what kinds of predicates there are and whether it is possible to obliterate such logical differences as do exist between them. # properties and predicates Predicates, however, fall into two main categories: one-place, or monadic, and more-than-one-place, or polyadic, predicates. Someone asks me what cherries look like and 1 pick one from the basket and say " This is a cherry ". My sentence consists of a demonstrative pronoun, which acts as an ersatz name and fulfils the function of <...>.

<...> however, its origin has hitherto been an insoluble problem: the explicit evidence of the ancients is notoriously inadequate and various different theories have been constructed from it. The main task is to establish the nature of the tragic chorus, since it is clear from the ancient tradition that tragedy originated in the chorus and once consisted of nothing but the chorus. For this reason, among others, we must reject A. W. Schlegel's interpretation of the chorus as the " ideal spectator " there being originally no spectacle for it to be spectator of. We should also reject (Hegel's) idea that it represents the populace as against the aristocratic heroes of the drama proper: in origin and essence, tragedy is purely metaphysical and not sociopolitical. There is more value in Schiller's insights that the chorus is essentially anti-naturalistic and serves to uphold tragedy's ideal ground and poetic freedom. The chorus of primitive tragedy did indeed have such a basis. Originally it was the satyr chorus of the Dionysiac dithyramb. That is, it originally comprised the band of Dionysus-worshippers who <...>.

<…> and phrases in any given language are. (It is possible to learn about aspects of sentence structure by studying linguistics, specifically the part of linguistics called SYNTAX.) One by-product of investigations into grammar has been the production of introductory books like Teach Yourself English Grammar, and A University Grammar of English, which provide accounts of most basic aspects of sentence formation. What we say in this chapter is simplified. But we hope it will be helpful with some of the more common grammatical problems writers run into. Before beginning our discussion, however, we should perhaps emphasise once more the distinction between an error and a variation. Class, regional and ethnic variation is a source of difference between people as regards ways of writing a sentence; but, just as in spelling, there are STANDARD forms of written grammar, which are intended to override differences and be common to everyone. Even so, there is no unchallengeable rule book or authority you can turn to which will tell you exactly what is standard and what is not.

We need to analyse the interaction between electors, whose attitudes have already been influenced by a variety of considerations (ranging from their own sense of both national and local political issues, down to whatever perception they might have concerning their need to accommodate themselves to their social superiors), and the party electioneers, who were determined to influence the electorate in whatever way they thought fit (which invariably meant a combination of political propaganda and various forms of manipulation, bribery and intimidation). We should begin, therefore, not with the elections

themselves, but by recreating the contours of the political culture in which they took place. This chapter will start by looking at the potential for politicisation in later-Stuart England, and show that most of the issues which divided the parties at this time had roots which dug deep in society. The government's policies -- especially in the areas of religion and foreign policy -- impinged directly on the lives of a significant proportion of the population, with the result that people <...>.

<...> Opera musicians, both began as players in its orchestra, and they rose to become controllers of its music by 1740. Rebel was the more active batteur, and two illustrations show the style of direction in his period of influence. Illus.3 and 5a show performances of 1745 and 1747 respectively. Details of the batteurs (illus. 2 and 5b) show an end-held baton of no great length. The 1747 baton seems especially solid, however. In both images the director is in action, positioned up against the stage, back to the band. But we should note that the 1747 image shows a scene where only principals are singing (Zaslaw identifies it as Act 5, scene 4 of Lully's Armide), whereas in 1745 dancing is in progress. We can not treat drawings like photographs. Yet the activity of musical direction displayed in both contexts (solo and ensemble) accords with other evidence, brought forward now for the first time. It is drawn from the historical review of' Baton de mesure' published in 1791 by P.L. Ginguene<...>.

- Can:

If you were to tell me that there are people, like the man upstairs to whom you now threaten to turn yourself in, who actually do have a strong sense of themselves, I would have to tell you that they are only impersonating people with a strong sense of themselves -- to which you could correctly reply that since there is no way of proving whether I'm right or not, this is a circular argument from which there is no escape. All I can tell you with certainty is that I, for one, have no self, and that I am unwilling or unable to perpetrate upon myself the joke of a self. The man upstairs, the first husband whom Maria is to leave, is not' self-aware' -- unlike Zuckerman, who declares, on behalf of the self-aware, that he has no self and that the self is a joke. But Roth must know that it is likely to be no joke to those who are reading his book <...>.

<...> are undecided about whether the patch is an after-image or a spot of mildew on the wall. What we do know, however, is that we are seeing a green patch, and our experience has a particular, qualitative -- indeed paintable -- character. How is a' cognisant episode' such as this going to be analysed away into the language of activity? Well clearly it is not going to yield to any such analysis, and to believe that it will is to deny the reality of subjective life and to side with the behaviourists. What I can say, however, is that the constructivist position allows a distinctive analysis of the' mental' when we speak of a' mental representation of a green patch': it helps us to understand the difference between mental representations and the non-mental variety (a photograph for example). At the time of looking up we ascribe an experience of greenness to ourselves; we consider the experience as something being undergone by us before any decision is taken about its veridicality.

The other kind would be academics who are committed to a tough professionalism on the American model, who believe that knowledge advances and becomes obsolete, that theory is essential, and that nothing of interest can be said about literature outside an institutional framework. In Lodge's characterology, they are Robyn Penroses aspiring to be Morris Zapps. What I have deplored or been sceptical about they would find admirable. They tend to be young, energetic, and ambitious, but there are by now professors of that outlook. All I can say to the objectors in both categories is that those who do not see a problem do not have a problem, and they can happily ignore what I have written. But other readers will, I imagine, accept the general drift of what I have said, whilst disagreeing on many points of detail. Not wanting to seem too negative, I have outlined ways in which the discipline of English as currently constituted might divide, to the benefit of both parties. But knowing how the academic mind works <...>.

But no art, major or minor, can be governed by the rules of social amenity. The English have a greater talent than any other people for creating an agreeable family life; that is why it is such a threat to their artistic and intellectual life. If the atmosphere were not so charming, it would be less of a temptation. In postwar Britain, the clothes, accents, and diction of the siblings may have changed, but, so far as I can judge, the suffocating insular coziness is just the same. Here, as often with the author of Thankyou, Fog, we may well suspect that Auden generalizes about English life too much on the basis of his own late-Edwardian childhood in a comfortable rentier household. And yet I wouldn't dismiss out of hand Auden's claim that what he

says of our family life holds as true of Coronation Street as of Lowndes Square. In any case, enveloped though it is in ingratiating compliments to us on how <...>.

Illusions, dreams, and fancies, on the other hand, consist of' ideas of imagination' which are voluntary and subject to our wills, and which lack both lively strength and orderly coherence. It appears to have escaped Berkeley's attention that not all imaginary things, for example a drunkard's pink rats, are voluntary and lack the vivacity of the real thing, and also that, when I set myself to imagine something, I can make my ideas as orderly and coherent as I like. It is interesting to note that his three criteria for distinguishing reality from illusion can be found also in the works of those philosophers, such as Descartes and Locke, whose view he rejects. Unlike Berkeley, they held that there are both ideas and a world of things which cause them. But this does not mean that they did not face the troublesome question Berkeley faces, of how to distinguish between illusion and reality. <...>.

Surely a similarity must strike us, or we shouldn't be moved to use the same word', that some act must precede the act of using the word; and in Sections 5 and 10 he talks about the' mistake' labelled by the word' to make'as it occurs in the question,' What made you call this' red'?') Third, I do not accept the principle that the meaning of utterances is the same as a person's (alleged) reasons for saying what he says. This being so, I can not accept what would be Mill's reason for giving an affirmative answer to the question,' Are there logical conditions of something's looking blue to someone?' Are there reasons for giving an affirmative answer to it to be found in what Wittgenstein says? If there are, they are not obvious to me. At the beginning of the section from which I have just quoted he distinguishes two' objects' of sight, between which, he says, there is a categorial difference.

Compare understanding a musical theme, a phrase, with suddenly making sense of a gesture, intonation, or facial expression (for example, a leer). When I know how a lustful man may feel towards his neighbour's pretty young wife I can understand a leer, but if asked what it means there is nothing I can say. Leering is part of my vocabulary of life, so to speak, in a way in which, being practically tone-deaf, musical harmonies are not. Leers are accessible (158) to me, but I can not explain a leer, unless by this is meant saying in what context talk of leering makes sense. (Try to imagine someone leering at a cat, or at a Yorkshire pudding.) Understanding music is like understanding leering. I may talk of experiencing a sly, unpleasant <...>.

But this doesn't explain why we should think it is the sort that is invoked in an argument from analogy. The third reason relates to the fact that whereas it doesn't make sense to say' It's afternoon' on the Sun, it does make sense to talk of other people's feelings. The reason why it makes sense is not because of an argument from analogy. But since it does make sense we can employ arguments from analogy to answer factual questions that arise within the language-game. For example, I can say that Jones is behaving just like Smith did, and we now know that Smith behaved as he did because he had feelings of being persecuted, so it is possible that Jones has feelings of being persecuted, too. In short, whereas there is not the possibility of using an argument from analogy to answer factual questions about time on the Sun, there is the possibility when it comes to people's feelings, and so, being predisposed by the second reason to think that there is some sort <...>.

In any case would not the right course require me to give his advice prima facie rather than pre-emptive force? The answer is that it would not. In cases about which I know only that his performance is better than mine, letting his advice tilt the balance in favour of his solution will sometimes, depending on my rate of mistakes and the formula used, improve my performance. But I will continue to do less well than he does unless I let his judgement pre-empt mine. Consider the case in a general way. Suppose I can identify a range of cases in which I am wrong more than the putative authority. Suppose I decide because of this to tilt the balance in all those cases in favour of its solution. That is, in every case I will first make up my own mind independently of the' authority's' verdict, and then, in those cases in which my judgment differs from its, I will add a certain weight to the solution favoured by it, on the ground that it, the authority, <...>.

<...> Snowdonia I will return to Wordsworth -- whether or no he has an extended vision or a circumscribed grandeur -- whether he is an eagle in his nest, or on the wing. And to be more explicit and to show you how tall I stand by the giant, I will put down a simile of human life as far as I now perceive it; that is, to the point to which I say we both have arrived at.

Well -- I compare human life to a large Mansion of Many Apartments, two of which I can only describe, the doors of the rest being as yet shut upon me. The first we step into we call the infant or thoughtless Chamber, in which we remain as long as we do not think... we no sooner get into the second Chamber, which I shall call the Chamber of Maiden-Thought, than we become intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere, we see nothing but pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever in delight. However, among the effects this breathing is father <...>.

He then heard my earnest indefatigable prayers and by a train of events the most impossible and unexpected released me from the cruel bondage in which the enemy of my soul had bound me. The result was' peace and happiness' and a commitment to antislavery work. Clarkson's account of his entry into his antislavery role stressed the long period of crisis in which he indecisively debated with himself and James Ramsay what to do.' At length I yielded... in obedience I believe to a higher Power. And thus I can say that both on the moment of this resolution and for some time afterwards I had more sublime and happy feelings than at any former period of my life.' These pioneers had the happy assurance of providential selection for their tasks. Later abolitionists exemplified in Buxton and Cropper, though it might have seemed easier for them to adopt antislavery as a routine, not only maintained vital feeling in their commitment but possessed sufficient accompanying serenity --' we have more than human help' -- to accommodate setbacks and' <...>.

The problems arise when we shift to the first person, asking how we come to have knowledge of the world, and asking how we are justified in dismissing the possibility that reality is wholly other than we take it to be. When faced with these questions, he urges, we must bracket our' scientific beliefs', and naturalistic epistemology will be of no use. We do not have a conception of how reality is with which to compare our opinions. Quine's response is instructive, although it may at first seem dismissive. I can speculate about how I know about reality, but no bracketing of current empirical certainties is required. Before asking what feature of Quine's position is supposed to make this response possible, we should note Quine's response to familiar sceptical arguments, for example, those that rest upon evidence for perceptual error and illusion, and upon empirical evidence of delusion. He acknowledges the' Humean predicament'; both induction and the hypothetico-deductive method are fallible, so that any of the beliefs which result from them could turn <...>.

They are, as we have frequently observed, capable of feats of sentience and locomotion that surpass anything of which we are capable. The rather weary drawing of parallels between animals and instances of human retardation diverts attention from their true source of value to us. Animals may be primitive beings but they are not thereby defective ones. In this sense, animals (and we might add primitive peoples and even the environment) are sui generis; they are perfect of their kind. I can make the point more contentiously. The vast amount of medical research devoted to the early detection and treatment of foetal abnormalities is witness to the fact that society would prefer that there were no retarded babies born. This does not imply that existing defectives should be done away with, nor that we should condemn the decision of a couple, whose foetus is at risk, that to have a retarded baby would be preferable to having none at all. Nor is it to deny that defective dependants will often, <...>.

One criterion ignored by both critics is that of euphony, although its relevance to the Sonnets has long been clear. Sonnet 13 begins: Recast this in the second-person singular and we have:' O that thou werst thyself, but love thou art/No longer thine than thou thyself here livest.' Not only do we have an almost unpronounceable cluster of' th' sounds but we ruin both rhymes. I can find no other principles for distinguishing You and Thou in the Sonnets: Shakespeare can use either without implying greater or lesser formality. A more promising approach would be the comparative one, starting from the total distribution of pronouns in Shakespeare compared to other Elizabethan sonnet-writers. So far three critics have attempted this comparison (with varying statistics), but none of them has done justice to the intensity and range of Shakespeare's pronouns. Giorgio Melchiori rightly sees pronouns as' semiotic pointers' towards a' network of <...>.

The point is worth considering for a moment, partly because it is of relevance to greatly more than the present conceptual issue. The first satisfaction of indeterminist claims, including those, like the present one, which are not within but are antecedent to the traditional area of dispute about Free Will, is of course that they leave, or promise to leave, room for a reassuring or enhancing view of ourselves and our situation. One proponent of effects as unnecessitated does not speak only

for himself. " I can not say that I think of the causal determinist's view as having any plausibility. And I should certainly hope that it was false. For I believe that it is determinism that rules out moral responsibility and other things we believe in... " (Sorabji, 1980, p. 37) Another would-be defender of freewill is as explicit. " Without freewill we seem diminished, merely the playthings of external causes. Our value seems undercut... My concern is not only intense but directed. I want (to be <...>.

We have in fact already come close to the view that mental events are at bottom individual properties, or rather sets of them, in allowing that the interdependent existence of subject and content may be a matter of nomic correlation. Mental events, however language enters into their specification, as of course it does (McGinn, 1982, Ch. 4), are not individuated only by our descriptions, or at any. rate our ordinary descriptions. We have in consciousness a finer mesh than that. Our awareness is finer-grained than our language. I can say truly on two occasions " I'm getting alarmed " and yet the mental events not be of the same type. That is, there might have been some discernible difference in content between them. Any will do. They will, of course, despite this, have been " of the same type " in some looser sense. It is likely to be, even, that two mental events are not of the same type on two occasions when I give a more explicit description of my experience <...>.

Only one such object-referring expression is needed to make the sentence complete. There are no other object-referring expressions involved. One object is sufficient for " cherry " to " hook on ". Here we have an example of a " monadic " predicate. But evidently not all predicates are of this kind. I can say " This is a cherry " and everyone understands what I mean, but I can not very well say " This is an offspring " without committing a grammatical impropriety, except perhaps as a contextually forgivable elipsis when it is already clear whose offspring is being talked about. " Offspring " demands an answer to " Whose offspring? ". It is a relation, a polyadic predicate, and requires more than one object to " hook on " to. Every predicate-term falls into one of these two categories. Which category a given term belongs to, this can be shown by explicating its <...>.

They are not accessible -- not entirely, at any rate -- to public inspection. I can not explain the meaning of " joy " by pointing to someone with glowing eyes and a smile on his face, and saying " This is an example of joy ", as I might explain the meaning of " tree " by pointing to a tree and saying " This is a tree ", or " This is an example of the kind of thing that we call a tree ". What I can say in the former case, at best, is " This is how people tend to look when they feel joyful " or " This is the kind of physical expression (or behaviour) that we associate with the joyous state ". But this is hardly likely to be very enlightening to someone who has never had, or is incapable of conceiving the relevant experience. Evidently, experiences can not be appropriately or adequately described in terms of the categories that are applicable to public objects or events.

<...> retrospectively to the perceptual experience as such as well as to the photograph qua photograph, and the logic of my reports will obviously be very different in the two cases. The photograph might be only a dreamed photograph. On closer inspection -- this time basing my judgment upon a different kind of evidential event, viz. an experience of disappointed expectation -- I might decide that there is really nothing there. But nothing can take away the pleasure that I derived from looking at what I took to be a photograph. The experience itself was real enough, and I can retrospectively describe it and analyse it, irrespective of whether its object was real or fictional. Similarly when I recall an experience of fear, the question of the existence or non-existence of the object of fear need not enter into my consideration, for the experience itself may be my exclusive concern. But the distinction between experiences and non-experiences is based on a phenomenological insight, not on any " external " criteria. We do not distinguish experiences from non-experiences as we might distinguish oranges from apples, viz. by indicating <...>.

(' From madrigal to cantata'), where Carter introduces the idea of a distinct' terza prattica, whose principal vehicle was the emerging aria of the 1620s and 1630s. This is surely an insight worth taking up by scholars of the subsequent period. It also helps to explain why late Monteverdi is so different from early Monteverdi. I can not recall reading a recent work in English on music history better written and more carefully seen through the press than this one. The many quotations are skilfully chosen and superbly translated. By way of correction I can offer only the thought that the word comprimat in the third line of Musae Jovis is a jussive subjunctive (' let... crush'), not an indicative (' crushes'). If this book has a significant weakness, it is simply that it takes three chapters to get into its stride. The discussion of conventional labels in the opening chapter,'

Renaissance, Mannerism, Baroque?' is not ruthless enough in its dissection of word and meaning. When music historians coin or appropriate their <...>.

This text confirms certain aspects of the situation described by II Maccabees. Just as the Temple of Jerusalem was renamed after Olympian Zeus, the sanctuary on Mount Garizim was to be called after Zeus Xenios (6.1-2). The Samaritans wanted to be treated as Sidonians, just as the inhabitants of Jerusalem were now treated as Antiochenes. I can not accept M. Delcor's theory that these Sidonians of Sechem were real Phoenicians, not Samaritans (Zeitschr. Deutsch. Palastina-Ver. 78 (1962), 2, 4-48). It is not worth discussing the difference between the document of Josephus and II Maccabees over the name which the Samaritan temple was going to take: Zeus Hellenios according to one source, Zeus Xenios according to the other. What the Samaritan document adds to II Maccabees is that the Samaritans petitioned the king for the name of their temple <...>.

<...> " I have written a pamphlet... which is to have the title " Music and Tragedy ", and I am sending you the beginning of it in manuscript. As you will see, I am attempting to explain Greek tragedy in a completely novel way, in that for the time being I disregard all philological approaches to the question and keep only the aesthetic problem in view. The real task, however, is to throw light on Richard Wagner, the extraordinary enigma of our age, in his relation to Greek tragedy. I think I can claim that the whole last part is bound to make an impact on our musical public; at least, if I compare it with what has been said recently on the same problem by Hanslick and others... I can not help believing that the most discerning public must be interested in this work. In order to make myself comprehensible to them, I have taken particular pains with the style and clarity of the exposition... " In speaking of Wagner as an " enigma ", Nietzsche was not resorting to <...>.

In an essay on the early-music revival in Europe and America, Howard Mayer Brown noted that' many English musicians... even today react strongly against what they see as the serious limitations of the English church music tradition...' That is true, and throughout the years of the a cappella renaissance there has been an undercurrent of critical dissatisfaction, stirred into existence by critics wary of complacency. Here, for example, is Daniel Leech-Wilkinson reviewing in Early music an a cappella recording of chansons by Guillaume de Machaut (a recording in which I can declare a special interest): the sound of Gothic Voices is altogether more familiar than that of the Taverner Consort, so much so that at times the listener can forget that this extraordinary music originated in 14th-century France, worlds away from the Oxbridge tradition. In the same issue, reviewing a recording of medieval English music by the Hilliard Ensemble, Leech-Wilkinson remarks: As to the performance, the increasing quantity of' voices only' work by the Hilliard Ensemble and others gives rise to several questions about the <...>.

<...> gradually it grew to be his habitual practice in the succeeding period. In proportion, then, as we advance in the chronological sequence of his works, we find his material become less and less pastose, his touches more and more liquid and transparent, more like watercolour. The change is gradual. Nor is it so regular that we can trust to it altogether to fix the exact date of any given work. There are returns to the impasto, but thin painting certainly predominates towards the end of the century. From description to formal interpretation, we can cite part of an analysis of a portrait, Monsieur Geoffroy: Its success must be partly due to the extraordinary number of sittings to which his admiring and clear-sighted sitter submitted. The construction here is more erudite than in the Madame Czanne. It is less removed from the ordinary conception of a portrait arrangement. The movements here are more complex, there is a less complete frontality of presentment and symmetry of design. The equilibrium so consummately achieved results from the counterpoise of a great number of directions.

I would say that there are two major problems with the mental-sentence thesis which both lead -- one ultimately, the other directly -- to the kind of developmental questions I shall be raising shortly. The first problem arises once we admit that in order for a' system' (I shall use this neutral term) to think, its thoughts must have reference: that is to say, they must refer to things regarded by the system as existing and enduring independently of itself. In short, thinking implies something that we can call' a theory of the external world'. Now the machine-code analogy works well only so long as we forget that all a computer program has to do is run. The machine does not need to know anything: it has to perform a task. (For the functionalist, I should interject, knowledge is decomposable into tasks.) Robot arms driven by digital computers can carry out instructions to, say,' put a pyramid on the big block' even if successful completion of the instructions <...>.

At the time of looking up we ascribe an experience of greenness to ourselves; we consider the experience as something being undergone by us before any decision is taken about its veridicality. Such an ascription is a cognisant act involving, at the very least, a conception of a one's self, a conception of experience, and a conception of veridicality. As I argued, given the holism of the mental, we are not going to succeed in analysing these conceptions in terms of some complex causal interplay between determinate representations. We can, however, make some attempt at understanding the cognisant act on the model of a physical act. And that is -- I am afraid -as far as it goes. The constructivist says that we should regard the problem of how it is possible to act at will as the best philosophical and psychological road to the problem of mentality. This problem is difficult enough; but starting from the nature of mental representations, considered as entities poised somewhere between subject and object, guarantees failure.

(This does not, unlike the Piagetian methods, rely on the baby doing anything intentionally -- such as reaching. It allows the psychologist to determine whether the subject has detected a change in a stimulus or can discriminate between two stimuli.) Initially the subject will attend to a new stimulus but will then gradually lose interest and start to look away (habituation); if the stimulus is then changed in some way and if this causes a re-awakening of interest (dishabituation) then we can assume that the baby has detected the change. Another technique is' preferential looking'. If the subject prefers to look at one stimulus rather than another we can assume that he has detected a difference between them. 8. This idea had a great influence upon the thinking of Schopenhauer who followed up its implications more thoroughly than did Kant. 9. The term' refractory' is taken from the theorist James Mark Baldwin. He had a considerable influence upon the thinking of Piaget. See Russell, The <...>.

The problem with the conclusions in both sets of experiments is that they are based on the assumption that we can infer when an experience occurs from a subject's verbal report. In each case, the subject was reporting which other event a particular experience was synchronous with. But, and this is Libet's error, what the subject was actually comparing was the time at which two experiences were occurring. We have no way of knowing exactly when these experiences took place. All we can reasonably conclude is that they happened at the same time. A much more likely explanation of Libet's findings is simply that all experiences are delayed relative to the stimulus causing them, so that synchronous external events produce synchronous experiences. (Another useful illusion is that of the instantaneity of experience. We have to view a stimulus for a finite time before it generates a perception, but that perception appears to us to occur instantaneously rather than fading into view like the Cheshire cat.)

<...> culturalists of much of the activity that now goes on in English degrees, in order to retain something more coherent, defensible, and inherently valuable. Culturalists will point out -- as C. S. Lewis once did -- that much poetry of the past was not written for aesthetic ends, but for religious, political, or other social purposes. This is true; but such poems have outlived their original purposes and now survive as aesthetic entities. We may, following Hirsch, accept that there is no such thing as a poetic or aesthetic essence; but we can say that such texts are rewarding when approached in aesthetic terms, or, in Lewis's words, are read in literary ways. The parallel with studying music has more than structural significance. Music is the most obviously aesthetic of the arts -- to whose condition they all aspire, according to Walter Pater -- yet it submits easily to formal and technical analysis. Interestingly, music, though a major cultural form, has not attracted the attention of contemporary culturalists. It may be that there is literally nothing <...>.

But it was he himself who, he says, opened the door to political philosophy. He claims to have been the first to produce any. Indeed, he thought De Cive contained things of a rather different nature from anything so far in political philosophy: it contained demonstrations of its conclusions. Apart from its demonstratively worked-out' indefinite' framework, natural philosophy is essentially hypothetical. The phenomena it explains are given to us in experience; they are not produced by us, their causes are not directly knowable, and we can only hypothesize, in the terms of our theoretical framework, about what they are. The geometrical part of that framework is demonstrable because, says Hobbes, the geometrical shapes which are its objects can be created by ourselves. For the same reasons, political philosophy can be demonstrated. For one thing, the' motions of our mind', which are the causes of political phenomena, are known directly to us in our experience. For another, the state, or civil society, the object of <...>.

<...> neither innate, nor easy to acquire by reason, no one need remain ignorant of his duties and obligations: the Bible gives us them.' The Gospel', Locke explained to Molyneux,' contains so perfect a body of ethics, that reason may be excused from that enquiry.' But taking our morality from the Bible does not necessarily mean merely taking it on trust and authority, and abandoning all thought of moral knowledge. Though our reason may fail us in discovering moral truths, it need not in verifying what the Bible says. We can find justifying arguments for its ethical contents, even if we could not come to them on our own. So long as, in the end, our grasp of them rests upon reason, we have knowledge, no matter how it was first suggested. But even though justification by hindsight is easier than discovery, some people are still not rationally able to see the truth of the Gospels for themselves; even though the Bible does point the way to moral knowledge, most people' can not know, <...>.

<...> one is aware of the pain, and one connects it with a certain place, rather as one connects different sorts of sensations with different sorts of malady -- rheumatism, indigestion, and so on. Ryle asks,' By what criteria do we come to locate or mislocate sensations as being in some sense of" in' in the right knee or in the pit of the stomach?' But he gives only the outline of an answer to this question, for he does not say what the criteria are. We can recognise a' dull load' as a sign of indigestion through its being located in the stomach, since previous stomach-located' dull loads'have occurred in conjunction with the other things which go to make up indigestion. But what is it that enables a person to recognise a pain as having its source in, say, his finger? If the pain which he had whenever he had anything the matter with his finger had always been a throbbing pain, and the pain caused by anything the matter with any other<...>.

McTaggart considers, and dismisses, two possibilities. The first is that to know' I' by description is to know it not as' that which is aware of something'or which has a mental state'but as, in Hume's words'' a bundle or collection of different perceptions'. If we hold this' bundle' view of the self, McTaggart observes, we must no longer say that the self perceives, thinks, or loves, or that it has a perception or thought or an emotion. We can only say that the bundle includes a perception, a thought, or an emotion as one of its parts. On this theory, then, when I use the word' I', I know what' I' means by description, and it is described as meaning that bundle of mental states of which my use of the word is one member. McTaggart can not accept this Humean view because he can discover no relation between mental states which could determine the bundle to which they belong other than <...>.

His point is that although' rules of grammar' are arbitrary in the sense that it is a mistake to look for a justification of a language game (331), they are not arbitrary in the sense that' our language game only works, of course, when a certain agreement prevails' (430). This is how nature makes herself audible (364). A child acquires our concept of red through being trained to react as the rest of us do to certain things (things which we can specify only by using the language in question cf. 432). This agreement is not agreement in opinion; the concept of it does not enter into the language game (430); it is a prerequisite of agreement, or disagreement, in opinion. That such agreement underlies the working of the language game is likely to be overlooked until one comes up against a disagreement which it is difficult to regard as one of opinion.

<...> might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. With the qualification' though not wholly unambiguously', Brentano recognised that the expressions' reference to a content',' direction toward an object' and' immanent objectivity'stand in need of further elucidation. He later attempted such elucidation, as did other philosophers, notably his one-time pupil Edmund Husserl. I mention Husserl because I think that it may have been via Husserl that Wittgenstein acquired his own <...>.

<...> the speaking of language is part of an activity'. It reminds us of the question: how does the term' language-games' bring this into prominence? More specifically, why does Wittgenstein italicise the word' game'? What is it about games that he

regards as so important? Consider the card games, whist and bridge. It is a rule that one may not use a trump card if one can follow suit. To break the rule is to revoke. Let us suppose that there are characteristic feelings associated with trumping and revoking. We can call them the' trumping-feeling' and the' revoking-feeling'. The trumping-feeling is one of triumph; the revoking-feeling is one of embarrassment -- at least when one is aware that one has revoked. Now for the question. To understand what it is to trump and to revoke should we attend to the use laid down in the rules of the game for trump cards, or should we attend to the characteristic feelings of trumping and revoking? If the latter, is it the case that we are acquainted <...>.

<...> Interesting and significant not just in what they say but in where they are saying it. Hilary Wainwright wrote in The Guardian (8 August 1988) and Ken Livingstone in The Evening Standard (27 June 1988). This latter piece was very much a response to Roy Hattersley's article,' Let's Pretend Politics' (The Listener, 23 June 1988) which had totally denounced the programme's politics as' fantasy as distinct from political thought'. Wainwright's, Livingstone's and Hattersley's articles all provoked various letters in response and hence we can begin to detect a limited, but not insignificant, space for discussion and criticism being opened up within the periphery of critical and not so critical journals. Perhaps what was most lacking in the left's criticism of A Very British Coup was any general discussion of the distinct importance of television as a medium and, more specifically, the question of what makes it such a potentially politically effective medium. Hilary Wainwright did begin to raise such questions in stating that truly radical television would have to address the needs <...>.

This is a striking indication of the role of money in European society as a whole; it reveals that even the peasantry must have reckoned, under good conditions, to produce, and to sell in the local market, a substantial surplus. Since a great proportion of them were engaged in growing corn and other basic needs of life, there must already have been a considerable proportion of the European population who needed to be fed by the labour of others. # MERCHANTS AND ARTISANS # We can list the types of people who depended on peasant labour for their bread, but grew it not themselves; but we can never hope to have any clear appreciation of the numerical strength of each class. It is clear that in the period between the tenth century and the thirteenth all the categories were tending to grow. There had long been some specialists, like vine-dressers or fishermen or cowherds or shepherds, who were producing food, but depended on others for their staple diet. Medieval society also contained a <...>.

<...> on the practice of placing children in monasteries, and the Cistercians forbade it, we may be sure that throughout the Middle Ages many nuns were dedicated to religion by the same procedure as they would have been dedicated to husbands -- by parental fiat. There was no lack of enterprise in founding monasteries or endowing them; it seems likely that if spinsters had been a serious problem to the fathers of the age, more convents of nuns would have appeared. Of the place of women among the artisans and peasants we know almost nothing. So far as we can tell, the men-folk ruled in every sphere; but it may be that the further one got from the world of high feudalism the less of a slave the woman became; it is certainly true, in a rather different way, that the Norman Conquest brought both a more complete feudalism and a fall in the status of women. It may be too that in the lower regions of society women were freer to find at least part-time employment: the distaff provided occupation for almost all, and even if <...>.

Todi, on the enchanting central square high above the tottering streets of one of the most beautiful and inconvenient of all hill towns, a Romanesque cathedral of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries smiles at no less than three town halls, witnesses of civic aspiration from the early to the mid and late thirteenth century. The prosperity which all these minor towns reveal occasionally has a local explanation: Todi's neighbour, Assisi, was greatly enhanced when it became the burial place of St Francis and a centre of pilgrimage. But the common story, so far as we can tell, was of a prospering contado helping a few of the citizens to be successful merchants, carrying local market goods and some from longer distances; and if Francis' father had not been a successful merchant trading into France, the saint would not have borne the name he did, nor suffered the intense reaction to his father's worldly values which helped to inspire him on the path to poverty and heaven. Francis might have more to tell of these towns -- of their poor and their beggars <...>.

<...> if he were to control his subjects and keep his enemies at bay. For these purposes he could use one of three methods. In the kingdoms of western Europe there was a traditional obligation on all free men to answer the king's call to arms, the arrire-ban, when the kingdom was attacked: a right which was rarely invoked in our period, since it produced a cumbersome and inefficient force, which could not be kept long in the field. The English fyrd was used in the Danish wars, but only later, so far as we can tell, as a local militia in emergencies. The French kings were as yet too weak to use the arrire-ban, if they had wished to, save in quite exceptional circumstances, as in 1124. The strength of the imperial idea in Germany is illustrated by the special form that the call to the host took there -- the duty to attend the king if he went to Rome to be crowned emperor. For this purpose the memory of the arrire-ban was preserved; but in practice the imperial armies were <...>.

Some details of the mechanisms of dispersal of such imported goods can be obtained by a more detailed examination of their distributions. The different nature of the materials imported to particular parts of England in the sixth and seventh centuries is (deleted:figure) mirrored by the different patterns of dispersal revealed by plotting fall-off curves (Huggett forthcoming). The Kentish concentration of amethyst, glass, wheel-thrown pottery and crystal balls all have a pronounced peak and sharp fall-off. Until the manner in which such goods are dispersed within regions is better understood we can only assume, at present, that places with very high consumption are also the points of distribution where a paramount controlled such prestige exchange, consuming most locally and allowing the passage of a little to other places. As we shall see, those cemeteries which display high quantities of such imports are also those where potential leaders are to be identified. Within Kent itself it may be possible to identify a shift, or more probably a division, of power through the distribution and date of certain imports. Amethyst <...>.

<...> taken it well beyond the realm of intuitive speculation from which it began. For that reason it will be useful to summarise the main themes that will run through our account. This will provide some guidelines for those readers unfamiliar with the area and also help to clear away in advance some misconceptions which, even among those knowledgeable of it, have sometimes obscured the debate. The first point to be made echoes a remark in the opening paragraph of this chapter; namely that effective creative production and an ongoing state of serious mental illness seem quite incompatible. We can not emphasise too strongly here that we would not disagree with that conclusion. As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, there are many features of such conditions that make them quite obviously inimical to the creative act. These include not only chaotic disruption of thinking (and perception) upon which originality ultimately depends; but also disturbances of mood, motor response, and volition that secondarily prevent the individual from organising his or her mental processes into the orderly sequence required for creative work.

<...> and persons whose blood pressure is more labile will carry an enhanced risk of heart attack or stroke. But since in all of these examples the relevant traits act only as dispositions, the actual outcome in any given individual will depend on the interaction between vulnerability and other factors that trigger illness, leading to symptoms. Unfortunately, in the case of psychosis it is still unclear precisely what these additional factors are; unlike, say, cardiovascular disease where it is possible to point to very particular things, such as smoking and diet. Nevertheless, we can say something further about the vulnerability itself; namely that the psychotic temperament does seem to be under strong genetic control. It has been shown, for example, that identical twins resemble each other quite closely on schizotypal traits. In addition, immediate relatives of diagnosed psychotics show schizotypal characteristics more frequently than would be expected by chance. These results are not too surprising given the research findings discussed in the previous chapter and suggest that what is inherited as vulnerability to psychosis forms a broad set of dispositions that include <...>.

It has been shown, for example, that identical twins resemble each other quite closely on schizotypal traits. In addition, immediate relatives of diagnosed psychotics show schizotypal characteristics more frequently than would be expected by chance. These results are not too surprising given the research findings discussed in the previous chapter and suggest that what is inherited as vulnerability to psychosis forms a broad set of dispositions that include both temperamental and cognitive features. Taken against the background of considerable other evidence about the genetics of psychosis (especially schizophrenia) we can therefore certainly conclude that inheritance plays a major role in determining susceptibility. Usually this has been emphasised as an attempt to make a statement about which people in the population are most likely, given other

interacting events, to develop psychotic illness; in fact that is how we initially phrased the question here. However, from our present perspective it is actually more pertinent to turn the question round the other way and ask: why is it that some people, despite having a strong genetic disposition for psychotic illness <...>.

<...> in order to further their passport and visa applications, such was their desperation to get out. Visa restrictions brought in by foreign governments in co-operation with the Chinese authorities in March and April of 1988 did little to reduce the queues of hopefuls in the embassy districts of Beijing and Shanghai. Waiting day after day, many said they would' keep trying' because it was their only hope. The goal was becoming more difficult to reach but the' tide' continued. Returning to the perspective of' adaptive behaviour' discussed earlier, we can call into question the extent to which going abroad can legitimately be viewed as a student strategy for maximizing opportunities in China when by necessity it implied turning away from the' motherland'in favour of foreign countries. Leaving behind low living standards and poor conditions in work and study seems more like rejection than adaptation. My own investigations, however, suggest that the option of going abroad, open only to several thousand young Chinese intellectuals each year, is a strategy of maximizing opportunities and benefits.

<...> even if inquiry is a goal-directed activity, the goals in terms of which it is directed do not represent a substantive conception of the' end' to which the process tends. But, while these points may be reasonable, and some of them may be true, this attempt to embed them in a general theory or schema seems unhelpful. Looking backwards over the history of inquiry, from the security of our current views, we may see evidence of the cunning of reason bringing us gradually closer to the approximately true, but from that perspective we can offer descriptions and explanations of what was going on which show, for instance, that hypothesis selection was not' blind'. Looking forward, and viewing ourselves as contributing to the development of provisionally held theories, it seems to offer no more than the hope that we might make a contributions even if we do not really understand what, how, or to what. As a theory, it has little to contribute to our reflective self-understanding of ourselves as agents of inquiry.

<...> in its origins although already transplanted to North and South America and the British white colonies and although unevenly spread among European countries themselves. Its essential features had few clear and unqualified expressions, but it was a civilization which had come to be distinguished from others by the emphasis it placed on the individual, by its increasing separation of social and political institutions, by its material wellbeing, and by its growing rationality. Another way of characterizing it is to describe its fundamental institutions, such as the sovereign state, the self-regulating market and the scientific method. We can call it liberal bourgeois civilization, and a fuller picture of its nature will emerge later in this book. All we need do here is to remark that by 1914 it had carried the control of violence and unreason in national and international life further than ever before, and brought Europeans to a previously unmatched level of material and mental achievement. But this success was followed by a decline in the vitality of this civilization. It was also followed by an intensification of a process which had already begun, the <...>.

Undoubtedly, some of the missing studies would prove very difficult to carry out. If we think about Freud and his influence it is not hard to find out what he wrote and said, and it is easy to guess that it must have been important. But how important? What part, for example, did his teaching play in the increasing secularization of modern society? Was it more important than, say, anticlerical propaganda or urbanization? Such questions can not be answered without many more secondary studies. We can assess roughly the impact of Freud's teaching and doctrine on the academic and clinical mind, but it is an immense task to document the slow, informal irrigation of society at large by new ideas. Yet millions of Europeans who may never have heard of Freud's name are now affected by his work, even when this is grotesquely misinterpreted. Further, when his influence on educated people is considered, there remain huge problems of discrimination. It seems likely, for instance, that some of Freud's <...>.

We are aware of its potential. All being well, it will slowly qualify to make decisions upon progressively more major matters. It will gain the rights to an education, and eventually to marry, vote, and buy alcohol. But it does not now have these rights although it is highly desirable (for us) that its future progress towards them be facilitated. What is therefore owing to it, what is' in its interest' are our custodial duties of care and protection. These are the only rights of persons (we can certainly call

them rights since they are protected by law) that it is necessary and makes sense to attribute to the infant now. Animals bear no comparison, lacking this potential; the care and protection due them is no less peremptory but it is dramatically limited in scope by their' primitive' status. So, against Clark, it must be argued that it is misleading to claim that because animals, imbeciles, and normal infants are all weak, defenceless, and at our mercy, to treat <...>.

Akrotiri was built in about 1550 BC (Late Minoan IA) and is likely to have been a Minoan foundation. It developed its own distinctively' Theran' artistic spirit, which was a development from the Minoan, while remaining in close and continual contact with Crete. The frescoes, for example, show many elements that are borrowed from Minoan Crete, but handled in a way that turns them into distinctively Theran compositions. We can speculate from the handful of known Minoan colonies that there were probably several more, possibly on the mainland of Greece itself. The status of Mycenae at this time was almost certainly politically independent of the Minoans, but culturally and artistically Mycenae was strongly influenced by them. Possibly the idea of the tholos tomb was exported to Mycenae from Crete. The Minoans were, in a very real sense, the Americans of the bronze age Aegean, exporting style and tone as much as products.

It is becoming clear now, from such studies as those of Nanno Marinatos (1984) at Akrotiri on Thera and of Mark Cameron (1987) at Knossos, that even some of the apparently purely decorative schemes on Minoan walls are actually religious in intention. What emerges from the archaeology is a culture steeped in religion. When the largest and most ambitious building projects, the so-called' palaces', are interpreted as temples, that preoccupation with religion is thrown into even higher relief. The Minoan belief-system was extremely complex and we can, in the absence of detailed, first-hand, documentary evidence, only make inferences about it. What is clear is that it evolved out of the neolithic Cretan religion and that the religion of the classical Greeks at least in part grew out of it. Some of the names of pre-Hellenic deities are mentioned by Greek and Latin authors: Diktynna and Britomartis, for instance, were Minoan goddesses. It seems to have been a religion that was in transition, which may explain some startling contradictions or apparent contradictions <...>.

<...> hat the Minoans worshipped a Great Goddess, the Mediterranean' Magna Mater', and that they later divided her up into a series of more specialized divinities. But this, as Nilsson says, would be the reverse of religious developments observed in other cultures, where various deities are combined or where one deity is given ever-stronger and more all-inclusive attributes and thus supersedes all the other deities. John Pendlebury's (1939) view was that the Minoans always tended to combine their goddesses into a single deity. Even so, the starting-point, so far as we can find one, was polytheistic. The' Magna Mater' goddess is named' Potnia',' The Lady', in the archive tablets, and she had shrines or sanctuaries in many places. She was worshipped, in the later part of the Minoan period at least, on the mainland as well, so perhaps cult practices and deities were among the Minoans' exports. At Knossos, there are dedications of offerings to' The Lady of the Labyrinth': <...>.

<...>disrespect, moving from verse to prose or back again, are often caused by the entry of one or more characters, with the result that those characters on stage have to readjust themselves, choose which medium they are going to use. Changes of media are most often precipitated by entrances and exits. But the switch can also be motivated by changes of mood. The move from verse to prose can often signify a drop in seriousness, to mockery or ridicule; from tension to relaxation; or from public to private discourse. As instances of mockery we can cite the reaction of the court of Navarre to the Pageant of the Nine Worthies (Love's Labour's Lost, V.ii.484ff.), or that of Athens to' Pyramus and Thisbe' (Midsummer Night's Dream, V.i.106ff.). In both cases prose underlines the distance between the conversational style of the courtiers and the variously absurd verse-styles of the inset play. In The Merchant of Venice, in a verse-scene, when Gratiano tries to cheer up Antonio with an' exhortation' that misfires, <...>.

<...> complementarities of verse and prose in Shakespeare, then, we might ponder over van Gennep's analysis of what he called' the pivoting of the sacred'. As he shows,' the presence of the sacred (and the performance of appropriate rites) is variable. Sacredness as an attribute is not absolute; it is brought into play by the nature of particular situations', existing in both space (such as the movement to and from town, or to a foreign country), and time (between birth and initiation, say). we can, then, apply his metaphor to our studies:' Thus the' magic circles' pivot, shifting as a person moves from one place in society to another.' So the media of prose and verse' pivot' too, shifting in value or significance as a character moves within

the society of the play, or within its internal hierarchy of language and values. The anthropological model allows us to detect within the lived experience of the play a system of complementarities which obeys its own laws, <...>.

Finally, it is to be noted that Sidgwick holds that a kind of intuition, not capable of empirical or discursive proof, is needed to support utilitarianism. The statement that the actions we ought to do are those which promote the general happiness would be useless if it meant nothing more than that they do promote it, and that something more can only be given by an intuition. (Sidgwick thus avoids the naturalistic fallacy to be considered in the next chapter.) 6. Appeal to intuition is uncongenial to most utilitarians. We can find the beginnings of an alternative defence of utilitarianism, not turning merely on a question begging appeal to the meaning of ethical words, in Bentham. He contends, in effect, that ethical statements do indeed do something more or different than merely state facts, even facts about the effects of actions on the general happiness, for they pick out actions for approval or disapproval. Nonetheless, guidance of our approval and disapproval by the principle of utility is the only serious option for those who wish to base <...>.

For example,' He is a wicked old man' expresses both the belief that he is an old man and some kind of disapproval of him. It should be noted, however, that a statement like' If you do that, you will be acting wrongly' has a purely valuational meaning. It expresses one's readiness to have a certain attitude to the person named by' you' if he acts in a certain way, and in a broad sense this readiness is itself an attitude. We can now say that the meaning of an individual word is valuational to the extent that its prime role is to make the statements in which it occurs express certain attitudes, and that it is descriptive if its prime role is to specify the content either of the belief or of the attitude which sentences in which it occurs express. By the content of an attitude is meant what it is an attitude towards, while the content of a belief is the state of affairs the reality of which it affirms.

It is from this perspective that it becomes possible to understand the basis of the distrust of totalizing systems of knowledge which depend upon theory and concepts, so characteristic of Foucault or Lyotard, both of whom have been predominantly concerned with the attempt to isolate and foreground singularity as opposed to universality. This quest for the singular, the contingent event which by definition refuses all conceptualization, can clearly be related to the project of constructing a form of knowledge that respects the other without absorbing it into the same. It is in the work of Edward Said that we can find the problematic of historicist forms of knowledge linked most forcibly to the question of European imperialism. He writes: So far as Orientalism in particular and European knowledge of other societies in general have been concerned, historicism meant that one human history uniting humanity either culminated in or was observed from the vantage point of Europe, or the West... What... has never taken place is an epistemological critique at the most fundamental level of the connection between the development of a historicism which has expanded and developed enough to <...>.

It is interesting that despite this some writers are still prepared nevertheless to claim Foucault as a Marxist -- perhaps less an indication of his Marxism than of his discursive power and the lack of alternatives within Marxism today. Foucault emphasizes that his work does not lay claim to universal or general categories, nor is it even homogeneous, a presupposition that, as he has shown, has less to do with the work as such than the critical construction of its' author'. Nevertheless we can say at least that his preoccupation with history has been consistent throughout: the articulation of repressed history in Madness and Civilization (1961), the historicity of history in The Order of Things (1966), the epistemic mutation of history and the theoretical difficulties of historiography in The Archaeology of knowledge (1969), and the attempt to write a different kind of history,' genealogy', that demonstrates the emergence of new forms of power in Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality <...>.

Let us take the variable x to cover or range over certain conceivable events or conditions or whatever -- in fact individual properties or sets of them -- which in fact did not occur. They are, we can as well say, certain conceivable changes in the universe, ways in which the universe might have been different. Let us contemplate, first, that they include all such changes save for the absence of cc or of e. They include all such changes save for logical excluders of cc or e. We can now contemplate that the relevant cc-e connection, when we suppose that cc caused e, can be stated in this way: If cc occurred, then even if x had occurred, e would still have occurred. That is on the right lines, of course, since certainly we do not suppose that e would

have occurred even if either cc or e itself did not. However, it will not do. We regularly take it that a causal circumstance is linked by way of a causal chain or <...>.

<...> was true of each one and its immediate successor that if the first occurred, even if there also occurred any change x logically consistent with both, then the second also occurred. To speak differently, if e had not occurred, then even if there had also occurred any change x logically consistent with the absences of e and of cc, and consistent with the absences of links between cc and e, it would also have been the case that cc did not occur. This fifth causal relation, like several to come, is stated by what we can call iii dependent nomic conditional statements, or simply ill de -pen dent conditionals. Their truth, in brief, is independent of what else is true. Expressed one way, as we generally shall, they are of the form If a occurred, then even if any events or conditions logically consistent with a and b had also occurred, in place of those which did, b would still have occurred. Or, as we can as well say, Even if any events or conditions logically consistent with <...>.

This fifth causal relation, like several to come, is stated by what we can call iii dependent nomic conditional statements, or simply ill de -pen dent conditionals. Their truth, in brief, is independent of what else is true. Expressed one way, as we generally shall, they are of the form If a occurred, then even if any events or conditions logically consistent with a and b had also occurred, in place of those which did, b would still have occurred. Or, as we can as well say, Even if any events or conditions logically consistent with a and b had occurred, rather than those which did, if a occurred then b did. Or again, independent nomic conditionals come to this: Given the rest of the world as it was, or given that it was different in any way we can conceive it as icing, without logically " excluding a and b, then if a happened so did b. Independent conditional statements are thus different in kind from those dependent <...>.

<...> other terms defined as with (5), we have this: (7) If none of cc " or cc " or... existed, then if cc had not existed, even if any change x had occurred logically consistent with that and with e's absence, c would not have happened. If none of cc " or cc " or... existed, then if e happened, cc would still have existed even if any change x had occurred consistent with e and cc. By way of abbreviation, for what it is worth, we can say that cc was dependently necessary to e, that e was such as to dependently necessitate cc. Our principal conclusion about causation is now at least in distant view. Causation and other nomicity consists in no less than, and not greatly more than, a web of connections between things or events, at bottom individual properties. What are these connections? They are those asserted by the two kinds of conditional statements. Causation is not, as some suppose, anything less than these connections -- which conclusion <...>.

<...> less leave it true that if the conditional's antecedent is true, so too is its consequent. By antecedent, in terms of the example, I of course mean only R and C. In virtue of this fact of generality with respect to independent conditionals they are not tied to a particular situation, as are dependent conditionals. Their truth is not dependent on a particular situation. They can be expressed formally in several ways, making use of the resources and notations of different logical systems, but are perspicuously expressed in just the forms we have. We can, as with dependent conditionals, distinguish them from other " if " statements, specify their logical properties-including contraposition and transitivity-and give their logical relations, notably their relations to dependent conditionals. On what is such an independent conditional as if R and C, even if X, still W based? The answer, in brief, is the method of empirical inquiry, at its best the method of science. There can be no doubt whatever about the validity of this method, and no doubt either that its <...>.

<...> circumstance necessitates the effect, and hence the effect is necessary to the circumstance. (6) Also, the circumstance is one of a set of circumstances necessary to the effect. Further (7) the causal circumstance is dependently necessary to the effect, which is to say that the effect dependently necessitates the circumstance. We have it too (8) that the circumstance (whose constituents need not be simultaneous) is prior in time to the effect. It is in virtue of (5), (7), and (8) that we can truly say that the circumstance makes happen and explains the effect, and not the other way on. The property of a circumstance that (5) it necessitates its effect, although we did not pause to consider the matter, is in a way essential to a final element in a definition of a causal circumstance, more particularly a specification of what is included in such a circumstance. To return again to the beginning, a circumstance (1) consists of items required for the effect.

<...> in using the term " sufficient condition " that they do not mean that the condition-set is genuinely sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. It is partly because " sufficient condition " and " causally sufficient condition " are so used, incidentally, that I have introduced the term " causal circumstance ". There is something more important, which is that the essential idea of the background view does not in itself conflict with our necessitation view. Those who propound the background view deny or doubt the necessitation view, of course, but they need not. We can in fact accept it along with our proposition that effects are necessitated events. We then have the composite view that an effect is necessitated by a causal circumstance and, furthermore, is related to a so-called sufficient condition in the way described, having to do with the usual background. It may be that there is something to be said for this composite view. Can the background view be held on its own as an adequate account of causation? So it is supposed.

This family of views, which derives from many of the same commitments as its predecessors, but owes a great deal to the development of the computer, has among others the rather unenlightening labels functionalism, cognitive science, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence-several of which labels obviously have other uses. (Putnam, 1975; Fodor, 1968; Dennett, 1978,1984; cf. Boden, 1977) To proceed in terms of a kind of model of this family of views, or many of them, what we can call functionalism shares with causalism the idea that mental episodes are to be understood relationally, in terms of their relations to other things. Somewhat less clearly put, mental episodes are to be understood in terms of their roles or functions vis--vis other things. Functionalism as we shall understand it differs from causalism, first, in not restricting the relata in question to two categories: external input or stimuli and external output or behaviour. This, certainly, is an improvement. It gives what is in a sense <...>.

<...> content, it seems, is necessarily also to think of something else, to think of that which exists for something else. We shall leave the matter as we have it. Consciousness, to come to a kind of summation, consists in general in this interdependent existence of subject and content. If we have the content primarily in mind, and are willing to strain language somewhat, consciousness can be described as the existence-for of contents, or their existence-to. Contents exist for or to subjects. To go further, consciousness is for-ness or to-ness. We can as tolerably say, however, having the subject primarily in mind, that consciousness consists in the existence through of subjects. They exist only through contents. Consciousness is existence-through. Perhaps the straining of language is not worth the effort. More might be attempted (Ayer, 1954a; Alston, 1976; Hannay, 1979; Wilkes, I 978) but we have, I submit, gone some way in analysing consciousness with the general conception of it as the interdependent existence of subject and content.

They take place in and indeed are sometimes identified in part by a location, which is to say the location of a person or other organism. I may indeed remind my friend of a thought I had by referring to it as the one I had on first wakening in Venice. I can indeed mean the thought that occurred there, rather than mean the thought that occurred nowhere on an occasion when my location was Venice. Further, there seems no reason to suppose that mental events do not also occupy space-as do other events of which we can not specify the minute space or the minute and myriad spaces which they occupy. (Thorp, 1980, pp. 60 f.) Finally, as we shall see more fully, and as generally is supposed, there are causal relations between mental events and observable space-occupants. Certainly we may feel a resistance to the idea that mental events are in space. The resistance, to my mind, does not amount to what can properly be called an argument. It may amount to the irrelevant truth, that <...>.

Such stronger forms are available, as we shall see, and they are always more interesting than their weaker counterparts. The claim that none of our beliefs about the future are ever justified is more important and more interesting than the claim that although our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is quite probably both true and justified, we can not really be said to know that the sun will rise tomorrow. The third distinction is even more important. We can distinguish sceptical arguments which, although they attempt to deprive us of knowledge (or even of justified belief) still allow that we understand the propositions whose truth we are no longer allowed to know, from those which claim that the reason why we don't know their truth is that we can not understand them. An obvious instance would be the contrast between the suggestion that although we understand the proposition that God exists, we could have no evidence that it is true, and the suggestion that the proposition <...>.

Is it possible, however, that though you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat you still know many other things, perhaps more important? Unfortunately if you do not know this there is not much else that you can know either, it seems. Suppose that you claim to know that you are sitting reading a book. You presumably also know that if you are sitting reading, you are not a brain in a vat. We can surely conclude that if you know that you are sitting reading, you know that you are not a brain in a vat, and hence (by simple modus tollens) that since you don't know that you are not a brain in a vat (agreed above) you don't know that you are sitting reading. The principle on which this argument relies can be formalized as the principle of closure under known entailment: This principal asserts that if a knows that p and that p implies q, <...>.

Such a theory would have been attractive, however. For someone who takes his belief that p to be justified is surely close to taking it that his belief tracks the truth of p. We can, if we want, restore the possibility of a conditional theory of justification by a move like the one made in 2.4. The suggestion there was that we derive the account of justification from that of knowledge, thus: a is justified in believing p iff in certain circumstances a would know that p. As an illustration, we can offer this instance of that approach: Here the crucial phrase 'in certain circumstances' is read in the simplest possible way, as 'if p were true'. If a theory like this were available, we would have reintroduced in a roundabout way the possibility of a conditional theory of justification. (c) Another point which I take to be in favour of the theory is that it begins to make some theoretical sense of the intuitive feeling that what was wrong in the Gettier cases was that <...>.

Hence it is hardly probable that a group of remarks about the first four groups could place any restriction on the nature of the two later groups, and thus there is a lot of room for an invalidating counter-example to the principle of closure. The more distant one of those later groups is, the more likely we are to be able to construct a counter-example; as is revealed in our own example where (deleted:formula) = you are a brain in a vat; By way of final illustration, we can apply Nozick's refutation to Descartes' sceptical argument about dreaming, and hence perhaps do better than Descartes did on the last page of the Meditations. Here a = you, p = you are sitting reading, q = you are not in bed dreaming that you are sitting reading. Can we have (deleted:formula), and (deleted:formula)? Yes. K aq is false because in the nearest group of worlds in which q is false (you are in bed dreaming etc.) you still believe that q is true <...>.

If the content of a putatively infallible belief is merely that things are looking that way to me now, there is clearly less room for error than if I were to risk the belief that that way is pink. The less the content, the less the risk, and greater the chance of infallibility. It seems probable, then, that a belief can only be genuinely infallible if it has no content at all. This is the strong fallibilist conclusion. But even if this conclusion is not justified, we can say that infallible beliefs must have vanishingly small content. And the point of this is that the infallible beliefs are intended, within the programme of classical foundationalism, to act as those by appeal to which all others are to be justified. They are the basic beliefs which ground all others, our epistemological foundations. And to perform this role they need to have sufficient content to be used rather as premises in inferences. With the reduction in content required to keep them infallible, it seems unlikely that any <...>.

We suppose that this person takes it that the rule he learnt demands this continuation rather than the one we favour (which is of course the right one). What makes us right and him wrong? There seems to be nothing in the early stages of the series which could support one continuation against the other. For there is a formula which generates the 'deviant' continuation from the same early stages; since both series start in the same way, we can not appeal to the way in which one starts in order to justify our preference for its way of going on. We might suggest that in conceiving the rule for + 2, we somehow already conceived all the instances, and this is what makes it the case that the 'correct' interpretation is correct. But this suggestion is very unconvincing. Even if by chance we happened to conceive of just these members of the series, it is surely not in virtue of that fact that they count as <...>.

For instance, it is compatible with the results of all actual and possible measurements to hold either that the universe is of a fixed size or that it is expanding at a constant rate. No theory, then, is ever entailed by the data. Different theories can have the same observational consequences. The second is the claim that non-observation sentences face the tribunal of experience not singly but in groups. Quine says that this thesis is owed to Pierre Duhem; we can call it Duhem's thesis (Quine, 1969, p. 80). Duhem is suggesting that individual non-observation sentences can not be conclusively verified or conclusively falsified

by observation, by the evidence of our senses. The reason is that such sentences do not somehow occur alone, in limbo; they occur as part of a more general theory. And because of this we have a choice where to alter the theory when things go wrong at the observational level. There will always be more than one way of <...>.

<...> partial theory can be played off against another in the same way that sentences can, we have eventually to hold, with Quine, that' the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science'. This conclusion can be re-expressed in two ways, both of which will be needed for future discussions. Quine holds, against Carnap, that a non-observation sentence does not have its own observational consequences (Quine, 1953, pp. 40-1). This shows that there is nothing which the sentence means, taken all by itself. To the extent that we can say what it means, our answer is dependent upon the nature of the remainder of the theory surrounding the sentence. There is no determinate object, then, which we can call the meaning of this sentence. So at the non-observational level, sentential meaning is indeterminate. There are no facts of the matter about what individual sentences mean. This is the thesis of the indeterminacy of sentential meaning. So far as non-observation sentences are concerned, Quine's theory of meaning can be called holistic.

<...> recuperation, re-articulated to the long tradition of bourgeois individual bohemianism. Examples of the former -- recombining existing elements -- would be the way this eclecticism in 1960s rock came into being in the first place, formed as it was from disparate sources, including many elements from bourgeois' art music'; or the way rhythmic techniques derived from working-class black American music were combined with other elements in 1920s dance music to signify a kind of safe but exotic, hedonist escapism for a broad grouping of classes in Britain. Particularly strong articulative relationships are established when what we can call' cross-connotation' takes place: that is, when two or more different elements are made to connote, symbolize or evoke each other. This is what seems to have happened in the late Victorian music hall, when a style evoking a particular class subject -- the' remade' working class described by the historian Gareth Stedman Jones (1974) -- is crossed with political elements -- the ideology of imperialism -- resulting in a relatively unified mode of' popular imperialism'within this song category.

In all, there are eleven complete statements (plus the fade). Structurally, there is nothing else. The phrase itself is, by rock standards, quite complex harmonically (though to Baroque musicians it was something of a clich). The use of a repeated harmonic progression is typical of rock. However, it also occurs quite often in Baroque music. There is no conflict here. We can say, then, that between the two codes involved -- Baroque and rock -- there are differences but also a relatively high syntactic correlation. Many other examples of rock/classical fusions fall apart because this element is lacking. This tells us something about the limits to fusion as an articulative method (as against other methods, such as parody or deliberate disjunction) and about the limits to the expropriation of meaning: some syntactic structures are simply incompatible. It tells us something also about the weight with which received connotations <...>.

In the same way, he might have looked at the conflicts between institutions, genres and styles during the 1890-1930 period (for instance, between old-fashioned vaudeville and new syncopated styles; or between the requirements of public dance and private listening), rather than just the more homogeneous synthesis established by the time it ended. Clearly, to answer Adorno completely would require nothing less than a complete' production history' of popular music from 1890 to the present. As yet, this exists only in scattered fragments. What we can say, though, is that the picture which emerges from these is not of a monolithic bloc but of a constantly mutating organism made up of elements which are symbiotic and mutually contradictory at the same time (see, for example, Sanjek 1988; Hirsch 1969; Peterson and Berger 1971; Hardy n.d.; Frith 1978; 1983a; 1988a). Over and above the nature of the general economic and social developments, the main reason for this is what can be termed the specificity of cultural goods: <...>.

For Adorno, though, the audience -- indeed, the entire production-consumption process -- has become an abstraction, resting on' an idealist inversion of the abstract and the concrete' (ibid: 49), in which real historical moments and differentiations of practice have no place. Once this abstractionist tendency is grasped, the disparities between Adorno's theory and what we see around us are explained. We can accept the possibility that reception of cultural products is not always as passive as Adorno suggests, that it is often class-differentiated, that consuming subjects are not necessarily unitary conformists so much as sites

traversed by conflicting interpretative schemas. Similarly, it becomes obvious that such reception does not always represent a direct appropriation of the consumer into a pre-given framework but is mediated by other, varied interpretative assumptions associated with other social institutions and values (which may be mutually contradictory). The growth of user-subcultures takes on enormous importance <...>.

And contrary to Adorno -- the more apparently homogeneous the product, the more important and potentially productive the role of reception, and of the mediations interposed between the two (DJs, peer-group opinion, subcultural appropriation, use-situation, and so on). Adorno's mistake here seems to rest on two aspects of his position, which in fact turn out to provide the two central explanations for the flaws in his argument. The first is his use of the' immanent method'; the second is his own historical location, or more precisely what we can call his ontologization of history. These need to be grasped if we are to understand him -- and so to make use of him, rather than simply dismissing him as an embittered elitist pessimist. The immanent method assumes that the' truth' of a work is to be found within the work itself: or rather, it can be discovered by critical confrontation of the work's ideal or concept -- what it' wants to be' -- with its reality. The problem here, of course, <...>.

<...> social meaning, the transition could be seen as associated with the move from a period dominated by the modernist critique of mass culture to the period of' post-modernism'. Adorno speaks from the vantage-point of modernism (though, as we have seen, he arguably gives this too monolithic an interpretation): his ideal is an individual critique, which is negative in relation to society but also constitutes a positive synthesis -- an alternative. The interrelationship of modernism and post-modernism is a matter of some controversy (see, for example, James on 1984). We can say, though, that with the at least partial collapse of the modernist perspective, there appears to be a certain potency in the post-modernist position, which takes the dominant system as given and proposes as method of critique the fragment: subversion takes the form of' guerrilla activity' which exploits fissures and forgotten spaces within the hegemonic structure. An' either/or' (to the extent it existed) is replaced by an' and/and', a confrontation between unitary subjectivity and its destruction by an acceptance of <...>.

Changes to this ratio are most effectively induced by the operation of media, which McLuhan defines as extensions to the senses. The alteration in our perception of reality then produces particular social and cultural forms. Thus, for example, alphabetic writing, and still more, print, is said to privilege sight quite strikingly at the expense of the other senses, and the effects of this on the way we think and perceive reality -- through a linear, mechanical, single-point-of-view consciousness -- then have the cultural consequences described earlier. We can disregard the epistemology. It is never convincingly argued for; the neurological and anthropological evidence renders it very doubtful (see Miller 1971: 92-120); it is patently there in order to support what is ultimately an idealist position, for the half-hidden premise of McLuhan's argument is that there is an ideal human psyche, an essence, which is characterized by balance and interplay of senses, which may once have existed -- in oral cultures -- but which was destroyed by literacy (a second Fall).

Each manoeuvre in their rearguard action has taken them further away from intuitive notions about that exciting enterprise referred to as science. Their technical programme has led to interesting advances within probability theory, but it has not yielded new insights into the nature of science. Their programme has degenerated. There are a number of possible responses to the problem of induction. One of them is a sceptical one. We can accept that science is based on induction and Hume's demonstration that induction can not be justified by appeal to logic or experience, and conclude that science can not be rationally justified. Hume himself adopted a position of that kind. He held that beliefs in laws and theories are nothing more than psychological habits that we acquire as a result of repetitions of the relevant observations. A second response is to weaken the inductivist demand that all non-logical knowledge must be derived from experience and to argue for the reasonableness of <...>.

If observations of Mars should turn out to falsify (a), then they would falsify (b) also. Any falsification of (a) will be a falsification of (b), but the reverse is not the case. Observation statements referring to the orbits of Venus, Jupiter, etc. that might conceivably falsify (b) are irrelevant to (a). If we follow Popper and refer to those sets of observation statements that would serve to falsify a law or theory as potential falsifiers of that law or theory, then we can say that the potential falsifiers

of (a) form a class that is a subclass of the potential falsifiers of (b). Law (b) is more falsifiable than law (a), which is tantamount to saying that it claims more, that it is the better law. A less-contrived example involves the relation between Kepler's theory of the solar system and Newton's. Kepler's theory I take to be his three laws of planetary motion. Potential falsifiers of that theory consist of sets <...>.

In 1864, therefore, Maxwell's theory was bold and the subsequent prediction of radio waves was a novel prediction. Today, the fact that Maxwell's theory can give an accurate account of the behaviour of a wide range of electromagnetic systems is a generally accepted part of scientific knowledge, and assertions about the existence and properties of radio waves will not rate as novel predictions. If we call the complex of scientific theories generally accepted and well established at some stage in the history of science the background knowledge of the time, then we can say that a conjecture will be bold if its claims are unlikely in the light of the background knowledge of the time. Einstein's general theory of relativity was a bold one in 1915 because at that time background knowledge included the assumption that light travels in straight lines. This clashed with one consequence of general relativity, namely, that light rays should bend in strong gravitational fields. Copernicus's astronomy was bold in 1543 because it clashed with the background assumption that the earth is stationery at the centre of <...>.

The mould-pieces are removed, and in principle can be used again to produce an identical statue, but there is little evidence for this being done in Greece. From the beginning of the classical period large bronzes were regularly cast in sections, which is impossible in the direct method but easy in the indirect. The Piraeus kouros appears to have an iron armature inside, so was cast in one piece (one of the advantages of sectional casting is that the core can be removed); but it has not been properly studied or published and we can not say what methods were used; nor do we know what was the nature of Rhoikos' and Theodoros's innovation. Our discussion has already made apparent a great paucity of large-scale bronzes compared to what survives in marble. The reason is simple. Marble can be sawn or broken up for building or burned for lime, and a great deal has certainly gone that way; but the melting down of bronze for conversion to tools, utensils, armour, coin, is far more tempting.

<...> road from Bern to Lausanne, offers a new perspective on the Swiss Mittelland for the visitor who may only until then have known the ski or climatic resorts of the mountain regions. FTV 1. The Problem of Reality # There is nothing easier to understand, it seems, than what facts are; and yet there is nothing that is more elusive. We distinguish between fact and fiction but there is, it would seem, precious little that we can say about this distinction beyond asserting it. Facts are simply facts, the opposite of fiction. Everyone is confident he knows what this means. We feel sure we understand this distinction just as we feel sure we understand the distinction between truth and falsehood, or the distinction between good and evil. It is when we make an attempt to clarify it that the confidence begins to desert us in the face of difficulties. For what reply could we give if asked to explain the meaning of " fact " <...>.

But this merely raises the problem of a definition of " truth conditions " and it is difficult to see how such a definition can steer clear of the question of " ontological commitment ". The ghosts conjured up by the concept of existence thus reappear to haunt us. If the reductivist is to be consistent, he will have to say not only that explicit existence claims are not a necessary constituent feature of a complete description of the world, but that explicit truth claims aren't either. We can hardly deny that " existence predicates " carry a logically independent descriptive content without being prepared to say the same of " truth-predicates ". If there is no separate philosophical " problem of existence, neither is there a separate philosophical " problem of truth ". Willy-nilly one is thus forced to extend the reductivist argument and adopt the position of what has become known as the " redundancy theory of truth ". The central thesis of the " redundancy theory ", which goes back to F.P.Ramsey, is that the <...>.

In particular it is a fundamental feature of the American New Critics' work, to which I will shortly turn. Some features of Richards's theory may now seem rather out of date: his notion that poetic language is purely emotive, his materialistic conception of literary value, his view of the author -- text -- reader relationship. But other features have become established parts of the Anglo-American critical tradition, and have by no means necessarily been superseded. These are his empiricism and humanism, and what we can call his organicist insistence on close reading, on careful attention to every detail of a literary

text, on the principle that the text, like a living organism, functions through the interaction of all its constituent parts. One other feature of Richards's work has had little impact in this country, but a much greater impact, as we shall see, in the United States: the demand that criticism be founded on theory. Until very recently the theoretical issues raised by literary study have been largely ignored <...>.

If we accept this, then we might have an objective principle for distinguishing between the relevant and irrelevant associations of words in a text, for ordering its parts according to their relative importance, and for connecting these parts with one another. But is such a structure of opposing factors really an objective property of poetry, and can we therefore as a matter of principle allow our interpretation and evaluation to be guided by it? There is more than one reason why we might not. First, we can question whether the concept is an adequate one for distinguishing poetry from non-poetry. It is easy enough to identify opposing terms or attitudes in a text, but how does one decide whether or not they are balanced or reconciled? For Richards the reconciliation occurred in the reader's mind, and therefore could be identified introspectively. For the New Critics it was an objective structural feature of the text, but they offered no precise structural criteria for identifying it. In practice, like Richards, they had to rely <...>.

<...> ' I' as well as a fear of responsibility for independent affirmation or denial which results in ambiguous statements (1980:135). This corresponds to what Deleuze terms' schizo-logic' in which contradictory propositions are accepted simultaneously. All these symptoms are displayed by the central consciousness in Out: a breakdown of reality-testing, the concretization of words, organ-speech, omission of the first person pronoun, the proliferation of contradictions, and perception of language as pure sound and as excrement. Nevertheless, it would perhaps be unjustified to label him' schizophrenic'. The most we can claim is that his social situation and his physical deterioration induces in him a condition that approximates the classical clinical picture given of schizophrenia. Robert Rogers comments on what is commonly held to be the widespread use of metaphor among schizophrenics. While he does not deny that they often speak in a manner that' normal' people regard as metaphoric, he points out that poets are aware of the metaphoric nature of their linguistic productions, whereas schizophrenics are not; they use what Rogers calls' unlabelled metaphor' <...>.

The invitation to Mikoian was issued shortly after the Diaz Lanz bombing. Although, unfortunately, we do not know the exact date of the meeting between Alekseev and Castro, it seems highly probable that, as Edward Gonzlez contends,' Castro seized upon the bombingincident as a pretext for' the turn against the Centre-Left and the United States' (Gonzlez: 1968, p. 51, note 39). As far as we can judge, in the early days at least, anti-Americanism went against the grain of popular feeling within Cuba. Carlos Rafael Rodrguez wrote that in the fifties' Anti-imperialism was... a proscribed word... Young people whom we knew to be honest, stung as we were by the sufferings of our Fatherland, lived convinced that Cuba's independence was a Yankee gift and that our denunciations of national oppression were simply ways of serving an idea that they considered to be' anti-Cuban' (' Reflexiones ante un aniversario' <...>.

Notice the emotive contour: an expressive rise and fall, with the highest note and largest leaps at the most emotive point. The theme continues with four bars made entirely from the cell (-----) (part of the reversal of the original cell), concluding with an exact repetition of Example 12. Notice also the poignant rests and clear sculpturing of each brief phrase. As the pitch patterns were presumably dictated by Elgar's' secret' melody, we can safely assume that his invention, and indeed the beauty of his creation, lay almost entirely in his construction. Construction is therefore to be valued (rather than despised) for its fruitful possibilities. The works of Beethoven and Bach are full of similar constructions, and it is remarkable how certain basic rhythmic cells (such as or (-----)) are used over and over again in their music. Sometimes a cell will be used in augmented or diminished note-values, or an occasional note may be lengthened.

<...> piece can be played by most instruments as a solo, or by groups of instruments as ensembles; that the general tempo can be between (-----) = 42 and 132, the duration between four and twelve minutes; and that the ordering of different melodic strands can be quite haphazard. In fact, as much is left to' chance' as possible. Example 18 is one of the fifteen or so melodic fragments which make up the piece: # Composing a complete melody # The first phrase. We have discussed different methods of melodic construction. Now we can begin on the first phrase -- the most important of the whole theme, for the success of

everything else depends upon it. The first phrase should have a distinctive and eminently memorable nature. The rhythmic design and pitch scheme are therefore extremely important. The first phrase should be a complete musical thought which demands a response or' reply' in the next phrase, to make up a complete' sentence'. Usually it is a united group of notes, as in (a) below, but <...>.

A word about the' anacrusis'. The Verdi example above begins with an upbeat, or anacrusis. Many first phrases begin in this way, with a preparatory note or group of notes, and it is usual for each succeeding phrase to begin with a similar anacrusis. This is true only for music which moves in regular patterns, and we could well do otherwise if we wish. Melodic continuity. Having discussed the construction of a melody's smallest essential part -- the initial phrase -- we can move on to the building of complete themes. Again, I would prefer to avoid laying down rules, which may prove inhibiting and a restriction on the imagination. This complete lack of rules will force us into a difficult situation, where the student will have to use his own intuition and aesthetic judgement. However, such a mental exercise may be found to be of more benefit to him than could any rules, and as such may not be such a bad thing. Very often a student creates <...>.

<...> phrase, with their chordal implications; change into a falling scale pattern, while the impulsive, staccato dotted rhythm changes to a series of contrastingly smooth legato quaver runs, quite different in character: In the March from Aida (Example 25), after a rather long first phrase of three bars, there is a complete change to material which has never been used before. The element of change is considerable, but Verdi then makes use of segments of both phrases in close association for the rest of the theme. To sum up this section, we can say that the first phrase of a theme may be followed by a second phrase to make a complete sentence, either through exact repetition, or by various degrees of change which can extend to the introduction of completely new material. No one procedure can be said to be absolutely right, and composers have used every compromise between these two extremes. All we can say is that each theme demands its own particular treatment, and that however much change is introduced there should be a convincing sense of unity.

<...> first two sentences from the Andante of Mozart's Eine Kleine Nachtmusik: Notice how the second sentence uses material -- semiquaver runs and larger leaps -- not found in the first. We can see also how the first sentence has a second phrase using syncopation, which is a distinct change from the first phrase. Note too how the first sentence rests on D (part of the dominant chord), thus inviting continuation, while the second ends on C, confirming finality. At this point, having reached the end of the' second sentence', we can confirm that all the conventional classical music examined seems to be built in sentences, each of which comprises two phrases of the' question and answer' type. There is always a first sentence in which the first phrase demands continuity, the second then providing repose. Further, in all the music examined, a second sentence, similarly made of two phrases, always comes to a point of temporary finality. (This double-sentence structure will be obvious from our analysis of thematic forms at the end of this <...>.

It is most necessary, before we begin, to have some idea of the skeleton framework which will shape the theme and create its total form. Length will depend on two factors, sentence length and the existence of periods of contrast. Short sentences can produce only short themes. Long sentences, which can stand plenty of repetition or extension, will make for long themes. A limited number of periods of contrast will make for brevity; adequate periods can lead to long themes. We can best conclude our discussion of melodic construction by giving the skeleton form -- sentence by sentence -- of a number of melodies, showing how the principle of' statement and change' (discussed in chapter 3) can be applied to theme building. The following symbols will be used: The number of bars in each sentence will be shown by numbers. (Some sentences overlap bars, beginning with an anacrusis which may occupy several beats, but with a correspondingly shorter last bar. These are rounded off to <...>.

<...> to be satisfactory, may need contrasting sections, differing textures, and periods of thematic recall; and such factors must not only be compatible with the text, but should also form a whole which is a perfect expression of the words. If the words are subdivided into similar verses the musical solution may be quite simple, but when this is not so an ideal musical form may not be easy to find. As we have said, each piece will have its own form, so no set patterns or rules can be formulated. All we can say is that logical, easily perceptible solutions are always preferable to enigmatic ones, which may have forms so

difficult to perceive that to the listener they seem formless. # The words # Choral music is best suited to simple, lyrical texts where nothing is superfluous. In fact, too few words are far preferable to too many. If we want to paint a big choral canvas, words can be repeated without any fear of being repetitious, or we can use whole sentences or sections several times over <...>.

Again, we are only really concerned with two intervals and their inversions, but it must be noticed that one is much more dissonant than the other. With inversions, the degree of dissonance is much attenuated. The tritone, though designated as' neutral', has a rather changeable quality, as it can seem mildly dissonant in a consonant context or consonant in a dissonant one. However, for the sake of simplicity, we can regard the tritone as being midway between consonant and dissonant. Our first step in illustrating interval harmony using the whole chromatic octave will be to write a succession of consonances in two parts: This succession of six two-part chords uses the total-chromatic and a variety of consonances, though not the 4th and major 6th. We will now add a lower part which will turn the consonant effect into one of uniformly relaxed mild dissonance. This is done in each chord by adding a note which is mildly dissonant with one <...>.

Why do you follow him who Loves you not? Where is Lysander? and fair Hermia? You told me they were stoln into this Wood. I seek, but can not find her. Hence, be gone. There would probably have been some cutting in Act 5. If Duke Egeus did not ask Hermia to choose between Demetrius and life in a nunnery in Act 1, there would be no point pressing her for an answer four acts later. There is a clue that cuts were made (though we can not tell how extensive -- for, unlike Act 1, Act 5 was not reprinted in 1693: it was inherited from the 1692 stockpile). Illus.4 shows the opening of Act 5 as it appears in both quartos. The Duke's speech (boxed in) would have to go; and with it probably the' Composition in imitation of Hunting' and the Duke's line cueing it in. There is no trace of hunting music in the theatre score at this point or anywhere else.

<...> that which we can not change and should therefore speedily abandon. It must be said, though, that in Schopenhauerian eyes the Greeks are in fact less compelling instructors than Shakespeare; and that tragedy as a whole is not much more than one of several " quietives of the will " which it is the function of art in general to provide. Were we to adhere strictly to the interpretation of our tradition as " theoretical ", there would, for our purposes, be no need to go beyond Schopenhauer. But with Nietzsche in mind, we can hardly conclude this section without mention of Richard Wagner: a figure of central importance to Nietzsche, albeit one of only peripheral relevance to the tradition in itself. With Wagner the theatrical part of the programme reappears in a pure form. The product is a new German drama -- music-drama -- which, with its reintegration of long separated arts, its mythic basis and its aspiration towards a socially organic function, evokes, at least in intention, several of Greek tragedy's most distinctive characteristics.

I have been quietly considering if we too should not likewise break with philology... as practised till now ". Three preoccupations stand out clearly: music (especially, though not at first, Wagner), philosophy (the ubiquitous Schopenhauer), and the Greeks -- the Greeks not merely as a professional concern, but as a personal ideal in conflict with professional norms: here, as will become apparent, Nietzsche is a whole-hearted successor of the earlier generations of Romantic Hellenists. In addition, we can point to certain temperamental facts: most obviously, the youthfully ardent seriousness; then the self-consciousness of the gifted and isolated individual -- a consciousness of his own giftedness, one might add, which shades into a growing concern with the problems surrounding genius as such, and which helps to intensify an already strong impulse to express himself articulately in writing; and, finally, a compulsion to relate his music, his philosophy- his Greece to each other. This last characteristic is of central importance: this, above <...>.

In November 1868 he had written to Rohde: " I intend to get through all the business of habilitation by Easter sc. 1869and finish my doctorate at the same time. " Then would come the journey to Paris, after which (as he noted in another connection in the same letter) " it will be all right in this academic career ". " Absit diabolus ": the strength of Nietzsche's feelings needs no commentary. In the light of the order of events involved in the earlier conversion to Schopenhauer, we can surely point to this moment as decisive. If Nietzsche was to come to terms with a specialized academic career, his need of a compensatory allegiance was extreme. Since June 1868 his enthusiasm for Wagner and his works had been steadily growing. The allegiance

he needed was now to hand. From this moment, but only from this moment, he was " a Wagnerian " without any qualification.
Biographical background II: the genesis of The Birth of Tragedy.

But actually the Greeks in their most creative period knew only too well that the basis of existence is horrific. Beneath its Olympian surface, Greek culture evinces an unmistakable and unique sensitivity to the painful truth about life: the Dionysiac truth <that the underlying reality of existence is unchanging contradiction, pain and excess, represented to our immediate experience as the " curse of individuation " -- our subjection, as impotent individuals, to the change and suffering that befall us from birth to inevitable death>. As evidence of the Greeks' Dionysiac perception, we can point to the dark side of their mythology: Titanic wars and heroes; the agonies of Prometheus, Oedipus, Orestes; and the definitive wisdom of Silenus, the satyr companion of Dionysus: the best thing is not to be born -- the next best is to die soon. These Dionysiac elements within Greek mythology must be regarded as its earliest stratum, pre-Hellenic in origin (second millennium B.C.); while the Olympian mythological apparatus, along with the world of art that depicts it, is a later <...>.

We can begin by returning to the question of defining your essay topic. You choose an author; but then you need to decide which text or texts to work on (sometimes which parts of that text or texts), and which version of the texts to choose. If you want to talk about the work of an author, you need to judge how many texts to talk about and how varied your selection needs to be (many authors write in different modes: novels, short stories, poems, <...>.

The dream vision convention was employed by the Middle English writers for such reasons; 3and it enjoyed great popularity. 4Discovering this literary phenomenon, we should realise that the contemporary reader of Middle English lived in a different social and cultural reality from ours. 5So the dream vision must have had a tremendous impact on his perception of the world. Notice that this paragraph is not only held together by the sort of unity, or development of ideas, that we described in the Great Gatsby example above. We can also identify a series of formal markers of connection between the respective sentences. Sentence (2) is connected to (1), for instance, by the phrase " for such reasons ", which refers back to the reasons listed in (1), as well as by the fact that the " dream vision convention " is recognisable as an aspect of " a literary work " referred to in (1). Sentence (3) is linked to (2) by the additive connective " <...>.

<...> and so on, until, after further euphemisms and foreplay, we return to the blunt world of crude speech as the squirrel enters the girl's con to seek from her stomach the nuts she ate the day before. The combination of such marked terms with a widespread use of word play is what we can regard as the typical exploitation of language in the French fabliaux. The list of single words or phrases substituting for the sexual or scatological items listed above is considerably longer than the basic list; e.g. " taking medicine " for having sexual intercourse, " pipe " for penis, " nest ", " eggs " and " purse " for scrotum and testicles, " fountain " for vagina. One of the most fascinating features of linguistic use in these works is the way in which words or syllables are <...>.

It is interesting to note how even euphemisms, symbolizing but not presenting marked terms, can be the more amusing for the conspiracy between scriptwriter, actors and audience in recognizing the term signified at the same time as superficially recognizing that its use is a taboo not to be broken. One thinks of examples such as " " shorthouse " " (for shortarse) or " " naff off " " (for fuck off) from post-war British comedy. An intellectual amusement resides in the interplay between what for simplicity's sake we can represent as just two contrasting ranges of marked and unmarked language -- although arse is undoubtedly less marked than fuck. Ironically, the linguistic difference (in markedness) between the terms is emphasized at the same time as their functional equivalence -- with the milder signifying the stronger -- is blatantly evident. The comic process here is conscious and intellectual rather than unconscious and psychological. Something very similar is found in L'Esquiriel, in which the boy's figurative euphemisms -- squirrel, nest, eggs -- are not simply comic <...>.

<...> text of the Interludium de Clerico et Puella looks quite different from Dame Sirith: it looks like an anticlerical play. It does appear as if there is an incomplete text of the play surviving: we could sketch in the rest from the analogue in Dame Sirith and the continental analogues reached through that text, but what we have here is sufficiently individual to counsel caution in assuming we know what is missing. Interrupted or not, the extant text of the Interludium ends exactly at the end

of a line and sentence, which by reference to Dame Sirith we can argue is the end of this particular speech from Mome Elwis. If the play did end at this point, the real anticlerical joke would be that the Interludium does not go on to the successful trick as the audience might have expected and the clerk might have hoped. As well as being fully adequate at the beginning, the text ends at a suitable and sufficient point; the possible significance of this can evidently easily be missed. # Chaucer's Shipman's Tale <...>.

<...> an apparently neutral moral description which nonetheless contrasts significantly with the more clearly marked " " harlotrye " " that has formerly been used to label the contents of the pair of fabliaux we are now halfway through. The responses of the pilgrims to the Miller's Tale, we are told, were various: but the majority of the pilgrims simply laugh (3858). If we imagine the situation at the end of the Miller's Tale in realistic terms, we can suppose that the divisions amongst the pilgrims in terms of their appreciation of the tale are as likely to reflect different sensibilities to the marked, fabliau language the Miller's Tale makes use of as shock at the possible moral implications of the tale (compare the response to the Prioress's Tale, noted in Chapter 3). The one dissenting voice that is made explicit to us is the Reeve's: As has been noted, the Reeve's Tale is often read as a much darker piece than the <...>.

<...> of the disc coating, is what makes a set of discs Windows, then does' Windows 1.0, condition poor' mean anything? In more practical terms, does meaningful collection of software imply a functionally intact copy with the promise or potential of running it? If so then we have at least one clear respect in which artefactual software, acquired in accordance with the cannons of conventional museology, differs from software acquired for archival purposes. 4We do not ask' functional intactness' of the telescope.' Telescope, broken' does the job. We can perhaps draw a useful analogy with pharmaceutical products. I learn from my medical sciences colleagues that the Science Museum has recently placed some proprietary drugs on inventory. Panadol, say, is now an inventoried object. There is valuable cultural information in the physical artefact: tablet form, bubble-pack press-through dispenser, advertising imagery used in the logo and packaging, and information about consumer appeal. But we can be reasonably sure that the drug company will not guarantee the potency of the sample beyond its sell-by date.

Discs used as storage media for textual data as distinct from programs provide one example. Parchment deteriorates leaving us with partial or fragmentary records. A progressively corrupt magnetic record is simply a partial record but a usable record nonetheless. The residual data is not deprived of meaning or access by partial corruption. The' all or nothing' fears do not in this case apply and we may be encouraged to re-examine whether there is some give in the apparently uncompromising need for bit-perfect records of program software. If we look at the effects of corruption on program performance we can identify three broad categories. Non-critical corruption covers situations in which unused portions of the program are compromised -- unused print drivers, irrelevant utilities or subroutines, for example. If we use a steam engine, say, as an example of a conventional museum object' non-critical corruption' would correspond to the damage to an unused or non-critical part -- a nut dropping off, a dented panel. Damage in this case does not compromise the primary function, that of producing traction. Critical corruption leading to evident malfunction <...>.

<...> was also likely to have been a woodwind maker, as was his brother, Jean, who is noted in the Livre commode (1692) as being among the most highly regarded master makers of woodwinds. From this it seems evident that Jacques brought to London examples of Hotteterre instruments. Comparing them to the English Baroque woodwinds, it is clear that they became the prototype and standard for English makers well into the 18th century. The outstanding examples are those by the Stanesbys and Bressan, whose instruments bear an unmistakable resemblance to those of the Hotteterres. We can conclude that French woodwinds were being used in England from about 1675, when they were apparently introduced by the Hotteterres, and were still being played there by leading musicians through the first quarter of the 18th century. Evidently Jacques returned to France by 1692. In that year he succeeded Jean Ludet as' Basse de Hautbois et taille de violon'; Ludet had assumed that position on 10 April 1682 at the retirement of Michel Rousselet (Arch. Nat. 01 26, f.122).

Importantly, this document does not refer to Louis Hotteterre, the brother of Nicolas (dit Colin), who lived on the rue Marmousets in the parish of Ste Marie Magdelaine, but to the Louis whom I first identified in an earlier article: a letter written

in 1712 by the French oboist Louis Rousselet mentions that he had left a musette for repair with Louis Hotteterre, who lived' proche le Pon sicMarie'. We can thus identify this Louis as the master maker described in the Livre commode (1692)' living near St Jacques de la Boucherie for all woodwind instruments, since St Jacques is located near the Pont Marie. On the back of Rousselet's letter he adds:' I ask you please to give my regards to my sisters, to M. Colin, and to M. Louis Hotteterre at the Opera and to M. Louis Hotteterre at the Opera, my godfather, and to all my friends.' This makes it clear that both Louis played at the Opra. Having now documented Louis's address and instrument business near the Pont Marie Therese for the years 1691,1692 and 1712, while the other Louis lived on the rue Marmousets and evidently worked in his brother Nicolas's atelier (according to common practice, he would have used his brother's stamp), we can conclude that the former made instruments stamped' L/Hotteterre' with a fleur-de-lis above, whereas instruments by the latter would have been made in the workshop of Nicolas Hotteterre and stamped' N/Hotteterre'with a six-pointed star above.

This makes it clear that Martin specialized in flutes and, indeed, was a maker of transverse flutes. Among the extant Hotteterre instruments there are only three transverse flutes, all of which are representative of the earliest three-piece model, and are stamped' Hotteterre' with an anchor below. It has long been speculated that the sign of the anchor was the mark Martin inherited from his father. In the light of these new data, we can assume this to be correct; we may also assume that the extant Hotteterre flutes were made in Martin's workshop. Although the inventory establishes that Martin made oboes, bassoons, musettes and piccolos, and Borjon included them among the woodwinds made by Jean and his sons, there are no known surviving examples. Of the two known Hotteterre oboes, one bears the mark of' L/Hotteterre' and the other' N/Hotteterre' In summary, Martin emerges as a master maker renowned for flutes and musettes, who <...>.

<...> lists his musical instruments kept' in another cabinet right next to the alcove, which were essentially the ones inventoried among the contents of Martin's bedroom (' a basse de viole, a viole, a pardessus de viole, a violon by Pierres in its case, a child's violin with a bow, a monocorus, a thorbe and a musette, priced at 100 livres'). Jacques's scores, itemized with the library books, were clearly those he had inherited from his father (document 9). We can note with interest that court records which list the instruments of the grand and petit choeur of the Opera orchestra (Acadmie Royale de Musique), of which Jacques was a member, do not include a number of instruments (musettes and cromornes) inventoried above. These, however, are indicated in scores and livrets and noted by contemporary writers on opera performance. It has been proposed that these instruments were played by extra musicians. But Martin's two posts (oboe and musette) and Jacques's <...>.

<...> See the fire in his eyes that seem to shoot off flames and darts.' The strokes are also consistent throughout two bars of accompanying semiquavers in the violas and basses. The staccato should be of the' hail' type. Turning to the third category, of strokes that serve to separate clearly a single note from a group of slurred notes that either precede or follow, we could call them' separation strokes' We find strokes in such patterns as shown in ex.3a so overwhelmingly, that we can identify sporadic dots as shrunken strokes. Illustrations are given in ex.3b from the D minor String Quartet for an upbeat, and ex.3c from Die Zuberflote for a downbeat. Though once in a while such separation strokes may have a slight accentual implication as perhaps in ex.3c in the majority of cases they do not. Their purpose seems to be simply that of differentiating a clear staccato separation from the very mild non-legato separation in such places as those of ex.3d from the start of the' Hunt' Quartet, K458 <...>.

- Will:

I will turn finally to experiments on what is now called the' child's developing theory of mind' (see Astington, Harris and Olson, 1988). By this is meant young children's explicit knowledge that they and others have mental states which are only' in the running for truth', that beliefs held by people can be false and yet these false beliefs can determine their thought and behaviour. The phenomena studied in theory-of-mind research, I will argue, fill out the Piaget-Flavell picture of the child as a victim of cognitive salience. Here is one of the standard procedures that is used to test whether a child has an adult-like appreciation of false belief. John and Mary (the two experimenters) show a child of three years of age a red box and a blue box and a pound coin. John gives Mary the coin, she hides it in the red box for safe-keeping and departs. Meanwhile John tells the child that he is going <...>.

If that is what is intended, the objector would say, then constructivism is nothing more than a kind of behaviourism (another attempt to replace the mental by the behavioural); or perhaps we might lump it together with Marxist attempts to' resolve' the mind-body problem in terms of' praxis'. That is hardly a solution: it merely changes the subject from the mental/physical relationship to the behavioural/physical relationship. What can I say in answer to this charge of irrelevance? I will take the example of an experience about whose veridicality a subject is undecided. I do this simply to bracket off questions about how experiences relate to the world and thus to concentrate on the question of subjectivity. Here is the example. Having just been reading a bright-red leaflet we glance up to a plain, white wall -- at which instant we see a green patch. For a second or so we are undecided about whether the patch is an after-image or a spot of mildew on the wall.

According to the Weber-Fechner law, there is a correlation between the intensity of the energy incident on the sense ending and the magnitude of the corresponding subjective experience. These laws seem a) to provide empirical support for the neurophysiological account of perception and b) to contribute to its explanatory force. I will argue, however, that a) and b) are apparent rather than real. a) Do the laws provide empirical support for the neurophysiological account of perception? Both laws are derived from observations and there can be no doubt about their empirical credentials. Are those empirical credentials sufficient, however, to sustain the metaphysical implications it is thought that the laws have? Empirical observations may generate laws that correlate one type of experience with another; but can they take us' beneath' experience to its basis <...>.

The right sort of literary experience can be like a nuclear explosion, whereas the' human expressiveness' that Scholes detects in the humblest graffito is more like the low-level radioactivity that is always present in the natural environment. There is, in fact, a good case for resisting the takeover of literature by culture, though it is not as strong as I once thought it was. My doubts have grown during the years I have been thinking about and then writing this book, but for the moment I will concede that for many scholars and teachers a clarion-call to defend' literature as literature' would prove rousing and timely. It was sounded a few years ago by Helen Gardner in In Defence of the Imagination, by the contributors to Laurence Lerner's Reconstructing Literature, and in America by Gerald Graff's Literature Against Itself (Graff's position has shifted somewhat in his more recent Professing Literature). It was heard loud and clear in the unedifying battles of the early eighties.

Once established,' Cultural Studies' might show structural affinities with Social Studies and move closer to that area. It might also become dominated by Marxists and cultural materialists, but not inevitably so; academic sociology offers points of comparison here. And in any case, Marxism looks like a declining force. My proposal will, I know, appear as selling the pass, to traditionalist teachers of English Literature, and perhaps upset them, which I am sorry for. I will point out, though, that it is in some ways a very conservative proposal, inviting a return to origins. When' English' first came on the scene in the nineteenth century, it was precisely as a form of Cultural Studies, involving not only language and literature, but history, geography, philosophy, and so on, requiring the first professors of the subject to be polymaths. It was only later that the aesthetic dimension of literary study became emphasized, with an accompanying concentration on the <...>.

Maybe this is one reason for depression, then: that the book's well-wrought arguments will not exercise those whose ideology it dissects. This indeed has already happened. Callinicos' Marxism has been repelled from the ramparts of pluralism for being... well, Marxist. It leads to the Gulag, you know, and is patriarchal to boot (translation: Marx had a beard). Given that Callinicos' book is difficult, and given the probability that despite the seriousness of its argument it is unlikely to be widely debated, I will firstly offer an interpretation of what I think its main themes are, and what they are not. In the first place, as the title makes plain, if offers a searching criticism of the claim that we are living in a postmodern epoch, and the consequence of that claim, that the culture and politics appropriate to such an epoch are structurally different from those of the preceding -- and now past -- Modern one. Callinicos' criticism of the' postmodern' hypothesis contains a range of emphases, <...>.

<...> and Socialist Realism (but also I suspect because of a more subterranean philosophical linkage between Callinicos' endorsement of Althusser's' complex totality' against Lukcs'' expressive totality'and the political voluntarism which it informed in the early twenties), Callinicos has to answer: No. This begins to be interesting, and it is I think the originary focus of that sense of misgiving with which I began. If I have been primarily expository hitherto (and I have been because I

believe Callinicos' book to be the best on this subject that we have) I will now begin to turn to criticism; or at least to trying to ventilate that reservation which, faced by Callinicos, certainty, will not be stilled. In a sense it doesn't matter if Callinicos' defence of Marxism is registered or not by the legion of Post-isms and -ists which form the undergrowth of contemporary cultural politics. They will wither at the first frosts anyway, if they come; and if they don't... But with his placement of Modernism in the lineage of Nietzsche, and as <...>.

Other mistakes do not affect the binding force of the directives. The pre-emption thesis claims that the factors about which the authority was wrong, and which are not jurisdictional factors, are pre-empted by the directive. The thesis would be pointless if most mistakes are jurisdictional or if in most cases it was particularly controversial and difficult to establish which are and which are not. But if this were so then most other accounts of authority would come to grief. # 5. Objections # I will conclude this chapter by considering a few objections to the account of authority suggested above which challenge its general orientation. I shall start with a misunderstanding which the method of explanation adopted here is likely to give rise to among readers used to philosophical explanations of concepts such as authority being presented as accounts of the meanings of words. Three theses were presented as part of an explanation of the concept of authority. They are supposed to advance our understanding of the concept by showing how authoritative action plays a special role <...>.

<...> than mine, letting his advice tilt the balance in favour of his solution will sometimes, depending on my rate of mistakes and the formula used, improve my performance. But I will continue to do less well than he does unless I let his judgement pre-empt mine. Consider the case in a general way. Suppose I can identify a range of cases in which I am wrong more than the putative authority. Suppose I decide because of this to tilt the balance in all those cases in favour of its solution. That is, in every case I will first make up my own mind independently of the' authority's' verdict, and then, in those cases in which my judgment differs from its, I will add a certain weight to the solution favoured by it, on the ground that it, the authority, knows better than I. This procedure will reverse my independent judgment in a certain proportion of the cases. Sometimes even after giving the argument favoured by the authority an extra weight it will not win. On other occasions the additional weight will <...>.

One, deriving from Hobbes and Locke, regards the consent given as an expression of rational enlightened self-interest. Its approach is instrumental. One consents to the establishment of a political society and to its authority because of the benefits one will derive from its existence. The other approach, deriving from Rousseau, regards consent non-instrumentally. The consent is a constitutive element both of the condition of the person who gives it and of the society resulting from it, which is good in itself. In this section I will offer an analysis of consent. I will then show, in the next section, how the non-instrumental approach to consent allows for a natural extension of the scope of the legitimacy of an authority to some cases where there is no consent.' Consent' means consent to a change in the normative situation of another -- to a change in his rights and duties. It is sometimes expressed and is spoken of what is agreed. Consent is, however, narrower than agreement and is roughly equivalent to the <...>.

But it is important to distinguish between two principles of political neutrality: Principles of Scope A: Neutrality concerning each person's chances of implementing the ideal of the good he happens to have. B: Neutrality as in A, but also regarding the likelihood that a person will adopt one conception of the good rather than another. B is the more radical principle, and in the absence of any special reason to prefer A, and given that writers supporting neutrality say little that bears on the issue, I will assume that the doctrine of neutrality advocates neutrality as in B. Another ambiguity concerns the level of neutrality. Is politics generally to be neutral between conceptions of the good, or does neutrality apply to the constitution only? The first, stricter, doctrine of neutrality allows that individuals may act to implement their ideals in their lives, and in the life of their community, but only to the extent that they can do so by non-political means. They may found voluntary associations, buy neighbourhoods and impose restrictive covenants <...>.

But the law is not necessarily so, and many people born today will find their chances to pursue different conceptions of the good affected by law as a result of the activities of our and previous generations. Again it seems best to assume the stricter doctrine as background for our discussion. It is important to realize what is involved in talking of principles of neutrality.' To

be neutral... is to do one's best to help or to hinder the various parties concerned in an equal degree.' This is the primary sense of neutrality, which I will call principled neutrality. In this sense one is neutral only if one can affect the fortunes of the parties and if one helps or hinders them to an equal degree and one does so because one believes that there are reasons for so acting which essentially depend on the fact that the action has an equal effect on the fortunes of the parties. One secondary sense of neutrality regards persons as neutral if they can affect the fortunes of the parties and if they affect the fortunes of all the parties equally regardless <...>.

Ensuring to all an equal ability to realize their conception of the good is more likely to require acting in a non-neutral way, acting to improve the ability of some at the expense of others. The principle is an anti-perfectionist principle but can it be regarded as a principle of neutrality? I think that this objection is mistaken and that the third principle is a principle of neutrality. I will call it the principle of comprehensive (political) neutrality to distinguish it from the second principle which will be called the principle of narrow (political) neutrality. We can best examine their character as two competing principles of neutrality in the context of objections to political neutrality on the ground that it is impossible or even incoherent. # 2. The Impossibility of Strict Political Neutrality # The most serious attempt to specify and defend a doctrine rather like our principle of comprehensive neutrality is that of J. Rawls. <...>.

In sum, then, there is no reason to believe that, in a complex machine, the real processes can be inferred reliably from any number of observations of internal behaviour (in the sense in which the changing of register contents expressed in binary numbers is internal behaviour), in the absence of knowledge of a quite different type: the language in which the processes have been expressed to the machine. It would be dangerous to suggest that this impossibility is in any strong sense theoretical, i.e. open to mathematical proof, and I will assume it is no more than a strong empirical impossibility. If such a program detective had descriptions of all the high-level languages ever written, and knew them to be all there were, then he could presumably work through them all in turn (the obvious difference from the human brain case being that, even if it has a high-level programming language we have no idea what it could be like). Suppose one grants some such upwards inscrutability, in terms of lower-to-higher language levels, does anything general or <...>.

Any claim that, because there are competing interpretations, either is equally valid in the absence of knowledge of the programmer's intentions in the matter, is impossible to maintain in the face of the long rolls of encashable instruments pouring out of its printer. # CRITERIA FOR AN EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS # I now want to draw together the four aspects of intelligent machines set out above and three prima facie features of consciousness: these three seem to me necessary criteria for any explication of consciousness, and I will suggest that the aspects of such machines already described are interestingly related to these facts. They are not, of course, sufficient features and I shall make neither claims nor suggestions here as to the sufficiency of existing or possible machines for being conscious entities. # (a) Vacuity or' downwards opacity' # Dennett (see below) has in recent publications emphasized the relative emptiness of the contents of consciousness: all that is not there and which, for much of the workings of our bodies, <...>.

For where it has been drawn is everywhere; from the insistence of Thorndike, and the early behaviourists like Watson and Hull, that all is to be explained, including human behaviour, in terms of conditioned reflexes, to the open-handedness of well-meaning liberationists like Rollin who argue that even worms and sea anemones should be given the benefit of the doubt since we can not be certain that they do not feel pain and therefore have a consciousness (1981: 31). Again, pursuant upon the discussion of recognition and perception, the criterion I will adopt will be the closeness of the behaviour to the pre-linguistic prototypes of human behaviour. Anthony Kenny's analysis of the differences between the voluntary behaviour of animals, a position acutely argued for by Aristotle, and that of human beings, gives us a useful start. It is beyond doubt, he argues, and most psychologists and ethologists would agree,' that animals act for the sake of goals, and that they may be conscious of their goals, in the quite literal sense that they may see <...>.

To live with Iago as a reader, or in the theatre, is bad enough; to create him shows an ability to conceive evil that almost strikes us as perverse and unnatural. Except....) I define the basic situation as that of Iago destroying Othello, since I believe that much modern criticism of the play has gone wrong through beginning with Othello, or through not giving Iago his full

measure of dominance. This is not the place to show the history of this misinterpretation, so I will merely suggest that discussions of the play ought to start from the beginning, as Shakespeare did, with the presence of Iago. It is a presence that dominates the action, first of all in its intimacy with the audience. No one else in the tragedies has as many soliloquies as Iago does (not even Hamlet). Hamlet is given soliloquies for reflection, self-criticism, and for resolves to act, some of which are carried out; Iago has them for self-presentation and for announcements of his actions <...>.

Indeed, ironically, the relation between lovers turns out, for him, to involve the most extreme possible violation of autonomy; in fact, the relation between lovers turns out to fit a relation Hegel argues must be transcended -- that between Master and Slave. Against the thinking of these philosophers, I propose to defend the view that the individual should be treated as a rational, autonomous being in perhaps the most private of all domains -- that of love-making. I shall support the view by means of a criticism of pornographic eroticism. Pornographic eroticism, I will argue, is, therefore, to be condemned, but it does not function in quite the way some feminists have argued that it does. Andrea Dworkin, in her book Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1981), argues that porn lies at the heart of male supremacy, of the oppression of women. I believe that this view is too strong, that, although porn does reinforce certain attitudes towards women, in the main, it is rather a symptom, and not a major part of <...>.

We have to understand the pleasure there is for women in such fantasies. We have to understand what seems often to attract women more than men to soap operas, or to a passionate interest in the doings of the Royal Family. We need to understand how and why male fantasies may commonly differ from female ones, and why the sorts of fantasies I have mentioned, which may in some ways seem antithetical to feminism, may still have a strong appeal to women who have a feminist allegiance. # The' Split' Between Reason and Desire # I will suggest, as a first example of this, a book by Suzanne Lowry, on Princess Diana, called The Princess in the Mirror (1985). The appearance of the book is at first glance like that of any other glossy book about the Royals. But it sets out, its author says, to deconstruct the image and appeal of the Princess. At the end of the book, Lowry states that the image of the Princess is conformist and reactionary, that it acts as a powerful form <...>.

Rare has been the computer project which did not, in the course of execution, bring to light an initial overestimation of the technical possibilities, and an underestimation of the problems of data preparation. The proliferation of personal computers in the last decade has often, embarrassingly, gone with an actual diminution in methodological sophistication. If the fruits of computing in the humanities are less abundant than one might have hoped, there are also disadvantages of the introduction of computers which are becoming all too obvious. Let me mention six, which I will call: redundancy of people, redundancy of effort, diversion of effort, diversion of funding, distortion of research and transfer of population. # 1) # Redundancy of people. Alexander Cruden spent the best years of his life preparing his concordance to the Bible. There is no longer any need for dedicated Crudens to make concordances. Classical scholars among us will all, as students, have stood in awe of our seniors who, given a rare Greek word, could pluck out of their memories the <...>.

The facts of observation might, or might not, fit into an acknowledged scheme of the universe, but the important thing, in Galileo's opinion, was to accept the facts and build the theory to fit them. The naive inductivist account of science, which I will outline in the following sections, can be looked on as an attempt to formalize this popular picture of science. I have called it inductivist because it is based on inductive reasoning, as will be explained shortly. In later chapters, I will argue that this view of science, together with the popular account that it resembles, is quite mistaken and even dangerously misleading. I hope that by then it will be apparent why the adjective' naive' is appropriate for the description of many inductivists. # Naive inductivism # According to the naive inductivist, science starts with observation. The scientific observer should have normal, unimpaired sense organs and should faithfully record what he can see, hear, etc. to be the case with respect to the situation he is <...>.

According to the naive inductivist, science starts with observation. The scientific observer should have normal, unimpaired sense organs and should faithfully record what he can see, hear, etc. to be the case with respect to the situation he is observing, and he should do this with an unprejudiced mind. Statements about the state of the world, or some part of it, can be justified or established as true in a direct way by an unprejudiced observer's use of his senses. The statements so arrived at (I will call

them observation statements) then form the basis from which the laws and theories that make up scientific knowledge are to be derived. Here are some examples of some not very exciting observation statements. At twelve midnight on 1 January 1975, Mars appeared at such and such a position in the sky. That stick, partially immersed in water, appears bent. Mr Smith struck his wife. The litmus paper turned red when immersed in the liquid. The truth of such statements is to be established by <...>.

The observation statements that form the basis of science are secure and reliable because their truth can be ascertained by direct use of the senses. Further, the reliability of observation statements will be transmitted to the laws and theories derived from them, provided the conditions for legitimate inductions are satisfied. This is guaranteed by the principle of induction that forms the basis of science according to the naive inductivist. I have already mentioned that I regard the naive inductivist account of science to be very wrong and dangerously misleading. In the next two chapters, I will begin to say why. However, I should perhaps make it clear that the position I have outlined is a very extreme form of inductivism. Many more sophisticated inductivists would not wish to be associated with some of the characteristics of my naive inductivism. Nevertheless, all inductivists would claim that in so far as scientific theories can be justified, they are justified by supporting them inductively on the basis of some more-or-less secure basis provided by experience. Subsequent chapters of this book will provide us with plenty of reasons <...>.

<...> a secure basis from which knowledge can be derived. In the present chapter, both of these assumptions will be criticized in a variety of ways and rejected for a variety of reasons. But first of all, I will sketch an account of observation that I think it is fair to say is a commonly held one in modern times, and which lends plausibility to the naive inductivist position. # A popular account of observation # Partly because the sense of sight is the sense most extensively used in the practice of science, and partly for convenience, I will restrict my discussion of observation to the realm of seeing. In most cases, it will not be difficult to see how the argument presented could be re-cast so as to be applicable to observation via the other senses. A simple, popular account of seeing might run as follows. Humans see by using their eyes. The most important components of the human eye are a lens and a retina, the latter acting like a screen on which images of objects external to the eye are formed.

I think it is fair to say that Lakatos adapted some of Kuhn's results to his own purposes. Lakatos's account was presented first in this book because it is best seen as a culmination of the Popperian programme and as a direct response to and an attempt to improve on the limitations of Popperian falsificationism. The major differences between Kuhn on the one hand and Popper and Lakatos on the other is the former's emphasis on sociological factors. Kuhn's' relativism' will be discussed and criticized later in the book. In the present chapter, I will restrict myself to a simple summary of Kuhn's views. Kuhn's picture of the way a science progresses can be summarized by the following open-ended scheme: pre-science -- normal science -- crisis-revolution -- new normal science -- new crisis The disorganized and diverse activity that precedes the formation of a science eventually becomes structured and directed when a single paradigm becomes adhered to by a scientific community. A paradigm is made up of the general theoretical assumptions and laws and techniques for their application that the members of a particular scientific <...>.

<...> the previous two chapters I have summarized two contemporary analyses of science that differ in fundamental respects. Lakatos and Kuhn offer conflicting distinctions between science and non-science or pseudo-science. The clash between Kuhn's views, on the one hand, and those of Lakatos, and also Popper, on the other, has given rise to a debate concerning two contrasting positions associated with the terms' rationalism' and' relativism' respectively. The debate is over the issues of theory appraisal and theory choice and over ways of demarcating science from non-science. In this chapter, I will first characterize two positions that represent the extremes of the debate, extremes that I will refer to as rationalism and relativism respectively. Then I will proceed to discuss the extent to which Lakatos and Kuhn can legitimately be characterized as rationalists or relativists. In the final section, I will begin to cast some doubt on the terms in which the debate has been set. # Rationalism # The extreme rationalist asserts that there is a single, timeless, universal criterion with reference to which the relative merits of rival <...>.

Is it not the case that individuals or groups can be wrong in their judgements about the nature or status of some theory? The posing of this kind of question suggests that there might well be a way of analysing science, its aims and its mode of progress, that focuses on features of science itself, irrespective of what individuals or groups might think. In the following chapter I will prepare the way for an analysis of that kind and in Chapter 11 I will propose an account of theory change in physics that does not hinge on the judgements of individuals or groups. FBF Editorial # Men have always painted women. Nude or clothed, the female figure has been at the centre of debates about the genius in art. In fact, throughout the entire history of art, as told by our cultural institutions, the creative male artist has been judged by his <...>.

This is not the place for a proper discussion of Empson's views, which like a great deal of British work are more concerned with critical method than with theory (he wrote (1950: 594) that' a critic ought to trust his own nose, like the hunting dog, and if he lets any kind of theory or principle distract him from that, he is not doing his work'). But his practical, analytical development of Richards's theory has been an important model for British criticism during the last few decades, and I will therefore conclude this section with a very brief indication of the difference between his and Richards's approach. In his early works Richards outlined in a general way the different textual factors contributing to the effect of poetry; he distinguished, for instance, between the sense, feeling, tone and intention of a text in Practical Criticism (pp. 180-3), and in Principles of Literary Criticism (pp. 103-12) he offered some discussion of rhythm and metre. But since his principal concern was with the psychological effect <...>.

<...> and although it has few answers to the problems facing the world archival community in such matters, I hope that it is in the position to ask some interesting questions. The present paper has, therefore, two main aims: first, to consider some of the ways in which historians use records and how this might (but probably won't) affect the storage of computer documents by their creators, record managers and archivists; and second, to consider some of the legal, institutional and cultural constraints on electronic archiving in central UK government. I will start by drawing a distinction between what I will call social science history and hermeneutic history. The former I conceive as the application of social science methodology to historical research. In its pure form, models are logically derived and then tested on historical data but I also include here most forms of quantitative research which use such data to test predefined hypotheses. I will leave to one side any consideration of the philosophical or practical relevance of this model of scientific activity. Hermeneutic history, on the other hand,<...>.

The paper and subsequent report were titled' Impact of electronic media on Scientific Research, Communication &; Collaboration'. Here are some quotations from the interviews regarding electronic mail: #'... pervading daily life...' #'... the telephone is dead.' #' It has increased the total amount of communications significantly...' #'... an accessory to face to face discussion...' #'... addiction...' #' All this communication is going to be lost to the history of science forever. There are no letters anymore.' I will argue, in this paper that, although valuable information is currently being lost to history, it need not and it should not be lost and the time has come to prevent it. Communication by electronic means is growing at a rapid rate throughout industry and government organisations. The growth is in terms of speed, medium, integration, numbers, and area. It has now reached the point where those professions involved in the management of data must take serious action to prevent information exchange becoming information loss.

The issues raised by handling census and other survey data as described by several speakers at this seminar are not so central to the management of our collections. A fundamental question in this area which does concern curators and readers at the British Library involves the nature of the text itself. Digital technology has introduced (or perhaps I should say that it has reintroduced, for the first time since the establishment and dominance of printing) the unstable, or infinitely variable, text. I will offer you a few examples of what this means for the British Library, in particular in its role as the provider of sources for historical research. # 13.2. Digitised publication as a replacement for print: the case of the Ordnance Survey # One issue which has yet to be resolved is that of the provision of large-scale Ordnance Survey mapping. In 1997, the Ordnance Survey will cease to produce its large scale mapping in analogue form, and will move to wholly digitised output. Having become an Executive <...>.

Even when we are balancing one consideration against another in a quite particular case, to decide which of two conflicting prima facie obligations is the more stringent, we are trying to reach such an intuition, but the wealth of detail which determines the relative degrees of stringency in this case will make it inexpressible in a formula mechanically applicable to other cases. A superficially similar case may differ from this one in some subtle matter of detail the relevance of which we will only recognize when we encounter it in the concrete. The prima facie duties Ross recognizes include the duty to maximise good, and the usually more stringent duty to minimise bad or evil. Good and evil are understood, just as with Moore, as non-natural characteristics whose presence in things is revealed to intuition. However, the duties to promote good and minimise evil may sometimes be outweighed by other duties, such as that of keeping a promise or a duty of gratitude, which in the particular circumstances are <...>.

How can our melodies be made both memorable and distinctive? This is not easy to answer. Each of us speaks with his own voice, and though the tone may be rich or poor the voice is unique. Similarly, our melodies are our own, but they may be striking or mediocre according to some hidden talent or the lack of it. There is no certain formula for making good, original melody, yet we can give some principles which will help towards this goal. Later we will discuss different technical constructions, but for the time being we will define precisely what makes melody, and what, probably, makes it distinctive. Melody is a rise and fall of notes, related to each other in time. There are therefore two main melodic components: # (1) # A pattern of notes, rising and falling. # (2) # Rhythmic designs which relate the notes to one another in time. In my opinion, distinctiveness and memorability owe more to rhythmic design than <...>.

There is no doubt that with closer spacing and dissonances in the lower parts the same note-groups could produce ugly results. We will return to this problem of spacing in the following section, with a more extended discussion on consonance and dissonance. The second method of creating harmony in free twelve-note music is mostly concerned with the qualities of intervals (their different degrees of consonance or dissonance), their combination in chords, and the control of the horizontal flow of such chords. We will therefore call this method of harmony creation' interval harmony'. Interval harmony. Example 112 shows consonant intervals within the octave, with the strongest on the left moving to the weakest on the right: Apart from the unison, it will be seen that consonances consist really of only three intervals (5ths and major and minor 3rds) and their inversions. The inversion of the unison (the octave) is omitted, because it is largely avoided in twelve-note music through its tendency to dominate as a tonal <...>.

The tritone, though designated as' neutral', has a rather changeable quality, as it can seem mildly dissonant in a consonant context or consonant in a dissonant one. However, for the sake of simplicity, we can regard the tritone as being midway between consonant and dissonant. Our first step in illustrating interval harmony using the whole chromatic octave will be to write a succession of consonances in two parts: This succession of six two-part chords uses the total-chromatic and a variety of consonances, though not the 4th and major 6th. We will now add a lower part which will turn the consonant effect into one of uniformly relaxed mild dissonance. This is done in each chord by adding a note which is mildly dissonant with one of the upper parts. The mild dissonance used is either a minor 7th or a major 9th: Note that the added part is mostly in contrary motion with the top part (this usually gives a more powerful bass), and that all the notes used are different. .

In the following examples we will alter the above procedure, beginning with two-part chords which are all dissonant. We have included tritones as mild dissonances deliberately, to illustrate certain factors: We will now introduce a lower part which will disperse the dissonances in the upper parts and produce relatively smooth, relaxed harmony. This is done most efficiently when the lower part is consonant with both the upper parts: Note that with tritones, the only possible notes which are consonant with both upper parts cause incomplete diminished 7th chords to appear. Finally, we will add a fourth part below to make complete four-part harmony. We will set ourselves the objective of increasing the degree of consonance still further, and therefore the bass will be kept consonant with all upper parts: Though the effect of this is quite good, indeed smooth and sonorous, the concept of using a bass consonant with all upper parts has produced chords which are either diminished 7ths (chord 1) or contain major or minor chords. (Note that in chord 1 a tritone has been used as <...>.

The large gap between the bassoons and the next woodwind part above is filled by the brass. If there is no tuba, the part which would have been given to it will be allotted to two bassoons in unison (if it does not go too low for them, of course). Below is a simple illustration of this, given on two staves to save space. It is the opening of a Trauermarsch by Schubert (for pianoforte, four hands): Ex. 27 (deleted:figure) The five octaves, from top to bottom, we will call a, b, c, d, e, and the scoring suggested (which the student should copy out in open score for greater clearness) is as follows: # (a) # 2 fl. and 2 clar. # (b) # 2 ob. and 2 trumpets. # (c) # 1st and 3rd hns., 2 tenor troms. # (d) # 2nd and 4th hns., bass trom. # (e) # 2 bassoons (and tuba, if any).