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SUMMARY

Theoretical and practical relevance of the research

The ideal of European unity has dominated, albeit with a few evident exceptions, the political thought of post-war European leaders during the second half of the 20th century. It also had strong popular support across the societies of European countries. The shock of two world wars, and especially Western Europe's direct experience of Nazism, widely (although mistakenly, as shown by Hannah Arendt¹) understood as a radical form of nationalism, prompted a rejection of the ideal of a nation state, which was dominant throughout the 19th century. A search began for new ways and means of transcending the sovereignties of nation states and uniting the countries of Europe. The primary goal was articulated clearly: peace and economic prosperity of European countries willing to enter into agreements that limit their sovereignty. "We aim to take away from the governments the means of preparing for war and the risk of them engaging in it"², wrote Robert Schuman, a French statesman widely considered to be the father of the project of what would eventually become the European Union. As of yet, the ideal of European unity has taken only one evidently expressed form – that of the European Union (EU, formerly (until 1992) European

1 Hannah Arendt in one of the most in depth analysis of nacionalsocialism wrote: „Nazis were not simple nationalists. Their nationalist propaganda was directed toward their fellow- travelers and not their convinced members; the latter, on the contrary, were never allowed to lose sight of a consistently supranational approach to politics. Nazi „nationalism“ had more than one aspect in common with the recent nationalistic propaganda in the Soviet Union, which is also used only to feed the prejudices of the masses. The Nazis had a genuine and never revoked contempt for the narrowness of nationalism, the provincialism of the nation-state, and they repeated time and again that their „movement,“ international in scope like the Bolshevik movement, was more important to them than any state, which would necessarily be bound to a specific territory.“ Hannah Arendt, *Totalitarizmo ištakos. Iš vokiečių kalbos vertė Arvydas Šliogeris*. Vilnius: Tyto Alba, 2001, p. 39.

2 Robert Schuman, *Už Europą*. Translated by Irmina Kovalčikienė. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2002, p. 45.

Economic Community), whose political predominance was so apparent that it became common to identify Europe with the European Union not only in everyday language, but also the field of European studies. The success of the EU project was – and still is – considered to be a measure of success of the project of a united Europe. For a long time, up until the global economic crisis of late 2008, this project continued to be developed, despite some setbacks, in a single direction – towards increasingly deeper integration.

Integration was both broadened by incorporating new countries and deepened by transferring more and more political decisions from the competence of nation states to the expertise of Brussels. During the period leading to the aforementioned crisis, optimistic confidence in the success of integration was prevalent in public discussions and academic research. There is a continued effort to partially follow this notion by stressing that European (i.e., EU) integration has always faced various obstacles and challenges, while ignoring the fact that these challenges were never as large-scale or systemic as to become insurmountable and induce a reverse process of EU disintegration.

However, conflicts within the EU which have become apparent over the last decade and increasingly obvious signs of a systemic and structural crisis have made discussions regarding the future of the EU inevitable, while also forcing an acknowledgement that the hitherto direction of the Union's development is no longer self-evident. In the last decade alone, the European Union faced Euro and migrant crises, and had to deal with the fallout caused by United Kingdom's decision to leave the union; furthermore, due to intensifying criticism regarding the "legitimacy crisis" caused by EU's functional integration, the prospect of disintegration has since been on everybody's mind – from leaders of the EU and its member states, to European researchers, leaders of public opinion, and societies of European countries themselves. Political doubts over the EU's long-term survival were most evidently revealed by the five scenarios for the Union's future (part of the "White Paper"), presented by J.-C. Juncker, President of the European Commission; the document proved that the European

Commission was searching for a way to save the European Union, and therefore did not hold its survival to be self-evident. Anxiety regarding the EU's future is also reflected in the statements of leaders of EU's supranational institutions and member states alike: F. Timmermans, Vice-President of the European Commission, stated in 2016 that "the European project can fail", and even after the first of the great crises, the Euro crisis of 2010, A. Merkel declared that "if the Euro fails, Europe fails", symptomatically using the word "Europe" to refer to the European Union³. The question of the survival of the European Union as the sole project of European unification realized in the 20th/21st century, became a natural part of political discussion.

The same trend can be seen in the statements of scientists and other public figures. George Soros, an especially active proponent of deeper European integration and federalization of the EU, caused some controversy and surprised many by stating that "the EU looks like the Soviet Union in 1991", in the sense that it may similarly collapse due to ignorance of its problems⁴. Generally speaking, comparisons between the EU and the USSR, which were still rare and often considered inadequate at the start of the previous decade, in recent years have become commonplace in discussions among both Lithuanian and European politicians and political scientists; such comparisons have even been publically made by several heads of EU member⁵. The

3 Florian Eder et al., „Commission outlines 5 scenarios for future of EU in white paper.“ *POLITICO*, 2017-03-01. <<https://www.politico.eu/article/breaking-politico-obtains-white-paper-on-eu-future/>> [Accessed 2018-02-09]; François-Xavier Lefranc „Frans Timmermans: The European project can fail.“ *Euractiv*, 2016-11-07. <<https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/interview/frans-timmermans-the-european-project-can-fail/>> [Accessed 2018-02-09]; BBC News, „Merkel: If the euro fails, Europe fails.“ *BBC*, 2011-09-07. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-14827834>> [Accessed 2018-02-09].

4 George Soros, „The EU looks like the Soviet Union in 1991 – on the verge of collapse.“ *The Guardian*, 2019-02-12. <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/12/eu-soviet-union-european-elections-george-soros>> [Accessed 2019-02-12].

5 Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, „Is the European Union truly like the Soviet Union?“ *New Europeans*. 2021-02-16. <<https://neweuropeans.net/article/3513/european-union-truly-soviet-union>> [Accessed 2021-02-22]

same question of EU's survival has been raised in academic studies by supporters of the EU project (Jurgen Habermas, *Europe: The Faltering Project*, 2009; John Gillingham, *The EU. An Obituary*, 2016; Jan Zielonka, *Counter-Revolution. Liberal Europe in Retreat*, 2018), as well as critics of its current direction. The latter have even issued the so-called "Paris Manifesto" – a declaration signed by dozens of representatives of the social sciences, which presents a concise critique of the EU's development and a vision for reform⁶. The last decade has seen a sharp increase in academic works analyzing various aspects of the EU crisis – from the Euro crisis (Joseph Stiglitz, *The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe*, 2016) to the crisis of legitimacy (Vivien Schmidt, *Europe's Crisis of Legitimacy: Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers in the Eurozone*, 2018). Critical approach to the meaning and future of the EU project (so-called Euroscepticism) has itself long since become a separate field of study.

Considerations regarding the possibility that European integration, in the form of the EU, may end up in failure and turn into disintegration, are not merely theoretical, nor are they limited to political discussions or scientific studies. The very real possibility of countries leaving the EU (thus increasing the risk of disintegration) was most clearly demonstrated by the secession of the United Kingdom from the European Union following the 2016 referendum (i.e., Brexit). It should be noted that as the Brits were voting to leave the EU, there was a lot of doubt whether it was even possible or if they would really go through with their decision, as well as hopes for a new referendum on the same question and various other outcomes. These expectations did not come true, however. The British secession, as unexpected as it may have seemed through the dominant prism of the European integration paradigm, really took place. Pan-European public opinion polls indicate clearly that doubts regarding their continued membership in the EU and its prospective benefits exist in other countries as well. These same

6 Phillipe Bénétou et al., „The Paris Statement. A Europe We Can Believe In.“ Paris, 2017. <<https://thetrueeurope.eu/paryziaus-pareiskimas/>>

societal trends are especially pronounced in the “contributor” member states of the EU – the ones that contribute more to the EU’s budget than they receive from it directly. In 2020, citizens of the largest EU countries were asked whether they would “support [their] country leaving the EU if the UK and its economy are regarded to be in good health in five years”. In Germany, 30% of respondents agreed with this statement; in Italy, 45%; in France, 38%; in Spain, 39% of respondents. Of all these countries, only in Germany there were less people who would support the secession than those who would not⁷. Similar results have been observed across the largest EU economies since 2016, regardless of how the question was formulated (e.g., support for the referendum, disposition to vote for leaving, the perceived benefits of the membership for one’s country, etc.). No country has a majority supporting the secession, but there was no such majority in the United Kingdom when the referendum was announced, either. Such polling results across the societies of various EU member states regarding the future prospects of the European Union suggest only that they are far from certain; and it is precisely this uncertainty that has in the last few decades become a new significant development in how the prospects of European unity itself are being assessed.

All of this suggests that on every level – from the political elite (decision makers) to researchers of European integration (analysts) and societies themselves (citizens) – the prospects of the project of European unity seem rather nebulous, and the future of the project is no longer considered certain. The aim of preserving the European Union, declared unanimously by the heads of member states and supranational institutions of the EU, clearly shows that it is considered an important and pressing political problem.

One explicit academic answer to that is the theory of European disintegration, which began to take form a decade ago in response

7 David Walsh, „How likely are the ‚big four‘ European economies to vote to leave the EU if Brexit works out?“ *Euronews*, 2020-08-10. <<https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/10/nearly-half-of-italians-would-support-leaving-the-eu-if-brexit-is-successful-according-to>>

to the aforementioned crises, and has since been detail in several monographs. Designed to answer the question of how disintegration is developing and will continue to develop, this theory has already become important enough in the field of European studies to become a separate subject in academic curricula⁸. Ultimately, neither political statements, nor research trends are necessary in order to understand that Europe's political fate is an existential question of the continent's nations; for many of them, including Lithuania, gaining membership in the EU was the most important event in decades, and the pursuit of it is the most evident long-term goal. Any essential developments in the project of a united Europe would directly and diversely impact the everyday lives of many citizens of EU member states. One can reasonably summarize that the prospects of European integration have become an important political, theoretical, scientific, and even existential problem for the European people. The scale and depth of the crisis plaguing the project of European unification has given cause to fundamentally question the dominant model of integration that preceded the crisis, and begin searching for potential alternatives to it; and in order to contemplate them, it is necessary to reconsider in earnest the philosophical basis of the idea of a united Europe.

The European Union is not Europe, and the on-going EU integration is not the only viable project of European integration. The problem of identifying one with the other is already being analyzed by researchers (Ari Hirvonen, *Imagining Europe as Open Spaces*, 2014); however, the EU is the sole project that has been practically realized to the extent where Europe and the EU have become largely conflated in the consciousness of Europeans. Uncertainty over the prospects of the project's long-term success has made those not indifferent to the continent's future raise

8 Hans Vollaard, *European Disintegration: A Search for Explanations*. London, Macmillan, 2018; Webber, Douglas, *European Disintegration? The Politics of Crisis in the European Union*, London: Macmillan, 2019. Those and other studies reflect a tendency, that the phenomena of European dezintegration is being analyzed in the field of European studies, in the context of theories of neofuncionalism, intergovernmentality and eurofederalism, all of which considered "classical" theories in European studies.

practically significant questions. What is the future of the project of a united Europe? What are the causes of the current crisis? What possible changes to the project of European unification could ensure its increased vitality? At best, the question regarding the future of the project of a united Europe is answered speculatively, not scientifically. Political, economic, cultural, demographic and other causes of the crisis that has befallen the current project of European unity are being analyzed. Potential changes to the institutional framework and the agreements that define it are being considered, some of which are suggested by EU's own supranational institutions.

There is, however, one underlying question that is naturally not being raised by the politicians (J. Monnet himself has publically advocated for avoiding such questions), but is paradoxically not being asked by the researchers of the field of European studies, either – the question of the theoretical foundations for European unification. Which ideas serve as the basis for the current unification of Europe, what enabled the conditions and prerequisites necessary for it to happen, and what characteristics are inherently “hard-wired” into this project of unity? Respectively, what would be the price of rejecting certain characteristics of the current project of a united Europe? Ergo, what changes are possible, and which ones are not.

There exists a vast contrast between the exceptionally numerous and varied theoretical explanations of EU integration and empirical scientific research, and the nearly universal disregard for its philosophical bases. This void itself requires an explanation. On one hand, the reflective nature of political reality has become fully apparent since the 18th century, meaning we have now fully realized that political entities and their systems are materializations of ideas of political philosophy. On the other hand, philosophical study is not only a tool for revealing the theoretical and ideological principles that constitute the empirically studied political entities, but also a means of evaluating their theoretical validity and prospects of their practical implementation and sustainability. As shown by the example of “scientific” research into building communism, conducted in the Soviet Union, even impossible

political projects, conceptualized through utopian imagination, can become a subject of research. Scientific studies of European integration are facing a similar challenge, the existence of which is only confirmed by the increasing doubts regarding sustainability and long-term survival of the current project of integration.

The project of European unification is undoubtedly based on specific philosophical ideas. One would assume that its proponents should strive to formulate as clearly as possible a vision for the future of an integrated Europe. However, one of the most puzzling characteristics of the current project of EU integration is the fact that discussions at the highest political level and academic publications constantly refer only to general European values, which remain abstract and indefinite as long as their philosophical basis and content are not revealed, and these are never clearly articulated in EU documents. There is an overall reluctance to study the philosophical foundations of the European Union. By itself, this fact is reason enough to ask why the issue of EU's philosophical foundations is consistently avoided in research papers in the field of European studies, and what are the fundamental authors and ideas upon which rest the visions of the project of European integration.

Another noteworthy characteristic of European studies is the fact that even the most important concepts in this field of research are not clearly defined. The very concept of integration is used in Europeanisation studies almost as if it was self-evident, and no attempt is made to explain its content, opting instead to rely on formalistic descriptions, thus maintaining a façade that European integration is a commonly understood mode and process of unifying separate countries. Both in everyday language and academic research, European unification is primarily and generally referred to precisely by the terms of “integration” or “Europeanisation”. However, one of the strangest and especially noteworthy characteristics of public political statements regarding the unification of Europe and academic studies of this process is that these underlying concepts usually remain undefined or are described in very abstract terms. The so-

called process of “Europeanization” is usually considered to be the essence of European integration; however, this widely used term is one of the least defined, most ambiguous and nebulous concepts in scientific literature. Throughout the last decade, its definition has been expanded so much that it gradually came to mean “changes determined by the EU”.⁹ An objective explanation of its content and meaning is possible only at the most fundamental level – that of philosophical analysis – by reconstructing the ideas that undergird various philosophical visions of integration, which are often obscured by the politicized and ideologized speech of not only public, but also academic discourse on EU integration.

Development of both the European Union and modern Europe itself essentially meant construction of a new political reality. The generally recognized founding fathers of the EU – Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet – agreed that Europe would have to be made, and that it was necessary to create a new conception of Europe and forge a new relation between Europeans and the idea of Europe. However, Robert Schuman spoke of a new relation with the already existing Europe, while Jean Monnet intended to create Europe as a new social construct that had little in common with the concept of “Europe” that existed at that time. “This idea – EUROPE – will reveal to all the common foundations of our civilization and gradually create a bond reminiscent of the one that was nurtured by homelands”¹⁰, wrote R. Schuman, referring to the existing Europe. “European unity is a process that encourages both people and nations to adapt to the changing circumstances [...] and forever transforms the relations between people and nations”¹¹, wrote Monnet, referring to a Europe that was yet to be created. The concepts of Europe put forward by these two

9 Klaudijus Maniokas, „Teorinė prieiga: europeizacija, elitas, valstybės užgrobinimas ir vystymasis“, *Politologija*, 4 (76), 2014, p. 7. < <https://www.zurnalai.vu.lt/politologija/article/view/4874/3130> >

10 Schuman, p. 22.

11 Jean Monnet, „A Ferment of Change.“ *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1(3), 1963, p. 2011.

politicians determined the development of two completely different visions for the unification of Europe and theoretical foundations they were based on. This essential divergence of visions for integration, the circumstances that caused it, and their consequences for the prospects of the project of European unity are analyzed in detail in the last chapter of the dissertation.

Europe is, among other things, a political idea what must take root in the consciousness of the population of a united Europe, and remain vivid in their imaginations. This idea must become an important element of political self-awareness of Europeans, and part of their identity. However, the essential question – regarding the basis and specific content of this idea – remains to be decided. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, when the European Economic Community officially became a political union, the EU began to continuously finance various projects aimed at researching and developing a European identity. By copying the modern nation states' formula of political allegiance and loyalty, an attempt was made to determine which of the common components of unifying national identities could be transplanted into the evidently multinational European political identity. Diversity of languages proved to be completely incompatible with this goal; however, it was decided that shared history, shared cultural norms, shared symbols and a shared “pantheon of heroes” (closely related with shared history), could serve as the required bases of European identity. Many works have been written, analyzing this narrative of European history or European heroes¹². However, the project of European unification is in no way an attempt at merely transplanting elements of national identity to a European level. Unifying Europe and creating the loyalty and identity

12 In Lithuania the topic was analyzed by Liutauras Gudžinskas, „Europos Sąjungos kultūros politika: integracija, dėl kurios nesiderama.“ Kn. *Istorijos politikos modeliai ir kryptys: Europos Sąjungos, Lenkijos, Rusijos ir Baltarusijos istorijos politika*. Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2014, 15–62; Adomas Pūras, *The Many faces of Jean Monnet: European identity projects in scholarly narratives*. Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2017.

that are necessary for that, requires answering the question of how European identity relates to national identities. The principal practical dilemma here is this: can they supplement each other, or must they replace one another? This dilemma can only be solved by theoretically answering the question of what ideas and values compose the basis of this intended European identity. It is thus necessary to ascertain what theoretical assumptions underlie the various projects of integration, especially the hitherto project, currently plagued by a crisis.

This dissertation treats the entire history of the idea of a united Europe and the attempts at unifying it as an expression of the constant tension between the moral and political ideal of European unity and the political particularism of the European states. Humanity has always existed only by dividing itself into limited, self-defined communities, and the notion of a united humanity has always been just a normative ideal. One of the most universal forms of such limited self-defined communities, regardless of its changing concept, is the nation. Since the Antiquity, the tension that exists between the concepts of national particularism and universalism has been a characteristic feature of what can be called European self-image. Their dichotomy hides the question of what is the relation between the so-called universal to humanity and nation-specific values, or to what extent a member of a specific limited community is also a member of humanity as a whole.

Throughout various periods of European history, this question was raised differently. Theoretical answers to it depended on the religious and cultural context of specific times, and the philosophical assumptions chosen by the thinkers who pondered the question. Because the cultural and sociopolitical reality we call “Europe” is the result of a centuries-old process of modernization, in order to answer the question of whether political unification of Europe makes it possible to combine the particular national and the more universal European individual identities, we need to discuss the basic differences of solving this problem in the pre-modern and modern paradigms of European thought.

In the paradigm of pre-modern political thought, the question of whether united humanity exists encompasses two different dimensions of human coexistence. On one hand, the variety of nations and their in-fighting is an evident historical fact that attests to the disunity of humanity. That is a political aspect¹³. On the other hand, a moral aspect normatively exists as well: is it possible to take care of every member of humanity equally? Tensions between the moral prospects of humanity's unity and the factual existence of diverse and rivaling nations became the basis to theoretically raise the question of whether a politically united humanity exists at all, and practically – whether it was even possible.

This universalist-particularist dilemma, contemplated from a metaphysical philosophical and Christian theological perspective during the pre-modern period, took on a completely new form in the modern times and revealed itself fully in the 18th and 19th centuries in the shape of a theoretical dispute between Enlightenment and romanticism, even though its conceptual and historical origins can be traced back to the opposition between Renaissance humanism (universalism) and Protestant denominations (particularism). In this perspective, cosmopolitanism was represented by the rationalist Enlightenment thinkers, who suggested basing human relations on instrumental rationality, while nationalism was represented by the adherents of the romanticism, who saw the culturally limited sense of sympathy as the basis of human relations.

In both of these visions, however, the individual remained a mere representative of its species (be it humanity or nation), useful only as far as it participated in the general process of progress¹⁴. The seemingly opposite lines of 18th and 19th centuries thought both treated the man instrumentally and (even though it was never specified

13 The Question of comparability of political nations and the project of European integration was analyzed more thoroughly by the author of this dissertation in an article „The Future of Nations in the Perspective of European Integration“, *LOGOS*, Nr. 84–86, 2015.

14 Anthony D. Smith, „Romanticism and Nationalism.“ *The Antiquity of Nations*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p. 239.

as such) followed the modernist assumption that history serves as an arena for creating a perfect man. Their conflict manifested as a search for a way to realize the universal principles of reason within a specific community which a man – a finite being – would be able to identify with. From the perspective of European integration, it became a question of how to preserve, by following abstract unifying principles (e.g. principles of Habermasian discourse), a sufficiently large community which a man would be willing to sacrifice himself for, identify with and remain loyal to.

Rationalism of the Enlightenment required to perceive the individual as a completely abstract representative of humanity as a whole, and viewed even cultural differences as a transient illusion that had to be entirely reduced to a unified global culture, or did not attribute these differences with any integrational function at all. It is not clear what could take this function over. Within such a perspective, even the individual undergoes disintegration, having lost all reference points of identity, primarily that of a defined community. The need for a collective identity is natural human characteristic.

Meanwhile, romantic historicism, having acknowledged the expression of “the spirit of nations” based on cultural differences, encountered fundamental difficulties in validating even the idea of a moral unity of humanity. One could say that the challenge of theoretically and practically solving this dilemma is the most important and difficult of the questions raised by all the projects of European unification of the 19th and 20th centuries, as well as a moral, intellectual and political driving force of the entirety of continental integration to this day. The assumption is that this exact conflict is the underlying cause of the tensions that plague the European Union.

Overview of existing research

European integration studies is a very broad and constantly expanding field, abundant in “scientific production”. It is dominated by institutional research that analyzes the activity of EU institutions

(EU's public policy) and its results. A multitude of studies on the history of European integration have also been written, but are mostly empirical and tend to analyze how the process of European integration is impacted by political events, not political ideas; therefore, they do not enter the field of history of ideas and are thus irrelevant to the subject of this dissertation. The same can be said about the equally abundant works of research on the development of European integration theories, which seek to conceptualize both the processes occurring in the EU and their empirical studies. Numerous research papers developing the theory of European integration do not attempt to trace the theoretical origins of European integration, opting instead to conceptualize the on-going empirical research on the EU. The absolute majority of these studies correspond closely to the conception of modern theory formulated by H. Arendt, according to which a theory is “a working hypothesis, changing in the wake of its own results and obtaining based not on what it “manifests” or “reveals”, but on whether or not it “works”¹⁵. Even before the start of the aforementioned series of crises that befell the process of European integration, the very nature of the crisis that now plagues the theories of European integration was specified exactly – a confusion between the “narrow” and “wide” conceptions of theory, as well as “subjectivity” and “objectivity”¹⁶. There is an abundance of research aimed at developing and improving the theories of European integration that conceptualize the empirical studies, but very few works that are dedicated to analyzing the philosophical foundations of European integration itself. The question examined in this dissertation – i.e., what are the theoretical bases of the project of European unification – is almost unresearched specifically. The field of theoretical European studies is completely dominated by papers on the development of the European Union as a political entity, not the idea of Europe itself. Symbolically

15 Hannah Arendt, *Tarp praeities ir ateities. Aštuoni politinės filosofijos etiudai*. Translated by Arvydas Šliogeris. Vilnius: Aidai, 1995, p. 48.

16 Vytautas Radžvilas, „Europos integracijos tyrimai ir teorinės paradigmos paieškos.“ *Politologija*, 55(3), 2009, p. 35–36; 45.

enough, the list of 100 recommended books on Europe, available on the website of the European Parliament, mostly consists of books that analyze the European Union, and not Europe itself. Not only is there a lack of critical literature on the topic, there is a shortage or literature that analyzes the development of the idea of a united Europe separately from the EU project. It is hard to find literature dedicated not explicitly to the EU, but the development of the idea of a united Europe among the studies on the development of the idea of Europe, and what little there is tends to be relatively one-sided and bare-bones. There are two dominant trends of such research. One type analyzes how the usage and meaning of the term “Europe” changed throughout history (Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, 1957; Kevin Wilson, Jan van der Dussen (eds.), *What is Europe? The History of the Idea of Europe*, 1993; Heikki Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, 1998; Anthony Pagden, *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, 2002;). The other examines specific projects of European unification put forward by theorists and politicians (Denis de Rougement, *The Meaning of Europe*, 1965; Denis de Rougement, *The Idea of Europe*, 1968; Catriona Seth and Rotraud von Kulessa (eds.), *The Idea of Europe: Enlightenment Perspectives*, 2017). Studies of both varieties differ in their comprehensiveness, authors emphasized, chronological limitations of research subjects, and other aspects. However, neither of these types of research tend to focus on the theoretical and historical preconditions that determined this exact course of development of the projects of European unity, and are often presented in a descriptive manner, or belong to the anthological genre in general.

A few striking exceptions can be distinguished from the rest. These include Gerard Delanty (*Invention of Europe*, 1998), who made an honest attempt at presenting a coherent vision of the development of the idea of Europe and its historical and political (but not theoretical) assumptions. Two recent papers also demonstrate the same ambition, one of which attempts to analyze the history of the idea of Europe from a postcolonial perspective, rejecting the “Europocentric” approach

(Shane Weller, *The Idea of Europe: A Critical History*, 2021), while the other examines how individual philosophers view the idea of Europe, instead of projects of a united Europe (Darian Meacham, Nicholas de Warren, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Europe*, 2020).

In 2014, a collective study was released, titled “Europe Beyond Universalism and Particularism”. Articles of the book are focused on the development of the concept of political universalism, questioning “Europe” as an idea in the Kantian sense on the basis of Husserl’s and Derrida’s conceptions of Europe, as well as Derrida’s and Habermas’s approaches to the problem of a united Europe. Half of the book is dedicated to questions regarding European identity and the directly related issues of the European Other and the spatial definition of Europe. While related to the subject of the dissertation, this study does not attempt to trace the genesis of the theoretical foundations of European unification.

Seemingly relevant to the subject of the dissertation, yet actually distinct from it, is the question of European identity, which was of particular interest to the European thinkers of the interwar period, reflecting upon the crisis of their own time; it was also the reason behind the multitude of works on European identity and unity during this period. However, the question of identity is essentially cultural, not political, even if it does have significant and obvious political consequences, and is often tackled incorrectly precisely because of the gross ignorance of its political aspect. Answers to the question of what is explicitly European are closely, albeit ambivalently related to the subject of the dissertation: on one hand, they are dependent of the exact political ideas upon which Europe is being unified; on the other, the very conception of “Europeanness” determines the bases upon which the political unification of Europe, no matter how defined, is being attempted. In the most general sense, Europe is conceived either as defined (often mistakenly referred to as “closed”) and characterized by specific cultural and civilizational content, which defines its limits, or as undefined, and thus primarily characterized precisely by its openness to the Other and the ability to transcend itself, which is what

makes Europe a potentially universal model of political organization. In the 20th century, the former approach was dominant in the Christian tradition of political thought, while the latter prevailed among various modernist movements. From a political perspective, the differing views on Europeanness also reflect differing visions of what bases Europe should and can be unified upon. This divergence of conceptions of Europe was already evident during the interwar period (the Christian conception was reflected in Gonzague de Reynold, *Tragiškoji Europa. Naujujų laikų revoliucija. I-III dalys*; 1938; in Lithuania – Juozas Luomanas, *Quo Vadis, modernioji Europa*, 1932; globally – Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europa*, 1923; Edmund Husserl, *Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity*, 1935).

Studies of European identity were plenty during afterwar and nowadays. Most of them can be grouped in those defending national identities from erosion in universalism and those suggesting universal identity, capable of transcending Europe and potentially including whole humanity. The former are usually associated with Euro-scepticism, the latter – with euro-optimism, though both concepts are ideologically charged and problematic. Rare exceptions in the field of European identity studies present an attempt to suggest not open identity, but one defined by civilization content (this is the way, suggested in collection of essays „Renovatio Europae“, edited by David Engels). Such a dynamic of the search for European identity clearly shows that attempts to find a defined civilizational European identity are scarce and hardly find a place in this field of studies. Question of European identity is not an object of this dissertation, but it seeks to show that such a state of studies of European identity is by no means accidental and reveal theoretical foundations of this situation.

Of the current-day Lithuanian European studies, the most recent and prominent study on the subject of European identity is the 2019 monograph by Povilas Aleksandravičius, titled “Europe as a Way of Thinking: Foundations of Open Society”. The aim of the monograph is to reveal the way of thinking that constitutes

European identity. Its thesis is that Europeanness is a process that requires continuous effort, an intellectual “struggle” and “search” towards forming an open relation with the Other, which is also a philosophical validation of the European Union¹⁷. It is noted that “Europeanness is not a substantive sort of identity, but rather a way of thinking”¹⁸. The author bases his theses precisely on a tradition of conceptualizing Europeanness that was begun by E. Husserl and continued by J. Patočka and P. Ricœur, commonly identified as his students (according to J. Patočka, this tradition is analyzed in detail in Rodolphe Hasche, *Europe, or the Infinite Task*, 2009), and is himself an adherent of this tradition. This approach, which states that European identity has no cultural content, and is instead a way of thinking based on openness, allows both of the aforementioned authors to easily solve the question of the relation between a European and national identity – supposedly, they are not commensurable, and thus cannot conflict with one another. Despite all that, stepping outside the framework of this approach and considering the necessity of creating a political European identity (i.e., capable of ensuring political loyalty), means that this question (side-stepped by the author himself) remains open. Openness as a way of thinking does not create loyalty required for the project of a united Europe.

Furthermore, although it follows other authors and employs different cross-cuts compared to this dissertation, the book provides an interesting analysis of the idea of divided sovereignty, characteristic of modern Europe. It can be said that this concept was developed by French philosopher J.-M. Ferry, whose model of reconstructive ethics requires one to reconsider the painful and bond-distorting relationship experiences, to perceive the causes of conflicts in this way, and then to move thusly towards political unity.

17 Povilas Aleksandravičius, *Europa kaip mąstymo būdas: atviros visuomenės pagrindai*. Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universitetas, 2019, p. 6.

18 Ibid, p. 9.

Contrary to J. Habermas's "discourse ethics", J.-M. Ferry posits that argumentation alone is not sufficient for a decision-making agreement to be reached – that also requires "intellectual intuition", a sense by the participants that not only there was an agreement regarding the decision, but that it matched reality as well¹⁹. Such perception of Europeanness is perfectly illustrated by J.-M. Ferry himself (whom P. Aleksandravičius references most frequently in his work), in saying that "Turkey cannot be accepted into the EU – not because it's culturally, geographically or historically separate from Europe, but because it doesn't recognize the essential European ethical principle [...] by refusing to acknowledge the Armenian genocide it committed"²⁰. The monograph, just like Ferry's own works, ignores the notion that ethics and politics are related, yet separate areas, and political problems thus cannot be reduced to ethic ones, and solving the latter does not solve the former.

This concept is connected to that of divided sovereignty, which the author derives from the 21st century texts of Ulrich Beck and Jean-Marc Ferry. According to their conception of it, divided sovereignty means that it is possible to combine the state- and EU-level sovereignty without sacrificing the "negative" sovereignty of the state (i.e., without forcing the nation to act against its will) by coordinating the decision making process; this creates the conditions where a nation can still make decisions (thus preserving its sovereignty), but the decision is also made on the scale of the EU, thus enabling "positive" sovereignty as a stronger decision-making power in the global arena²¹. The book restricts itself to stating that realizing this project would be difficult, although it problematic aspects are not considered. In regards to the subject of this dissertation, it is more important that although the monograph of P. Aleksandravičius is seemingly dedicated to a closely

19 Ibid, p. 40–45.

20 Jean-Marc Ferry, „Apie dvasinį Europos uždavinį.“ *Bernardinai.lt*, 2018-05-18. <<https://www.bernardinai.lt/2018-05-18-apie-dvasini-europos-uzdavini-pokalbis-su-jeanu-marcu-ferry/>> [Accessed 2018-05-22]

21 Aleksandravičius, p. 78–79.

related subject and even emphasizes the same contributing factor of “divided sovereignty” in the genesis of a united Europe, it does not at all analyze the theoretical assumptions of “divided sovereignty” and its development in the modern times.

Theoretical and methodological basis of the dissertation

The dissertation employs methods of analytical-descriptive, comparative-historical and metaphilosophical analysis. In searching for the origins of theoretical foundations of European unification, the dissertation analyzes the political philosophy of Samuel Pufendorf, Gottfried Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Problem of the dissertation – inside the framework of modern political philosophy, based on the concept of abstract individual, is it possible to create coherent and viable project of political integration of Europe, that would allow to theoretically substantiate an equilibrium between nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism and open a possibility to solve a practical dilemma arising from their tension – a governance without a state or state without nation?

Object of the dissertation – philosophical discourse of European integration.

Aim of the dissertation – to theoretically reconstruct and critically analyze the philosophical principles of the most important projects of European integration (i.e., Catholic, Neofunctionalist and Eurocommunist), in an attempt to reveal their theoretical and historical origins, as well as the dynamics and peculiarities of their genesis and formation, and to evaluate the potential of their constructive development and/or a search for alternative philosophical principles of integration.

Tasks of the dissertation

- to review and critically assess the current state of research into the philosophical bases of European integration, to reveal their theoretical-methodological strengths and shortcomings, to ascer-

tain the most important of the unsolved problems of this field, and to evaluate the directions and prospects of the creative and/or alternative development of such research;

- to reveal the conceptual and historical origins of the main philosophical-theoretical notions of European unification, the social, cultural and conceptual context of their formation and development, their theoretical interrelations, and their practical effect on the process of European integration;
- to conduct a critical-comparative analysis of the basic principles and content of the philosophical concepts of European integration in an attempt to reveal their similarities and differences, and to ascertain the directions of their constructive development or potential theoretical alternatives of these concepts.

Scientific novelty of the dissertation

Dissertation is an attempt to theoretically reconstruct the philosophical assumptions of the modern-day political thought that served as the basis for projects of European integration put forward in the 20th century, by analyzing the historical development and changes of the visions of European unity through the lens of the dilemma between cosmopolitan universalism and nationalist particularism. There are no systemic works of this type in academic literature; the dissertation fragmentally analyzes only the relevant insights provided by individual thinkers discussed therein.

Main statement to be proven

Modern projects of unification of Europe are theoretically contradictory and practically unrealizable, because of radical duality of abstract concept of the individual that modern political paradigm is based on. That duality determines unsolvable tension between two qualities of an individual: an absolute equality as uniformity and an endless differentiation based on the empirical features of the individual.

Because of this differentiation political integration of modern Europe is at the same time the process of endless inclusion and levelling of differences, in result – a perpetual differentiation, that creates an identity of a “becoming European” and makes it impossible to define and stabilize the political form of Europe that is in the process of perpetual integration.

Side statements to be proven

- European integration is a centuries-long process of the culturally Christian and politically united continent’s modernization and transformation, during which medieval Western Christianity transformed into a new, reflectively constructed form of sociopolitical and cultural reality, called “Europe”.
- The essential practical problem faced by European political integration since the XVI century and remaining unsolved today is the challenge of combining the loyalty of European citizens to their national countries and supranational institutions, that are meant to replace former loyalties to Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire and ensure peace and unity in the newly integrated Europe.
- During the early modernity this problem was addressed with projects of paneuropean peace in the political framework of Holy Roman Empire, proposed by S. Pufendorf and G. Leibniz. During the Enlightenment it was formulated by I. Kant in the broader context of perpetual peace, while in the 19th century’s Nietzsche finally clarified a task to unite Europe politically on the completely new grounds, that demanded to solve the contradiction between nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism both in theory and practice.
- In the modern political theory the dilemma of nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism was analyzed and attempted to solve by rejecting the classical metaphysical notion of universal human nature and replacing it with a new anthropology,

based on notion of an abstract individual, devoid of any defined and stable natural qualities.

- Premise of an abstract equality (recognizing only quantitative differences) and freedom (as power of self-definition, unrestrained by nature) of all individuals, on which the modern notion of an individual was based, implicated a new form of government, that was even theoretically impossible before – an absolute sovereign, that had to ensure civic peace in national states but at the same time pushed them towards a Hobbesian natural state of war of all against all and forced to explore ways of at least to some extent restore peace among religiously fragmented states.
- The theoretical parameters and logic of historical development of modern controversy between nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism were already set in the modern concept of the individual, characterized by tension between freedom and equality. Balancing that tension became the most important question in search of philosophical foundations of European unity and to this day remains driving force of integration projects.
- The pursuit of modern political philosophy to solve the dilemma of, on one hand, political particularism of national state, based on the premise of individual freedom, and, on the other hand, supra-national paneuropean universalism, based on the premise of equality of the individuals, can be conditionally divided into three stages – pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean.
- The pre-Kantian period is characterized by a dualism caused by a combination of the pre-modern and modern conceptions of reality and human beings, which prompted a search for a compromise between the alternative pre-modern and modern solutions to the universalist-particularist controversy.
- Nietzsche refined the modern meaning of this dilemma, stating that the practical unification of Europe would inevitably demand the process of homogenization of collective political identities liquidation of nations, that are capable of founding a nation-state.

- The universalist-particularist controversy and its associated tensions were inherited by the 20th century thinkers of the interwar period, who were forced to come up with a theoretical solution to it; they essentially suggested three different strategies, which can be meaningfully defined through their relation to Nietzsche's insights on this issue.
- The project of Christian integration, represented by J. Maritain, attempted to restore the pre-modern conception of European unity, which completely lacked the theoretical and practical prerequisites necessary for its realization. The left-wing vision of integration, developed by R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, closely followed Nietzsche's conclusions; it was based on the model of assimilation of nations, but remained misunderstood at the time, as during the period that preceded the Second World War, national identities were still too strong to be willingly rejected by politicians or societies. The functionalist model attempted to "depoliticize" European integration by side-stepping the question of what future awaited nation and states within a united Europe, opting instead to build unity through continuous formation of new interdependencies between nations and states.
- The systemic crisis that has befallen the EU in the 21st century shows that the functionalist tactic of postponing the political decision, enabled by this model, has reached the limits of its applicability. Any further attempts of European integration must return to Nietzsche's conclusions on the future of nations and the dilemma of nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism.

Conclusions

1. In the history of political thought, the goal to ensure its subjects' loyalty and civic peace, important to every multinational state, unfolded in the shape of the theoretical dilemma of nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism. The constant search for the ways to solve this dilemma was stimulated by the

practical need to find a common moral ground that could include and mobilise all of its individuals and neutralise collective political aspirations or independency attempts of different national groups. At different stages of European political history and developments of its political theory, this dilemma was dealt with according to different ontological and anthropological premises about the nature of humans and of reality itself.

2. The ongoing European integration, currently facing an ever-deepening crisis, is only a specific historical attempt to solve the theoretical and practical dilemma of nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism that has been known since antiquity, which provided the first paradigmatic example of its solution.
3. The principal theoretical solution that was supposed to ensure stability of multinational imperial polities was made possible by pre-Christian (firstly Stoic) cosmopolitanism, which sought to transcend the limitations of an antique oikumenical concept of humanity and on which the 'dual citizenship' of the subjects of the Roman Empire was based. This 'dual citizenship' meant being subordinate to a certain empirical polity and at the same time being a part of a cosmopolis, a universal spiritual community. However, such cosmopolitanism could not gain a stable and coherent political form as it was lacking grounds for the premise of the equality of all people at least in one aspect.
4. This dilemma was solved by Christianity, which gave humanity a transcendent perspective of unification. Created by God in His image, people are equal both morally and ontologically, and their humanity cannot be denied on any empirical grounds. Thus emerged a qualitatively new concept and a vision of unification of humanity. According to it, spiritually united humanity is represented by the Catholic Church in the religious dimension and by the Holy Roman Empire in the political dimension. Between those representations exists a universal spiritual and political community, Western Christendom.

5. The fragmentation of Western Christendom as a comparatively united spiritual and political entity started during the late Middle Ages and accelerated during the sixteenth century. The most obvious signs of this process were the Protestant revolution and the formation of modern national states, which fragmented the Holy Roman Empire. In essence, the religious wars of the time among Catholic and Protestant states turned into a civic war of becoming Europe and actualised not only the question of restoring peace but also the problem of political unity in the continent.
6. The core of the problem that arose for the constantly modernising Europe in the sixteenth century and remains unsolved today was the necessity to reconcile loyalties to the nation-states and the supranational institutions aimed to replace the medieval Church and the Holy Roman Empire and secure unity and peace across the newly-unified Europe. By that time, the perspective of new integration began to show a new component that became increasingly visible throughout the modernity. The affiliates of former Christendom (future proto-Europeans) started to realise that the basis for the sought-after unity was the modernisation through which culturally Catholic and politically united Western Christendom transformed into a new reflectively constructed time-space continuum and a formation of sociopolitical reality, which was called Europe. This new entity could have been politically united only on completely new grounds.
7. Theoretically, this question was addressed by the then emerging modern political philosophy based on the completely new ontological and anthropological premises about the nature of politics, states, and humanity itself. In modern political theory, the dilemma of nationalist particularism and cosmopolitan universalism was approached by rejecting the classical concept of the universal human nature and replacing it with a new type of anthropology, based on the abstract individual devoid of defined and stable qualities. Invention of such an individual changed substantially the content and meaning of the particularism-universalism dilemma.

8. The premise of an abstract equality (recognising only quantitative differences) and freedom (as power of self-definition, unrestrained by nature) of all individuals, on which the modern notion of an individual was based, implied a new form of government that was even theoretically impossible before: an absolute sovereign that was supposed to ensure civic peace in national states, but at the same time pushed them towards a Hobbesian natural state of war of all against all and forced them to look for ways to restore peace, at least conditionally, between the countries of the religiously divided continent.
9. The efforts of modern political philosophy to theoretically resolve the dilemma between the political particularism of the nation-state based on the assumption of individual freedom and the supra-national pan-European universalism based on the assumption of the equality of individuals can be conditionally subdivided into three – pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean, and post-Nietzschean – stages.
10. The pre-Kantian period is characterised by the duality determined by a combination of pre-modern and modern conceptions of reality and the individual, which led to the search for a compromise over the alternative solutions of the controversy of pre-modern and modern universalism and particularism. Pufendorf argued that equal individuals themselves limit the powers of the sovereign and have the right to oppose them when their commands contradict natural law. Therefore, sovereignty can also be limited, not just absolute. Along with the notion of natural religion disconnected from Christianity, such an interpretation of the relationship between the individual and the sovereign laid the foundations not only for a self-creating but also for a potentially universal individual. In Leibniz's rationalist philosophy, the duality of the modern concept of the individual unfolded with particular prominence. Since Leibniz approached whole reality as qualitatively homogeneous, he argued that all mankind had to strive for norms corresponding to an objectively valid order. The

recognition of universal norms would only be enabled by absolute power, which would abolish hindering differences (national identities among them). Without it, however, Leibniz's theory of monads is just programming a constant fragmentation and multiplicity of identities. The qualitative uniformity of the monads meant that the sovereign had to obey all the universally valid norms, sovereignty could be divided, and the diversity of peoples and religions could be transcended for the sake of the unity of humanity. Projects of European unification came to be based on the transcendence of collective differences and the uniformity of individuals.

11. In Kant's transcendental philosophy, the individual is already understood as having no defined nature but only changing interests and is a purely historically existing phenomenon. The human is a product of nature's plan that is unfolding in history. Through individuals, nature seeks to unleash the unlimited beginnings of mankind, and all individuals are the means to create the most perfect, 'history-writing' human being of the future. Individuals realise their abstract beginnings (thus create themselves) in the perspective of the history of humanity. Peace is an indispensable prerequisite for this development, and a prerequisite for peace is global citizenship, which is understood as a state in which all individuals compete equally under formal rules. This further reinforces the notion that the uniformity of all individuals is a prerequisite for their unity. Europe becomes a model of a united humanity for the whole world.
12. Nietzsche fully revealed the absolutely unfettered self-creation of individuals as a fundamental principle of modernity and, at the same time, definitively prepared the prerequisites for the emergence of the image of a 'becoming Europe'. According to him, the individual must create the world of their own free will and thus create self. After the death of God and the suprasensuous world, and along with other changes brought about by modernity, Europe is moving towards a condition in which the individu-

als, who accepted the will to power on the basis of the principle of self-creation, will realise the possibilities of infinite freedom of self-determination. The image of the freely self-defining human, which implies the need to renounce all the secular idols of incomplete nihilism, obliges Nietzsche's good European to reject all external meanings, values, and goals, including the chains of nationalism constraining their self-creation, to establish own reality, and impose it on others. The attempt to create a defined European identity as a substitute for national identities would be yet another search for external meanings and collective identities.

Upon realising how false collective identities are, the good Europeans will themselves renounce their national identities and affiliations, merge into one European race and consider themselves Europeans, just free people.

Having overcome the need to identify with defined communities, the dilemma and tension between universalism and particularism would be overcome: they would simply cease existing.

13. The three main trends of the European unity projects of the first half of the twentieth century attempted to deny, realise, or circumvent Nietzsche's conclusions on the need to abolish nations. Jacques Maritain's Christian project of integration attempted to restore the pre-modern concept of European unity for the realisation of which there were no longer any prerequisites. In this vision, Europe was to be reunited on Christian foundations, with the pope as the ultimate authority and an institutional structure similar to that of the Holy Roman Empire. Not only does it completely reject Nietzsche's insights: it actually ignores the impact of modernity as such on the peoples of Europe. On the other hand, the left-wing vision of integration developed by R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi consistently followed Nietzsche's conclusions and envisaged a model of the assimilation of peoples. It maintains, in a moderate form, that a nation should be separated from the state and that it should be a matter of private choice, in the way that religions had already become, but later it also spoke openly of the

physical mixing of Europeans into a new race. This view had no support in the period of flourishing nationalism. David Mitrany's functionalist model proposed 'depoliticisation' of European integration, bypassing the issue of the future of nations and states in a united Europe and building unity through ever new interdependencies between peoples and states, which, in turn, would create the need for new dependencies. This subtle path recognises the consequences of modernity and the unfolding principle of individual self-creation, as well as the incompatibility of the nation state with the ideal of a united Europe. However, the functionalists deliberately bypassed these and many other issues, postponed them till the future, and even openly called for the discussions on values to be left intact.

14. The application of the functionalist model made almost seventy years of European unification possible. Looking at the twentieth-century projects of European political unification through the prism of their philosophical underpinnings, one can argue that the theoretical dilemma of nationalist particularism and pan-European cosmopolitanism cannot be resolved due to the theoretical problem of the indistinguishable interconnection of the nation and the nation-state unresolved in these projects; politically, it is transformed into an impasse without a constructive solution: it is either governance without a state or a state without a nation. Governance without a state can only be non-political governance. A state without a nation is impossible. This dilemma calls for a critical reflection and a fundamental update of the philosophical and political paradigm of European integration and encourages a theoretical search for alternative European integration projects.

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Sinica V., 2018. “Vieningos Europos idėja Kanto politinėje filosofijoje”, *LOGOS*, 94, pp. 190-199.

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