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A Phenomenological Analysis of Melancholy
Aspects of Temporality and Corporeality

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Vijolė Valinskaitė

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SUMMARY

Research Problem and Relevance

The history of the concept of melancholy is long and varied. Literally translated, it means black bile (μέλαινα χολή). In antiquity, melancholy meant one of the four humours (fluids) that explained ailments and, later, the human temperaments. An excess of black bile has long been thought to cause looking down, sadness without reason, inexplicable joy, obsessions, eccentricities, delusions, hallucinations and suicidal tendencies. In 19th century psychiatry, the meaning of melancholy was narrowed. It was defined as an affective disorder, and most of those states that had led to the diagnosis of melancholy in antiquity were attributed to other diagnostic categories.

But even the narrowed concept of melancholy was not destined to take root in the emerging psychiatry. In the 19th century the term *depression* was introduced. The choice of this term was not accidental. Even in antiquity it was believed that melancholy leads to being pressed down, which is what the word *depression* literally means. In the first half of the 19th century the term *depression* was used only to denote the affect or mood of melancholy, but was not considered a separate diagnostic category. By the end of the 19th century, two terms were used synonymously, and in the first half of the 20th century the term *melancholy* was replaced by the term *depression*. General practitioners preferred the term *depression* because it evoked a 'physiological' explanation. However, the term *melancholy* referred to much more than just physical symptoms. It referred to a certain way of being that the term *depression* did not express. Thus, replacing the term *melancholy* with the term *depression* led to a reduction of the phenomenon to physical symptomatology.

Although currently the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 (DSM-5) does not include melancholy as a separate diagnostic category (it utilizes the term *melancholy* only to denote one of the subtypes of depression), the term *melancholy* is used

in phenomenological psychopathology as a synonym for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) or simply to indicate a severe form of depression.

Phenomenology has been applied to psychopathology since 1913, when Karl Jaspers' *General Psychopathology* was published. The critique of scientism offered by phenomenology and the call to abandon all preconceptions and return to the things themselves have long fascinated psychopathologists who have opposed objectivism and operationalism in psychopathology, especially biological psychiatry, which is now taking a stronger and stronger position. Phenomenologically oriented psychopathologists refuse to do both – to equate mental disorders with a collection of symptoms and to identify them with brain abnormalities.

One of the most influential phenomenological concepts in psychopathology is a concept of the life-world. It allows psychopathologists to describe mental disorders and psychopathological phenomena in terms of patients' life-worlds, and to consider the symptoms of a particular disorder as manifestations of alterations in the main characteristics of the life-world. The distinction between normal and psychopathological life-worlds, as well as differences between two or more psychopathological life-worlds, are captured in alterations in the life-world's characteristics such as temporality, corporeality, intersubjectivity and selfhood.

The object of this dissertation is one such life-world – the life-world of melancholy, which will be analysed in relation to the characteristics of temporality and corporeality. The term *melancholy* is chosen because, on the one hand, it refers to the tradition of phenomenological psychopathology. The prominent phenomenologically oriented psychopathologists such as Jaspers, Erwin W. Strauss, Eugène Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger and Hubert Tellenbach used the term *melancholy*. On the other hand, since phenomenological psychopathology investigates the characteristics of psychopathological life-worlds, the term *melancholy*, by implying a

certain way of being, makes it possible to better convey the specificity of phenomenological research in psychopathology.

Phenomenological analyses of melancholy usually utilize the concepts proposed by Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Plessner. In this dissertation, the analysis of the temporal and corporeal characteristics of the melancholic life-world will be carried out mainly on the basis of Husserl's phenomenological ideas. This choice is determined primarily by the nature of the research. The dissertation aims to reveal the conditions of possibility of temporal and bodily experience in melancholy. The ideas of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology are particularly conducive to this type of research. Another reason for using Husserl's concepts is to avoid problems at the conceptual level, which arise when a phenomenon is analysed by applying non-equivalent concepts from different phenomenologists.

Literature Review

The overview of primary sources. The analysis of melancholy is phenomenological, so the main sources of the research are the works of representatives of phenomenological philosophy, phenomenological psychopathology, their surveys and the self-reports of patients diagnosed with melancholy.

In discussing the variety of phenomenological approaches used in psychopathology, reference is first made to Blankenburg's article *Phenomenology and Psychopathology* (1980), in which Blankenburg introduces the three phenomenological approaches that are characteristic of phenomenological psychopathology: the descriptive, the eidetic, and the constitutive approaches. Jaspers' book *General Psychopathology* (1963) and Strauss' article *Aesthesiology and Hallucinations* (1958) are used to present the descriptive and eidetic approaches respectively. For the constitutive approach, reference is made to Husserl's books *Cartesian Meditations* (2005b) and *Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological*

Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to a pure Phenomenology (1982). In these works, attention is paid to the epoché and the reduction, a distinctive feature of the constitutive approach.

Husserl's writings are also used to discuss the concepts of the life-world, normality and abnormality, the relationship between the affective level and temporal structures, and to analyse the relationship between affection, volition, and bodily movements and actions. Husserl reflects on the concept of the life-world in his book *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (1970), and on the criteria of normality and abnormality, as well as on the relationship between bodily and volitional acts, in *Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (1989). The relationship between the affective level and temporal structures and acts of will is revealed in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* (2001b). Husserl analyses the concept of inner time consciousness in the book *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1991).

Interpretations of the alteration of temporal experiences in melancholy are found in Strauss's articles *Time Experience in Endogenous Depression and Psychopathic Mood* (org. *Das Zeiterlebnis in der endogenen Depression und in der psychopathischen Verstimmung* (1928)) and *Disorders of Personal Time in Depressive States* (1947), in Minkowski's book *Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies* (1970), in Binswanger's book *Melancholia and Mania* (org. *Melancholie und Manie* (1994)), and in T. Fuchs' articles *Melancholia as a Desynchronization: Towards Psychopathology of Interpersonal Time* (2001), *Implicit and Explicit Temporality* (2005) and *Temporality and Psychopathology* (2013b).

The concepts of Körper and Leib are reflected in Blankenburg's article *Körper and Leib in Psychiatry* (org. *Körper und Leib in der Psychiatrie* (1982)), in E. Borgna's book *Melancholia* (org.

Malinconia (1992)) and in Fuchs's articles *The Phenomenology of Body, Space, and Time in Depression* (2005a), *Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in Melancholia and Schizophrenia* (2005b), and *Depression, Intercorporeality, and Interactivity* (2013a).

Descriptions of patients' own experiences are given in Tellenbach's article *Taste and Atmosphere* (org. *Geschmack und Atmosphäre* (1968)) and Borgna's book *Melancholia* (org. *Melinconia* (1992)). Racliffe's book *Experiences of Depression* (2015) presents the results of his surveys on how the body is most often experienced in depression. G. Stanghellini et al.' study *Abnormal Time Experiences in Major Depression: An Empirical Qualitative Study* (2016a), as well as D. H. Vogel et al.'s study *Disturbed Experience of Time in Depression—Evidence from Content Analysis* (2018), indicate how time is most commonly experienced by patients with depression. Mr Kuiper's memoir *Far Away* (org. *Ver Heen* (1988)) contains descriptions of his experiences of melancholic depression.

The overview of secondary sources. The research used in this dissertation can be divided into four groups. The first group includes research aimed at defining what phenomenological psychopathology is and discussing phenomenological approaches in psychopathology. Spiegelberg's seminal work, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry* (1972), discusses the ideas of different phenomenologists and their influence on phenomenological psychiatry, taking into account and distinguishing between different currents and tendencies and outlining the differences between them. B. Kimura's article, *The Phenomenology of the Between: the Problem of the Basic disturbance of Schizophrenia* (1982), reflects on the difference between phenomenological philosophy and phenomenology in psychiatry and considers how phenomenology should be applied to psychiatry. Lanteri-Laura's article *Phenomenology and a Critique of the Foundations of Psychiatry* (1982) discusses the phenomenological approach in psychiatry, with particular reference to the application of Husserl's phenomenology. In A. Mickūnas's and D. Jonkus's book

Phenomenological Philosophy and its Shadow (org. Fenomenologinè filosofija ir jos šėšėlis (2014)), the phenomenological epoché is discussed and the significance of its performance is examined. D. Zahavi's article *Applied Phenomenology: Why it is Safe to Ignore the Epoché* (2021) discusses the difference between Husserl's phenomenology and its application, and reveals why the epoché can be ignored in the application of Husserl's phenomenology. G. Messas's and co-authors' article *New Perspectives in Phenomenological Psychopathology: Its Use in Psychiatric Treatment* (2018) and Stanghellini's article *Phenomenological Psychopathology and Care. From Person-Centered Dialectical Psychopathology to the PHD Method for Psychotherapy* (2016) argue that phenomenological psychopathology investigates psychopathological life-worlds, and that the symptoms of mental disorders should be considered as manifestations of alterations in the basic characteristics of the life-world.

The second group includes research on temporality in melancholy. Changes in temporal experience are analysed in Ratcliffe's articles *Depression, Guilt, and Emotional Depth* (2010) and *Varieties of Temporal Experience in Depression* (2012). C. Kupke's article *Lived Time and to Live Time* (2005) draws attention to the primacy of the present over other temporal modalities. S. Micali, in his article *The Alternation of Time in Melancholia. A Phenomenological Analysis* (org. *L'alternazione del tempo nella malinconia. Un'analisi fenomenologica* (2009)) also highlights the primacy of the present over other moduses and argues that in melancholy it is this modus that is altered.

The third group includes research on the alteration of corporeality in melancholy. Mention should be made of Micali's articles *The Alteration of Embodiment in Melancholia* (2013a) and *The Transformation of Intercorporeality in Melancholia* (2013b), which not only deal with the different alterations of corporeality in melancholy, but also with their impact on intercorporeality. In A. V. Fernandez's article, *The Phenomenology of Psychopathological*

Embodiment. A Critique of Thomas Fuchs' Concept of Corporealization (2016), it is argued that the concept of corporealization encompasses too broad a range of phenomena.

The fourth group includes studies devoted to discussing different aspects of Husserl's phenomenology. The studies belonging to this group can be divided into several subgroups. The first subgroup includes all studies that deal with Husserl's concepts of life-world, normality and abnormality. Steinbock's book *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (1995a) and his article *Phenomenological concepts of normality and abnormality* (1995b) discuss in detail how normality is established in experience, focusing on the main criteria of concordance and optimality that belong to experience itself. *Husserl on Perceptual Optimality* (2018), by M. Doyon, provides a broader treatment of the optimality criterion. D. Jonkus's article *The Structure and Genesis of Intentionality in Husserl's Phenomenology* (org. Intencionalumo struktūra ir genezė Husserlio fenomenologijoje (2008)) discusses the teleological aspect of intentional consciousness. In M. Wehrle's article "'Feelings as the Motor of Perception'": *The Essential Role of Interest for Intentionality* (2015a), the role of interest in perception is discussed, on which the optimality of perception also depends. In other articles *Normality and Normativity in Experience* (2015b) and *There Is a Crack in Everything'. Fragile Normality: Husserl's Account of Normality Re-Visited* (2018), Wehrle addresses the aforementioned criteria of concordance and optimality; in the latter article, she also assesses the applicability of the notions of normality and abnormality, based on these criteria, to psychopathology. Heinämaa's and Taipale's article *Normality* (2019) also discusses the applicability of Husserl's concept of normality to psychopathology. The dissertation also draws on Gutauskas' *Dialogue Space: A Phenomenological Approach* (org. *Dialogo erdvė: fenomenologinis požiūris* (2010)), which addresses the problem of intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology. Heinämaa's article *Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Normality: Constitution by Mortals* (2013) and Taipale's article *Twofold Normality: Husserl*

and the Normative Relevance of Primordial Constitution (2012) discuss the intersubjective aspect of the concept of normality.

The second subgroup of the fourth group includes studies on temporality and affectivity. Jonkus's book *Experience and Reflection: Perspectives of Phenomenological Philosophy* (orig. *Patirtis ir refleksija: fenomenologinės filosofijos akiračiai* (2009)), N. de Warren's *Husserl and the Promise of Time* (2009) and D. Bacevičiūtė's *The Past and the Interruption: Phenomenological Transformations of the Concept of Time* (orig. *Praeiga ir pertrūkis: fenomenologinės laiko sampratos transformacijos* (2017)) provide a detailed presentation of Husserl's phenomenology of time. D. Lohmar's article *What does Protention "Protend"?* (2002) distinguishes and analyses the different functions of protention. Steinbock's article *Affection and Attention: On the Phenomenology of Becoming Aware* (2004) provides a detailed discussion of Husserl's concept of affect.

The third subgroup of the fourth group includes studies on the concept of volition. I. A. Bianchi's book *Phenomenology of Volition*. (orig. *Fenomenologia della volontà* (2003)), as well as U. Melle's article *Husserl's Phenomenology of Willing* (1997), analyse Husserl's phenomenology of volition from different perspectives.

Research Aims and Objectives

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a phenomenological description of melancholy in terms of two levels of experience: the temporal and the bodily. In order to achieve this goal, specific tasks are set:

1. To reveal how the psychopathological phenomenon is studied phenomenologically.
 - 1.1. Discuss the different phenomenological approaches in psychopathology.

- 1.2. To clarify whether to perform the epoché is necessary for the application of phenomenology in psychopathology.
2. To uncover why a psychopathological phenomenon is an abnormal phenomenon.
 - 2.1. Examine Husserl's concept of the life-world.
 - 2.2. To uncover the conditions necessary for the world to be experienced intersubjectively.
 - 2.3. Examine Husserl's concept of normality.
 - 2.4. To uncover the criteria by which a phenomenon is considered abnormal.
3. To reveal the conditions for the alteration of temporality in melancholy.
 - 3.1. Discuss the temporal experiences characteristic of melancholy.
 - 3.2. To examine how phenomenological psychopathology, in particular Strauss, Minkowski, Binswanger and Fuchs handle the problem of temporality in melancholy.
 - 3.3. To reveal the intertwinement between affectivity and temporality in Husserl's phenomenology.
 - 3.4. To reveal how the disturbance in affectivity motivates the alteration of the experience of the present and the future in melancholy.
4. To uncover the conditions for the alteration of corporeality in melancholy.
 - 4.1. Discuss the alterations in bodily experience that are characteristic of melancholy.
 - 4.2. To reveal how phenomenological psychopathology, in particular how Blankenburg, Borgna and Fuchs utilize the concepts of *Leib*, *Körper* and corporealization.
 - 4.3. To examine Husserl's conception of the body as organ of the will and to reveal the intertwinement between acts of volition and affectivity in Husserl's phenomenology.
 - 4.4. To uncover how disturbance in affectivity motivates the alteration of one's experience of the body in melancholy.

Key Claims

1. The application of phenomenology in psychopathology is characterised by diversity; at least three approaches can be distinguished – descriptive, eidetic and constitutive.
2. In the constitutive phenomenological approach in psychopathology, mental disorders are analysed as the psychopathological life-words.
3. Analysing mental disorder as a psychopathological lifeworld requires the epoché.
4. In Husserl's phenomenology, the condition for a common experiential life-world is an experience that meets the criteria of concordance and optimality.
5. In Husserl's phenomenology, the abnormal experience is the experience that does not fulfil the criteria of concordance and/or optimality.
6. A psychopathological life-world is considered to be an abnormal life-world if it fulfils two conditions: firstly, if the experience of that world does not meet the criteria of concordance and/or optimality, and secondly, if the failure of one or both of these criteria in the experience affects the intersubjective dimension of that world.
7. Melancholic's life-world is considered abnormal because the experiences of time and the lived body are not optimal and this leads to the isolation of the experience of that world.
8. In phenomenological psychopathology, the approach to the problem of temporality in melancholy has shifted from the indication of the disappearance of élan vital to the presupposition of a disturbance in temporal synthesis and affectivity.
9. Consideration of the melancholic experiences of the flow of time as still and the future as impossible in the context of the interconnectedness between affective and temporal levels in Husserl's phenomenology reveals how these experiences are motivated by a disturbance in affectivity.

10. The diversity of definitions of *Leib* and *Körper* in phenomenological psychopathology depends on the different conceptions of the lived body in relation to which the concepts are defined.
11. The utilization of a concept of corporealization can be avoided if the alterations of corporeality in melancholy are considered in the light of the definitions of the lived body provided by Husserl and Blankenburg.
12. Consideration of the melancholic experience of the body (as requiring great effort to move and perform) in the context of the concept of the body as organ of the will, reveals how this experience is conditioned by a disturbance in affectivity.

Methods

The methods of reconstruction, analysis and comparison are used in the first section of the dissertation in order to distinguish and define the different types of phenomenological approaches in psychopathology. Phenomenological approaches in psychopathology are presented on the basis of the descriptive, eidetic and constitutive levels of phenomenology identified in Blankenburg's text *Phenomenology and Psychopathology*. Seeking to present the descriptive approach Jaspers' concept of phenomenology in *General Psychopathology* is analysed and compared with Husserl's definition of phenomenology in his *Logical Investigations*. Seeking to define the eidetic approach Strauss's description of the phenomenon of hallucinations is analysed, highlighting the similarities of the method used in this description with the eidetic method proposed by Husserl. Seeking to present the constitutive approach Husserl's concepts of the epoché, the reduction, time, body, intersubjectivity and the self are reconstructed and their application to psychopathology is analysed by drawing on the studies of Fuchs and Stanghellini.

In the second section of the dissertation Husserl's concepts of the life-world, normality and abnormality are reconstructed in order to

reveal the criteria for defining a psychopathological phenomenon as abnormal. The reconstruction of these concepts is carried out by analysing Husserl's works such as *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, *Cartesian Meditations* and *Ideas II* and by comparing and interpreting the ideas Husserl presented in the above-mentioned works.

In order to describe temporality and corporeality in melancholy, the third and fourth sections of the dissertation first considers the way in which melancholic patients experience time and their own bodies, based on the different sources that record these experiences. Seeking to reveal how phenomenological psychopathology has dealt with the problem of temporality and corporeality, the texts of Strauss, Minkowski, Binswanger and Fuchs on the theme of time in melancholy and the texts of Blankenburg, Borgna and Fuchs on the issue of the alteration of corporeality in melancholy are analysed and compared. In order to evaluate the solutions to the problems presented, a critical position is taken, from which it is argued that the assertion by contemporary representatives of phenomenological psychopathology that the alteration of temporality and corporeality in melancholy is caused by a disturbance in affectivity needs to be better substantiated by showing how the levels of temporality and corporeality are related to affectivity. Seeking to reveal this relationship Husserl's works such as *Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* and *Ideas II* are analysed. Once this relationship has been uncovered, it is considered how the experience of time and corporeality would be affected if a disturbance at the affective level were presupposed.

Academic Contribution of the Dissertation

Contemporary analyses of melancholy are carried out by applying Husserl's, Heidegger's, Merleau-Ponty's and Plessner's concepts combined. This dissertation, in its search for the conditions of possibility of the experience of time and the body in melancholy,

draws exclusively on Husserl's phenomenological ideas and argues that this kind of research should include the performance of the epoché.

Contemporary researches on the alterations of corporeality in melancholy are mostly based on the concept of corporealisation. This dissertation takes a different stance by analysing the melancholic alterations of corporeality in the light of the different characteristics of the lived body provided by Husserl and Blankenburg.

Although a number of dissertations and papers have been written on phenomenological topics in Lithuania, melancholy has not yet been studied in the context of phenomenological psychopathology, which is why this dissertation is the first study of its kind to be conducted in Lithuania.

Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation comprises an introduction, four expository sections, and conclusions.

The first section of the dissertation is devoted to a discussion of what phenomenological psychopathology is, and more specifically how phenomenology is applied in psychopathology, indicating that it is characterised by a variety of phenomenological approaches. This chapter consists of four subsections. The first subsection discusses the descriptive approach to psychopathology, taking into account Jaspers' concept of phenomenology in *General Psychopathology* and its application in psychopathology, as well as pointing out the links between his phenomenology and Husserl's concept of phenomenology in *Logical Investigations*. In the second subsection, the eidetic approach is introduced by analysing Strauss's description of the phenomenon of hallucinations. Based on Husserl's definition of the eidetic method in *Ideas I*, it is shown why Strauss's analysis of the phenomenon of hallucinations is an example of an eidetic approach in psychopathology. In the third subsection, the constitutive approach is introduced, indicating what the epoché and the reduction are, and

revealing how the structures of the world are accessible after their performance. In the first section of the dissertation the main focus is devoted to the constitutive approach. Its main themes such as lived time, lived space, lived body, intersubjectivity and the self are discussed separately. In the fourth subsection, the importance of the performance of the epoché is discussed, revealing why the epoché should not be ignored when applying phenomenology in psychopathology.

The second section of the dissertation is devoted to a discussion of the concepts of the life-world, normality and abnormality, and also to revealing on what basis the psychopathological life-world could be considered an abnormal life-world. The first subsection introduces Husserl's concept of the life-world as one for all, i.e., as intersubjectively experienced. In the second subsection, the criteria of concordance and optimality that underpin normality in experience are analysed. The third subsection discusses abnormality in experience in relation to the discrepancy between the criteria of concordance and optimality. In this subsection, by analysing and comparing the life-world of the blind with the psychopathological life-worlds of schizophrenia and melancholy, it is shown that, although all three life-worlds are deviations of the normal life-world, only the intersubjective dimensions of the psychopathological life-worlds are fractured.

The third section of the dissertation is devoted to the transformation of temporality in melancholy. In the first subsection, the abnormal temporal experiences of melancholy are presented on the basis of patients' testimonies collected from different sources, taking into account changes in all temporal modalities, i.e., past, present and future. In the second subsection, solutions to the problem of temporality in melancholy in the psychopathology of Strauss, Minkowski, Binswanger and Fuchs are discussed, demonstrating how the solutions to this problem have shifted from the indication of a disappearance of the *élan vital* to the presupposing of a disturbance in affectivity. Even though the dissertation draws on Fuchs' claim that

alterations in the experience of time in melancholy are related to disturbance in affectivity, it is argued that this relationship is not self-evident. In the third subsection, applying the concepts of passive temporal synthesis, affection and association proposed by Husserl, it is first revealed how the temporal and affective levels are interconnected, and then it is demonstrated how the disturbance in affectivity motivates melancholic experience of the flow of time as still and the future as impossible.

The fourth section is devoted to a discussion of bodily alterations in melancholy. The first subsection introduces the different types of alterations of corporeality in melancholy – the atmospheric, related to intercorporeality, and to the experience of one's body. In the second subsection, the concepts of *Körper* and *Leib* in phenomenological psychopathology of Blankenburg, Borgna and Fuchs, as well as Fuchs' concept of corporealization, are analysed. In the third subsection, one melancholic alteration of corporeality, the experience of the body as requiring effort in order to move and function, is analysed in the light of Husserl's and Blankenburg's concept of the body as organ of the will.

CONCLUSIONS

1. There are at least three different approaches of application of phenomenology in psychopathology – descriptive, eidetic and constitutive. These approaches differ from each other in terms of eidetic method's and the epoché performance. The descriptive approach suspends preconceptions and describes the mental states that are actually experienced by the patients. This approach does not consider the use of the eidetic method to be necessary. The eidetic approach, on the contrary, seeks for a modifying process that could uncover the eidos of the abnormal phenomenon. The constitutive approach in addition asks to perform the epoché. Its performance enables access to the psychopathological life-world. Although these phenomenological approaches are different, their representatives are united not only in considering direct experience as an essential and indispensable source of knowledge for the analysis of the psychopathological phenomenon, but also in a dialogical relationship with Husserl's phenomenological ideas, taking up the demand for the suspension of preconceived notions, rejecting or adopting the methods of eidetic variation and the epoché.

2. Although the performance of the epoché is an essential feature of the constitutive approach, it is usually left out in today's phenomenological psychopathology. However, given that in Husserl's phenomenology the life-world becomes accessible only after the epoché has been performed and that the constitutive approach analyses mental disorders in the light of the life-worlds of the patients, the performance of the epoché should be reconsidered. It could reveal further applications of the concept of life-world or even function as a well-defined method in phenomenological psychopathology.

3. The analyses of Husserl's concepts of the life-world and normality reveal that normal experience, i.e., experience that meets the criteria of concordance and optimality, is a condition for intersubjective experience of the world in which what is experienced by one subject can be experienced by other subjects. Abnormal

experience should be understood in relation to normal experience as experience that does not meet these criteria, and the abnormal life-world either as a world that has no intersubjective basis at all, or as a world that is intersubjectively inaccessible only with respect to some of the characteristics of that world. The life-world of melancholy is considered abnormal because the experiences of time and the lived body are not optimal and this influences the insularity of the experience of that world.

4. In phenomenological psychopathology the way of dealing with the problem of temporality in melancholy has varied from the indication of the disappearance of *élan vital* to the presupposition of a disturbance in temporal syntheses and affectivity. Strauss and Minkowski have explained the experiences of the flow of time as still and the future as impossible in terms of the disappearance of *élan vital*, which was later rejected as a metaphysical principle. Binswanger has interpreted the melancholic experiences of time by presupposing an alteration in the structure of retention, primal impression, protention. This interpretation was later also rejected, on the grounds that Binswanger misunderstood the temporal structure. Currently Fuchs explains the alteration of temporality in melancholy as conditioned by a disturbance in affectivity. Although analyses of this kind are dominant, it is not self-evident how a disturbance in affectivity can lead to changes in how time is experienced, and it is therefore necessary to clarify the interrelationship between temporal and affective levels.

5. Analyses of Husserl's concepts of passive temporal synthesis, affection and association reveal the link between affectivity and temporality at the lowest level of experience. In the light of these analyses, it is argued that the weakened functioning of affection in the field of the present, by acting on the formation of the second type of protention, leads to the experience of the flow of time as still and the future as impossible. Although the weakened affection in the impressional field does not lead to structural changes in retention, primary impression, and protention, the experience of time is radically

altered by the weakening of the interface between impression and the affective level. Firstly, the loss of the theme in the impressional field results in the explication of the experience of time, which is dominant in melancholy; secondly, as the awakening of past and future contents disappears in the field of the present, the dynamic relationship between present, past and future is lost, and the present itself is experienced as never-ending. The impossibility of accessing past contents and predicting future ones will also affect the subject's self-givenness. Not being able to see himself as futural, the subject cannot foresee his future either. All this allows us to assert that the reduction of the impact of affection leads to a radical change in the experience of time in melancholy.

6. The several definitions of *Leib* and *Körper* are utilised in phenomenological psychopathology. Defining these concepts Blankenburg draws from the distinction between experiential and objective attitudes described in Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. These attitudes indicate two different ways in which human beings can be studied. Meanwhile, Fuchs's definitions of *Leib* and *Körper* draw from Plessner's concept of embodiment according to which a man not only is a body, but also has a body as a physical object. In order to describe an alteration of corporeality in melancholy, phenomenological psychopathology utilizes the concept of corporealization that draws from Fuchs's definition of *Körper*. Corporealization therefore indicates that the body becomes *Körper*. However, if *Körper* is defined as a body studied in the objective attitude, then the change of corporeality in melancholy can no longer be described on the basis of the concept of corporealization.

7. The utilization of the different definitions of the lived body distinguished by Husserl and Blankenburg in the description of the alterations of corporeality in melancholy is beneficial in twofold way. First, it helps to avoid relying on the concept of corporealization that is too broad. Secondly, it allows to reveal the conditions of possibility of these alterations. In this dissertation the experience of the body as requiring effort to move and function is analysed in the context of the

body as organ of the will. Such an analysis allows avoiding the presupposition of the body becoming *Körper* in melancholy, as well as it reveals how a disturbance in affectivity leads to this alteration of corporeality. The diminished impact of affection, by acting on the formation of desires, motivates the weakening of the will. The body is organ of the will, so when the will is weakened, the "control" of the body changes; movement and performing all activities becomes more difficult.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Valinskaitė, V., 2015. Laikinės sąmonės intencionalumas Levino ir Waldenfelso fenomenologijoje. *Problemos* 87: 31-43.

Valinskaitė, V. 2020. Laiko patirties melancholijoje analizė remiantis Husserlio fenomenologiniais tyrinėjimais. *Problemos* 97: 164-175.

Related Conference Activities

2019 12 18 “On the Phenomenon of not Seeing the Future. An Analysis from Husserl’s Passive Synthesis”, research colloquium at Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium.

2022 01 18 “The meaningless Future in Melancholic Depression”, conference “Philosophy and Meaning in Life“, organised by University of Pretoria, South Africa.

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