| Abstract [eng] |
The object of the research is dishonest taxpayers’ behaviour. It is analysed by using methods of microeconomics and experimental economics. This paper contains three models based on the one suggested by Allingham and Sandmo. The essence of these models – the taxpayer has to decide how much of the income (turnover) to declare (that means paying taxes), when there is a probability of the tax audit. Models also involve other important aspects like corruption factor, i.e. taxpayer and tax auditor can agree to conceal violations, endogenous tax audit probability and reputation costs. Comparative statics of the models, as well as optimisation calculations enabled to evaluate how the behaviour of taxpayer would adjust when certain parameters change. Two of three models were adjusted according to the legislation of Lithuania and used for calculations of optimal level of tax evasion. According to the results of these results potential tax losses in Lithuania due to tax evasion were calculated. This paper also comprises the main factors which influence taxpayer’s decision (not) to evade taxes. According to the factors indicated, analysis of theoretical model and results of calculations, there were recommendations for improvements of tax administration provided. This paper consists of introduction, three main parts and conclusions. It contains 163 pages, excluding annexes, 12 tables, 28 figures. There were 145 references used. |
