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## **Sexual Revolution, Mobilization or Civil War: How to Understand the Soviet Transformation of Sexuality (The Case of Soviet Lithuania)**

### **Abstract**

The article raises a question whether the concept of sexual revolution could be applied to the changes of sexuality in the Soviet Union. The case of one of the republics of the USSR, Soviet Lithuania is analysed. The dynamics of sexual policy, norms and behaviour that took place in 1944–1990 are examined to demonstrate what problems arise when applying the concept of the sexual revolution and a new solution is offered – the concept of sexual civil war. It is argued that this new concept points to implications that contradict the sexual revolution: the changes of sexuality are elongated and viscous, the conflicting traditional and modern norms and behaviour can overlap or entrench in separate social and cultural groups to create a kind of stalemate. Therefore the concept of sexual civil war does not stress on the changes themselves but a particular conflict in the process of a transformation of sexuality.

*Keywords:* sexuality, sexual revolution, sexual mobilization, sexual civil war, Soviet Lithuania.

### **Introduction**

20th century sexuality research and debate are inseparable from the concept of the sexual revolution. It usually helps to define and explain the changes in sexual norms, values, and behaviours that took place in this century. This concept is characterized by a kind of academic immortality. It has been repeatedly heavily criticized for not being in line with historical reality; not being theoretically, ideologically or normatively neutral and

implying certain ways and direction of thinking about important social and cultural processes of the 20th century. However, despite a wide field of criticism, the concept of the sexual revolution continues to be actively used, even if only as a freely used metaphor. Such immortality could be explained by the fact that it is a convenient methodological tool which does not clearly define what processes in the field of sexuality actually took place in the last century but serves as a base and look for more precise definitions, names and interpretations.

In this article, we will raise the issue of the application of the concept of sexual revolution to changes in sexuality in the Soviet Union: does this concept make it possible to understand and explain the Soviet transformation of sexuality? This case of Soviet transformation of sexuality is valuable because it challenges the concept of the sexual revolution differently from, for example, the cases of Western societies. First, historiography shows the changes in sexuality in the USSR after the Second World War but this change is usually not associated with the sexual revolution, which itself took place in the 1980s.<sup>1</sup> However, in the 1960–1970s, as will be shown later, there were obvious structural changes in the field of sexuality, therefore such an interpretation, which reduces the sexual revolution only into the expression of sexuality in public space, seems unsatisfactory. In recent years there has been more discussion on the importance of private space. Yulia Gradszkova, Alexander Kondakov and Maryna Shevtsova propose the concept of a “revolution of intimacy”<sup>2</sup> but they still apply it more to the post-socialist period. Secondly, it has already been observed that “The Soviet Union has largely been left out of the broader discussions of European and global gender history, because the complexities of its gender ideology and outcomes have not easily fitted prevailing models elsewhere in the past or in the present day”.<sup>3</sup> The same could be said about sexuality research. It is difficult to apply the Western concept of the sexual revolution in the case of the USSR, therefore there is a tendency to abandon it or

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<sup>1</sup> E. g., Anna Rotkirch „the sexual revolution in the public sphere“ dates the beginning of 1987: Anna Rotkirch, *The Man Question: Loves and Lives in Late 20th Century Russia* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2000), 23.

<sup>2</sup> Yulia Gradszkova, Alexander Kondakov, Maryna Shevtsova, “Post-socialist Revolutions of Intimacy: An Introduction,” *Sexuality & Culture* 24 (2020): 359–370, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12119-020-09706-8>.

<sup>3</sup> Erica L. Fraser, “Soviet Masculinities and Revolution,” in *Gender in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe and the USSR*, ed. Catherine Baker (London, New York: Palgrave, 2017), 127.

seek reservations, in the sense that the changes have taken place “beneath the ice”.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, in this article we aim, on the one hand, to show more the history of change in sexuality in the Soviet Union in the context of global research on sexual history, and on the other hand to look at this change from a theoretical perspective – through the prism of the sexual revolution – and also to contribute to the conceptualization of sexuality changes and gender history. We will examine the dynamics of the sexual policy, norms and behaviour that took place in 1944–1990 and demonstrate the problems that arise when applying the concept of the sexual revolution to the sexual processes that took place during the Soviet era and we will offer a new solution – our own concept of sexual civil war. We will do this by using and analysing the elements of different concepts of the sexual revolution found in historiography and the implications inherent to the concept. We will also introduce a new concept of sexual mobilization that allows a new interpretation of Soviet family and gender policies. It is important to emphasize that the article will only analyse what was then considered the norm, therefore it will not talk about topics such as homosexuality, which would require a separate study.<sup>5</sup>

The article will analyse the case of one of the republics of the USSR – Lithuania. Although a lot of space is given to the general processes of the USSR, the specifics of Lithuania are discussed separately. This republic was not quite typical: occupied by the USSR in 1940, it did not undergo a revolutionary Soviet sexual policy phase til the mid-1930s.<sup>6</sup> Until 1940 Lithuania was a conservative peasant dominated state that did not even have a marriage law. Therefore, subsequent changes in the field of sexuality here may have been even more favourable to the application of the concept

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<sup>4</sup> Dan Healey, “The Sexual Revolution in the USSR: Dynamics Beneath the Ice,” in *Sexual Revolutions*, eds. Gert Hekma, Alain Giami (London, New York: Palgrave, 2014), 236–248.

<sup>5</sup> For further reading: Dan Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Dan Healey, *Russian Homophobia from Stalin to Sochi* (London, Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2018); Rustam Alexander, *Regulating Homosexuality in Soviet Russia, 1956–91: A Different History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526155771>.

<sup>6</sup> Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women, The State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Gregory Carleton, *Sexual Revolution in Bolshevik Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Dan Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia*.

of sexual revolution. The dynamics of sexuality in Lithuania will be examined since its reoccupation in 1944.<sup>7</sup> However, Soviet Lithuania could not pursue any of the relatively more independent family, gender and sexual behaviour policies. All union laws and other legal and administrative provisions were transposed and adapted into it. Therefore, in order to understand the policy of sexuality in Soviet Lithuania, it is necessary to talk about the policy of the entire Soviet Union.

This article summarizes part of a broader study of sexuality change in the 20th century, in Lithuania,<sup>8</sup> and seeks to conceptualize it. While investigating the USSR's sexuality policy, sources of Soviet law were examined, ranging from family law (such as family and marriage codes) to various laws and ordinances managing the gender situation. The Soviet Lithuanian press was the most important source for studying the cultural level of changes in sexuality. All periodicals for teachers (*Tarybinis mokytojas* [Soviet teacher], *Tarybinė mokykla* [Soviet school]), women (*Tarybinė moteris* [Soviet woman]), youth (*Jaunimo gretos* [Ranks of Youth], *Nemunas*), family (*Šeima* [Family]), popular magazines for a wide audience (*Švyturys* [Lighthouse], *Šluota* [Broom], *Mokslas ir gyvenimas* [Science and Life]) were reviewed. Family counselling and sexological literature published in soviet Lithuanian were also analysed. The big help for study of social practices was 28 interviews collected by the authors.<sup>9</sup>

## 1 Levels of Sexual Revolution

There is no single concept of sexual revolution. Different concepts of sexuality and sexual development – different meanings, causes and consequences attributed to the sexual revolution; ideological attitudes,

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<sup>7</sup> During the Soviet occupation in 1940–1941 much more liberal laws were in force (as compared to 1944), but there was no time for them to have a greater impact on society (only a year later the Soviet occupiers were replaced by the Nazis, who introduced their own law).

<sup>8</sup> The research project *The Change of Sexual Norms and Behavior in Modern Society of Lithuania* was conducted 2017–2019 in Vilnius University, funded by Research Council of Lithuania. As a part of the project a monograph on the culture of sexuality in soviet Lithuania was published: Valdemaras Klumbys, Tomas Vaiseta, *Mažasis o: seksualumo kultūra sovietų Lietuvoje* (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2022).

<sup>9</sup> Interviewees were women and men who lived in the Soviet era. All were born no later than 1960. In the text, they are coded by indicating gender and year of birth (for example, a woman born in 1952 will be marked W52).

expectations, inclusion or rejection of political, cultural and social phenomena according to various criteria determined the existence of many concepts of sexual revolution. Here we will not discuss in detail the notions of sexual revolution determined by different ideological approaches, which are, in principle, normatively defined.<sup>10</sup> Despite different ideological and value assumptions, the transformation of sexuality in society is recognized in all cases. This transformation consists of three main components: gender (its role and relationship), sexuality (its private and public expression, sexual behaviour, including contraception and abortion, forms of love, etc.) and family (its patterns, marriage, divorce, etc). It also encompasses three structural levels: (1) the political level, which defines the relationship between the state and society; (2) the social level, which defines sexual behaviour and interpersonal relationships; (3) the cultural level, which defines provisions, attitudes, values, discourses (about what and how we talk) about sexuality, and the state of public culture. The authors investigating the sexual revolution disagree on whether changes at all levels are equally important and significant, which of them should we consider first in relation to others, i. e. which became factors driving other change, or whether all factors must necessarily be captured in order for certain changes to be termed a sexual revolution.<sup>11</sup> Here, all three structural levels will be

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<sup>10</sup> These approaches vary from the radical utopian proclamation of the liberation of sexuality from the repressive bourgeois society, relations, norms and ideological constraints (about the emergence and development of this concept, see John Levi Martin, "Structuring the Sexual Revolution," *Theory and Society* 25, no. 1 (February 1996): 105–51) to the conservative, which sees the process of liberation as the disintegration of the traditional moral order, the destruction of traditional values and the moral decline (e.g., Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (New York: The Free Press, 1999)).

<sup>11</sup> For a broader discussion see, for example, Stephen Garton, *History of Sexuality: Antiquity to Sexual Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2004), 210–228; David Allyn, *Make Love, Not War. The Sexual Revolution: An Unfettered History* (London, New York: Routledge, 2016), 3–9; Alan Petigny, "Illegitimacy, Postwar Psychology, and the Reperiodization of the Sexual Revolution," *Journal of Social History* 38, No. 1 (Autumn 2004): 63–79, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jsh.2004.0100>; Jeffrey Weeks, *Sexuality and Its Discontents: Meaning, Myths and Modern Sexualities* (London, New York: Routledge, 1985), 15–32; Hera Cook, "The English Sexual Revolution: Technology and Social Change," *History Workshop Journal*, No. 59 (Spring 2005): 109–128, <https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbi009>; Jeremy Greenwood, Nezhil Guner, "Social Change: The Sexual Revolution," *International Economic Review* 51, No. 4 (November 2010), 893–923, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00605.x>.

considered as interactive and treated with equal importance. Looking for answer to whether the concept of sexual revolution allows us to understand and explain the Soviet transformation of sexuality, we will first examine the processes that took place in the USSR in general and Soviet Lithuania in particular at all three levels, not only identifying changes but also describing their nature. We will then assess these changes in terms of the implied features of the concept of sexual revolution.

### **1.1 Policy Level: Mobilization and Manoeuvring**

The political (including legal) changes are often considered to be the most obvious factors driving the process of sexual revolution. On the one hand, various social and cultural groups or movements fought against government policies and laws that restricted people's freedom and choice: These movements politicized private and everyday life, identities and culture.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, there is a visible policy pursued by the government on sexuality in the broadest sense: the applied laws and other policies, the extent of state intervention, the extent to which the state and its institutions (legal, medical, scientific, media) restrict or allow freedom of choice, restraint or support the expression of sexuality, whether the said movements are allowed to appear and act in response to their demands. It is no coincidence that one of the most important criteria of the sexual revolution was "permissiveness" – a certain level of freedom granted by the government or the state in the field of sexuality, which was changing the boundaries in the public and private spheres.<sup>13</sup> In Soviet society, the emergence of independent emancipation (rights of feminists, homosexuals' etc.) movements and coming into the public sphere was impossible due to the state's monopoly in the public sphere that precluded any independent movement. Soviet postwar policy was also strictly heteronormative, criminalizing the male homosexual intercourse. Therefore it makes no sense to talk about a sexual revolution in this regard. On the other hand, the issue of political "permissiveness", i. e. what sexuality policy the Soviet state pursued, is much more complicated.

In the most general sense, the USSR has emerged as a modernizing state from the very beginning, as it perceived not only reproduction but also

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<sup>12</sup> Gert Hekma, Alain Giami, "Sexual Revolutions: An Introduction," in *Sexual Revolutions*, eds. Gert Hekma, Alain Giami (London, New York: Palgrave, 2014), 2.

<sup>13</sup> Jeffrey Weeks, *The World We Have Won: The Remaking of Erotic and Intimate Life* (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), xii.

gender relations and sexual behaviour as the object of active policy (intervention and regulation). Especially since adopting pro-natalist policies in the mid-1930s, the Soviet state resembled the Western states and began to operate largely on the principles of modern biopolitics.<sup>14</sup> In this respect, the reproductive behaviour of citizens, like their economic activities, was no longer a purely private matter, but acquired the status of responsibility and even commitment to the state. At the same time, however, sexuality and the sexual behaviour of citizens in private space were not significantly interfered during Stalin's rule. It was simply not talked about in the public space, which meant that it was left on its own, and was thus uncontrolled: "Stalinism was not only repressive; it also encouraged some kind of privacy and comfort in family life".<sup>15</sup> Findings of our research shows that the Soviet state cared about sexuality only insofar as it helped or at least not harmed the reproduction of society, the economic activity of the state and its military power. These goals determined the USSR's policy on sexuality throughout the Soviet era.

Family, gender and sexual behaviour policies throughout the USSR are best summarized by the concept of mobilization. It shows that the "liberalization" or "conservative constraint" observed in any period was not an end in itself, but only a means to reach a true end – mobilization of one type or another. We suggest that, according to the concept of mobilization, Soviet policies can be defined as two mobilization waves and one manoeuvring phase: the wave of the political and economic mobilization till the mid-1930s, the wave of sexual mobilization since then until the 1960s and manoeuvring state policy till the end of 1960s. This timeline is common for USSR but Lithuania didn't experience first, most liberal gender policy phase although inclusion of women in the labour market was constant process.

Starting from 1917 until the mid-1930s, the Soviet state carried out primarily political and economic mobilization, the main goal of which was to bring out women's political and social activism and include them in the labour market.<sup>16</sup> The aim was to transform society through measures

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<sup>14</sup> David L. Hoffmann, "Mothers in the Motherland: Stalinist Pronatalism in Its Pan-European Context," *Journal of Social History* 34, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 35–54, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jsh.2000.0108>.

<sup>15</sup> Rotkirch, *The Man Question*, 20.

<sup>16</sup> Men's economic mobilization was self-evident – they were subject to a constitutional obligation to work; an unemployed woman could legally be just a "housewife".

that often liberalized and equalized gender relations.<sup>17</sup> Since the mid-1930s, the Soviet state began a new way of transforming society – sexual mobilization, i. e. it undertook an active attempt to direct the sexual behaviour of women and men in a way that would achieve the state’s pro-natalist goals. This modern policy, by its very nature, began to be implemented through measures that largely encouraged and upheld conservative norms (the traditionally interpreted institute of society – the family and the traditional role of women – motherhood). The apogee of conservative sexual mobilization is the Decree of 1944,<sup>18</sup> revoking the recognition of a de facto marriage and making divorce particularly difficult, etc.<sup>19</sup>

The Decree of 1944 and the legislation supplementing it were the last significant manifestations of the mobilization policy of the Soviet state. Economic mobilization remained, however law liberalization of 1950–1960s (the legalisation of abortions and simplifying divorce procedures were probably of particular importance) essentially meant the abandonment of sexual mobilization. The refusal of this mobilization was slowed down by Nikita Khrushchev, who was the author of the Decree of 1944 and sought to continue pronatalist policies.<sup>20</sup> Sexual mobilization was finally abandoned after his removal in 1964: as early as 1965 divorce was greatly simplified and in 1968 union laws and The Soviet Lithuanian Family and Marriage Code of 1969 again provided an opportunity for parents to recognize their illegitimate children and for mothers to be granted alimony for

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<sup>17</sup> For example, the formal legal consolidation of gender equality in all areas took place immediately after the revolution and lasted throughout the Soviet era: “the formal commitment of the Soviet regime to sexual equality is not in doubt” (Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, “Sexual Equality in Soviet Policy: A Developmental Perspective,” in *Women in Russia*, eds. Dorothy Atkinson, Alexander Dallin, Gail Warshofsky Lapidus (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 115).

<sup>18</sup> Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR “On increase of State aid to pregnant women, mothers with many children and lone mothers; on strengthening measures for the protection of motherhood and childhood; on the establishment of the title “Heroine Mother”; and on the institution of the order “Motherhood Glory” and the “Motherhood Medal”” (1944-07-08), in Rudolf Schlesinger, *The Family in the USSR: Documents and Readings (Changing Attitudes in Soviet Russia)* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), 367–376.

<sup>19</sup> More on the Decree and its emergence: Nakachi Mie, “N. S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law: Politics, Reproduction, and Language,” *East European Politics and Societies* 20, No. 1 (February 2006): 40–68, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325405284313>.

<sup>20</sup> Nakachi, “N. S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law,” 42.



them. Although there was no complete return to the liberal 1920s: actual marriages were not recognized, and the mother's testimony was no longer enough to grant alimony – the man's paternity had to be proven.<sup>21</sup>

The abandonment of sexual mobilization marked a fundamental change in the field of sexual policy: from now on, the state sought to no longer actively (trans)form society but to manoeuvre more passively, adapting the Soviet system to a changing, modernizing society and its needs and demographic targets to overcome declining natality that was not abandoned. Gary Lee Bowen calls such a policy a compromise between state priorities and greater personal freedom and equality in personal relationships.<sup>22</sup> But it would be possible to argue that the Soviet state took more into account the processes of society as a whole, the deepening social problems, rather than the interests of the individual. The increased freedom of the individual and the family as a result of the changes can be seen as an indirect consequence of the refusal of sexual mobilization. Therefore, by the end of 1960s, not much of the pronatalist policy was “hesitant pronatalism,” as Mona Claro describes it,<sup>23</sup> but rather this refusal of sexual mobilization in order to adapt to society contradicted the almost unchanged pronatalist aims.

There were also strong contradictions in other areas, such as the desire to preserve a strong family, but the promotion of women's work, financial independence unequivocally contributed to the weakening of the then traditional family institute. Economic mobilization remained throughout the Soviet era, but in the 1920s it was carried out as part of the transformation of society, and now these changes were already well established (women were included in the labour market), while there was no return to the attempt to truly equalize gender roles. Political liberalization made it possible to adapt to what is inevitable. It was an attempt to cushion past consequences not only of family, gender, and sexual behaviour, but also of industrialization, collectivization, and urbanization, or social policy in general, while maintaining the economic and demographic impact of

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<sup>21</sup> Whitmore Gray, “Scholarship on Soviet Family Law in Perspective,” *Columbia Law Review* 70 (1970): 248.

<sup>22</sup> Gary Lee Bowen, “The Evolution of Soviet Family Policy: Female Liberation Versus Social Cohesion,” *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 14, No. 3 (Autumn 1983): 306.

<sup>23</sup> Mona Claro, “Interpreting the World or Changing It? The ‘Woman Question’ and the ‘Sexual Question’ in Soviet Social Sciences,” *Clio. Women, Gender, History* 41, No. 1 (January 2015): 55.

both mobilizations for the benefit of the State. The State began to act here as a force trying not to lose control and basically a force which could no longer solve social problems and to realize its interests. The state's path to the manoeuvring phase is well illustrated by the shift from efforts to encourage large families to have as many children as possible in an effort to encourage smaller families to have children – initially several and later on at least one child<sup>24</sup>. It is true that, none of the mobilizations (the political-economic till the mid of the 1930s and sexual till the end of the 1960s) were radical, but rather selective<sup>25</sup> (for example, seeking to change family models but not seeking to abandon the family altogether), and at the manoeuvring stage from the 1960s the Soviet state continued to care more about its own political and economic interests than about reforming of society.

## 1.2 Social and Cultural Levels: Processes and Meanings

At the social level, the sexual revolution is primarily understood as changing daily practices and more general sexual behaviours in the field of sexuality, measured or at least reflected statistically and significantly for a larger part of the population (extramarital sex, illegitimate children, abortion, divorce, etc.). Often, in the context of the sexual revolution, factors that may have had a sudden impact, such as the prevalence of birth control pills, are cited.<sup>26</sup> However, there is a greater tendency to value long-term social structural change or wider, even sudden, social change.<sup>27</sup> The cultural level, meanwhile, basically means an increase in the level of “visibility” of sexuality (similar to the “permissiveness” at the political level) and the change in

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<sup>24</sup> For example, under the Decree of 1944, not only childless citizens who have reached the age of 20 but also families who had less than three children had to pay special tax (see *Instrukcija dėl viengūnių, vienišų ir mažaseimių TSRS piliečių mokesčio* (Vilnius: Lietuvos TSR Finansų ministerija, Mokesčių ir rinkliavų valdyba, 1948), 1–4), whereas the instruction of 1961 shows that the obligation to pay the tax for families with one or two children has already been revoked and only families without children had to pay it (see *Instrukcija dėl viengūnių, vienišų ir mažaseimių TSRS piliečių mokesčio* (Vilnius: TSRS Finansų ministerija, 1961), 1–3).

<sup>25</sup> Andrea Stevenson Sanjian, “Social Problems, Political Issues: Marriage and Divorce in the USSR,” *Soviet Studies* 43, No. 4 (1991): 633.

<sup>26</sup> Hera Cook, “The English Sexual Revolution: Technology and Social Change,” *History Workshop Journal*, no. 59 (Spring 2005): 109–128, <https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbi009>.

<sup>27</sup> e.g., Alan Petigny, “Illegitimacy, Postwar Psychology, and the Reperiodization of the Sexual Revolution,” *Journal of Social History* 38, No. 1 (Autumn 2004): 63–79, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jsh.2004.0100>.

norms associated with it: beginning (allowing) to speak and show what was previously hidden, forbidden, restricted and censored, the limits of acceptability and tolerance are expanding, the ideals and standards are changing. In this way, a fundamentally new relationship of society with the culture of sexuality is formed.<sup>28</sup> Theoretically separated social and cultural levels should be jointly considered in the practical analysis of sexuality transformation: social behaviour is active or is influenced by cultural motives and attitudes, and the meaning and influence of the latter cannot be understood without comparing them with real human behaviour.

Statistics on the changing sexual behaviour of the Soviet Lithuanian population are not unambiguous. The population grew during the Soviet era, but families decreased and their nuclearization took place.<sup>29</sup> In the late Soviet era, the family norm of 2 children began to take effect. An extensive survey of women of 1974 in Soviet Lithuania showed that 64% of families with one child planned to have more, and only 22% of families with two children, and although a large proportion of respondents considered three to be the ideal number of children, in reality the majority had 1–2 children.<sup>30</sup> Such a decline in the family was influenced by the inability of the Soviet economy to satisfy growing needs of population, poor State support for mothers mobilized to work, a chronic lack of housing and similar socio-economic factors. However, the change of cultural norms – individualization, strengthening of the child-centred family model – also had a profound effect. The interviewee W48b named the new modern norm as follows: “Well, because you shouldn’t have too many kids. [...] One, two – it’s [normal], and if more, it’s something ... something not good. [...] It’s just a shame here.” On the other hand, the statistically observed family nuclearization does not show the other side of this process – the family’s maintained

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<sup>28</sup> It is sometimes pointed out that it was precisely the cultural revolution that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, because only the cultural environment in which sexual relations are established and maintained can change rapidly and radically (see Jeffrey Escoffier, “Pornography, Perversity and the Sexual Revolution,” in *Sexual Revolutions*, eds. Hekma, Giami, 208; Jonathyne Briggs, “Sex and the Girl’s Single: French Popular Music and the Long Sexual Revolution of the 1960s,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 21, No. 3 (September 2012): 524), <https://doi.org/10.7560/JHS21306>.

<sup>29</sup> *Soviet Lithuanian Women: A Short Collection of Statistics* (Vilnius, 1985), 17.

<sup>30</sup> Stasys Vaitiekūnas, Petras Adlys, Leonas Perkumas, *Karta keičia kartą* (Vilnius: “Mokslas”, 1986), 74–77.

relationship with its parents (grandparents) and other relatives who helped this “nuclear” family to survive – by raising children, providing food from the countryside, etc.<sup>31</sup> In the absence of effective State aid to accelerate the consolidation of those links (e.g. the slow development of the nursery network), “nuclear” families often continued to resemble extended ones in their practices.

Divorce and its growth are also generally perceived as a sign of the modernization of society and sometimes of the sexual revolution, driven by increasing women’s economic independence and cultural autonomy, generally declining individual dependence in the context of increasing role of “welfare state” on traditional family institution and similar factors, although none of them are unquestionable.<sup>32</sup> In Soviet Lithuania after the liberalization of the divorce process in 1965 their sudden growth was recorded (it is true that it started before the legal changes).<sup>33</sup> This divorce process is also related to the cultural motives of the marriage. It is generally accepted that in the 2nd half of the 20th century “romantic love” came into being in Soviet Lithuania as one of the main factors of marriage.<sup>34</sup> If so, it probably also contributed to the fragility of marriage, with relationships based on feelings rather than economic pragmatism being more likely to break. The establishment of romantic love could be explained, at least partially, by one of the most striking tendencies in Soviet Lithuania in the 2nd half of the 20th century – a decrease in marital age. This trend contradicts the development of the sexual revolution in the West, where it has led to delays and declines in marriages.<sup>35</sup> We could say that with the replacement of economic pragmatism by romantic love, young people no longer waited

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<sup>31</sup> Similar processes in Russia are discussed: Rotkirch, *The Man Question*, 120–124.

<sup>32</sup> Aušra Maslauskaitė, Marė Baublytė, *Skyrybų visuomenė: ištuokų raida, veiksniai, pasekmės* (Vilnius: Lietuvos socialinių tyrimų centras, Demografinių tyrimų institutas, 2012), 21, 32–34.

<sup>33</sup> If 2611 divorces were registered in the 1965, in 1970 – already 6918, and in 1980 – 11038 (see *Soviet Lithuanian Women*, 16).

<sup>34</sup> Aušra Maslauskaitė, *Meilė ir santuoka pokyčių Lietuvoje* (Vilnius: Socialinių tyrimų institutas, 2004), 63–65.

<sup>35</sup> For example, the published data of Vilnius residents show that in 1939, the average age of marriage for male workers was 30.1, for women 26.8, and in 1975 – 23.2 and 22.2 respectively (see Angelė Vyšniauskaitė, Petras Kalnius, Rasa Paukštytė-Šaknienė, *Lietuvių šeima ir papročiai* (Vilnius: “Mintis”, 2008), 230), and it steadily declined until the collapse of the USSR (see Vladas Gaidys, *Sem’ya v Litovskoj SSR (social’nyj i demograficheskij aspektj)* (Vilnius, 1986), 14).

to accumulate sufficient capital to enter into marriage. And then it should be said – as sociologist Anthony Giddens does – that romantic love is one of the most important signs of modernization.<sup>36</sup> Its entry into force seems to be confirmed by Soviet statistics: 70% of the respondents of the surveys conducted after 1970 named the feelings as the motive for marriage.<sup>37</sup>

But the different trajectories of the age of marriage in the USSR and the West may also have been caused by economic differences. Compared to capitalist countries, marriage did not require such large financial investment (it was not possible to buy an apartment and make a financial commitment accordingly), therefore there was no need to raise capital. During the Soviet era, some young people acquired a specialty early on through vocational schools and were able to start living independently earlier, even if they were not very well-off. Some applicants mentioned that some students were in a hurry to marry in the third or fourth year of studies, which may have been caused by anxiety that post-graduation assignments could separate the couple (they could be sent to work in different locations).

Pre-marital sex (similarly as a dominance of romantic love), which is even more commonly associated with the sexual revolution, could be considered as a sign of modernization. One of the statistical indicators that can reflect them is the number of first pregnancies and changes in it. Most of those born in cohorts until 1949 took place in marriage (about one-fifth were out of wedlock), in 1950–1959 in cohort pregnancies out of marriage were 29%, in 1960–1969 in cohort – it went up to 33 percent. This trend is confirmed by the results of anonymous survey of 15–25-year males published in 1973: 38% named sexual curiosity as a trigger of the first intercourse, 25% – a wish of the partner and only 22% – love. Moreover, 28,5% respondents stated that they knew their partners only from several hours to several days, 45% characterised their partners as adventitious acquaintance, and main criteria of partner choice for 26.7% of respondents was “easy of access.”<sup>38</sup> This means that not only “the union of marriage and sexuality was dismantled in the Soviet era,”<sup>39</sup> but that union between sex

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<sup>36</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

<sup>37</sup> Gaidys, *Sem'ya v Litovskoj SSR*, 7.

<sup>38</sup> Kestutis P. Jocius, “Motivy nachala polovoj zhizni sredi yunoshej g. Kaunasa,” *Mokslo darbai* 3 (Kaunas: Šviesa, 1973): 178–181.

<sup>39</sup> Vlada Stankūnienė, Aušra Maslauskaitė (eds.), *Lietuvos šeima: tarp tradicijos ir naujos realybės*, (Vilnius: Socialinių tyrimų institutas, 2009), 59.

and love was also dismantled at the end of 1970s and in 1980s. Here we find a process that could be called one of the most important elements of the sexual revolution. This trend is reinforced by another turning point, when even 20% of young people from the 1970s started living together in cohabitation, whereas before, number of people starting to live in a partnership in cohabitation rather than marriage was twice as low.<sup>40</sup> Increasing birth control, which reduced fear of pregnancy a bit, also contributed to the modernization of sexuality. Even the fact that in 1960–1970s there were significantly fewer abortions in Lithuania than in Russia,<sup>41</sup> although testify to a greater conservatism of society, but still show a clear separation of sexual life from the reproductive function. All this makes it possible to state that part of the statistically significant changes in sexuality in the social sphere attributed to the sexual transformation began in the late 1960s or in the 1970s and then intensified.

In the cultural field, we see during this period a rather active attempt by the state to adapt to and influence ongoing changes through sex education, maintaining a conservative approach to sexuality, while at the same time trying to modernize gender (especially male) roles (there are a lot of discussions in the press<sup>42</sup>) and provide more knowledge of the psychology and physiology of sexual intercourse, which was in great demand in a liberalizing society. Historiography is still dominated by the view that the extremely

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<sup>40</sup> Aušra Maslauskaitė, Marė Baublytė, “Education and Transition from Cohabitation to Marriage in Lithuania,” *The History of the Family* 20, no. 4 (2015): 569–570, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1081602X.2014.984238>.

<sup>41</sup> About 80–90 abortions to 100 new borns in Lithuania (calculated according: “Historical Abortion Statistics, Lithuania”, *Abortion Statistics and Other Data – Johnston’s Archive*, compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston, last updated 14 January 2020, <http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/ab-lithuania.html>), about 200 in Russia (see “Chislo abortov na 100 rodivshihsyia zhivymi, 1960–2016,” *Demoskop Weekly*, last updated September 13, 2018, <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/app/app40ab.php>).

<sup>42</sup> We can see the confusion of what modern masculinity is in such discussions. Often even the titles of articles are eloquent, for example, *Where Are Your Don Quixotes, Dulcineas?* (M. Survila, “Kur jūsu don kichotai, dulcinėjos?,” *Jaunimo gretos*, No. 8 (1966): 29); *Waiting for the Masculinity* (Birutė Mackonytė, “Vyriškumo belaukiant”, *Švyturys*, No. 16 (1968): 22–23); *Men! Are You Deficit Gender?* (Giedrė Kazlauskaitė, “Vyrai! Jūs deficitinė lytis?,” *Švyturys*, No. 20 (1968): 9) and so on. More about the soviet crisis of masculinity: Elena Zdravomysova, Anna Temkina, “The Crisis of Masculinity in Late Soviet Discourse”, *Russian Social Science Review* 54, No. 1 (2013): 40–61.

rigorist sexual policy changed little in the post-Stalinism period, and until the 2nd half of 1980s only “research on sexuality was again partially allowed, and some kind of information and advice featured in medical journals”, but due to Soviet censorship on practically all matters of what was referred to as “intimate life” [...] was impossible to debate publicly.”<sup>43</sup> However, this does not quite correspond to the situation in Lithuania. Here in 1950–1960s, as the efforts of public discipline intensified<sup>44</sup> and at the same time when the press became more open to the public, more and more education was imparted on how to behave in the intimate life of the family. In Lithuania, first books dedicated to the etiquette of family life appeared in 1959,<sup>45</sup> and in 1960 – the first major popular book on sexual education.<sup>46</sup> A couple more books of this kind appeared in 1960’s but most importantly, in the 2nd half of 1960’s (exactly during the classic sexual revolution), the debate on family, love and sexuality intensified greatly in the press<sup>47</sup>. After a slight decline in 1968<sup>48</sup> such discussions continued into the 1970’s.

Of course, the public discourses continued to be strictly heteronormative. The ‘question of homosexuals’ was tended to be silenced in a public, and in those rare cases when it was mentioned the rhetoric and narrative was mostly homophobic. Also there were not many descriptions of sexual techniques in the press, and those which appeared were quite modest.<sup>49</sup> However, quite a few open discussions about a woman’s sexual needs were published in the press. As early as 1967, it was stated that 60–80% of women “suffer from the coldness of the feeling of love,”<sup>50</sup> but the call to combat

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<sup>43</sup> Rotkirch, *The Man Question*, 22.

<sup>44</sup> For more information: Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

<sup>45</sup> Julija Šalkauskienė, *Tai liečia ir tave* (Vilnius: Valstybinė politinės ir mokslinės literatūros leidykla, 1959).

<sup>46</sup> Tigranas Atarovas, *Lytinio auklėjimo klausimai* (Vilnius: Valstybinė politinės ir mokslinės literatūros leidykla, 1960).

<sup>47</sup> Klumbys, Vaiseta, *Mažasis o*, 141–142.

<sup>48</sup> Stricter censorship after events in Czechoslovakia.

<sup>49</sup> For example, a doctor in a family magazine states: “Because men and women reach orgasm at different times, it is necessary to prolong the functioning of a woman’s erotic zones before sexual intercourse” (see Česlovas Grizickas, “Negalia ar nepasitikėjimas?,” *Šeima*, No. 6 (1978): 44). The use of an almost comical “wooden” medical language and the diligent avoidance of specificities show an inability to speak on such topics in general, and perhaps a shame because of the subject.

<sup>50</sup> Aleksandras Alekseičikas, “Meilės psichologija,” *Jaunimo gretos*, No. 10 (1967): 34.

it is very abstract – by raising people’s cultural level. From the mid-1970s the sexual dissatisfaction of women is more pronounced, although it is only one part of the image of “suffering femininity”, which also emphasizes the double burden of women, them becoming more masculine, etc. Medical professionals turned the question of female sexual frustration and orgasm into a one of the most important public topics of sexuality, in which they attempted to decentralize the position of men by moving them away from the centre of sexual relationships and giving more significance to women. Although the problems of sexuality were seen and discussed in the press, most of such texts offered a rather conservative image of family and love as a way out of the situation.

The debate on sexuality had, on the one hand, an increasing impact on the family and sexual space, and, on the other hand, gradually became more open and more clearly expressed in the changing sexuality of society.<sup>51</sup> The state’s attempt to respond to the growing needs of society in the field of sexuality education and to control and direct them in the 1970–1980’s is testified by the publication of the magazine *Family*. It was launched in 1970, and its circulation increased from 8,000 to 140,000 in five years. The circulation of books dedicated to sexual education (mostly very conservative) shows an even clearer breakthrough. These books were translated, mainly by socialist Poland and East Germany (GDR) authors. 60,000 copies each of the two editions of the first book, Rudolf Neubert’s *New Book on Family Life*,<sup>52</sup> were sold. It was very large, even on the scale of Soviet publishing. The circulation of other books varied between 60,000 and 100,000 copies. Although the titles of the books themselves were not many, however the sum of all copies of their circulation was close to one million in 15 years. A sizeable amount for a Republic with a population of 3 million. Thus, sexuality themes, albeit very limited, still took root in the public sphere. Importantly, this was clearly due to societal pressures<sup>53</sup> to which the State was forced to adapt, at least partly.

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<sup>51</sup> For example, in 1982 a letter of teenager, adherent of free love was published claiming that families practicing this kind of love are happy (see R. Dalia, “Noriu paneigti...,” *Jaunimo gretos*, No. 4 (1982): 30).

<sup>52</sup> Rudolf Neubert, *Nauja knyga apie vedybinį gyvenimą: santuoka kaip dabarties ir ateities problema* (Vilnius: “Mintis”, 1971, 1972).

<sup>53</sup> Articles on love, family, gender, and sexuality received a large number of readers’ letters, and these topics were constantly debated in them.



Public pressure also led to the visual sexualization of the public discourse which took place from the post-Stalinist period until the end of the 1960s, evident first in popular magazines, when there was a visible increase in the usage of images of half-naked, highly sexualized women. This sexualization partially echoed the same processes simultaneously taking place in Western countries (and even used some Western images at times) and had the potential of growing into a visual sexual revolution. However, it was halted by the Soviet government in 1968, when magazine editors were ordered to decrease the number of sexualized images in print. However, from then on, the sexualization of public discourse did not stop entirely, but took place in a slower and more reserved manner. It regained speed only in the 80s.<sup>54</sup>

In more general sense, influence from Western countries was hindered by the State. It means that public circulation of western texts was strongly limited. On the other hand, the press, especially in the late Soviet period, often published articles directly condemning or criticising the changes of sexual culture in the capitalist West, but such texts could also be read by the audience as informative. From the late 1950s, the influence of Western culture came through people's contacts with relatives and friends who had fled to the West at the end of the war (they sent, for example, jeans and music records), and sometimes they could have come to Soviet Lithuania. From the "thaw" period, particularly the younger generations were increasingly influenced by Western trends, from pop culture and its fashions (for example, the mini-skirt, invented in the early 1960s, became fashionable in Soviet Lithuania a few years later) to local adaptations of modernist<sup>55</sup> and countercultural ideas,<sup>56</sup> including the idea of free love (for example, Jack Kerouac's *On the Road* was published in Lithuanian as an entire book in 1972, while in Russian a decade earlier only individual chapters were published). It is difficult to assess how much Western culture arrived through informal and illegal channels. But it is known that both sex education literature translated from English into Russian and published as samizdat

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<sup>54</sup> For broader discussion see: Klumbys, Vaiseta, *Mažasis o*, 82–102.

<sup>55</sup> Rimantas Kmita, "Barzdoti, liūdni ir su Kafkos tomeliu rankose: auksinis 7-ojo dešimtmečio jaunimas lietuvių prozoje," *Colloquia* 41 (2018): 89–111; Solveiga Daugirdaitė, "Ar jos buvo tylios, ar jos buvo modernistės? Moterų vaidmenys XX a. 7–8 dešimtmečio lietuvių literatūros pasaulyje," *Acta Academiae Artium Vilnensis* 95 (2019): 198–228.

<sup>56</sup> For further readings on Soviet hippies culture see: Juliane Fürst, *Flowers Through Concrete: Explorations in Soviet Hippieland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

and also visual pornography were distributed through the black market and reached the population of Soviet Lithuania.<sup>57</sup>

In reality, since the 1970s Western societies have not only experienced liberalisation but also strong opposition to it,<sup>58</sup> but because of the strict control in Soviet Lithuania, Western ideas were associated with liberation and it was these ideas that may have had the greatest influence on the youth. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church had to act as a conservative force. Only a separate study could give a clearer answer to the question of what its role was in the context of the changing sexual norms of Soviet Lithuania's society, but the Soviet policy of atheisation severely constrained its activities. As Nerija Putinaitė writes, a part of society became irreligious, but it did not so much as become atheistic as morally, and in terms of worldview, indifferent.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, a certain part of society retained its faith, or at least its values in line with Catholic teaching. For example, even after a civil marriage, couples looked for opportunities to get married in church (often in a remote location). This also seems to have been a source of intergenerational conflict at times. One respondent (W55b) stated that her husband's parents were angry that the couple were getting married without a church and there were fears that they would not attend the wedding at all. But the generally conservative Catholic attitude towards the changing sexual culture could paradoxically coincide with the Soviet official discourse. For example, in underground Catholic publications attitudes toward modernisation of sexual culture replicated official Soviet view in general and often were far more conservative than in legal press. Western influence in this sphere was condemned fiercely in samizdat.<sup>60</sup>

Thus, in Soviet Lithuania, the field of sexuality underwent cultural changes, albeit moderate and incomplete,<sup>61</sup> with many different influences that may have promoted or hindered this change.

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<sup>57</sup> Klumbys, Vaiseta, *Mažasis o*, 109–127.

<sup>58</sup> David Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 270–294; Dagmar Herzog, *Sexuality in Europe: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 172–174.

<sup>59</sup> Nerija Putinaitė, *Nugenėta pušis: Ateizmas kaip asmeninis apsisprendimas tarybų Lietuvoje* (Vilnius: Naujasis Židinys-Aidai, 2015), 327–338.

<sup>60</sup> See: Valdemaras Klumbys, “Sovietinis seksualumas savilaidos veidrodyje,” *Genocidas ir rezistencija*, No. 2 (52) (2022): 25–44.

<sup>61</sup> For comparison with the case of Soviet Latvia, see: Ineta Lipša, “Silencing Sex Education in Soviet Latvia in the early 1980s: the Case of the Destruction of the Book *Mīlestības vārdā* by Jānis Zālītis,” *Acta medico-historica Rigensia* XV (2022): 97–124, [https://dspace.rsu.lv/jspui/bitstream/123456789/10176/1/IPD-2589\\_ActaMedico-XV\\_04.pdf](https://dspace.rsu.lv/jspui/bitstream/123456789/10176/1/IPD-2589_ActaMedico-XV_04.pdf).

## 2 Implications of Sexual Revolution

The discussed political, social and cultural levels show that one or another kind of sexuality transformation took place in Soviet Lithuania. However, this is not enough to conclude that this change was a sexual revolution. The term “sexual revolution”, and in particular the second part the “revolution”, implies not only political, social and / or cultural changes, but also the fact that these changes must have certain characteristics. These assumptions or implications in the concept are another reason why the sexual revolution should be considered a problematic definition. In the context of the changes in sexuality that took place in Soviet Lithuania, we will highlight the most important of these implications (there are more of them): the suddenness, radicality and homogeneity of the changes.

### 2.1 Suddenness of Change

The word “revolution” implies the assumption that the changes that have taken place in the field of sexuality must have been sudden, i. e. occurred within a relatively short period of time, when “quantity became quality”.<sup>62</sup> Historiography based on this assumption usually sees such a period in the 2nd half of 1960’s, sometimes extending to the whole decade or covering part of the 1970s.<sup>63</sup>

The processes of Soviet Lithuania and the entire USSR examined at the political, social and cultural level raise reasonable doubts as to whether they would meet the criterion of “suddenness” required for the revolution. We take only one case – the dynamics of illegitimate children. Researchers looking for sudden processes that mark the sexual revolution point to the rapid increase in the number of illegitimate children in the post-war years of the USSR: 62.8 million children were born in the USSR between 1945 and 1958, of which 16% (10.6 million) out of wedlock.<sup>64</sup> Mie Nakachi

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<sup>62</sup> Martin, “Structuring the Sexual Revolution,” 111.

<sup>63</sup> Of course, we can find other interpretations. For example, some scholars talk about two 20th-century sexual revolutions (in the 1920s and 1960s): Stephen Garton, *History of Sexuality*, 211, 214. But far more often, there is a tendency to preserve the concept of sexual revolution by adjusting it and adding the epithet “long” or “incomplete”, thus abandoning the presumption of abrupt change, but maintaining other presumptions: for instance, Hekma, Giarni, “Sexual Revolutions: An Introduction,” 2; Hera Cook, *The Long Sexual Revolution: English Women, Sex, and Contraception, 1800–1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252183.001.0001>.

<sup>64</sup> Evgenij Andreev, Leonid Darskij, Tat’yana Har’kova, *Naselenie Sovetskogo Soyuz, 1922–1991* (Moskva: Nauka, 1993), 66.

even talks about the “sexual liberation” from above by the Decree of 1944.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, observing the statistics, it seems that top-down sexual mobilization very quickly changed people’s sexual behaviour and sparked a sexual revolution, one of the important features of which is the separation of sex from marriage. However, a more detailed analysis changes the situation: immediately after the war, there were as many as 25% of illegitimate children in the Soviet Union, and then this number steadily declined till 1969 when reached 8–9% and stabilized at this rate,<sup>66</sup> indicating that the sexual revolution had not taken place. Exactly the same process took place in post-war Bavaria, which had completely different laws.<sup>67</sup> This situation was caused by a huge gender disproportion. Which led to an increase in the number of illegitimate children in the USSR, rather than sexual liberation.

The shortage of men in Lithuania was much lower than in Russia<sup>68</sup>, which also led to a lower share of illegitimate children. In the mid-1950s there were 17% of illegitimate children in the USSR<sup>69</sup>, whereas in Lithuania there were 12.5% of illegitimate children registered in 1950, and in 1955 – 9.7%, then stabilized at 6–7% (the same percentage of illegitimate children was in interwar Lithuania),<sup>70</sup> although sexual mobilization was finally abandoned in 1968. Even if we take into account that the birth rate of illegitimate children was somewhat slowed down by the increase in the number

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<sup>65</sup> Mie Nakachi, “A Postwar Sexual Liberation? The Gendered Experience of the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War,” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 52, No. 2/3 (Avril–Septembre 2011): 423–440, <https://doi.org/10.4000/monderusse.9345>.

<sup>66</sup> Andreev, Darskij, Har’kova, *Naselenie Sovetskogo Soyuz*, 83; Galina Bondarskaja, Leonid Darskij, “Brachnoe sostojanie zhenshhin i rozhdaemost’”, *Demograficheskie processy v SSSR* (Moskva: Nauka, 1990), 32–35.

<sup>67</sup> Michael Kvasnicka, Dirk Bethmann, “World War II, Missing Men, and Out-of-wedlock Childbearing,” *The Economic Journal* 123, No. 567 (March 2013): 162–194, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02526.x>.

<sup>68</sup> In Russia the ratio of women to men in the 30–69 age cohort was 0.62, in the USSR as a whole 0.66 (see Nikolaj Savchenko, “Podrobno o poteryah Velikoj Otechestvennoj,” *Demoskop Weekly*, No. 559–560 (June 2013), <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2013/0559/tema02.php>), in Lithuania 0.77 (calculated according to: *1959 metų visasąjunginio gyventojų surašymo duomenys. Lietuvos TSR* (Vilnius: Valstybinė statistikos leidykla, 1963), 24).

<sup>69</sup> Liubov Denisova, *Rural Women in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia* (London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 76–77.

<sup>70</sup> Aušra Maslauskaitė, “Nesantuokinis gimstamumas Lietuvoje: lyginamoji laiko perspektyva,” *Demografija visiems*, No. 1 (2014): 12–13, [https://smf.vdu.lt/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/demografija\\_visiems\\_nr\\_1.pdf](https://smf.vdu.lt/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/demografija_visiems_nr_1.pdf).

of abortions after 1955, there is still doubt that post-war policies made a significant contribution to the increase in the number of illegitimate children, as historiography suggests.<sup>71</sup>

The increase in the number of premarital first pregnancies in the younger cohorts, which we discussed earlier, suggests that sexual behaviour really was changing, but the process was much slower and more complex. The share of children born to unmarried parents in Lithuania from 1960 to 1990 fluctuated very little, without significant changes. In comparison, for example, in Latvia, where in 1960 such share of children was higher than in Lithuania, there is a clear upward trend since 1970, whereas in Denmark this share is 4 times higher in the same period.<sup>72</sup> It could be said that this speaks of the non-prevalence of extramarital sex, but considering the abortions and early marriages that are very common in the USSR and Lithuania, the low percentage of illegitimate children mainly indicates the reluctance to have children out of wedlock, and thus the unfavourable attitude towards such children, unmarried couples or single mothers. In the absence of significant material barriers to marriage and in the presence of both cultural and state pressures to marry at the onset of pregnancy, an uninterrupted pregnancy very often resulted in marriage. This situation, in turn, also contributed to the premature marriage.

## 2.2 Radicality of Change

If authors who question the presumption of abrupt change can defend the concept of a sexual revolution by appealing to an industrial revolution that is also perceived as having taken place for several decades or even centuries, so the radicality of change implied by the revolution poses a different kind of problem. Radicality indicates that the changes must have taken place not only suddenly but also radically,<sup>73</sup> i.e. almost all (traditional, conservative) norms and patterns of behaviour are replaced by other (modern, more liberal) norms and patterns of behaviour, and this is essentially an irreversible process. Thus, the radicality of change includes their universality and irreversibility. However, such an assumption is also doubtful, when

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<sup>71</sup> O. M. Stone, "The New Fundamental Principles of Soviet Family Law and Their Social Background," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 18, No. 2 (1969): 395.

<sup>72</sup> *Demografija visiems*, No. 1 (2014): 5, [https://smf.vdu.lt/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/demografija\\_visiems\\_nr\\_1.pdf](https://smf.vdu.lt/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/demografija_visiems_nr_1.pdf).

<sup>73</sup> Gert Hekma, "A Radical Break with a Puritanical Past: The Dutch Case," in *Sexual Revolutions*, eds. Hekma, Giarni, 61.

raising a question as to what extent different social and cultural groups were affected by these changes,<sup>74</sup> whether they are not only partial and do not hide “traditional” or “conservative” motives under the external form of “modern” or “liberal” behaviour, or changes are not reversible, at least in part. Moreover, the radicality of change is called into question by the fragmentation and inconsistency of change itself. After all, these changes and the activists who fought for them, in fact, immediately met with strong resistance from other groups in society and the process was marked by uncertainty,<sup>75</sup> while Angus McLaren argues that in the 1960s and in 1970s we were able to observe the clash of different sexual views and narratives (sexual scripts) and not the liberation.<sup>76</sup>

An example of questioning the radicality of change could be a divorce. It shows a modernized approach to the family – it is no longer an institution that is perceived as immovable, indestructible, possible only once in a lifetime by sacrificing one’s personal happiness. However, the family remained a traditional value. After all, most people intended to start a family and tried to start a new one after the divorce, as evidenced by the growing number of remarriages during the Soviet era.<sup>77</sup> What is more, divorces can also show the strength of traditional norms. Their motives may have been the non-fulfilment of expectations formed by such norms. Here is the story of the W47 about her first marriage: “Actually, I got married, in my understanding, because most of the friends were already married back then, and somehow it was even weird to me how I am still single. And I thought from the beginning, well, if I don’t like it – I’ll divorce.” Such a narrative in itself shows a merged partly traditional (marriage not out of romantic love, but not a pragmatic-economic union, and it occurs due to the pressure of traditional norms forcing marriage) and modern (easy to end a marriage) approach. After the unsuccessful marriage, the divorce took place on her initiative – again a clearly modern act. However, the reason for the W47’s divorce reflects the traditional approach – the man did not fulfil

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<sup>74</sup> Matt Cook, “Sexual Revolution(s) in Britain,” in *Sexual Revolutions*, eds. Hekma, Giami, 123.

<sup>75</sup> Dagmar Herzog, *Sexuality in Europe*, 135–136.

<sup>76</sup> Angus McLaren, *Twentieth-Century Sexuality: A History* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 167.

<sup>77</sup> Ernesta Platūkytė, “Pakartotinių santuokų kūrimo Lietuvoje ilgalaikės tendencijos,” *Kultūra ir visuomenė. Socialinių tyrimų žurnalas* 8, No. 1 (2017): 60, <http://dx.doi.org/10.7220/2335-8777.8.1.3>.

the traditional role: “Anyway, the man has to be masculine, and the boy has to be masculine, well, not just some milksop. [...] A man must take care, in my understanding, and [...] with a man I have to feel safe” and “I think woman should be the softer side of the family, the man should be strong [...]”. Therefore, divorce in this case was a modern act, but determined by traditional norms. Quite a number of similar examples showing modern practices aimed at upholding traditional norms or values could be found.

When discussing structural changes at the social level, we also explained the increase in divorce by the establishment of romantic love. But the dominant answer in the surveys of 1970’s that feelings are the most important basis for marriage is suspicious. In the public sphere, the only reason for marriage recognized in the post-Stalinism period was love. Therefore respondents to official surveys may have tended to adapt to the norms dictated by public discourse. According to Rotkirch’s study, marriage for money “is not viewed as acceptable in any autobiography of the Soviet period.”<sup>78</sup> According to the survey data, due to material motives, only 2.5 percent of marriages (22.2% by 1941) were arranged.<sup>79</sup> But the interview material suggests that the real situation may have been different. Here, the interviewee W52 says that “some girls in the company of boys boasted about their parents’ wealth or their “prestigious” job, or acquaintances [...]. There were some who took the bait [...] There were still such parents [...] who, until their daughters were married, adorned them like dolls. Not only during the holidays, but also every day they were exceptionally dressed. Because it was necessary for them to get married fast.” This suggests that the unambiguous link between marriage and love may oversimplify reality. Romantic love could only be a convenient, culturally acceptable answer, given to sociologists who conducted surveys, in order to hide the real motives against the background of the motive of love that dominated public discourse. Unsustainable marriages could have been created on the basis of more pragmatic interests. One of the examples were given by our presenters: “We were friends for two years, and then it kind of got boring [...]. I tell him straight: you know what, if you don’t date me because of love, at least help me to get an apartment. We laughed, and later, well, he helped. We got married and [...] we have lived for eighteen years.” (W55)

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<sup>78</sup> Rotkirch, *The Man Question*, 12.

<sup>79</sup> Gaidys, *Sem’ya v Litovskoj SSR*, 7.

In addition, the respondents of our study often repeated the explanation that love is not primarily passion but trust and respect. This could be interpreted as a more pragmatic motive than romantic love, as such a concept of love appeals to (in this case probably traditional) gender roles.<sup>80</sup> In this sense, love as respect and trust could be called a transitory motive in the transition from traditional economic pragmatism to modern romantic love and this transition is not necessarily happening till the end (at least in the Soviet era).

### 2.3 Homogeneity of Change

The sexual revolution, when used in the singular, implies the assumption that at least one revolution, one wave of change, took place in at least one certain geographical and cultural space (Europe and the USA), albeit not at the same time and scale, but with equal or very similar political, social and cultural changes. In this case, the sexual revolution is seen as a single phenomenon with the same causes, spreading in parallel or dispersing in different societies and even in its separate groups. However, such an approach could be seen not only as keeping the colonial assumption that a value-positive, positive change-making process is spreading from the Western Centre (Paris, New York, etc.), but also as artificially homogenizing the political, social and cultural environment of regions, states or individual societies, the diversity of groups, and perhaps even forcing to rate societies with different political, social, and cultural characteristics according to Western norms. As a result, some authors use the term plural – “sexual revolutions”, but often distinguish them only geographically (by country).<sup>81</sup> And this does not always disregard the fundamental presumption of homogeneity of change.

This assumption is also very important in the context of research on sexuality in the Soviet Union. Firstly, the differences between the political, social, and cultural levels may be much greater here than in democratic societies, because the Soviet system was particularly in control of the political and cultural (public space) level, with less effective action on social level. Secondly, the Soviet Union is perceived as a political entity, but it consisted of republics with different historical, political and cultural

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<sup>80</sup> Respect and trust are earned by performing certain duties and meeting the expectations of the other partner, ensuring stability, peace, etc.

<sup>81</sup> Hekma, Giambi (eds.), *Sexual Revolutions*.



experiences and traditions, in which even the same Soviet policy could have different effects, so even in the Soviet Union itself (at least in theory) it might make sense not to talk about one, but several different (simultaneous) transformations of sexuality. This is especially evident in the above-mentioned differences in the number of abortions comparing Lithuania and other republics of the USSR. Finally, not only political but also economic and social differences between the USSR and Western capitalist countries determined the peculiar development of sexuality.

Soviet policy on gender, family, and sexuality, previously described as having two mobilizations and one manoeuvring phase, if it sought to transform society as a whole, had very different effects on its individual groups. With regard to the case of Lithuania, it is worth emphasizing once again that until 1940 there was a fundamentally different model, similar to the Western one, of modernization with a much slower inclusion of women in the labour market than in the USSR, a more conservative concept of the family – the society did not experience economic mobilization of women and more liberal Soviet transformation phase. As a result, the then conservative policy of the USSR had a partially opposite effect here – economic mobilization could have been more significant than the pronatalist goals that the Soviet government was more concerned at the time. The economic mobilization of women started only since 1944 in Lithuania, which began to fundamentally change gender relations in Lithuania. Thus, even conservative (given the recent past of the USSR) processes could have had a liberalizing effect here (at least to shake up traditional norms, if not yet behaviour). For example, the possibility of judicial divorce emerged (albeit difficult to implement), which was almost non-existent in interwar Lithuania, and the employment of women significantly accelerated.

The emerging economic and sexual mobilizations that began to shift traditional norms of family, gender, and sexual behaviour and, over time, created more and more contradictions, tensions, and conflicts in society, both within one gender group and between the sexes. The wave of sexual mobilization that followed economic mobilization did not abolish the previously enshrined statutory gender equality. The surviving economic mobilization of women modernized their role, and the sexual mobilization supported the traditional role of the mother more and more.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Soviet motherhood was not modern because it did not form a symmetrical relationship with the man in the family.

And after the liberalization of 1960's there was a clear tendency to support pro-reproductive trends, but instead of mobilization, it used elements of maternal privilege: maternity, post-natal and maternal leave were increasingly extended, as well as other privileges for mothers. And such tendencies further intensified after the resolution of the Central Committee of the LCP in 1981 on the improvement of the demographic situation in Soviet Lithuania.<sup>83</sup> Measures provided there (the possibility for women with children to work part-time and part-week, on rolling shifts, extended maternal leave, etc.) large gap in women's inequality with men. This conflict of women's roles, caused by two mobilizations, manifested itself in everyday life as a phenomenon of "double burden". However, even the phenomenon of "double burden" already widely described in historiography does not cover all sources of tension in women's cultural and social roles, as this tension was rising not between two roles, the working woman and the mother, but between the three, as their growing cultural capital increased their cultural awareness, which does not allow the Soviet woman to be portrayed only as a victim of the above-mentioned "double burden".<sup>84</sup>

Meanwhile, in regard to men, there was little change in State policy since the introduction of sexual mobilization. Until the 1980s men were essentially pushed out of the family institute, made either completely irresponsible for the family (children), or made mere maintenance payers. Apart from the material supporter, the state did not propose any other models of masculinity in the family (as women were offered worker's and social worker's role outside the family) that would allow men to contribute to the upbringing of children as well. On the contrary, men were even pushed out of the family by legal means (e.g., only the mother could take leave due to the child's illness). Thus, the state did not try to create a more liberal family model even by liberalizing other areas. In principle, it can be

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<sup>83</sup> "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR" On Measures to Increase State Support for Families with Children and to Improve the Demographic Situation in the Republic," *LTSR Aukščiausiosios Tarybos ir Vyriausybės žinios*, No. 16 (1981): 446–456. It reflected a similar union resolution.

<sup>84</sup> Yulia Gradszkova, "Women's Everyday Life in Soviet Russia: Collecting Stories, Dealing with Silences and Exploring Nostalgia," in *The Soviet Past in the Post-Socialist Present: Methodology and Ethics in Russian, Baltic and Central European Oral History and Memory Studies*, eds. Melanie Ilic, Dalia Leinarte (New York, London: Routledge, 2016), 48.

argued that men were dominated by economic mobilization for work, military activity and state governance, while their sexual mobilization was only an additional manipulation of their role in promoting reproduction. From the 1970s intensified attempts in the press to involve men in the family. For example, magazine for youth *Jaunimo Gretos* constantly published articles and discussions about everyday life and problems of the young couples with such advices, from 1977 there was constant rubric “Together” for such texts. Magazine *Šeima* for families employed another strategy – a lot of publicity articles depicting idealized portraits of the fathers in their families and emphasizing importance of father to spouse and children.<sup>85</sup> Even in a book for youngsters “Be a man!” there were multiple morals that no work is solely a man’s work or a woman’s works at home.<sup>86</sup> These tendencies were somewhat at odds with economic mobilization of men and therefore had little effect in changing informal gender inequality.<sup>87</sup>

Looking at gender relations, this situation created not so much a contradiction between the roles of men (worker and father) as more of a contradiction between men as compared to women. In addition, the state promotion of men’s irresponsibility created tensions with increasing woman’s responsibility to the family and thus encouraged conflict between them. The discrepancy between the declared gender equality and reality also increased tension, as the role of woman and mother being the most important family members was clearly distinguished in the family, whereas in society and workplace gender inequality and traditional gender roles were not opposed. Attempts to “return” women to the family in the late Soviet era did not coincide with their changed situation and self-awareness, and the double burden at work and in the family increased women’s dissatisfaction and fatigue.

### **Conclusions: Sexual Civil War Instead of Sexual Revolution?**

The transformation of sexuality in Soviet Lithuania did take place, but its scale, depth, and speed varied greatly in various fields. In this case, it is impossible to talk about any entirely fulfilled implications of the concept

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<sup>85</sup> For example, J. Ramoškienė, “Tėvas,” *Šeima*, No. 1 (1973): 12–15.

<sup>86</sup> S. Gričiuvienė, *Būk vyras!* (Vilnius: Mintis, 1971), p. 90–92, 100–104 etc.

<sup>87</sup> Vladas Gajdis, *Sem’ja v Litovskoj SSR (social’nyj i demograficheskij aspekty)* (Vilnius: Litovskoe obshhestvo družby i kul’turnoj svyazi s zarubezhnyimi stranami, 1986), p. 23–24.

of sexual revolution. The changes were not abrupt, and those that seemed abrupt could hide a process that had begun a long time ago or return to previous tracks after a short period of time. The changes were not radical, as neither state policy, nor human behaviour, nor cultural norms became truly modern. On the contrary, both inconsistent and contradictory state policies and people's attitudes and views, as well as social and economic characteristics of society, often hindered, restricted or distorted the development of modern norms. Change brought relative freedom, but it was always fairly limited, so there can be no talk of real freedom. We should not talk about modern norms that replaced traditional ones, but about their protracted or stuck confrontation – what has been the norm from earlier times, typically does not give in to modernization so easily, and there are also conservative manifestations of state policy, which was implementing traditional norms.

Therefore, after abandoning the concept of sexual revolution, we should look for a more accurate name for the sexual transformation that took place in Soviet Lithuania, and perhaps throughout the USSR, and in other countries with a complicated history of sexual change. At the beginning of this article we suggested the concept of sexual mobilization. It helps to clearly identify and understand the logic of the Soviet state's family, gender and sexual behaviour policies, to separate goals from measures, to deconstruct the constructs of Soviet ideology (for example, what was declared “women's emancipation” should be seen as their economic mobilization). However, the concept of sexual mobilization does not cover all the processes and phenomena of sexual transformation, but only highlights the role of the state, its nature and, in part, its impact on society. Therefore, it cannot change the concept of the sexual revolution either.

This requires a concept that reveals the different speeds, heterogeneity, incompleteness, contradictions and especially conflicts of the processes. Therefore, just as sexuality research deals with the interaction and overlap of different discourse traditions,<sup>88</sup> the transformation process can also be seen not as a finite process in which one type of norms and patterns of behaviour are displaced by others, but as a kind of long-term coexistence with various forms of interaction. As we have shown in this article, these interactions were by no means always smooth and non-conflicting.

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<sup>88</sup> David H. Halperin, *How to Do the History of Homosexuality* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 108–110.

The overlapping of modern norms and behaviours with traditional norms and behaviours at the political, social and cultural level has been extremely difficult, causing conflicts between traditional and modern norms both in state-society relations and in different groups (gender), within each group and finally within each individual person (the person himself does not necessarily reflect reality as a conflict, taking modern action, but adhering to traditional values). Both the contradictorily programmed state policy and the diversity of society's own attitudes suggest that both traditional and modern norms shone more or less clearly in the palimpsest of Soviet-era sexuality, with not one of them clearly replacing the other.

In this context, a more precise concept could be not the sexual revolution but sexual civil war. This concept points to the opposite implications than the sexual revolution. If in the first case the changes are sudden, then in this case they are elongated and viscous: they take place slowly, inconsistently, not necessarily in one direction (the process can change direction and, for example, start to return to the previous situation). The radical change of the sexual revolution, in which previous norms, values, attitudes, or behaviours are irreversibly pushed out by new norms, values, attitudes, or behaviours, here is replaced by a long, usually conflicting interaction between the old and the new (tradition vs. modernization, conservatism vs. liberalism, etc.). This conflicting interaction, which can take the form of both the clash of direct norms or forms of behaviour and their overlapping or entrenching in separate social and cultural groups, is not only a temporary, albeit unavoidable, stage, as in case of a revolution, but a peculiar *modus operandi* of sexual transformation. Therefore, the transformation is taking place, but by following a completely different logic as compared to that during the revolution. The concept of sexual civil war refers precisely to a kind of stalemate in such a state where the forces are distributed approximately evenly between the different sides and neither side is clearly winning. It does not eliminate the dynamics of the processes themselves, that changes are happening, only they are highly complicated and do not necessarily end in a complete change in the state of society, a dramatic transition to a new reality. Finally, the changes in the concept of sexual civil war are not homogeneous, as different sides could lead on different front lines, without a clear winner, without a clear loser. In short, the concept of sexual civil war does not stress on the changes, but a particular conflict in the process of a transformation of sexuality.

The concept of sexual civil war basically speaks of a protracted and complicated process of transition from one sexuality, gender and family model to another, which is considered a “crisis” from the perspective of traditional values and modern values respectively – “backwardness” which is necessary to overcome. In reality, however, this should be seen neither as a “crisis” nor as a “backwardness”, but as a complication of a protracted transition period, which in the case of Soviet Lithuania was later moved, but by no means ended by political change of 1990 when Lithuania regained independence.

The Soviet Union was made up of politically, culturally and socially very different republics over a relatively long historical period. Some of them underwent Western modernisation and were then occupied by the Soviets, while others essentially experienced only a rapid Soviet version of modernisation. Some republics experienced both waves of mobilization, while others experienced essentially only one. On the other hand, they were also shaped by common Soviet policies and the attempt to homogenise Soviet space, often without regard to local particularities. All this suggests that the changes in sexuality in other Soviet republics were no less, and sometimes even more, complicated than in Soviet Lithuania, and that the concept of a sexual civil war could at least be tested in the case of other Soviet republics.

## **Seksuālā revolūcija, mobilizācija vai pilsoņu karš: kā izprast seksualitātes padomju transformāciju? (Padomju Lietuvas piemērs)**

### **Kopsavilkums**

Rakstā tiek aplūkots jautājums, vai seksuālās revolūcijas jēdzienu var attiecināt uz izmaiņām, kas notika seksualitātes attīstībā Padomju Savienībā. Šim nolūkam tiek analizēta situācija vienā no bijušajām PSRS republikām, Padomju Lietuvā. Raksturojot seksuālās politikas, normu un uzvedības dinamiku Lietuvā 1944.–1990. gadā, tiek parādīts, ka seksuālās revolūcijas jēdziena piemērošana ir problemātiska, un tiek piedāvāts jauns risinājums – seksuālā pilsoņu kara koncepts. Autori apgalvo, ka seksuālā pilsoņu kara koncepts atšķirībā no seksuālās revolūcijas koncepta norāda

uz pretējām sekām, proti, kara situācijā seksualitātes izmaiņas ir ilgstošas un neelastīgas, konfliktējošās tradicionālās un modernās normas un uzvedība var pārklāties vai nostiprināties atsevišķās sociālajās un kultūras grupās, radot sava veida strupceļu. Tādējādi seksuālā pilsoņu kara jēdziens akcentē nevis pašas izmaiņas, bet gan tieši konfliktu seksualitātes transformācijas procesā.

Padomju Lietuvā seksualitātes transformācija notika, taču tās mērogs, dziļums un ātrums dažādās jomās bija ļoti atšķirīgs. Šajā gadījumā nav iespējams runāt par pilnībā notikušu seksuālo revolūciju. Izmaiņas nebija pēkšņas, un tās, kuras šķita pēkšņas, varēja sevī slēpt jau sen sākušos procesu vai arī šīs pārmaiņas varēja pēc neilga laika atgriezties situācijā pirms izmaiņām. Izmaiņas nebija arī radikālas, jo ne valsts politika, ne cilvēku uzvedība, ne kultūras normas nekļuva patiesi modernas. Gluži pretēji, gan nekonsekventa un pretrunīga valsts politika un cilvēku attieksme un uzskati, gan arī sabiedrības sociālie un ekonomiskie raksturlielumi bieži vien kavēja, ierobežoja vai deformēja moderno normu attīstību. Izmaiņas atnesa relatīvu brīvību, taču tā vienmēr bija pārāk ierobežota. Nav pamata runāt, ka modernās normas bija aizstājušas tradicionālās, bet gan par to, ka moderno un tradicionālo normu konfrontācija bija ieligusi vai iestrēgusi. Kā zināms, normas, kas mantotas no agrākiem laikiem, parasti modernizācijai tik vienkārši nepadodas, turklāt valsts politikai piemita arī konservatīvās izpausmes un tā pat īstenoja tradicionālās normas.

Tādējādi, atsakoties no seksuālās revolūcijas jēdziena, būtu jāmeklē precīzāks apzīmējums seksuālajai transformācijai, kas notika Padomju Lietuvā un, iespējams, visā PSRS, kā arī citās valstīs ar sarežģītu seksuālo pārmaiņu vēsturi. Piemēram, mūsu sākotnēji ierosinātais seksuālās mobilizācijas jēdziens (koncepts) palīdz skaidri identificēt un izprast padomju valsts ģimenes, dzimumu un seksuālās uzvedības politiku loģiku, nodalīt mērķus no līdzekļiem, dekonstruēt padomju ideoloģijas konstruktus (piemēram, par sieviešu emancipāciju dēvētais būtu jāuzskata par sievietes ekonomisko mobilizāciju). Tomēr seksuālās mobilizācijas jēdziens neapver visus seksuālās transformācijas procesus un parādības, bet tikai izceļ valsts lomu, tās būtību un daļēji arī ietekmi uz sabiedrību. Tādējādi ar to nevar aizstāt seksuālās revolūcijas jēdzienu.

Šim nolūkam nepieciešams jēdziens (koncepts), kas atklāj procesu dažādos ātrumus, nevienādīgumu, nepabeigtību, pretrunas un īpaši – konfliktus. Tādējādi, tāpat kā seksualitātes izpēte ir saistīta ar dažādu

diskursa tradīciju mijiedarbību un pārklāšanos, arī transformācijas procesu var skatīt ne tikai kā ierobežotu procesu, kurā viena veida normas un uzvedības modeļus aizvieto citi, bet arī kā sava veida ilgstošu līdzāspastāvēšanu, kurā darbojas dažādi mijiedarbības veidi. Turklāt šī mijiedarbība nekad nav bijusi neproblemātiska un nekonfliktējoša. Moderno normu un uzvedības prakšu pārklāšanās ar tradicionālajām normām un uzvedības praksēm politiskā, sociālā un kultūras līmenī ir bijusi ārkārtīgi sarežģīta; tā izraisījusi konfliktus starp tradicionālajām un modernajām normām gan valsts un sabiedrības attiecībās, gan dažādās (dzimumu) grupās, tāpat katrā grupā atsevišķi un beidzot – katrā individuā (pats cilvēks, rīkojoties moderni, bet pieturoties pie tradicionālām vērtībām, ne vienmēr atspoguļo realitāti kā konfliktu). Gan pretrunīgi ieprogrammētā valsts politika, gan pašas sabiedrības attieksmju daudzveidība liek domāt, ka padomju ēras seksualitātes palimpsestā vairāk vai mazāk skaidri parādās gan tradicionālās, gan modernās normas, turklāt neviena no tām tā arī viennozīmīgi nenomaina otru.

Tādā kontekstā precīzākais apzīmējums seksualitātes pārmaiņām varētu būt nevis seksuālā revolūcija, bet gan seksuālais pilsoņu karš. Kara jēdziens norāda uz pretējām implikācijām, nekā tas ir seksuālās revolūcijas gadījumā. Ja pēdējā gadījumā izmaiņas ir pēkšņas, tad seksuālā pilsoņu kara gadījumā tās ir ilgstošas un neelastīgas: notiek lēni, nekonsekventi, ne vienmēr vienā virzienā (process var mainīt virzienu un, piemēram, sākt atgriezties iepriekšējā situācijā). Seksuālās revolūcijas izraisītās radikālās pārmaiņas, kurās iepriekšējās normas, vērtības, attieksme vai uzvedība neatgriezeniski tiek izspiestas ar jaunām normām, vērtībām, attieksmi vai uzvedību, seksuālā pilsoņu kara gadījumā tiek aizstātas ar ilgu, parasti konfliktējošu mijiedarbību starp veco un jauno (tradīcija pret modernizāciju, konservatīvisms pret liberālismu utt.). Šī konfliktējošā mijiedarbība, kas var izpausties gan kā tieša normu vai uzvedības veidu sadursme, gan kā to pārklāšanās vai nostiprināšanās atsevišķās sociālajās un kultūras grupās, ir ne tikai īslaicīgs, kaut arī neizbēgams, posms, kā tas ir revolūcijas gadījumā, bet savdabīgs seksuālās transformācijas modus operandi. Tādējādi transformācija notiek, bet tā notiek, vadoties pēc pavisam citas loģikas nekā seksuālās revolūcijas situācijā. Seksuālā pilsoņu kara jēdziens tieši attiecas uz sava veida strupceļu tādā stāvoklī, kad spēki starp dažādām pusēm ir sadalīti aptuveni vienmērīgi un neviena no tām neuzvar nepārprotami. Tas neizslēdz pašu procesu dinamiku – to, ka notiek pārmaiņas,



tikai tās ir ļoti sarežģītas un ne vienmēr beidzas ar pilnīgu sabiedrības stāvokļa maiņu, striktu pāreju uz jaunu realitāti. Visbeidzot, izmaiņas seksuālā pilsoņu kara konceptā nav viendabīgas, jo dažādas puses var veidot dažādas frontes līnijas, kur neredz ne skaidra uzvarētāja, ne skaidra zaudētāja. Proti, seksuālā pilsoņu kara koncepts uzsvēr nevis pašas izmaiņas, bet gan konkrētu konfliktu seksualitātes transformācijas procesā.

Seksuālā pilsoņu kara jēdziens galvenokārt aptver ilgstošu un sarežģītu pārejas procesu no viena seksualitātes, dzimtes un ģimenes modeļa uz citu, kas no tradicionālo vērtību viedokļa tiek uzskatīts par “krīzi” un no moderno vērtību viedokļa – par “atpalcību”, kas jāpārvar. Taču patiesībā šis process nav jāuztver ne kā “krīze”, ne kā “atpalcība”, bet gan kā sarežģījums ieilgušā pārejas periodā, ko Padomju Lietuvas gadījumā vēlāk gan iekustināja, bet tomēr pārtrauca 1990. gada politiskās pārmaiņas, kad Lietuva atguva neatkarību.

Padomju Savienību salīdzinoši ilgā vēstures periodā veidoja politiski, kultūras ziņā un sociāli ļoti atšķirīgas republikas. Dažas no tām bija piedzīvojušas Rietumu modernizāciju, bet pēc tam tās okupēja padomju vara; savukārt citas piedzīvoja strauju padomju modernizācijas versiju. Dažas republikas piedzīvoja abus mobilizācijas viļņus, bet citas piedzīvoja tikai vienu. Turklāt tos veidoja arī kopējā padomju politika un mēģinājums homogenizēt padomju telpu, bieži vien neņemot vērā vietējās īpatnības. Tas viss liek domāt, ka izmaiņas seksualitātē citās padomju republikās bija ne mazāk sarežģītas un dažkārt pat sarežģītākas nekā padomju Lietuvā un ka seksuālā pilsoņu kara koncepta skaidrojošo potenciālu varētu pārbaudīt, pētot seksualitātē notikušās izmaiņas arī citās padomju republikās.

*Atslēgvārdi:* seksualitāte, seksuālā revolūcija, seksuālā mobilizācija, seksuālais pilsoņu karš, padomju Lietuva.

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