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**THE TRANSLATION OF DISCOURSE
MARKERS FROM ENGLISH INTO
LITHUANIAN**

Master Thesis

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Šiauliai
2007

ŠIAULIŲ UNIVERSITETAS
HUMANITARINIS FAKULTETAS
ANGLŲ KALBOS KATEDRA

DISKURSO ŽYMEKLIŲ PERTEIKIMAS
VERČIANT IŠ ANGLŲ Į LIETUVIŲ KALBĄ

Magistro darbas

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Šiauliai
2007

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INTRODUCTION

If one takes a glance at any fragment of English spontaneous conversation s/he is likely to find it sprinkled with such expressions as *oh, well, like, I mean, so, though, you know*, etc. Robert E. Longrace (1976) referred to such insertions as “mystery particles” and regarded them as elements that were “simply salt-and-peppered through a text to give it flavor” (as cited in Lutzky 2006: 3). Today these mysterious particles are commonly referred to as ‘discourse markers’ and are seen as performing important functions in text generation and interpretation.

Discourse markers are mostly words with little or no lexical meaning that appear on the periphery of clause structure. “They can occur as lexical equivalents or complements of more elusive gestural or intonational cues that subtly guide and modulate the participant’s understanding, or they can saliently signal relations between utterances or larger discourse units” (Redeker, 2005:1). Nowadays discourse markers are no longer seen as extra or accessory to the utterance; conversely, it is acknowledged that they perform a variety of functions, i.e. contribute to the coherence of an utterance, indicate pauses, transitions, topic shifts, etc.; they are used for gap filling, which in turn indicates the idea of uncertainty, unexpected or unpleasant response. Discourse markers convey extra-linguistic information, i.e. they signify about speaker’s beliefs, emotional state, and attitude towards the referenced information. Although the status of these particles has significantly altered during those years, some of their former mysteriousness seems to remain as it is still disputable by what title they should be named and what linguistic units are attributable to this group.

Research on discourse markers has expanded continually throughout the 1980 and 1990. Within pragmatics and discourse analysis research two basic theoretical orientations within which discourse markers are analyzed stand out: discourse-coherence approach (Schiffrin 1987, Redeker 1990, 1991, 2005, Fraser 1993, 1996) and relevance-theory approach (Blakemore 2002, Andersen 2001). Discourse markers are receiving increased attention in other fields as well, i.e. in research on sociolinguistics (Andersen 2001), second language acquisition (Müller 2005, Aijmer 2002), language pedagogy (Tyler 1992, Lee 2000, 2001) and some other areas. Furthermore, they have captured the attention of translation theoreticians, too. Various researchers analyzed the peculiarities of translating these units, for example, Manfred Stede and Birte Schmitz (1997) (English-German), Sandra Hale (1999) (English-Spanish), Maija Brede (2003) (English-Latvian), etc. In Lithuania researchers mainly focus on English discourse markers and their distribution across registers (Buitkienė 2005, Šiniajeva 2005). Few attempts have been made to identify Lithuanian words that could be ascribed to the category of discourse markers or to analyze by what equivalents discourse markers are translated into the Lithuanian

language. The only exception is *Discourse Markers in English and Lithuanian*, a contrastive study by Dalia Masaitienė (2003).

This research is new and important because of its concentration on the translation of English discourse markers into Lithuanian. Discourse markers play a significant role in creating and interpreting stretches of speech. It applies to both spoken and written form of conversation. In a literary work discourse markers may be considered to acquire an even greater significance since the reader has to rely exclusively on the author's choice of formulating and shaping characters' speech. The basic problem they present to translators is that the selection of a target language equivalent is based on the conversational function of the discourse marker. Discourse markers cannot be translated according to their lexical meaning, i.e. their translation is based on pragmatic rather than semantic analysis. Besides, languages have evolved different conventions on using such items - there may be considerable differences in their range, connotation and frequency of usage. Thereby, the **subject** of the research is discourse markers in English and Lithuanian.

The **aim** of this research is to prove the polyfunctional nature of discourse markers and the significance of rendering their meanings in translation from English into Lithuanian.

To achieve this aim the following **objectives** have been set:

1. To present theoretical overview of the concept of discourse markers, including variant approaches to the definition and delimitation of these particles.
2. To present theoretical overview of the functions discourse markers play in a coherent text.
3. To analyze the translation of discourse markers and its impact on the resultant text.

The **methods** used in the work are:

1. *Literature analysis* provided a possibility to overview various approaches to the concept of discourse markers and the functions ascribed to them.
2. *Metaanalysis* helped to summarize major theoretical statements developed in the chapters of the paper.
3. *Interlingual contrastive method* was useful in studying the usage of discourse markers in English and Lithuanian and to analyze how these units are translated into the Lithuanian language.
4. *Statistical method* helped to generalize the results of the analysis and to draw some conclusions.

Sources: The research is based on the analysis of Melvin Burgess' *Doing it* (2003) and its Lithuanian translation by Rūta Razmaitė *Darant tai* (2005); John Irving's *A Widow for One Year* (1998) and its Lithuanian translation by Daiva Daugirdienė *Našlė vieneriems metams* (2005). The major criterion for book selection was richness of conversational language. In addition, they are contemporary, popular and intended for different age groups, i.e. teenagers and adults, respectively. Conversational style in both books is highly realistic, natural and colloquial. Consequently, the books provided us with satisfactory material for the analysis

The **structure** of the work: the present thesis consists of an introduction, 3 chapters, conclusions, references and a summary. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of a discourse marker, reviews basic theoretical orientations within which discourse markers are analyzed and presents the list of defining and non-defining properties of discourse markers. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical overview of the functions discourse markers play. Part 3 focuses on the translation of English discourse markers into Lithuanian. The results of the investigation are summed up in the conclusions.

The **practical value** of this paper: the paper will contribute to the existing translation theory by offering a thorough analysis of the translation of discourse markers, including possible hazards and some recommendations that may help a translator / interpreter to cope with the task. In addition, the data collected may be used for further investigations of the subject.

1. AN INTRODUCTION TO DISCOURSE MARKERS

‘Discourse markers’ refer to minor words used by a speaker to comment upon the discourse plan and goals. “They can occur as lexical equivalents or complements of more elusive gestural or intonational cues that subtly guide and modulate the participant’s understanding, or they can saliently signal relations between utterances or larger discourse units” (Redeker, 2005:1). This category covers a variety of English lexical items, ranging from those widely accepted as discourse markers like the coordinate conjunctions *and*, *or*, *but* to the less accepted interjections, *well*, *oh*, verbs, *look*, *see*, and literally used phrases like *to repeat*, *I mean*, *you know*.

Although discourse markers have been analyzed and broadly discussed by many linguists (Schiffrin 1987, Blakemore 2002, Redeker 1990, 1991, 2005, Fraser 1993, 1996, Knott 1996, Knott and Sanders 1998, Andersen 2001, etc.) and a number of corpus-based studies have contributed to a better understanding of the phenomenon, it is still disputable by what title they should be named and what linguistic units are attributable to this category. Besides the term ‘discourse markers’, a variety of other expressions are used: discourse particles, discourse connectives, discourse operators, pragmatic markers, pragmatic particles, cue words/phrases and some other. Along with the terms, there is a range of definitions and under each of them a different set of discourse markers is subsumed. For the present, there is no complete consensus about the status of these linguistic units. We will, therefore, review the basic theoretical orientations within which discourse markers are analyzed, i.e. discourse-coherence approach and relevance-theory approach.

1.1. Basic approaches

1.1.1. Discourse-Coherence Approach

This approach comprises theoretical contributions aiming to elucidate what a discourse marker is and to assess its status from a discourse-coherence perspective. The works of Schiffrin (1987), Redeker (1990, 1991, 2005), Fraser (1993, 1996) are coherence based and related by a number of background assumptions, namely that texts are coherent, that there is a definable set of coherence relations, and that the recovery and processing of such coherence relations are essential for comprehension. Within discourse-coherence approach discourse markers are mainly viewed as lexical units that help make coherence relations explicit.

The first to carry out a serious examination of discourse markers was *Schiffrin* (1987). She analyzed the occurrence of *and, because, but, I mean, now, oh, or, so, then, well* and *y'know* in unstructured interview conversations. The aim of Schiffrin's (1987) study was to find out the role that discourse markers play in the mechanics of discourse coherence, providing a satisfactory answer to the question "*Why do we use discourse markers?*" (as cited in Gonzalez 2004: 53).

Schiffrin sees discourse markers as useful tools for the establishment of coherence in discourse and defines them as "sequentially dependant elements which bracket units of talk" (Schiffrin 1987: 31) or, in other words, as a kind of discourse glue. According to her, the presence of a discourse marker is not strictly obligatory for a full understanding of a text but it is probably necessary to make the type of relationship established between preceding and following propositions explicit and clear. To support this claim she proposes an example:

- a. *Sue dislikes all linguists.*
- b. *I like her.*

Without any marker heading utterance (b), interpretations are open to different options: it may be interpreted that there is a relationship of contrast between (a) and (b) or there could be a cause-consequence relationship between them. Clearly, the meaning of both utterances is open to several possible interpretations and only its context will provide us with the correct one. Therefore, the presence of a discourse marker between (a) and (b) utterances would clarify the type of relationship set up, with all the inferences derived from it. In Schiffrin's words, "either relation is possible without markers, but only one relation is possible with a marker [...] for this reason I suggest that markers select, and then display, structural relations between utterances, rather than create such relations" (Ibid., 321).

According to Schiffrin, discourse markers contribute to coherence because they establish multiple contextual coordinates simultaneously, thus facilitating the integration of several components of verbal interaction. The contextual coordinates, that she suggests are indicated by discourse markers, are of two main kinds. First, discourse markers index utterances to preceding or following text and to the speaker or hearer. Second, they locate utterances in *five planes of talk* which she calls *ideational structure, action structure, exchange structure, participation framework* and *information state*. Although discourse markers have a primary function on only one of these planes, it is possible for them to function on more than one plane at a time, thus binding the different levels of discourse to make it coherent. Following Oates's (1999) and Schourup's (1999) review articles on discourse markers the five planes of talk function as follows:

The *exchange structure* and the *action structure* consist solely of nonlinguistic units that are realized through discourse markers which enable the speaker and hearer to explicitly mark

the structure of the discourse. Within the *exchange structure*, the units of talk are turns. The exchange structure accounts for the alternation of roles between the speaker and the hearer and the way in which this alternation can be signaled. Because of the emphasis on turns in this structure, it is only appropriate for describing dialogue, not monologue. The discourse markers *well, and, but, so, or* and *y'know* all signal a change in the exchange structure. For example, *but* signals that the hearer wishes to take a turn, *so* marks the completion of a turn while *and* is used by the speaker to continue their turn.

Next is the *action structure*. This structure refers to the speaker's identity, the social setting and the preceding speech acts to account for those speech acts which are expected to occur in the discourse and those that actually do occur. *Oh, well, and, but, so, because* and *then* are all markers of the action structure. Both *but* and *and* are used by a speaker to continue their turn regardless of the other speaker's activity.

The units of the *ideational structure* are propositions, or 'ideas' (Schiffrin, 1987: 26). Schiffrin argues that three types of relations can hold between ideas. Firstly, there are cohesive relations which are established when the interpretation of one clause presupposes information from another. Secondly, there are topic and subtopic relations that exist between ideas, although the combination of all subtopics will not necessarily produce the overriding topic of the discourse. Finally, there is the notion of functional relations which takes account of the effect of conjoining two or more ideas. For example, one idea may provide evidence or background information for another idea. All of the discourse markers examined in this study except *oh* could be used to mark relations between idea units. For example, *I mean* signals that one utterance is a paraphrase of another.

The *participation framework* explains how the speaker and hearer relate to one another through the discourse and also how they relate to the discourse themselves, for example by performing direct or indirect speech acts or by relinquishing or fighting for a turn in the ongoing discourse. *Oh, well, so, now, I mean* and *y'know* are all used to mark aspects of the participation framework. For example, *well* is used by a speaker to warn the hearer that their response should not be interpreted as a direct answer to a question and that there will be a digression before a relevant answer is given.

The fifth plane of talk is the *information state*. The information state is constantly evolving; it accounts for the speaker's and hearer's own knowledge and what they know, or think they know about each other's knowledge. The primary function of *oh* occurs in the information state where it marks the receipt of information. *Oh, well, so, because, then, I mean* and *y'know* are all markers of the information state.


Another more recent account for discourse markers within discourse-coherence approach is **Redeker's** (1990, 1991, 2005). She employs different terms referring to discourse markers, namely *discourse operators* and *discourse particles*. Her motivation is “a clear distinction between discourse markers that modulate the interpretation of utterances, and those with discourse-structuring functions, [...] I call the former uses *discourse particles* and the latter *discourse operators*” (Redeker, 2005: 1). She defines a discourse operator as “any expression that is used with the primary function of bringing to the listener’s attention a particular kind of relation between the discourse unit it introduces and immediate discourse context” (Redeker, 2005: 3). Her definition is wider than many other definitions as discourse operators do not have to be optional, syntactically or intonationally independent, and may add truth-conditional content.

Like Shiffrin (1987), she assumes that discourse markers select coherence options and her model is also based on coherence effected between adjacent units of discourse. Redeker (1991) eliminates two of Schiffrin’s five planes of talk, i.e. participation framework and information structure, because they deal with the speaker’s knowledge of the discourse situation, thus are concerned with individual utterances and only indirectly related to ‘inter-utterance coherence’.

The three remaining planes are remodeled as *components of coherence* and undergo some renaming. The action structure is labeled as *rhetorical structure* and is conceived as a relation between illocutionary intentions conveyed by two discourse units. Exchange structure is broadened to include topic and other transitions in both interactive and non-interactive discourse and is referred to as *sequential structure*. *Ideational structure* refers to the relation between two discourse units when their propositions describe a relationship that holds in the real world.

Redeker (1990) suggests that the links discourse operators signal can be described and classified in terms of these revised coherence components. The ideational structure establishes semantic relations; the other two structures establish pragmatic ones: rhetorical structure is related to illocutionary intentions of the speaker and sequential structure deals with all relations attached to discourse structure, i.e. the ‘sequential’ relations among segments. Such discourse structures offer a clear-cut distinction between semantic and pragmatic coherence relations. From this frame, she proposes the following classification of discourse markers (cited from Gonzalez, 2004: 60-1):

Figure 1. The Classification of Discourse Markers



According to Redeker (1990, 1991).

Markers of ideational structure:

a) *Simple connectives*. They include *that* subordinator (with sentential complements), and the relative pronouns *that*, *who* and *which*, with their variants. *And* and *or* are excluded because the former is considered an “unmarked mode of connection” in narratives and the latter is usually an editing self-repair form.

b) *Semantically rich connectives*, which are conjunctions and adverbial connectives that signal a semantic relation. Examples of these are the adversative *but*, question words introducing embedded questions (*what*, *how*, *why*, *etc.*) temporal connectives (*when*, *as*, *while*, *meanwhile*; (*and*) *then*, *next*, *now*, *before*, *after*, *etc.*) and clausal conjunctions (*because*, *so*). In this category, there are only clause-initial connectives.

c) *Other temporal adverbials*, which comprehend those not considered in (b). Their position is, in this case, utterance internal or final. Units that specify the time of the event in the current utterance in relation to the time expressed in the preceding one are: *now*, *then*, *after that* and *all this time*. Similar uses of locative expressions belong to this class, too.

Markers of pragmatic structure:

a) *Pragmatic uses of conjunctions*. Conjunctions are considered to have pragmatic use “if the semantic relation between the conjoined utterances does not correspond to the propositional meaning of the conjunction” (Redeker, 1990: 374, cited from Gonzalez, 2004: 61). In this classification, the author includes (*and*) *so*, to mark the speaker’s summing-up or conclusion, *because*, to evidence a relation (totally distinct from the semantic clausal relation), and *but*, used to signal the return to the main discourse after a digression or aside (also very different use from the semantic adversative relation).

b) *Interjections*. These include utterance-initial uses of *oh*, *all right*, *okay*, *anyway*, and *well*. Also utterance-final tags like *okay?* or *right?*, with the main function of eliciting acknowledgement from the listener and signal discourse segment boundaries in monologues.

c) *Comment clauses*. These usually occur, as interjections, at the beginning of direct quotes. In this case, they function as ‘enquoting devices’ (Schourup, 1985). It is not always easy to see if they are in or out of the direct quote. Comment clauses include units such as *you know* (*y’know*), *I mean* and *mind you*.

Fraser’s (1993, 1996) characterization of discourse markers is to some extent different from the above reviewed. His primary concern is to locate discourse markers in relation to other linguistically encoded elements of sentence meaning. Fraser (1993, 1996) assumes that sentence meaning comprises two distinct types of encoded information: content meaning (or propositional content) and pragmatic meaning. Content meaning represents a state of the world which the speaker wishes to bring to addressee’s attention, i.e. it is what the sentence is about. Pragmatic meaning provides signals of what different messages the speaker intends to convey through the direct literal communication. It is signaled by both structural and lexical expression of varying length and complexity. Fraser proposes that this non-propositional part of sentence meaning can be analyzed into different types of signals, what he calls *pragmatic markers*. Fraser (1996) distinguishes the following characteristics of pragmatic markers:

1) Pragmatic markers are not part of propositional content of the sentence; they are separate and distinct;

2) Pragmatic markers carry meaning; basic, commentary and parallel markers have representational meaning, while discourse markers have procedural meaning and specify how the sentence of which they are a part is related to the preceding discourse.


3) Pragmatic markers signal messages that only apply to direct basic message;

4) Nearly all pragmatic markers may occur in sentence-initial position (*though* is one exception) and usually occur there. There are occasions when they will occur medially or finally, but in these cases the marker is set off by coma intonation to distinguish it from a homophonous form used as part of the proposition.

5) Pragmatic markers are drawn from all segments of the grammar: verbs, nouns, adverbs, idioms are all pressed into service as pragmatic markers.

Fraser (1996) subdivides pragmatic markers into the following four groups: *basic markers*, *commentary markers*, *parallel markers* and *discourse markers*.

Figure 2. Subdivision of Sentence Meaning



According to Fraser (1993, 1996).

Basic markers have representational meaning, which means they contribute conceptual information over and above that of the propositional meaning. They represent information which signals the force of the direct basic message of the sentence. There are three types of basic markers:

Structural basic markers - the syntactic structure of the sentence itself, its mood (declarative, imperative, or interrogative - each type signals a general force for the basic message).

Lexical basic markers - include performative expressions, which essentially refine the force signaled by the sentence mood (e.g. *I apologize for running over your cat*) and pragmatic idioms. Within pragmatic idioms there are both force idioms, which signal the intended basic message force (e.g. *Can you please help me?* – when *please* occurs before an imperative structure, it signals that the utterance is to be taken as a request), with message idioms, which signal the entire basic message and include simple expressions (e.g. *get a horse* [directive to hurry up]), proverbs (e.g. *a stitch in time saves nine*), rhetorical questions (e.g. *is the Pope a Catholic?*) and interjections (e.g. *Oh! Psst! Hey!* etc.).

Hybrid basic markers - involve a specific structure combination with certain lexical conditions. There are three general types: declarative-based (consist of a declarative followed by a brief tag, e.g. *John saw Mary, didn't he?*), interrogative-based (may express a request for action, e.g. *Can you do that*; request for permission, e.g. *May I see that vase?*; and a suggestion to do the opposite of the action denoted, e.g. *Why not take an aspirin now?* – interpretation: *I suggest you take an aspirin now*), and imperative-based (include “Or case” which is usually heard as a threat, e.g. *Talk, or I'll shoot you*; and “And case”, e.g. *Smile, and the world will love you* – the imperative here signals that a conditional interpretation is required and the declarative takes on the force of a strong claim).

Commentary pragmatic markers are lexical expressions which have both a representational meaning specifying an entire message, and a procedural meaning signaling that this message is to function as a comment on some aspect of the basic message. Fraser (1996) examines the following commentary markers:

Assessment markers signal the speaker's evaluation of the state of the world represented in the proposition (e.g. *Amazingly, Derrick passed the exam* – the speaker is sending two messages: the basic one that Derrick passed the exam, and the comment that the speaker finds it amazing).

With **manner-of-speaking markers** the speaker can signal a comment on the manner in which the basic message is being conveyed (e.g. *Frankly, you need to stop now* – in addition to the basic message the speaker is informing the addressee that the message is being conveyed in a frank way).

Evidential markers include the evidential adverbs, which signal the degree of confidence, positive or negative, weakly or strongly, held by the speaker about the truth of the basic message (e.g. *Certainly, Harry will go*).

Hearsay markers are comments about the type of source of the speaker's information (e.g. *Reportedly, the game was postponed because of rain*).

Mitigation markers signal the speaker's desire to reduce the face loss associated with the basic message. Fraser considers two varieties: pseudo-conditionals (e.g. *If I may interrupt, when is the next train?*) constituting a basic message with a mitigating comment on it, and expressions ending with *but* (e.g. *I'm no expert, but it doesn't look like you bought the right gas tank*) – here the basic message that follows mitigation marker is typically disadvantageous to the addressee and thus susceptible to mitigation.

Emphasis markers have the function of emphasizing the force of the basic message (e.g. *Mark my words: Sam will end up in jail; Do stop!; Where on earth are my slippers?*).

Parallel markers signal an entire message in addition to the basic message. Fraser (1996) presents four classes of these markers:

Vocative markers include standard titles (e.g. *Mr. President, Mom, Colonel, etc.*), occupation names (e.g. *waiter, doctor, etc.*), general nouns (e.g. *boys, guys, ladies and gentlemen, etc.*) and pronominal forms (e.g. *you, somebody, anyone, etc.*). By using one of these vocative forms, for example, *waiter*, the speaker is explicitly sending the message that the addressee of this message is the waiter.

Speaker displeasure markers signal the speaker's displeasure (e.g. *get your damned shoes off the table!*) – usually it is not clear whether the addressee or the situation is the target of the anger.

Solidarity markers signal solidarity (e.g. *As one guy to another, we're in deep trouble*) or lack of it (e.g. *Look, birdbrain, this has been sitting in the "in box" for over a week. What's the story?*).

Focusing markers signal focusing or refocusing on the topic at hand (e.g. *I think you should be concerned. Now, take a look over here for a minute*).

Discourse markers are expressions that signal the relationship of the basic message to the foregoing discourse. In contrast to the other pragmatic markers, discourse markers do not contribute to the representative sentence meaning, but only to the procedural meaning: they provide instructions to the addressee on how the utterance to which the discourse markers is attached is to be interpreted. Fraser (1996) subdivides discourse markers into four groups:

Topic change markers signal the departure from the current topic (e.g. *I don't think we can go tomorrow. It's David's birthday. Incidentally, when is your birthday?*).

Contrastive markers signal that the utterance following is either a denial or a contrast of some proposition associated with the preceding discourse (e.g. *Jane is here. However, she isn't going to stay*).

Elaborative markers signal that the utterance following constitute a refinement of some sort on the preceding discourse (e.g. *He did it. What is more, he enjoyed doing it*).

Inferential markers signal that the force of the utterance is a conclusion which follows from the preceding discourse (e.g. *Mary went home. After all she was sick*).

Fraser's classification provides a convenient and rational basis for assigning expressions to the category of discourse markers or excluding them, and in most cases, provides an alternative for excluded items. However, he excludes the prototypical discourse markers *well* and *oh* frequently met in English conversation. *Oh* is classed with basic markers, while *well* is rejected from the category of pragmatic markers.

In the reviewed accounts for discourse markers the intuition that discourse markers are linking devices is a pervasive belief. In the following section the relevance-theory approach is surveyed, within which discourse markers are seen as linguistic signs guiding a hearer towards the intended interpretation of an utterance. The most influential contributions within this approach include Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2002) and Andersen's (2001).

1.1.2. Relevance-Theory Approach

Relevance Theory has originally been developed by Sperber & Wilson (1995). This account of communication starts from the assumption that every utterance has a number of different interpretations, each compatible with its linguistic form. Hearers interpreting discourse are seen as trying to identify among the set of possible interpretations the one that best satisfies a certain expectation of relevance. *Relevance* is defined as a balance between the cognitive gains obtained in processing an utterance and the effort invested in deriving those effects, i.e. cognitive processes aim at achieving the greatest possible effects with the smallest processing effort. Sperber & Wilson (1995) argue that each utterance comes backed by a guarantee of its own *optimal* – as opposed to maximal – relevance. An utterance is defined as *optimally relevant* if:

- a) it achieves sufficient cognitive effects to be worth the hearer's processing efforts, and
- b) it is the most relevant one the speaker could have produced given his/her abilities and preferences.

In this account of communication, interpretation of utterances is not merely a matter of linguistic decoding but relies heavily on inference. Sperber & Wilson (1995) argue that “the linguistically encoded properties of utterances are never enough on their own for the identification of the speaker's intended message. There is inevitably a gap between what the grammar delivers – the linguistically determined semantic representation – and the interpretation intended. And this gap is filled by pragmatically constrained inference” (cited from Blakemore, 2002: 64). Thus, utterance interpretation involves two processes: *decoding* and *inference*. The decoding process gives the hearer an incomplete conceptual representation, which the hearer must inferentially enrich. The inferential process is the process of hypothesis formation and confirmation driven by the *communicative principle of relevance* - “every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its optimal relevance” (Sperber & Wilson 1995, cited from Blakemore, 2002: 63).

Naturally, an utterance is never interpreted in isolation – it is processed against a set of background assumptions that the hearer possesses. Thus, newly presented information interacts with already-existing assumptions or context to produce one of the three cognitive effects:

- a) the new information can combine with existing assumption to produce a new contextual implication;
- b) the new information can combine with the context to strengthen an existing assumption;
- c) the new information can combine with the context to contradict and eliminate one or more of the hearer's assumptions.

Finally, relevance theory makes an important distinction between two types of encoded meaning, i.e. *concepts* and *procedures*. Concepts act as constituents of the propositional meaning

of the utterance. Procedures encode interpretational procedures. These forms do not contribute directly to the propositional meaning of an utterance, but provide constraints on the interpretation process. Concepts and procedures can be distinguished on several grounds:

Concepts	Procedures
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Concepts are representational; that is, they represent entities in the actual world. > Concepts are entities which can be brought into focus in a person's consciousness, because they contain logic and encyclopedic information (e.g. <i>bachelor</i>, <i>red</i>). > Conceptual information can have a compositional structure (e.g. <i>young</i>, <i>good-looking bachelor</i>). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Procedures do not; they are computational and provide instructions as to how some aspect of the interpretation should proceed. > Procedures, such as the encoded meaning of <i>however</i> and <i>nevertheless</i> do not have this capacity. They are seen to carry meanings which cannot be brought to consciousness, and they fall outside the scope of logical operators like <i>if-then</i>. > Procedural information cannot (cf. * <i>very however</i>).

Broadly speaking, a form that encodes procedural information tells the hearer how conceptual representations are to be understood and manipulated. The notion of procedural encoding is crucial to the category of discourse markers. They contribute to relevance by telling the hearer how an utterance is to be understood, thus reducing the processing effort that the hearer must employ in utterance comprehension.

The conceptual/procedural distinction was originally proposed and developed by **Blakemore** (1987). According to her, discourse markers, or *connectives* as she calls them, do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an utterance, but constrain the search for relevance by indicating the intended types of context and cognitive effects. Blakemore (1992) classifies discourse markers following the three conditions under which a hearer interprets information conveyed by the utterance, i.e. yields contextual effects: (1) derivations of contextual implications; (2) strengthening of an existing assumption; and (3) contradiction of an existing assumption (cited from Blakemore 2002: 94-5).

1. *Discourse markers introducing contextual implications.* The role of such markers is to bring about and constrain contextual implications. Such is the case of *so* in the following example supplied by Blakemore (2002: 95).

E.g. (a) *Ben can open Tom's safe.* (b) So *he knows the combination.*

Here the speaker is indicating that segment (b) is relevant by virtue of being a contextual implication. According to Blakemore, a proposition that is introduced by *so* must be interpreted

as a conclusion. Similarly behaves *therefore*, the only difference being that *so* can always be substituted by *therefore*, but not the other way round. The reason is, according to the author, the register issue (*so* is more informal).

2. *Discourse markers of strengthening*. This group of discourse markers serves to strengthen the interlocutor's assumptions set in the preceding utterance (*after all, indeed*) or to provide additional evidence for an assumption coming from the preceding utterance (*besides, moreover, furthermore, utterance-initial also*). Consider an example proposed by Blakemore (2002: 95) :

E.g. (a) *Ben can open Tom's safe.* (b) *After all, he knows the combination.*

Here the speaker is indicating that segment (b) is relevant by virtue of strengthening an existing assumption.

3. *Discourse markers of contradiction or elimination*. Such discourse markers (*however, still, nevertheless, but*) introduce an utterance that presents evidence of inconsistency with the previous one. Blakemore illustrates this in the following example (2002: 95):

E.g. (a) *There's a pizza in the fridge,* (b) *but leave some for tomorrow.*

In this example the relevance of the (b) segment lies in the fact that it contradicts and eliminates an assumption presumed to have been made manifest by the (a) segment, namely 'you can eat all the pizza'.

Such classification allows distinguishing three broad categories of discourse markers. However, as the author notices, it does not enable us to capture the fine-grained distinctions between the meanings of the different expressions which fall into a particular category. Thus, for example, while there is a whole range of expressions whose use seems to be connected to contradiction and elimination (*but, nevertheless, however, etc.*), they are not always interchangeable with each another. To support this claim Blakemore proposes the following examples (Blakemore, 2002: 96):

1. a) *I am sure she is honest. Nevertheless, the papers are missing.*
b) *I am sure she is honest. But the papers are missing.*
c) *I am sure she is honest. However the papers are missing.*
2. [in response to: *Have you got my article?*]
a) *Yes, but the last page is missing.*
b) *Yes. However, the last page is missing.*
c) *Yes. *Nevertheless, the last page is missing.*
3. [speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whisky]
a) *But I don't drink.*
b) **However, I don't drink.*
c) **Nevertheless I don't drink.*

It seems that *but* has the most general meaning in the sense that it can always be used in utterances in which *however* and *nevertheless* are acceptable. *However* is more restrictive, as it cannot always be used in utterances in which *but* is acceptable. And *nevertheless* is more restrictive than *however*, since there are utterances in which *however* is acceptable but not *nevertheless*. The fact that there are contexts in which these discourse markers cannot be substituted by one another suggests that they do not encode exactly the same constraints on interpretation.

Since *but* can be used in all these utterances it may be presumed that it does not encode any information about the contexts in which the effect of contradiction and elimination is achieved. While *however* and *nevertheless* do not simply encode the information that the hearer is expected to follow an inferential route which results in the contradiction and elimination of an accessible assumption, but also that there is a restriction on the context in which this cognitive effect is derived. In the case of *however* the recovery of this effect is restricted to contexts which include assumptions that carry a guarantee of relevance accepted by the speaker and whose cognitive effects do not include the elimination of an accessible assumption. Consider the following example provided by Blakemore (2002: 119)

- E.g.: A. *She's had a very difficult time this semester.*
B. However, *I think she should hand in at least some of the work.*

The hearer is intended to recognize that the context includes assumptions whose relevance comes with a guarantee that is accepted by the speaker and whose cognitive effects do not include the elimination of the assumption '*she does not need to hand in any work*'.

Similarly the use of *nevertheless* encodes a restriction on the contexts in which the effect of contradiction and elimination is recovered. "*Nevertheless* is acceptable only in contexts in which there is an assumption whose truth is an issue, or in other words, in contexts in which the elimination of the assumption amounts to accepting one answer (the speaker's) rather than another" (ibid: 128). For example (ibid: 125):

- E.g.: A. *She's had a very difficult time this semester.*
B. Nevertheless, *I think she should hand in at least some of the work.*

This example can be understood as part of a dialogue in which the participants are discussing the question of whether a student should be absolved from the course requirements regarding assessed work. *A*'s contribution could be interpreted as a reason for waiving the rules entirely, a suggestion which is contradicted by *B*. Thus, utterance introduced by *nevertheless* is understood as an answer to a question which has been raised (explicitly or implicitly) by the preceding discourse or which has been made relevant through the interpretation of the preceding discourse.

It is evident that although *but*, *however* and *nevertheless* share the function of contradiction and elimination, *however* and *nevertheless* have additional functions which are not encoded by *but*. Blakemore (2002: 128) defines these additional functions as “restrictions on the contexts in which the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination is achieved” and concludes that the notion of a semantic constraint on relevance is more complex than the one proposed in her earlier work of 1987.

Moreover, according to Blakemore (2002), there are expressions classified as discourse markers which, although they encode procedures, are not linked to any particular cognitive effect. Such is the case with *well*, which does not activate a particular cognitive effect but simply encodes the speaker's guarantee that his utterance yields cognitive effects.

E.g.: *Remember Tom? Well, he's just bought a motorbike.* (ibid: 141)

It is possible for a question such as ‘*Remember Tom?*’ to be taken as a genuine request for information or as the preparatory utterance. In the latter case the speaker may be not sure that even with the preparation, the hearer is able to derive the intended effects. In such a case, it would be in both the speaker's and the hearer's interests to signal that the following utterance is relevant in the context which has been made accessible. Hence the use of *well* in this example is used to encourage the hearer to process the utterance for relevance in a context which the speaker believes would not have otherwise yielded a maximally relevant interpretation. According to this account the information that *well* encodes is that the utterance is relevant; and the usage of *well* is justified by the speaker's belief that certain assumptions are not manifest to the hearer.

In addition to this, Blakemore claims that there are discourse markers which encode procedural constraints on explicit context. This refers to indexical temporal adverbs (e.g. *now*, *then*, *after that*, etc.). Consider the following example (ibid: 177):

E.g.: *She jumped on her horse and then rode off into the sunset.*

According to the author, *then* in this example contributes to the proposition expressed by the utterance, but it does not encode a constituent of that proposition. The meaning of *then* is not a concept which appears in the propositional form recovered by the hearer, but is a means of narrowing down the hearer's search space for the value of the time reference for the event described. The author notices, however, that “further research is required before this can become anything more than speculation” (Ibid., 178).

Finally, according to Blakemore (2002), not all expressions classified as discourse markers can be analyzed in terms of procedural encoding – some of them encode constituents of conceptual representation. This is the case with reformulation markers such as *in other words* or *that is*. For example (Ibid., 183):

E.g.: A. *I'm afraid I will have to let you go.*
B. *In other words, I'm fired.*

The expression *in other words*, as it is used in the example, does not have the properties characteristic to procedural encoding. First of all, it can appear in semantically complex expressions

such as *'to put it in other words'*. Secondly, it has synonymous counterparts that are analyzable as contributing to the conceptual content of the utterances that contain them. Consider, for example *'he asked me to put it in other words'*; *'that is the same as saying I'm fired'*.

Following this analysis, Blakemore (2002) concludes that the notion of procedural meaning based on the three cognitive effects of contextual implication is not broad enough to capture all the ways in which linguistic expressions and structures can encode information about the computations involved in the interpretation of the utterances that contain them. Further to this, she claims that there cannot be a unitary account of the expressions which have been classified as discourse markers. Some of them encode concepts, and can be treated from a semantic point of view; others encode procedures, and resist straightforward analysis. Therefore, the research on discourse markers as a class or category is not worth continuing. However, she states, the research on the expressions themselves should not be abandoned, as they play a central role in the research on how linguistic form may contribute to the inferential process involved in utterance understanding.

Andersen (2001) is another researcher who has analyzed discourse markers within relevance-theory approach. He refers to these linguistic units as *pragmatic markers* and defines them as “a class of short, recurrent linguistic items that generally have little lexical import but serve significant pragmatic functions in conversation” (Andersen, 2001: 39). As Andersen notes, the view that utterance interpretation is governed by the principle of relevance is fundamental to his account of discourse markers. In agreement with Blakemore, he sees discourse markers as ‘helpers’ that tell the hearer how an utterance is to be understood and help him to arrive at the intended explicatures and implicatures of the utterance.

However, although it is generally agreed that the majority of discourse markers contribute to procedural rather than conceptual meaning of an utterance, Andersen (2001) argues that some markers may encode conceptual information and contribute to the proposition expressed. For example (Andersen, 2001: 48):

E.g. *I've always got someone who sort of fancies me or I'm flirting with.*


The use of *sort of* in the example provides a signal for the hearer to choose a loose interpretation of the concept ‘fancying’, i.e. not to take it too literally. As Andersen (2001) explains:

“‘fancying’ and ‘sort of fancying’ are not identical from the point of view of propositional meaning, the epistemically strong and weak expressions would not be appropriate in identical circumstances” (Ibid: 48).

The fact that some markers may encode concepts and thus contribute to the propositional meaning of an utterance can be explained, according to Andersen (2001), by the process of *grammaticalisation* - “a subclass of linguistic developmental processes whereby linguistic units are recruited into grammar” (Ibid., 33). From the point of view of grammaticalisation, discourse markers are seen as expressions which, through repetitive use and routinisation, have developed non-propositional meanings of a more abstract nature than their original lexical meanings, i.e. they follow a cline from propositional to textual and expressive meanings. An important feature of grammaticalisation is the possibility for the original forms to coexist with the new ones. Thus, linguistic items under discussion in some utterances may encode conceptual meaning, while in others - procedural meaning. Marker and non-marker uses have traditionally been distinguished in terms of propositionality: concepts contribute to propositional meaning of an utterance, procedures – to non-propositional meaning of an utterance. However, the grammaticalisation of discourse markers is not identical in terms of ‘completeness’, i.e. some discourse markers (e.g. *sort of, kind of, you know, you see, just, like*) are still in the process of it, thus even when the form is used as a marker, the original conceptual information is still accessible. Andersen (2001: 57) distinguishes three states of the items in the process of grammaticalisation: monosemous state, intermediate state and polysemous state. Such three-stage development is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The Development of Discourse Markers

STAGE I: Monosemous state STAGE II: Intermediate state STAGE III: Polysemous state



In this initial stage a form exists as a monosemous expression.

This stage encompasses the actual grammaticalisation process: speakers begin to innovatively apply an extant form with an associated implicature that gradually becomes conventionalized. In this stage the distinction between the old and the new interpretation of the form may be ambiguous.

This state is characterized by greater fixedness and distinctness of the two functions, as the invited inference that was firstly innovative has become routinised and part of the linguistic code. The new and old forms may continue to coexist as polysemous expressions or it is possible for the original form to fade.

According to Andersen (2001).

Therefore, according to Andersen, the conceptual/procedural distinction cannot be considered a defining criterion of the discourse marker category. Similarly, he does not regard the contribution to higher-level explicatures to be a defining characteristic of discourse markers - although it may account for majority of discourse markers, it is not applicable universally. Rather, he suggests, individual markers should be studied with a view to describing what type of information they encode.

Andersen (2001), in addition to the above presented statements, proposes a functionally based analytical model of discourse markers. He attempts to subdivide the plethora of functions discourse markers may perform into three broad categories: *textual function* (contributes to the coherence and structure of discourse), *subjective function* (expresses speaker's attitude or speaker's commitment towards proposition/assumption), and *interactional function* (oriented towards the hearer and may be used to engage, involve or elicit a response from him). He explores these three different functional domains in connection with the different cognitive effects that markers may have in utterance interpretation.

Andersen's (2001) account for discourse markers and their functions provide sound argumentative lines that will eventually be of great value for the grounding of the empirical analysis of the selected discourse markers. For that reason, his account for functional domains of discourse markers will be exposed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

So far we have reviewed the basic theoretical orientations within which discourse markers are analyzed. In discourse-coherence studies discourse markers are defined in terms of the role they play in marking the structural relations between segments, and the key to their analysis lies in the classification of the kinds of relations that exist between text segments. Within discourse-coherence approach accounts described in section 1.1.1., the production and interpretation of texts crucially depends on the identification of the particular coherence relation obtaining between two textual units, and discourse markers are seen as contributing to the identification of such relations. The Relevance-theory framework provides a different perspective on the presence of markers in discourse. This framework approaches linguistic items under discussion as signals that facilitate the interpretation of a given message or sequence of utterances. Although the structuring function of markers is not neglected, it is seen as a secondary, derivative notion. Rather than attempting to identify coherence relations, hearers are seen as attempting to determine how an utterance achieves relevance. This approach puts more weight on the cognitive aspect of discourse markers than the former one. Without diminishing or putting down the importance of one of the reviewed accounts over another, we take Andersen's relevance-theoretic view of discourse markers and their functions as a basis of the research.

In the following section a set of characteristic features most commonly attributed to discourse markers are presented and briefly discussed. This will allow us to draw a more comprehensive picture of a discourse marker category. Therewith, a concise characterization of Lithuanian discourse markers is presented as well.

1.2. Properties of Discourse Markers

As has already been reflected, the title, definition, functional qualification of a discourse marker category diverges greatly depending on a researcher and theoretical framework invoked. Similarly, authors vary in the features they consider to be characteristic to a discourse marker. However, it is possible to discern a set of features that are attributed to discourse markers, although with varying emphasis, by the majority of authors. According to Schourup (1999), connectivity and the assumption that they are syntactically and semantically optional are those properties of discourse markers that figure most prominently in literature.

Connectivity is the property of discourse markers that is most often taken to be the necessary one and figures in the majority of definitions. However it is perceived in different ways. For example, Shrifin's and Fraser's definitions, and most others, specify that discourse markers relate two textual units, thus contributing to inter-utterance coherence. Other authors, such as Blakemore, see discourse markers as relating propositional content expressed by the current utterance to assumptions that may or may not have been communicated by a prior utterance. In other words, within discourse-coherence approach connectivity is seen as a defining property of discourse markers, while within relevance-theory approach – as a derivative.

Optionality of discourse markers has two distinct senses. They are almost universally regarded as syntactically optional in the sense that removal of discourse markers does not alter the grammaticality of its host sentence. In addition to this, discourse markers are widely claimed to be semantically optional as well. Therefore, the omission of a discourse marker does not dissolve the relationship it signals; it remains accessible, although not explicitly marked. Despite such observations it is never claimed that they are useless or redundant. Their usefulness lies in the observation commonly agreed with, that they clue the interpretation intended by the speaker.

These two properties of discourse markers are frequently taken together to be necessary attributes of discourse markers. Less central features of discourse markers often mentioned in literature are the following:

Non-truth-conditionality is a generally mentioned characteristic of discourse markers. However in several recent studies it is no longer seen as a defining feature of the category (see section 1.1.2.) as certain markers had been shown to contribute to truth-conditions of an utterance. However, this characteristic is still applicable to a major part of discourse markers and in majority of cases allows distinguishing between marker and non-markers uses.

Weak clause association – discourse markers are usually thought to occur “either outside the syntactic structure or loosely attached to it” (Brinton, 1996: 34, cited from Schourup 1998: 232). This characteristic is frequently correlated with phonological independence. Indeed, many

discourse markers constitute independent tone units or are set off from the main clause by ‘comma intonation’. However, this is true not for all discourse markers and cannot be a defining characteristic of the category.

Initiality – although this characteristic is rarely considered defining, most items considered as discourse markers are at least possible in initial position, and many occur there predominantly.

Orality – most forms claimed to be discourse markers occur primarily in speech (e.g. *by the way, well, after all, etc.*). However, no reasonable grounds exist on which to deny discourse marker status to similar items that are largely found in written discourse (e.g. *moreover, consequently, etc.*). Association of a particular discourse marker with the written or spoken channel is rarely strict and is often tied to the relative distinction between formality and informality. However, most discourse marker studies so far are concentrated on spoken rather than written discourse.

Multi-categoriality – discourse markers are often said to constitute a functional category that is heterogeneous in terms of syntactic class. On this view discourse markers are independent of syntactic categorization and may include adverbs (*now, actually, etc.*), coordinating and subordinating conjunctions (*and, but, because, etc.*), interjections (*oh, gosh, etc.*), verbs (*say, look, see, etc.*) and clauses (*I mean, you know, you see, etc.*); besides, some authors would shorten or lengthen this list. Multi-categoriality is seen diachronically and discourse markers are taken to arise from other categories through historical processes.

1.2.1. Characterization of Lithuanian Discourse Markers

It seems relevant to mention some characteristic features of Lithuanian words that could be seen as discourse markers. Masaitienė (2003) carried out a contrastive analysis of the use of discourse markers in English and Lithuanian everyday conversation. She made a tentative list of the discourse markers in Lithuanian (*na/nu/nu tai* ‘well, so’; *žinai* ‘(you) know’; *taigi* ‘so, thus’; *va/tai va* ‘here, so’; *žinok* ‘know - imperative’; *matai* ‘(you see)’; *supranti* ‘(you) understand’; *ta prasme* ‘in that sense, that is’; *žodžiu* ‘in a word’) and drew some parallels with English. According to her, Lithuanian discourse markers are also mostly inserts with little lexical meaning and loosely attached to the clause structure. Some of them may be considered equivalents of English markers with partly or entirely overlapping functions (e.g. *you know-žinai*; *I mean – na/nu*). Nevertheless, Masaitienė observed some differences as well. Firstly, she noticed that “Lithuanian does not have a colloquial marker that could be comparable with the English *I mean*” (Ibid: 69). She also notes that in Lithuanian there are more markers oriented towards hearer (e.g. *žinai* - (you) know, *žinok* – know (imperative), *matai* - (you) see, *supranti* – (you) understand). Finally, she discerned that the majority of Lithuanian markers are more colloquial comparing to English and are acceptable only in informal conversation. For example, *žinok* (imperative know) can be used only while talking to a close friend. Similarly, the grammatical distinction between singular ‘you’ *tu* and plural ‘you’ *jūs*, which also marks a distinction between ‘familiar’ and ‘polite’, determines inadmissibility of the majority of forms in a more formal setting or even when one casually converses with a stranger. Hence, Masaitienė concludes that “a number of Lithuanian markers can be used only in a very informal setting, which presupposes more monitoring of speech and, consequently a greater variation in the use of discourse markers in Lithuanian, depending on the level of formality of situation” (Ibid).

2. FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS OF DISCOURSE MARKERS

As it was mentioned earlier, discourse markers do not form a finite group. For instance Swan (1996, as cited in Louwarse & Mitchell, 2003: 202) distinguishes at least 150 discourse markers in the English language, but Knott (1996) estimates this number to be over 350. We will, therefore, analyze only a limited set of markers (*you know, I mean, well, okay, so, like, now*) that usually occur in the lists of most frequently used discourse markers. The selected items as well as frequency lists from other researches are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. The most frequently used discourse markers

<i>Frequency scale of English pragmatic markers found in the narratives, Gonzalez, 2004:131</i>	<i>Pragmatic markers in the spoken native speaker corpus (acc to frequency) Aijmer, 2004:181</i>	<i>Discourse marker use (acc. to frequency) Lee 2004: 120</i>	<i>Frequency of discourse markers in native speaker corpus Fuller, 2003: 187</i>	<i>Frequency of common inserts Longman student grammar of spoken and written English, 2002: 449</i>	<i>Discourse markers in the English conversations. Masaitienė 2003:66</i>	The selected discourse markers
So Well Then I mean You know Anyway You see Okay Now	I think You know Sort of Well Really I mean You see And so on Or something I suppose Actually Or anything Like ...	You know Like I mean Yeah Whatever Actually Something like that So Right I don't Know I guess	Oh Well Y'know Like I mean	Yeah Oh No Uh/er Well Ok You know Mm Um/erm Yes I mean	You know Well I mean So Okay See Er Now Um	You know I mean Well Ok So Like Now

Discourse markers are usually said to carry little or no propositional meaning. It is their function in a particular context rather than lexical meaning of an item that has to be interpreted and rendered in the target text. Dictionaries are of little help for the translators as they provide only minimal (if any) coverage for marker uses. Andersen noticed that dictionaries providing such information are “for the most part dictionaries of dialects, slang or unconventional English” (Andersen 2001: 215). He also mentions that some all-purpose dictionaries (e.g. *Longman Dictionary of the English language* 1991, *Chambers Dictionary* 1994) cover most common marker uses, but describe them as being redundant and meaningless interjections, exclamations, gap-filling or hesitation devices. We have surveyed the biggest so far bilingual English-Lithuanian dictionary (Piesarskas, 2000) for the marker uses coverage of the selected items. The results of this survey are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Lexicographic coverage of the selected items

DMs	English-Lithuanian Dictionary (Piesarskas, 2000)
<i>You know</i>	◇ <i>You know</i> – supranti.
<i>I mean</i>	<i>I mean it</i> – aš rimtai kalbu, aš nejuokauju.
<i>Well</i>	<i>Int na!</i> (<i>reiškiant nustebimą, sutikimą ir pan.</i>) <i>well and good!</i> - na (ir) puiku!; <i>well then!</i> - na ir kas!; <i>well, to be sure!</i> - na štai!; <i>well what next?</i> - na, ir kas toliau/paskui? <i>well, who would have thought it?</i> - na ir kas galėjo pagalvoti?; <i>well as I was saying</i> - na, kaip aš minėjau
<i>Okay</i>	<i>Int gerai!, puiku!, sutinku!</i> <i>okay, let's go on to item B</i> - gerai, eime prie punkto B
<i>So</i>	Tai; <i>so what are the advantages of nuclear energy?</i> - tai kokie atominės energijos pranašumai?; <i>Int taip!, na jau!, nejaugi!</i> (<i>reiškiant (ne)pritarimą, nustebimą ir pan.</i>)
<i>Like</i>	<i>šnek. na, taip sakant</i> (<i>pauzei užpildyti</i>); ◇ <i>I had like to have fallen</i> - aš vos neparkritau; <i>prep kaip (ir)</i> ; <i>far off countries like Australia and China</i> - tolimos šalys, tokios kaip Australija ir Kinija;
<i>Now</i>	Tada, tuo metu (<i>pasakojime</i>); <i>it was now clear that ...</i> - tada tapo aišku, kad ... ◇ <i>now (then)</i> - taigi ; <i>now (then)!</i> - a) na!, nagi! ; b) greičiau! <i>int 1 now now!</i> na na! (<i>raminant</i>); 2 prašau!, klausyk! (<i>raginant ko nedaryti</i>)

As is evident from the results presented above, the dictionary describes only several marker uses of the items under discussion and, similarly to monolingual explanatory dictionaries, specifies them as interjections or gap-filling devices, their uses characteristic to spoken language. Because of specificity of these items as well as because of minimal lexicographic coverage, they generally pose a problem in the process of translation. Thus it seems rational to describe the functional spectrum of the markers selected for the analysis.

In the literature on discourse markers, a wide range of functions are associated with these items. Some studies consider them to be devices for signaling sequential structure (Schiffrin 1987, Fraser 1996) and distinguish such functions as opening or closing of conversation, turn-taking, indicating topic shift and marking logical relations between propositions. Other studies focus on attitudinal functions of discourse markers (Andersen & Fretheim 2000, Stenström 1994, Holmes 1995), which include epistemic commitment (endorsement or rejection of propositional meaning), affective evaluation of propositional meaning, newsworthiness, speaker-hearer

relationship and politeness. Andersen (2001), however, proposes functional framework that encompasses all functional aspects mentioned. According to him, this plethora of functions can be systematically described in terms of basic aspects of pragmatic meaning referred to as *subjective*, *interactional*, and *textual*.

Andersen (2001) forewarns that his tri-dimensional analysis of discourse markers functions is not meant for taxonomic purposes. According to him “pragmatic markers are notoriously difficult to place in a certain category as they are multifunctional not only in the sense that they can serve a variety of pragmatic functions depending on a context they occur in, but also in the sense that they display several pragmatic features at the same time” (Andersen 2001: 63). Thus, the meaning of a discourse marker in a particular utterance can involve several functional domains. This, for instance, is evident in quotative uses of markers where they may be seen as having dual function: serving as direct speech frame markers (textual), and signaling the transition to a new interpretative perspective, i.e. the source of knowledge (subjective). In fact, Andersen argues that “a degree of subjectivity is something all markers express, since any utterance expresses a speaker’s intention to make something manifest to an individual” (Andersen 2001: 65). Nevertheless, despite the frequent co-occurrence of several functional aspects, one function typically dominates in the actual marker use.

Andersen (2001) also notes that although markers cannot be classified into subjective, interactional and textual categories, they can be primarily associated with one of the three functional levels. In Andersen’s words, “some markers are predominantly textual, others predominantly subjective and yet others predominantly interactional” (Andersen 2001: 81).

In the following sections, these three main functional aspects will be described in turn, and the individual functions of the selected discourse markers identified by various researchers (namely, Müller (2005) for *you know*, *well* and *so*, Brinton (2003) for *I mean*, Beach (1993) for *okay*, Andersen (2001) for *like*, and Aijmer (2002) for *now*) will be described and distributed according to Andersen’s (2001) functional framework.

2.1. Subjective functions

“The subjective functions of discourse markers capture and make explicit the attitudinal relation that exists between the speaker and the proposition contained in the utterance” (Andersen 2001: 67). Subjectivity, as a feature of discourse markers, comprises the following types of meaning:

- > *The epistemic stance of the speaker* refers to varying degrees of endorsement and rejection (ranging from weak doubt to downright rejection) of propositional meaning.
- > *Source of knowledge* of propositional information (e.g. *I mean* – speaker’s own claim; *apparently* – other’s claim), which also includes metalinguistic stance, i.e. lexical commitment of various strength (e.g. *definitely* – strong lexical commitment; *sort of* – weak lexical commitment).
- > *Speaker’s affective attitude* refers to speaker’s positive or negative evaluation of the proposition expressed (e.g. *oh no, P* (P = proposition)! vs. *Thank God, P*).
- > *Newsworthiness* refers to the predictability of the propositional information, ranging from predictable to unpredictable propositional meaning (e.g. *P, actually* – surprise; *P, of course* - predictable).

2.1.1. Subjective functions of the selected discourse markers

You know marking approximation or lacking of exactness. *You know* may be used to indicate that a word, phrase or clause lacks exactness and thus is only an approximation to what the speaker had in mind. In the following example speaker B tries to describe Chaplin’s acting, which, apparently, is not easy. The expression s/he finally settles on is not a very precise one and presumably does not render exactly what s/he had in mind. It is preceded by *you know* to indicate the lack of exactness.

E.g. B: ... *the main characters was that girl and the guy.*

A: *mhm.*

B: *and don’t think the woman did much ... but ... like ... Charlie Chaplin had all these ... you know ... big movements to show like what’s going on [an’] his facial expressions that was cool.*

(Müller 2005: 163)

I mean is described following Brinton’s article (2003) *I Mean: the Rise of a Pragmatic Marker*. Although her main aim is to determine how *I mean* developed into a discourse marker, the article also reflects the functions this marker serves in Modern English. Thus, the subjective functions of *I mean* in Modern English are the following:

1. *Reformulation* - *I mean* is used to reformulate the preceding discourse.

E.g. “*I just want to look at the stuff, I mean, examine it physically, not experience it emotionally*” (Ibid: 6).

2. *Exemplification* - *I mean* introduces an example to make the preceding material more comprehensible.

E.g. *Miranda was a star; I was space dust. I mean, when she made cheerleader our sophomore year, I got elected treasurer of the Latin Club* (Ibid: 7).

3. *I mean* may express *emphasis* or assert the veracity of an utterance.

E.g. *But Cousin Alexander is rich! Really rich, I mean* (Ibid: 8)

4. *I mean* may express *evaluation or judgment*, especially in the context of an evaluative adjective.

E.g. *I mean, it's humiliating to be beaten by someone who doesn't even walk properly* (Ibid)

5. *I mean* may also express *sincerity* in the sense 'I'm serious when I say'.

E.g. *I would never pick up the phone and call him; I mean, I wouldn't do that* (Ibid)

Well in the following uses, described by Müller (2005), may be seen as serving subjective functions:

1. *Indirect answer* – *well* may preface answers to questions or requests, indicating that the answer is not a direct one or not a complete one.

E.g. B: ... *oh did you like it?*

A: ... *let's ask .. did YOU like it.*

B: *Well I liked the second part. The first part was not funny.* (Ibid: 123)

2. *Response to self-raised expectations* - *well* here preface answers to the self-raised questions or expectations. In the following example the expectation is raised by a statement with the pragmatic force of a promise. *Well* addresses and acknowledges the expectation raised, without any interference from the hearer.

E.g. *there are some comic touches of course, ..um --.. let me see if I remember them. .. um - - .. well the card game I guess with the .. the evil.. man* (Ibid: 127)

3. *Contributing an opinion* – *well* here signals that the speaker begins to deliver his/her opinion. The contributed opinion does not necessarily contradicts the previous statements, there may be no discrepancy between previous and current utterances; thus *well* has the sole function of introducing speaker's own opinion. The following example illustrates how speaker B employs *well* to marks the beginning of her own opinion:

E.g. A: ... *but I think I think wha- wha' interested me about this, when I watched it is the way you have to like really concentrate.*

B: *mhm*

A: *It's not like when you watch like... you know Hollywood movie you like you sit there,*

B: *yeah,*

A: *and you don't actually concentrate on what's going on*

B: *mhm*

A: *it jus' uh comes into your head. ... and then she actually had to think --*

B: *well... usually it's -- ... with with uh... um a text it's a lot easier to be interested, but... it was actually-- I found it ... pretty interesting to sit there and watch. (Ibid: 128)*

Okay. Beach (1993) briefly mentions the function of *okay* which might be labeled as subjective. *Okay* in this usage is phonologically marked (*o::ka::y*) and conveys special meaning, i.e. *surprise*, *deference* or even *contempt* towards the prior utterance. Consider the following example:

E.g. S: [...] *What do you mean hope. Get (th)em off the planet don't rele:ase (th)em an(d) have (th)em kill other people*

G: *O :: k a :: y?*

S: *(I)f they can't ha- (i)f they can't handle reality the:n: get the fuck out 'ya know get outta tow:n --*

G: *Right but d- does that still give us the right to:- to- to kill (th)em. (Ibid: 340).*

So, according to Müller (2005), may be used by a speaker to introduce an expression of his or her *opinion*. Sometimes speaker may explicitly declare the utterance to be his opinion, by using *I assume*, *I think*, *I guess*, etc., sometimes, there may be no such explicit declaration. *So* in this function includes an element of result. The speaker presents his/her opinion as motivated by what s/he has said before.

E.g. *the um... the fish bit his nose, so that was kind of funny. (Ibid: 84)*

Like is a marker whose main contribution to utterance meaning, according to Andersen (2001), is to signal that the relation between an utterance and its underlying thought is not one-to-one relation, but relation of non-identical resemblance. As such, it provides speakers with a means to dissociate themselves slightly from the expressions contained in the utterance. In such uses the most salient aspect of meaning of *like*, according to Andersen (2001), is subjective. Non-identical interpretative resemblance involves the following sub-groups:

1. *Approximation or loose use of a lexical expression.* Here the function of *like* is to signal that the speaker is opting for the loose interpretation of her beliefs. In other words, *like* explicitly indicates discrepancy between the propositional form of the utterance and the thought it represents. The following example illustrates a rough approximation of the score. Speaker's choice may be triggered by a wish not to sound unreasonably pedantic and/or to avoid putting the hearer to unnecessary processing efforts with the presentation of an exact score (e.g. 38.5).

E.g. *My lowest ever was like forty. (Ibid: 233)*

Like can, as in the example above, take in its scope a numeral phrase or some other measurable unit. Similarly, it can modify the inherent semantic features of the subsequent phrase, as in the

following example, where the speaker is not saying that the described activity is downright boring but reduces its force by means of *like* (along with *a bit* and *sort of*):

E.g. *No it's not that bad the game, actually it's alright but, it is a bit, sort of like boring when it's, when you play it every day.* (Ibid: 235).

2. *Exemplification.* *Like* here suggests that what follows should be seen as exemplifications of wider categories. In the following example *like* picks out several items of a larger set of alternatives, i.e. potential weapons in a fight.

E.g. *Mates of theirs, if there's a fight, they come back with blades and that and then like, baseball bats, hammers, and they got ready for a fight but they're all gone.* (Ibid: 236)

3. *Like in connection with metaphors and hyperboles.* *Like* preceding metaphors and hyperboles, similarly to the above uses, signals that the subsequent expressions are not to be construed literally. The following examples illustrate *like* in connection with metaphors (1) and hyperbolic use (2).

E.g. 1) *He said oh she's just, you know she, she's like sailed through (name of school). She gets out of everything.* (Ibid: 237)

E.g. 2) *Yeah but you imagine it you're doing out with someone and you see them like every day. And then during the holidays you won't be able to see them.* (Ibid)

Metaphors involve non-identical resemblance between an encoded concept (e.g. *sailed through school*) and the communicated concept (e.g. *attended school without many difficulties*). Likewise, *every day*, as a description how often people get together, is not intended to be taken literally but is a case of hyperbolic loose use. Andersen also points out that “there may be uses of *like* in front of numeral expressions that indicate hyperbole rather than rough approximation” (Ibid: 238).

4. *Enrichment.* *Like* can be used to indicate the need for an enrichment process. Enrichment involves adding features to achieve an ad hoc concept that is more specific (i.e. semantically narrower) than the lexically encoded concept. Consider the following example where *like* functions as an incentive to contextually enrich the subsequent vague expression *a big thing* and arrive at the intended interpretation of it as *somebody's beard*.

E.g. *Well why's he got on like a big thing round his neck?* (Ibid: 239)

5. *Metalinguistic use of like.* *Like* here precedes a linguistic expression whose meaning is fairly clear-cut and exact. Nevertheless, the function of *like* in this use is to mark a discrepancy as well, but one that pertains to the linguistic form of the expression rather than its conceptual (logical and encyclopedic) properties. In such cases *like* signals that the chosen expression is either not the most appropriate one, or the speaker feels a minor discomfort with its use (the potential alternative might be, for instance, syntactically different or more common to the

speaker's vocabulary). In other words, *like* has a function of putting the subsequent material in a metalinguistic focus. Consider the following example:

E.g. Claire: *Thing is there's no way Gemma and (name) are gonna be allowed to stay upstairs when they've got boys downstairs.*

Kath: *Why do you think they'll, (name)'s a [laughing] paedophile or something (/)?*

Claire: *No but I mean it just can't be that.*

Kath: *Why not?*

Claire: *It's like not moral.*

Kath: *Not [laughing] moral(/)?*

Claire: *Cos that's why they had to move out of this house in the first...*

Kath: *Place. Oh well.* (Ibid: 245-6)

In the context of an informal conversation between adolescents, the expression *not moral* may be seen as relatively sophisticated and alien in teenage talk. Here the speaker by using *like* indicates that the expression chosen is “*really part of somebody else's language*” (Ibid: 246) and thus distances himself/herself from it. Andersen (2001) also notes that this usage of *like* may have an interactional (side-)effect - to increase politeness and solidarity between the speakers, suggesting that “*this is the way other people talk, and not really how you and I do*” (Ibid: 249)

Now in the following uses described by Aijmer (2002) serves predominantly subjective functions, although textual functions also interblend:

1. *Now introducing a metacomment.* A frequent use of *now* is to mark the transition to a metacomment (e.g. *let me see/think, let me try and think, let me pause, where was I, what was it, what else have I been doing.*). Speakers shift from the main topic to an afterthought or an aside in order to ask a rhetorical question, speak a reflection aloud, using *now* to mark a shift in orientation. Commenting on one's own talk constitutes a frame-break since ‘asides’ take place on a different plane of talk. This use of *now* is illustrated in the following example:

E.g. a: □: *what modern poets have you been reading?*

A: *well I'm ... I like Robert Graves very much--*

a: *who else*

A: □: *m – now, let me see - - - well I'm quite fond of Durrell – I don't really know very much about modern poetry - - mm but I like □:m* (Ibid: 88).

A special kind of metacomments is represented by ‘prefaces’ in which the speaker states what he is going to do (e.g. *now my duty this morning is to ask...*) before coming to the point.

2. *Now and affective stance.* *Now* may accompany frame-shift to evaluation. In the following example A first imitates an imaginary student, who reads books but is not willing to analyze them, and then switches to an evaluation additionally signaled by *now*:

E.g. A: *(sighs) I read a book last night and it moved me so much I can't talk about it - - Now this is a a gorgeous lazy way out -- you see. He's take in by this dear-- soul.* (Ibid: 91)

3. *Now introducing a disclaimer.* *Now I think* introduces a subjective opinion or evaluation. This collocation is often associated with conflict and with disagreement. In the following extract

from a radio discussion the speaker expresses his opinion on the issue whether Britain should have a coalition government. *Now*, which is emphatic and authoritative, co-occurs with the emphatic *do* and introduces a disclaimer:

E.g. *Between these different views the coalition government falls and we become another France-- now I do believe that the whole question of defense-- the whole question of a stand upon a summit talks, the whole reaction as to whether Britain ought...* (Ibid: 92)

2.2. Interactional functions

Discourse markers with interactional functions are hearer-oriented and have a capacity for engaging the hearer in the conversation. “Interactional meaning concerns the hearer’s relation to a communicated proposition/assumption or, more precisely, what the speaker perceives as the hearer’s relation to a communicated proposition/assumption” (Andersen, 2001: 69). It is commonly the case that interactional meaning encourages the hearer to talk either by addressing the issue of whether communicated assumptions are mutually manifest (e.g. utterances of the type *P, right?*), or by asking for his contribution of some kind. The interactional function can also be associated with the expression of solidarity and politeness, but it is not always the case.

Andersen (2001) points out, that the subjective and interactional aspects of discourse marker meaning are necessarily interwoven. Discourse markers with interactional functions, like those with subjective functions, are expressions of speaker attitude. Subjective and interactional aspects of marker meaning are distinguished on the grounds that certain attitudinal markers are hearer-oriented, i.e. reveal “the speaker’s inclination to take the hearer’s perspective in evaluating propositional meaning” (Andersen, 2001: 69) while others are not hearer-oriented and reveal speaker’s own evaluation of propositional meaning. Interactional meaning, then, is a feature which some attitudinal expressions have while others do not.

2.2.1. Interactional functions of the selected discourse markers

You know, according to Müller (2005), is used to involve the hearer in various ways and to various degrees:

1. *You know* may be used by the speaker to check whether the hearer understands what is being said or implied. Consider the following example where *you know* serves as a check that the listener perceives the emotion the speaker is trying to describe.

E.g. B: *and she was sort of embarrassed by that. But --*

A: *...she was embarrassed?*

B: *or something like shy, you know?*

A: *o=h ... tryin’ to see what else has happened in there* (Ibid: 172)

2. *Reference to shared knowledge.* *You know* can be employed when the hearer has to be reminded or asked to access the shared knowledge at a particular point in the narrative or discussion. In the following example the speakers are discussing the acting of the minor characters. When speaker A expresses his opinion about one of the characters, it is important for him that his partner knows which character he is referring to. This desire is expressed through *you know*.

E.g. A: *the ... the guy the thief was really convincing ... you know the big guy*
B: *yeah*
A: *at the beginning.* (Ibid: 180)

3. *Appeal for understanding.* When the speaker gives up searching for an expression or does not know what to say about the topic at hand, s/he may use *you know* to appeal to the hearer's understanding despite the gap. It may sometimes carry an additional apologetic note. Consider the following example:

E.g. B: *and he paid for it, but it was fake, ... cause it could bend, so then he goes <oh wai' wai' > I want...some coffee ... for her, so to -- ... you know.*
A: *he knows he knows it's faked?* (Ibid: 182)

After describing what Chaplin did when he discovered the coin was not real one, speaker B sets off to say why he did that, i.e. to gain more time to find a solution to his problem. But apparently B cannot think of the right expression and rather than making further effort, s/he immediately appeals to the hearer's understanding of what she mean to say with *you know*.

5. *Acknowledge that the speaker is right.* Another kind of appeal involving the hearer is asking the hearer to agree with the speaker. Typical for such cases is the speaker's confidence about his opinion and Müller (2001) paraphrases *you know* serving this function as '*this is my opinion, don't you agree?*' (Ibid: 184). Consider the following example where the speaker does not hesitate about his opinion and uses *you know* to appeal for approval:

E.g. *I ...DON'T want to be FORCED to feel PITY for him, because it's just so - - it's too much, because sometimes he's just dumb. ...he's not -- it's -- ... he's dumb, that's why I think, you know.* (Ibid: 184)

6. *Introducing an explanation.* *You know* may be used to introduce clarifications, amplifications and exemplifications. Müller (2005) labels all these cases as '*you know marking an explanation*', because "in a wide interpretation, all three can be seen as special types of explanations" (Ibid: 166). The following example illustrates clarification:

E.g. *... so then he's like <no no no>. I -- you know Charlie Chaplin is like <no no no>* (Ibid: 165)

I mean. Brinton (2003) presents the following interactional functions of *I mean*:

1. *Cause.* *I mean* may indicate cause in the sense ‘*I’m saying this because*’ (Ibid: 7). As the speaker is being attentive to the hearer’s need for explanation, this usage of *I mean* is interactional.

E.g. *Don’t you think it’s time you put that thing away. I mean, look at it, it’s antique; you could hurt yourself with it.* (Ibid).

2. *I mean* may also be used to make the preceding utterance more precise or explicit. In this function *I mean* is interactional in the sense that speaker explicitly states something that he considers hearer might have not understood, thus is concerned with hearer’s needs.

E.g. “*It could be embarrassing, you see. Politically, I mean.”* (Ibid: 6).

3. *I mean* is also interactive when it is used in a variety of phrases containing a second person pronoun (e.g. *you know what I mean; if you understand/see/know what I mean; etc.*) or in an interrogative. Although this structure is hearer-oriented, it does not always expect a response. The sense of *I mean* can be paraphrased as “*I’m implying more than I’m saying*” (Ibid: 9). Consider the following example:

E.g. *It is because she isn’t that she is successful ... if you understand what I mean.* (Ibid)

Well as a mitigator of confrontation. In the literature on *well* its function to make the subsequent utterance less face-threatening is widely discussed. Müller (2005) distinguishes to some extent narrower function ‘*evaluating a previous statement*’ because in the scope of her experiment there were no occasions for confrontations or face-threatening acts. Nevertheless, in her data *well* served such function by introducing utterances evaluating a previous statement. In the following example, speaker’s A contradiction to B’s opinion is introduced by *well*:

E.g. B: *I hate Charlie Chaplin movies.*

A: *why?*

B: *.. I don’t know. I don’t think they are funny.*

A: *..oh well -- I think they are interesting.*

B: *...because?*

A: *it’s just s-so different what the people at these times could laugh about.*

B: *yeah. Ok. Maybe interesting but not funny..for..today.*

A: *...well* (Ibid: 133)

Well in this function can often be considered a marker of politeness, since it respects the addressee’s face.

Okay. From the functions of *okay* presented in Beach (1993) the following ones are interactional:

1. *Tag-positioned okay* functions as a device for soliciting and insuring agreement and/or alignment from the next speaker and is usually receipted with *okay* in next turn.

E.g. B: *Alrighty. Well I’ll give you a call before we decide to come down. O.K.?*

C: *O.K.* (Beach 1993: 336)

2. *Okay as a free-standing receipt marker.* Recipients often rely on *okay* for marking receipt of or agreement with the prior speaker's utterance. In these ways *okay* often stands alone and demonstrates recipient's orientations to the topic at hand. In the following example Flo's *okay* signals the receipt of Sha's informing, rather than willingness to immediately obey her mother.

E.g. Sha: *Your mother wants you!* –
Flo: *okay*. (Ibid: 330)

Free-standing *okays* are also employed by current speakers who initiate such activities as questions, and having received an affirmative, acceptable, and/or clarifying answer from recipient, move next to mark recognition and/or approval in third slot via *okay*. The following example illustrates such usage:

E.g. A: *You wan' me bring you anything?*
B: *No: no: nothing.*
A: *AW: kay*. (Ibid: 332)

Sometimes *okay* may have dual function: indicate agreement with and/or understanding of the prior utterance, and signal a state of readiness for moving to next-positioned matters. At times these dual functions (interactional and textual, respectively) are explicitly marked with two *okays* by the same speaker in consecutive turns: one for prior and one marking orientation to next. Consider the following example where D by his first *okay* marks receipt of C's agreement to the clarifications offered and then, with a similar *okay* following pause, D shifts attention to 'what time is it':

E.g. D: [...] *so you want to take your car*
C: *We can take your car if you wa:nt*
D: *hhh hhh I meant you want- you wanna have your car there so you can le:ave*
C: *Yeah I think that'd be a better idea*
D: *Okay ... Okay hhhh well what time is it now I don't have my watch on*
C: *Six o'clock* (Ibid: 341)

So in the following functions distinguished by Müller (2005) prefaces utterances which are directed at the hearer, thus serves interactional purposes:

1. *Speech act marker – question or request.* *So* prefacing requests/questions indicates that there is a resultative relationship between the request/question and some piece of previous discourse, i.e. the request/question is motivated. *So* in this function often occurs at a transition relevance place, thus textual and interactional functions co-occur.

E.g. B: *that's when that movie ended.*
A: *mhm. So what happened to the old lady?*
B: *I don't know, the old lady was never seen ... again.*
A: *she was ... disappeared?* (Ibid: 83)

The above example illustrates a question prefaced by *so* which was motivated by what was not told in the previous discourse. The old lady appeared in the first half of the movie, up to the point where speaker A had to leave the room. Speaker B, in her narrative, had not mentioned the old lady again, what incites speaker A to inquire what happened to her.

2. *Marking implied result.* *So* here indicates that a speaker has reached a point in the presentation of his/her ideas at which a hearer can infer what would come next even if it is not explicitly stated, i.e. *so* marks an implied result. *So* here directly addresses the hearer and challenges her/him to figure out what the speaker implies. Consider the following example:

E.g. B: ... *what did you think was the funniest part.*

A: *oh, I only saw half the film. So um,*

B: *in your section.* (Ibid: 84)

Speaker A ends his turn with '*so um*', implying that he cannot answer the question because he has seen only half of the film, and indicating that he turns over the floor to his partner.

This function typically includes a (potential) transition relevance place. *So* is either followed by the hearer's turn or by a pause, after which the speaker resumes his or her turn.

Now in the following uses described by Aijmer (2002) serves interactional functions:

1. *Explanation, clarification, support* – *now* in this function introduces clarification, explanation, or elaboration on something which has been said. *Now* may collocate with other discourse markers, for instance when introducing an explanation or justification it is likely to collocate with *you see* or *I mean*. In the following example *now* marks the transition from the main line material to support. According to the speaker, it is not clear without some further explanation why the water had to come from the well:

E.g. A: *the water supply to our house was from a well -- now it had to be a well because you could not build a house in those days without digging well --* (Ibid: 87)

2. *Now and change of footing* – *now* in this function is used to mark a change in 'footing', i.e. a change from the speaker perspective to the hearer. The shift also involves turn-taking (textual function) since *now* is followed by a question:

E.g. M: *hounds, killing their dead-beat fox, and hounds, deserving a taste of blood, the wisest expression to use, is that a fox was accounted-- for, try to avoid the expression, blood sports, and if that isn't an admission I don't know what is. Now, do you agree?*

B: *(2 to 3 sylls)*

M: *that foxes are in fact deliberately bred for hunting*

B: *no* (Ibid: 93)

3. *Now as a hearer-oriented intensifier (modal particle).* Affective or intensifying *now* expresses the speaker's involvement with the hearer (e.g. in combination with imperatives). It may carry friendly overtones (*now come on*), impatience (*now wait*) or resistance (*well now, now look*) *Now* also has affective meaning when the speaker is fighting for the conversational floor or

trying to hold his control over it (e.g. *now wait a moment, now excuse me two minutes, now let me finish*). The following example illustrates *now* being used to get the floor:

E.g. W: *now we've tried all these others we must fall back on this means?! Because our whole argument is that it isn't a- means*

N: *now now I don't – now just a moment* *Mr Williams, why fall back - -* (Ibid: 94)

2.3. Textual functions

Textuality is the function most commonly associated with discourse markers in the literature. Thus, it seems that it is an integral/indispensable function of discourse markers. However, Andersen considers that while some markers serve predominantly textual functions, some of them “to a very little extent (if at all) contribute to discourse structure, but whose sole purpose is to contribute to meaning of a subjective or interactional kind” (Andersen 2001: 77). Thus, Andersen (2001) acknowledges textual functions as one of three potential components of the meaning of discourse markers.

The textual functions of discourse markers involve their capacity for coherence and textuality in discourse. While the subjective and interactional functions of pragmatic markers concern attitudinal relations between the proposition expressed and an interlocutor, their textual properties concern the relation between sequentially arranged units in discourse, i.e. between propositions, utterances, turns, topics, etc. Discourse markers with textual functions communicate how the speaker perceives the relation between propositions, for instance that the current proposition is intended as a conclusion of previous proposition.

2.3.1. Textual functions of the selected discourse markers

You know. Müller (2005) enumerates the following textual functions of *you know*:

1. *Marking lexical or content search (gap-filling).* *You know* may be used for gap filling and in this function it is generally accompanied by a pause or a verbal hesitation (*erm, er*). In the example the speaker describes the scene in which Chaplin pays for his food with a coin the waiter finds is fake. In the flow of speech, the speaker starts saying *the waiter was telling him don't - -* and then realizes that the movie is a silent one. Therefore she hesitates and for a moment does not know what to say next.

E.g. ... *Charlie Chaplin got worried, and the waiter was telling him ... don't -- you know um uh um didn't tell him anything obviously. But ... the waiter ... uh rejected the coin obviously, because it was fake.* (Ibid: 159)

2. *Marking false start and repair.* In the following example *you know* marks a repair:

E.g. *it was rocky...rocky so they were kind of roll-- you know rocking back and forth.*

(Ibid: 161)

3. *Quotative you know*. *You know* occurs with reported speech, i.e. functions as direct speech frame marker, used by the narrator to introduce quoted material, either his/her own or somebody else's. In this function you know is typically accompanied by other quotative words, such as *think, say, BE+like*. Consider the following example:

E.g. *so Charlie Chaplin's like you know <hey waiter what's the matter> and the waiter says he was ten cents short.* (Ibid: 169)

I mean may be used for *mistake editing* or *self-repair*:

E.g. *"How many" ... I mean, how long is it since you got the first of these?"* (Brinton 2003: 5)

Well. Müller (2005) enumerates the following textual functions of *well*:

1. *Searching for the right phrase* – *well* in this function indicates that the speaker has difficulties in finding the right words for expressing his thought or mental image and utters *well* often combined with other pause-filling devices to gain some time.

E.g. *so ... you know he tries to propose and all of this stuff, and ... she's being really shy=, but you know ... she lets him -- well he kind of kisses her* (Ibid: 110).

2. *Rephrasing /correcting* – *well* in this use introduces a correction of the apparently faulty phrase or expression. Consider the following example where *well* introduces speaker's correction of his prior utterance, as it was not Chaplin's own decision to shuffle.

E.g. *they sit down and they h- have this game of ... uh cards. Charlie Chaplin um... decides to shuffle. Well is chosen to shuffle, ...* (Ibid: 112)

3. *Quotative* – *well* here functions as a frame indicating the beginning of direct speech, parallel to the quotation marks in writing. Typically it is preceded by devices introducing reported speech, such as *BE + like, go, say, ask, think*.

E.g. *and he's like ... <well let's play poker my way>* (Ibid: 113)

4. *Topic shift* – Müller (2005) distinguishes 'move to the main story' and 'introducing the next scene' as two different functions of *well*. In this paper, however, both of them are subsumed under the heading *topic shift* as, generally, this is the function *well* serves in these cases. While in the first category distinguished by Müller *well* introduces a move back to the (main) story, in the second case *well* introduces the next episode or topic. Thus, in either case *well* marks the beginning of another episode or topic, either discussed previously or no. In the following example a move to the next episode of the narrative is illustrated:

E.g. [...] ... *an' then ... Chaplin sees that, so he ... slams his foot on the coin, an' ... started playing games back and forth to ... to get up and get the coin. Well then ... he picks it up, [...].* (Ibid: 118)

5. *Conclusive well* – used to give a conclusive statement or to summarize an opinion. It marks the end of the current (sub)topic. Quite often this usage of *well* can be paraphrased as ‘*I don’t know what to say more*’.

E.g. B: *but maybe.. in former times he was a more typical way to --*

A: *..yes in former times you have no.. other movies.. to see*

B: *yeah, that’s --*

A: *that’s the only uh possibility to ..watch a movie at all, and he was very popular and --*

B: *mhm.*

A: *Well I think .. people.. really like him (Ibid: 120).*

6. *Taking or holding the floor* – under this heading two functions distinguished by Müller (2005) are subsumed, namely *direct answers* and *continuing an opinion/answer*. *Well* preceding direct answers indicates that the speaker is taking the floor; while *well* accompanying the continuation of the same speaker’s opinion/answer may be considered as a device for holding the floor. In both cases *well* indicates that the speaker is about to say something. In the following example B expresses his/her opinion about the movie and then provides A with possibility to take the floor. Since A does not take the opportunity, B continues herself starting with *well* and adds more to her opinion.

E.g. B: *it was .. for that time I guess well done, but if you did it did this nowadays, where you can actually talk, that would be so .. exaggerated. Li- just like ... um theatre or something. ... so -- ... I think -- Well it was well done, you could see= like um.. gestures, um or a ... a mime. (Ibid: 131)*

Okay. From the functions of *okay* presented in Beach (1993) the ones enumerated hereafter are textual:

1. *Okay in phone call openings.* *Okay* is frequently used in canonical phone openings, where it serves as both, responsive query and preparatory to further talk, i.e. *topic initiator*. Consider the following example (cited from Beach 1993: 334) where Marlene moves directly to the business of the call with *okay*:

E.g. Marlene: *Hi, this is Marlene:*

Bonnie: *Hi,*

Marlene: *How are you,*

Bonnie: *I’m fi:ne,*

Marlene: *Okay..hh D’you have Marina’s telephone number?*

2. *Okay in pre-closing environments.* *Okay* has been evidenced as one routine component in topic closure. Speakers rely on *okay* to offer recognizable attempts at closure, and if the *okay* is answered by another, then together these utterances constitute not a possible, but an actual first exchange of the closing section.

E.g. A: *O.K.*

B: *O.K.*

A: *Bye Bye*

B: *Bye (Ibid: 336)*

Phone calls are not the only environments within which participants rely on *okay* to close down activities/topics. Consider the following example where J tries to exit a troubling topic by *okay* accompanying topical shift:

E.g. A: *Never mind it'll all come right in the end,*
J: *Yeh. Okay you go and get your clean trousers on.* (Ibid: 337)

Willingness to get off troubling topics may also be signaled by '*Okays-in-a-series*' which additionally indicates speaker's impatience and negative attitude towards the topic at hand, thus serves subjective functions as well.

3. *Okay as turn initiator (a mild one)*. Free-standing *okays* can also be interpreted as failed attempts to gain the floor, i.e. speakers employ *okay* for indicating willingness to say something, but the current speaker continues.

E.g. Y: *U:m eh- hopefully I'll be able to get with the printer and it'll just take you following up to make sure they're*
X: *For what we intended them to be*
Y: *That it's: proof rea:d and all that stuff*
X: *Okay well we...*
Y: *And I'll cal Beverly da- u:h (continues)* (Ibid: 348)

Continuation of this sort is successful for two basic reasons: first, current speakers do not treat recipients' *okays* as clues signaling movement; second, recipients producing *okays* themselves withhold fuller pursuit toward a given matter.

So in the following uses described by Müller (2005) serves textual functions:

1. *Marking result or consequence*. *So* explicitly marks the resultative relationship between the preceding and following propositions.

E.g. *and then um ... there is like a ruckus going on in front of them, which is uh some guy wa- you know short on his bill, so they beat him up and kicked him out.* (Ibid: 72)

2. *Main idea unit marker*. Speakers may use *so* to come back after a digression or explanation to the main thread of the narrative or to a topic/opinion mentioned before. In the following example speaker narrates how Chaplin paid his bill by using another customer's tip which gives rise to the subsequent subsidiary scene; *so* leads back to the main story:

E.g. *and then they got ready to leave. ... and I'm not sure. Well it seemed like ... the waiter was mad at the guy cause he didn't give him a tip, and he just left without saying anything, ... so then they left.* (Ibid: 75)

3. *Summarizing/ rewording/ giving an example*. *So* may serve for summarizing what the speaker had said before, for saying it in other words, or for giving an example. The following example illustrates *so* introducing a rewording, as the speaker quotes the artist's words (appearing in the movie as an inter-title) and later follows a rewording prefaced by *so*.

E.g. *but the artist said, um I'll engage both of you tomorrow. ... And so he was gonna hire them ... to be part of his art studio or something, I don't know.* (Ibid: 77)

4. *Sequential so*. “When two adjacent discourse units do not have any obvious ideational or rhetorical relation – while still being understood as belonging to the same discourse – their relation is called *sequential*. Sequential relations can be paratactic, that is, transitions to the next topic or to the next point, or hypotactic, that is, leading into or out of a commentary, correction, paraphrase, aside, digression or interruption segment.” (Redeker 1990: 369, as cited in Müller 2005: 78). Sequential function of *so* is to introduce the next event in a series of events. In the following example the speaker makes a transition from the ‘good-bye’ scene to the next one and marks it with *so*:

E.g. *all of them get up and leave. Like arm in arm, an’ ... the artist says it was nice meeting you, so-- it’s raining outside. So they go around the corner, and there’s a big s-- door. There is a big door that says marriage licenses.* (Ibid: 79)

5. *Marker of a transition relevance place*. *So* in this function may be used for the self-selection of a speaker or for indicating that the speaker yields the floor to the partner. In the following example the participants are talking about the challenges of making a silent movie. B obviously does not have anything else to say, so speaker A takes the floor starting with *so*. In some cases a hearer does not take the floor and the speaker continues himself after a long pause beginning his/her new turn with *so*.

E.g. B: *when they’re talking, they-- right? They were moving their mouths,*

A: *OK*

B: *U=h*

A: *... so everything was ... over-emphasized, what you were saying a little earlier there.*

(Ibid: 86)

Like. In the following uses *like* predominantly serves textual functions, although subjectivity may also be present.

1. *Quotative BE like*. In this use *like* provides an explicit signal that the following material is a representation that may or may not have been explicitly uttered. It is important to note that along with *BE like* there are other expressions with *like* introducing reported speech: *it’s just like, it’s sort of like, it was like, etc.* Besides, *like* alone functions as a demarcation marker between quotation and the rest of the utterance. Consider the following examples adopted from Andersen (2001):

E.g. a) *and then, and then Kevin came up to me and said erm [...] if you if you go and see Mark this afternoon erm he would like to speak to you, I was like, he should come and speak to me.* (Ibid: 250)

b) (the speaker is telling how his friend assisted him in picking a name for his black kitten) *[...] and he goes call it Nigger. I think Nigger’s a good name, but you know what I mean like come here Nigger! But ... it’s, it’s racist.* (Ibid: 252)

2. *Topic continuation (it's like)*. Collocation *It's like* provides a signal that the speaker wants to elaborate on the topic on the floor. The following example illustrates its use for signaling topic continuation on the basis of what someone else said.

E.g. Marsha: *oh you know those small fries, you get those little weeny erm little fries*

Carla: [laughing] *yeah, it's like they count them out and go that's a small one.*

(Ibid: 258)

3. *Like as a hesitational/linking device*. *Like* can contribute to discourse coherence, signal utterance continuation and help speaker to gain some production time. Andersen (2001) distinguishes four different types that represent hesitational/linking uses of *like*: *like* can accompany *false-starts* (e.g. 1), introduce a minor correction, i.e. *self-repair* (e.g. 2), occur in *terminated utterances*, i.e. when a speaker wishes to continue, but planning difficulties or interruption prevent him/her from doing so (e.g. 3), and finally, *like* may link syntactically (sometimes even thematically) unrelated structures, i.e. it provides a *discourse link* (e.g. 4).

1) E.g. *But like it's different if you've got a really bad cold and sometimes you have to, you can't like ... sometimes you can hide it but I don't go in front of someone [mimicking bringing up phlegm] I always do it discreetly.* (Ibid: 255)

2) E.g. *It might be better to use like, just wait on the edge of like a [??]jam[/] or something like that, just let the ball come straight through.* (Ibid)

3) E.g. Grace: *Just tape conversations for school. Teacher wants to know about conversations, like...*

Dawn: *Is it still running?*

Grace: *Yeah.* (Ibid)

4) E.g. *I know and like...on Friday yeah I mean we're gonna be there for about an hour and a half probably yeah, and I wanna...* (Ibid)

Now may express a number of textual relations. Its core meaning 'at the present moment' explains that it functions as a stepping-stone to a new topic, new argument or new stage in a narrative. Aijmer (2002) distinguishes the following textual functions of *now*:

1. *Now as a topic changer*. *Now* may function as a topic introducer marking a change of topic. It is a typical switch-on signal, thus marks the starting point of a new topic. In the example speakers are talking about the reasons for the antipathy between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. *Now* marks the change to talking about Bernadette Devlin who owned a house in Cookstown in which A has been staying.

E.g. B: *... and they probably have more children.*

A: *they do - -. n□:m - - □: Berna_dette Devlin. Now*

B: *Ah yes -.*

A: *She was born in a place called Cookstown County Tyrone* (Ibid: 75)

It is typical for *now* to co-occur with metalinguistic comments announcing something new or the return to a preceding topic. The next example illustrates how discourse markers are used to

prepare hearers for what is going to come. Here *well now* together with metalinguistic *let's go back to...* signals that the interviewer wants to return to the topic discussed earlier:

E.g. *well now, let's go back to Hamlet then - - □: do you agree with Eliot's view that this is an imperfect play?* (Ibid: 77)

2. *Now as a frame between discourse units.* *Now* has a framing function when it marks a clear break between two parts in the text. The first part in the example below functions as 'preliminaries' in relation to what comes afterwards - the main topic, which is introduced by *now*:

E.g. A: □: *m - - and in in the second batch we have Bunyan, is it bunyan or Bunyans?*

B: *Bunyan, yeah*

A: *Bunyan-- □: -- and about five other names - - Now-- I'd like to ask you-- about two people who appear again to be known - □: to the college - -* (Ibid: 78)

3. *Now in turn-taking.* An important role of *now* is to announce who has the turn and to keep the turn in order to say something more; the speaker may for example use it because he has a story to tell or in order to elaborate on a topic. In the example speakers C, A and a third person have been talking about how some people in the local drama group have racial prejudices. Speaker C takes the turn in order to elaborate on this theme:

E.g. C: *and you get this like what's that lady who does □, is it one of the play leaders of this-- what's her name*

A: *Mary, yes*

C: *Mary, now, she's an Irish Catholic with about eight kids and she's going on about all these foreigners coming into this country and ... (laughs) taking over the country.* (Ibid: 79)

4. *Now between subtopics.* *Now* can be used between subtopics (episodes, paragraphs) in a monologue with the function to move the discourse forwards. In the following example, the issue is whether drugs or surgery is the most efficient cure. The speaker is comparing what the surgeon does when he removes a cyst with the use of drugs to achieve the same result. The contrast marked by *now* is reinforced by the use of the pseudo-cleft construction and fronting (the 2nd occurrence of *now*):

E.g. A: *now. What the surgeon doesn't really consider is the etiology of the cyst it doesn't really - - because it's not really known - you can see it, very easily, it's there. And you know when you cut it out it will go away - what he doesn't consider particularly is how it gets there - - now. With drugs what you do is - - - you let yourself really have almost as much unknown as the surgeon at both ends - - -* (Ibid: 81)

5. *Now marking the steps in an argument/narrative.* *Now* may also be used to introduce an important or noteworthy point in an argument/proof or in a series of statement. In the next example the speaker, who is a doctor assessing his chances of becoming a consultant, uses *now* to focus attention on the logical steps in the argument.

E.g. A: *now. I have to realistically assess where am I. I'm third or fourth - you see - now if one of those chaps who was in my year so that means that four are probably going to become consultants, you know in in general surgery or general medicine. Now I'm third or fourth - [...]*

now the first six are going to be the only people who are going to get a look in. and the first four are the only people who are actually going to make it – *now* - - the first four – are the people who are going to really stick at it. (Ibid: 81-2)

6. *Now and listing*. Speakers may use *now* in descriptive lists to signal that there is a connection between the actions or subtopics. *Now* here marks information which will add to a list of actions/events. In demonstrations, for example, *now* is frequently used to show the order of events. The following example is an extract from a cooking demonstration where *now* marks a new stage in the sequencing of events:

E.g. *now* I'm going to show you how to cook the ham shank – the way it's been done in my home. Since long before I was born - - - *Now* if you get a lovely ham shank like you can easily get two nice slices off there for grilling [omitted] *now* if you're cooking in an ordinary pan you have to take about an hour and a half to two hours to get it to this stage - - so well get the ham shank out *now*- - - (Ibid: 83-4)

7. *Now as a marker of elaboration or subtopic*. *Now* here marks the modification or elaboration of a preceding referent. In the following example the speaker interrupts the main-line topic (his holiday in Scotland) in order to describe Shetland. *Now* and the repetition of Shetland marks the following discourse segment as an elaboration of a subtopic:

E.g. *I happened to spend a holiday in Shetland. Now Shetland as you know is island very windswept hardly a tree on the place – and looking through my binoculars one day I saw on the opposite mountain – a man working on one of these dry stone walls.* (Ibid: 85)

8. *Quotative now*. *Now* introduces direct speech either of somebody else's or of his/her own. The quoted material is typically marked by the reporting clause (*say, ask, think*). Collocations between *now* and other discourse markers are frequent in this use (e.g. *now look, well now, well now look*) and typically express emphatic reaction. In the following examples *now* introduces somebody else's words and speaker's own speech, respectively:

E.g. 1) A: *he looked at me – and I thought it was my cue to leave too*
B: *mhm*
A: *and out in the darkness – he said well now sir – I'm going to I'm going to raid the IRA tonight at Coagh. – if you ever heard of Coagh*
B: *don't think so*
A: *and would you like to send my troops to help – I said I would not - - -* (Ibid: 69).
2) A: *I said now look Mr Hills it's about time we sorted a little bit of this out--* (Ibid: 90).

In the 2nd example *now*, collocating with *look*, suggests objection or resistance and makes the presentation livelier.

In this section we have described functions of the selected discourse markers following Andersen's (2001) functional framework. He explains the functions of discourse markers in terms of three functional aspects, namely subjective, interactional and textual. Although these aspects are not meant for taxonomic purposes, they allow distinguishing markers that are predominantly subjective, predominantly interactional and predominantly textual. Accordingly, the following conclusions may be drawn about the discourse markers selected for the analysis:

Discourse marker you know can be primarily associated with interactional functions. Hearer-orientation is implied by the lexical meaning of the item, which penetrates in the majority of marker uses. Nevertheless, the marker has a capacity for expressing merely textual functions as well.

Marker uses of I mean are also influenced by its original meaning and implies speaker's orientation towards own talk, thus the most salient function of the marker is subjective. Along with subjective functions, it may also serve interactional ones, as in some cases speaker's attentiveness to hearer's needs is obvious.

Discourse marker well has a capacity for expressing a number of textual functions. However, its uses for subjective and interactional purposes are also well known and widely used. Therefore, well is a marker that can serve all three functional aspects.

The most common function of okay is to mark receipt of or agreement with the interlocutor's utterance. As such it serves interactional functions. Nevertheless, in some uses its functions are clearly textual, thus the marker can be associated with both, interactional and textual functions.

So predominantly serves textual function, more specifically marks a resultative relation between prior and following proposition. Although in some uses, the marker serves interactional or subjective functions, its textual function of marking result is faintly present.

The most salient function of discourse marker like is subjective; but the marker may also be used for merely textual purposes.

Now can primarily be associated with textual functions as its lexical meaning 'at the present moment' accounts for its use to mark the beginning of a new topic, argument or stage in a narrative. Even when it may be identified with subjective or interactional functions, textual functions interblend.

In the following chapter we are going to see how the selected discourse markers are treated in the process of translation, i.e. whether translators strive to render their meaning/function in the target text or tend to omit them and how their treatment rebounds on the resultant text.

3. TRANSLATION OF DISCOURSE MARKERS

Generally, translation is a process during which a message expressed in a particular source language is linguistically transformed into the target language. Consequently translators may be seen as mediators responsible for the adequate rendering of the message. In order to convey the intended meaning and associated implications translators must first of all correctly interpret the source text. Discourse markers best testify that every little and seemingly insignificant detail must be given an adequate treatment. These innocent minor words familiar to everyone, but whose presence often remains imperceptible, turn out to be capable of expressing a variety of important conversational functions and guide the collocutor towards the intended interpretation of an utterance. When employed in a literary work they acquire some additional functions, i.e. they may serve as stylistic devices subtly alluding to the inner state of the characters, contributing to their more vivid portrayal or to the depiction of emotional nuances associated with a particular situation. Discourse markers, in Green's words, "may speak volumes about the person who uses them" (Green 1990: 51).

Every language has developed distinctive conventions for using discourse markers. Consequently, they are seldom susceptible to a straightforward translation. The task of finding an appropriate equivalent equally subtly implying the shades of meaning encoded in the source text is always a delicate subject for the translator. In translation of discourse markers the information on discourse function is the most significant determinant in choosing the proper treatment of the marker: either insertion of a corresponding target language marker, modifying the syntactic structure of the target sentence or omission of the marker. Considering the early stages of the field and the fact that discourse markers do not seem to be the fundamental challenge for a proper translation, translators can mostly count upon their own intuition and creativity in coping with the task.

The current chapter analyzes the translation of the selected discourse markers in two novels. The investigation will reveal whether markers are given adequate treatment in the process of translation, what strategies of translation are applied in dealing with the rendering of their meaning/function and what impact this has on the resultant text. Consequently, this paper will contribute to the existing translation theory by giving a detailed account of discourse markers' treatment in the process of translation.

3.1. Methodological principles of the research

The current section gives a description of the data which the empirical investigation is based on and the methods applied.

The primary intention of this investigation is to analyze the translation of the set of English discourse markers into Lithuanian. The empirical part is based on the analysis of John Irving's *A Widow for One Year* (1999) and its Lithuanian translation by Daiva Daugirdienė (2002) as well as of Melvin Burgess' *Doing it* (2004) and its Lithuanian translation by Rūta Razmaitė (2004). The major criterion for book selection was richness of conversational language as the selected discourse markers are primarily associated with ordinary, informal speech.

John Irving's *A Widow for One Year* is a life-story of a famous writer Ruth. The story is told in three parts describing three distinct and separate moments of her life. At the beginning we see Ruth as a four-year-old girl, later as a 36-year-old unmarried woman, successful in her career but struggling in her relationships, and finally – as a 41-year-old widow with a child. The characters of the novel are divergent and colorful personalities and almost everybody is a writer. Ruth's father, Ted, writes and illustrates mysterious books for children and seduces unhappy, lonely mothers. Ruth's mother, Marion, abandons her husband and four-year-old daughter and eventually writes detective stories in which she unleashes her grief over the deaths of her two teenage sons. Marion's 16-year-old lover, Eddie, grows up to be a soft-hearted man and an unsuccessful writer elaborating on the sore topic - love between younger men and older women – in all his novels. Ruth's best friend, Hannah, is a journalist, a vital adventurer and, at the same time, lonely young woman. The diversity of characters, the gripping plot and strong literary style makes the novel a worthwhile reading. The narrative is interspersed with characters' monologues and passages of direct lively speech, thus the novel was selected for the search of discourse markers.

The selection of the second book – Melvin Burgess' *Doing It* – was influenced by the findings of Andersen's (2001) sociolinguistic study. According to Andersen (2001), the fact that teenagers are undergoing rapid cognitive, social and psychological developments reflects in their language and influences age-conditioned differences in type and frequency of hesitational phenomenon, hedges, metalinguistic cues, etc. Adolescent conversation is commonly characterized by vivid storytelling, frequent usage of reported speech and abundance of various linguistic means, including discourse markers, that help to modify their speech in order not to sound too assertive, abrupt or direct. Furthermore, some uses of discourse markers are associated with a certain age group, for instance, the majority of *like* uses described by Andersen (2001) are characteristic to teenage speech exclusively. Although this study does not touch upon sociolinguistic variation of discourse markers' functions and frequency of usage, such

observations influenced the selection of this particular novel in anticipation of a greater variety of examples. Melvin Burgess' *Doing It* is a novel about everyday cares and sexual experiences of a group of British teenagers. The novel is written in conversational style and contains a number of direct speech passages. Characters themselves tell their story what looks like a dialogue with the reader, therefore the language of the novel resembles the turn of speech characteristic to adolescents. Indeed, although the novel is comparatively short (330pg.), it provided with a considerable amount of examples (437).

The novels were carefully studied and the instances of the occurrence of the selected discourse markers were picked out. Marker uses of the items were distinguished on the basis of the defining and non-defining properties of discourse markers presented in Section 1.2. The two novels were quite different in the amount of discourse markers: 290 examples were picked from *A Widow for One Year*, while *Doing it* provided with 437 examples although it was by half shorter. The selected examples were grouped according to their functions described in Chapter 2. Afterwards the selected instances of discourse markers' occurrence were compared to the corresponding instances of the target text with the aim to determine whether the conversational functions of the markers and accompanying implications remained accessible in the Lithuanian version. Therefore, *interlingual contrastive method* was employed in the investigation, which also helped to evaluate the impact of the discourse markers' treatment on the overall quality of the translation. In addition, the *statistical method* helped to generalize the results of the investigation: the instances of proper translation, misleading translation, reasoned omission and unreasoned omission were counted, what helped to generalize and visualize the treatment of discourse markers in the analyzed material.

Interlingual contrastive and statistical methods were applied in the empirical investigation of the thesis.

3.2. Translation of the selected markers

The present section analyzes the translation of the selected discourse markers *you know*, *I mean*, *well*, *okay*, *so*, *like* and *now* in sequence. The selected examples were grouped on the basis of Andersen's (2001) functional framework (see Ch. 2), hence the translation of the subjective, interactional and textual functions of the markers will be reviewed in turn.

3.2.1. You know

Interactional functions. The functional analysis in Chapter 2 revealed that discourse marker *you know* can be primarily associated with interactional functions. Indeed, these functions were the most frequent in the analyzed material.

1. *Checking whether hearer understands what is being said or implied.* *You know* serving this function was most frequently translated by *supranti(at)*, which successfully renders the intended function of the marker:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> Everything was just like normal. [...] They went out for drinks, they kissed goodbye, they smiled and made jokes and teased each other, <i>you know</i>?
(Burgess 2004: 225)</p> | <p>Viskas buvo kaip paprastai. [...] Jie išeidavo išgerti, bučiuodavosi atsisveikindami, šypsojosi, laidė sąmojus ir vienas kitą erzino. <i>Suprantat</i>?
(Burgess 2004: 207)</p> |
|--|--|

In several instances the marker serving this function was translated by *žinai*, which modifies the intended meaning. Consider the following example:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>> 'I mean that it's all because of you that I've had <i>my</i> last bad boyfriend—it's not just a <i>title</i>, <i>you know</i>.'
(Irving 1999: 578)</p> | <p>- Norėčiau pasakyti, kad tik tavo dėka aš nusprendžiau daugiau nesusidėti su netikusiais vaikinais – <i>žinai</i>, tai ne tik <i>pavadinimas</i>.
(Irving 2002: 550)</p> |
|--|---|

Ruth, the main character of the novel, is trying to explain to her husband, who is also her editor, why she kept postponing giving him to read her new book. *You know* is obviously used in order to check whether he really understands what she means. While in Lithuanian *žinai* sounds as an introduction to a separate statement and slightly alters the original meaning.

The strategy of omission was also applied. Although this did not affect the intended lexical meaning, the emotional force was lost or weakened. Consider the following example:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>> What would happen if Mum and Dad looked in the wheelie bin and found all those cups and fag ends and cans and so on, <i>you know</i>?
(Burgess 2004: 135)</p> | <p>Kas būtų, jei mama su tėčiu dirstelėtų į šiukšliadėžę ir pamatytų puodukus, nuorūkas, skardines ir taip toliau *?
(Burgess 2004: 128)</p> |
|---|--|

You know here is used to check whether the reader envisages the implied dramatic consequences of the parents finding the obvious evidence of the wild party their son held at

home during their departure. The translation fails to render the dramaticallity of the possible situation, while something like *įsivaizduojat/ ar galit įsivaizduoti?* would not only render the intended meaning but also add some emotional force. The following example illustrates a felicitous solution for a similar situation:

> Dino had started going on about this uncle of his who worked on a pleasure cruiser up in the Lakes, on Windermere, and that maybe he could get us jobs up there over the summer. *You know?* That sounded cool.

(Burgess 2004: 319)

Dinas pradėjo pasakoti apie dėdę, kuris dirba kruiziniam laive Vindermere, ežerų Krašte – tikriausiai jis galėtų gauti mums darbo vasarai. * Kas gali būti geriau?

(Burgess 2004: 292)

Although here the marker is omitted as well, the emotional force it carries is adequately rendered by the rhetorical question. Regrettably, the occurrences of such a subtle translation were extremely rare. The majority of omission cases weakened the emotive force.

2. *Reference to shared knowledge.* *You know* serving this function was mostly translated by (*pats/kaip*) *žinai*, which succeed in rendering the meaning of the marker:

> ‘I miss you more than I ever have,’ Ruth told Allan, truthfully. ‘I should have made love to you before I left. I want to make love to you as soon as I’m back—I’m coming back the day after tomorrow, *you know*. You’re still meeting me at the airport, aren’t you?’

(Irving 1999: 473)

- Dar niekada nebuvaу tavęs taip pasiilgusi, - pasakė Ruta Alanui, ir tai buvo tiesa. – Turėjau su tavimi pasimylėti prieš išvykdama. Norėsiu su tavim mylėtis kai tik grįšiu – grįšiu poryt, kaip žinai. Juk pasitiksi mane oro uoste, ar ne?

(Irving 2002: 447)

Nevertheless, this is not the only alternative for rendering this function of the marker. In the following example the marker is translated by *juk*, which not only preserves the intended meaning, but also sounds very natural:

> ‘You better get to like her a little,’ Marion replied. ‘If Ted kicks you out—and I can’t imagine that he’ll want you to *stay*—you’re going to need a ride to the ferry at Orient Point. Ted’s not permitted to drive, *you know*—not that he would want to drive you, anyway.’

(Irving 1999: 132)

- Verčiau pasistenk bent kiek ją pamėgti, - atsakė Merion. – Jei Tedas tave išspirs – vargu ar jis norės, kad pasiliktum, - tau reikės, kad kas nors pavėžėtų į kelto priplauką Orient Pointe. Pats Tedas juk negali vairuoti... nors jis ir šiaip tavęs nevežtų.

(Irving 2002: 121)

3. *Appeal for understanding.* Instances where *you know* was used to appeal for understanding without explicitly saying something were translated by either *na žinai* or *pats(-i/-ys) supranti(-at)*. Both versions retain the intended meaning:

> ‘Can I have a look?’ I said.
‘What?’
‘*You know*.’ I nodded down the bed.

(Burgess 2004: 111)

- Gal galiu pasižiūrėti? – paklausiau.
- Ką?
- Na žinai. – Linktelėjau į lovos pusę.

(Burgess 2004: 105)

> She's still the best-looking girl in the school, and I still fancy her something rotten. And we never – you know. It'd be shame not to, wouldn't it?

(Burgess 2004: 323)

Ji vis dar gražiausia mokyklos mergina ir man žiauriai patinka. Ir mes dar niekada... patys suprantat. Būtų kvaila praleisti tokią progą, ar ne?

(Burgess 2004: 295)

4. *Acknowledge that the speaker is right*. Müller (2001) paraphrased *you know* serving this function as '*this is my opinion, don't you agree*' and noted that typical of it is speaker's confidence in his opinion. In the analyzed material slightly different cases were found. *You know* serving this function occurred mostly in antagonistic environment. The speaker is not only implying that he has a strong opinion and will not change it, rather, he declares his point of view as a categorical statement implying that no further discussion is expected and the hearer ought to simply accept it. Instances with the marker serving this function were translated diversely. The intended meaning was rendered best by strengthening the meaning of the statement by various auxiliary words. Consider the following examples:

> '[...] And don't you dare go with anyone else – I'll find out, you know. Goodbye'

(Burgess 2004: 59)

Ir nedrįsk susitikinėti su kita – vis tiek sužinosiu. Viso.

(Burgess 2004: 59)

> 'She still has feelings you know,' said Ben severely. 'Just because she's overweight...'

(Burgess 2004: 70)

- Juk ji turi jausmus, - griežtai pasakė Benas. – Ir vien dėl to, kad ji apkūni...

(Burgess 2004: 69)

In several cases the marker was translated by *supranti* which fails to render this function. In the following example it makes the sentence sound as an explanation, which softens the actual force of an argument.

> Then she added: "And *this* dildo is really not at all the same *type* of dildo as the dildo in my previous novel. Not every dildo is the same, you know."

(Irving 1999: 290)

Paskui pridūrė: - Beje, šis vibratorius visai ne toks – ne tokio *modelio*, - koks buvo ankstesniame romane. Suprantate, ne visi vibratoriai vienodi.

(Irving 2002: 268)

Ruth, the famous writer is receiving some pushy criticism from one of her readers that all her novels are alike. After several attempts to explain the opposite, she gradually gets annoyed at the flimsy and impertinent reproaches. Consequently, her remark '*not every dildo is the same*' is intended as an argument rather than enlightenment. What is lost in the translation is Ruth's negative emotions, she sounds too patient and polite. The assertiveness could be achieved by using imperative *žinokit* or *juk/gi*.

Another group of examples attributed to this function can be described as attempts to convince the hearer in the truth or reliability of the speaker's words. Speaker's confidence in his own opinion or words is not necessarily present in such cases. He simply has some motivation for making the hearer to believe him. Consider the following examples:

- > 'I wouldn't really have booted you out, you know,' I told. (Burgess 2004: 110) - Iš tikro nebūčiau tavęs palietęs, * - pasakiau jai. (Burgess 2004: 104)
- > 'I can easily find someone who will, you know. You're not the only fish in the sea.' (Burgess 2004: 51) - Lengvai galiu rasti kitą, kuri taip nesilaužys *. Nemanyk, kad tu vienintelė pana. (Burgess 2004: 53)

Both examples illustrate omission, which was commonly used for translating similar instances. Although, the loss is not very great, the idea of persuasion remains faintly present in the translation. Similarly to the examples discussed above, imperative *žinok* could help achieve greater correspondence at the emotional level.

5. *Introducing an explanation (amplification, clarification)* was the most frequent function of *you know* in the analyzed material. Usually the marker was translated by *supranti* which is quite suitable, especially when supplemented by *na* (*na, supranti* also *na, žinai*), or *na* alone. Consider the following examples:

- > '... I can *maintain* a pool, of course. I can do the vacuuming and keep the chemicals in balance. You know, so the water doesn't get cloudy—or your skin doesn't turn green, or something.' (Irving 1999: 211) - ... Be abejo, galėčiau baseiną *prižiūrėti*. Valyti jį siurbliu ir tinkamai subalansuoti chemikalus. Suprantate, kad nesidrumstų vanduo – arba kad nepažaliuotų oda ir panašiai. (Irving 2002: 197)
- > 'How do you say, 'He doesn't have sex'?' Ruth asked the boy. 'You know, like you,' she added. (Irving 1999: 472) - O kaip jūsiškai būtų: „Jis nesantykiauja“? – paklausė Ruta vaikinuko. – Na, supranti, kaip ir tu, - pridūrė ji. (Irving 2002: 446)
- > Perhaps there was some secret way of opening it up. Open sesame! You know. Or a button or a flap or something. Whatever. (Burgess 2004: 217-8) Gal yra koks paslaptingas būdas jai atidaryti? Sezamai, atsiverk! Na žinot. Mygtukas, rankenėlė ar kas nors. Nesvarbu. (Burgess 2004: 201)

In several instances, including the following example, the function of the marker was misinterpreted and, as a result, the original meaning was altered. Although the aftermath of this particular case is not detrimental, it illustrates the importance of context in interpreting discourse markers:

- > 'It was after Ruth was born, before Marion said anything to me,' Ted continued. 'I mean, she hadn't said a *word*—not one word about the accident. But one day, after Ruth was born, Marion just walked into my workroom—you know, she never went anywhere near my workroom—and she said to me: 'How could you have let me see Timmy's leg? How *could* you?' (Irving 1999: 207) - Tik po Rutos gimimo Merion pradėjo su manimi kalbėti, - toliau pasakojo Tedas. – Turiu galvoje, kad ji anksčiau neištarė *nė žodžio* – nė vieno žodžio apie avariją. Tačiau kartą kai Ruta jau buvo gimusi, Merion paprasčiausiai įėjo į mano darbo kambarį... juk žinai, ji išvis prie jo nesiartindavo... ir pasakė: „Kaip tu galėjai leisti man pamatyti Timio koją? Kaip *galėjai*?“ (Irving 2002: 192)

The translation seems irreproachable, except that Eddie, whom this narrative is addressed to, does not know that Merion ‘*never went anywhere near Ted’s workroom*’. Therefore, translators should be very attentive and invoke context in deciding which of the possible interpretations is intended.

The cases of omission were quite frequent in translating this function. Usually, the losses were minimal as in the first example below. But the second and third examples (both from *Doing it*) illustrate unfaithful representation of style, namely the translated utterances sound more fluent:

<p>> ‘Maybe we could play a little round-robin,’ Scott suggested. ‘<i>You know</i>, the three of us. You play your father, your father plays me, then I play you . . .’</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 1999: 336)</p>	<p>- Gal galėtume pažaisti paeiliui? – pasiūlė Skotas. – * Visi trys. Jūs su tėvu, jūsų tėvas su manimi, paskui aš su jumis...</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving: 312)</p>
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<p>> ‘Oh, I thought it was Dad’ he said, and he looked loads more cheerful, the little prick. Because, <i>you know</i>, it’s bad enough to have your mum sobbing hysterically outside your door – but your dad? Sounding like your mum? Arghhh!</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 226)</p>	<p>- O aš pamaniau, kad ten tėtis, - pasakė neabejotinai apsidžiauęs mažas šiknius. * Jau blogai, kai tau už durų isteriškai rauda mama – bet tėvas? Aaaaa!</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 208)</p>
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<p>> But I was really flattered, <i>you know</i> – that he’d spoken to me.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 300)</p>	<p>Tačiau man labai paglostė savimeilę, * kad jis man išsipasakojo.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 275)</p>
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Textual functions.

1. *Marking lexical or content search* was the most frequent textual function of *you know* in the analyzed material. The function was properly rendered only by *na žinai*, while other alternatives *patys suprantat/ žinot* implied reference to shared knowledge, like in the following example (2nd occurrence of *you know*):

<p>> Apart from getting a lot too much, there’s another reason. I mean, girls my own age. <i>You know</i>? Someone I could really fall for. I mean, the sex with Ali is great but it’s not like the real thing, is it? It’s just porn with a pulse. I want to... <i>you know</i>. Well. I want to fall in love.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 209)</p>	<p>Ir ne tik todėl, kad man jau viskas lenda per gerklę. Yra ir kita priežastis. Mano amžiaus merginos. <i>Suprantat</i>? Kas nors, su kuo galėčiau pasikalbėti. Ką galėčiau įsimylėti. Seksas su Ele nuostabus, bet tai nėra tikra. Tai tik porno su pulsu. O aš noriu... <i>patys žinot</i>. Taip. Aš noriu įsimylėti.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 194)</p>
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In the current example *you know* marks lexical search. Suspension points and two discourse markers in a row signal the moment of hesitation while the speaker is trying to think of the suitable expression for his thoughts. Apparently, the character tries to avoid the word *love*, which makes him feel uncomfortable. Although he finally settles on *love*, the preceding hesitation

implies uncertainty. In the translated utterance these emotional nuances are not so obvious since *patys žinot* invites to simply remember a widely known fact.

Considering the fact that pause-filling is less practiced in Lithuanian if compared to English, the omission of *you know* marking lexical or content search seems a justifiable strategy. Nevertheless, the strategy should be applied carefully as discourse markers in fiction acquire some additional functions, for example, signal character's tentativeness. The following example illustrates the reasonable case of omission, as the pause still remains visible in the translation:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>> 'You are chucking me, aren't you!
'No. But. . .'
'What?'
'It's just that, <i>you know</i> ... I really thought you wouldn't want to know.'</p> | <p>- Vis dėlto tu <i>palieki</i> mane!
- Ne. Bet...
- Kas?
- Tiesiog *... Maniau, kad nenorėsi nieko girdėti.</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 169)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 158)</p> |

2. *Quotative you know*. Only two instances of this function were found in the analyzed material. Once the marker was misunderstood and translated by *suprantate*. While in the second similar instance it was omitted, which seems a far better solution:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> 'OK, if that's the way it's going to be, but I don't like it,' I told them. I could see Mum glare at me as if to say, <i>you know</i> – like, what's it got to do with anything whether you like it or not? 'But I still want to go with my dad. OK?'</p> | <p>- Gerai, jei taip jau turi būti, bet man tai nepatinka, - pasakiau jiems. Mačiau, kaip mama piktai į mane žiūri – atseit * koks skirtumas, ar tau patinka, ar ne. – Bet vis tiek noriu išeiti su tėčiu. Aišku?</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 230)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 211)</p> |

In the source text the quoted material is signaled by three different means: *as if to say*, *you know*, *like*. The function of the marker is satisfactorily rendered by *atseit*, thus the intended function remains explicitly marked. Besides, in Lithuanian signaling quotation by several markers concurrently may indeed sound unnaturally over-redundant, therefore omission is understandable.

3.2.2. I mean

Subjective functions.

1. *Reformulation.* Instances of *I mean* being used for reformulation of the preceding discourse were most common in the analyzed material. The function of the marker was properly rendered by *turiu galvoje/ noriu pasakyti/ na*. Consider the examples:

> ‘Oh, you’ll meet him—you’ll see,’ Ruth had told her. ‘He’s also a gentleman.’ ‘He’s *old* enough to be,’ Hannah had replied. ‘*I mean*, he’s the right generation for gentlemanly behavior.’ (Irving 1999: 275)

- Kai susipažinsi - suprasi, - atsakė Ruta. – Be to, jis džentelmenas.
- Taigi, pakankamai *senas*, kad būtų džentelmenas, - tarė Hana. – *Turiu galvoje*, kad jis iš gerai išauklėtų vyrų kartos. (Irving 2002: 253)

> ‘Wow,’ he breathed. ‘Susan! I never knew. *I mean* - you look amazing. You don’t normally look gorgeous. What have you done to yourself?’ (Burgess 2004: 193)

- Oho, sušnopavo jis. – Sjuzana! Nežinojau... *Noriu pasakyti* – atrodai nuostabiai. Paprastai neatrodai taip gražiai. Ką tu sau padarei? (Burgess 2004: 180)

Nearly half of *I mean* signaling reformulation were omitted. Sometimes the losses were insignificant, like in the following example, where reformulation is perceivable without any extra signaling:

> ‘I’m just trying to find a way of doing this more often,’ she said, all huffy. ‘Really?’ ‘You’re so paranoid!’ ‘You just sound ... *I mean*, I thought we’d agreed it was the right thing to be careful and not see too much of each other.’ (Burgess 2004: 165)

- Aš tik noriu dažniau tai daryti, - atsakė ji įsižeidusi.
- Tikrai?
- Tu paranojikas!
- Tiesiog pati sakei... * Maniau, mudu susitarėm, kad bus geriausia saugotis ir nesimatyti pernelyg dažnai. (Burgess 2004: 154)

Nevertheless, in some instances omission caused some discrepancy between the meaning in the source and target texts:

> It’s not that his eating habits, *I mean* his table manners, embarrass me; it’s more that I find the way he eats repellent. (Irving 1999: 399)

Negaliu sakyti, kad jo valgymo įpročiai, * jo elgesys prie stalo mane trikdo; tiesiog tai, kaip jis valgo, kelia man pasibjaurėjimą. (Irving 2002: 374-5)

In the source text Ruth reformulates her first expression *eating habits* by *table manners*, which, apparently, is a more precise wording for her thoughts. In the target text reformulation is not signaled by any means, therefore it seems that Ruth is embarrassed by both, his eating habits and his table manners. Consequently, Lithuanian translation implies a more negative evaluation of the person than the English one.

3. The analyzed material provided with several examples of *I mean expressing emphasis*. The function was properly translated by *aš rimtai/ iš tikrujų*. The following example illustrates the most subtle rendering of the intended emphasis:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> “I said he was odd,” Ruth told her. “Odd and sweet, and delicate. And he’s devoted to my mother. <u>I mean</u>, he would marry her tomorrow!”</p> | <p>- Sakiau, kad jis keistas, - pasakė Ruta. – Keistas ir mielas, ir delikatus. Ir <i>atsidavęs</i> mano motinai. Sutiktų ją vesti <u>nors</u> ir <i>rytoj!</i></p> |
| <p>(Irving 1999: 316)</p> | <p>(Irving 2002: 293)</p> |

Several cases of omission were present as well. All of them contain some loss - the emphasis is not so manifestly expressed if compared to the source text. If in the following example, *sutinku* was additionally strengthened by, for instance, *tikrai* (*sutinku, tikrai.*), the emphasis would be more evident:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> ‘You are chucking me, aren't you!’
‘No. But. . .’
‘What?’
‘It's just that, you know ... I really thought you wouldn't want to know.’
‘What do you think I am? Some sort of arse? No, if that's how you feel, sure. <u>I mean</u>, of course.</p> | <p>- Vis dėlto tu <i>palieki</i> mane!
- Ne. Bet...
- Kas?
- Tiesiog... Maniau, kad nenorėsi nieko girdėti.
- Kuo tu mane laikai? Kokių nors šiknių?
Ne, jei tu taip galvoji, aš tave palaikau. *
Sutinku.</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 169)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 158)</p> |

4. All instances of *I mean expressing evaluation or judgment* were translated properly i.e. the cases of omission were reasonably grounded and the translated cases not only rendered the intended meaning but also sounded natural. Consider the following examples:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>> Like she'd had an abortion once, and that had just happened. <u>I mean</u>, how's that? She didn't want it, her boyfriend didn't want it, so it went, like she had no choice.</p> | <p>Kartą ji pasidarė abortą, nes taip jau nutiko. *
Kaip tai? Ji nenorėjo vaiko, jos draugas nenorėjo, ir ji pasidarė – atseit, nėra kitos išeities.</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 253)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 232)</p> |
| <p>> She started using this little girlie voice, it drives me mad.
‘Would oo like Ali to make oo a cuppa tea, nice Bennie?’ she goes. <u>I mean</u> - she's in her twenties! It gives me the creeps.</p> | <p>Netgi pradėjo šnekėti plonu mergaitišku balsu, kuris mane varo iš proto.
- Gal nori, kad Elytė Beniukui išvirtų arbatytės? – cypia ji. <u>Dėl Dievo</u>, jai jau greit trisdešimt! Man net šiurpas per nugarą eina.</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 297)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 272)</p> |

Interactional functions.

1. *I mean indicating cause* in the sense “*I’m saying this because*” was translated very diversely, depending on a situation described (e.g. *sutinku, pagalvok pats, na, galų gale, o, juk,*

noriu pasakyti, etc.). Lithuanian translation of all the instances sounded natural and properly rendered the meaning carried by the marker. Several of them are illustrated below:

> So by the time we had another chance I was scared as he was. *I mean*, if it went wrong again, what then? Maybe he'd never speak to me again! Maybe he'd have a nervous breakdown.

(Burgess 2004: 310)

Todėl kai nusprendėm pabandyti dar kartą, aš bijojau ne mažiau už jį. *Q* jei ir vėl nepasiseks, kas tada? Gal jis išvis daugiau su manim nekalbės. Gal jį išstiks nervų priepuolis.

(Burgess 2004: 283)

> ‘Why do you have to be so suspicious?’
‘Aren’t you suspicious?’
‘No,’ said Jackie, in an offended voice. ‘*I mean*, he's making all the right noises, isn't he? That was the deal, wasn't it?’

(Burgess 2004: 174)

- Kodėl tu visada tokia įtari?
- O tu ne?
- Ne, - įsižeidusi paneigė Džekė. – *Juk* jis viską padarė kaip reikia, ar ne? Taip buvo tartasi.

(Burgess 2004: 163)

Cases of omission were also quite frequent in dealing with the translation of this function but neither of them caused significant losses. Consider several examples:

> Jonathon’s different again. He's filthy, he's always been filthy, but it's just a show. *I mean*, he never says a word about him and Debs. Not a word. He's very discreet, really.

(Burgess 2004: 213)

Džonatanas vėl kitoks. Jis nešvankus, visad toks buvo, bet tai tik kaukė. * Jis nepasakoja nė žodžio apie save su Debe. Nė žodžio. Jis labai uždaras.

(Burgess 2004: 198)

> ‘You told her we were lovers. Is that it?’
Ruth asked Wim.
‘Well, weren’t we—in a way?’ Wim replied slyly. ‘*I mean*, we slept in the same bed together. You let me do certain things . . .’

(Irving 1999: 608)

- Tu jai pasakei, kad mes buvome meilužiai, ar ne? – paklausė Ruta Vimo.
- Na... tam tikra prasme *juk* ir buvome? – gudravo Vimas. – * Miegojome vienoje lovoje. Jūs leidote man kai ką daryti...

(Irving 2002: 578)

2. The most common use of *I mean* in the analyzed material was to *make the preceding utterance more precise or explicit*. Usually the marker was translated by *turiu galvoje(omenyje)/na/ noriu pasakyti (paklausti)* with several cases of a more creative treatment exemplified below:

> ‘This is a difficult thing for a father to explain to his daughter, Ruthie. *But*. . . if nakedness—*I mean* the *feeling* of nakedness—is what a nude must convey, there is no nakedness that compares to what it feels like to be naked in front of someone for the first time.’

(Irving 1999: 42)

- Vargu ar tėvas gali tai paaiškinti savo dukteriai, Ruti. *Bet*... jeigu nuogumas – *būtent* nuogumo *pojūtis* – yra tai, ką aktas turi perteikti, tai joks nuogumas negali prilygti apsinuoginimui prieš ką nors pirmą kartą.

(Irving 2002: 34)

> ‘Did she have to *say* she was divorced?’
Hannah asked. ‘*I mean*, who couldn’t tell she was divorced?’

(Irving 1999: 647)

- Ar dar reikėjo *sakyti*, kad išsiskyrusi? – tarė Hana. – *juk* ir taip visiems aišku!

(Irving 2002: 616)

What concerns a more traditional treatment mentioned above, it succeeds in rendering the intended meaning, but in quite a number of cases does not sound natural. Especially this applies to instances when the marker is used in adjacent sentences, like in the following example:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>> ‘I don’t know. How long would it take?’
Mrs. Mountsier asked. ‘Or which of us would you want to draw first? <i>I mean</i> separately. <i>I mean</i>, after you’ve drawn us together.’</p> | <p>- Nežinau. Kiek laiko tai užimtų? – pasidomėjo ponia Muntsjė. – Ir kurią norėtumėte piešti pirma? <i>Turiu galvoje</i>, kai piešite atskirai. <i>Norėjau pasakyti</i>, kai jau būsite nupiešęs mus kartu.</p> |
| <p>(Irving 1999: 167)</p> | <p>(Irving 2002: 153)</p> |

The strategy of omission was applied to nearly half of the instances of the marker serving this function. Each separate case of omission can be justified in the sense that the relation marked by the marker remains easily perceptible without any additional signaling. But the overall effect of frequent application of omission caused unfaithful representation of style, especially this refers to the translation of *Doing it*.

3. ‘*I’m implying more than I’m saying*’ – *I mean* acquires such meaning when used in various phrases containing a second person pronoun (e.g. *you know what I mean*). Several such instances (6) were present in the analyzed material as well. Some of them were translated by the equivalent Lithuanian phrase, thus the intended meaning was properly rendered and the translation sounded natural:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> Everything was just like normal. Socks in the drawer, breakfast on the table. No, that sounds bad, but <i>you know what I mean</i>.</p> | <p>Viskas buvo kaip paprastai. Švarios kojinių stalčiuose, pusryčiai ant stalo. Ne geriausias pavyzdys, bet <i>suprantat ką noriu pasakyti</i>.</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 225)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 207)</p> |

When the phrase was followed by a question-mark, it was translated either by *suprantat?*, which is fairly suitable, and once by *ar ne?*, which fails to render the implication encoded in the English phrase. Consider:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> And so she got what she wanted, as usual. I ought to just say no, but somehow ... I mean, she's Miss, <i>you know what I mean?</i>’</p> | <p>Ir gavo ko norėjusi, kaip visada. Turėjau atsisakyti, bet kažkaip... Galų gale ji mano mokytoja, <i>ar ne?</i></p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 209)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 194)</p> |

Textual functions. *I mean* may be used for mistake *editing* or *self-repair*. Instances with *I mean* serving this function were not very frequent and nearly all of them were treated properly in the process of translation, with only one instance of misinterpretation. The current function of the marker was appropriately rendered by *noriu pasakyti/ turiu galvoje* and the most natural *tai yra*.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> ‘Come on, let's make a tart, <i>I mean</i> a start,’ she said.</p> | <p>- Eime, pradėsim puoštis. <i>Tai yra</i> ruoštis, - pasakė ji [...]</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 49)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 51)</p> |

The single instance of omission is reasoned and does not cause any visible losses:

- > His mother rubbed her eyes. 'I should have spoken to you ages ago. I didn't know ... I mean, I wasn't sure if you'd seen us.'
- (Burgess 2004: 184)
- Jau seniai turėjau su tavim pasikalbėti. Aš nežinojau... * nebuvo tikra, ar mus matei.
- (Burgess 2004: 172)

Finally, there was one case of misinterpretation:

- > Dino began, 'My girl ... I mean, this girl did that and walked out,' he said. 'Just now. Did you see her?'
- (Burgess 2004: 99)
- Mano mergina, - pradėjo Dinas. – Supranti, ji privėmė ir išėjo, - pasakė jis. – Ką tik. Matei ją?
- (Burgess 2004: 93)

Dino started his utterance by pronouncing *my girl*, then after a second thought he decided to conceal his romantic relationships in the case this other girl would be interested in him. Therefore, he replaced *my girl* by *this girl* implying that he has nothing in common with her. Due to the misinterpretation of the marker, the target text alters the intended meaning. Firstly Dino makes no secret of his dating and *supranti* here sounds as a complaint (which is fairly possible considering the context).

3.2.3. Well

Subjective functions.

1. *Well preceding indirect answers.* *Well* has a capacity of indicating that the subsequent utterance is not a direct or complete answer to questions or requests. The current function of *well* was the most frequent subjective function in the analyzed material. Mostly it was translated by *na*, which succeeds in rendering a moment of hesitation or uncertainty detectable in the source text and implies lack of straightforwardness. Consider the following examples:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>> Ruth had said: 'But Mommy's sadder.'
'<i>Well</i> . . . yes,' Ted had said.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 1999: 36)</p> | <p>Ruta tada tarė:
- Bet mamytė dar liūdnesnė.
- <i>Na</i>... taip, - pasakė Tedas.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 2002: 28)</p> |
| <p>> 'You seem <i>different</i>, somehow,' Allan told her.
'<i>Well</i>. I'm married to you, Allan,' Ruth replied.
'<i>That's</i> different, isn't it?'</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 1999: 508)</p> | <p>- Atrodai pasikeitusi, <i>kitokia</i>, - pasakė Alanas.
- <i>Na</i>... Aš ištekėjau už tavęs, Alanai, - tarė Ruta. – <i>Tai</i> ir yra pokytis, argi ne?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 2002: 483)</p> |

In some instances the marker was translated by *juk*, which less explicitly marks indirectness of the utterance if compared to *na*. Nevertheless, indirectness in such cases was evident from the context and did not need additional signaling, thus *juk* was useful only in rendering the conversational style of the utterance and contributing to the naturalness of the conversation. Consider the following example:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> 'Have you checked your mail today?'
'What, on the PC, no, why?'
'No, snail mail. Letters.'
'<i>Well</i>, it's Sunday, isn't it?'
'Oh, right!'</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 240-1)</p> | <p>- Ar šiandien jau tikrinai paštą?
- Kompe? Ne. O ką?
- Ne, normalų paštą. Laiškus.
- <i>Juk</i> šiandien sekmdienis, ar ne?
- Tiesa!</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 220)</p> |
|---|---|

Finally, the marker was translated by *ka gi* twice, which, similarly to *juk*, does not explicitly mark indirectness; rather it signals some sort of summarizing or making a conclusion. Nevertheless, in the instances found *ka gi* sounded natural and, due to easily perceptible indirectness, caused no losses:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> 'I can't see the road, Daddy,' Ruth told him.
'<i>Well</i>. There's no place to pull over, is there?' her father asked her. 'You'll just have to keep going, won't you?'</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 1999: 358)</p> | <p>- Aš nematau kelio, tėti, - pasakė Ruta.
- <i>Ka gi</i>. Sustoti tikriausiai nėra kur? – paklausė tėvas. – Teks važiuoti toliau, ar ne?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 2002: 333)</p> |
|---|---|

However, the most common strategy for translating this function of the marker was omission. Some of the instances cause minimal losses as the indirectness is signaled by other means and additional signaling would sound over-redundant, like in the following example:

> ‘*Well*, yes of course I fancy her, I was kissing her, wasn’t I?’ On the tip of his tongue were the words, ‘But that doesn’t mean...’ But somehow they couldn’t emerge.

(Burgess 2004: 72)

- „* Aišku, ji man patinka, jei bučiavau, ar ne? – Jam ant liežuvio galo jau sukosi žodžiai. – Bet tai dar nereiškia, kad...“ Tačiau taip ir liko neištarti.

(Burgess 2004: 70)

Indirectness is implied by a tentative remark *jei jau bučiavau, ar ne* and explicitly mentioned by the narrative voice, thus it is easily perceptible without additional signaling. Besides a signal of indirectness would mismatch *aišku*, which implies certainty, thus the utterance would sound unnatural. Consequently, similar cases of omission are justifiable. Nevertheless, there was quite a number of instances where the application of the strategy caused some notional or stylistic discrepancy between source and target texts. Consider the following example:

> ‘What did Eddie say about squash?’ Dot repeated.

‘*Well*, you tell me,’ Minty said.

(Irving 1999: 55)

- Ką Edis sakė apie skvošą? – pakartojo Dot.

- * Ką aš žinau! – tarė Mėtinis.

(Irving 2002: 47)

The proposition containing *well* was modified into a straightforward exclamation in the target text, which fails to render the shades of meaning encoded in the original wording. At this stage of the narrative Eddie’s parents, namely their unique communicative style, is described: “*they never listened to each other. A tender politeness passed between them; the mom would allow the dad to speak, at length, and then it was the mom’s turn — almost always on an unrelated subject*” (Irving 1999: 51). Naturally, the parents were not attentively listening to their son as well. When later they remembered that Eddie had been telling something about squash, they kept asking each other what exactly he was saying. The passage is described comically, extending the description of the unique phenomenon of communication, and a straightforward exclamation is out of character with the context.

2. *Contributing an opinion* – *well* here introduces speaker’s own opinion. The function was comparatively rare in the analyzed material and in all instances the strategy of omission was applied. It must be admitted that it caused no difficulty in interpreting the utterance as an opinion, it was evident without marking. Therefore, the adoption of the strategy is reasoned. Consider the following example:

> ‘Do you love her?’

‘You’re not listening.’

‘But do you love her?’

‘Yes.’

‘*Well*, that’s not fair, is it?’

‘Dino, will you listen?’ Dino took a breath and picked up his sandwich. ‘All right, then.’

(Burgess 2004: 265)

- Tu ją myli?

- Tu nesiklausai...

- Bet ar tu ją myli?

- Taip.

- * Tai nesažiningą, ar ne?

- Dinai, tu paklausysi, ar ne?

Dinas giliai įkvėpė ir paėmė sumuštinį.

- Gerai, klausau.

(Burgess 2004: 241)

Interactional functions – *well* as a mitigator of confrontation. *Well* has a capacity of making the subsequent utterance less face-threatening. Such uses of *well* were present in the analyzed material and mostly were translated by *na*, which is rather suitable for mitigation. It implies a moment of hesitation, which may also be interpreted as striving to find a way of expressing something unpleasant or shocking in a more delicate way. Consider the following examples:

<p>> ‘<u>Well</u>.’ Ruth was aware that Karl and Melissa were the ‘virtual strangers’ in this case. ‘Eddie O’Hare was my mother’s lover,’ she announced. (Irving 1999: 302)</p>	<p>- <u>Na</u>... – Ruta suprato, kad Karlas ir Melisa šiuo atveju ir yra „visiškai svetimi žmonės“. – Edis O’Hara buvo mano motinos meilužis, - pareiškė ji. (Irving 2002: 280)</p>
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<p>> By the time he got up to date, Jon was horrified. ‘How awful! What an old bitch! What a cow!’ ‘<u>Well</u>, not a cow, not that bad, not really...’ (Burgess 2004: 293)</p>	<p>Kai pasakojimas pasiekė šias dienas, Džonas paklaiko. - Siaubas! Kalė! Sena karvė! - <u>Na</u>, ne karvė, ne taip viskas ir blogai... (Burgess 2004: 268)</p>
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The strategy of omission was applied to nearly half of the instances of *well* as a mitigator. The majority of such instances can be justified on the grounds described earlier, i.e. avoidance of redundancy. Nevertheless, in some cases the elimination of mitigation causes inadequate harshness, lack of empathy, thus the original meaning is twisted. Consider the following example, where not only the mitigating marker was omitted but also the chosen expression was too forthright:

<p>> ‘[...] Just because I’m a teacher and you’re a student doesn’t change how I feel about you.’ ‘It’s not that, it’s...’ And then I bit the bullet. ‘It’s... <u>well</u>, It’s that I don’t think I love you.’ (Burgess 2004: 251)</p>	<p>- [...] Tai, kad aš mokytoja, o tu mokinys, nekeičia mano jausmų tau. - Tai ne... – Ir tada ryžausi. – Tiesiog... * Tiesiog aš tavęs nemyliu. (Burgess 2004: 229-30)</p>
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Textual functions of *I mean* were the most frequent in the analyzed material.

1. *Searching for the right phrase*. In a number of instances *well* indicating search was adequately translated by *na*, which effectively renders the moment of hesitation or difficulty to find the right expression of one’s thoughts. Besides it is common to the Lithuanian language, thus the translation sounds natural. Consider the following examples:

<p>> ‘Uh . . .’ he began, ‘I imagine that your mother must make peace with herself before she can . . . uh, <u>well</u>, re-enter your life.’ Eddie paused—as if he hoped that the taxi had already arrived at the Stanhope. (Irving 1999: 312)</p>	<p>- E... – sumykė Edis, - manau, kad tavo motina pirmiausia turi susitaikinti su savimi, tik tada galės... e... <u>na</u>, grįžti į tavo gyvenimą. – Edis nutilo – tarytum tikėjosi, kad taksi jau privažiavo „Stanhopo“ viešbutį. (Irving 2002: 289)</p>
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<p>> Are there men the prostitute says no to? There <i>must</i> be! Prostitutes can’t be totally indifferent to . . . <u>well</u>, the <i>details</i> of men. (Irving 1999: 398)</p>	<p>Ar yra vyrų, kuriems prostitutė sako „ne“? <i>Turėtų</i> būti. Vargu ar prostitutės visiškai abejingos... <u>na</u>, kai kurioms vyrų <i>dalims</i>. (Irving 2002: 374)</p>
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In some cases the marker was treated differently, but, apparently, because the function of the marker was misinterpreted. In the following example *žinot kodėl?* fails to indicate search; rather it sounds as means for attracting attention, implying that something surprising is following. Actually the speaker only contemplates seeing a doctor and tries to convince himself in the advantage of doing so, which is not an easy thing to do. Therefore his *it's going to work, because* is followed by a pause, by the marker to fill the gap while he is searching for an argument, which is finally followed by *I suppose* and thus weakened as doubtful. Consequently, his utterance is marked by uncertainty and hesitation which is missing in the target text.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> But it's going to work, because – <i>well</i>.
Because I believe in doctors, I suppose.
(Burgess 2004: 301)</p> | <p>Bet man tai padės. <i>Žinot, kodėl?</i> Todėl, kad aš tikiu daktarais.
(Burgess 2004: 276)</p> |
|---|---|

Naturally, the strategy of omission was also applied. The majority of its application was fairly reasonable and only several cases sounded too fluent and modified the intended effect, like in the following example:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> Or swimming in Fine Old Wine or something like that. Just rich and filling up all your senses and <i>well</i> – gorgeous and thick and loads of it.
(Burgess 2004: 94)</p> | <p>Arba maudymasis senam geram vyne. Svaigus, užvaldantis visus pojūčius, * nuostabus, klampus ir begalinis.
(Burgess 2004: 90)</p> |
| <p>> And he's so grateful for it. You can read Dino like a book, he's so open. It makes you feel that... <i>well</i>, he appreciates you.
(Burgess 2004: 246)</p> | <p>Be to, jis buvo dėkingas. Dina gali skaityti tarsi knygą, jis toks atviras. Jautei... * kad jis tau dėkingas.
(Burgess 2004: 226)</p> |

2. *Well* indicating *rephrasing/ correcting* was translated by *na/ tiksliau/ bent jau* – all capable of expressing the function. Consider the examples:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> 'A ride!' cried Mendelssohn. 'Yes, of course! No problem! You live in Sagaponack, don't you? I'll take you myself! <i>Well</i>. . . I'll have to call my wife. She may be shopping, but not for long. You see, <i>my</i> car is in the shop.'
(Irving 1999: 143)</p> | <p>- Kad parvežtų namo! – sušuko Mendelsonas. – Taip, žinoma! Būtinai! Berods gyvenate Sagaponake? Aš pats jus parvešiu! <i>Na</i>... reikės paskambinti žmonai. Ji gali važinėti po parduotuves, bet neilgai. Suprantate, <i>mano</i> automobilis dabar garaže, remontuojamas.
(Irving 2002: 131)</p> |
| <p>> Dino's the worst. He's always going on about Jackie - <i>Well</i>, he used to, anyway.
(Burgess 2004: 213)</p> | <p>Dinas blogiausias iš visų. Jis nenutildamas pliuropia apie Džekę – <i>tiksliau</i>, pliuropė.
(Burgess 2004: 197)</p> |
| <p>> Not a good start. But they went back to Ben's place and there he spilled the beans. He went through the whole thing – <i>well</i>, quite a lot of it anyway – from beginning to end.
(Burgess 2004: 292)</p> | <p>Ne kažin kokia pradžia. Tačiau nuėjus pas Džoną jam atsirišo liežuvis. Papasakojo viską – <i>bent jau</i> didžiąją dalį – nuo pradžios iki galo.
(Burgess 2004: 268)</p> |

All instances of omission, including the following, may be considered well reasoned:

- > 'I... have this lump. *Well*, this bump.' - Aš... aš turiu auglį... * gumbą...
(Burgess 2004: 303) (Burgess 2004: 278)

3. *Quotative well* functions as a frame indicating the beginning of direct speech, parallel to the quotation marks in writing. All such instances were rightly omitted in the translation. Firstly, because in all the instances the quoted material was explicitly marked by other means, not only *well*. Secondly, it is not typical for the Lithuanian language to begin the quoted material by some additional marking. Consider the following examples:

- > Jackie decided to take it at face value and be outraged. '*Well*, how could she do that to your dad? And to you! In your own house! [...]'
(Burgess 2004: 172) Džekė nusprendė prisiminti tikrąsias vertybes ir įtūžo.
- * Kaip ji taip galėjo pasielgti su tavo tėčiu? Ir su tavim! Jūsų namuose! [...]
(Burgess 2004: 161)

- > I suppose I could say, *Well*, maybe this'll teach her a lesson, maybe she won't do the same thing next time and all that.
(Burgess 2004: 318-9) Tikriausiai galėčiau pasakyti – * gal tai ją pamokys, daugiau ji nekartos tos pačios klaidos ir panašiai.
(Burgess 2004: 291)

4. *Conclusive well* was rather common in the material analyzed. The major part of the instances was translated by *na/ ką gi*. *Na* was suitable in cases where the conclusive aspect of an utterance was obvious without additional marking, like in the following example:

- 'Oh, *that*,' Ruth said. She'd expected *that*. When she wrote about abortion, not having had an abortion, she got angry letters from people who *had* had abortions; when she wrote about childbirth, not having had a child—or when she wrote about divorce, not having been divorced (*or* married) . . . *well*, there were always *those* letters.
(Irving 1999: 389) - A, *tai*, - pasakė Ruta. *Tai* ji buvo numačiusi. Kai rašė apie abortus, pati niekada nenutraukusi nėštumo, gavo piktų laiškų nuo *tai patyrusių*; kai rašė apie gimdymą, pati niekada negimdžiusi – arba apie skyrybas, pati neišsiskyrusi (ir neištekėjusi)... *na, tokių* laiškų būdavo.
(Irving 2002: 364)

Nevertheless, *ką gi* as well as less frequent *taigi* and *vadinasi* are more adequate equivalents for the present function of *well*. For instance, in the following example *ką gi* successfully renders the intended summarizing which at the same time indicates closing of the topic:

- The sexual detail, the boy's gloomy foreknowledge that the summer will end—and with it his love affair with a woman who means everything to him (while he believes he means much less to her)—and the relentless *anticipation* of sex, which is almost as thrilling as the act itself . . . *well*, these elements in Eddie's stories rang true. (Irving 1999: 227) Intymios smulkmenos, niūrūs šešiolikmečio pamąstymai, kad vasara pasibaigs – o kartu ir jo meilės ryšys su moterimi, kuri jam – viskas (nors vaikinas įsitikinęs, kad *jai* jis reiškia ne tiek jau daug), - ir dar tas nepaliaujamas lytinių santykių *laukimas*, beveik toks pat jaudinantis, kaip ir pats meilės aktas... *ką gi*, visa tai Edžio istorijose atrodys tikra. (Irving 2002: 211)

There were several cases of different treatment of the marker: *bet dabar, ir, o*. Such choices may be considered successful as well, because the intended conclusive aspect of the utterances remained present and such treatment added to the naturalness of the Lithuanian wording. Consider several instances:

<p>> Can you believe him? ‘You’re not the only fish in the sea.’ Who does he think he is? And me! Letting him. <i>Well</i>, that’s it. If he thinks I’m going to go to bed with him at his ridiculous party, he’s living on another planet. (Burgess 2004: 53)</p>	<p>Tik pamanyk! „Lengvai rasiu kitą, kuri taip nesilaužys“. Kuo jis save laiko? O aš irgi gera. Kad jam leidau. <i>Bet dabar</i> viskas. Jei jis mano, kad miegosiu su juo per jo kvailą vakarėlį, tai gyvena kitoje planetoje. (Burgess 2004: 54)</p>
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<p>> ‘But you did, didn’t you? You lucky, lucky bastard! God!’ Despite himself, Ben smiled. ‘<i>Well</i>, I’m paying for it now.’ (Burgess 2004: 292-3)</p>	<p>- Bet taip ir buvo, ar ne? Eina šikt, kaip tau nuskilo! Po velnių! Nepaisant visko, Benas nusišypsojo. - <i>Ir</i> dabar už tai moku. (Burgess 2004: 268)</p>
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The instances of omission were quite rare and it must be acknowledged that the application of the strategy was reasonable. Considering the fact that the Lithuanian language avoids unnecessary verbalism some cases would sound unnatural if faithfully translated from English. Such is the case in the following example:

<p>> ‘Why else does she want to talk to me? Check up on my homework, I don’t think so.’ Pause. ‘He has a point,’ said Ben. ‘<i>Well</i>, if it is true then that’s all my faith in girls gone forever. That would be pathetic.’ (Burgess 2004: 321)</p>	<p>- Kam dar ji norėtų su manim pasikalbėti? Pasitarti dėl namų darbų? Abejoju. Tyla. - Jis teišus, - pasakė Benas. - * Jei tai tiesa, mano tikėjimas visom merginom žlugo visiems laikams. Tai apgailėtina. (Burgess 2004: 293)</p>
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5. *Well* used for *taking or holding the floor* was translated diversely: *o, na, matot, ką gi, nagi*. *Na* seems irrelevant in the target text with the exception of several cases where turn-taking is supplemented by hesitation, like in the following example:

<p>> ‘No—I don’t expect to hear from her,’ Eddie admitted. ‘<i>Well</i> . . . me neither,’ Ted said. (Irving 1999: 194)</p>	<p>- ne, nesitikiu iš jos jokių žinių, - prisipažino Edis. - <i>Na</i>... aš irgi, - tarė Tedas. (Irving 2002: 180)</p>
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While straightforward cases translated by *na* either attach some uncertainty to the original meaning, or sound unnatural, thus can not be considered adequately rendered. For example:

<p>> ‘What <i>is</i> it, Eddie?’ she’d asked him once. ‘Oh, nothing,’ he’d replied. ‘I was just wondering how you were doing.’ ‘<i>Well</i>, I’m doing all right—thank you,’ Ruth had said. (Irving 1999: 586)</p>	<p>- Kas yra, Edi? – kartą paklausė Ruta. - O, nieko, atsakė Edis. – Aš tik galvojau kaip tu laikaisi. - <i>Na</i>, neblogai... ačiū, - tarė Ruta. (Irving 2002: 557)</p>
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Another unnaturally sounding conveyance of the current function is *ka gi*, which is more suitable in pre-closing environment since it implies that the subsequent utterance is a generalizing or conclusive statement. Consider the following example:

- > ‘*Well*, Daddy,’ she’d said to him, ‘you probably thought I’d be married by now, and that you could stop worrying about me.’ (Irving 1999: 330) - *Ka gi*, tėti, - tarė ji, - tikriausiai manei, kad tokio amžiaus aš jau būsiu ištekėjusi ir tu galėsi dėl manęs nebesijaudinti. (Irving 2002: 305)

In other solitary instances the function of the marker was successfully rendered and the translation did not sound foreign. Consider some of them:

- > ‘I was trying to let the air out of it,’ the little boy said. ‘It won’t fit in the car. Then it got away, in the wind.’ (Irving 1999: 287) - Norėjau išleisti orą, - pasakė berniukas. – Netilpo į automobilį. Bet vėjas pagriebė ir nunešė. - *Nagi*, tuoj tau parodysiu – yra tokia gudrybė, - tarė berniukui ponias Deš. (Irving 2002: 266)
- > So where do you start? ‘*Well*, I’ve been sleeping with your daughter but I want to chuck her now and I can’t, so will you do it for me?’ (Burgess 2004: 315) Nuo ko pradėti? „*Matot*, aš miegu su jūsų dukra, bet dabar noriu ją mesti, tik ji niekaip manęs nepaleidžia. Gal atvestumėt ją į protą?“ (Burgess 2004: 288)

Several cases of omission were present as well but all of them were well reasoned. Turn-taking was obvious and undisturbed, no fighting for the floor was present or implied, and thus, no additional marking was needed:

- > ‘*Well*, there he is—your never-ending admirer,’ Maarten said, when he saw Wim Jongbloed waiting at the taxi stand on the Kattengat. (Irving 1999: 471) - * Štai ir jis – nenuilstamas jūsų garbintojas, - pasakė Maartenas, pamatęs taksi sustojimo vietoje Katengate laukiantį Vimą Jongbludą. (Irving 2002: 446)
- > ‘Go on then.’ Dino busied himself with his sandwich. ‘OK. *Well*, for starts, I don't want us to split up, as you know ...’ (Burgess 2004: 264) - Kalbėk, - ir Dinas suleido dantis į sumuštinį. - Gerai. * Iš pradžių turiu pasakyti, kad visai nenoriu skirtis, kaip jau turbūt supratai... (Burgess 2004: 241)

3.2.4. Okay

Interactional functions.

1. *Tag-positioned okay* functions as a device for soliciting and insuring agreement and/or alignment from the next speaker and is usually receipted with *okay* in next turn. Mostly it was translated by interrogative *gerai?* which was suitable for the conversational situations described and carried the same meaning as the marker *okay*. The following example illustrates such instances:

- > ‘That’s just between us, Ben, OK?’ (Burgess 2004: 21) - Bet tai tik tarp mūsų, Benai, gerai? (Burgess 2004: 26)

Other words used for rendering this function were *aišku?* / *supranti?* / *patenkintos?*; all of them succeeded in rendering the intended meaning and perfectly suited the conversational situation described. Several such instances are exemplified below:

- > ‘Don’t think this means anything, because it doesn’t,’ she said. ‘We’re just being friendly, OK?’ (Burgess 2004: 323) - Nemanyk, kad tai ką nors reiškia, nes taip nėra, - pasakė ji. – Mes tik draugai, supranti? (Burgess 2004: 295)

- > ‘Oh, God. I’m sorry, but I didn’t do it! I’m not upset about you and Dad. I mean, of course I was upset but I didn’t do it. OK?’ A long pause. ‘OK,’ said his mother. (Burgess 2004: 238) - O Dieve. Atleiskit, bet aš tų daiktų nevogiau! Ira š visai nenusiminęs dėl tavęs su tėčiu. Noriu pasakyti, aišku, nusiminęs, bet aš nieko nevogiau. Aišku? Ilga pauzė. - Aišku, - pasakė mama. (Burgess 2004: 218)

Omission was applied only in several instances and caused some losses - appeal to the hearer was missing in the target text. Consider the following examples:

- > ‘I just wanted you to know because I thought you might be worried about it. So you don’t have to be, because I never told anyone. OK?’ (Burgess 2004: 24) - Sakau tik todėl, kad man pasirodė, jog jūs nerimaujat. Neverta, nes aš niekam nieko nesakiau *. (Burgess 2004: 29)
- > Well, listen-it was an emergency for me, OK? (Burgess 2004: 302) Bet man tai buvo labai svarbu *. (Burgess 2004: 277)

2. *Okay as a free-standing receipt marker* signals the receipt of or agreement with the prior speaker’s utterance. All instances of the marker serving this function were translated by *gerai* (also *gerai! gerai!*; *gerai, jau gerai*). Appropriateness of such translation, however, was questionable in some of instances. While it perfectly well suited for rendering the agreement with the prior speaker’s utterance, *gerai* failed to signal the receipt. Both cases are illustrated below respectively:

> ‘I’m going to tell you,’ she told him again. - Tuoju pasakysiu, - vėl tarė ji. – Tik tu turi visiškai manimi pasitikėti.
 ‘You just have to trust me, completely.’ - *Gerai*, - atsakė Edis, nors pirmą kartą suvokė, kad ja nepasitikimi – ne visiškai.
 ‘*Okay*,’ he said, but for the first time Eddie knew that he *didn’t* trust Marion—not completely. (Irving 2002: 119)
 (Irving 1999: 130)

> ‘Where is this lump, on the shaft of your penis, or the head?’ - O kur auglys, ant penio ar ant galvutės?
 ‘Jjj. Shi.’ - P...pa... ties...
 ‘The shaft. *OK*, if you'd just go to the couch over there and take your pants down, I'll have a look for you.’ - Ant paties penio. *Gerai*, o dabar gulkis ir nusimauk kelnes, kad galėčiau tave apžiūrėti.
 (Burgess 2004: 305) (Burgess 2004: 279)

In the 2nd example above *OK* is used to signal that the previous utterance, was understood, despite that it was stammered out. Accordingly *aišku/ suprantu* or even *mhm* would be more suitable for signaling the receipt of the interlocutor’s utterance. Similar situation is illustrated in the example below. The intended meaning of repeated *okay* may be conceived from the context, thus the inadequate translation of the marker does not prevent from correctly interpreting the situation described. Nevertheless, *gerai! gerai!* in this particular situation does not sound natural:

> There, when the light was green, he could execute a left U-turn; then he would be approaching the hotel on his right. Marion thought the U-turn at the traffic lights was safer than the left turn from the turning lane, where there were no lights.” Ten, užsidegus žaliai šviesai, jis būtų apsisukęs ir kita juosta grįžęs atgal; tuomet viešbutis jau būtų buvęs jo dešinėje. Merion manė, kad apsisukti prie šviesoforo daug saugiau, negu sukti į kairę iš vidurinės juostos, kur nėra jokių šviesų.
 ‘*Okay! Okay!*’ Eddie screamed in the dark. ‘I see it! I see it!’ - *Gerai! Gerai!* – tamsoje sušuko Edis. Suprantu! Suprantu!
 (Irving 1999: 203) (Irving 2002: 188)

Textual functions.

1. *Okay in phone call openings* – serves dual function: responsive query and preparatory to further talk, i.e. marks the beginning or continuation of the topic. Although the analyzed material does not contain *okay* being used in phone call openings, several instances were found with *okay* serving as topic initiator. All such instances were translated by *gerai*, which fails to render the intended meaning of the marker. Apparently, the function of the marker was misunderstood for the obedience to the preceding encouragement to speak. Nevertheless, *gerai* sounds neither natural nor comprehensible. Consider the following examples:

> ‘Go on then.’ Dino busied himself with his sandwich. ‘*OK*. Well, for starts, I don't want us to split up, as you know ...’ - Kalbėk, - ir Dinas suleido dantis į sumuštinį.
 - *Gerai*. Iš pradžių turiu pasakyti, kad visai nenoriu skirtis, kaip jau turbūt supratai...
 (Burgess 2004: 264) (Burgess 2004: 241)

> ‘Yes, of course—she’s very beautiful,’ the manager said. Eddie nodded. Then he kept on writing, as follows: ‘Okay. Although I am Mr. Cole’s assistant, I have been sleeping with Mrs. Cole this summer. [...]’

(Irving 1999: 149)

- Taip, žinoma... ji labai graži, - atsakė dirbtuvės vedėja. Edis linktelėjo. Paskui rašė toliau: „Gerai. Nors esu pono Koulo padėjėjas, šią vasarą miegojau su *ponia* Koul. [...]“

(Irving 2002: 137)

2. *Pre-closing environment*. Speakers rely on *okay* to offer recognizable attempts at closure. Such instances were translated either by *gerai* or *ką gi*; both are capable of implying an ending and are commonly used in such situations. Consider:

> So of course Deborah had to offer to walk home with her. Which should have been great because I could have said - OK, see you later ...

(Burgess 2004: 92)

Savaime suprantama, Deborahi teko pasiūlyti palydėti ją namo. Aš net apsidžiaugiau, nes galėjau pasinaudojęs proga pasakyti: „Gerai, viso...“

(Burgess 2004: 88)

> ‘Oh, you’re off?’ Ben asked. ‘Yeah.’ ‘OK, have a nice time.’

(Burgess 2004: 194)

- O, išeinat? – paklausė Benas.
- Taip.
- Ką gi, gero vakaro.

(Burgess 2004: 181)

Another group of instances attributed to the current function of *okay* may be characterized as getting out of a troubling topic, usually signaled by ‘*okay-in-series*’. Nearly all such instances were translated by ‘*gerai-in-series*’ which not always succeeded in conveying the negative emotions that usually interblend in such cases. A slightly modified *gerai*, *jau gerai* achieves a greater correspondence at the emotional level. Consider the examples below:

> ‘Just don’t think that you know me, or Marion,’ Ted said. ‘You don’t know us—you don’t know Marion, especially.’ ‘Okay, okay,’ Eddie said.

(Irving 1999: 207)

- Tik nemanyk, kad pažįsti mane arba Merion, - tarė Tedas. – Tu mūsų nepažįsti – ypač nepažįsti Merion.
- Gerai, gerai, - atsakė Edis.

(Irving 2002: 191)

> ‘Most *families* have rules, Daddy,’ Ruth told her father. ‘Most *friends*, too,’ Ruth said to Hannah. ‘Okay, okay—I’m lawlessness personified,’ Hannah told her friend. ‘You never apologize, do you?’ Ruth asked her.

(Irving 1999: 343)

- Dauguma *šeimų* laikosi tam tikrų taisyklių, tėti, - kreipėsi Ruta į Teda. – Ir dauguma *draugų*, - tarė ji Hanai.
- Gerai, jau gerai! Aš – įstatymų laužytoja, - pasakė draugei Hana.
- Tu niekada neatsiprašai, ar ne? – paklausė jos Ruta.

(Irving 2002: 318)

3. *Okay as turn initiator* in nearly all instances was translated by *gerai*, which fails to signal turn-taking and its presence is rather confusing. Therefore, the only case of omission seems a better solution if compared to the translated cases. Consider the following examples:

- > ‘OK, Ben,’ said Dino. ‘What about... Jenny or Mrs Woods.’ (Burgess 2004: 2) - Gerai, Benai, - tarė Dinas. – Dženę ar ...
ponią Vuds? (Burgess 2004: 8)
- > ‘OK, you,’ Jonathon pointing his finger at Ben. (Burgess 2004: 5) - * Tu, - Džonatonas pirštu dūrė į Beną.
(Burgess 2004: 11)

Nevertheless, there is a number of turn-taking signals in Lithuanian as well, for instance *dabar tu* would have suited the 2nd example and made the turn-taking sound as natural as in the source text. Consequently, it may be concluded that translators imprudently stick to the original lexical meaning of an item without considering other possibilities of translation.

3.2.5. So

Subjective functions.

1. *So* introducing speaker's opinion was properly translated by *vadinasi/ taigi/ žodžiu*. These words succeed in rendering the element of result typically implied by the marker and, as the utterances were easily perceptible as speaker's own opinion without additional marking, it may be concluded that the above enumerated Lithuanian words are appropriate equivalents. Consider the following examples:

- > 'So I'll be the gooseberry again,' said Ben. But he came along anyway.
(Burgess 2004: 327)
- > 'So you like fat girls too, then,' Dino told Ben, leering at him. Ben smiled blandly and slipped away to the back corridor.
(Burgess 2004: 72)
- > 'Don't worry. There are no photographs in there,' Ruth said. Scott opened the drawer. It was full of condoms in brightly colored foil wrappers, and there was a large tube of lubricating jelly. 'So. . . I guess this *is* your father's bedroom,' Scott said, looking around nervously.
(Irving 1999: 368)
- Žodžiu, aš ir vėl lieku ant ledo, - pasakė Benas. Bet vis tiek atėjo.
(Burgess 2004: 298)
- Vadinasi, ir tau patinka storos, - pasakė Dinas Benui nenuleisdamas nuo jo akių. Benas kaltai šyptelėjo ir nėrė pro duris.
(Burgess 2004: 70)
- Nebijok. Nuotraukų ten nėra, - tarė Ruta. Skotas atidarė stalčių. Jame buvo daugybė prezervatyvų su ryškių spalvų folijos apvalkalėliais ir didelė drėkinamojo tepalo tūbelė.
- Taigi... ko gero, čia *tikrai* tavo tėvo miegamasis, - nervingai dairydamasis pasakė Skotas.
(Irving 2002: 343)

Several separate cases of the different treatment of the marker were also present (e.g. *o, taip! viskas!*). Such handling of the marker was conditioned by the particular conversational situation, and although the function of the marker was not explicitly expressed, it remained perceivable. Consequently the choice may be justified because it guaranteed the naturalness of the Lithuanian version. Consider the following examples:

- > 'It's very brave of you to come to me to talk about it. Some people go through years of agony just because of embarrassment. But embarrassment can't hurt you: untreated problems can.'
'Ah,' I gasped. So! I did have cancer!
(Burgess 2004: 304)
- > 'She thinks it'll be better all round to get it out of the way and sorted, since this is what's going to happen anyway,' he said. 'So you're just going along with it.'
'There's not much choice.'
(Burgess 2004: 266)
- tu labai drąsus, jei atėjai apie tai pasikalbėti. Kai kurie kenčia ilgus metus, nes gėdijasi apie tai kalbėti. Tačiau gėda nekenkia, tuo tarpu negydoma liga – kenkia.
- A! – žioptelėjau. - Viskas! Man vėžys!
(Burgess 2004: 278)
- Ji mano, kad bus geriau išsiskirti ir viską nuspręsti, nes tai vistiek neišvengiama, - pasakė jis.
- Ir tu pasiduodi.
- Nelabai turiu iš ko rinktis.
(Burgess 2004: 242)

The strategy of omission was applied only several times. Traditionally, some of the instances entailed only minimal or no losses, like in the following example:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> ‘<u>So</u> she’s gaga about the guy—that’s fucking obvious,’ Hannah said. ‘But what do we know about him? What does <i>Ruth</i> really know about him?’</p> | <p>- * Ji visai pakvaišo dėl to vyruko – čia tai jau aišku, - pasakė Hana. – Bet ką mes apie jį žinom? Ką <i>Ruta</i> apie jį žino?</p> |
| <p>(Irving 1999: 622)</p> | <p>(Irving 2002: 592)</p> |

Some instances, however, illustrate discernible losses:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> And you know what? I was brokenhearted. But only for a bit, <u>so</u> it probably wasn't falling in love at all, really.</p> | <p>Ir žinot ką? Ji sužeidė man širdį. Bet neilgam, * nes rimtai nebuvaus jos įsimylėjęs.</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 211-2)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 196)</p> |

In the source text the character’s utterance implies uncertainty about his former feelings, while in the target text the character sounds completely sure about them. Although the discrepancy is not very serious, it must be admitted that the target text fails to adequately render the intended emotions.

Interactional functions.

1. *So as a speech act marker* is used to introduce questions or requests motivated by the previous discourse. The analysis shows that the rendering of the current function of the marker is not very complicated. All equivalents chosen (*vadinasi, tai, tad, taigi, na, tada, todėl, o*) were effective in conveying the intended meaning. Several cases are exemplified below:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>> ‘I think it’s sweet,’ Ruth said. ‘He’s in love with me <i>before</i> he’s slept with me. I think it’s nice.’
‘It’s <i>different</i>,’ Hannah allowed. ‘<u>So</u> what are you afraid of?’</p> | <p>- Manau, jog tai labai gražu, - pasakė Ruta. – Jis mane įsimylėjo dar su manimi nepermiegojęs. Puiku, ar ne?
- Čia <i>visai kas kita</i>, - pripažino Hana. – <u>Tai</u> ko tu bijai?</p> |
| <p>(Irving 1999: 276)</p> | <p>(Irving 2002: 254)</p> |

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> ‘I think Allan will stay around,’ Ruth said. ‘Sure he will,’ Hannah told her. ‘<u>So</u> you’re worried if <i>you’ll</i> stay around—is that it?’</p> | <p>- Manau, Alanas nepaspruks.
- Žinoma, kad ne, - pasakė Rutai Hana. – <u>Vadinasi</u>, nerimauji, ar nepaspruksi pati – taip?</p> |
| <p>(Irving 1999: 277)</p> | <p>(Irving 2002: 255)</p> |

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>> Leave a letter? Tempting! But impossible. It was just too cowardly. <u>So</u> what was wrong with cowardice? He who fights and runs away ...</p> | <p>Palikti laišką? Didelė pagunda! Bet neįmanoma. Pernelyg bailu. <u>Q</u> kuo blogai bailumas? Jis priešinasi ir bėga...</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 270)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 246)</p> |

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> ‘We get on so well together.’
‘Yes.’
‘<u>So</u> what’s the problem?’</p> | <p>- Mums taip gera kartu.
- Taip.
- <u>Tai</u> kas <u>tada</u> negerai?</p> |
| <p>(Burgess 2004: 153)</p> | <p>(Burgess 2004: 143)</p> |

Several instances where the strategy of omission was applied were present as well. All of them seem well reasoned as the omission causes neither notional, nor emotive loss. Consider the following examples:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> ‘What about my relationship with Dad? What about Mat’s? <u>So</u> why's your relationship with him so much more important than ours?’
(Burgess 2004: 229)</p> | <p>- O kaip mano santykiai su tėčiu? O Meto? *
Kodėl tavo santykiai su juo svarbesni už mūsų?
(Burgess 2004: 210)</p> |
| <p>> ‘<u>So</u>,’ I said, ‘if it’s just a break, how long for?’
‘Not long,’ said Dad.
‘We don’t know,’ said Mum.
(Burgess 2004: 229)</p> | <p>- * Jei tai pertrauka, - pasakiau, - ar ji ilga?
- Neilga, - pasakė tėtis.
- Mes nežinom, - atkito mama.
(Burgess 2004: 210)</p> |

Textual functions of *so* where the most frequent in the analyzed material. Each of them will be reviewed in turn.

1. *So marking result or consequence*. Similarly to the above described function of *so*, the current function caused little problems to the translators. The marker was translated diversely (e.g. *taigi, todėl, vadinasi, žodžiu, ir, teko*), but each of the enumerated alternatives are suitable equivalents as the result/consequence remains explicitly marked. The examples below illustrate such instances:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>> ‘...You know how boys are—the kids can’t get enough of the skiing, and <u>so</u> the mom and the dad do the waiting. . . .’
(Irving 1999: 202)</p> | <p>Žinai kokie tie berniūkščiai... slidinėjimo jiems niekada negana, <u>taigi</u> mama su tėčiu laukia...
(Irving 2002: 187)</p> |
| <p>> ‘You know things have been difficult between me and your dad,’ Mum began. [...] She glanced at Dad and he said, ‘<u>So</u> we've decided, the best thing is for me to make a bit of space and... and move out. Just for a while.’
(Burgess 2004: 227)</p> | <p>- Žinai, kad mūsų santykiai su tėčiu įtempti, - pradėjo mama. [...]
Ji žvilgtelėjo į tėtį ir šis pasakė:
- <u>Todėl</u> mes nusprendėm, kad man bus geriausia pakeisti aplinką ir... ir išsikraustyti. Kuriam laikui.
(Burgess 2004: 209)</p> |
| <p>‘<u>So</u> you might as well keep on with her, unless you've got someone better to do,’ I said. [...]
‘No, of course not,’ he snarled. <u>So</u> there I was back in the depths of the shit heap again, without really knowing why this time.
(Burgess 2004: 142)</p> | <p>- <u>Vadinasi</u>, susitikinėsi su ja, jei nesusirasi geresnės? – paklausiau.
[...]
- Aišku, ne, - supyko jis. <u>Ir</u> aš vėl atsidūriau mėšlo krūvoj šikart nė pats nesuprasdamas, kodėl.
(Burgess 2004: 134)</p> |

The instances of omission were infrequent and all of them were well reasoned as the resultative relation was obvious, like in the example illustrated below:

> Mum glared. I'd got her.
 'Six months,' she said crisply.
 'Four,' I said, and Dad said, 'Four,' at the same time. *So* Mum pinched her lips together and nodded and I thought, Oh, yeah? See? I knew it was her all the time.
 (Burgess 2004: 229)

Mama siuto. Aš ją užlaužiau.
 - Šeši, - griežtai nukirto ji.
 - Keturi, - pasakiau kartu su tėčiu. * Mama prikando lūpą ir linktelėjo, o aš pamaniau – ak taip? Matot? Seniai žinojau, kad čia ji viską surezgė.
 (Burgess 2004: 211)

2. *Summarizing/ rewording/ giving an example.* In the analyzed material instances with *so* marking summarizing were the most frequent. The function was rendered diversely: *vadinasi, žodžiu, taip, ir, taigi* – all were suitable for the particular situation of their occurrence and properly marked summarizing. Consider several examples:

> *So* Mr Knobby is happy.
 (Burgess 2004: 215)

Žodžiu, Karštas Bičas laimingas.
 (Burgess 2004: 199)

> 'Let me see if I follow you, Eddie,' Ted said. '*So* . . . Marion takes every existent photograph of the boys that she can lay her hands on—and all the negatives, too—and she goes off to be a writer, because the boys' death is the only subject that keeps presenting itself to her, although she can't write about it. Yeah . . .'" Ted said, "that makes a lot of sense, doesn't it?"
 (Irving 1999: 194)

- Nežinau ar gerai tave suprantu, Edi, - pasakė Tedas. – *Vadinasi*... Merion pasisavina visas berniukų nuotraukas – ir visus negatyvus – ir iškeliauja, kad taptų rašytoja, nes berniukų mirtis yra vienintelė tema, nuolat jai lendanti į galvą, nors ji negali apie tai rašyti. Taip... – tarė Tedas, - labai aišku, ar ne?
 (Irving 2002: 179)

3. *Sequential so.* *So* may be used to mark transitions to the next topic/point or to lead into or out of a commentary/ correction/ paraphrase/ aside/ digression/ interruption. In the analyzed material sequential *so* was mostly used to lead out of a commentary, aside or interruption. Such instances were mostly translated by *taigi*, which seems suitable for rendering this function. Consider the following examples:

> 'Okay! Okay!' Eddie screamed in the dark. 'I see it! I see it!'
 'No, you don't!' Ted shouted at him. 'You can't possibly see it until it's *over*! Or do you want me to stop?'
 'No—please go on,' Eddie answered.
 '*So* ... Thomas moves into the center lane, [...]'
 (Irving 1999: 203)

- Gerai! Gerai! – tamsoje sušuko Edis. – Suprantu! Suprantu!
 - Ne, nesupranti! – užriko ant jo Tedas. – Negali suprasti, kol tai *nesibaigė*! O gal nori, kad nutilčiau?
 - Ne... pasakokite, - atsakė Edis.
 - *Taigi*... Tomas įsuka į vidurinę juostą, [...]
 (Irving 2002: 188)

In this example *so* leads back to the narrative after an interruption. *Dictionary of Modern Lithuanian* (2000) indicates that *taigi* is 'used for putting an emphasis on a word or phrase' (our translation). Although formally this function is different from the one executed by *so*, it succeeds in marking the beginning of something different from the preceding utterance, in this case, of the

narrative initiated earlier. Similar situation is illustrated in the example below, where *taigi* successfully leads out of an aside:

> Ruth noticed that he'd left the window open. Even if the air that night was special, it was never a good idea to leave a window open in New York—the noise of the early-morning traffic would wake the dead. (It would not wake Allan.)

In every marriage there are designated chores; [...]. Allan was in charge of *temperature*: he opened and closed the windows, he fiddled with the thermostat, he built up the fire or he let it die down. And so Ruth left the window open in their bedroom at the Stanhope. (Irving 1999: 579)

Ruta pastebėjo, kad jis palikęs atvirą langą. Nors oras tą naktį buvo nuostabus, vistiek nereikėjo palikti atviro lango Niujorke – eismas paryčiais galėjo prikelti ir mirusį. (Alano neprikėlė.)

Visi sutuoktiniai pasiskirsto pareigomis; [...]. Alanas buvo atsakingas už temperatūrą: jis atidarydavo ir uždarydavo langus, reguliuodavo termostatą, užkurdavo židinį arba leisdavo jam išblėsti. *Taigi* Ruta neuždarė lango miegamajame „Stanhopo“ viešbutyje.

(Irving 2002: 551)

The strategy of omission was applied only several times for translating the sequential *so*. All of the instances were harmless, like the one exemplified below:

> 'I love making love to you, Ben.'
That was a bit odd to start with, because [...]
Anyhow, so then there's this pause and then she says,
'I love you. Do you know that?'

(Burgess 2004: 250)

- Man patinka su tavim mylėtis, Benai.
Tai buvo gan keista pradžia, nes [...] Žodžiu,
* stojo tyla, po kurios ji tarė:
- Aš tave myliu. Ar žinai tai?

(Burgess 2004: 229)

In this example *so* (together with *anyhow*) leads out of a commentary (omitted due to its length). In the Lithuanian version only one of the markers is translated – *anyhow*, but the omission of *so* is harmless and helps to avoid unnecessary verbalism.

3.2.6. Like

Subjective functions.

1. *Approximation or loose use of a lexical expression.* The analysis revealed that the current function of the marker was correctly interpreted and translated in all the instances found. Various Lithuanian words, as well as expressions, were used to render this function of the marker (*galima sakyti; kaip; taip, lyg; panašu; tarsi; tarytum; berods; kone; savotiškas; atrodo*) and their appropriateness must be admitted. Several more interesting cases are exemplified below:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> I'd like to be thin, I can't help that, but it's so stupid. Just fashion, isn't it? I don't go for fashion. It's <i>like</i>... being bullied, you know. I've decided to settle for being plump.'</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 154)</p> | <p>Aišku, ir aš norėčiau būti plona, neneigiu, bet tai kvaila. Juk tai tik mada, ar ne? O aš nepaisau madų. Tai... <i>savotiška</i> prievarta. Todėl ir nusprendžiau būti apvalutė.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 144)</p> |
| <p>> You know? It's been a month now, a whole month and I'm still a virgin. I mean, it's practically <i>like</i> I was saving myself for her, because there's loads of other girls I could have had.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 30)</p> | <p>Suprantat? Praėjo mėnuo, ištisas mėnuo, o aš vis dar skaistus. <i>Galima sakyti</i>, kad saugojau save jai, nes buvo dešimtys mergaičių, kurias galėjau turėti.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 34)</p> |
| <p>> 'When a woman says 'No'—when she says 'Please stop'—well . . . what's it mean when a man <i>won't</i> stop?' Ruth asked. 'Isn't that a little <i>like</i> rape?'</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 1999: 375)</p> | <p>- Kai moteris sako „ne“ – kai ji sako „liaukis“... na... ką reiškia, jei vyras <i>nesiliauja</i>? – paklausė Ruta. Ar nemanai, jog tai <i>panašu</i> į prievartavimą?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Irving 2002: 350)</p> |

The instances of omission were twofold – some well reasoned and causing little or no losses, and some twisting the intended sense or causing losses at the emotional level. The first example below illustrates harmless instance of omission:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>> If you disagree with her it's <i>like</i> some big insult. She goes on about it for hours and hours and in the end I just say OK, OK. You're right, I'm wrong, but I don't care, I'm gonna do it/wear it/try it anyhow.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 158)</p> | <p>Jei su ja nesutinki, * iškart išsiveidžia. Pradeda nesibaigiančius išvedžiojimus ir galiausiai aš pasakau: gerai, gerai, tu teisi, aš klydau, man nesvarbu, aš tai padarysiu/užsivilksiu/pabandysiu.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Burgess 2004: 148)</p> |
|---|---|

Although the incitement to loosely interpret *insult* is missing in the translation, the conveyed meaning is similar to the intended one, thus, the notional loss is minimal. In addition, the Lithuanian version sounds natural and typical of teenage speech which consorts to the tone of the novel. Conversely, the example below illustrates the insupportable case of omission:

> But at the same time I had this stupid urge to tell her that I loved her, too. I almost did say it, which would have been a disaster because it's completely untrue. It was just *like* it was the polite thing to say.

(Burgess 2004: 250)

Aš persigandau, ir tuo pat metu man užėjo kvailas noras pasakyti, kad ir aš ją myliu. Vos nepasakiau, o tai būtų buvusi katastrofa, nes tai netiesa. * Tiesiog mandagumas, kuriuo atsakoma į tokį pareiškimą.

(Burgess 2004: 229)

By using *like* Ben indicates that saying *I love you* back does not amount to an act of politeness; it is something similar to it. While the failure to render the function of *like* in the translation conditions a complete assimilation.

2. *Exemplification*. Similarly to the previously described function of *like* this one caused little difficulties to the translators as well. The marker was translated diversely but properly: *toks kaip; kaip tas; kad ir; pavyzdžiui; sakykim; na*. The following example illustrates three instances of the marker serving this function and several alternatives for translating it:

> “An Analysis of the Atavistic Symbols of Fear in *The Door in the Floor*,” the pretty girl, who was clearly mortified, said. ‘You know, *like* the boy not being sure that he wants to be born—and the mother not being sure that she wants to have him. That’s very tribal. Primitive tribes have those fears. And the myths and fairy tales of primitive tribes are full of images *like* magic doors, and children disappearing, and people being so frightened that their hair turns white overnight. And in myths and fairy tales there are lots of animals that can suddenly change their size, *like* the snake—the snake is very tribal, too, of course. . . .’

(Irving 1999: 156)

- „Atavistinių apsakymo *Durys grindyse* baimės simbolių analizė“, tarė gražioji mergina; ji aiškiai jautėsi pažeminta. – Suprantate, * tas berniukas, kuris nežino, ar nori gimti... ir motina, nežinanti, ar nori, kad jis gimtų... Tai pirmykščiai jausmai. To bijo pirmykštės gentys. Primityvių genčių mituose ir pasakose yra daugybė *tokių* įvaizdžių, *kaip* stebuklingos durys, dingstantys vaikai bei žmonės, kurie taip išsigąsta, kad pražyla per naktį. Be to, mituose ir pasakose dažnai minimi gyvūnai, staiga padidėjantys arba sumažėjantys, *kaip* ta gyvatė... gyvatė, be abejo, irgi pirmykštis simbolis...

(Irving 2002: 143)

Instances of omission were quite rare and some of them caused only minimal losses like the 1st occurrence of *like* in the example above. Nevertheless, there were some cases where omission modified the intended meaning, like in the example below:

> I think the thing is, she likes the risk. She always used to do things *like* grab my packet when I was standing behind her and there were other people in the room - you know, shielding me with her body so no one could see.

(Burgess 2004: 116)

Dabar matau, kad jai patinka rizikuoti. * Ji dažnai sugriebdavo mane už klyno, kai stovėdavau už jos, o aplink būdavo žmonių – uždengdama savo kūnu, kad niekas nepamatytų.

(Burgess 2004: 109)

What is intended by the original wording is that the teacher used to do a number of provoking acts and the one described is only an exemplification. In consequence of the failure to render the function of the marker the action described seems to be the only of such kind, thus the discontent looks less intent.

Textual functions. *Like* serving textual functions was extremely rare in the analyzed material, only two instances of hesitational *like* were found, both omitted, and five instances of quotative *like*, twice omitted and in the rest of the instances properly translated by *atseit* and *lyg jam sakytu*. The omission of hesitational *like* makes the utterance seem smoother, the feelings of uncertainty and fluster disappear. Consequently, the translation fails to render the emotions accompanying the utterance. Consider the example below:

> Dino looked at the books. They were heavy, thick things. ‘*Picasso – A Visual Biography*,’ he read. ‘I didn’t know you were interested in art.’
‘I’m not. It’s just, *like*, it’s for free, innit?’

(Burgess 2004: 232)

Dino žvilgtelėjo į knygas. Sunkenybės.
- „Pikaso – vizuali biografija“, - perskaitė jis. –
Nežinojau, kad domiesi menu.
- Nesidomiu. * Bet ji man nekainuoja, ar ne?

(Burgess 2004: 213)

The cases of omission applied in translating the quotative *like* were harmless, since the quoted material was introduced by other means, like in the following example:

> A loud, lewd song throbbed throughout the bus, the only discernible lyrics being a repeated phrase; it was something *like*, “Ya wouldn’t know da truth, mon, if she sat on ya face!”

(Irving 1999: 248)

Rėksminga, nešvanki daina drebino visą autobusą; vieninteliai daugmaž suprantami žodžiai buvo nuolat kartojama frazė *: „Tu nepažinsi tiesos, jei ji sėdės tau ant veido!“

(Irving 2002: 229)

3.2.7. Now

Subjective functions.

1. *Now introducing a metacomment.* Instances of *now* serving this function were rare in the analyzed material. In the instances found they were mostly omitted together with the metacomment they introduced, like in the following example:

> ‘Between climbing the stairs and sleeping in Ted’s so-called *work* room . . . well, I’ll have to think about that,’ Marion told him. ‘It might *eventually* feel like a personal triumph, to be sleeping in the very room where my former husband seduced so many unfortunate women—not to mention where he drew them and photographed them. That might be most *pleasurable*, now that I think of it.’

(Irving 1999: 664)

- Jei reikia rinktis, ar laiptoti laiptais, ar miegoti Tedo *darbo* kambaryje... na, teks gerai pamąstyti, - tarė Merion. – Kita vertus, gal tai būtų savotiškas triumfas, jei miegočiau ten, kur buvęs mano vyras suviliojo tiek daug vargšių moterėlių, kur jas piešė ir fotografavo. Gal tai būtų *malonu* *.

(Irving 2002: 631)

The omission of the metacomment does not eliminate the implications carried by it, i.e. the recency of the thought and the alternation of Merion’s mind - unattractive idea becomes rather tempting. The recency is evident from the context and the alternation of mind is signaled by *kita vertus*, omission may be justified.

In other instances the marker and the metacomment it introduces were rendered by *žinai* or by word-for-word translation (*nors dabar, kai pagalvoju*). Both solutions seem satisfactory, only *dabar* is irrelevant in the word-for-word translation, as the item does not signify time; its sole function is to signal the transition to a metacomment.

2. *Now and affective stance.* *Now* accompanying shift to evaluation was omitted in all the instances found. Such solution is fairly justifiable as it causes no difficulties in understanding the subsequent utterance as an evaluation. Consider several examples:

> ‘I am *morally* superior to you, Eddie—I know that much,’ the nanny told him. ‘*Morally* superior,’ Ted repeated. ‘Now *there*’s a concept! Don’t you ever feel ‘*morally* superior,’ Eddie?’

(Irving 1999: 187)

- *Moraliai*, Edi, aš už tave pranašesnė – tiek tai jau žinau, - pasakė jam auklė.

- *Moraliai* pranašesnė, - pakartojo Tedas. – * Čia tai bent sąvoka! O tu ar nesijauti “*moraliai* pranašesnis”, Edi?

(Irving 2002: 173)

> Yet Marion’s Toronto address had sat for a year in a prominent place on Ruth’s desk. Pride and cowardice—now *there* was a title worthy of a long novel!—prevented Ruth from writing to her.

(Irving 1999: 584)

Vis dėlto Merion adresas Toronte visus metus išgulėjo gerai matomoje vietoje ant Rutos rašomojo stalo. Išdidumas ir baimė – * puikus pavadinimas ilgam romanui! – neleido Rutai parašyti laiško.

(Irving 2002: 556)

Interactional functions.

1. *Explanation, clarification, support.* Instances of *now* marking the transition from the main line material to explanation/ clarification/ support were quite rare in the analyzed material and mostly were properly rendered, like in the following example:

> Even Eleanor's troubled daughter was quite a pretty girl, relaxed and outgoing—*now* that she was in a boarding school and wasn't living in the same house with the lurid movie of her own birth and her mother's nuclear missile of pleasure.

(Irving 1999: 286)

Netgi nenuorama Eleonoros duktė atrodė gana graži mergaitė, draugiška ir ne tokia įsitempusi –*tikriausiai, todėl, kad* jau mokėsi internatinėje mokykloje ir nebegyveno namuose, kur buvo tas šiurpus filmas apie jos gimimą ir branduolinę motinos malonumų raketa.

(Irving 2002: 265)

In the single case of omission the explanation remained explicitly unmarked, nevertheless, this caused no difficulties in perceiving it and caused no notional losses, therefore the application of the strategy is justifiable.

2. *Now as a hearer-oriented intensifier.* Typically the marker or its combination with other items was translated word-for-word (*now look – dabar tik pažiūrėkit*). The translation is not completely unsuitable as it still carries the negative overtones and resistance implied by the English wording. The only shortcoming is that in some particular situations it sounds unnatural, something shorter is needed. Consider the following example where *now look* strengthens speaker's reproach to his wife for her malapropos confession about adultery.

> He stopped, wiping his eyes, and looked up at the clock. 'But I have to go. I have that meeting.' He stood up. 'An important meeting, God help me, I was looking forward to it. *Now look*. What timing!' He glared at his wife and then at Dino, trying to swallow the things he wanted to say.

(Burgess 2004: 181)

Jis nutilo, nusišluostė akis ir pažvelgė į laikrodį. – Man reikia eiti. Turiu susitikimą, Dieve padėk, kurio labai laukiau. *O dabar tik pažiūrėkit*. Pačiu laiku! – Jis pažiūrėjo į žmoną, paskui į Diną ir pabandė nuryti žodžius, kurie sukosi ant liežuvio galo.

(Burgess 2004: 1700)

Textual functions.

1. *Now* marking *turn-taking* occurred only once in the analyzed material and it was translated by *na*, which seems to be appropriate:

> They were back at the hotel when Ruth asked him: "*Now* what are you going to do with me?" Harry looked surprised. "I don't have a plan," he admitted.

(Irving 1999: 615)


Kai jie sugrįžo į viešbutį, Ruta paklausė:
- *Na*, tai ką dabar su manim darysi?
Haris lyg ir nustebo.
- Dar nesugalvojau, - prisipažino.

(Irving 2002: 585)

3.3. Statistical generalization of the investigation

The current section generalizes the results of the investigation and discusses the overall effect of the translation of discourse markers on the analyzed novels. The novels were very different from the point of view of discourse markers. Firstly, they differ in the amount of discourse markers: *A Widow for One Year* provided with 290 examples out of 660 pages, while *Doing it* provided with 437 examples although it was by half shorter, 330 pages. Consequently, the significance of discourse markers in both novels cannot be considered alike. In *Doing it* discourse markers acquire additional stylistic functions which makes their adequate rendering even more important. Secondly, the markers were not equally treated in the process of translation. On account of these differences, the translation of the discourse markers in each of the novels will be discussed separately, starting from John Irving's *A Widow for One Year*.

Although *A Widow for One Year* is not extremely rich in discourse markers, the proper rendering of discourse markers' functions had an impact on the overall quality of the translation. The markers mostly occurred in the characters' monologues or dialogues where they served conversational functions (see Ch. 2). In other words, they guided the reader towards the intended interpretation of characters' utterances, thoughts, emotions and attitude towards the discussion at hand. The analysis revealed that discourse markers in *A Widow for One Year* had been given an adequate treatment (Figure 4 summarizes and visualizes the statistics). The translator conscientiously strived to render their meaning/function and in the majority of instances succeeded. The only drawback is that the translator was overly faithful to the original lexical meaning of a particular marker, thus some of the translated instances sounded slightly unnatural, although the intended meaning was perceivable. Moreover, the strategy of omission was not overused and only several cases of its application caused some observable losses. To sum up the results, roughly 90% of the markers' occurrences in this novel were treated properly in the process of translation.



The situation is quite different in *Doing it*. Since the entire novel is written in conversational language and contains a number of direct speech passages it was extremely rich in discourse markers. Alongside with conversational functions discourse markers in this novel acquired stylistic significance as well. They helped to imitate the natural flow of speech typical


of teenagers and contributed to the depiction of the characters and emotional nuances. The abundance of markers made the characters seem self-doubting and unsure about their feelings, thoughts and actions. They avoided directness, sounding too assertive, often tried to slightly dissociate themselves from the uttered words by repairing or assuaging them and often appealed to the reader for approval. The analysis revealed that the translator underestimated the stylistic significance of discourse markers. The strategy of omission was applied to nearly half of the instances of markers' occurrence (the statistics is presented in Figure 5). In the majority of

instances omission could be justified on the grounds that the relation marked by the marker remains easily perceptible without additional signaling and a faithful word-for-word translation was likely to cause unnecessary redundancy. Nevertheless, the overall effect of such frequent application of omission caused unfaithful representation of the style characteristic to the novel. The language of the novel is intended to sound like spontaneous speech which is typically accompanied by hedges, repairs, veiling and unnecessary redundancy. The translation modified the original rustic speech into a more fluent narrative. In addition to this, in the Lithuanian version of the novel characters seem more self-

confident, quite certain about their actions and feelings and excellent at expressing exactly what they have in mind. In order to avoid such after-effect some means for compensating the losses should have been applied. On the other hand, in the major part of the translated instances the intended meaning/function of the marker was properly rendered. It must be noted that discourse markers in this novel were translated more creatively if compared to the translation of *A Widow for One Year*, i.e. the translator did not confine herself strictly to the original lexical meaning of the particular marker. Consequently, the markers' functions were not only adequately rendered but also sounded natural to Lithuanian readers. Statistically, 79% of the markers' occurrences in this novel were treated properly; the number does not reflect the overall effect of overuse of omission.

Figure 5. Doing it

Instances of translation	259 (59%)
Proper translation	226 (52%)
Misleading translation	33 (7%)
Instances of omission	178 (41%)
Reasoned omission	121 (28%)
Unreasoned omission	57 (13%)
Total	437



CONCLUSIONS

1. The theoretical overview of the concept of discourse marker and various approaches to the definition and delimitation of the category revealed that so far there is no complete consensus about their status. The most prominent theoretical orientations which aim at explaining their presence in discourse provide with diverse accounts: within Discourse-coherence approach discourse markers are seen as contributing to the identification of coherence relations obtaining between two textual units, their structural functions are emphasized; while within Relevance-theory approach they are seen as signals that facilitate the interpretation of a given message or sequence of utterances, thus this approach puts more weight on their cognitive aspect. Despite the lack of consensus in the literature on discourse markers, their importance in text generation and interpretation is never denied. The universally appreciable observation is that discourse markers clue the interpretation intended by the speaker.

2. Discourse markers are capable of performing a variety of conversational functions not necessarily related to the original lexical meaning of an item. The functions of discourse markers may be explained in terms of the basic aspects of pragmatic meaning: subjective, interactional and textual. Subjective functions express the speaker's attitude or his/her commitment towards proposition/ assumption; interactional functions are oriented towards the hearer and may be used to engage him in conversation; and textual functions contribute to the coherence and structure of the discourse. Accordingly, some markers can primarily be associated with one of the three functional domains.

3. On the grounds of the analysis of the translation of discourse markers in John Irving's *A Widow for One Year* and Melvin Burgess' *Doing it* the following conclusions may be drawn:

> The importance attached to discourse markers vary according to the translator. While 85.5% of the marker occurrences were translated in *A Widow for One year*, in *Doing it* the translated instances of the markers constituted only 59% of the markers' occurrences.

> Similarly, translators differ greatly in the strategies employed for the rendering of the markers' functions. In *A Widow for One year* the translator was overmuch faithful to the lexical meaning of the markers. As a result, the Lithuanian expressions were often too long and sometimes sounded unnatural, although the function of the marker was rendered in the majority of such instances. The translator of *Doing it* was more creative. The functions/meanings of the markers were rendered not only by corresponding Lithuanian markers but also by modifying the syntactic structure of the sentence, by transforming the original phrasing, or by using graphic indications of pauses. Consequently, the translated instances not only adequately rendered the function/meaning carried by the marker but also sounded natural to Lithuanian readers.

> Instances of omission were of twofold character. Very often they contained only minimal losses and may be justified on the grounds of avoidance of unnecessary redundancy. Nevertheless, in several instances due to the omission of the marker a particular shade of meaning was lost or deprived the readers of the subtle attitudes offered in the original conversation. Moreover, the frequent application of the strategy in translating markers in *Doing it* modified the intended emotional state of the characters and caused unfaithful representation of the style of the novel. Such observations demonstrate that before omitting a marker its significance to the text should be carefully assessed.

> Lithuanian markers, similarly to the English ones, are capable of expressing a variety of different functions and can be used in different contexts and for different purposes. The most versatile Lithuanian discourse marker appears to be *na*, which occurred in the translations of the majority of the markers found in the analyzed material.

DISKURSO ŽYMEKLIŲ PERTEIKIMAS VERČIANT IŠ ANGLŲ Į LIETUVIŲ KALBĄ SANTRAUKA

Darbe nagrinėjamas diskurso žymeklių vertimas iš anglų į lietuvių kalbą. Diskurso žymekliai - tai žodžiai ar žodžių junginiai, kurių leksinė reikšmė turi mažai įtakos sakinio prasmei, bet kurie atlieka daug svarbių funkcijų, padedančių pašnekovui teisingai interpretuoti pasakymą. Darbo tikslas – įrodyti diskurso žymeklių daugiavertę prigimtį ir tų funkcijų perteikimo svarbą verčiant iš anglų į lietuvių kalbą.

Anglų kalboje diskurso žymekliai analizuojami jau daugiau nei 20 metų, tačiau kol kas dar nėra nusistovėjęs bendro teorinio požiūrio į šią leksinę grupę. Priklausomai nuo kalbininko ir jo pasitelktos teorinės krypties, skiriasi diskurso žymeklių definicijos, funkcinis spektras, grupės sudėtis. Nepaisant to, visi tyrinėję diskurso žymeklius pripažįsta jų svarbą kuriant bei interpretuojant tekstą. Kadangi kalbininkų nuomonės nesutampa, darbe apžvelgiamos dvi svarbiausios teorinės kryptys, kuriomis remiantis analizuojami diskurso žymekliai ir aiškinamos jų funkcijos.

Teisinga diskurso žymeklių interpretacija, taigi ir perteikimas vertime, priklauso ne nuo leksinės lingvistinio vieneto reikšmės, bet nuo jo atliekamos funkcijos, kuri gali būti mažai ar net visai nesusijusi su pirmine žodžio reikšme. Todėl darbe aprašomos analizei pasirinktų žymeklių (*you know, I mean, well, okay, so, like, now*) funkcijos.

Empirinė dalis pagrįsta diskurso žymeklių vertimu dvejuose romanuose. Analizė parodė, kad diskurso žymeklių vertimas priklauso nuo individualaus vertėjo požiūrio į juos. Lietuviškajame John Irving *A Widow for One Year* vertime beveik visi žymekliai buvo išversti, tačiau vertėja buvo pernelyg ištikima leksinei žodžio reikšmei, kuri ne visada išlieka kai žodis vartojamas kaip žymeklis. Todėl vertime kai kuriais atvejais buvo iškreipta autentiška žymeklio reikšmė arba pasakymai skambėjo neįprastai lietuvių skaitytojui. Melvin Burgess *Doing it* vertėja pernelyg dažnai taikė praleidimo strategiją, todėl vertimas nėra adekvatus stiliaus požiūriu. Be to, kai kurie praleidimo atvejai susilpnina emocijas, apie kurias originalo tekste subtiliai informuoja žymeklis. Tačiau vertėja kūrybiškiau perteikė žymeklių funkcijas, taip stipriai nesilaikydama leksinės žodžio reikšmės. Todėl diskurso žymeklių reikšmės ir jų keliamos asociacijos buvo perteiktos vertime tiksliai ir natūraliai.

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