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**THE CONCEPT OF ANGER IN ENGLISH AND LITHUANIAN
AND ITS TRANSLATION**

MASTER THESIS

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INTRODUCTION

Language is both a product and an important part of culture. By investigating languages in a holistic manner, one can gain an insight into the universal human nature; analyzing languages in the idiosyncratic way, an individual can gain a profound understanding of any specific culture. Languages (culturally) provide evidence of different ways of conceptualizing and categorizing human experience. To understand the concepts we have to be in on a certain experience. Emotion includes both a reference to feelings and a reference to thoughts (as well as reference to the body), and culture often shapes both ways of thinking and ways of feeling. However, to study all these, we need a clear and reliable conceptual framework.

After having for a long time been excluded from linguistics in a narrow sense, concepts of emotions have, in the last few years, been the topic of increased interest. Anna Wierzbicka was the first who started to speak about concepts reviving the ideas of Humboldt and Sapir-Whorf. Concept is the unit of thinking, all information about something that exists in the consciousness of people, speaking a certain language. The perception of emotion concepts is rendered through the conceptual metaphors. The greatest work on metaphorical aspects of emotion concepts was done in the past decade. The results are obtained by using a cognitive linguistic framework within the tradition that was established in the 1980s and 1990s by the work of such figures as Lakoff and Johnson (1987), Langacker (1987) and others. The framework takes figurative language most seriously in the study of human conceptual systems. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1987), the peculiarities of the emotional states, recorded in the world-view of a language – naïve psychology – are explicated by conceptual metaphors, revealing part of the contents of the concept. Therefore, the attention is drawn to them, since metaphor not only pervades the language people use about the emotions, but also that it is essential to the understanding of most aspects of the conceptualization of emotion and emotional experience.

The issue of emotion concepts has been discussed by both foreign (Rastopchinska, 1973; Babenko, 1989; Lakoff and Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Bamberg, 1997; Kövecses, 1986, 1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2000; Wierzbicka, 1992, 1995, 1999, Lassan, 2002, etc.) and by Lithuanian authors in various aspects and contexts (Gudavičius, 1997, 2000; Kudirkienė, 1975; Jakaitienė, 1980, 1988; Papaurėlytė, 2004; Marcinkevičienė, 1993, 1994, Būdvytytė and Toleikienė, 2003) and others.

There are, on the one hand, individual studies on certain emotions, e.g. the study by Rastopchinska (1973) on the semantic field “fear”, as well as more general studies which survey different emotions, such as, for example, Kövecses (1986) or Wierzbicka (1992). Kövecses gains

access to emotional meaning above all via metaphorical expressions. Lassan (2002) has described the interrelation of the content of the term “concept” and the lexical meaning. The author analyzes the content of concept not only via metaphorical expressions, but in different discourses as well. Wierzbicka has developed a “reductive” analysis based on her “semantic primitives” (1972). In the number of her works, the author suggests cognitive scenarios while analyzing the emotion concepts including anger. According to Wierzbicka, the cognitive scenarios help to map the similarities and differences between the concepts reflecting the same fragment of reality, in another language.

Lithuanian linguistics contains few research works analyzing the lexis of emotion. Kudirkienė (1975) in her article “Lithuanians and Latvians about anger and the angry ones” tries to compare the descriptions of emotion expression. The author compares only a small part of the phraseology of both nations. R. Marcinkevičienė (1993) provides us with the conceptual metaphors of anger only in Lithuanian. Būdvytytė and Toleikienė (2003) in their work “Eyes, Soul, Heart and Other Containers” aim to project the concept of container into the concepts representing the soul and the body. The concepts of the Lithuanian and German languages are analyzed here.

This work follows the most recent tendencies in linguistics. Hence, the **novelty** of the work is the comparison of the perception of emotional states in the world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages in the aspect of translation.

The research **subject** is the concept, represented by words *pyktis* and *anger* in the Lithuanian and English languages.

The **aim** of the work is to describe the part of the concept of anger, expressed by language, and explore how linguistic means correlate in translation between the corresponding languages. To achieve this aim, the following **objectives** have been set:

- 1) to present a brief literary review on the issues of the concept in the works of Lithuanian and foreign linguists;
- 2) to provide empirical examples and inventory of lexical expressions of the concept of *anger* in the Lithuanian and English languages;
- 3) to compare the conception peculiarities of emotional states of anger and to define similarities and differences in the Lithuanian and English languages;
- 4) to investigate the ways the concept of anger is rendered from one language into another.

The **methods** chosen for the investigation of the meanings of abstract lexis are as follows:

1. *Conceptual analysis* is quite new in the Lithuanian linguistics and rarely applied. However, it helps to present the peculiarities of expression of emotional concepts.

2. *Linguistic literary analysis* provides an opportunity to analyze different views about concepts.
3. Received information has been processed by using a *contrastive* method.

The **key issues** of the work are: 1) linguistic perception of the concept, 2) peculiarities of conceptual metaphors.

Research data sources

The research is based on over 600 examples of using the words naming the emotions of **anger** (281 example of the Lithuanian language and 337 examples of the English language) which were selected from the corpus, compiled at the Computer Linguistics Center at Kaunas Vytautas Magnus University (the address in the Internet <http://donelaitis.vdu.lt>), the corpus of the English language (access through data <Concordance for Windows.Version 2.0>) and 8 world-known English fiction pieces.

The work is divided into three parts. *The first part* contains the theoretical description of the concept. Different views of linguists are presented here. *The second part* is devoted to the linguistic expression of the concept of **anger**. It helps to form the theoretical basis of the research. *The third part* is related to the conceptual metaphors expressing emotional states of the concept of **anger**. It also includes the classification according to the level of conceptual metaphors and presents the ways the concept of **anger** is rendered from one language to another. Conclusions and references follow this part.

In the text, terms used for the first time and the names of the emotional states of **anger** are written in bold. Words, which are directly related to the statement, are underlined in the examples printed in italics. Because of the traditions of the Cognitive Linguistics, the conceptual metaphors are written in capital letters.

I. THE REVIEW ON THE EMOTION LEXIS RESEARCH

All research related to the names of emotions can be conditionally divided into two groups, taking into account what ideas of linguistic paradigms are implemented in them. The research of the first group should be regarded as a realization of the statements of structural linguistics. The information provided in them easily fits into different structures and models, but here quite little concrete information, reflecting the essence of the phenomena, is present, the contrastive aspect is not completely revealed. Systematic structural paradigm concentrates all attention to the thing, its name, therefore the word is in the center of research (Maslova, 2001, 5). This group includes such monographs, dissertations and articles, where general semantic matters of the words, naming emotions, are analyzed: the structure of a concrete semantic field of emotions, their inter-relations. Research of the second group should be more related to the linguistics of the last decade, the peculiarities of which are determined by *anthropocentric orientation*. The researchers' attention from cognition objects is shifted to the subject – the user of the language. To quote Gudavičius, the content of the language, the actualized information in the act of speech, its relation with the world of a person's consciousness, the relation between language and culture draws more attention of linguists (2000, 6). In addition to dictionary data, the authors of such research usually refer to a numerous usage of examples from mass media, fiction, and corpus materials. They attempt to convey how the perception takes place, what a concrete emotion is in the world-view of a language.

One of the biggest works of the first group in the Lithuanian linguistics, analyzing the part of the emotions' semantic field, is the dissertation “Emotional verbs of emotional disposition and emotional states in the modern Lithuanian literary language” by Barauskaitė (1988). The author makes the inventory of the semantic components, establishes their hierarchy, specifies the content of sememes of the polysemous verbs and the limits of the lexical semantic group, describes its relations with other lexical semantic groups, and presents the methods of the meaning description.

Kudirkienė in her article “Lithuanians and Latvians about anger and the angry ones” tries to compare the descriptions of emotion expression (1975, 61-65). The author compares only a small part of the phraseology of both nations, however such an amount shows that there are many of similarities. For example, anger in both the Lithuanian and Latvian languages is described as hot, boiling gall: *kaitinti tulžį* ‘annoy, irritate’, *žults vārās* “*tulžis verda*”, ‘be angry’.

There are more works analyzing the emotion lexis in the Russian linguistics. Babenko in her monograph “The means of lexical emotion expression in the Russian language” (1989) describes the emotion lexis of the Russian language. The author states that emotions themselves

are universal, however, their typological structure does not coincide. The linguist distinguishes two groups of the lexis related to emotions:

- 1) the lexis of emotion – words, meaning emotions (anger, sadness, grief);
- 2) emotional lexis – emotionally colored words, expressing feelings (bunny).

The biggest part of authors analyzing emotions bases themselves on the componential analysis (Korotkich, 1986, 51-63; Nabiruchina, 1990, 69-74). More precisely lexical phraseological fields of *laughter* and *cry* are analyzed in the work by Rotova (1985), the field of *fear* in the French and Russian languages by Rastopchinska (1973).

The second group of works related to emotions consists of the researches which present the ways for explanation of semantics of the names of emotions, i.e. the attempts to convey the perception takes place, what a concrete emotion is in the world-view of a language. The linguists are of the opinion that analysis of everyday language metaphors reveals psychic models, existing in a person's consciousness. The newest works of the researches, analyzing the lexis of emotions, contain a clear tendency to treat these words as the names of a certain situation and to describe the parts of the situation scenario.

Wierzbicka states that situation scenarios reflect the subtlest nuances of the situation. They cover the wider context; the situation description gives more dynamics to the concept of emotional state itself. That is how the English word *anger* is portrayed:

X was angry (with Y)

- a) X felt something because X thought something
- b) sometimes a person thinks about someone:
- c) "this person did something bad
- d) I don't want this person to do things like this
- e) I want to do something because of this"
- f) When this person thinks this, this person feels something bad
- g) X felt something like this
- h) because X thought something like this

(Wierzbicka, 1999, 89).

If, as Wierzbicka states, the name of emotion is a shortened name of the situation, so the heard or pronounced word should provoke the whole chain of images. Wierzbicka maintains that emotion prototypes are different cross-culturally, but the semantic primitives with which these differences are expressed can be and are universal. However, the prototypical or focal members of the basic emotion categories in different languages tend to be different to varying degrees. To compare, Lutz (1988, 62) gives the following account of *song* (roughly corresponding to anger) in Ifaluk:

- (a) There is a rule or value violation.
- (b) It is pointed out by someone.
- (c) This person simultaneously condemns the act.
- (d) The perpetrator reacts in fear to that anger.
- (e) The perpetrator amends his or her ways.

As can be seen, this model is considerably different from the one associated with the English word *anger*. To account for the difference, Lutz claims that this model of Ifaluk *song* is a social-cultural construction whose properties depend on particular aspects of Ifaluk society and culture. For example, while the view linked with the English word *anger* emphasizes properties of anger that relate to individuals, the view linked with *song* highlights the essentially social nature of this emotion concept.

Psychic models in the consciousness are revealed analyzing metaphors of everyday language (Barcelona, 2000; Lakoff, 1987). Lakoff and Johnson argued that many everyday metaphors are conceptual in nature, that is, they are not mere words used in a non-literal sense. Rather, “metaphors are conceptual devices used for important cognitive jobs. One of these that metaphors can actually “create”, or constitute social, cultural, and psychological realities for us” (Kövecses, 2000, 17).

The account of *song* can be seen as diametrically opposite to that of *anger* as discussed by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987). Lakoff and Kövecses claim that to the degrees that the metaphors (especially the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID metaphor) that constitute anger are motivated by physiological functioning (e.g. increased body heat), the concept will be motivated by the human body, rather than being completely arbitrary, being just a social-cultural product.

Kövecses goes beyond the view that the concept of anger is motivated by human physiology. It is suggested that it is *both* motivated by the human body *and* produced by a particular social and cultural environment (in Russell et al, 1995, 10). That is, the attempt is made to reconcile the two apparently contradictory views. In this way, social constructions are given bodily basis and bodily motivation is given social-cultural substance.

Since figurative terms also describe (and do not primarily express) emotions, this is a subgroup within descriptive terms. This subgroup may be larger. Here, the words and expressions do not literally “name” particular kinds of emotions, and the issue is not how basic or prototypical the word or expression is. The figurative words and expressions that belong in this group denote various aspects of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, control, and so forth. They can be metaphorical and metonymical. The metaphorical expressions are manifestations of conceptual metaphors. Conceptual metaphors bring two distant domains into the correspondence of each other. One of the domains is typically more physical or concrete.

That is **the source domain**. The other, **the target domain**, is thus more abstract. The correspondence is established for the purpose of understanding the more abstract terms of the more concrete.

Linguistic expressions can also be metonymical. Conceptual metonymies, unlike conceptual metaphors, involve a single domain, or concept. The purpose of metonymy is to provide mental access to a domain through a part of the same domain (or vice versa) (Kövecses, 1994).

The Polish linguist Mikołajczuk in the work “Anger in the Polish language” (1999) describes the words naming *anger* and other emotions of this continuum. On the basis of dictionaries and databases the author describes the nuances of the meaning, semantic situations characteristic to every meaning. The metaphors reflecting the conceptualization of the semantic field of *anger* are presented separately. Everything is compared to the results of researches by Lakoff, Wierzbicka, and Kövecses. Mikołajczuk concludes that the concept of *anger* does not have a universal implication, though many metaphors are realized in both the Polish and English languages.

The Lithuanian author Marcinkevičienė describes emotion concepts similarly. Describing the concept of *anger* in the Lithuanian and English languages, the author seeks to reveal its similarities and differences. Though both languages have more common conceptual metaphors of *anger* (ANGER IS HEAT, ANGER IS INSANITY, ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL), however, the conceptual model of *anger* is not universal. The conclusion is arrived at after having analyzed numerous cases of different expression of common metaphors of *anger* (Marcinkevičienė, 1993, 54-56; Marcinkevičienė, 1994, 14-16).

Pimenova in the monograph “Ethno - hermeneutics of the reflection of the inner world in the naïve world-view” (1999) presents an ethno – hermeneutic model for the description of cognitive processes. The author interprets the scheme of the human inner world recorded in the language. The language gives semantic characteristics of living beings to the phenomena of the inner world (*soul, consciousness, will, imagination, heart, mind*), so the inner world, consequently, the emotions can be described as a human being. The linguist analyzes the physiology, vitality, anthropomorphic, zoomorphic features, and mental, social characteristics of the “inner human”. Pimenova grounds the conceptual metaphors reflecting all these by the examples from the English and Russian poetry and prose (Pimenova, 1999).

To compare the categorization of emotions in languages, one needs at least minimal knowledge of psychology. There are many emotion theories created in the world (see Lyons, 1980). It is acknowledged, that it is impossible to create a universal classification of emotion,

because the classification, which fits one type, can be worthless when the purpose of the research changes (Dodonov, 1975, 21).

All psychologists agree on the existence of basic emotions. They form the basis for all other emotions (e.g. *hatred* is hardly imagined without *anger*, *fury*, or *rage*). They do not depend on nation, time, or peculiarities of an individual. The list of basic emotions by is as follows: *interest*, *joy*, *wonder*, *sadness*, *anger*, *fear*, *disgust*, *contempt* (Emanatian, 1995, 17). Similar emotions form the emotion continuums, the members of which differ by the intensity and the closeness to the dominant of continuum.

Anger – is a strong feeling of wanting to harm, hurt or criticize someone because they have done something unfair, cruel, offensive, etc. (LDCE, 2001, 43). Some authors (e.g. Quinn, 1991) write about “goals blocked”, others (e.g. Lazarus, 1991, 122) link *anger* with “a demeaning offense against me and mine”, or with an “affront” (e.g. Averill, 1982), still others (e.g. Steen, 1997, 287) claim that “almost any type of loss or aversive state can evoke anger when a belief about goal reinstatement is strongly held”. Wierzbicka states that the implication is “something bad happened because someone did (or didn’t do) something. For example, when some dying people “are angry at God” or “angry at their doctors” the implication is not that God, or the doctors, did something bad, but rather, that “something bad happened” (the illness), and that God, or the doctors, failed to do something to prevent it or cure it (Wierzbicka, 1999, 88).

In this work, **anger** is considered as a concrete situational emotion (direct response to concrete events) and a feature of personality. Such a view is determined by the aims of the research. We seek not to define the concepts of psychology or to make the terms concrete, but discuss and compare how **anger** (in Lithuanian *pyktis*) is perceived in the world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages.

The sphere of emotions is so important to people that they started to speak about the separate sphere of scientific researches - **emocionology** (Language of Emotions, 1997). Emocionology is an interdisciplinary science, because here psychology, philosophy, ethnology, sociology, linguistics, and other sciences intersect.

The relation between emotions and language is a special one. The language defines their essence, indicates their similarities and differences, and categorizes the inner world. The feeling sphere is not only abstract, but also the reality fragment depending on the experience of every individual. The language generalizes this experience, and names the corresponding states (Bamberg, 1997, 212).

Emotions can be described literally and figuratively. The literal marking is typical of various terms related to emotions: basic (*fear*, *anger*, *joy*, *sadness*, etc.) and non-basic

(*depression, disappointment, content*) emotion names. Figuratively emotions are described while analyzing metaphors and metonymies.

In this research, we are dealing with lexical means of expression of the concept of **anger** in the English and Lithuanian languages. It is not possible to say that every emotion has its label – the word naming it – and there is not any synonymy. The emotion world and the means of language do not coincide. People name different experiences by the same word that is why sometimes only the context clarifies the things they are speaking about. The relation between the emotional states and their reflection in the language is not strict, though typical, therefore the communicants can understand each other. People are able to describe the most complicated feelings by one word, and do not limit themselves to some sentences for the description of, as it could seem, a very simple emotional state (Dodonov, 1975, 23).

II. LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION OF THE CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF ITS CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS

1. Concept as an Object of Cognitive Linguistics

The amount and quality of information one can get while analyzing **anger** (Lithuanian **pyktis**) emotions in the Lithuanian and English languages depend on the perception of the content (or meaning) of the word.

Chronologically there are two stages of evolution of the view to the word meaning: **structural** (traditional) (for more see Gudavičius, 1985; Jakaitienė, 1988) and **cognitive** (Barcelona, 2000, Kövecses, 2000) – the result of the linguistics of the last two decades.

The beginning of the cognitive paradigm is related to the middle of the 5th decade of the XX century. Then the researches began trying to find out the reasons for the quick and effective communication. Cognitive science started to analyze cognition. The term includes both the process of cognition and its results, i.e. knowledge. Cognition is the process related to the information storage, retrieval, operation, and usage. The term “cognitive science” connect some branches of science that analyze how the information is received, processed, fixed, stored, operated, and used. Without linguistics, this is analyzed in semiotics, information theory, mathematical modeling, biology, medicine, psychology, philosophy, computer sciences (Kubriakova, 1994, 36).

Cognition is related to the cognitive abilities of a person. One of such abilities is language, because the experience and knowledge is passed on, the information is exchanged during the act of speech. Language is also a mean of describing cognitive mechanisms.

Cognitive linguistics appeared and was developed in the USA. The beginning of it is related to the appearance of the book “Language and Cognition” by Miller and Johnson – Laird (Skrebцова, 2000, 7). In spring, 1989, the first conference on cognitive linguistics took place in Duisburg (Germany). The participants founded the *International Cognitive Linguistics Association* and started to publish the magazine *Cognitive Linguistics*.

The trends of the European cognitive linguistics are the most outstanding. The most distinctive are the Austrian and German schools of cognitive linguistics. Representatives of the Russian cognitive linguistics generalized the ideas of the USA and Western Europe’s linguists, and created their independent school. In Lithuania, cognitive linguistics is still trying to strengthen its position. Some works are in process at Kaunas Faculty of Humanities of Vilnius University and at Vytautas Magnus University (Lassan, 2002, 21-29; Marcinkevičienė, 1994, 14-16; Marcinkevičienė, 1999, 109-124).

Cognitive linguistics is a branch of linguistics analyzing the language as a common cognitive mechanism. Representatives of cognitive linguistics state that the semantic relation is not between the word and the thing, but between two mental phenomena – the word representation and the world representation in the people’s consciousness. There is no difference between linguistic and non – linguistic knowing. The object of research is the content of consciousness. Human linguistic skills are not separated from the whole content of consciousness, thinking. All communicants’ knowledge – common, situational, related to the communication contexts and concrete experience – takes place in the linguistic communication. In every case, the context and experience of communication differ, so the word meanings are also a little different. The essence of the method of cognitive linguistics is that linguistic data are always compared to the sensor-motor experience. The questions the representatives of this trend are interested could be as follows:

- how conceptual and linguistic systems relate (in other words, cognition and language);
- how scientific and everyday world-views are related to the language world-view;
- what is the role the language performs in the cognition, conceptualization and categorization of the world (Kubriakova, 1999, 4-5; Cognitive Linguistics, 1999).

Comparing these statements to those of structuralism, it is clear, that we speak about a new linguistic paradigm, which needs a new term for the **meaning**. The terms **concept**, **conceptual analysis**, **conceptualization**, **categorization** appeared in linguistic semantics.

The most important term to representatives of cognitive linguistics is **concept**. *Conceptus*, translated from Latin, means “a notion, generalized, abstract idea, connected to a thing or phenomenon”.

Concept is closely related to the study of culture. Russell writes that concept is like a piece of culture in a person’s consciousness, a form of culture functioning in somebody’s mental world (Russell, 1991, 160). Concept not only exists in culture, it also determines the behavior of the representatives of this culture.

This work is based on the linguistic perception of concept. It differs from other views, because concept is related to a certain way of its expression in language (Vorkachev, 2002, 3). The concept definitions by different authors have some common features.

In the dictionary of cognitive terms (KSKT) concept is defined as a unit of psychic and mental resources of consciousness and informational structure, which reflects the knowledge, and experience of a human being (KSKT, 1996, 90).

American linguists define concept as a unit of thinking (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 11-12). Wierzbicka states that concept is an object of ideal world, having a name and reflecting the world-view of reality determined by culture (Wierzbicka, 1999, 3).

Concept is an ideal content, any thinking unit, having the meaning (Babushkin, 1996, 35), a complex thinking image, operational thinking unit verbalized by different means of speech in the process of communication (Sternin, 1999, 69).

All the definitions have in common that concept is a thinking unit.

Some representatives of cognitive linguistics consider that concept is equal to meaning. However, there are some other opinions: concept is defined as intermediary between the words and non – linguistic reality, thus the word meaning cannot be equal to concept (KSKT, 1996, 92).

Concept differs from the notion by its linguocultural specificity. The description of the contents of a concept is simultaneously the description of part of the **world-view of a national language**. The world-view of a language is a view of the world that particularly differs from reality, but the specific “shade” of the world, depending on the national value of phenomena, things and processes, which is determined by nation characteristic peculiarities of activities, way of life and culture (Maslova, 2001, 66). The views of the world, conveyed by different languages are partly universal and partly differ from each other. People, speaking different languages, see a little different world. The world-view of a language is called naïve because it differs from the scientific world-view. The naïve description of the inner world – **naïve psychology** – generalizes the internal experience, accumulated by numerous generations.

The structure of concept consists of two parts: *logical* and *sublogical* (Papaurélytè – Klovienè, 2004, 21). The logical part contains what can be maintained the scientific world-view. The sublogical part, consisting of the knowledge, which belongs to everyday or naïve language world-view, is larger. The information, belonging to the logical part, is received after the analysis of free and logically motivated word linking, whilst the metaphoric word linking reveals the sublogical information (Lassan, 2002, 44).

There are many classifications of concept. The classification in the present work is based on the terms used in cognitology to pass the knowledge. Concept types are as follows:

- **Thinking pictures** (most often it is a concrete object, connected to the image seen, for example, *a house*);
- **Schemes** (remind pictures, however there are less details, special nature is emphasized, for example, *a way*);
- **Hyperonyms** (are not figurative, can be explained only verbally, pointing out the logical relations, for example, *foot-wear*);
- **Frames** (such a concept joins separate details into a whole, it could be compared to the film slip, which conveys everything that is typical and important in some circumstances, for example, *hospital*);

- **Insights** (when information about the thing's construction, function, inner structure is accommodated in the word, for example, *scissors*);
- **Scenarios** (the nature of scenario depends on the plot, so it is like a heading of series of stereotypical actions, for example, *fight*) (Babushkin, 1996, 19-95).

There is no strict limit among concepts. A special group is considered to be concepts with abstract meanings (*consciousness, truth, anger, happiness*). They can come closer to frames, schemes, or scenarios.

Concepts can be **national, group** (they belong to groups according to sex, age, etc.) and **individual**. National concepts should include both group and individual concepts. Individual or group concept is not possible without the national component. Concepts expressed by the same word differ if types of it are different. For example, a concept represented by word *justice* would be different in the mind of a criminal (group concept) and a retired police officer, thus both concepts are probably related by the nationality of the users (Popova, Sternin, 1999, 7).

Concepts are formed in a person's consciousness basing on:

- **Sensory experience**, i.e. directly perceiving the world by organs of sensation (*an apple, a wolf*);
- **Experience of practical activity** (*a knife, a hammer, soap, a tractor, a bicycle*);
- **Experience of scientific activity** (*an experiment, doing sums*);
- **Experience of thinking activity** (*discussing, concluding*);
- **Verbal and non-verbal communication** (Boldyrev, 2000, 25).

Many concepts originate from a direct experience – as some empirical image of a thing or phenomenon. Though the information is increasing, this image remains as the best expression of concept in human consciousness.

It is proved that thinking is based on the non-verbal material visual code, which is called *a universal material code* (UMC) (Zinkin, quoted from Papaurėlytė – Klovienė, 2004, 23). The units of this code are visual. They are formed in consciousness. The concepts are form, and a person thinks. The code is individual, because it depends on the experience of a person. All people have codes, so they are called universal. UMC units are neuropsychological units, coding knowledge and, in a such way, keeping them in a person's memory: images related to feelings, schemes, pictures, emotional states. Language is not indispensable for the concept formation, however it is necessary to exchange them.

Exhaustive and complete concept description is not possible. It is impossible to embrace all ways of concept expression in language or speech. There are always new texts, which can have an influence on the revealing the content of the concept.

The concepts are analyzed by employing the method of *conceptual analysis*. In short its essence can be defined as follows: based on texts and dictionary definitions it is observed how the word, naming the phenomena of abstract realm “behaves” in the text, what material objects or subjects it reminds of, what is the relation between it and synonymous means of expression (Frumkina, 1992, 5-9).

The individuality of concepts is reflected by the notion of **conceptualization**. Conceptualization is a process of meaning formation, mental experience, construct of consciousness, the meaning itself (Gudavičius, 2000, 49). The essence of it is that the information that reaches a person is processed, concepts and conceptual structures are formed in the consciousness, and the whole conceptual system is shaped.

Categorization is related to conceptualization. Categorization is phenomena of systematization, ordering, bonding into groups of different nature (KSKT, 1996, 44). Conceptualization forms minimal units of experience. Categorization bonds similar units to larger classes. These processes cannot operate without each other. Conceptualization is meaningless if its result – experience units – does not form any system. Vice versa, categorization process loses its background if there is nothing to form larger classes of. The result of categorization is **categories**. Category is one of the cognitive thinking forms giving the possibility to a person to generalize the experience and classify it (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 122-124).

2. Specificity of Emotion Concepts

Anger belongs to the sphere of abstract nouns. The peculiarities of words having an **abstract** and a **concrete** meaning are different. The concrete and abstract words are related to notions of ideal world. A *bird* is an object we can touch, smell, hear, and distinguish it from other objects. We understand the word *truth*, however, it is difficult to describe it, name the features, and define clear boundaries of its meaning. While grouping nouns into abstract and concrete, we can reject a strict term opposition and refer to the peculiarities of object conception. The more concrete an object is, the more organs of sensation it can be perceived through. Some objects are seen (*a wild boar, boletus, traffic lights, snow*), heard (*rustle, bang*), smelled (*odor, fumes*). Others, which cannot be seen, heard, or smelled and touched, are not the same: some can be felt (*anger, joy, threat*), others are perceived (*harmony, beauty, goodness*), and it is only believed in the most abstract (*destiny, space*) (Bamberg, 1997).

The attention in the work is concentrated on emotional states of **anger**. The relation among emotional states and the words naming them is defined differently in linguistics.

The structure of emotion concepts is seen by many researchers as a script, a scenario, or a model (e.g. Wierzbicka, 1990; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987; Kövecses, 1988, 1990, etc.). For example, Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) describe **anger** as a sequence of stages of events:

- (1) cause of anger;
- (2) manifestation of anger;
- (3) attempt at controlling anger;
- (4) loss of control over anger;
- (5) retribution.

That is, **anger** is viewed as being conceptualized as a five-stage scenario.

However, many believe that metaphors and metonymies are important for the perception of the concepts. Authors representing various disciplines discuss the role and possible contribution of conceptual metaphors and metonymies in the conceptualization of emotional experience (Kövecses, 2000, 13). Taking into account the relation between the meaning and the concept, **prototype theory** seems the most accessible. Representatives of cognitive psychology – initiators of this theory – think, that an abstract or a concrete image is formed in a person's consciousness. This image is called a **prototype**, if it helps a person to perceive reality. The prototype is the best member of the category. Many emotions, such as *love, fear, and anger*, have not just one, but several prototypical cognitive models associated with them (i.e., they each have multiple prototypes). Thus, several members (or cases) can acquire the status of “best example” within an emotion category. This is because, given a category with several members, one member can be typical, another can be salient, a third can be ideal, and so on (on metonymic models such as these, see Lakoff, 1987).

While analyzing texts associated with human emotions, it is reasonable to state that the lexis naming emotions is **situational**. The words representing emotional concepts orient the consciousness to fix some essential moments: who experiences this emotional state, what the reason of this state is, how the essence of this emotional state is described, what its expression is. All these elements not necessarily have to be described directly, some are understood from the wider context:

*“I (**subject**) been out my mind (**emotional state**), nearly, since the last awful fellow we had left us (**reason**)”* (Cronin, 1977, 9);

*“Then he (**subject**) came home angry (**emotional state**) with her mother for having turned the girl away so rudely (**reason**)”* (Lawrence, 59).

The latest works analyzing the emotional lexis confirm the mentioned premise. Words naming emotional states are certainly related to some situation, the elements of that situation scenario are defined (Bamberg, 1997, 315).

Russian linguists Apresjan and Apresjan state, that **body metaphor** describing the emotional state should be projected into the description of prototypical scenario. Emotional reaction to any emotion, for example, *fear*, is similar to the body reaction, for example, in cold. Apresjan and Apresjan describe the word meaning naming emotion as follows:

Pity of X for Y (*His pity for patients was limitless. Jo gailestis ligoniams buvo beribis.*): “a feeling, disturbing mental equilibrium of X and caused by Y to X; such feeling grips a person when s/he thinks that somebody is in a bad situation and this situation is worse than somebody deserved (**cause**), a person feels something similar to another person’s body is feeling, when it hurts, human body reacts to this feeling (**body metaphor**), a person experiencing this feeling, wants to change the situation of the other (**result**)” (Apresjan, Apresjan, 1993, 35).

However, to quote Lakoff (1987), in the characterization of what concepts and meaning and rationality are, there can be no mention of the nature of the human organism. <...> But this does not mean that bodies can play no role at all in objectivist cognition. Far from it (Lakoff, 1987, 174). The perceptual mechanisms of the body, on the objectivist view, are means of gathering information and checking on it. It is assumed that, on the whole, perception is veridical – what you see (and hear, and touch, etc.) is by and large and accurate guide to what there is. Perception is viewed as the means by which we establish correct correspondences between external reality and the symbol system in terms of which we think. Of course, perception is not perfect by any means. It sometimes fools us. And many kinds of knowledge are beyond what we can perceive directly. The body thus aids in the acquisition of conceptual information, and it may limit our ability to conceptualize.

What the human body does not do, on the objectivist account, is add anything essential to concepts that do not correspond to what is objectively present in the structure of the word. The body does not play an essential role in giving concepts meaning. Moreover, the body plays no role in characterizing the nature of reason.

Situational scenario reveals the naïve world-view. In description of **anger** emotional states, the following factors are important:

- (a) The cause of emotional state;
- (b) The location of emotional state;
- (c) The subject of emotional state;
- (d) The emotional state itself (conceptual metaphors, defining the peculiarities of emotional states);
- (e) The expression of emotional state;
- (f) The results of emotional state.

This way of the description of emotional states of **anger** is partly based on the method of scenario of prototypical situation. The scenario of prototypical situation in the work is related not to one word, as by Wierzbicka (1999, 508-526), but to the whole group of words. The concept is treated as a category. The word, which, based on the dictionaries of synonyms, is the dominant of the list of synonyms and most accurately reflects the common meaning of the list of synonyms, should be considered the most prototypical representative of the concept. Other lexemes representing this concept differ from the most prototypical that is why they describe not all fragments of the reality but only its separate parts. Common features are parts of the situation scenario. All emotions have a reason, an object; they are characterized by certain peculiarities. The differences are the type of reason, expression, etc.

One of the main assignments of contrastive analysis, ensuring the success of the work, is the selection of a proper initial comparative unit, i.e. what could be called “frame of reference” (Jarceva, 1981, 29). Both the similarities and differences between scenarios lexicalized in different languages can be pinpointed. But the very possibility of comparisons rests on the availability of a universal **tertium comparationis**. Such an objective measure is considered to be cognitive system, which is the whole of knowledge characteristic to public, and the potentiation of an individual and a nation to adopt this knowledge. In this sense, cognitive system is universal, international, so it could be considered to be objective standard of comparison (Gudavičius, 1985, 46-51). Wierzbicka suggests comparing with the help of semantic universal – natural semantic metalanguage (1995, 41).

The peculiarities of the description of the concept, which in the Lithuanian language is represented by the word **pyktis**, and in the English language by the word **anger**, are determined not only by the specificity of the emotion concept, but also by the approach to the structure of the concept. The analysis of the definitions in the dictionaries related to the logical part of the concept is **the level of lexicographical concept description**. **The level of prototypical situation scenario** should provide both logical and sublogical information, because in this case the materials of the analysis are both metaphorical word combinations and word groups, directly reflecting the nonlinguistic reality. **The level of conceptual metaphors** is related only to sublogical part of the contents of the concept.

3. Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and its Application in Comparative Researches

Metaphor is a trope or a mechanism of speech, when the name of a thing or phenomenon is transferred to another; in other words, the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. Metaphor has been discussed since Aristotle. The traditional theory of metaphor provided the idea that the essential features of metaphor were

its individuality, unexpectedness, and eventuality. However, in spite of its individuality, everyone to whom it was addressed understood metaphor. However, nowadays in the world of progress and new ideas a new one replaces this theory. Modern theory of metaphor points out the conventional nature of metaphor and considers it to be the basis of conceptualization of the world. **Cognitive/conceptual metaphor** is a cognitive process, which expresses and forms new concepts, and the absence of which makes it impossible to get new knowledge. According to the theory of conceptual metaphor, the basis of metaphor is the strategy of human thinking. It correlates to the human ability to notice and generalize the similarities between different individuals and object classes (KSKT, 1996, 55). The terms **cognitive metaphor** and **conceptual metaphor** are synonymous, so the terms **cognitive theory of metaphor** and **conceptual metaphor** will be used in this work.

The common perception of metaphor by representatives of cognitive linguistics is represented in the works of Lakoff and Johnson (1999). Their book *Metaphors We Live By* stimulated the appearance of the trend of cognitive linguistics, which analyses metaphor as the fact of language, thinking, and culture. Lakoff and Johnson suggest the way for research, which is called **experientialist synthesis**. In such a way the objectivist rationality and subjectivist imagination are connected. The authors state that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. <...> metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human *thought processes* are largely metaphorical” (Lakoff, Johnson, 1999, 3-6).

The relation between two domains – **the source domain** and **the target domain** – expresses the essence of metaphor. The source domain of the metaphor QUARREL is WAR (*His arguments pulverized the opponents’ defense*) is war. The shift of the knowledge of one domain to another is based only on such features of a concrete object, which are familiar to a person from his physical experience. Another source of metaphors is nation’s cultural experience. The source presumably helps to classify the meaning and significance of the target (Averill, 1990, 104).

Metaphors serve two main functions beyond mere description or elaboration. Those functions are explanation and evaluation (Averill, 1990, 106). *Explanatory* metaphors are concerned primarily with the transfer of knowledge from the target to the source domain. *Evaluative* metaphors, by contrast, are intended to convey an attitude or mood. Phenomena that call for both explanation and evaluation are especially likely to become a source and/ or target metaphor.

Every conceptual metaphor is related to the simplest human body peculiarities, movements that are so clear to the speaker, that the existing regularities can be transmitted to

other spheres. This transference is based on Lakoff's (1999) **embodiment idea**, the essence of which could be described as follows: initial things are not only the ones related to a human, but human special experiences and motor reactions.

Another source of metaphors is the nation's cultural experience. There exist national thinking specifics, so national metaphor peculiarities exist as well. Language in the semantic system reflects only the differences, which are relevant to the nation in respect of communication (Sternin, 1998, 30). While analyzing conceptual metaphors, there is always a question, whether metaphors are the reflection of already existing cultural models, or they determine the cultural models. Kövecses (1995b, 49-71) thinks that both opinions are wrong. If metaphor just reflected the existing cultural model, the same thing in many different cultures would be perceived differently. The linguist presents many examples, that **anger** in different languages (Indo-European and non-Indo-European) is conceptualized by the same metaphors. The prototypical **cognitive model** related to **anger** concept in different languages (i.e. cultural model) is the same. Its structure is formed of three components: *cause* → *existence (force)* → *expression*. Kövecses concludes that metaphors related to the emotion concept are not only the result of accidental nature or the fact transmitted to other cultures. They are also influenced by certain universal properties of the human body. Nobody doubts that human beings are conceptualized as containers, and **anger** and its counterparts as some kind of substance (typically fluid) inside the container. However, the general metaphor seems to be elaborated in more or less different ways at a more specific level of metaphorical understanding. Though the author states that the cultural model of **anger** and its counterparts is a joint product of metaphor, metonymy, (possibly universal) actual physiology, and cultural context, he does not think that the cultural model comes **after** the metaphor.

Lakoff and Johnson describe linguistic metaphors of three types: **orientational**, **ontological**, and **structural** (1999, 22-46; 75-84):

1. **Orientational** metaphors have to do with spatial orientation: UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, DEEP-SHALLOW, CENTRAL-PERIPHERAL. They arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept spatial orientation; for example, HAPPY IS UP.

Such metaphorical orientations are not arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience. Though the polar oppositions up-down, in-out, etc., are physical in nature, the orientational metaphors based on them can vary from culture to culture. For example, in some cultures the future is in front of us, whereas in others it is behind.

2. **Ontological** metaphors help to understand our experiences in terms of objects and substances. Abstracts are perceived as objects having size, form, weight, quantity, inside, outside, color (*a beautiful catch, much hostility, internal dissension*).

One of the most common ontological metaphors is *container* metaphor. A human himself is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. A human projects this orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces. Even where there is no natural physical boundary that can be viewed as defining a container, people impose boundaries. Bounded objects have sizes. This allows them to be quantified in terms of the amount of substance they contain.

3. **Structural** metaphors relate abstracts to the concrete concepts (*fluid, illness, poisons, a beast*). An abstract concept is usually related to some concrete one, so the abstract is perceived in various ways. Structural metaphors are the most closely related to the cultural experience.

The variety of metaphors by Kövecses (2000) correlates with the metaphors defined by Lakoff and Johnson. However, these two metaphor classifications are based on different principles. Lakoff and Johnson classify metaphors according to their abstract and concrete level. Kövecses pays attention to the source domain of metaphors. Having analyzed nine emotion concepts (**anger, fear, joy, sadness, love, pleasure, honor, shame, surprise**), the author concludes that all emotions are related to some source domains.

To show the relation between these two views, both classifications should be compared. For example, *ontological* metaphors could be called metaphors EMOTIONAL STATE IS A SOCIAL CHIEF, EMOTIONAL STATE IS AN ENEMY, *structural* – EMOTIONAL STATE IS ILLNESS, EMOTIONAL STATE IS FIRE, EMOTIONAL STATE IS A BURDEN.

Lakoff and Johnson's spatial metaphors are related to Kövecses' conceptual metaphor EMOTIONAL STATE IS DIRECTION UP/DOWN.

There is no opposition between these two views while analyzing conceptual **anger** metaphors in the Lithuanian and English languages. We will base the work on the principles of metaphor classification presented by Kövecses, though such classification is not complete and can be enlarged.

The part of abstract image can be compiled of separate phrases of daily speech, where the conceptual metaphors are realized. A concrete linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor is a common word combination, which cannot reflect a non-linguistic reality directly, however, tells something about it.

There are many examples when the abstract we are speaking about is not shown directly, and can be only perceived from the context. There is danger that this abstract could be conceptualized as another one. Therefore, it is the best way to base on the examples, when the

wanted abstract is directly named in the text, or, if it is impossible to interpret it by any other, if there is no direct abstract naming. Describing conceptual metaphors of **anger** (in Lithuanian **pyktis**) in the Lithuanian and English languages, the examples, when the name of emotional state is defined directly, will be analyzed.

Conceptual metaphors define the qualitative features of emotions: strength, weakness, positive or negative evaluation, and if this emotional state is desired (Kövecses, 2000, 41-49). Metaphors most often are the result of categorization of naïve world-view, not the scientific one.

Conceptual metaphors are variants of perception of an object of reality, different means of the same explanation of the concept content. All of them have a common invariant part. It gives the possibility to explain why the same concept is related to different metaphors. The common denominator relates metaphors around the name of the same emotional state, and the differences motivate the variety of emotions. For example, **anger** (**gniew**) in the Polish language is conceptualized as an illness, dangerous beast, bad weather, devil, etc. The common part of these conceptual metaphors is the force, negative emotion evaluation (Mikołajczuk, 1999). It seems that it should be enough to have one metaphor in the language world-view. However, the differences are clear: illness can be cured, one can fight with the beast and even annihilate it, the activities of the devil cannot be foreseen at all. These metaphors do not mean that all the mentioned features are common to **anger** at the same time, rather, it is the evidence that it can be of all sorts.

Conceptual metaphors are treated as an independent comparison standard. Comparison involves three steps: on the source domain level, on the level of features, relating an abstract and a concrete object, and on the level of the realization of these features.

In the contrasted languages, the same conceptual metaphors related to the same emotion do not prove that they are analogical. To say that ANGER IS A HOT FLUID we base on the word combinations: *užliejo pyktis; filled with anger*. The mechanism of conceptual metaphor is that only one feature of source domain is emphasized. In the mentioned word combinations, the same quality of fluid – ability to flow – is stressed. It correlates to the instability of emotional states. Other qualities – ability to freeze or evaporate in a high temperature, etc. – are not important.

The actualization of the same quality of reality object also does not prove the equivalence, because the flow can be of different nature: in one case, emotional state just flows, in the other, its effect can be stronger. The relation of all three comparison steps and comparison of examples *užliejo pyktis, filled with anger* can be illustrated by the scheme:

LANGUAGE A		LANGUAGE B
I. EMOTIONAL STATE IS FLUID (strong, not always controlled).	=	I. EMOTIONAL STATE IS FLUID (strong, not always controlled).

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| II. Based on the ability of fluid to flow
(emotional state changes). | = | II. Based on the ability of fluid to flow
(emotional state changes). |
| III. The fluid flows, but it is not dangerous
(emotional state can be controlled). | ≠ | III. The fluid flows intensively and is dangerous
(emotional state cannot be controlled, it is very
intensive). |

Emotional states are strong in both language world-views. However, it is more intensive and changeable in the language B, because the fluid conveying its qualities is not in a container. The biggest possibility is that the difference of abstract conceptualization will be concentrated on the third level.

III. THE LEVELS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF ANGER AND THE PECULIARITIES OF ITS TRANSLATION

1. Lexicographical level.

Because it is maintained in the work that information for the description of a concept is provided in the dictionary definitions, in the first place this part of material is reviewed. We take into account the fact that because emotions are abstract lexis, the material of dictionaries can provide only a small part on information. Having generalized dictionary definitions of all the lexemes representing the concept of anger, we can obtain the common denominator, generalize the logical information, which should be known to all language users.

The concept in a person's consciousness is stimulated by the most abstract and neutral word, the meaning of which has accumulated main features of the concept. This word is maintained the dominant of the list of synonyms. The Dictionary of Synonyms by Lyberis (2002) points out that the dominant of the list of synonyms is the word **pyktis** (*a hostile feeling due to harm, offence, etc.*). The group of synonyms is formed of the following lexemes: *piktumas, piktybė, pyka, pykmė (spoken), pykinys (spoken), papykis (spoken), rūstis, rūstybė, apmaudas, pagieža, pagaiža (rarely), tūžis, nirtis, nirtulys, nartas, nirštas, niršulys, siutas, siūtis, siutulys, siutinys, tulžis (fig.), įpykis, perpykis, itūžis, inirtis, iniršis, įsiūtis (spoken), išėlis (spoken), iširdis (spoken), idūkis (spoken), ikirtis (spoken)* (SŽ, 345-346). The concept is also verbalized by the groups of synonyms, which are formed of verbs and adjectives: **pykti** (*feel anger*) *pykauti, rūstauti, apmaudauti, niršti, širsti, tūžti, rūgti (spoken); piktas* (*the one who gets angry quickly; full of anger*) *rūstus, tūžlus, tūžmingas, irzlus, nartus, apmaudus, siutus, pagiežingas, nedoras, abuojas (dial.)*. The Systemic Dictionary of the Lithuanian Language holds the same opinion (SLKŽ, 1987, 268-269).

Oxford Dictionary of Synonyms and Antonyms presents **anger** as the dominant of the list of synonyms. The list includes the following words: **nouns** – *angry feelings, annoyance, antagonism, bitterness, cholera, displeasure, exasperation, fury, hostility, indignation, ire, irritability, outrage, passion, pique, rage, rancor, resentment, spleen, tantrum, temper, vexation, wrath*; **verbs** – *inf aggravate, antagonize, sl bug, displeasure, inf drive mad, enrage, exasperate, incense, incite, inflame, infuriate, irritate, madden, make angry, inf make someone's blood boil, inf needle, outrage, pique, provoke, inf rile, vex*; **adjectives** – *bad-tempered, bitter, inf shocked, cross, exasperated, indignant, provoked, raving, resentful, stormy, vexed, wild, wrathful* (ODSA, 1999, 13;).

Words, which the corresponding languages have to name the emotions of **anger**, define the differentiation of emotion field in the consciousness. The fact that one word in the language

is not enough to name the emotion proves that the world of emotions is categorized as well. Furthermore, the presence of a word proves that in that society the concept in question is a salient one. If a special word does not exist, we cannot state that the people of the nation are not able or have no opportunities to experience other emotions. Simply, emotional states are not so important to be named. The absence of a word does not prove the absence of a concept, but the presence of a word does prove the presence of a concept (Wierzbicka, 1995, 19).

The concept, in the Lithuanian language represented by the word **pyktis** and in the English language **anger**, relates also to the names of other emotional states. The term **word** is used relatively, because in this case the research is not limited exclusively to nouns, it also includes verbs and adjectives.

The definition of still other language units that represent this concept was facilitated by the analysis of dictionary definitions. The list includes such words, in the explanation of meaning of which the group dominant is repeated; afterwards it has been analyzed, in the explanation of what meaning they were repeated. Besides, it has been checked whether the meanings of all words, representing the concept, contain the common part: *'a strong feeling of wanting to harm, hurt or criticize someone because they have done something unfair, cruel, offensive, etc.'* The common part of the meaning was based on the common part of the meaning of the words, naming this type of emotions in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDCE, 2001, 43). The group of the representatives looks as follows:

THE LITHUANIAN LANGUAGE

Pyktis, apmaudas, įniršis, įtūžis, niršulys, nirtulys, pagieža, perpykis, piktybė, piktumas, rūstis, rūstybė, siutas, siutulys, tūžis. The list does not include dialecticisms, for example, *pagaiša, papykis, išėlis.*

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Anger, antagonism, bitterness, cholera, displeasure, exasperation, fury, hostility, indignation, ire, outrage, pique, rage, rancor, spleen, tantrum, wrath.

The lists are formed in the alphabetical order, so they do not reflect the structure of semantic field. The words included in the lists are related to the concept without any intermediate links, i.e. those, which used directly, provoke images, associations, memories, and all the information related to this concept.

The comparison of separate lexemes would be unproductive because of the extent of different semantic fields, which in this research are treated as the whole of the linguistic expression of the concept. There are not many cases when one element of a language has a clear equivalent in the other. It is proved on the basis of the data of bilingual dictionaries. It is possible

to compare the dominant **pyktis** in the Lithuanian language with its equivalent **anger** in English. The word **pyktis** is related to some English words:

Choler *poet. pyktis* (DALŽ, 92).

Tantrum *susierzinimo priepuolis; staigus įniršis/ pyktis* (DALŽ, 946).

Ire *pyktis, įtūžis* (DALŽ, 480).

One word of a language has some equivalents of similar semantics. As it was mentioned, one Lithuanian word can be rendered in English by at least three equivalents. Therefore, we could assume that the Lithuanian language does not reflect all the nuances of feelings, the variety of emotional states. However, the conclusion can be arrived at after having analyzed all the means of the language, describing the fragment of reality, not only the part of them. Perhaps, there is such a language X, where all the emotional states caused by the cruel or offensive things done by someone are defined by one word. However, it does not mean, that people speaking this language are deficient because they are not able to experience the whole variety of emotional states, which in the Lithuanian and English languages is described by some words. The most convenient way would be the comparison of semantic fields (as the concept realization in a language).

After the definitions of the meanings given in the dictionaries are discussed, it is anticipated to find out which features of the logical part of the concept of **anger** are recorded in the definitions of the meanings. This should be the information, known and important to every language user, minimal but sufficient.

THE LITHUANIAN LANGUAGE

All the words, which represent the concept of **anger** (in Lithuanian **pyktis**), have similar components in their definitions. It can be illustrated by the data from The Dictionary of the Contemporary Lithuanian Language (DLKŽ, 2000) and the academic Dictionary of the Lithuanian Language (LKŽ, 1968 - 2002).

While motivating the interrelations of the representatives of the concept and the members of the field, the frame of reference is the word **pyktis**, which renders the most common meaning of the concept.

Pyktis *priešiškas nusistatymas dėl patirtos žalos; piktumas, susierzinimas, rūstis* (DLKŽ, 554).

Pykti *jausti pyktį, susierzinimą, norėti atkeršyti už nuoskaudą* (DLKŽ, 554).

Piktas 1) *kuris greit supyksta, vaidingas* 2) *supykęs, susierzinęs* 3) *užgaulus, įžeidžiantis* 4) *blogas, nelemtas* 5) *didelis, smarkus* (DLKŽ, 554).

Pyktis *įširdimas, užsirūstinimas* (LKŽ IX, 969).

The dominant of the synonyms is repeated in the definitions of other words:

Siutas 1) *siutimas, šėlimas* 2) *niršulys, pyktis* (DLKŽ, 695).

Siutas 1) *didelis pyktis, įniršis* (LKŽ XII, 629).

Apmaudauti *turėti, griežti apmauda, pyktį* (DLKŽ, 30).

Niršti *smarkiai pykti, tūžti, nirsti* (LKŽ VIII, 811).

Tūžis *tūžimas, pyktis* (DLKŽ, 865).

Tūžis *įtūžis, pyktis* (LKŽ XVII, 202).

Nartas 1) *nirtulys, užsispyrimas* 2) *pyktis, įniršis* (DLKŽ, 414).

Nartas *pyktis, įniršis, užsispyrimas* (LKŽ VIII, 562).

In the definitions of other members of the field the dominant is not repeated, however, the words synonymous to the dominant or to the words in the meanings of which the dominant was used, appear in them.

Apmaudas *piktumas, graužatis* (DLKŽ, 30).

Apmaudas *piktumas, rūstybė* (LKŽ I, 249).

Įniršis *smarkus įpykimas, įniršimas* (DLKŽ, 213).

Įniršis *įniršimas, įnikimas, įkarštis* (LKŽ IV, 113).

Piktybė 1) *piktumas* 2) *blogis, blogybė, nedorybė* (DLKŽ, 554).

Piktybė 1) *piktumas, rūstybė* 2) *blogis, blogybė, negerumas* (LKŽ IX, 967).

The definitions in the Lithuanian language dictionaries provide little information about this concept. They employ synonymous way of defining the meaning, which is not very suitable for such lexis. The attempts to explain the units, representing the concept of **anger**, level the words of similar but not the same meaning, and it turns out that **pyktis** is the same as **nartas**, **pykti** does not differ from **apmaudauti**, and the words **pyktis**, **įniršis**, **siutas**, indicating emotional states of clearly different intensity, mean nearly the same.

Different words show the states of different intensity, however, very little attention is paid to it in the dictionary definitions. Only **įniršis** is described as *an intense anger*. The dictionaries do not indicate the reasons of emotional states of this continuum, but the most general reason can be defined: **anger** is caused by something cruel, unfair, or wrong.

To conclude, the information about the concept in the dictionary definitions is not sufficient. The words are explained by synonymous words. The words representing the concept in question have a negative evaluation.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

The dictionaries of the English language provide more information about the concept of **anger**. Some words traditionally, as in the Lithuanian dictionaries, are explained by synonyms:

Ire (*literary*) *anger, wrath* (CED, 857).

Choler *anger or ill humor* (CED, 300).

However, it is not the most popular way of the word explanation. The dictionaries of the English language tend towards a descriptive explanation of the meaning. The members of the list of synonyms are clarified by definitions, indicating different intensity, the reasons of emotional state, by metaphor-oriented definition of an emotional state.

Anger is the dominant of the list of synonyms and it is treated as the frame of reference in the modeling of definitions of its synonyms in the English dictionaries. It is the most general of these terms, merely indicating the emotional reaction of extreme displeasure aroused by injury, injustice, wrong, etc. It usually does not have a definite degree of intensity and is accompanied by an impulse to retaliate.

Anger *a strong feeling of wanting to harm, hurt or criticize someone because they have done something unfair, cruel, offensive, etc.* (LDCE, 43).

Anger *a strong feeling against someone or a situation which makes you want to hurt someone, be unpleasant, shout at someone, etc.* (CIDE, 86).

On the basis of the definitions of six English dictionaries (LDCE, CIDE, CED, CCED, WNED, WEUD), we could state that **ire** is stronger than **anger**, besides, its sphere of usage is defined. **Ire** usually suggests a somewhat greater emotional turmoil. This is shown by the words used in the definitions:

Ire *anger, wrath* (WNED, 278).

Ire (*literary*) *anger, wrath* (CED, 857).

Indignation, **resentment**, and **rancor** imply anger of no specified intensity or outward display but provoked by what one considers mean, shameful, unworthy, unfair, or outrageous:

Indignation *the feeling of shock and anger, which you have when you think that something is unjust or unfair* (CCED, 858).

Indignation *is a more formal word, implies deep and justified anger* (WEUD, 57).

Resentment *bitterness and anger that someone feels about something* (CCED, 1411).

Resentment *a feeling of anger because something has happened that you think is unfair* (LDCE, 1387).

Rancor *a feeling of bitterness and hate* (CIDE, 1172).

Rancor *a feeling of bitterness and resentment, a formal word* (CCED, 1358).

From the definitions, we can see that **indignation** is a little stronger than **resentment**, because it is shown as a deeper emotional state. **Rancor** implies the feeling of hatred, especially when one cannot forgive someone. It is usually a more formal word.

Other members of the semantic field are different from these because the sphere of usage, specific intensity and the reason of emotional state are clearly defined.

Fury is the strongest of all the synonyms. It usually indicates extreme overwhelming rage. The definitions of this word show that it is an emotion resembling the elemental force, which cannot be controlled:

Fury *violent or uncontrolled anger; wild rage* (CED, 660).

Fury *intense and often destructive rage* (WNED, 213).

When **fury** is extremely strong, it may reflect a mental disease. The dictionaries of the English language show that, first, this word is related to the emotional state, and only then, to an illness:

Fury 1) *unrestrained or violent anger, rage, passion, or the like; 2) rage so great that it resembles insanity* (WEUD, 576).

Rage is of similar intensity as **fury**, because it implies the idea of loss of control. It usually has a strong outward display presumably reflecting an intense inner frustration, revengefulness, or temporary derangement.

Rage *strong anger that is difficult to control* (CCED, 1354).

Rage *violent and uncontrolled anger* (WNED, 431).

Wrath may imply either rage or indignation, usually also implying grievance and a desire to revenge or punish in return.

Wrath 1) *angry, violent, or stern indignation 2) divine revenge or retribution 3) Archaic a fit of anger* (CED, 1853).

Wrath *formal extreme anger* (LDCE, 1657).

Though **wrath** is similar to **rage** and **fury** due to the intensity of the emotional states they present, it differs from them because it is not said that **wrath** can be uncontrolled, so we can state that **rage** and **fury** are stronger emotional states.

In the definitions of **pique**, a clear reason for such emotional state is seen:

Pique *a feeling of being annoyed or upset, esp. because someone has ignored you or made you look stupid* (LDCE, 1069).

Pique *a feeling of anger and annoyance, esp. caused by damaging someone's feeling in pride in themselves* (CIDE, 1070).

Pique *a feeling of resentment or irritation, as from having one's pride wounded* (CED, 1238).

Antagonism and **hostility**, as their Lithuanian equivalent **priešiškumas**, name the emotional state caused by the disapproval of something. They both express the opposition

towards people or some ideas and imply the outward display. **Hostility** is even stronger than **antagonism**.

Antagonism *openly expressed and usually mutual opposition* (CCED, 58).

Antagonism 1) *active opposition or hostility*; 2) *opposition in physiological action* (WEUD, 62).

Antagonism 1) *hatred between people or unfriendly or conflicting groups*; 2) *opposition to an idea, plan* (LDCE, 46).

Hostility 1) *a feeling or attitude that is extremely unfriendly* 2) *strong or angry opposition to a plan or idea* (LDCE, 692).

Hostility *unfriendly or aggressive behavior towards people or ideas* (CCED, 816).

Spleen, besides its first meaning (*an organ near one's stomach that controls the quality of the blood* (LDCE, 1387)), also names the emotional state.

Spleen *a feeling of anger and dissatisfaction* (CIDE, 1394).

Spleen 2) *violent and spiteful anger, a formal word* (CCED, 1609).

In the Collins English Dictionary (CED), there is the fourth definition of the word **spleen** that implies the mapping to the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A CONTAINER:

Spleen 4) *Archaic the organ in the human body considered to be the seat of the emotions* (CED, 1560).

Tantrum is a little different from the other synonyms of **anger**, because most often it means a sudden anger of a child. Therefore, it implies not some serious injury or damage, which can cause anger, but usually something that a child did not get. However, it is quite intense, and sometimes even uncontrolled.

Tantrum *a childish fit of rage; outburst of bad temper* (CED, 1560)

Tantrum *a sudden period of uncontrolled childish anger* (CIDE, 1490).

The information about the analyzed concept could be generalized on the basis of the reviewed English dictionaries. The word representing the concept and all the members of the semantic field name the emotional states which are described as negative. All the emotional states are caused by something that was or was considered to be unfair, cruel, wrong, etc. The scale of the causes can be very wide, so the reasons in the definitions are indicated only when they are clearly seen.

Though the used dictionaries are of different nature, the principles of data presentation differ as well, the intensity of emotional states is defined similarly.

We can structure the sets of expressions in different languages according to partly the same criteria. These criteria seem to be for emotions in general the criteria [intensification] and [minimization] to which other more specific criteria have to be added, in the case of **anger** a

moral aspect and the criterion of being suppressed or curbed (Weigand, Hunsnurscher, 1996, 50). In this way we can structure the sets of expressions for **anger** in the Lithuanian and English languages according to subsets. Within the subsets there is no clear correspondence between individual words of different languages, they have to be all analyzed individually. The following scheme for the language pair English/ Lithuanian is to be understood in this way, i.e. correlating subsets and not single words:




Fig. 1: English/ Lithuanian

Dictionary data lead to the conclusion that the words, naming the emotional state of **anger** in the English language are more differentiated according to their stylistic dependence. Beside stylistically neutral, there are some words of formal and literary, even archaic usage. In the dictionaries of the Lithuanian language, there is no reference to any sphere of usage of the words belonging to the line of synonyms of **anger**. That shows that the lexis of the English language is more stylistically differentiated than the lexis of the Lithuanian language.

The dictionaries of both languages describe the peculiarities of emotional states quite laconically. The definitions in the dictionaries differentiate emotional states only by intensity and even not always the case.

Any categorical conclusions cannot be arrived at on the basis only of the dictionary data, because they can be based not on the realization peculiarities of the concept existing in the reality, but on the different principles of the work of dictionary compilers. It is necessary to analyze the usage of the words expressing this concept.

2. The Level of Scenario of Prototypical Situation

There are many various prototypical scenarios proposed by different linguists. The cognitive models were studied by Wierzbicka (1999), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), King (1989), Gibbs, Steen (1997), etc. in different languages including English, Russian, Polish, Chinese, Japanese, Hungarian, etc.

Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) showed that conceptual metaphors play an important role in the conceptualization of **anger**. Scenarios of prototypical situation show how various conceptual metaphors map onto a part of this prototypical cognitive model and how they jointly converge on it. This enables to show exactly how the various metaphors are related to one another and how they function together to help characterize a single concept.

In the Lithuanian linguistics, there are no weighty works on the prototypical scenarios; only attempts to employ already suggested cognitive models in the Lithuanian language. For example, Papaurėlytė - Klovienė in her dissertation “The Concept of Sadness in the Lithuanian and Russian Languages” (2004) devotes a small part to the prototypical scenarios of sadness in the corresponding languages.

We will base our research on the prototypical scenario of situation suggested by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987).

In recent years, several studies have been conducted to investigate the concept that roughly corresponds to **anger** in languages belonging to non-Indo-European language families (Chinese, Japanese, Hungarian) by using the linguistic methodology Lakoff and Kövecses employed in their study of **anger** (Kövecses, 1999, 142-144). The model we are going to employ in our work proved to work well in different cultures only with some slight differences. To quote Kövecses, who led the studies, “the scenario applies to Japanese **anger**, although Stage 3 is more elaborate than in English” (1999, 67).

So, this model was chosen as the most suitable for the investigation of the concept of **anger** in the Lithuanian and English languages. When describing prototypical situation of emotions of **anger** (Lithuanian **pyktis**), attention is concentrated on the following parts of the prototypical cognitive model:

- (1) **cause of anger**;
- (2) **manifestation of anger**;
- (3) **attempt at controlling anger**;

(4) **loss of control over anger;**

(5) **retribution.**

As it was suggested, the course of **anger** depicted in the prototype scenario is by no means the only course **anger** can take. In claiming that the scenario is prototypical, we are claiming that according to our cultural folk theory of **anger**, this is a normal course for **anger** to take (Lakoff, 1987, 398).

2.1. The Cause of Anger

The most general reason for **anger** (Lithuanian **pyktis**) – something offensive, cruel, unfair, or wrong that was done – can be differentiated in various ways.

First, it is important to define the subject of emotions: a person, an animal, a thing, or a event. **Anger** can be caused by two kinds of offense: physical or moral. A person can do both physical and moral harm, however, an animal usually may harm only physically and in such way cause anger. A wanted, but not available thing injures morally. For example, a child who wants a toy throws into tantrum in the middle of the store <don.lt> if his/her parents do not buy it.

According to Lakoff (1987, 397-406), there is an offending event that displeases S (short for the self). There is a wrongdoer who intentionally does something directly to S. The wrongdoer is at fault and S is innocent. The offending event constitutes an injustice and produces anger in S.

In the world-view of the Lithuanian and English languages, the situation when another person (a wrongdoer) says something offensive about S is very common. When S is hurt directly, his/her anger can be very intensive. In addition, the rumors or talks about another person, who is related to S in any way, can arouse anger in S:

But he was angry now, his nervousness lost in a swelling indignation at the ignorance, the intolerant stupidity of Chenkin's accusation, <...> (Cronin, 1977, 179).

Juose buvo aiškiai matyti apmaudas dėl nepelnyto priekaišto, todėl Šeli paskubėjo paaiškinti savo mintį <don.lt>.

His heart went hot, and he was angry with them for talking about the girl (Lawrence, 2004, 337).

Vien mintis, kad jos galėjo taip pasakyti apie jo sužadėtinę, supykde ji <don.lt>.

The wrong or unfair behavior of the wrongdoer causes anger in S. It insults S directly:

On hearing from Bosinney that his limit of twelve thousand pounds would be exceeded by something like four hundred, he had grown white with anger (Galsworthy, 2004, 181).

Aktoriai vaidino pagal ankstesnę tekstą. Autorių pagavo siutas, paskui jis nurimo ir net atsiprašė <don.lt>.

Though Lakoff's model suits many cases, very often a wrongdoer does not do anything wrong, however, S feels anger because s/he treats the action as insulting or offensive, because S did not expect it.

They would burn with envy and anger how the poor kid with no status could afford all this fresh out of law school (Grisham, 1991, 17).

Išsijungiau kaip biologinis gyvis. Dėl to ir siuntu. Negalima prisigyventi ligi keturiasdešimt ketverių metų ir ūmai pajusti, kad nebėra jėgų <don.lt>.

Very often S feels angry because s/he does not like the person or his/her looks, even a glance or a voice tone. The presence of such a person annoys S:

When he came down, speckles after his bath, he found his mother scrupulous in a low evening dress, and, to his annoyance, his Uncle Soames (Galsworthy, 2004, 337).

The tone, the half-lifted sneering lip, roused sudden anger in Jolyon; but he subdued it (Galsworthy, 2004, 364).

Tačiau matydamas įsmeigtas į save jos akis, patamsėjusį, tarsi iš siaubo sustingusį žvilgsnį, jis atsikvošėjo, ir skausmingas padrikumas virto pykčiu <don.lt>.

Jau pati jų išvaizda, sakanti, kad jiems prireikė atsidurt kažkur kitur, ir tik todėl jie čia, erzino mane <don.lt>.

Not only the presence of another person who is not desired may cause anger. Quite often, a view, which is unpleasant to S, provokes negative emotions:

And then one day he saw that which moved him to uneasy wrath--two riders, in a glade of the Park close to the Ham Gate, of whom she on the left-hand was most assuredly Holly on her silver roan, and he on the right-hand as assuredly that 'squirt' Val Dartie (Galsworthy, 2004, 397 – 398).

Šis vaizdas ją vėl gerokai įsiutino <don.lt>.

Abandonment is also treated as a negative action, which arises emotional states of anger to S:

She felt a sudden bitterness that Baxter could leave her so soon and so entirely (Lawrence, 2004, 329).

Ji stabtelėjo pasipiktinusi, kam jis ją paliko <don.lt>.

Loss of a dear person also may cause anger, however, here the target of anger is not indicated:

Even her eyes were pouting. It was thus that she recorded her permanent resentment at the loss of Septimus Small (Galsworthy, 2004, 32).

Negaliu apie tai ramiai pagalvoti! Kiekvienąkart šiltas niršulys perbėga mane, kai pagalvoju, kad jo daugiau nebepamatysiu <don.lt>.

In the world-view of the Lithuanian and English languages, we can find the examples when a particular feature of a person causes anger. S cannot stand it, so s/he gets angry:

He seemed to see his fellow-creatures grotesquely, and he was angry with them because they were grotesque (Maugham, 2004, 126).

Her self-possession made him angry; and, disdainingly to explain his presence, he pointed to the mournful little Niobe (Galsworthy, 2004, 447).

Mane pykdo žmonių nesugebėjimas įvertinti situaciją, ir kai dėl to kenčia kiti <don.lt>.

In the world-view of the compared languages we can find many examples when anger is felt because of the marriage fallen to pieces. The target of anger is a S him/herself or another person, not always the wrongdoer:

After this she ceased to blame herself for the breakdown of their marriage, but instead expressed considerable anger towards her husband <concord>.

Jis pats visa tai buvo patyręs, buvo iki dugno išgėręs karčią nevykusios santuokos taure, tad negi galėjo šaltakraujiškai ir nepykdamas įsijausti į galvosena tu, kurie nė nebuvo girdėję kovos žvangesio? <don.lt>

Again, we can disagree with the proposed cognitive model, because, in some cases, there is no wrongdoer, and S is angry at him/herself. S/he does not like his/her particular qualities, behavior of him/herself, or gets angry because his/her expectations are not justified:

He was trembling, infuriated by the consciousness of his own weakness in this awful situation which Ivory had sustained with such cold-blooded nerve (Cronin, 1977, 298).

He got out of the cab in a state of wary anger--with himself for not having seen Irene, with Jolyon for having seen her; and now with his inability to tell exactly what he wanted (Galsworthy, 2004, 366).

Jis net supyko ant savęs dėl tokio atkaklaus žavėjimosi <don.lt>.

Viskas išsisprendė, galima nebesigraužti dėl savo elgesio, tik niršti, kad buvo tokia kvailė ir kažko tikėjosi <don.lt>.

Sometimes the truth also can provoke anger:

"You are affected in that piece," she would say; and, as there was an element of truth in her condemnation, his blood boiled with anger (Lawrence, 2004, 272).

Tėvas sakė tiesą, todėl jis dar labiau užpyko <don.lt>.

As it was mentioned, it is impossible to convey all the causes of the emotional state of **anger**. It is the emotional state which can be caused by any thing, action, person or phenomenon, and it depends on how a particular person understands the situation or treats one or another thing,

i.e. it depends on the experience of a person. In everyday life of people speaking the Lithuanian and English languages, we can find many examples when **anger** is caused by a physical action (e.g. *a fight, a dog's bite*), however, it is not very common in fiction.

Based on the analysis of the examples, the causes of the emotional state of anger can be presented in the following scheme. The illustration does not include all the causes of anger due to the reasons mentioned earlier in this part.




Fig. 2: The causes of the emotional state of anger

The inventorization of emotional states is endless (it correlates with the approach that the limits of a concept can be hardly defined). Only part of the concept is verbalized, that is why it can be treated as more important than the information stored and passed on in non-verbal ways.

2.2. The Manifestation of Anger

The existence of the emotional state of **anger** is commonly understood in terms of physical presence. One is typically aware of someone's presence if it is nearby and s/he can see it. This is the basis for metaphor EXISTENCE IS PRESENCE, e.g.:

It was the first time he had seen Christine angry (Cronin, 1977, 65).

There were signs of hostility from either side (London, 1997, 148).

The Forsytes were resentful of something, not individually, but as a family; this resentment expressed itself in an added perfection of raiment, an exuberance of family cordiality, an exaggeration of family importance, and – the sniff (Galsworthy, 2004, 5).

Nerodyk man savo pykčio, aš vis tiek išeisiu <don.lt>.

Associated with the entity **anger** is a scale that measures its intensity. As the intensity of **anger** increases, S experiences physiological effects. First, it causes the increase in body heat. We can find many examples to illustrate this effect:

He started and a slow flush of shame and resentment spread over his face (Cronin, 1977, 157).

She was fiery and furious as he. They went on till he called her a liar (Lawrence, 2004, 27).

And the slow, sulky anger Soames had felt all the afternoon burned the brighter within him (Galsworthy, 2004, 89).

Juodakaktį ne sykį kaitino siutas - imti ir išnešioti tą jų gyvenvietę atgal į vienkiemius, tegu gyvena kaip nori <don.lt>.

Ir piktumas, budėjęs Teresės krūtinėj, vyriškų rankų paglostytas ūmai plykstelėjo <don.lt>.

O jei, palikęs tuos, kuriuos pyktis degino po vieną, užsinorėsi pažvelgti į kardu iškapotus susirinkimų dalyvius <don.lt>?

Also, seized by **anger**, a person experiences internal pressure:

When I found out, I almost burst a blood vessel <concord>.

The thought rankled with the bitterness of a long-inflicted injury in her tenacious old heart (Galsworthy, 2004, 13).

A dumb and grumbling anger swelled his bosom (Lawrence, 2004, 32).

Baisus siutas paėmė. Bjauriausia, kad ir padaryti nieko negali. Nors iš pykčio ir sprok <don.lt>.

Pyktis drasko moterį - ji visai sutrikusi <don.lt>.

The existence of the emotional state of **anger** is best shown by its location. It is common that the place of feelings, the center of emotions is *heart* and *soul* (Boers, 1997, 6; Šimėnaitė, 2003, 20), though it is not so in all the languages. For example, in the world-views of the Iranian, Tadjic, or Persian languages the center of emotions is *liver* (Šimėnaitė, 2003, 77), and it is recorded in the world-view of the Infaluk language, that emotional, spiritual, and mental life is concentrated in *guts* (Pimenova, 1999, 36).

However, in most Indo-European languages, *soul* is the center of all the inner world of a human being, a material object (Beresnevičius, 1990, 93). *Heart* is usually the organ of feelings

and desires. The feelings, which appear in heart, depend less on the outer circumstances than those, which are related to *soul*.

Soul and *heart* are not the only containers for emotions. These organs are in *breast* – *inside* the human being, that is why, they can also act as the place for emotions.

The emotional states of **anger** in the Lithuanian and English languages can appear in some places. The most intensive emotions are situated in *heart*:

His heart beat with rage and the hot night <...> (Greene, 1982, 71).

Paul felt his heart go hard and angry (Lawrence, 2004, 397).

Neapykanta ir pyktis įsižiebė jų širdyse <don.lt>.

Roko širdyje, giliai giliai kaupiasi pyktis, kuris paprastai vėliau prasiveržia <don.lt>.

The emotions located in *soul* are not so strong. They come there themselves or affected by some unexplainable force:

All were gone; and in spite the rage roused within her championing soul at the thought <...> (Galsworthy, 2004, 234).

Pyktis neduoda ramybės sielai, kaip kitos ydos, o pasigrobia ją ir kursto <don.lt>.

The most undefined location of emotions is the *inside* of a person, who experiences them. The emotions *inside* a person occupy a lot of space, so they are potentially more intensive:

He was full, too, of resentment (Galsworthy, 2004, 402).

She sat full of bitterness (Lawrence, 2004, 308).

Dabar gi supratome, kad dar gajus mūmyse pyktis ir pagieža <don.lt>.

Pyktis manyje virte verda, todėl dar neinu namo <don.lt>.

The emotional states of **anger** in the world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages can be expressed in *breast*. They are usually already situated there and remind about their existence when something or somebody provokes them. The emotional states of **anger** are so strong here, that they may cause the intention to hurt another person:

Veiling under a Jove-like serenity that perpetual antagonism deep-seated in the bosom of a director towards his shareholders, he faced them calmly (Galsworthy, 2004, 119).

Anger struggled in his breast with misery (Maugham, 2004, 31).

Drauge su išgąsčiu, su baime tavo krūtinėj užsiplieksdavo pyktis, itūžis <don.lt>.

Man krūtinėje netelpa pyktis, <...> <don.lt>.

Quite often, in the world-views of the compared languages, a concrete place of the emotional state of **anger** is indicated. **Anger** is present in *head*:

Let not worry and shame and anger chase like evil night birds in his head (Galsworthy, 2004, 478).

Galvoje tvenkiasi pyktis <don.lt>.

It can also appear and act in *brains*:

“Oh, is that all?” she asked with immense relief, and irritation at her ignorance moved like hatred unfairly in his brain (Galsworthy, 2004, 210).

Man smegenyse kaip laikrodis tvinksi pyktis <don.lt>.

It is very common in both the Lithuanian and English languages to show **anger** in *tears*:

She had denied just now that she felt any bitterness, but a little more of it drained out now like tears from exhausted ducts (Greene, 1982, 272).

“It’s you,” she flared, bright tears of vexation in her eyes (Cronin, 1977, 65).

Ji nusisuko, tramdydama pykčio ašaras <don.lt>.

Vos besulaikydama piktas įniršio ašaras, ji išdėstė visą istoriją <don.lt>.

Gulėjo prispaudęs veidą prie užtiesalo, liedamas pykčio ir skausmo ašaras <don.lt>.

Very often **anger** is seen in *eyes* or in a *glance*. This is a very common place for this emotional state and its counterparts:

Her eyes grew steady with anger, like old Jolyon’s when his will was crossed (Galsworthy, 2004, 39).

“What are you amused at?” he said, with a gleam of anger in his eyes (Maugham, 2004, 68).

Jų žvilgsnyje – pyktis, pagieža, neapykanta, nepasitikėjimas <don.lt>.

Irmos akyse tvykstelėjo pyktis <don.lt>.

In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, we can find one more place of **anger**, that is the *eyelashes*:

Išsišėrusiomis Burokienės blakstienomis blykstelėjo ir užgeso nesąmoningas pyktis <don.lt>.

However, in the world-view of the English language, such an expression was not found.

The emotional states of **anger** can be expressed on *face*. They are so strong that even can distort it, change the features of a person:

The look on her face, such as he had never seen before, such as she had always hidden from him, was full of secret resentments, and longings, and fears (Galsworthy, 2004, 66).

Suddenly his face contracted with wrath (Lawrence, 2004, 186).

Pelenius net lošteli sustojęs. Veidą iškreipia pyktis <don.lt>.

Akimirką senis atlėgo, bet greitai niršulys vėl pasirodė jo veide, visoje jo išraiškoje <don.lt>.

In the world-view of the English language, the location of the emotional states of **anger** on *face* is indicated more precisely. It appears on *cheeks*:

I felt my cheeks grow red with sudden anger (Maugham, 2004, 118).

In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, we can find some examples where anger is situated in *throat*. It is not very common in the English language:

She swallowed her anger and her shame, bowing her dark head (Lawrence, 2004, 151).

The example hints that the emotional state of **anger** may be situated in *throat*, because it is swallowed; however, the location is just implied. In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, the location – *throat* – is indicated directly:

Toks siutas pradeda gniaužti gerkle, kad, rodos, pats save sudraskytum, širdį išplėštum <don.lt>.

Apmaudas ir pyktis užgniaužė gerkle, Rūta net suvirpėjo, nupurtyta nevilties kupino pasidygėjimo <don.lt>.

Valentina pasijuto lyg apipilta šaltu vandeniu. Pyktis užsmaugė gerkle <don.lt>.

The emotional states of **anger** can be located not only in the upper part of a human body. In the world-view of the English language, we find an example when **anger** is situated in *legs*, more precisely, in *knees*:

His face was aflame, even his knees seemed to blush with rage, shame, self-depreciation (Greene, 1982, 132).

The most common and, probably, best seen, or more precisely, heard expression of **anger** is in *words*. A person experiencing this emotion becomes rude, offensive, and noisy. S/he passes his/her **anger** in a *voice*:

“Do with myself?” repeated old Jolyon with an angry break in his voice (Galsworthy, 2004, 29).

“Besides” – her voice suddenly flashed into anger and contempt – “it is disgusting – bits of lads and girls courting” (Lawrence, 2004, 165).

Veronika vis tiek nesutinka, ir pyktis jau skamba jos balse <don.lt>.

<...>bet mano balsq vis dar valkstė galutinai nenugramzdintas pyktis <don.lt>.

In the English language, also, the uttered *words* and *phrases* may contain **anger**:

But now his quarry again began muttering words of violent hate and anger (Galsworthy, 2004, 216).

There was warmth of fury in his last phrases (Lawrence, 2004, 227).

The metaphorical locations of emotional states of **anger** in the Lithuanian and English languages are presented in the following table:

THE LOCATIONS OF THE EMOTIONAL STATES OF ANGER

The Lithuanian language	The English language
Širdis	Heart
Siela	Soul
Krūtinė	Breast, bosom
Veidas	Face
Akys	Eyes
Žvilgsnis	Glance
-----	Cheeks
Blakstienos	-----
Ašaros	Tears
Gerklė	Throat (implied)
Galva	Head
Smegenys	Brain
Vidus	Inside
-----	Knees
Balsas	Voice
-----	Words, phrases

The localization of the emotional states of **anger** in the world-views of the Lithuanian languages has many similarities, however, in some cases it differs.

The analyzed examples of **anger** and its counterparts can ground the second part of the prototypical situation scenario – **manifestation of anger**. As it was proved that **anger** exists, it can be very intensive, it may affect the person who experiences this emotional state him/herself or other people around him/her, we can pass on the third stage of the prototypical situation scenario – **the attempt at controlling anger**.

2.3. The Attempt at Controlling Anger

Anger is a negative emotion, which seizes a person, and forces him/her to act in an unacceptable way. Moreover, loss of control is damaging to S's own well-being, that is why S has a responsibility to control his/her **anger** (Lakoff, 1987, 398).

A person him/herself understands that s/he has to control it:

You need to subdue your anger <concord>.

Raukim pykti iš savo širdžių <don.lt>.

Valdykime pykti <don.lt>.

To overcome **anger**, one needs to put lots of effort. S/he has to do something that would defeat or at least lessen this feeling:

Outraged and on edge, Soames recoiled (Galsworthy, 2004, 448).

With a great effort, he recovered his temper, and looked at me with a smile (Maugham, 2004, 115).

Įkvėpė oro, kiek pajėgė. Nealsavo. Iškvėpęs pajuto, kad piktumas atlėgo <don.lt>.

Tereikia laiko, pastangu, noro – ir nereikės pykti ant savęs ir viso pasaulio, kad iki visiškos laimės pritrūko tik kelių minučių <don.lt>.

Sometimes S realizes that s/he has no right to be angry with somebody or something, and this notion helps to suppress his/her **anger**:

The sting, of course, was in the “hidden away”, but how could he allow to feel the least irritation, remembering the letter she had written to him <...> (Maugham, 2004, 231)?

I can't get angry with people I love (Galsworthy, 2004, 267).

Prisiminiau Reginos sudaužytą vazą. Kaip gali pykti ar bausti? Aš pati kalta, kad taip atsitiko <don.lt>.

Laikausi principo, kad negalima pykti – padarė klaidą, reikia žiūrėti kaip ją ištaisyti <don.lt>.

Another person can help to subdue the emotional state of **anger** of S. S/he intentionally or not intentionally does something that changes the emotional state or prevents S from getting angry:

“Very well then, we will bring your breakfast up to your room, so that my father may not be vexed about it” (Balzac, 1952, 332).

I do not know that it was attractive, but it lit up his face, changing the expression, which was furious (Maugham, 2004, 65).

Pagiedosiu, ir jo piktumas išnyks kaip rytą rasa <don.lt>

Džekas rėkia, stūgauja, bet tereikia jam žvilgtelėti į lakūną, ir pyktis atsitraukia, o veidą nutvieskia vis dar gundanti ir vyliojanti šypsena <don.lt>.

Anger is an emotional state which depends on a person who possesses it. S/he is able to control it if s/he desires to do that:

He would not see them, and let the old bitterness, the old longing rise up within him (Galsworthy, 2004, 481)!

If he had known the tumult in that still breast, he would not have lost his temper as he did (Cronin, 1977, 269).

Ilgai niršti Vycka nemėgo <don.lt>.

Negaliu ilgai pykti ant žmonių, kuriems simpatizuoju, o Tu stovi netgi aukščiau už juos <don.lt>.

Sometimes a person is able to hide the experienced **anger** from others, in such a way controlling it. Though s/he tortures him/herself, an inappropriate behavior caused by **anger** does not harm others:

The look on her face, such as he had never seen there before, such as she had always hidden from him, was full of secret resentments, and longings, and fears (Galsworthy, 2004, 66).

He breast rose and fell as though with secret anger (Grisham, 1991, 62).

Ji stengėsi paslėpti kylantį įniršį <don.lt>.

Quite often, the emotional state of **anger** can be suppressed because of the human nature. A person possesses more positive emotions, which can choke off the rising **anger**:

Chafing at the slowness of his cab, he reached the Zoo door; but, with his sunny instinct for seizing the good of each moment he forgot his vexation <...> (Galsworthy, 2004, 127).

Even then, however, he was not offensive, but one of those people who hurt themselves by their own irritability more than they hurt other people (Lawrence, 2004, 112).

Aš branginu dvasios ramybę, užtat niekam nepavydžiu, pyktis tuoj pat vėju praeina, vengiu konfliktų <don.lt>.

Jeigu tu dabar ir supykai ant jo, tai pyktis greit praeis, nes tėčio meilė tokia didelė, kad tavo pyktį kaipmat išgarins <don.lt>.

People very often attempt to control **anger**, because they have the notion of the consequences, which usually are not suitable for them. To prevent this, they do not intend getting angry or quarrel with other people:

He considered Bosinney's conduct in every way outrageous, but he did not wish to run up against him, feeling that the meeting would be awkward (Galsworthy, 2004, 219).

Today, he thought, she can't afford to quarrel – or so she believes (Greene, 1982, 209).

Tačiau negaliu pyktis su ja, nes esu senas ir neturėčiau kur eiti, jei ji mane išvartytų <don.lt>.

Kita prielaida – pacientas nenori pyktis su gydytoju, gydymo įstaiga, ypač jei vėl teks ten sugrįžti <don.lt>.

Also, as people are able to decide what is good and right, they are able to foresee that getting angry is useless or even silly, in cases, when the experienced **anger** will not change the matter, just cause the torture for him/herself. Therefore, they prevent themselves from this emotional state:

He looked such a fool she was not even angry with him (Lawrence, 2004, 48).

She retained no rancor against poor, dear Fred, he was such a fool (Galsworthy, 2004, 193).

Pasirodo, kad nereikia pykti ant pranašesnio, o būtina pačiam lavintis ir pralenkti aną <don.lt>.

Tikrai beprasmiška pykti ant ligos už tai, kad ji tave apniko. Pati liga tavo įsiūčio net nesuvoks <don.lt>.

Each person has a certain tolerance for controlling **anger**. That tolerance can be viewed as the limit point on the anger scale (Lakoff, 1987, 398). However, as it is seen from the analyzed examples, one has to put enormous efforts to control it, and it is not always possible. When the intensity goes beyond that limit, S can no longer control his/her emotional state of **anger**. According to the prototypical scenario, we reach the fourth stage – **loss of control**.

2.4. The Loss of Control

According to Lakoff and Kövecses (1987, 143), the stage – loss of control – of the prototypical cognitive model conveys some steps:

- The intensity of anger goes above the limit.
- Anger takes control of self.
- S exhibits angry behavior (aggressive actions).
- There is damage to self.
- There is danger to target of anger, in this case, the wrongdoer.

We will follow these steps to see how **anger** and its counterparts perform in the world-views of two different languages: Lithuanian and English.

Anger is an emotional state that can be very intensive. In the case of losing control over **anger**, a person must experience an extremely intensive emotion, or it should rise rapidly to reach and overcome the limit:

By this time Andrew's temper was rising rapidly (Cronin, 1977, 16).

"It's not like Jolyon to be late!" he said to Irene, with uncontrollable vexation (Galsworthy, 2004, 34).

Iš merginos srūte sruvo baisus pyktis, šaltis, svetimumas <don.lt>

Kartais stačiai piktumas sukildavo – kokia nepraustaburnė! <don.lt>.

When **anger** reaches the limit, it takes control of a person who experiences it:

It was anger that had seized Mrs. Strickland, and her pallor was the pallor of a cold and sudden rage (Maugham, 2004, 48).

She choked with rage, her two fists uplifted (Lawrence, 2004, 20).

Baisus siutas paėmė. Bjauriausia, kad nieko negali padaryti. Nors iš pykčio ir sprok <don.lt>.

Kai praleidome trečią įvartį, apėmė pyktis. Turbūt pirmą kartą gyvenime taip negalėjau save suvaldyti aiškstėjė <don.lt>.

A person, i.e. S, exhibits angry behavior, which is usually aggressive actions. Overcome by **anger** a person can attack another one physically:

His body bunched together as though for a spring, and his face became as an infuriated beast's as he snarled, "It's a—" (London, 1997, 15).

"I think that he is a better man than you are," I answered, impelled, somehow, with a desire to draw upon myself a portion of the wrath I felt was about to break upon his head (London, 1997, 57).

Supaistysi tu vyrus. Įsigėrė, užėjo siutas ir apdaužė <don.lt>.

Užgniaužtas pyktis išsilies kitu pavidalu: muštynėmis, liga, ižūliais išpuoliais už mokyklos ribų <don.lt>

Toks siutas mane pagavo. Tvėriau už taburetės (iš kur dar galia atsirado?) ir užsimojau <don.lt>.

However, such an expression of loss of **anger** is not a common one in the world-views of the English language. More often, it is expressed by cruel and offensive words, the raised tone:

Besides"--her voice suddenly flashed into anger and contempt--"it is disgusting—bits of lads and girls courting" (Lawrence, 2004, 165).

"There!" said Denny in a suppressed voice, as though all the secret bitterness of his life escaped into that single word (Cronin, 1977, 31).

"Do with myself?" repeated old Jolyon with an angry break in his voice (Galsworthy, 2004, 29).

Kai išėjome į švintančią gatvę, ji paniuro, ėmė niršti, vadino šeimninę ragana, davatka, ir dar bjauriau <don.lt>.

Šitokios tirados betgi man patiko todėl, kad vaizdžiai parodė, koks pyktis ir pavydas užsiliepsnojo žmonėse <don.lt>

Susipykus dėl sūnaus, pyktis prasiverždavo riksmu, barniais <...> <don.lt>.

In addition, when **anger** overcomes a person, S is out of control and acts under coercion; s/he is not responsible for his/her actions:

Although he was so desperately anxious to prove his case he almost regretted his impulse in producing it (Cronin, 1977, 180).

Pyktis Katriutę užsodino ant motociklo ir pakišo tokią mintį: <...> <don.lt>.

A person starts to behave unusually and vent **anger** on things:

Manson, after a furious evening during which he composed and tore up three vitriolic letters to the medical officer of health, tried to forget about the episode (Cronin, 1977, 38).

The Commissioner stopped whittling the corner of his desk and drove his knife furiously into the top (Greene, 1982, 143).

In a temper he dragged it, so that it flew out bodily, and spoons, forks, knives, a hundred metallic things, splashed with a clatter and a clang upon the brick floor (Lawrence, 2004, 42).

Na, ir apėmė siutas. Išspardžiau kibirus, išmaliau langus su visais rėmais <don.lt>

Mane sukaustė toks pyktis, kad norėjosi išrengtus tuos skarmalėlius tėkšti sveikatos apsaugos ministrui <don.lt>.

As **anger** is an emotional state inside a person, consequently, it makes damage to S. First, when **anger** seizes a person, it is so powerful that can change the look on a face, distort the features of a person who experiences it:

Suddenly his face contracted with wrath (Lawrence, 2004, 186).

And I noticed the boyish face of Harrison,—a good face once, but now a demon's,—convulsed with passion as he told the new-comers of the hell-ship they were in and shrieked curses upon the head of Wolf Larsen (London, 1997, 123).

Pelanius net lošteli sustojęs. Veidą iškreipia pyktis <don.lt>.

Pyktis iškraipo ne tik veidą ar kūną <...> <don.lt>.

Anger can cause some physical changes of a person: trembling, heart beating, deranged breathing:

Aunts Juley and Hester were on their feet at once, trembling from smothered resentment <...> (Galsworthy, 2004, 357).

His heart beat with rage and the hot night: the sweat drained from his armpits (Greene, 1982, 71).

Gabrielė vangiai įlindo į palaidinę, ją purtas niršulys vis dar nenuslopo <don.lt>.

Iš įsiūčio jo širdis pradėjo daužytis <don.lt>.

Aklas kunkuliuojantis įniršis užgniaužė jam kvapą <don.lt>

Seized with **anger**, a person loses the ability to think clearly, becomes blind:

It's the climate for meanness, fury, snobbery, but anything like anger or love drives a man off his head (Greene, 1982, 31).

You drink till you are blind with rage (Maugham, 2004, 66).

Pyktis apakina žmogų, jis praranda sveiką orientaciją ir jo nebesupranta aplinkiniai <don.lt>.

Neveltui sakoma: supykai – pralaimėjai, pyktis aptemdo protą <don.lt>.

The emotional state of **anger** can even provoke illness:

But Morel's blood was up. William was bigger, but Morel was hard-muscled, and mad with fury (Lawrence, 2004, 62).

His rage was a madness (London, 1997, 59).

Užgniaužtas pyktis – depresijos priežastis <don.lt>.

Įrodyta, kad nuolatinis pyktis dėl smulkmenų sveikata griauna kur kas labiau už didelius stresus <don.lt>.

However, **anger** harms not only a person who is in this emotional state. Seized with **anger**, a person is no longer in control of him/herself. There is danger to the target of **anger** – the wrongdoer:

Brutality had followed brutality, and flaming passions and cold-blooded cruelty had driven men to seek one another's lives, and to strive to hurt, and maim, and destroy (London, 1997, 60).

Before Dawes, in fury and agony, could wrench him free, he had got his fists twisted in the scarf and his knuckles dug in the throat of the other man (Lawrence, 2004, 381).

Pyktis tuojau pat išsiverš ir padarysiu ką nors siaubinga <don.lt>.

Bet kartu ir toks piktumas ant mamos, kad sergėk, Dieve <don.lt>.

Since S is out of control and acting under coercion, s/he is not responsible for his/her actions. This causes the emotional state of fear of another person to whom this **anger** is addressed or a person who is aware of the consequences:

For want of the warm cuffs she caught a chill after a violent perspiration brought on by one of her husband's fearful outbursts of rage (Balzac, 1952, 376).

But that men should wreak their anger on others by the bruising of the flesh and the letting of blood was something strangely and fearfully new to me (London, 1997, 61).

Žmones pyktis baugina taip pat, kaip šešėlis kūdikius, raudona plunksna žvėris <don.lt>.

Dėl ko nors užpykęs jis imdavo baltakiuoti ir taip niršti, kad jei net šiurpas per nugarą nueidavo <don.lt>.

Pirma, jei pyktis turi tiek jėgos, kiek grasina, jis nekenčiamas dėl to, kad baugina <don.lt>.

Anger can be so strong and intensive that it can even lead to death:

“Grandet, you will kill me with your angry fits,” said the poor wife (Balzac, 1952, 382).

Achilo pyktis, kuris buvo Hektoro mirties priežastis, - tai ne tas pats pyktis, kuris atnešė tiek nelaimių graikams <don.lt>.

Ajantą į mirtį atnešė pamišimas, o į pamišimą – pyktis <don.lt>.

When the control over the emotional state of **anger** is lost, S performs the act of retribution.

2.5. The Retribution

In the prototypical case, the retribution takes the form of an act by S against some target. The wrongdoer is the target of the act, and s/he is in danger of S's angry behavior:

The Cockney strove in vain to protect himself from the infuriated boy (London, 1997, 60).

For some incomprehensible reason his anger became directed towards Christine (Cronin, 1977, 125).

Suddenly he turned on her in a fury, his eyes flashing: <...> (Lawrence, 2004, 75).

Visas moterų pyktis buvo nukreiptas į ministrą <don.lt>.

Klaidinimo ir manipuliavimo politika atsispindi daugumoje dainų, kur žydų pyktis nukreiptas ne prieš vokiečių okupantus, bet prieš juos pavaduojančias jėgas <don.lt>.

<...> bemat viduje sukyla vos vos tvardomas pyktis Sokratui – dėl to, kad šis stovi čia lyg niekur nieko <...> <don.lt>.

Lakoff (1987, 396-405) discusses the ontology of **anger**: the entities, predicates and events required. **Anger**, as analyzed earlier, is a separable entity, as it can overcome someone, take control, and cause S to act in ways s/he would not normally act. The ontology of **anger** also includes a number of predicates: *displeasing, cause, exist, control, dangerous, damaging, balance*. There are also some other kinds of events: the physiological effects; the angry behaviors. All of them were discussed in the previous parts of the research.

Since **anger** has a quantitative aspect, the ontology must include a scale of **anger**, including an intensity, a zero point and a limit point. The basic **anger** scenario also includes an offending event and a retributive act. Each of these has a quantitative aspect and must also include an intensity, a zero point, and a limit. When **anger** reaches and overcomes a limit point, S performs the act of retribution. The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offense:

This kind of thing was gall and bitterness to Mrs. Morel that she had a fair share of it (Lawrence, 2004, 18).

He was livid with rage and thirsting for battle (Cronin, 1977, 80).

Rugpjūčio apklausoje teigiama, kad italų “eržilų” nirtulys silpnėja, nes merginos daros seksualiai agresyvesnės <don.lt>.

Tik ūmai sukyla toks apmaudas, toks piktumas, kad pastumiu šalia važiuojantį <don.lt>.

When the intensity of retribution roughly equals the intensity of the offense and the scales are balanced again, the intensity of **anger** drops to zero:

And then his anger moved away again, like a shabby man, when he thought of Fraser's disappointment in the morning (Greene, 1982, 39).

Once again in his cab, his anger evaporated, for so it ever was with his wrath – when he had rapped out, it was gone (Galsworthy, 2004, 140).

All his striving, his frenzied efforts, his almost hysterical outbursts seemed far away and done with (Cronin, 1977, 145).

Kol aptalžė, kol pamokė, supluko ir visas siutas išgaravo <don.lt>.

Kol iš jo pasiutimas išėjo ir pyktis ant viso pasaulio galiūnų išgaravo <don.lt>.

Argi nesakoma, jei supykai – apibėk apie namą tris kartus, ir pyktis praeis <don.lt>?

The prototypical scenario of **anger** in both the Lithuanian and English languages is composed of five successive stages conveying *an ontological*, *a causal*, and *an expressive aspect*. The prototypical cognitive model has *an ontological part* that gives us an idea of the ontological status and nature of **anger**, i.e., what kind of thing/event it is: in the compared languages **anger**, or its counterparts, is a force inside a person that can exert pressure on him/her.

The ontological part also includes some physiological processes associated with the respective emotion. This part constitutes the second stage of the prototypical scenario or model as a whole. Kövecses (1999, 145) names it as *the causal part*. This presents **anger** and its counterparts as an emotion that is caused, or produced, by a certain situation. Still another part of a scenario is concerned with *the expressive component*; that is, the ways in which **anger**, or its counterparts, is expressed in different cultures.

Finally, the expressive component is preceded by *a control component* that is manifested as two separate stages of the model: attempt at controlling expression and loss of control over expression. Thus, the resulting five-stage model for the Lithuanian and English cultures seems to be the following:

Cause → existence of anger → attempt at control → loss of control → expression

This seems to be *the basic structure* that both cultures share in their folk understanding.

To conclude we can say that the emotional concept of **anger** in the Lithuanian and English languages is remarkably similar in regard to its basic structure.

3. The Level of Conceptual Metaphors and the Peculiarities of Translation of the Concept of Anger

In this part of the work, we will discuss the conceptual metaphors, which define the peculiarities of the concept, which in the Lithuanian language is represented by the word **pyktis**, and in the English language by the word **anger**. Conceptual metaphors relate only to sublogical part of the concept. Taking into account the “behavior” of the emotional state in the text, the

examples are grouped into several clusters. After the analysis of each cluster, the peculiarities of translation of the concept of **anger** into the Lithuanian language are presented.

The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. Metaphor not only pervades the language people use about the emotions, it is essential to the understanding of most aspects of the conceptualization of emotion and emotional experience (Kövecses, 1999, 20).

Conceptual metaphors involve two domains – *the source domain* and *the target domain*, which express the essence of metaphors. *The source domain* is typically more physical or concrete. It is expressed by the second part of the conceptual metaphor, and addresses various aspects of the concept of **anger**. For example, in the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS OPPONENT attention is drawn to the aspect of control, and in ANGER IS INSANITY focus is on the insane behavior. *The target domain* is, thus, more abstract. In our case, it is **anger** itself.

The groups of conceptual metaphors are followed by the analysis of the translation of the concept of **anger**. Translation is considered as means of communication between parties from different language regions; communication between the sender and the receiver, in which the translator performs the role of mediator. The translator is to decode the message and to present it to the listener or the reader. Bell defines translation as “the replacement of a representation of a text in one language by a representation of an equivalent text in a second language” (Bell, 1991, 6). He points out that languages differ from one another in a variety of respects. While translating something can be lost, therefore translators are often accused of reproducing only a part of the original and “betraying” the author’s intentions.

Marcinkevičienė (1996) asserts that in the process of translation the translator faces great difficulties. On the one hand, s/he is influenced by peculiarities of a source language (SL) text, on the other hand – by the standards of the target language (TL). The author provides two conceptions about *the standard*. The first conception emphasizes that the standard means the correct usage of TL units. The second conception is wide, though not defined enough. It involves delicate translation peculiarities, tendencies, and the so-called “spirit of language.” The latter standard requires the translator to know SL to such extent as to be able to read, whereas s/he must know TL so well as to be ready to create in this language (Marcinkevičienė, 1996, 67-69).

Whatever the difficulty in the translation process, procedures must aim at the essence of the message and faithfulness to the meaning of the SL text being transferred to the TL text. In the words of Nida and Taber (1974), translating consists of reproducing, in the TL, the nearest equivalent to the message in the SL, in the first place in the semantic aspect and, in the second place, in the stylistic aspect.

To a great extent, the quality of translation will depend on the quality of the translator, i.e. on his/her knowledge, skills, training, cultural background, expertise, and even mood.

Z. Maalej (2004) states that translation of stylistic devices, which cause the biggest difficulties to translators, is believed to be strongly dependent on the type of the text in which it occurs. In informative texts, where they have no real functional relevance informatively speaking, lexicalized metaphors, similes, and metonymies are of high translatability, and might as well be ignored in the translation process; and in expressive texts, where they carry a heavy informational load, these stylistic devices are of low translatability since they convey contextual, semantic, and pragmatic information. The translatability of any given SL stylistic device depends on (1) the particular cultural experiences and semantic associations exploited by it, and (2) the extent to which these can, or cannot, be reproduced correctly in TL, depending on the degree of “overlap” in each particular case (internet access: www.simsim.rug.ac/Zmaalej/transmeta.html).

Translation of conceptual metaphors and the concepts do create difficulties. According to Lakoff (1987), in discussions of relativism it is often claimed that if two languages have radically different conceptual systems, then translation from one language to another is impossible. Accurate translation requires close correspondences across conceptual systems. The difference between translation and understanding is this: translation requires the mapping from one language to another language. Understanding is something that is internal to a person. It has to do with his/her ability to conceptualize and to match those concepts to his/her experiences, on the one hand, and to the expressions of the new language on the other. Translation of concepts for well-structured experiences, which are universal, is often possible and understanding is relatively easy, if not immediate. Metaphorically defined concepts (e.g., the Western TIME IS MONEY or the traditional Japanese idea that THE BELLY [*hara*] is THE LOCUS OF THOUGHT AND FEELING) cause more difficulties for translators. Each language comes with an enormously wide range of such concepts and their corresponding expressions (Lakoff, 1987, 311-313).

In the analysis of translation of the conceptual metaphors of **anger**, we will aim to explore how linguistic means correlate in translation between the Lithuanian and English languages. In the translation of the concept of **anger** understood through the conceptual metaphors from the English languages into Lithuanian, we will draw attention to the similarities and differences of the original and translated texts not taking into account the grammatical transformations. We will refer to the lexical transformations influenced by the conceptual system of the world-views of the compared languages.

3.1. ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER

ANGER IS A HOT FLUID is one of the most productive metaphors in both the Lithuanian and English languages. The image of EMOTION – FLUID has come from the mythology of the Bible (Vorkachev, 2002, 56). Fluids are mobile, can change their place quickly. Emotions appear and disappear with lightning speed. Fluids and their measure differ from the *drop* to the *ocean*, *blood*, *boiling water*. Every emotional state conceptualized in such way has many qualitative and quantitative variations. The bigger their measurement, the stronger the emotional state is.

Fluid is kept in a container. The ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor allows us to conceptualize intensity (*filled with*), control (*contain*), loss of control (*could not keep inside*), dangerousness (*brim with*), expression (*express/show*), etc. of the emotional state of **anger** (Kövecses, 1995, 55). Indeed, it appears that no other conceptual metaphor associated with **anger** can provide us with the understanding of all these facets of **anger**. This feature of the CONTAINER metaphor may in part be responsible for the singular popularity of the metaphor both historically in a civilization (Geeraerts and Grondelaers, 1991) and cross-culturally (Solomon, 1984). It is also the metaphor that appears to be the most popular both as a folk theory and as a scientific theory of emotion (Solomon, 1984; Lutz, 1988; Kövecses, 1990).

When there is no heat, the liquid is cool and calm. In the central metaphor, cool and calmness corresponds to lack of **anger**:

- *Keep cool <concord>!*

Bet po to, kai atvėso visas pyktis, Veronika atsiminė batukus <...> <don.lt>.

The HEAT OF FLUID IN A CONTAINER is referred to as the source domain of the central metaphor and ANGER as the target domain.

According to Lakoff (1987, 384), we usually have extensive knowledge about source domains. This conceptual metaphor is productive because it can carry over details of that knowledge from the source domain to the target domain. Lakoff refers to such carryovers as metaphorical *entailments*. Such entailments are part of our conceptual system. They constitute elaborations of conceptual metaphors. The central metaphor has a rich system of metaphorical entailments. For example, one thing we know about hot fluids is that, when they start to boil, the fluid goes upward. This gives rise to the entailment:

When the intensity of **anger** increases, the fluid rises:

Pretty soon I was in a towering rage <concord>.

But the shooting has once more raised Armenian passions to boiling point <concord>.

Pyktis pasirodo iškildamas į paviršiu <don.lt>.

Kažkokia slopinama pagieža kilo mano krūtinėje <don.lt>.

We also know that intense heat produces steam and creates pressure on the container.

This yields the metaphorical entailments:

Intense **anger** produces steam:

Billy's just blowing off steam <concord>.

I was fuming <concord>.

In the Lithuanian language, such conceptual metaphor was not found. On the contrary, when **anger** produces steam, it evaporates, and this indicates the loss of **anger**:

Po tokio nuoširdaus prisipažinimo išgaruoja bet koks pyktis <don.lt>.

Jeigu tu dabar ir supykai ant jo, tai pyktis greit praeis, nes tėčio meilė tokia didelė, kad tavo pyktį kaipmat išgarins <don.lt>.

Nuo šiol visada prisimins, kad tvarka ir švara – svarbūs dalykai, o pyktis išgaruos <don.lt>.

However, as it is seen from the examples, fuming and producing steam in the English language refer to the intensive emotional state of **anger**.

Intense **anger** produces pressure on the container:

He was bursting with anger <concord>.

I could barely contain my rage <concord>.

Galvoje tvenkiasi pyktis <don.lt>.

“Ir kodėl aš šitam ponuliui turiu tarnauti?” – viduje verda vos trandomas pyktis <don.lt>.

Barbutė, nežinia kodėl pritvinkusi piktumo <...> <don.lt>.

When fluid reaches the limit, i.e. 100° C, it starts boiling. This shows a very intensive emotional state of **anger**:

She is boiling with anger <concord>.

The sight made his blood boil <concord>.

Waiting outside, while they voted on his case, he kicked his heels, simmering with exasperation (Cronin, 1977, 180).

Užvirė kaip verdančiu vandeniui apipiltas, išgirdęs tokias kalbas <don.lt>.

Seime virė, kunkuliavo aistros <don.lt>.

Net kraujas, būdavo, užverda <don.lt>.

When the pressure on the container becomes too high, the content escapes, sometimes exploding the container:

We won't tolerate any more of your outbursts <concord>.

<...> frustration boiled over in a series of riots in London, Bristol, Birmingham, <...>
<concord>.

When I told him, he just exploded <concord>.

Ilgai kauptas pyktis, nepasitikėjimas, netgi žinios bei pavydas tiesiog sprogs mumyse
<don.lt>.

Iš rašinio trykšte trykšta pyktis bei neapykanta ne tik gyvūnams, bet ir jų šeimininkams
<don.lt>.

Ko gero, visi suvokėm, kad tas laikraštis šviesaus nieko nenori, ir kažkoks pyktis tiesiog
sunkiasi <don.lt>.

In the Lithuanian language, we can find examples, when anger erupts in the form of lava, which is an extremely hot and powerful substance:

Ir tada visas mano pyktis staiga prasiveržė kaip lava. Negalėjau susivaldyti, aš šaukiau
<...> <don.lt>.

The emotional state of **anger** is related to fluid not only because it can fill in the human body, but also because it can be removed from the organism in fluid – tears:

“For goodness sake, hold your tongue,” she interrupted, tears of annoyance in her eyes
(Maugham, 2004, 67).

June bit her lip till the blood came, and walked back to her seat without another word, but she could not help the tears of rage rolling down her face (Galsworthy, 2004, 95).

Čia per kraštus liejasi pykčio ir nuoskaudos ašaros <don.lt>.

Švenčių dienomis nesaugu buvo ir danguje, ir vandenyje, ir ant žemės, pyktis ir ašaros
liejosi upeliais <don.lt>.

The smallest quantity of **anger** in the English language takes the shape of a tear. However, it does not express the lower intensity of this emotional state. In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, **anger** can be in the form of dew:

“Pagiedosiu, ir jo piktumas išnyks kaip rytą rasa” <don.lt>.

It does not harm anyone. It disappears easily, when the sun starts shining, not demanding any effort. Therefore, we can state that the smaller quantity of **anger**, the weaker it is.

Very intensive emotions in both languages can occupy larger spaces – they are shown as a torrent, flood, waves, and a storm:

Hitler was by no means altogether excluded from the angry storm of criticism which arose from the “crucifix action” <concord>.

He realized, all at once with a great flood of bitterness, that he had reached the limit of his endurance (Cronin, 1977, 80-81).

With some men, it needs a cataclysm, as a stone may be broken to fragments by the fury of a torrent (Maugham, 2004, 43).

Andrew felt the blood rise behind his ears in quick surging waves (Cronin, 1977, 80).

Pykčio banga užplūdo vaikiną <don.lt>.

Iš merginos srūte sruvo bausis pyktis, šaltis, svetimumas <don.lt>.

The conceptualized emotional state in the world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages can have different variants of their intensity. The English language has more variants to express the intensity of **anger** by the boiling water. The quantity of fluid does not indicate the intensity of **anger** in the English language; however, in the world-view of the Lithuanian language the smaller the quantity, the weaker the **anger**.

The ANGER – FLUID metaphors are most often translated by equivalent expressions into Lithuanian because the understanding of the concept of **anger** in these metaphors is similar:

She swallowed her anger and shame <...> (Lawrence, 2004, 151).

<...> ji nurijo savo pyktį ir gėdą (Lawrence, 1996, 202).

But that men should wreak their anger on others <...> (London, 1997, 61).

Bet, kad žmonės išlietu pyktį and kitą <...> (Londonas, 1991, 87).

Then Owen startled them all with the first burst of anger he had <...> (Cronin, 1977, 181).

Bet čia Ovenas visus nustebino pykčio prasiveržimu – tai atsitiko pirma kartą <...> (Kroninas, 1994, 204).

Sometimes the concept of **anger** perceived as fluid, is translated with some slight changes in the TL text. These changes refer to the expressed intensity of **anger**, perceived through this conceptual metaphor:

<...> the storm of indignation and anger that had sounded so genuine would subside <...> (Greene, 1982, 19).

<...> iš pažiūros tokia nuostabi pykčio ir nuoskaudos banga atslūgtų <...> (Grynas, 1994, 13).

The English example indicates that the emotional state of **anger** is conceptualized as a very intensive one, because it is referred to a storm. In the TL text, **anger** is compared to a wave, which is not so powerful as a storm. However, the Lithuanian sentence sounds vivid and the expressiveness of the original is preserved.

There are some cases when the emotional state of **anger** in the SL text is conceptualized as fluid, while in the TL text, the translators do not show this metaphorical correspondence.

When such expressions are translated as ordinary words or word combinations, they lose their stylistic expression:

And a kind of bitterness at the tenacity of his own admiration welled up in him (Galsworthy, 2004, 351).

Jis net supyko ant savęs dėl tokio atkaklaus žavėjimosi (Golsvortis, 1981, 350).

He was too strung up, too seething with indignation <...> (Cronin, 1977, 104).

Tuo momentu jis dar tebebuvo suirzęs, per daug įpykęs <...> (Kroninas, 1994, 114).

<...> he burst out at me, with renewed rage (London, 1997, 20).

<...> jis vėl supyko (Londonas, 1991, 30).

Sometimes, translators chose the non-equivalent word combinations, though the TL has them. It is in the case of tears, which in both the Lithuanian and English languages is the expression of ANGER – FLUID:

The tears of rage and disappointment rolled down June's cheeks (Galsworthy, 2004, 236).

Iniršio ir nevilties ašaros ėmė tekėti Džunės skruostais (Golsvortis, 1981, 232).

<...> could not help the tears of rage rolling down her face (Galsworthy, 2004, 95).

<...> neįstengdama sulaikyti iniršio ašarų, pasipylusių skruostais (Golsvortis, 1981, 98).

In the world-view of the English language, as presented in the examples, tears roll. The Lithuanian language has the same equivalent *ašaros rieda*, however, the examples of translation possess the word combinations *ašaros teka* and *ašaros pasipylė*, which indicate the more intensive and spontaneous ability of fluid to move.

Also, we can find examples in the original text, where the emphasis is on a fluid in a container, while the translation presents the intensive emotional state of **anger** referring it to the boiling fluid – blood:

Even as he spoke he felt his blood rise (Cronin, 1977, 134).

Jis pajuto, kad bekalbant užvirė jo kraujas (Kroninas, 1994, 149).

<...> brimmed up with wrath <...> (Lawrence, 2004, 185).

<...> kunkuliuodama pykčiu (Lawrence, 1996, 193).

However, both the original and the translation texts indicate an intensive emotional state of **anger**.

As it is not very common for **anger** in the world-view of the Lithuanian language to be located behind ears, some changes of the SL text are made:

Andrew felt the blood rise behind his ears in quick surging waves (Cronin, 1977, 80).

Endrius pajuto, kad kraujas nesuvaldoma banga mušė jam į galvą (Kroninas, 1994, 86).

Though the translator chooses the more common equivalent of the TL, the meaning of the original text remains the same, the expressiveness is preserved.

3.2. ANGER IS HEAT

The ANGER IS HEAT metaphor is based on the folk theory of physiological effects of **anger**, according to which increased body heat is a major effect of **anger**:

They were having a heated argument <concord>.

When the cop gave her a ticket, she got all hot and bothered and started cursing <concord>.

Plėšiką pradeda kaitinti pyktis. – Duok pinigų <don.lt>!

Šokteli pyktis, nukaitina Svajūnę <don.lt>.

Increased body heat and/or blood pressure is assumed to cause redness in the face and neck area, and such redness can also indicate the emotional state of **anger**:

And the red-faced man, his face now purplish with wrath, and with arms extended overhead <...> (London, 1997, 4).

She was scarlet with rage <concord>.

Jos veidas paraudo iš pykčio <don.lt>.

Irmos skruostai užkaito <don.lt>.

Colors play an important role in conceptualizing of the emotional state of **anger**. When the intensity of **anger** increases, the colors get darker:

The dark sun-bronze of his face went black with wrath, his eyes were ablaze (London, 1997, 43).

Iš pykčio jis pajuodo <don.lt>.

Though white color is the symbol of innocence, the light, in the case of the conceptual metaphors of **anger**, it expresses an extremely intensive emotion. A person experiencing it becomes pale:

<...> and took no notice whatever when our pilot, white with rage, shouted <...> (London, 1997, 4).

Holly went pale with anger (Galsworthy, 2004, 399).

Jis vis labiau blyško iš pykčio <don.lt>.

Iš įsiūčio jis išblyško kaip popierius <don.lt>.

In the Lithuanian language, the green and blue colors also show a very intensive emotional state of **anger**:

Pažaliavo iš pykčio <don.lt>.

Pamėlęs iš pykčio, jis trenkė į stalą <don.lt>.

The folk theory also maintains that agitation is an important effect:

She was shaking with anger <concord>.

He was quivering with rage (concord).

Gabrielė vangiai įlindo į palaidinę, ją purtaš niršulys vis dar nenuslopo <don.lt>.

Jis visas drebėjo iš pykčio <don.lt>.

Interference with accurate perception is also one of the expressions of intensive **anger**:

She was blind of rage <concord>.

He was beginning to see red <concord>.

Mane apakino pyktis <don.lt>.

Pyktis aptemdo protą <don.lt>.

Each of these expressions indicates the presence of **anger** via its supposed physiological effects in both world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages. They show that both cultures similarly conceptualize the emotional state of **anger**, however, the Lithuanian language has more different ways to express it by describing **anger** in colors, though the English language includes more tints of red color.

Table 2

COLORS EXPRESSING ANGER

The Lithuanian language	The English language
Balta	White
Raudona	Red:
-----	Scarlet
-----	Purplish
Mėlyna	-----
Žalia	-----
Juoda	Black

The ANGER IS HEAT metaphor is conceptualized in the Lithuanian and English languages similarly, so there are many examples of equivalent translation of the concept of **anger**:

I could see their faces, flushed and angry, the brutality <...> (London, 1997, 23).

Aš mačiau jų įraudusius ir piktus veidus, <...> (Londonas, 1994, 34).

<...>asked Dirk, red in face with anger (Maugham, 2004, 67).

<...> paklausė Dirkas, paraudęs iš pykčio (Moemas, 1964, 73).

<...> he had grown white with anger (Galsworthy, 2004, 181).

<...> Somsas pabalo iš pykčio (Golsvortis, 1981, 180).

However, when the concept of **anger**, perceived metaphorically as heat, is translated literally, the expressiveness of the original text is lost:

<...> when our pilot, white with rage, shouted: <...> (London, 1997, 4).

<...> *kad mūsų vairininkas įsiuteš šaukė: <...>* (Londonas, 1991, 8).

As it was mentioned in the analysis of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, colors play a great part in the expression of the intensity of the emotional state of **anger** – the darker they are, the stronger the emotional state:

<...> *his swollen face was of a dull, angry red* (Galsworthy, 2004, 105).

<...> *išbrinkęs veidas pamėlo iš pykčio* (Golsvortis, 1981, 107).

The example of the translation indicates a little more intensive emotional state of **anger**, as referred to the conceptualization through its expression – colors.

It is not very common in the world-view of the Lithuanian language to go hot, so the translator finds the more common expression in the TL, which also indicates the intensity of the emotional state of **anger**. The metaphor *heart went hot* is replaced by the *heart boiled* without any losses of the original meaning:

His heart went hot, and he was angry with <...> (Lawrence, 2004, 337).

Jo širdis virte užvirė, jis įsiuto <...> (Lawrence, 1996, 436).

3.3. ANGER IS FIRE

When ANGER IS HEAT is applied to solids, we get the version ANGER IS FIRE.

Fire belongs to the sphere of the elements of nature. It can give warmth, light, as well as destroy. If water floods or a storm pulls down a building, the ruins remain. Fire destroys everything in its way. However, fire, the only one of all the elements, can be produced by a man (Biedermann, 2002, 446).

The source domain of this conceptual metaphor is FIRE, and the target domain is ANGER. The metaphor highlights the cause of **anger** (*kindle, inflame*), the intensity and duration (*smoldering, slow burn, burned up*), the danger to others (*breathing fire*), and the damage to the angry person (*consumed*).

The relations between emotions and fire or heat always indicate that the emotional states are strong. They cannot be controlled. Thus, these emotions are dangerous. Fire can harm not only the object it burns with, but others around as well. Analogically with the kindled fireplace, ANGER – FIRE, experienced by other person, can be partly controlled:

Her insincere apology just added fuel to the fire <concord>.

Savo užuojautos žodžiais jis tik pakurstė tėvo pyktį <don.lt>.

Kada jį perimdavo siutas, visuomet stengdavausi jį prigesinti <don.lt>.

Though it was mentioned that the metaphor ANGER IS FIRE indicates the intensity of emotions, before arriving at this conclusion, it is important to take into account the features of fire in certain cases. Hardly flaming up or going out fire is the reference to the appearing or

vanishing emotional state. Such emotion cannot harm the person who experiences it and s/he can control it easily:

Andrew left the house in a smoldering irritation (Cronin, 1977, 26).

She was doing a slow burn <concord>.

Antanas, kai išblėso piktumas ir pagieža, kartais atsiprašydavo <don.lt>.

Išsišėrusiomis Burokienės blakstienomis blykstelėjo ir užgeso nesąmoningas pyktis <don.lt>.

The most dangerous are the most intensive emotional states. Turbulent uncontrolled fire burns everything on its way, and the emotional states “burn” the vital important organs – the heart (in Lithuanian *širdis*), eyes (in Lithuanian *akys*), annihilate the subject within him/her:

Suddenly he turned on her in a fury, his eyes flashing (Lawrence, 2004, 75).

His heart burned (Cronin, 1977, 179).

They would burn with anger and wonder how the poor kid with no status could afford all this fresh out of law school (Grisham, 1991, 17).

<...> o jei palikęs tuos, kuriuos pyktis degino po vieną <...> <don.lt>.

Jos gaudulio sklidinose akyse degė pyktis <don.lt>.

Širdyje liepsnojo pyktis <don.lt>.

Emotions totally ruin the inner harmony of a person who experiences it:

The relations among the men, strained and made tense by feuds, quarrels and grudges, were in a state of unstable equilibrium, and evil passions flared up in flame like prairie – grass (London, 1997, 55).

Bet ūmai mane nuplieskė, nudegino kitas pyktis, ir aš nesipriešindamas jam pasidaviau <don.lt>.

In the compared languages the ANGER IS FIRE metaphor is based on the analogies of the emotional states of **anger** and fire:

- Fire/ emotional states can quickly change their intensity;
- Fire/ emotional states can turn into the destructive force.

As the world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages share the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS FIRE, which is perceived very similarly, there are many (half of them) examples when the concept of **anger** referred to fire is translated without any distinctive lexical changes:

<...> and evil passions flared up in flame like prairie-grass (London, 1997, 55).

<...> ir piktosios aistros įsiliepsnodavo it prerijū žolė (Londonas, 1991, 79).

<...> her eyes sparking with honest indignation (Cronin, 1977, 64).

<...> *akyse blykčiojo kilnus pasipiktinimas* (Kroninas, 1994, 69).

“Say you’re NOT drunk!” *she flashed* (Lawrence, 2004, 26).

- *Gal pasakysi, kad neužpylęs? – užsiplieskė ji* (Lawrence, 1996, 34).

Again, the concept of **anger** is sometimes translated into the Lithuanian language literally, which causes the loss of expressiveness of the original text:

Andrew left the house in a smouldering irritation (Cronin, 1977, 26).

Endrius išėjo iš namų šiek tiek suirzęs (Kroninas, 1994, 25).

Suddenly he turned on her in a fury, his eyes flashing (Lawrence, 2004, 75).

Itūžęs jis ūmai atsisuko ir puolė motiną (Lawrence, 1996, 100).

As it is impossible for fluid – blood – to flame up in the world-view of the Lithuanian language, an intensive emotional state of **anger** is expressed by the other metaphor, conveying the same message of the SL text and retaining the stylistic coloring:

The blood flamed up in him (Lawrence, 2004, 339).

Kraujas užvirė gyslose (Lawrence, 1996, 438).

Sometimes a translator adds some information to illustrate the meaning and understanding of the metaphor ANGER – FIRE, which in the SL is expressed by one – word metaphor:

Arthur was so inflamed and irritable at last, <...> (Lawrence, 2004, 117).

Galų gale Artūras pasidarė toks karštas, toks užsiplieskiantis lyg degtukas dėl mažiausio menkniekio, jog <...> (Lawrence, 1996, 157).

In addition, the concept of **anger** referred to fire is sometimes translated into the Lithuanian language by employing a different conceptual metaphor – ANGER IS A LIVING BEING:

They would burn with anger and wonder <...> (Grisham, 1991, 17).

Juos smaugs pavydas ir pyktis vien pagalvojus <...> (Grišemas, 1997, 21).

“And,” *she cried, flashing into sudden fury, <...>* (Lawrence, 2004, 26).

- *O jeigu... - staiga ją pagavo tūžmatis, - <...>* (Lawrence, 1996, 34).

Though the source of the conceptual metaphor is changed, the essence of the SL text remains, the expressiveness, and the intensity of the emotional state of **anger** is maintained.

In some cases the translator must refer to a longer paragraph of the text since the metaphor does not provide all necessary information about the character it defines:

She was fiery and furious as he. They went on till he called her a liar (Lawrence, 2004, 27).

Abudu užmiršo viską, tik kunkuliavo neapykanta vienas kitam ir pykčiu, kuris ūmai juos prarijo. Tūžiu ir įniršiu stengėsi nurungti vienas kitą (Lawrence, 1996, 35).

In the translation process the stylistic status is preserved.

3.4. ANGER IS A LIVING BEING

The concept of **a living being** is very abstract. It may refer to both an animal and a human being. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to include this conceptual metaphor in the explanation and understanding of the emotional state of **anger**. Some features and actions are characteristic to human beings as well as to animals. It would be impossible to inventorize all the characteristics of a living being. The essential feature should be referred to as the *vitality*, i.e. a certain time limit when such a subject can be active in all senses.

The metaphor ANGER IS A LIVING BEING can be grounded by a lot of examples – almost all the features which are characteristic to a living being. Emotions have an influence on the human behavior, however, they are spontaneous and are not directed to the aim. Though some predicates, which occur together with the emotions, indicate the speed of the movement (*love flew by, joy vanished*), they characterize the duration of a feeling, but not the tempo of development (Pedersen, Nuyts, 1997, 364).

A living organism appears, grows, gets bigger till it reaches some limits, then disappears. This emphasizes that the emotional state is strong, however, it can be controlled.

In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, all the features of a living being are rendered to the emotional state of **anger**. Emotional states can be born, produce sounds, move:

Žinok, pyktis gimsta ne iš skriaudos <don.lt>.

Bejėgiškas pyktis prieš Lietuvos nepriklausomybę kalba jo lūpomis <don.lt>.

Maniau, kad didysis jos pyktis bus praėjęs, ir ji teiksis priimti mane <don.lt>.

Pyktis sugrižta bumerangu, kartais net ne mums patiems, bet vaikams <don.lt>.

In the English language the emotional state of **anger** can live inside a person:

And they parted, a subtle antagonism alive within them (Galsworthy, 2004, 372).

It can also move:

Now that the anger and hysteria have passed he could see her exactly <...> (Greene, 1982, 233).

The ANGER IS A LIVING BEING metaphor is not very productive in the world-view of the English language, while in the Lithuanian language it can also escort a person:

Skaudi tiesa yra tai, kad pyktis esti palydovas ne saujelės, o daugybės žmonių <don.lt>.

Jei pyktis būtų gėris, ar jis nelydėtų kiekvieno tobulo žmogaus <don.lt>?

Also, ANGER – A LIVING BEING can give advice, though, not always the right one. It is referred to the negative influence of the emotional state of **anger** on a person experiencing it:

Pyktis blogas patarėjas <don.lt>.

Sometimes **anger** can turn into other emotional states. Only very powerful unearthly living beings can transform themselves, so it refers to the intensity and dangerousness of the emotional state:

Neteisingas pyktis transformuojasi į irzlumą, agresyvumą ir norą sunaikinti <don.lt>.

Darbininkai jau pavargo trypčioti prie vartų, jų pyktis virsta įtūžiu <don.lt>.

Anger can become weaker and transform itself into more positive emotional states:

Alkoholikai būna nepastovių emocijų: juokas greitai virsta ašaromis, pyktis – meilumu <don.lt>.

Staiga Vegos pyktis virto gailėsčiu <don.lt>.

More often, dangerous features and actions of emotional states are indicated. Especially strong emotional states cause torture and disturb a normal existence, force people to behave unconsciously:

The hostility of United directors persuaded Mr. Knighton that he could never hope to reconcile them to his ownership of the club <concord>.

Pyktis Katriutę užsodino ant motociklo ir pakišo tokią mintį: <...> <don.lt>.

Prigimtis ragina mylėti, o pyktis - neapkęsti, prigimtis liepia pasitarnauti, o pyktis - kenkti <don.lt>.

In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, ANGER – A LIVING BEING can strangle a person, grip his/her throat and heart, and does not let him/her function normally. It indicates that the emotional states can be very powerful and uncontrolled:

Ponią Šimkuvienę siutas užsmaugė <don.lt>.

Valentina pasijuto lyg apipilta šaltu vandeniu. Pyktis užsmaugė gerklę <don.lt>.

Baisus siutas sugniaužė Anupro širdį. Nenusakomas <don.lt>.

In the compared languages, the relations between the emotional state of **anger** and a living being are based on the same analogies: vitality, ability to operate and change the surroundings.

In the world-view of the English language the metaphor ANGER IS A LIVING BEING is not as productive as in the Lithuanian language, however, it also indicates a great intensity and dangerousness of the emotional state of **anger**.

Taking into account that the conceptual ANGER IS A LIVING BEING metaphor is a common one in the English language, though not so productive as in the world-view of the Lithuanian language, the concept of **anger** is most often translated into Lithuanian by an equivalent metaphor:

His anger turned gradually to indignation (Cronin, 1977, 36).

Endrius rūstumas pamažėle virto pasipiktinimu (Kroninas, 1994, 37).

<...> his anger became directed towards Christine (Cronin, 1977, 125).

<...> Endrius nukreipė savo pyktį į Kristiną (Kroninas, 1994, 139).

Sometimes the concept of **anger** is translated by another word. As the translator has to take into account all the context of the SL, he chooses the best equivalent:

He preferred the vanity and vexation to the <...> (Lawrence, 2004, 53).

Jis labiau vertino tuštybę ir rūpestį negu <...> (Lawrence, 1996, 77).

S/he preserves the stylistic status, the expressiveness, and the message of the SL text.

The following example presents the metaphor ANGER IS A LIVING BEING in the English language, while in the Lithuanian translation, the concept of **anger** is referred to a thing, more precisely, to a ball, which can roll down:

Gradually his feeling of ignominy and of rage sank (Lawrence, 2004, 100).

Pažeminimo ir pykčio kamuolys pamažėle nusirito žemyn (Lawrence, 1996, 133).

Though the message and expressiveness of the original is preserved, the conceptualization of the emotional state of **anger** in the text of the Lithuanian language is changed due to the translator's intention and personal attitude.

3.5. ANGER IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE

The most essential feature distinguishing a human being from other living beings is the ability to think, plan his/her actions, and behave purposefully.

Anger is understood as a negative emotion. It produces undesirable physiological reactions, leads to an inability to function normally, and is dangerous to others. The angry person, recognizing his **anger**, views his **anger** as an opponent:

I was struggling with my anger <concord>.

He's been wrestling with his anger all day <concord>.

Jos širdyje staiga susigrumia pyktis ir atlaidumas, rūstybė, neapykanta ir gailėstis <don.lt>.

Jis kovojo su savo pykčiu <don.lt>.

The ANGER IS AN OPPONENT metaphor is constituted by the following correspondences:

Source: STRUGGLE

Target: ANGER

- The opponent is anger.
- Winning is controlling anger.
- Losing is having anger control you.

- Surrender is allowing anger to take control over you (Lakoff, 1987, 392).

The OPPONENT metaphor focuses on the issue of control and the danger of loss of control to the angry person himself.

ANGER – OPPONENT provokes the subject to lose the control. The struggle between two equally powerful opponents can be won by one, or another, so this conceptual metaphor illustrates the efforts, thus, the ability to control the emotional state (Kövecses, 2000, 68-72):

But, making a great effort, he conquered his temper and his pride (Cronin, 1977, 21).

“Well, she lost her temper; and I didn’t lose mine” (Galsworthy, 2004, 398).

Britain and its Hong Kong administration are trying to sooth Peking’s anger by assuring
<...> <concord>.

Aš suvaldžiau savo pyktį <don.lt>.

Nugalėjęs pyktį, jis pažvelgė į mus, ir jo veidą nušvietė plati šypsena <don.lt>.

More often the struggle over anger is lost. This refers to a very intensive emotional state, which can seize a person, get control over him/her:

Anger took control over him <concord>.

He lost his temper and suddenly shouted (Cronin, 1977, 264).

It was anger that had seized Mrs. Strickland (Maugham, 2004, 48).

Kylantis pyktis, iniršis užvaldo mane <don.lt>.

Ponios pyktis ją pribaiigė <don.lt>.

Sometimes the emotional state of **anger** is so powerful that a person has not got enough strength to fight with it, so s/he surrenders:

He surrenders to his anger <concord>.

Nebeturėjau jėgų kovoti su savo pykčiu - nuleidau rankas <don.lt>.

The metaphor ANGER IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE in both the Lithuanian and English languages is conceptualized similarly. It indicates the intensity of the emotional state of **anger** and focuses on the issue of control.

As the understanding of this conceptual metaphor is similar in both the Lithuanian and English languages, the translation of the above-mentioned metaphor does not cause many difficulties or changes:

<...> *roused sudden anger in Jolyon; but he subdued it* (Galsworthy, 2004, 364).

<...> *ūmai įširdino Džolioną, bet jis sutramdė pyktį* (Golsvortis, 1981, 362).

But, making a great effort, he conquered his temper and his pride (Cronin, 1977, 21).

<...> *bet didelėmis pastangomis nugalėjo pyktį ir įžeidimą* (Kroninas, 1994, 20).

And then his anger moved away, like a shabby man, <...> (Greene, 1982, 39).

Ir jo pyktis vėl lyg elgeta nuslinko šalin <...> (Grynas, 1994, 34).

However, as it is not very common nor productive in both languages, it may undergo some changes in the translation process. When the metaphor is translated into Lithuanian literally, it loses its stylistic coloring, however, the meaning of the original is maintained:

Instead an irritation took him against the gangling <...> (Greene, 1982, 240).

Užtat sypyko ant to nerangaus <...> (Grynas, 1994, 129).

But he was consumed with indignation, real or feigned (London, 1997, 20).

Bet jis gal iš tikrujų, o gal ir apsimesdamas, vis tebeniršo (Londonas, 1991, 30).

To express the concept of **anger** of the same intensity, the translators use other conceptual metaphors which are more common in the Lithuanian language:

He lost his temper and suddenly shouted (Cronin, 1977, 264).

Jis užsidegė, jo balsas virto riksmu (Kroninas, 1994, 300).

Then, with a venom that took Scobie completely by surprise <...> (Greene, 1982, 240).

Paskui su netikėta pagieža išrėžė Skobiui į akis: <...> (Grynas, 1994, 129).

A dumb and grumbling anger swelled his bosom (Galsworthy, 2004, 32).

Aklas kunkuliuojantis įniršis užgniaužė jam kvapą (Golsvortis, 1981, 39).

In the Lithuanian language, the location of feelings is usually heart, so the translation of the ANGER – OPPONENT metaphor undergoes this change due to a slightly different conceptualization:

Anger struggled in his breast <...> (Maugham, 2004, 31).

Pyktis kovojo jos širdyje <...> (Moemas, 1964, 34).

However, the stylistic status is preserved.

3.6. ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL

The metaphor ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL also focuses on the issue of control, but its main aspect is the danger to others. It is a very widespread metaphor in Western culture, namely, PASSIONS ARE BEASTS INSIDE A PERSON (Lakoff, 1987, 392). According to this metaphor, there is a part of each person that is a wild animal. Civilized people are supposed to keep that part of them private, that is, they are supposed to keep the animal inside them. In the metaphor, loss of control is equivalent to the animal getting loose:

“There!” said Denny in a suppressed voice, as though all the secret bitterness of his life escaped into that single word (Cronin, 1977, 31).

Prasiveržia pyktis, baisus nerimas – puolu atgal į kambarį, liepiu jiems susėsti už stalo <don.lt>.

In addition, the behavior of a person who has lost control is the behavior of a wild animal. There are versions of this metaphor for the various passions – desire, **anger**, etc. In the case of **anger**, the beast presents a danger to other people:

His body bunched together as though for a spring, and his face became as an infuriated beast's as he snarled, <...> (London, 1997, 15).

Blind rage seized him, and without knowing what he was doing he flung on Strickland (Maugham, 2004, 85).

Pyktis tuojau pat išsiverš, ir padarysiu ką nors siaubingą <don.lt>.

- Vadinasi, ilgam ruošiasi būt, pamanė Jonas ir staiga jį suėmė toks piktumas, kad prišoko prie kiemo varčiukų įraudęs, kumščius gniauždamas <don.lt>.

In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, A DANGEROUS ANIMAL causes danger to the person who experiences **anger** him/herself:

Tavo pyktis uždusins tave patį <don.lt>.

Ir toks negerumas suspaužia krūtinę, toks siutas pradeda griaužti gerklę, kad, rodos, pats save sudraskytum, širdį išplėštum <don.lt>.

The correspondence – the aggressive behavior of the dangerous animal is angry behavior – indicates **anger** via a combination of metaphor and metonymy, in which the aggressive behavior metaphorically corresponds to angry behavior, which in turn metonymically stands for **anger**. For example, the snarling of the animal corresponds to the angry verbal behavior of the person, which in turn indicates the presence of **anger**. Aggressive verbal behavior is a common form of angry behavior:

He groaned in exasperation, dismayed and angry at his own inadequacy (Cronin, 1977, 14).

Grief and jealousy and rage seized him, and he cried out hoarsely (Maugham, 2004, 108).

Itūžęs jis užriaumojo <...> <don.lt>.

The DANGEROUS ANIMAL metaphor portrays **anger** as a sleeping animal. It refers to **anger** near the zero level. It is dangerous to awaken it, because then **anger** comes near the limit:

That awakened my ire <concord>.

It's dangerous to arouse his anger <concord>.

Jos neatidumas pažadino manyje pyktį <don.lt>.

Į tokį dalyką negaliu net reaguoti, nes tai išgirdus manyje pabunda pyktis <don.lt>.

ANGER – ANIMAL is something that can grow and thereby become dangerous:

His anger grew <concord>.

Roko širdyje giliai giliai auga pyktis, kuris paprastai vėliau prasiveržia <don.lt>.

ANGER – ANIMAL causes danger to other people, so it is something that has to be held back:

Don't let your anger get out of hand <concord>.

Valdykime pykti <don.lt>.

In the world-view of the Lithuanian language, the emotional state of **anger** has the ability to perform like an animal - it can gnaw, tear, and these processes destroy the object they are directed to. In the case of emotional states of **anger**, destruction threatens the person, who experiences **anger**:

Pyktis drasko moterį – ji visai sutrikusi <don.lt>.

Toks siutas pradeda griaužti gerklę <...> <don.lt>.

Amalija buvo jautrios, poetiškos prigimties, tačiau ją sugraužė neapykanta, pyktis ir baimė <don.lt>.

The conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL is based on the following analogies in both the Lithuanian and English languages:

- the behavior of animals/emotional states can be partly controlled;
- the activity of animals/emotional states is directed to the object.

The analyzed conceptual metaphor focuses on the danger of loss of control. In the world-views of the compared languages, angry behavior is addressed to other people, the emotional state is very powerful.

The ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL metaphor is more productive in the Lithuanian language and the emotional state of **anger** seems to be more dangerous, because it can destroy the subject, i.e. the person experiencing it.

This conceptual metaphor is a productive one in both compared languages, so the translators while rendering the metaphor from the English language into Lithuanian do not face many difficulties. There were 47 (81%) cases when the concept of **anger** was conveyed by the same metaphor in both the SL and TL texts:

<...> I should stand and face an infuriated bull (London, 1997, 24).

<...> kaip kautis su įsiutusiu buliumi (Londonas, 1991, 35).

<...> bawled Morel furiously (Lawrence, 2004, 200).

<...> subliuvo įpykęs Morelis (Lawrence, 1996, 267).

He ground his teeth, furious with her (Cronin, 1977, 264).

Jis sugriežė dantimis, įsiutęs ant jos (Kroninas, 1994, 300).

<...> *as though all the secret bitterness of his life escaped into that single word* (Cronin, 1977, 31).

<...> *visas jo gyvenimo kartėlis prasiveržė tuo vienu žodeliu* (Kroninas, 1994, 31).

However, in the case of the translation of this conceptual metaphor, the translator also uses the more common metaphors of the Lithuanian language:

Grief and jealousy and rage seized him <...> (Maugham, 2004, 108).

Širdgėla, pavydas ir pagieža ji svilinte svilino (Moemas, 1964, 117).

He felt himself that into words <...> there crept the bitterness of his jealousy (Maugham, 2004, 89).

Jo žodžiai <...> yra prisisunkę pavydo tulžies (Moemas, 1964, 95).

<...> *Arthur was furious* (Lawrence, 2004, 117).

<...> *Artūras tiesiog eidavo iš proto* (Lawrence, 1996, 156).

The SL text undergoes some changes and the TL text expresses a more intensive emotional state of **anger** than it is defined in the English language due to the different conceptualization.

One case, when the conceptual metaphor was translated in the opposite way, was found:

In a towering rage, he sat down (Lawrence, 2004, 55).

Nuslopinęs pyktį jis atsisėdo (Lawrence, 1996, 72).

The meaning of the original text was changed completely, as the *in a towering rage* refers to a very intensive emotional state and the chosen Lithuanian equivalent *nuslopinęs* – indicates the control of anger.

3.7. ANGER IS INSANITY

While analyzing the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, we spoke about the physiological effects of **anger**: increased body heat and agitation. Agitation is also an important part of our folk model of insanity (Lakoff, 1987, 389). According to this view, people who are insane are unduly agitated – they go wild, start raving, flail their arms, foam at the mouth, etc. Correspondingly, these physiological effects can stand, metonymically, for insanity. The overlap between the folk theories of the effects of **anger** and the effects of insanity provides a basis for the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS INSANITY, e.g.:

He got so angry, he went out of his mind <concord>.

Sakoma, pyktis – trumpalaikė beprotybė <don.lt>.

The ANGER IS INSANITY metaphor has the following correspondences:

Source: INSANITY

Target: ANGER

- The cause of insanity is the cause of anger.

- Becoming insane is passing the limit point on the anger scale.
- Insane behavior is angry behavior.

Perhaps the most common conventional expression for **anger** came into English historically as a result of the metaphor:

- *I'm mad!*

Because of this metaphorical link between insanity and **anger**, expressions that indicate insane behavior can also indicate angry behavior:

His rage was a madness (London, 1997, 59).

He's about to throw a tantrum <concord>.

Kai mama sužinos, ji pasius <don.lt>.

Violent behavior indicative of frustration is viewed as a form of insane behavior. According to the folk model of **anger**, people who can neither control nor relieve the pressure of **anger** engage in violent frustration behavior:

If one more thing goes wrong, I'll start banging my head against the wall <concord>.

Toks kvailas jis buvo, kad iš įsiūčio norėjosi sienomis lipti <don.lt>.

Jis pradėjo rautis plaukus <don.lt>.

An insane person cannot function normally:

There was no clearness or sanity in them – nothing but the terrific rage of a madman (London, 1997, 43).

O užėina jai kartais pasiutes pyktis, stačiai – nerimas, tada ji pasiruošus staugti, staugti dėl savo likimo <don.lt>.

The ANGER – INSANITY cannot be controlled and this refers to a very intensive uncontrolled **anger** which causes danger to others:

Batty Davis, so called because of his insane rages when he would send a whole ship's crew to the plank (Greene, 1994, 130).

Jo beprotiškas įsiūtis baugino mane <don.lt>.

Jis lyg išprotėjęs puolė mane <don.lt>.

In the Lithuanian language ANGER – INSANITY may cause damage to a person, who experiences such an emotional state him/herself. **Anger** leads to destruction, death:

Ajantą į pyktį atvedė pamišimas, o į pamišimą – pyktis <don.lt>.

Pyktis su ATOK – beprotybė, tad belieka laukti <don.lt>.

However, in the world-view of the English language ANGER – INSANITY gives energy, to a person, who experiences **anger**:

Far from her intention, her words were maddening me, driving me on (London, 1997, 146).

In both compared languages, the emotional state of **anger** conceptualized as insanity is a destructive emotion, causing danger to others. **Anger** is an extremely intensive emotional state, which cannot be controlled. Moreover, in the world-view of the Lithuanian language, it is dangerous to a person experiencing such an emotion him/herself. In the world-view of the English language, the ANGER – INSANITY metaphor also has a positive evaluation.

This conceptual metaphor is not very common in both the Lithuanian and English languages, consequently, only nine cases of it were found in the English fiction. Seven (77,8%) of them were translated by the equivalent metaphors, conveying the same meaning of the original text and expressing the same understanding in both languages:

<...> *nothing but the terrific rage of a madman* (London, 1997, 43).

<...> *nieko, tik siaubingas bepročio įsiūtis* (Londonas, 1991, 62).

His rage was a madness (London, 1997, 59).

Jo įniršis buvo beprotybė (Londonas, 1991, 85).

And there were only two cases when the conceptual metaphor underwent some changes in the TL text. One of them, when, due to different conceptualization of the emotional state of **anger** as insanity, was translated with quite a different meaning:

Far from her intention, her words were maddening me, driving me on (London, 1997, 146).

Nors ir nenorėdama, bet ji savo žodžiais mane siutino, tiesiog erzino (Londonas, 1991, 203).

The original text implies a positive effect on a person, while the chosen Lithuanian equivalent in the TL text expresses the consequence on a person – annoyance.

The other case is when the translator uses literal translation, which causes the loss of the expressiveness and does not provide all the information of the SL text:

<...> *gone into a mad fury with its own shadow* (Lawrence, 2004, 240).

<...> *žiūrėdamas į veidrodį piktai skalija ant savo vaizdo* (Lawrence, 1996, 316).

3.8. ANGER IS A BURDEN

A person holding or carrying a burden, experiences physical pressure; the burden is heavy; therefore normal functioning is disturbed. When it gets too heavy, i.e. overcomes the limit, a burden is no more desired. If it is possible, a person seeks to get rid of it.

The main feature of ANGER – BURDEN is heaviness. It weighs on the container: the whole body, or just the heart:

Nei pyktis ji prispaus <...> <don.lt>.

Adomėlio širdi pyktis slėgė <don.lt>.

The weightier it is, the stronger the emotional state of **anger** is expressed.

ANGER – BURDEN is loaded on a person by person him/herself or circumstances, or it may fall and bring pressure itself:

“I think that he is better man than you are,” I answered, impelled, somehow, with a desire to draw upon myself a portion of the wrath I felt was about to break upon his head (London, 1997, 57).

Visuotinis pyktis nebeturi teisės kaip pirma taip beatodairiškai jo užgriūti <don.lt>.

Consequently, it can be active or passive. The effect on a holder of such an emotional state is dangerous:

He had striven to help the unfortunate Harrison of the risk of incurring Wolf Larsen’s anger (London, 1997, 33).

Pyktis kartais būna per sunkus, kad galėtume jį suvaldyti <don.lt>.

A person who experiences ANGER – BURDEN is able to get rid of it, so it is metaphorically indicated that the emotional state of **anger** can be controlled:

I got my anger off my chest <concord>.

Jis nusimetė pykčio našta <don.lt>.

When a burden is lost, i.e. the emotional state of **anger** is controlled, a person feels relief:

Unburdening himself of his anger gave him a sense of relief <concord>.

You’ll feel better if you get rid of your anger <concord>.

Kai atsikračiau pykčio, man palengvėjo <don.lt>.

The world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages share the same analogies of a burden and the emotional state of **anger**:

- Passing a burden on others refers to the act of retribution of anger.
- Sometimes a person can get rid of a burden; an emotional state of anger can be controlled.

ANGER IS A BURDEN in the world-views of the compared languages presents a danger to others when it is passed on. However, it is not very intensive nor extremely dangerous.

As the compared languages share the same conceptualization of ANGER – BURDEN, most often the metaphors are translated similarly:

<...> with a desire to draw upon myself a portion of the wrath <...> (London, 1997, 57).

<...> *nesąmoningai trokšdamas užsitraukti ant savęs nors dalį pykčio* <...> (Londonas, 1991, 82).

<...> *no risk of incurring the resentment of the women* <...> (Maugham, 2004, 115).

<...> *nėra pavojaus užsitraukti rūstybę moterų* <...> (Moemas, 1964, 124).

<...> *at the risk of incurring Wolf Larsen's anger* (London, 1997, 33).

<...> *rizikuodamas užsitraukti Vilko Larseno pyktį* (Londonas, 1991, 48).

However, sometimes the translators do not use the conceptual metaphor and translate by literal combinations, which causes the loss of the understanding proposed by the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A BURDEN, though the meaning of the original text is preserved:

He seemed to bear no resentment (Maugham, 2004, 88).

Atrodė, kad jis net nesijaučia įžeistas (Moemas, 1964, 94).

Your wife doesn't strike me as the sort of woman to bear anger (Maugham, 2004, 83).

Neatrodė, kad tavo žmona būtu pagiežinga (Moemas, 1964, 90).

As the ANGER IS A BURDEN metaphor focuses on the heaviness, a slight change of the SL text in the translation process does not influence the understanding of it, however, if to take into account the activity of a person experiencing **anger**, in the English language text a person carries this emotional state, while in the Lithuanian language the translation proposes that the emotional state of **anger** is lifted:

He came just when her own bitterness of disillusion was hardest to bear (Maugham, 2004, 19).

Jis atėjo į jos gyvenimą tada, kai neviltis ir širdgėla atrodė nebepakeliama (Moemas, 1964, 23).

3.9. ANGER IS COLD

When we say that something is cold, we refer to something that is of low temperature. In the case of **anger**, cold indicates an intensive emotional state:

The surprise, the wrath and bewilderment with which Belshazzar beheld Mene Mene Tehel Upharsin written upon his palace wall were as nothing compared with Grandet's cold fury (Balzac, 1952, 324).

Be reikalo šurmuliuojantis piktumas yra be galo šaltas <don.lt>.

In the ANGER IS COLD metaphor the intensity of the emotional state of **anger** depends on the variants of cold: cool, cold or icy.

Cool, as it is defined in LDCE (2001), is low in temperature, but not cold, often in a way that feels pleasant. When ANGER – COLD takes the state of cool, it passes away and gives a relief to a person:

But, on the way home, his resentment slowly cooled (Cronin, 1977, 78).

Jo pyktis atvėso <don.lt>.

Cold stands in the middle of the mentioned variants. It indicates a strong emotional state of **anger**, especially when it goes with the more intensive expressions of this concept – fury or rage:

<...> and her pallor was the pallor of a cold rage (Maugham, 2004, 48).

He spoke quietly, with a still, cold fury (Cronin, 1977, 28).

Icy means extremely cold (LDCE, 704), of the lowest temperature, freezing. It refers to the most intensive emotional state of **anger**:

But there was an ugly look on his cold hard face which spoke, icily, of unforgiving fury (Cronin, 1977, 299).

O viduje Miką surakina ledinis pyktis: geriau būtu nevedęs <don.lt>.

In the world-views of the compared languages, the intensity of the emotional state of **anger** depends on the state of cold. The lowest temperature indicates the strongest emotional state.

The concept of **anger** perceived through the conceptual ANGER IS COLD metaphor is usually translated by the equivalent metaphor in the TL text:

He spoke quietly, with a still, cold fury (Cronin, 1977, 28).

Tuos žodžius jis ištarė tyliai, su šaltu ir santūriu įniršiu (Kroninas, 1994, 28).

But there was an ugly look on his cold hard face, which spoke, icily, of unforgiving fury (Cronin, 1977, 299).

Jo šaltas ir rūstus veidas bylojo apie ledinę, neatlaidžią pagiežą (Kroninas, 1994, 339).

He shied, dodged her, and suddenly became quite cool (Galsworthy, 2004, 304).

Velas atšoko nuo jos, apėjo lanku ir kaip mat atvėso (Golsvortis, 1981, 304).

Sometimes the translator omits the words grounding the conceptual metaphors, considering them not necessary for the exact expression of the SL text. Though the message of the original is preserved in the TL text, the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS COLD is lost:

<...> were as nothing compared with Grandet's cold fury (Cronin, 1977, 324).

<...> nebūtu galėjęs prilygti tam Grande įtūžiui (Kroninas, 1994, 354).

As the emotional state of **anger** is more often conceptualized as fluid in the world-view of the Lithuanian language, the TL text presents this expression as the equivalent to the one, conceptualized as cold in the world-view of the English language:

But, on the way home, his resentment slowly cooled (Cronin, 1977, 78).

Tačiau, beinant namo, pyktis jam pamažu atslūgo (Kroninas, 1994, 85).

The meaning and the stylistic status are preserved, however the conceptualization of the emotional state of **anger** is changed.

The features of the emotional state of **anger**, which are explicated by the means of languages and recorded in naïve psychology, are as follows:

- strength/ weakness;
- possibility to control/ lack of control/ inability to control;
- dangerousness;
- positive/ negative evaluation.

The relations between the peculiarities of the emotional state of **anger** and the corresponding conceptual metaphors are generalized in Table 3:


Table 3

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PECULIARITIES OF THE EMOTIONAL STATE
AND CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS


Metaphor	Strength/ weakness	Possibility to control	Lack of control	Inability to control	Positive/ negative evaluation	Heaviness/ lightness	Danger
Fluid	+/+	+		+			+
Heat	+/			+	/+		+
Fire	+/+		+	+	/+		+
A living being	+/	+					+
Opponent	+/	+			/+		
Animal	+/	+					+
Insanity				+	+/+		+
Burden		+				+/	
Cold				+			+

The ratio of the conceptual metaphors in the Lithuanian and English languages is presented graphically. The numbers indicating the percent are carried over to the nearest whole number.

THE LITHUANIAN LANGUAGE



THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE



The conceptual metaphors are concurrent in the Lithuanian and English languages. A corresponding conceptualization of the emotional states of **anger** (in Lithuanian **pyktis**) in the compared languages is based on almost the same analogies of the source and target domains. The differences of the conceptualization could be defined only after a thorough analysis how the basic features, grounding conceptual metaphors, are realized in every language.

271 examples with the words naming the emotional states of **anger** in eight books of the world-known English fiction were found. As both compared cultures share similar understanding of the concept of **anger** through the conceptual metaphors, more than a half (171 (63.1%)) were


translated by equivalent metaphors. 43 (15.9%) cases of translation show that some conceptual metaphors defining the emotional state of **anger** were replaced by different ones, however, they did not cause any loss of expressiveness or meaning of the TL text. There were 28 (10,3%) examples when the concept of **anger** was translated into Lithuanian by employing different conceptual metaphors and this made a slight influence on the meaning of the SL text. Most often, in the TL text, they referred to the more intensive emotions.

When metaphors describing **anger** in the original text were translated literally, they lost their stylistic value and did not convey the exact meaning of the SL text. Though such cases were not very common (23 examples (8.5%)), they still show that translators do face difficulties, because they deal with two different cultures at the same time. Because of this particular aspect, there also were 3 (1.1%) examples when the concept of **anger** was translated by employing different conceptual metaphors, just because the ones in the SL text were not common in the world-view of the Lithuanian language. They were replaced without any loss of their stylistic colorfulness, and the message of the original text was preserved.

However, there were 3 (1.1%) cases, when a totally different meaning was rendered in the process of translation. As translation depends upon the translator’s knowledge, competence, experience, and even personal attitude, the mentioned examples could be the result of the lack of any of these.

The obtained results are presented graphically:

Diagram 1



CONCLUSIONS

After a thorough analysis of theoretical material on the concept of **anger** and the selected examples the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Concept is a unit of thinking, consisting of two parts: logical and sublogical. The lexicographical level of the analysis of the concept of **anger** (Lithuanian **pyktis**) helped to generalize the logical information, which is known to all language users. However, this analysis is not very productive, as the dictionaries describe the peculiarities of emotional states quite laconically, differentiating emotional states only by intensity and even that is not always the case.
2. A scenario of prototypical situation plays a great role in the conceptualization of the concept of **anger**. Different linguists propose various cognitive models, however, the research is based on the one, proposed by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) as the most suitable and universal. The prototypical scenario of **anger** in both the Lithuanian and English languages is composed of five successful stages conveying an ontological, a causal, and an expressive parts, according to which we can conclude that the concept of **anger** in the compared languages is remarkably similar.
3. Part of the concept is conveyed by conceptual metaphors, which relate only to sublogical part of the concept and involve two domains: the source domain, which is more concrete, and the target domain, which is more abstract. By relating emotional states to concrete things or phenomena, their main features are defined. The tendency to relate emotional states to extra-linguistic reality objects is universal. However, due to the differences between languages and cultures these universal tendencies in the languages are differently realized.
4. The inventory of conceptual metaphors of **anger** in the compared languages is almost the same, explicating the following features of emotional states of **anger**: strength, dangerousness, inability to control these emotions completely, and most often negative evaluation. Conceptualization differences appear due to different realization of the same features.
5. Translation of conceptual metaphors and emotion concepts causes difficulties because there is no direct correspondence across conceptual systems. As the world-views of the Lithuanian and English languages have similar understanding of the concept of **anger**, the bulk of the selected examples (63.1%) were translated by equivalent metaphors. However, the other part proves that due to differences of conceptualization metaphors undergo multidimensional changes, i.e. loss of stylistic status, change of the meaning,

linguistic loss, which diminishes the vividness and does not provide the exact understanding of the concept of **anger** of the original text.

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PYKČIO KONCEPTAS ANGLŲ IR LIETUVIŲ KALBOSE BEI JO VERTIMAS

SANTRAUKA

Kalbos pasaulėvaizdis laikomas ne tikrovės atspindžiu kalboje, bet jos interpretacija. Kalba nesukuria naujos realybės, ji parodo, kaip žiūrima į pasaulį ir ką jame galima pamatyti. Kalbos pasaulėvaizdis formuojasi kalbėtojams aktyviai pažįstant pasaulį, todėl skirtingų kalbų pasaulio interpretacijos skiriasi.

Darbo **objektas** – konceptas, lietuvių kalboje reprezentuojamas žodžiu *pyktis*, anglų – *anger*. Remiamasi antropocentrinės paradigmos idėjomis – į kalbą žvelgiama kaip į kultūros fenomeną. Žodžio reikšmė laikoma mažiausiu koncepto aktualizacijos laipsniu. Emocinių būsenų ypatybės siejamos su atitinkamomis konceptualiosiomis metaforomis, kurių esmė – santykis tarp dviejų sričių: ištakų (angl. *source domain*) ir tikslo (angl. *target domain*). Perkeliant vienos srities žinias į kitą sritį, remiamasi tik tomis konkreto objekto savybėmis, kurios žmogui yra pažįstamos iš jo fizinės patirties. Kitas metaforų šaltinis yra kultūrinė patirtis.

Praktinėje dalyje yra nagrinėjamos dviejų indoeuropiečių kalbų – anglų ir lietuvių – konceptualiosios metaforos, kurių tikslo sritis yra pyktis (angl. *anger*) bei šio koncepto vertimo ypatumai.

Sugretinus šių kalbų konceptualiąsias metaforas, rasta panašumų ir skirtumų. Panašumai liudija anglų ir lietuvių kalbų vartotojams būdingą panašų pasaulio suvokimą. Pyktis siejamas su skysčiu, ugnimi, pavojingu gyvūnu, t.t. Pykčio konceptas dažniausiai reiškia neigiamą vertinimą, keliamą pavojų emocijos patyrėjui, jos stiprumą, jausmų kontrolės praradimą. Tačiau kiekviena

kalba turi ir specifinių bruožų. Pavyzdžiui, pyktis žmonių, kalbančių lietuvių kalba, suvokiamas kaip beprotybė, anglų kalbos pasaulėvaizdyje turi ir teigiamą vertę. Ši emocija suteikia jėgų, „užveda” žmogų. Taigi, verčiant iš vienos kalbos į kitą, būtina atidžiai apgalvoti, kokį parinkti atitikmenį, norint perteikti vienokią ar kitokią mintį.

Šiame darbe buvo surinkti ir palyginti 271 pavyzdžiai iš 8 pasaulio grožinėje literatūroje gerai žinomų anglų autorių kūrinių bei jų vertimų į lietuvių kalbą. Vertimo analizė atlikta atsižvelgiant tik į leksinius pakitimus, įtakotus skirtingos konceptualizacijos. Dažniausiai pykčio konceptas iš anglų kalbos į lietuvių buvo verčiamas ekvivalentiškai (63,1% pavyzdžių). Antras vertimo būdas – kitokios, dažniau vertimo kalboje vartojamos konceptualiosios metaforos. Kai kuriais atvejais šios metaforos verčiamos paprastais, nevaizdingais žodžių junginiais ir praranda savo stilistinį atspalvį.

Kadangi grožinės literatūros vertimas yra meninės kūrybos forma, svarbiausia yra ne tik geras abiejų kalbų (originalo ir tos, į kurią verčiama) mokėjimas, bet ir vertėjo talentas, abiejų pasaulėvaizdžių suvokimas, intuicija bei įsigilinimas į verčiamo teksto kontekstą.