| Abstract [eng] |
The foreign policy of Azerbaijan and the implementation of strategic hedging in order to avoid choosing one clear side in international order – as multipolar one – is the subject of this thesis. Considering the dynamic political agenda in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan is not an exception in this process. Especially, the changes taking place following the Second Karabakh war in 2020, balance of power in the region between Russia, Turkey and the EU has become a relevant topic, thereby creating newer challenges for the Azerbaijani government to deal with. Therefore, the main research problem is related how the geopolitical rivalry and power shift have been taking place in the region, and how Azerbaijan has been trying to address such novelties. The first goal of this case study is to explain the reader how geopolitically complex region Azerbaijan is situated in, and what kind of empiric interests the main big powers – the EU, Russia and Turkiye possess towards Azerbaijan. The second goal following the introduction to the region, is related to explain how Azerbaijan has reacted to such diverse interests, which may become a threat if not addressed properly. Especially, post-2008 period and Azerbaijan’s foreign policy tools to implement hedging are explained. Lastly, two important cases of energy policy and Karabakh issue following the dynamics in the region in 2020 are given special emphasis. The main findings of this research: • As discussed in the theory, small states applying strategic hedging attempt to maximize their economic activities and cooperation with various parties. Azerbaijan’s energy resources play a great role in this process, especially in economic relations with the EU. However, the country has never ignored Russian interests, which could cost a lot. Following the hedging theory, the government did not give up its economic interests, simultaneously ensuring Russia that it is merely commercial, and there is no political commitment. This seems to have worked as a strategy, which also has benefited the country’s economy enormously, so as Azerbaijan enjoys greater economic activity with the EU after the energy deal, while Russia’s political interests are not violated. • Regarding the status quo in Nagorno Karabakh, Turkiye’s support must be emphasized, thanks to which Azerbaijani government has attempted to prevent dominant existence of Russian military power in the region. However, to which extent such attempts will be successful is hard to answer at the current stage, which creates future possibilities of research into this topic. • Russia’s military deployment into Karabakh is a case that can be understood as exempt from hedging strategies, since they could not help Azerbaijan to hedge this process enough. All the possible resources of the country were inadequate for this, and missing support from a third party (excluding Turkiye, which would not be enough) made Azerbaijan partially bandwagon Russia. This sample proves that under specific circumstances, usual tools implemented for hedging may not work, thereby leaving no other option for the country. • In many cases, Azerbaijan has succeeded to prevent bandwagoning Russia, and such a big potential threat – Russia itself has not stopped the country from developing economic cooperation with the EU thanks to strategic hedging. At the same time, Turkiye’s existence in the region has helped Azerbaijan to neutralize Russia’s overwhelming impact, especially in the example of post-second Karabakh war scene. • Therefore, Azerbaijan seems to have formulated its foreign policy, which benefits the country’s economy in most cases, while in political terms hedging tools have helped the country to prevent direct dominance of Russia, and soft-power influence of the EU, thereby enabling Azerbaijan to abstain from choosing any of them as a clear side. |
