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Exploring the Use of Epistemic and Effective Stancetaking Acts in American Presidential Discourse on Economy: a corpus-based study

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Abstract

The present thesis is a corpus-based study that aims to analyze the use of epistemic and effective stancetaking acts in speeches by the former American President Donald Trump, and the current President Joe Biden, concerning economy. The present study sourced its data from various reputable resources, including the official website of the White House, as well as the archives of the White House, in addition to websites such as Time Magazine and the World Economic Forum. Subsequently, the data was self-compiled into a corpus comprising of 42,697 words, with speeches ranging from the year 2016 to the year 2023. Moreover, the theoretical frameworks chosen for this study, which were anchored on Marín-Arrese's (2021a, 2021b) categorization of epistemic and effective stance subcategories, as well as her fourfold distinction of subjectivity and intersubjectivity (2011) helped to analyze and classify all subcategories of epistemic and effective stance, as well as the dimensions of (inter)subjectivity.

Based on the analysis of the data, the results indicate that Donald Trump utilizes subcategories of effective stance slightly more frequently than epistemic stance, particularly markers of intentionality (e.g. *I will*, *I am going to*, *I want to*), which indicate the speaker's intention and commitment. In contrast, Joe Biden employs a significantly greater number of subcategories of epistemic stance than effective stance, specifically through the use of epistemic modals (e.g. *may*, *could*, *might*, *will*), which demonstrates his level of (un)certainty about the communicated proposition, in addition to expressions of marked enunciational positioning (e.g. *as I said*, *let me say*, *as I mentioned*), allowing him not only to convey his knowledge, but also reinforce his claims and assertions by explicitly invoking himself as the source of the claim with the use of the first-person pronoun *I*. Regarding the dimension of (inter)subjectivity, it is observed that both speakers employ subjectivity more prominently than intersubjectivity. Notably, Trump demonstrates a preference for implicit subjectivity, enabling him to evade personal accountability, whereas Biden employs explicit subjectivity to emphasize personal responsibility instead, representing an opposite approach.

Keywords: stance, epistemic stance, effective stance, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, economy, presidential discourse, political discourse.

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List of Abbreviations

S1: Subject 1

S2: Subject 2

EP: Epistemic Stance

EM: Epistemic Modals

IIE: Indirect Inferential Evidentiality

CFV: Personal Cognitive Factives

IFV: Impersonal Factives

CGA: Cognitive Attitude

MEP: Marked Enunciational Positioning

APH: Aphonic or Ignorative Predicates

IIR: Interpretation or Reformulation of Information

EF: Effective Stance

DM: Deonticity

DIR: Directivity

NRM: Normativity

INT: Intentionality

POT: Potentiality

SE: Subjective explicit

SI: Subjective implicit

IE: Intersubjective explicit

IO: Intersubjective opaque

LL: Log-likelihood

UCREL: University Centre for Computer Corpus Research on Language

O$_1$: Observed frequency in Corpus 1

O$_2$: Observed frequency in Corpus 2

N: Raw numbers

R: normalized frequency

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1. Introduction

Stance, alongside other interrelated fields such as (inter)subjectivity, evidentiality, and modality have all garnered great attention and interest by many scholars in linguistics and other related disciplines. It is evident that over the years there has been a marked growth in the investigation of these topics, as a result of the substantial amount of research that has been produced by scholars such as Benveniste (1971), Du Bois (2007), Lyons (1977), Langacker (1987, 2002), Nuyts (2001, 2012), Traugott and Dasher (2002), and more. Kiesling (2022: 409) defines stance and stancetaking as "a concept that has been used mostly in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology as a means of referring to ways that people position themselves in conversation, often in terms of politeness, certainty, or affect/emotion". Thus, it can be said that stance refers to the various ways that people express their attitudes, emotions, beliefs, ideas, points of view and much more, while communicating with others.

When discussing the concept of stance, it is possible to delve more specifically into epistemic and effective stance. Epistemic stance is linked to the knowledge and belief the speaker possesses and puts forward, while on the other hand, effective stance is centered around the speaker's feelings, attitudes, and in some cases persuasion as the speaker attempts to call the public into action (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b). It is evident that a substantial amount of research has been conducted on epistemic and effective stance markers (Carretero 2006; Roseano *et al.* 2016; Xiao-Desai *et al.* 2017; *etc.*), more specifically in political discourse (Marín-Arrese 2011, 2013, 2021), as well as presidential discourse (Hidalgo-Downing 2021; Ramsburg 2021), which are closely intertwined. In addition, when speaking about stance, it is impossible not to speak about subjectivity and intersubjectivity, as they are intricately linked. Subjectivity refers to the manner in which a speaker conveys their personal opinions, with the speaker being the only subject, not including the hearers in what they are saying. As opposed to subjectivity, intersubjectivity pertains to the ways in which the speaker conveys certain information, while at the same time including the audience or addressee at the same time. Nonetheless, there seems to be a limited amount of research conducted on the examination of epistemic and effective stance markers as well as subjectivity and intersubjectivity in presidential discourse pertaining to economy.

The reason for choosing presidential speeches regarding economy as the focus of this thesis is the significance of economy as a topic of discussion, because it impacts the well-being of individuals and societies as a whole. Another reason for specifically choosing Donald Trump and Joe Biden as subjects of analysis pertains to their shared experience and history of serving as political figures for the same nation, which presents a unique opportunity to investigate any potential overlaps and/or divergences in their respective rhetorical styles. In addition, Donald Trump's and Joe Biden's presidential speeches on economy have not yet been subject to linguistic analysis, and thereafter, may

serve as valuable and novel sources for the examination of stance and stancetaking. Lastly, given that Donald Trump and Joe Biden belong to different political parties, the Republican and Democratic parties respectively, it would be intriguing to incorporate this factor in the analysis and explore whether any divergence in the utilization of effective and epistemic stance markers may be attributed to this ideological contrast. Thus, the central aims of the current corpus-based study is to examine and analyze epistemic and effective stance markers, as well as the dimensions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in presidential speeches on economy delivered by former President of the United States Donald Trump, and current President Joe Biden. To fulfill the aims of this thesis, a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis of epistemic and effective stance, as well as the dimension of subjectivity and intersubjectivity will be performed.

When it comes to the subject matter concerning linguistics and economics, some studies have been conducted regarding these two topics (Block 2017; Chiswick 1993; Desmet *et al*. 2012). For example, an analysis was carried out with discourse markers, where Almeida and Álvarez-Gil (2021) analyzed the expressions *indeed*, *in fact*, *really*, and *actually*, as well as their Spanish equivalents in economic texts. In their research, they discovered that although these four adverbials are classified as boosters according to Hyland's (2005) categorization of metadiscourse markers, their Spanish counterparts may be classified under different subcategories of metadiscourse, such as hedges, which are the complete opposite of boosters, which illustrates the distinction between the English and Spanish language. Thus, there have been some studies conducted in the fields of economic discourse and linguistics, however, it is not as popular as political discourse and linguistics.

The theoretical framework chosen for this study, will be anchored on Marín-Arrese's (2021a, 2021b) categorization of epistemic and effective stance markers, as well as her fourfold distinction of subjectivity and intersubjectivity (2011). It is important to note that the frameworks presented in (2021a, 2021b) have been merged for the purpose of this study which was due to the fact that certain markers were present in one article but not the other and vice versa. Hence, it was deemed imperative to examine all possible categorizations in order to obtain the most accurate information and results for the assessment of as many markers as possible. Moreover, the basis for selecting Marín-Arrese's categorizations of epistemic and effective stance, and her fourfold distinction of subjectivity and intersubjectivity as the frameworks for this study lies in the fact that they have been widely applied in a great range of other studies (Romero 2022; Ruskan & Šolienė 2023; Wang *et al*. 2022; *etc*.), indicating the efficiency and reliability of these frameworks, thus proving to be an appropriate and suitable choice for this study. This paper will not only extend existing information on epistemic and effective stance and (inter)subjectivity, but it will also contribute new knowledge in the sphere of presidential speeches on economy, which has not been previously accomplished.

It is anticipated that the findings of this specific analysis will demonstrate that even though both epistemic and effective stance expressions will be used at a similar rate, effective stance will dominate over epistemic stance in total as was the case in other similar studies, such as in Marín-Arrese's (2021a) article on epistemic and effective control in political discourse, or Ruskan and Šolienė's (2023) article on epistemicity and effectivity, as politicians strive to demonstrate their stance and express particular commitments, rather than merely presenting their knowledge and information pertaining to a particular subject matter. Lastly, in order to attain the aims of this study, the subsequent objectives were established:

1- To identify markers for conveying epistemic and effective stance in political speeches related to economy and provide their taxonomies.

2- To determine similarities and differences (both quantitative and qualitative) of the use of epistemic and effective markers in political speeches on economy by the American presidents.

3- To investigate the dimensions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the speeches given by the American presidents.

This thesis is organized into several sections and subsections, including an introduction (1), literature review (2), data and methods (3), findings and results (4), and lastly a conclusion (5).

This section, which served as an introduction, provided a brief overview of the mounting scholarly attention towards the study and investigation of stance, with a proliferation of literature being produced on this specific subject. In addition, emphasis has been placed on the significance of economy as a subject of discussion, especially in terms of a linguistic perspective. Lastly, the aims and objectives of this thesis have been provided, along with the methodology for achieving the stated aim and the accompanying theoretical frameworks.

The second section, which discusses the literature review, will be subdivided in three subsections, (2.1) which focuses on epistemic stance, and (2.2) on effective stance where a definition and explanation will be provided of both stances, and (2.3) which will focus on explaining subjectivity and intersubjectivity more thoroughly. Moreover, an exhaustive account of the potential classifications and categorizations alongside examples of the markers and their dimensions will be provided.

The third section will address all the technicalities, furnishing a comprehensive explanation of the research methodology, which encompasses the rationale behind speech selection, the specifics of data collection, data analysis, corpus size, and exclusions that have been made.

The fourth section, findings and results, will discuss both qualitative, as well and quantitative outcomes. With the help of quantitative analysis, it will be possible to analyze the raw numbers,

percentages, and normalized frequencies of epistemic and effective stance markers, along with instances of subjectivity and intersubjectivity as well. As for the qualitative analysis, the objective is to provide an interpretation of the findings of the results, and explore potential explanations for phenomena such as the overuse or underuse of certain markers.

Lastly, the fifth section will consist of a conclusion where a discussion of the main findings will be provided, with additional guidelines pertaining to future research and limitations of the current research.

2. Literature Review

In order to grasp the concepts of epistemic and effective stance, it is important to provide a broader and comprehensive explanation and definition of the notion of stance because "one of the most important things we do with words is take a stance" (Du Bois 2007: 139). Several definitions of stance have been put forth in different literature (Biber *et. al* 1989; Du Bois 2007; Kockelman 2004; Kiesling 2009, 2015, 2022, *etc*.). While there may be slight variations among these definitions, they are all founded on the same fundamental principle that, in brief, stance is a phenomenon that is expressed through language and encompasses linguistic values, interactional values, and even sociocultural values. For example, Biber and Finegan (1989: 92) define stance as "the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitments concerning the propositional content of a message." In addition, Du Bois' (2007) "stance triangle" has emerged as an influential definition and explanation of stance, garnering over two thousand citations in a wide range of scholarly articles. Du Bois (2007: 163) defines stance as:

a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means (language, gesture, and other symbolic forms), through which social actors simultaneously evaluate objects, position subjects (themselves and others), and align with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of value in the sociocultural field.

To explain, the stance triangle consists of a set of three entities: the first subject, second subject, and the stance object, also known as the object being "evaluated" by the subjects. Through communication, the stancetaker takes a stance and creates three stance actions all at once which are evaluating an object, positioning a subject, and lastly aligning with other subjects. For example, let us analyze a conversation from Du Bois' book (2007: 166) to get a better idea of the notion of stance:

(1) Sam: *I don't like those.*

Angela: *I don't either.*

S1: Sam, I

S2: Angela, I

Object: those

Evaluation of the object: don't like **those**

Positioning of the subject: **I** don't like

Alignment: either

Thus, if one subject, which in this case is S2, agrees with the other, which in this case is S1, on a specific matter, in this example, 'those', that person may be regarded as having adopted an identical or very similar stance, thereby exhibiting a convergent alignment. However, if one subject disagrees, it can be said that their alignment is divergent.

Biber *et al.* (1999) propose that stance can be analyzed in terms of three semantic categories: epistemic stance, attitudinal stance, and style of speaking. Epistemic stance and its subcategories, which will be elaborated on later, serve to express a speaker's perspective regarding the status of the information contained within a proposition. "They can mark certainty (or doubt), actuality, precision, or limitation; or they can indicate the source of knowledge or the perspective from which the information is given" (Biber *et al.* 1999: 972). On the other hand, attitudinal stance is associated with feelings, emotions, and personal attitudes, rather than (un)certainty and source of knowledge like in epistemic stance (*ibid.*: 974). Lastly, although style of speaking is not as common as the other two categorizations and received less scholarly attention in general, Biber *et al.* (*ibid.*: 975) explain it as "presenting speaker/ writer comments on the communication itself".

The examination of stance and (inter)subjectivity has been undertaken in different forms of discourse, with a substantial focus being placed on investigating epistemic and effective stance within the realm of political discourse (Marín-Arrese 2011, 2013, 2021a, 2021b). Marín-Arrese's investigations demonstrate that the utilization of stance and the dimensions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity can reveal politicians' ideologies, and the communicative approaches that they tend to adopt. For example, in her paper titled "Effective vs. epistemic stance and subjectivity in political discourse Legitimising strategies and mystification of responsibility" (2011), Marín-Arrese conducted an analysis on the interpersonal styles exhibited by three politicians, namely George Bush, Anthony Blair, and José María Aznar López, focusing on their utilization of stance expressions and subjectivity within parliamentary statements and political speeches. The findings indicate a preference for markers of epistemic stance over effective stance in the communication style of both Bush and Blair, whereas Aznar demonstrates an opposite pattern, favoring markers of effective stance over epistemic stance. According to Marín-Arrese, these findings may be a result of the "tendency in Spanish to uphold truthfulness over politeness" (Marín-Arrese 2011: 211), hence, these intercultural distinctions position Aznar as the speaker displaying a higher level of commitment among the three individuals. In terms of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, there is a shared preference among the three politicians, Bush, Blair

and Aznar, as they consistently exhibit a preference for the dimension of subjective implicit over any other dimension. By favoring the dimension of subjective implicitness, the politicians make it less clear who is explicitly responsible for the propositions being communicated, and spreads the sense of personal responsibility for those statements among multiple individuals. Moreover, the analysis of speeches addressed to the Arab World by George Bush and Barack Obama by Laura Hidalgo-Downing and Yasra Hanawi (2017) reveals a broader approach to stance that incorporates the aspect of negation and personal pronouns, thus encompassing not only the analysis of non-epistemic and epistemic modal verbs. In their investigation, it may be interpreted that the increased occurrence of subjective stance markers such as mental and modal verbs in combination with the usage of first-person pronouns and negation in Obama's speeches may be seen as an intentional effort to reshape and reimagine the United States' position on Middle East policy. On the other hand, when examining Bush's speeches, it becomes apparent that he exhibits a more conventional discourse characterized by a notably lower occurrence of stance markers and negation, as well as a preference for second-person pronouns over first-person pronouns as opposed to Obama. As stated by Hidalgo-Downing and Hanawi (2017: 207), "the low frequency of negation seems to indicate that there is no need to deconstruct previous assumptions about the status quo in US international affairs".

As previously stated in the introduction, the present thesis relies on the frameworks developed by Marín-Arrese (2021a, 2021b), which identifies subcategories for both epistemic and effective stance, and a fourthfold distinction for subjectivity and intersubjectivity (Marín-Arrese 2011). In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of these stances and (inter)subjectivity, this section will be split into three subsections. The table below illustrates epistemic and effective stance subcategories, which have been extracted from Marín-Arrese's two articles (2021a, 2021b) and merged into one table.

Table 1. Epistemic and effective stance subcategories adopted from Marín-Arrese (2021a, 2021b).

Epistemic stance (EP)	Effective stance (EF)
Epistemic modals (EM)	Deonticity (DM)
Indirect Inferential Evidentiality (IIE)	Directivity (DIR)
Personal Cognitive Factives (CFV) and Impersonal Factives (IFV)	Normativity (NRM)
Cognitive Attitude (CGA)	Intentionality (INT)
Marked Enunciational Positioning (MEP)	Potentiality (POT)
Aphonic or Ignorative Predicates (APH)	
Interpretation or Reformulation of Information (IIR)	

In the following sections, an in-depth examination of both epistemic stance and effective stance, along with all the markers correlated with these two categories of stance shall be conducted. In addition, subjectivity and intersubjectivity and their subcategories will be discussed as well.

2.1 Epistemic stance

Epistemic stance can be said to refer to a person's attitude towards knowledge, belief, and truth. It encompasses the ways in which individuals express their confidence or (un)certainty in their own beliefs, as well as their openness to other perspectives and sources of information. As noted by Marín-Arrese (2011: 195):

> *Epistemic stance refers to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to knowledge concerning the realization of the event, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries out a stance act aimed at estimating the likelihood of an event and/or judging the validity of a proposition designating the event.*

Seven distinct subcategories of epistemic stance can be identified. This section will provide an in-depth explanation of each subcategory, as well as illustrative examples.

Starting with the first subcategory, we may encounter epistemic modals (EMs), which indicate the speaker's degree of certainty or belief in the occurrence of an event; they express the speaker's assessment about the likelihood or possibility of the event happening (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b). Expressions such as *certainly*, *probably*, *must*, *should*, *will*, and more may be observed.

(2) *Jobs **will** <EP, EM, SI> return, incomes **will** <EP, EM, SI> rise, and new factories **will** <EP, EM, SI> come rushing back to our shores.*[1] (Trump)

(3) *It's **probably** <EP, EM, SI> the reason I ran for President, more than any other thing, because I couldn't understand why we were losing all of these jobs to other countries at such a rapid rate. And it got worse and worse, and I think <EP, CGA, SE> it's **probably** <EP, EM, SI> the primary reason that I ran, but there are other reasons also.* (Trump)

The second subcategory, indirect inferential evidentiality (IIE) has many functions. The primary function of evidentiality is to signal the source of information, as identified by Aikhenvald (2004), and according to Anderson (1986), it indicates that a claim made by the speaker is based on some supporting evidence. IIE may be classified into different subtypes such as perception-based inferences, conception-based inferences, as well as communication-based or report-based inferences (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b). The following expressions may be included: *clearly*, *it is clear*, *evident*, *obvious*, *obviously*.

(4) *I made it real **clear** <EP, IIE, SE> to everybody, when speaking to the National Chamber of Commerce or the Business Roundtable, the reason I'm the most pro-union President in American history is because you're the single-best workers in the world.* (Biden)

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[1] The analyzed speeches have served as the sole source for all of the examples henceforth presented.

(5) *And there's a strong sense from all the leaders of the world of the strength of the American economy, and **we've seen** <EP, IIE, IE> the willingness to want to work together and also here at home.* (Biden)

The third subcategory can be split into two, personal cognitive factives (CFV) and impersonal factives (IFV); however, for the sake of simplicity, CFV and IFV were merged together. CFV as well as IFV are expressions that serve to strongly reinforce the speaker's commitment to an assertion, and as written by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), they are typically characterized by presupposing the truth of the proposition represented by the complement clause. Such expressions as *I/we remember*, *I/we know* (CFV), *The truth is*, *in fact* (IFV) reflect the speaker's significant level of epistemic support as well as commitment to the assertion, for example:

(6) *And **I know** <EP, CFV, SE> many of you are probably Republicans, but many of my Republican friends are basically arguing that good news for the economy is bad news — is bad news for America, as if they're rooting for fewer jobs and lower wages.* (Biden)

(7) *Over 30 years ago, we, **in fact** <EP, IFV, SI>, manufactured 30 percent of the global chip production worth tens of billions of dollars. But today, we produce only 10 percent — 10 percent.* (Biden)

The fourth subcategory, which is cognitive attitude (CGA), indicates a speaker's beliefs or attitudes towards a certain situation or event. They can range from showing complete certainty to only limited support, and they reflect the speaker's level of confidence in their statement (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b). The most common markers of cognitive attitude are *I/we think*, *I/we believe*, however there are expressions such as *I have no doubt*, *supposedly*, and more.

(8) *And our approach, **I believe** <EP, CGA, SE> is working. The economy grew at 2.6 percent last quarter while inflation started to slow and unemployment started — stayed low.* (Biden)

(9) *But it's going to <EP, EM, SI> take time to get inflation back to normal levels as we keep our job market strong. So we could see <EF, POT, IE> setbacks along the way, **I don't doubt that** <EP, CGA, SE>, but thus far we're in good shape. But we're laser-focused on that.* (Biden)

The fifth subcategory, marked enunciational positioning (MEP), refers to the use of language that emphasizes the speaker as the source of a statement and vouches for the truth of the information being communicated. It is a way for the speaker to signal their commitment and belief in what they are saying, and it is an explicit way for the speaker to indicate that they are taking responsibility for the information being conveyed (Marín-Arrese 2021a: 295). MEP includes expressions such as: *I say*, *I can tell*, *I repeat*, *to put it plainly*, *I have/want to say*.

(10) **Let me start off with** <EP, MEP, SE> *two words: Made in America* (Biden)

(11) *We're making it possible for families to save thousands of dollars in energy savings with the legislation we have — which,* **as I said** <EP, MEP, SE>*, it's going to* <EP, EM, SI> *bring a trillion-seven off the market investing in other jobs.* (Biden)

The sixth subcategory, aphonic or ignorative predicates (APH), are expressions that convey negative or doubtful meaning, and they are used by the speaker to distance themselves from taking responsibility for their statements. These expressions include negative epistemic expressions and expressions that indicate a lack of certainty or knowledge, and the speaker is using them to express their ignorance or lack of sufficient information about a subject (Marín-Arrese, 2021b). Some APH markers may be: *I don't know*, *I/we cannot know*, *I'm not sure*, *hard to say*.

(12) *"Socialism."* **I didn't know** <EP, APH, SE> *there were that many socialist Republicans. Think about it. I'm serious. Let's* <EF, DIR, SI> *get serious about taking care of ordinary people — regular people like I grew up.* (Biden)

(13) **I don't know** <EP, APH, SE> *about you, but as my dad used to say, people just — they're worried about get — putting three squares on a table every day, and not having to deal with all the politics that are going on. And all the — all — so who should know the names of these — these pieces of legislation?* (Biden)

Lastly, and the final subcategory of epistemic stance is interpretation or reformulation of information (IIR), where the process of interpreting or rephrasing information can be thought of as a way for a speaker to support their knowledge by using contextual, personal, and encyclopedic knowledge (Marín-Arrese, 2021b). The following expressions may include: *show(s)*, *mean(s)*, *suggest(s)*.

(14) **This** *growth* **means** <EP, IIR, IO> *that our jobs plan, including our childcare reforms, will* <EF, INT, SI> *be completely paid-for in combination with proposed budget savings.* (Trump)

(15) *We will* <EF, INT, IE> *turn America into a magnet for new jobs – and* **that means** <EP, IIR, IO> *jobs in our poorest communities.* (Trump)

This last subcategory concludes the section on epistemic stance. The subsequent section will center on effective stance and its corresponding subcategories.

2.2 Effective stance

Effective stance, on the other hand, concerns the speaker's positioning regarding the actualization of certain events (Marín-Arrese 2011). Within the context of effective stance, speakers

typically emphasize a call to action by urging their audience or listeners to take specific steps, rather than simply presenting information or knowledge on a particular topic, as is the case with epistemic stance. According to Marín-Arrese (2011: 195), "effective stance pertains to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the realization of events, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries out a stance act aimed at determining or influencing the course of reality itself." Five distinct subcategories of effective stance may be discerned.

The first subcategory of effective stance is deonticity (DM), which is often used to emphasize the necessity of a particular course of action. As stated by Marín-Arrese (2021b: 142), "the category includes expressions of deontic modality involving necessity, and also weak forms of deonticity, that of 'advisability'." Thus, markers of deontic modality such as *should* and *must* may be observed, as well as markers of quasi-modals or semi-modals such as *have to* and *need to*.

(16) *To understand why trade reform creates jobs,* **we need to** *<EF, DM, IE> understand how all nations grow and prosper.* (Trump)

(17) **We need to** *<EF, DM, IE> bring inflation down without giving up all the historic economic progress that working-class and middle-class people have made. And that's exactly what we're seeing.* (Biden)

The second subcategory is directivity (DIR), and it refers to language that is used to give commands or directions. This category includes different markers, including those employing the imperative with a conventional directive force *do not*, or markers with a hortative value such as *let's/ let us*, as well as performative directive speech acts, like *I/we urge* (*you to*), *I/we ask* (*you to*), and finally indirect directives *I/we would suggest*, *I/we want you to* (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b).

(18) **I want you to** *<EF, DIR, IE> imagine how much better our future can <EF, POT, SI> be if we declare independence from the elites who've led us to one financial and foreign policy disaster after another.* (Trump)

(19) *Today,* **I urg**e *<EF, DIR, SE> other nations to follow our example and liberate your citizens from the crushing weight of bureaucracy. With that, you have to <EF, DM, IE> run your own countries the way you want.* (Trump)

The third subcategory, normativity (NRM), refers to language that expresses the social acceptability or necessity of a proposed action or plan. As stated by Marín-Arrese (2021b: 142), NRM:

> *reflects the claims to social desirability or requirement regarding events and situations, which may be used with the intent to persuade readers of the desirability of the occurrence of events. Expressions of normativity provide an evaluative frame for some other proposition.*

Markers like *it is time*, *it is essential*, *it is crucial* are considered impersonal predicates that convey judgements regarding the social instrumental advisability of actualization of an event, or its social righteousness and justification, as well as markers like *it is fair*, *it will not do*, *it is right* (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b).

(20) ***It is time to*** <EF, NRM, IO> *believe in the future.* ***It is time to*** <EF, NRM, IO> *believe in each other.* ***It is time to*** <EF, NRM, IO> *Believe In America.* (Trump)

(21) *That's why I believe* <EP, CGA, SE> ***it is time to*** <EF, NRM, IO> *establish a national goal of reaching 4% economic growth.* (Trump)

The fourth subcategory, intentionality (INT), encompasses linguistics expressions that convey volition, intention, commitment, and/or inclination (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b). It is possible to observe modals denoting volition that carry a commissive illocutionary force like in *I/we will*, *I/we won't/will not*, in addition to predicates denoting speaker inclination *I/we hope*, *I/we would like*, and lastly what Krug (2000) defines as 'emerging' modals of intention, commitment and/or volition *I am/we are going to*, *I/we want*, and more.

(22) *Four:* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *tell our NAFTA partners that* ***I intend to*** <EF, INT, SE> *immediately renegotiate the terms of that agreement to get a better deal for our workers. And I don't mean just a little bit better, I mean a lot better. If they do not agree to a renegotiation, then* ***I will*** <EF, INT, SE> *submit notice under Article 2205 of the NAFTA agreement that America intends to withdraw from the deal.* (Trump)

(23) ***I am going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *lower you taxes;* ***I am going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *get rid of massive amounts of unnecessary regulations, on business and in your life;* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *unleash American energy;* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *repeal and replace Obamacare;* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *appoint Justices to the Supreme Court who will follow the Constitution;* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *rebuild our depleted military and take care of our vets;* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *save your 2nd amendment;* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *stop illegal immigration and drugs coming into our country, and yes,* ***we will*** <EF, INT, IE> *build the wall; and* ***I'm going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *renegotiate our disastrous trade deals, especially NAFTA – and* ***we will*** <EF, INT, IE> *only make great trade deals that put the American worker first.* (Trump)

The fifth and last subcategory is potentiality (POT), which is often used by speakers to raise the listeners' awareness of the possibility of an event or action happening. The persuasive potential of these expressions is that they try to influence the listener's perception of the feasibility of the event or

action (Marín-Arrese 2021a, 2021b). It may include expressions such as *we can/cannot*, *you can/cannot*, *it is possible/impossible*.

(24) *It doesn't have to be this way.* **We can** <EF, POT, IE> *turn it all around - and* **we can** <EF, POT, IE> *turn it around fast.* (Trump)

(25) *That's not my plan.* **We can** <EF, POT, IE> *continue to grow our economy in a stable and sustainable way.* **We can** <EF, POT, IE> *build on an economy that works for everyone.* (Biden)

This final subcategory concludes the section on effective stance. The following section, subjectivity and intersubjectivity, will focus on classifying and discussing them.

2.3 Subjectivity and intersubjectivity

The notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity have been widely discussed by many scholars throughout history (Benveniste 1971; Finegan 1995; Facchinetti 2009). Finegan (1995: 1) defines subjectivity as something which "concerns expression of self and the representation of a speaker's (or, more generally, a locutionary agent's) perspective or point of view in discourse - what has been called a speaker's imprint". In other words, it may be said that subjectivity refers to the way that individuals experience and interpret the world around them, which includes their own thoughts, emotions, and experiences, whilst also being concerned with the way that speakers express their own perspectives and points of view. On the other hand, for Nuyts (2012: 58), intersubjectivity "is presented as being shared between the assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but not necessarily) including the hearer". Thus, intersubjectivity is not only a matter of personal opinion, but it is shared with others, usually a hearer or addressee.

For the sake of this study, Marín-Arrese's (2011) categorizations of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, where the "salience or overtness of the role of the conceptualizer, which refers to the degree of explicitness, implicitness or opaqueness of the presence of the conceptualizer and personal vs. shared responsibility for the communicated information" (Marín-Arrese 2011: 215) will be employed to evaluate the degree to which the use of language is subjective or intersubjective. In her article, Marín-Arrese proposes four distinct classifications, which can be seen below.

Table 2. Categorization of subjectivity and intersubjectivity as figured in Marín-Arrese's article (2011).

Subjective	Intersubjective
Explicit (SE)	Explicit (IE)
Implicit (SI)	Opaque (IO)

For the rest of this section, a detailed explanation and examples of each subcategorization will be provided.

Subjective explicit (SE) refers to expressions in which the speaker is explicitly identified as the main point of reference, and the only subject of the epistemic or effective stance expressed in the sentence. It is common to find examples with the first person singular pronoun (as in (26) and (27)) such as *I think*, *I believe*, *I will*, *etc.*, which indicate that the speaker is the "subject of conception" (Marín-Arrese 2011: 215). In addition, it is possible to observe additional expressions that explicitly allude to the speaker (see examples (28) and (29)), like *I'm proud to declare*, *let me tell you*, *as you heard me say*, and more.

(26) *Some people say there are $2 trillion dollars overseas,* **I think** *<EP, CGA, SE> it's $5 trillion.* (Trump)

(27) *And our approach,* **I believe** *<EP, CGA, SE>, is working.* (Biden)

(28) *Today,* **I'm proud to declare** *<EP, MEP, SE> that the United States is in the midst of an economic boom the likes of which the world has never seen before.* (Trump)

(29) **As you heard me say** *<EP, MEP, SE> many times, Wall Street didn't build America. No, they didn't build — they didn't.* (Biden)

On the other hand, as opposed to subjective explicit expressions, subjective implicit (SI) pertains to expressions where the speaker remains the only subject of the stance expressed in the sentence, however, the subject is not explicitly identified. Meaning, that there may not be a use of personal singular pronoun *I* like in its explicit counterpart. This type of language may be characterized by the use of modal verbs ((30), (31)) such as *will*, *can*, *should*, *could*, *etc.*, or modal adverbs ((32), (33)) like *probably*, *perhaps*, *certainly*, *unlikely*, and more. Instances of such cases may be observed in the following examples:

(30) *The TPP* **would** *<EP, EM, SI> be the death blow for American manufacturing.* (Trump)

(31) **It would** *<EP, EM, SI> cut those — all those folks out again. Instead, they let tax cheats get away with it.*

(32) **Perhaps** *<EP, EM, SI> most shockingly, 1 in 6 men aged 18-34 are either in jail or out of work.* (Trump)

(33) *And I'm* **probably** *<EP, EM, SI> the only non-rail guy who's walked that tunnel. No, I'm not joking.* (Biden)

Moving on to intersubjectivity, we can first observe intersubjective explicit (IE) expressions, which involve instances where the speaker explicitly states their stance as being shared by either a particular audience or specific individuals (see examples (34), and (35)) with the help of expressions

like *we can*, *we are going to*, or as "universally shared" (36) (Marín-Arrese 2011: 215) such as *we all know*. Below are a few examples:

(34) ***We can*** <EF, POT, IE> *turn it all around - and **we can** <EF, POT, IE> turn it around fast.* (Trump)

(35) *And, folks, for the first time in a long time, **we're going to** <EF, INT, IE> make sure the biggest corporations begin to pay their fair share of federal taxes with a minimum tax rate of 15 percent.* (Biden)

(36) *And **we all know** <EP, CFV, IE> it's been four or five years in this country — the last four or five — a lot of things have been tough for people.* (Biden)

Lastly, we may encounter expressions which are intersubjective opaque (IO) wherein the speaker remains implicit, while conveying information that is shared with the audience or any other kind of addressee. In such cases, the speaker's statements rely on evidence which may be accessible to the addressee. This subcategory contains numerous different markers such as impersonal modal evidentials (37) like *it is reported*, *it seems*, *it appears*, *etc.*, evidential adverbs (38) like *clearly*, *obviously*, *etc.*, and impersonal modal predicates ((39), (40)) like *it is necessary*, *it is important*, *it is possible*, *etc*. Moreover, predicates where 'that' functions as a discourse deictic subject may be observed ((41), (42)), most often with expressions such as *that means* and *that shows*. Examples of all these instances can be found below:

(37) ***It was clear*** <EP, IIE, IO> *to me, and I think <EP, CGA, SE> to most people, in those meetings that the United States is as well or better positioned than any other nation in the world to lead the world on the economy in the years ahead.* (Biden)

(38) *And we still have more work to do though, but **we're clearly** <EP, IIE, IO> moving in the right direction.* (Biden)

(39) *It **should** <EP, EM, IO> be no surprise then that Hillary Clinton, **according to** <EP, IIE, IO> Bloomberg, took a "leading part in drafting the Trans-Pacific Partnership".*

(40) *Look, folks, I'm sorry to give you so much detail, but I think <EP, CGA, SE> **it's important** <EF, NRM, IO> we get the facts laid out on the table.* (Biden)

(41) ***That means*** <EP, IIR, IO> *reversing two of the worst legacies of the Clinton years.* (Trump)

(42) ***That means*** <EP, IIR, IO> *an end to protection for millions of people with pre-existing conditions who rely on the Affordable Care Act. Gone.* (Biden)

These last examples concludes the section on subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The next section, data and methods, will highlight certain specifics and technicalities of data collection.

3. Data and Methods

In order to achieve the objectives of this thesis, a comprehensive corpus has been compiled. This corpus consists of speeches specifically related to economy, delivered by the two most prominent and influential political figures in recent American history, the former Republican President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the current Democratic President, Joe Biden. A total of 12 speeches have been included in this corpus, with an equal distribution of six speeches each by both Trump and Biden. The selected speeches were delivered during a period spanning from 2016 to 2023, providing a look into the economic policies and strategies of both the Republican and Democratic administrations during this period.

Despite the variation in length of each speech in each sub-corpus, the total number of words in both sub-corpora is nearly equivalent, ensuring a fair and balanced comparison of the speeches. More specifically, the sub-corpus encompassing Donald Trump's speeches consists of a total of 20,797 words, while Joe Biden's sub-corpus comprises 21,900 words, resulting in a total word count of 42,697 words. Below is a table of all the selected speeches, including the number of words for each speech, as well as the total word count of all speeches combined.

Table 3. Table of Donald Trump's and Joe Biden's speeches with the corresponding word count.

Speeches			
Donald Trump	Number of words	Joe Biden	Number of words
Declaring America's Economic Independence, June 28, 2016	2,515	**Remarks by President Biden on the Economy and the September Jobs Report, October 7, 2022**	3,649
Donald Trump's Speech on Jobs and the Economy, September 15, 2016	3,035	**Remarks by President Biden in a Meeting with Business and Labors Leaders on the Economy, November 18, 2022**	1,262
Speech delivered by President Donald Trump at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, January 26, 2018	1,834	**Remarks by President Biden on the Economy and Efforts to Tackle Inflation, January 12, 2023**	1,393
Remarks by President Trump at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, January 21, 2020	4,032	**Remarks by President Biden on Economic Progress Since Taking Office, January 26, 2023**	6,668
Remarks by President Trump in State of the Union Address, February 4, 2020	6,217	**Remarks by President Biden on the Economy, February 8, 2023**	3,733

Donald Trump Addresses Economic Club of New York, October 14, 2020	3,164	Remarks by President Biden on the Economy, February 15, 2023	5,195
TOTAL TRUMP	20,797	**TOTAL BIDEN**	21,900
TOTAL: 42,697 words			

As evident by the titles, all the speeches are in one way or another linked to economy, and the total number of speeches by both Trump and Biden is highly similar.

In terms of speech retrieval, the sources used were carefully selected to ensure accuracy and completeness of the data. While the majority of the speeches for both Donald Trump and Joe Biden were obtained from the official website of the White House as well as the White House archives, a few speeches were acquired from other publicly recognized websites such as the World Economic Forum and the Time Magazine. Moreover, certain modifications were implemented to the speeches made by the presidents. Given that the transcriptions were written verbatim, several redundant elements such as audience questions, interjections, and/or reactions (e.g. *applause*) were present. Therefore, to ensure precision and consistency in the analysis, all irrelevant information not uttered by the presidents was excluded, in turn, enhancing the accuracy of the research.

In addition, this study employs a comprehensive research approach, utilizing both qualitative as well as quantitative research methods. To ensure accuracy in the examination of the data, raw numbers and normalized frequencies have been normalized per one thousand words. Moreover, the log-likelihood (LL) test from the University Centre for Computer Corpus Research on Language (UCREL) was employed to perform a frequency analysis of stance expressions in both corpora and to compare them. The purpose of this test is to determine whether there is a significant difference in the observed frequency (O_1) in Corpus 1 as compared to the observed frequency (O_2) in Corpus 2, indicating either and overuse or an underuse. It is worth noting that if the LL value is equal to or greater than 3.84 and the significance level is set to $p < 0.05$, then the difference in frequency is deemed to be statistically significant. The '+' sign is used to indicate an overuse in O_1 relative to O_2, and the '-' sign is used to indicate an underuse in O_1 relative to O_2.

It is important to note that the markers obtained from the selected speeches were subjected to manual analysis and annotation, wherein a set of tags were allocated to ensure accuracy in the categorization of markers and their dimensions:
a) Stance: EP – epistemic stance, EF – effective stance;
b) Subcategories of epistemic stance: EM – epistemic modals, IIE – indirect inferential evidentiality, CFV – personal cognitive factives, IFV – impersonal factives, CGA – cognitive

attitude, MEP – marked enunciational positioning, APH – aphonic or ignorative predicates, IIR – interpretation or reformulation of information;

c) Subcategories of effective stance: DM – deonticity, DIR – directivity, NRM – normativity, INT – intentionality, POT – potentiality;

d) Subcategories of subjectivity: SE – subjective explicit, SI – subjective implicit;

e) Subcategories of intersubjectivity: IE – intersubjective explicit, IO – intersubjective opaque.

The following example (43) constitutes an illustrated case of an annotated expression:

(43) *And **I've said** <EP, MEP, SE> so many times — often told the Democrats and Republicans — **we can** <EF, POT, IE> actually work together.* (Biden)

This paper will not only analyze modals such as *must*, *should*, *could*, *have to*, *need to*, but it also encompasses an investigation of adjectives and adverbs, as well as an array of expressions which pertain to intention, volition, commitment, desirability, advisability, knowledge, attitude, belief, and more. However, it is necessary to provide additional explanations concerning certain markers as some modal auxiliaries are multifunctional. For example, the modal verb *must* may occur in instances of both epistemic (epistemic modal) and effective (deonticity) stance, as evident in the following examples:

(44) *Under this American System, every policy decision we make **must** <EF, DM, SI> pass a simple test: does it create more jobs and better wages for Americans?* (Trump)

(45) *And I know <EP, CFV and IFV, SE> these numbers **must** <EP, EM, SI> be true because they were given to me by the great Larry Kudlow, who is sitting on my left.* (Trump)

Moreover, the modal verb *will* can also function as either an epistemic (epistemic modal) or effective (intentionality) stance marker, as demonstrated in the following examples:

(46) *In addition, **we will** <EF, INT, IE> streamline the permitting process for all energy infrastructure projects, including the billions of dollars in projects held up by President Obama – creating countless more jobs in the process.* (Trump)

(47) *Not one single idea she has **will** <EP, EM, SI> create one net American job, or create one new dollar of American wealth for our workers.* (Trump)

Another modal verb that may function as both epistemic (epistemic modal) or effective (potentiality) is *can*, for instance:

(48) *That's why Hillary is now only saying she has problems with the TPP "in its current form," – ensuring that she **can** <EF, POT, SI> rush to embrace it again at her earliest opportunity.* (Trump)

(49) *It **can** <EP, EM, SI> all go very quickly, but perhaps <EP, EM, SI> they are too proud or too foolish to ask for that help.* (Trump)

As evident from the data, multiple markers can be associated with either of the two stances. Furthermore, in addition to the aforementioned markers, there exist several others such as *should*, *may, might*, and more. Nonetheless, the markers cited earlier are among the frequently observed ones. Thus, a comprehensive analysis was conducted on all occurrences of modal verbs that may occur in both epistemic and effective stance, and subsequently attributed to their respective categories.

In addition, it is important to mention certain criteria and exclusions that have been conducted. The chosen exclusions are the following:

(i) Discourse markers functioning as pragmatic expressions such as *you know*, *I mean*, *you see*, have been excluded as they do not add to the analysis of stance or (inter)subjectivity.

(ii) The negated forms of modal verbs such as *won't/will not*, *can't/cannot*, and more, have been excluded as they may lead to false interpretations due to their ambiguity.

The topic of modality and negation have been thoroughly explored in the scope of literature (Cormack & Smith 2002, de Haan 1997; Narrog 2009, van der Auwera 2001). The reason for only including the positive forms of modal verbs in this study was made due to the potential impact of negation on the interpretation of sentences. Negated modals may create ambiguity and render it challenging to distinguish between epistemic and effective interpretations of the modal expressions, for example:

(50) *We **cannot** have free and open trade if some countries exploit the system at the expense of others.* (Trump)

In this example, the sentence may be interpreted epistemically as "it is not possible that we have free and open trade if some countries exploit the system at the expense of others" or effectively as "we are not allowed to have free and open trade if some countries exploit the system at the expense of others". Consequently, the present study is exclusively limited to researching positive occurrences of modal verbs, thus leaving the area of negative forms of modal verbs open for further research.

The upcoming section will concentrate on the discoveries and results derived from the analysis of all the markers featured in the selected speeches.

4. Findings and Results

The Findings and Results section is divided into three distinct sub-sections, each of which provides a detailed examination and discussion on the outcomes of the analysis of epistemic stance, effective stance, (inter)subjectivity, and their respective subcategories in the speeches delivered by both presidents, Trump and Biden.

4.1 Distribution of Effective and Epistemic Stance Markers

The following table (4) below presents a comprehensive overview of the frequency of effective and epistemic stance markers identified in the speeches delivered by the two American presidents, Donald Trump and Joe Biden. The results are presented both in raw numbers (N) as well as in normalized frequencies (R) per one thousand words, accompanied with the percentages (%), which indicate the use of epistemic and effective stance markers across all speeches, as well as the corresponding log-likelihood (LL) test scores.

Table 4. The overall frequencies of effective and epistemic stance markers in the speeches delivered by Trump and Biden.

Stance	Trump			Biden			Trump vs. Biden
	20,797 words			21,900 words			
	N	%	R	N	%	R	LL
Epistemic (EP)	220	44.896	10.578	224	63.457	10.228	+0.13
Effective (EF)	270	55.099	12.982	129	36.542	5.890	+58.47
TOTAL	490	100	23.561	353	100	16.118	+30.01

The results above reveal some differences. As we can see, Trump's use of stance expressions appears to be fairly balanced, wherein 44.8% and 55.09% of resources used pertain to epistemic and effective stance respectively, with effective stance expressions being used slightly more often. On the other hand, the results pertaining to Biden display a stark contrast, as there is an obvious tendency to use one stance category over the other. More specifically, with 63.4% of expressions pertaining to epistemic stance expressions, as opposed to just 36.5% of effective stance ones.

In addition, we can observe certain differences regarding both politicians in terms of the total ratios, whereby Trump employs both stance expressions combined to a substantially higher extent with R=23.561 as compared to Biden's R=16.118, as a result of the considerable use of effective stance expressions specifically, at R=12.982, in comparison to Biden's use of R=5.890. Thus, Trump's use of effective stance expressions surpasses those of Biden by more than twofold. However, when it comes to epistemic stance, the use of these expressions by both speakers is rather similar, with R=10.578 for Trump and R=10.228 for Biden. In the case of epistemic stance, the log-likelihood test shows no

significant difference between the two frequency scores as LL=+0.13, whereas in the case of effective stance, there is a significant difference between both frequency scores that may be observed, with the log-likelihood test score showing LL=+58.47.

In short, it appears that Trump chooses to employ both epistemic and effective stance expressions more or less equally. With the help of epistemic stance, he makes sure to convey his degree of certainty and knowledge concerning a particular topic that is being spoken about, while at the same time emphasizing a certain call to action with the help of effective stance. On the other hand, Biden seems to be prioritizing one single strategy, demonstrating a preference for the use of one stance over the other, particularly, epistemic stance.

The upcoming section will focus on the distribution of the subcategories of epistemic stance in particular, and the results of the analysis.

4.2 Distribution of the subcategories of Epistemic Stance

The next table (5) portrays the subsequent phase of the analysis, wherein all the subcategories of epistemic stance were analyzed. The classification of the subcategories of epistemic stance in the speeches by both presidents has revealed that the primary subcategory employed by both Trump and Biden were epistemic modals, followed by marked enunciational positioning for Biden, and cognitive attitude for Trump.

Table 5. The distribution of epistemic stance subcategories.

Epistemic stance	Trump's Speeches 20,797 words		Biden's speeches 21,900 words		Trump vs. Biden
	N	R	N	R	LL
EM	148	**7.116**	90	**4.109**	**+17.43**
IIE	8	0.384	15	0.684	-1.82
CFV and IFV	18	0.865	27	1.232	-1.38
CGA	20	0.961	21	0.958	0.00
MEP	15	**0.721**	44	**2.009**	**-13.43**
APH	4	**0.192**	14	**0.639**	**-5.38**
IIR	7	0.336	13	0.593	-1.53
TOTAL EP	**220**	**10.578**	**224**	**10.228**	**+0.13**

As mentioned previously, we can see that epistemic modals are used most frequently by both presidents Trump and Biden. However, Trump employs epistemic modals far more than Biden, with R=7.116, as compared to Biden's R=4.109. This means that they tend to employ devices which indicate their cautiousness in making definitive statements, as well as expressing their certainty and/or uncertainty about a proposition. As for the log-likelihood test scores, we can observe a statistically significant difference, as the score shows LL=+17.43. Some examples of EMs may be:

(51) **Perhaps** <EP, EM, SI> *the most transformative change of all is on trade reform, where we're addressing chronic problems that have been ignored, tolerated, or enabled for decades.* (Trump)

(52) *Over the past six months, inflation has gone down every month and, God willing, **will** <EP, EM, SI> continue to do that.* (Biden)

The second most used subcategory of epistemic stance by Trump is cognitive attitude. Although it is not the second most used epistemic stance subcategory by Biden, it is nonetheless used at an almost exact rate like Trump, only slightly less. The normalized frequency for Trump is R=0.961 and for Biden, R=0.958. In addition, the log-likelihood test score shows LL=0.00, which means that there is no significant difference in the use of this subcategory between both presidents at all. The use of this subcategory allows both speakers to convey their attitude and/or belief towards a certain statement. Here are the following examples:

(53) *Some people say there are $2 trillion dollars overseas, **I think** <EP, CGA, SE> it's $5 trillion.* (Trump)

(54) *And our approach, **I believe** <EP, CGA, SE>, is working.* (Biden)

The next subcategory that will be discussed is quite interesting, because unlike epistemic modals, which were both Trump's and Biden's most frequently utilized, Biden's second most used subcategory of epistemic stance is marked enunciational positioning, with R=2.009, as compared to Trump's R=0.721. The log-likelihood test score shows a statistically significant difference in the use of this subcategory by both speakers with LL=-13.43. The use of marked enunciational positioning expressions allows the speakers to emphasize that they are the main source of the claim, draw attention to said claim, while at the same time actively engaging the audience, for example:

(55) **As I mentioned** <EP, MEP, SE> *earlier, we ended the NAFTA disaster — one of the worst trade deals ever made; not even close — and replaced it with the incredible new trade deal, the USMCA — that's Mexico and Canada.* (Trump)

(56) **I made it real clear** <EP, MEP, SE> *to everybody, when speaking to the National Chamber of Commerce or the Business Roundtable, the reason I'm the most pro-union President in American history is because you're the single-best workers in the world.* (Biden)

Personal cognitive factives and impersonal cognitive factives are the third most used subcategory by Trump, with the normalized frequency being R=0.865. However, Biden has used both personal and impersonal cognitive factives more than Trump by quite a margin with the normalized frequency being R=1.232. The log-likelihood test score does not show any statistically significant difference in the use of this subcategory by both speakers as LL=-1.38. These two subcategories of

epistemic stance may be employed to achieve multiple purposes, such as highlighting how Trump and Biden rely on their knowledge (see examples (57) and (58)), in addition to demonstrating how they both establish shared knowledge with the audience (as in examples (59) and (60)), and lastly, emphasizing the veracity and factuality of a proposition (such as in (61) and (62)):

(57) *All **I know** <EP, CFV and IFV, SE> is once I had Regeneron, it worked out very well.* (Trump)

(58) *And **I know** <EP, CFV and IFV, SE> many of you are probably Republicans, but many of my Republican friends are basically arguing that good news for the economy is bad news — is bad news for America, as if they're rooting for fewer jobs and lower wages.* (Biden)

(59) ***As you know** <EP, CFV and IFV, IE>, a week ago, I wasn't feeling so hot, and I had a drug, Regeneron, that it made me feel very good, very fast.* (Trump)

(60) *Let me start off with <EP, MEP, SE> two words: Made in America. Made in America. And that's not hyperbole. I'm not joking about that, **as you know** <EP, CFV and IFV, IE>.* (Biden)

(61) ***The fact is** <EP, CFV and IFV, SI> that everybody wants to be where the action is, and the United States of America is indeed the place where the action is.* (Trump)

(62) *Over 30 years ago, we, **in fact** <EP, CFV and IFV, SI>, manufactured 30 percent of the global chip production worth tens of billions of dollars.* (Biden)

The following subcategory, interpretation or reformulation of information, is the second least used epistemic category by Trump (R=0.336), and the least used by Biden (R=0.593). However, the log-likelihood test score does not show any statistically significant difference in the use of this subcategory by both presidents (LL=-1.53). The reason for the low use of such expressions by both presidents is not definitively known. However, one potential explanation could be that the speakers may fear misinterpretation, which could result in them being misunderstood by the audience, and therefore, opting not to use such expressions. Alternatively, the presidents may think that their speech is already clear enough to the audience, and thus, there is no need to use markers of reformulation or interpretation of information. Lastly, time constraints may discourage the use of such expressions, as the presidents may prefer using clear language which is straight to the point, rather than explaining and reformulating in order to convey as much information as possible in a limited amount of time, for example:

(63) ***It also means** <EP, IIR, IO> scrapping the EPA's so-called Clean Power Plan which the government itself estimates will cost $7.2 billion a year.* (Trump)

(64) ***Meaning** <EP, IIR, IO> if you don't reauthorize them every five years, they go out of existence.* (Biden)

The second to last subcategory of epistemic stance is aphonic or ignorative predicates. For Trump, this subcategory is the least used one out of all of them, with the normalized frequency being R=0.192. For Biden, it is the second least used subcategory with R=0.639. The log-likelihood test score shows a statistically significant difference in the use of this subcategory by both speakers, with LL=-5.38. As it has been documented by Bull (2008), the deliberate use of evasive or imprecise language, which are frequently encountered in political discourse, may indicate a lack of commitment on the part of the speaker. For example, the use of "agnostic qualifiers" as Caton (1966) puts it, may count as evasive language because it indicates a lack of knowledge. Moreover, expressions of aphonic stance, which is taken from Brandt's (2004) "aphony", may count as well because "the speaker emphatically withdraws or refrains from investing in the utterance" (Brandt 2004: 5). Some examples of APH from the speeches are the following:

(65) *They call it therapeutic, but **I don't think** <EP, APH, SE> it was therapeutic.* (Trump)

(66) *Where in the hell is it written that says America can't lead the world in manufacturing again? Where is that written? **I don't know** <EP, APH, SE> where it's written.* (Biden)

The last subcategory of epistemic stance is indirect inferential evidentiality, which was also scarcely employed by both Trump and Biden. Trump's normalized frequency of this subcategory is R=0.384, and Biden's almost double at R=0.684. The log-likelihood test score does not show any statistically significant difference in its use by both speakers as the score is only LL=-1.82. Despite the infrequent use of these expressions, the reliance of the presidents on perceptual or conceptual evidence in their discourse may enable them to draw inferences that bolster their argumentation. Some examples with IIE are:

(67) ***According to*** *<EP, IIE, IO> the U.S. International Trade Commission, improved protection of America's intellectual property in China would <EP, EM, SI> add 2 million jobs a year to the United States every single year.* (Trump)

(68) ***I've seen*** *<EP, IIE, SE> what happens, also, as you go around the country, in towns when factories employing 3 to 3,000 workers shuts down. The very soul of the country — of that community evaporates.* (Biden)

In summary, epistemic modals are the most utilized markers by both Presidents Trump and Biden, however, Trump utilizes more expressions that convey a lower degree of commitment compared to Biden. Then, although expressions marking enunciational positioning are used moderately by Trump, we can see that Biden resorts to these expressions quite often, which serves the function of legitimization by vouching for the proposition being communicated. On the other hand,

markers of cognitive attitude, which are used almost equally by both speakers means that they tend to employ and do not shy away from using them, as it helps them express their subjective beliefs and attitudes. The last highly employed subcategory of epistemic stance is CFV and IFV, whereby both Trump and Biden utilize personal as well as impersonal cognitive factives which shows how they are fully committed to the assertion that is being made. From the less used markers, we first have indirect inferential evidentials which are still used by both presidents to, in a way, show that the claims they are making are based on some kind of evidence, indicating a source of information. Subsequently, expressions of interpretation or reformulation of information can be identified, which Trump and Biden rarely employ to "back the speaker's knowledge" as Bednarek (2006: 650) put it. Lastly, although the presidents seldom use aphonic or ignorative predicates, they do resort to them to dissociate themselves from any position of accountability by showing that they have insufficient knowledge on the subject matter or simply acting ignorant.

The upcoming section will concentrate on the distribution of the subcategories of effective stance in particular, and the results of the analysis.

4.3 Distribution of the subcategories of Effective Stance

Table (6) centers on the following stage of the analysis, which encompassed a thorough examination and classification of all the subcategories related to effective stance. The results derived from the categorization of effective stance in the speeches by the presidents demonstrate that both Presidents Trump and Biden employed markers of intentionality in their speeches most frequently, followed by deonticity for Trump, and potentiality for Biden.

Table 6. The distribution of effective stance subcategories.

Effective stance	Trump's speeches 20,797 words		Biden's speeches 21,900 words		Trump vs. Biden
	N	R	N	R	LL
DM	31	1.490	21	0.958	+2.49
DIR	16	0.769	15	0.684	+0.10
NRM	11	**0.528**	3	**0.136**	**+5.28**
INT	183	**8.799**	68	**3.105**	**+60.82**
POT	29	1.394	22	1.004	+1.36
TOTAL EF	**270**	**12.982**	**129**	**5.890**	**+58.47**

As stated earlier, it is clear that markers of intentionality are employed most often by both presidents Trump and Biden. In spite of them both using intentionality the most, Trump employs intentionality markers considerably more than Biden does, with R=8.799, as compared to Biden's R=3.105. With the help of the log-likelihood test, we can see that there is a statistically significant difference in the use of this marker by both presidents, with the score being LL=+60.82. Thus, it should be noted that Trump utilizes intentionality markers almost thrice as much as Biden.

Nonetheless, both presidents tend to employ markers of intentionality, which may be subdivided into devices that indicate speaker's intentions ((69), (70)), commitments ((71), (72)), and volition ((73), (74)), such as in the examples below:

(69) *China's unfair subsidy behavior is prohibited by the terms of its entrance to the WTO, and **I intend to*** <EF, INT, SE> *enforce those rules.* (Trump)

(70) ***I want to*** <EF, INT, SE> *strengthen Social Security and Medicare, not gut it.* (Biden)

(71) *Next, **I am going to*** <EF, INT, SE> *instruct my Treasury Secretary to label China a currency manipulator, and to apply tariffs to any country that devalues its currency to gain an unfair advantage over the United States.* (Trump)

(72) ***I will*** <EF, INT, SE> *veto everything they send me.* (Biden)

(73) ***I hope*** <EF, INT, SE> *they'll* <EP, EM, SI> *forgive me for that.* (Biden)

(74) ***I was hoping*** <EF, INT, SE> *she'd go pro.* (Biden)

Subsequently, we have deonticity which is Trump's second and Biden's third most used subcategory of effective stance. However, there is a stark difference between the most used and second most used subcategory of effective stance, as deonticity is almost six times less employed than intentionality. We can see that Trump's normalized frequency for deonticity is R=1.490 and for Biden, R=0.958. In addition, the log-likelihood test score shows LL=+2.49, which means that there is no significant difference in the use of this subcategory by both speakers. When it comes to the use of deontic markers, it is not unusual that both Trump and Biden have a similar distribution of deontic markers, as such expressions allow both speakers to emphasize their stance and highlight the need for a particular course of action (see (75) and (76)):

(75) *So, together, **we must*** <EF, DM, IE> *go forward with confidence, determination, and vision. **We must*** <EF, DM, IE> *not be timid, or meek, or fearful — but instead **we must*** <EF, DM, IE> *boldly seize the day and embrace the moment.* (Trump)

(76) *It's one thing to have passed it all. Now **we have to*** <EF, DM, IE> *make sure we're ever — on it every single day. Not a joke.* (Biden)

As opposed to deonticity, potentiality is Trump's third and Biden's second most used subcategory of effective stance. Trump's normalized frequency of this subcategory is R=1.394, while Biden's is R=1.004. The log-likelihood test score does not show any statistically significant difference in the use of potentiality markers by both speakers, as the score is only LL=+1.36. These expressions have a wide range of possible applications, including referring to actions that have been effectively accomplished in the past (see examples (77) and (78)), or actions that may happen in the future (79).

Alternatively, these markers may also serve the purpose of raising the audience's awareness of the feasibility of various actions and events happening (as in (80) and (81)), for instance:

(77) **We have succeeded** <EF, POT, IE> *beyond our highest expectations. Instead of two-for-one, we have cut TWENTY-TWO burdensome regulations for every ONE new rule.* (Trump)

(78) **We've achieved** <EF, POT, IE> *a lot because of all of you in this room and other rooms around the country.* (Biden)

(79) *Families* **will be able to** <EF, POT, SI> *fully deduct the average cost of childcare from their taxes, including stay-at-home parents.* (Trump)

(80) *America is the place to do business – so come to America where* **you can** <EF, POT, IE> *INNOVATE, CREATE and BUILD.* (Trump)

(81) **You can** <EF, POT, IE> *get up to a $600 tax credit for new windows, $500 for new doors, $2,000 to install a heat pump, $600 to replace electrical panels.* (Biden)

The subsequent subcategory of effective stance, directivity, demonstrates a marked decline in frequency as compared to the subcategories discussed above, and is much less used already by both Trump and Biden. As for Trump, the normalized frequency of this subcategory is R=0.769, while for Biden the normalized frequency is slightly lower, at R=0.684. The log-likelihood test score shows that this subcategory has no significant difference as the score is LL=+0.10, which is also the lowest out of all subcategories of effective stance that have been analyzed. By making use of directives, the presidents are capable of persuading and exerting influence over individuals by employing the imperative mood with a hortatory function ((82), (83)), and also by engaging in performative directive speech acts ((84), (85)).

(82) **Let us** <EF, DIR, SI> *bring light to their lives one by one and empower them to light up the world.* (Trump)

(83) **Let's** <EF, DIR, SI> *finish the job, and* **let's** <EF, DIR, SI> *cap the cost of insulin for every single American who needs it and pays no more than $35. That's just one example.*

(84) **We urge** <EF, DIR, IE> *our friends in Europe to use America's vast supply and achieve true energy security.* (Trump)

(85) **I ask you to** <EF, DIR, SE> *pass Senator John Barrasso's highway bill to invest in new roads, bridges, and tunnels all across our land.* (Trump)

Lastly, we have normativity, which is the least frequently used among all the subcategories of effective stance. Trump's normalized frequency of this subcategory is R=0.528, while Biden's is even less, at a mere R=0.136. As for the log-likelihood test, the test score shows a significant difference in

the use of such expressions, as Trump has an overuse of LL=+5.28. Through the use of normativity, the presidents are capable of incorporating expressions that indicate their judgements concerning the advisability or desirability of an event's occurrence (such as in examples (86) and (87)), or its social and moral justification.

(86) *Ladies and Gentlemen,* ***it's time to*** *<EF, NRM, IO> declare our economic independence once again.* (Trump)

(87) *Look, folks, I'm sorry to give you so much detail, but I think* <EP, CGA, SE> ***it's important*** *<EF, NRM, IO> we get the facts laid out on the table.* (Biden)

To conclude and sum up this section, markers of intentionality are the most frequently employed by both presidents; however, Trump employs them much more in comparison to Biden. By using these expressions, the presidents express their strong intentions and commitments. Subsequently, it can be observed that both presidents utilize deontic markers to a comparable extent, which often serves the function of highlighting and stressing the necessity of a particular course of action. Potentiality, another subcategory which is also used to a very comparable amount by both presidents, indicates that they may, at times, attempt to persuade and raise the audience's awareness concerning a certain topic. Moreover, subcategories which were relatively less utilized may be observed, where we can see both Trump and Biden employ directivity to a near identical degree. The use of directives serves to indicate the president's stance on how an event or action should be carried out. Finally, while normativity is the least used subcategory of effective stance out of all by Trump and Biden, it is still used to serve as a means for them to signal their stance regarding the social desirability or obligation of proposed courses of action.

The next and final subsection of the results will focus on the dimensions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

4.4 Distribution of the subcategories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity

Similar to the results above of the subcategories of epistemic and effective stance, the following table (7) shows the results of all the possible subcategories of (inter)subjectivity, which are marked in raw numbers (N), as well as the normalized frequency (R) per one thousand words. In addition, the log-likelihood test was performed as well in order to discern if there are any significant differences in the use of this added dimension.

Table 7. The distribution of the subcategories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

(Inter)subjectivity	Trump	Biden	Trump vs. Biden
	20,797 words	21,900 words	

	N	%	R	N	%	R	LL
Subjective explicit (SE)	106	21.628	5.096	121	34.278	5.525	-0.37
Subjective implicit (SI)	207	42.243	**9.953**	114	32.293	**5.205**	**+32.35**
TOTAL SUBJECTIVITY	**313**	**100**	15.050	**235**	**100**	10.730	**+15.54**
Intersubjective explicit (IE)	148	30.202	**7.116**	88	24.928	**4.018**	**+18.68**
Intersubjective opaque (IO)	29	5.916	1.394	30	8.493	1.369	0.00
TOTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY	**177**	**100**	8.510	**118**	**100**	5.388	**+15.13**
TOTAL FOR BOTH	**490**	**100**	**23.561**	**353**	**100**	**16.118**	**+30.01**

The figures above highlight both speakers' affinity to employ the dimension of subjectivity over intersubjectivity in their speeches. More specifically, it is clear that Trump most often chooses to employ the dimension of subjective implicit as the normalized frequency is R=9.953, which is almost twice as much Biden's at R=5.205. As for the log-likelihood test, the score displays a marked difference as LL=+32.35. Trump's overuse of this dimension may serve as a means to deflect personal responsibility for the communicated proposition (Marín-Arrese 2011). The analyzed speeches reveal that the dimension of subjective implicit is most often employed in conjunction with epistemic stance, more specifically epistemic modals ((88), (89)), but also with impersonal factives ((90), (91)), which enables the speakers to emphasize the veracity of a statement without the explicit use of a first-person pronoun, for example:

(88) **It would** <EP, EM, SI> *further open our markets to aggressive currency cheaters.* (Trump)

(89) **It would** <EP, EM, SI> *cut those — all those folks out again.* (Biden)

(90) **The fact is** <EP, CFV and IFV, SI> *that everybody wants to be where the action is, and the United States of America is indeed the place where the action is.* (Trump)

(91) **The truth of the matter is** <EP, CFV and IFV, SI> *we made a lot of this progress with Republican help.* (Biden)

However, it is also evident that the dimension of subjective implicit is employed in conjunction with effective stance as well, particularly with markers of directivity ((92), (93)), allowing the presidents to exert their authority and attempt to shape the listener's actions, for example:

(92) *Together,* **let us** <EF, DIR, SI> *send our love and gratitude to them—because they make our countries run.* (Trump)

(93) **Let's** <EF, DIR, SI> *also restore the Child Care Tax Credit, which gave tens of millions of parents some breathing room.* (Biden)

On the other hand, the dimension of explicit subjectivity is much less used by Trump than implicit subjectivity with R=5.096. However, for Biden it is slightly more used than subjective implicit with R=5.525. Nevertheless, there is no statistically significant difference in its use by both speakers as it is used at a similar rate, with a log-likelihood test score of LL=-0.37. Just like its implicit counterpart, the dimension of explicit subjectivity may be found with markers that designate both an epistemic or effective stance, and it is usually employed in order to highlight their personal responsibility concerning the statement with the use of the first-person pronoun *I*.

When it comes to epistemic stance, explicit subjectivity is found with markers of personal factives ((94), (95)), in comparison to the impersonal factives of implicit subjectivity. Moreover, markers of cognitive attitude are also present ((96), (97)), which helps the presidents convey their attitude and degree of epistemic support. However, most often we can find explicit subjectivity with expressions of marked enunciational positioning ((98), (99)) which "includes examples of self-reference to current or previous acts of communication or self-attribution" (Marín-Arrese 2011: 209), as in the following examples:

(94) **I know** <EP, CFV and IFV, SE> *so many people that are proud members and they're great people.* (Trump)

(95) **I know** <EP, CFV and IFV, SE> *that sounds bizarre, but look it up.* (Biden)

(96) *Some people say there are $2 trillion dollars overseas,* **I think** <EP, CGA, SE> *it's $5 trillion.* (Trump)

(97) **I doubt** <EP, CGA, SE> *any of you can tell me what the Republican reelection plan is this time out.* (Biden)

(98) *Last week,* **I announced** <EP, MEP, SE> *a groundbreaking plan for peace between Israel and the Palestinians.* (Trump)

(99) **Let me say** <EP, MEP, SE> *that right — right now, it carries $2 billion worth of freight every single day from Florida to Canada.* (Biden)

Nevertheless, explicit subjectivity can be found with subcategories of effective stance as well, primarily with markers of intentionality ((100), (101)), which allows the speakers to convey a broad range of stancetaking acts from intention to volition or even their commitment to the proposition that is being communicated, for example:

(100) *Five:* **I am going to** <EF, INT, SE> *instruct my Treasury Secretary to label China a currency manipulator.* (Trump)

(101) ***I will*** <EF, INT, SE> *flat veto them.* (Biden)

Moving on to intersubjectivity, a notable difference between the dimension of intersubjective explicit and intersubjective opaque is evident in the usage pattern of both speakers. Both Trump and Biden prefer employing explicit intersubjectivity over its opaque counterpart, with Trump's normalized frequency being R=7.116 in comparison to the low normalized frequency of the intersubjective opaque dimension with R=1.394. Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that the dimension of explicit intersubjectivity is the only one that exhibits a statistically significant difference out of the two. Biden's relatively low normalized frequency of R=4.018 as compared to Trump contributes to this significant marking, as reflected by the log-likelihood test score of +15.13.

As mentioned by Fetzer and Johansson (2010: 246):

> *in the particularized context of mediated political discourse, politicians do not only speak on behalf of themselves as individual agents, but also, if not primarily, on behalf of the political party (or government) they are affiliated with and which they represent.*

Thus, the use of intersubjectivity in discourse usually serves to exhibit a certain degree of shared responsibility between the speaker and the addressee, or "to present the information as implicitly shared or potentially shared with the audience" (Marín-Arrese 2011: 218).

Although explicit intersubjectivity can be observed in subcategories of both epistemic and effective stance, it is more common to find it in effective stance. Epistemically, it is often found with evidential markers (see (102) and (103)), which indicate that what the speakers are stating is based on some kind of evidence that they possess, which is also available to the audience. Most often, however, explicit intersubjectivity is found with cognitive factives ((104), (105)), like in the examples below:

(102) *In recent months, **we have seen** <EP, IIE, IE> proud Iranians raise their voices against their oppressive rulers.* (Trump)

(103) *Already **we've seen** <EP, IIE, IE> a nearly 40 percent increase in new sign-ups over last year.* (Biden)

(104) *And, **as you know** <EP, CFV and IFV, IE>, it just passed in Congress overwhelmingly.* (Trump)

(105) *I'm not joking about that, **as you know** <EP, CFV and IFV, IE>.* (Biden)

Effectively, explicit intersubjectivity is frequently present in expressions denoting potentiality ((106), (107)), which signifies the speaker's capability or possibility to accomplish a specified task, intentionality ((108), (109)), and lastly deonticity ((110), (111)), which tends to indicate the necessity of a certain action, as demonstrated in the following examples:

(106) **We can** <EF, POT, IE> *help them make a very good and short-time recovery.* (Trump)

(107) **We can** <EF, POT, IE> *build on an economy that works for everyone.* (Biden)

(108) **We are going to** <EF, INT, IE> *make America wealthy again.* (Trump)

(109) **We will** <EF, INT, IE> *ensure that America remains the world's number one energy producer.* (Biden)

(110) *So, together,* **we must** <EF, DM, IE> *go forward with confidence, determination, and vision.* (Trump)

(111) *Now* **we have to** <EF, DM, IE> *make sure we're ever — on it every single day. Not a joke.* (Biden)

Among all the dimensions, opaque intersubjectivity is the least utilized one by both presidents. It can be observed that Trump's normalized frequency of this dimension is R=1.394, and it is similar to Biden's at R=1.369. The log-likelihood test shows no statistically significant difference as the score is exactly 0.00. As figured in Marín-Arrese's article (2017: 42), opaque intersubjective expressions may be as a result of "obfuscating personal responsibility and accountability for expressing a certain position". From the analyzed speeches, opaque expressions are most commonly found in conjunction with effective stance rather than epistemic stance. Epistemically, opaqueness is typically observed only when using markers of interpretation or reformulation of information ((112), (113)), by using expressions like *that means*, *it shows*, for example:

(112) **It shows** <EP, IIR, IO> *how to solve the 21st century challenge we all face: protecting intellectual property, expanding digital trade, re-shoring lost jobs, and ensuring rising wages and living standards.* (Trump)

(113) **That means** <EP, IIR, IO> *an end to protection for millions of people with pre-existing conditions who rely on the Affordable Care Act. Gone.* (Biden)

Lastly, opaque markers are present in subcategories of effective stance as well, which, in the analyzed speeches, were particularly limited to expressions of normativity ((114), (115)). Such markers convey the implicit speaker's tendency or desirability towards the actualization of the event or express the speaker's emotive response to the event (Marín-Arrese 2011), for example:

(114) *Now* **it's time for** <EF, NRM, IO> *the American people to take back their future.* (Trump)

(115) *Look, folks, I'm sorry to give you so much detail, but I think* <EP, CGA, SE> **it's important** <EF, NRM, IO> *we get the facts laid out on the table.* (Biden)

The above example concludes the current subsection on subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Subsequently, the forthcoming section, the conclusion, will be the last section of this paper which will provide any final remarks and other related aspects.

5. Conclusion

This current thesis has attempted to make a novel contribution to the ever-expanding fields of epistemic and effective stance, in addition to the dimensions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. This was achieved through an investigation of the strategic implementation of epistemic and effective stance resources, as well as (inter)subjectivity in the discourses of the two American presidents on the subject of economy. Particularly, a series of speeches by Trump and Biden were analyzed, with the analysis commencing from Trump's speech which was given on June 28, 2016, and ending with Biden's speech which was delivered on February 15, 2023. As stated by Langacker (2009: 291), "epistemic relations are those which hold at the level of knowledge, and thus involve conceptions of reality. By contrast, effective relations hold at the level of reality per se." Thus, the utilization of both epistemic and effective stance markers represents a strategic effort wherein the speakers seek to assert influence over both the audience's perception of reality, and the actual reality itself. Markers of epistemic stance furnish the needed information and knowledge that bolsters the speaker's conceptions of reality as mentioned above. On the other hand, markers of effective stance help facilitate speaker's control over the level of reality by asserting the need, potentiality, and more, for a call to action, while also emphasizing their intentions, commitments, and volition of said action.

In terms of stance, Biden employed expressions of epistemic stance more often than effective, whereas Trump exhibited the opposite pattern by using expressions of effective stance more frequently than epistemic. In regards to epistemic stance, the most dominant subcategories with the biggest statistical differences were epistemic modals (e.g. *must*, *will*, *probably*, *would*), which were most commonly employed by both speakers, along with expressions of marked enunciational positioning (e.g. *as I said*, *I repeat*, *I have to say*), and aphonic or ignorative predicates (e.g. *I don't know*, *I can't see*). Moreover, although there was no statistically significant difference in the use of other subcategories by both speakers such as expressions denoting indirect inferential evidentiality (e.g. *seem*, *see*, *clear*), personal and impersonal cognitive factives (e.g. *I/we know*, *it's true*, *the fact is*), cognitive attitude (e.g. *I/we think*, *I/we believe*, *I'm convinced*), and interpretation or reformulation of information (e.g. *It shows*, *it means*, *it suggests*), it is noteworthy that President Biden employed markers from all these subcategories to a relatively similar extent to Donald Trump, albeit slightly more extensively. Biden's preference for the use of epistemic stance markers could potentially be attributed to his extensive experience in public service and his knowledge in political matters, even before becoming president, as opposed to Donald Trump. It is no secret that Joe Biden served as Vice

President during Barack Obama's presidency from 2009 to 2017, where he held a significant position in Obama's foreign policy administration, notably as the person in charge of the Iraq file (Dodge 2010). Furthermore, prior to assuming the position of Vice President, Biden held the position of Senator from Delaware for 36 years, during which he was a member of various committees, such as the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Obama White House Archives n.d.). Therefore, it could be inferred that Biden's previous experiences may have influenced his rhetorical strategies and communication style, which is also reflected in his present-day speeches as President concerning economy, and rather than expressing his intentions and commitments, he adheres to communicating the knowledge and information at his disposal.

As for effective stance, the predominant subcategories with a statistically significant difference were intentionality (e.g. *I/we want to*, *I/we are going to*, *I/we will*, *I am/we are determined*), which was the most used subcategory by both Trump and Biden, and normativity (e.g. *it is time*, *it is right*, *it is crucial/essential*). Furthermore, similar to the case of epistemic stance, there was no statistically significant difference in the use of some subcategories by both speakers such as expressions denoting deonticity (e.g. *have to*, *need to*, *should*, *must*), directivity (e.g. *let's/let us*, *I/we want you to*, *I/we ask you to*, *I/we urge you to*), and potentiality (e.g. *you can*, *we can*). However, it is important to highlight that unlike epistemic stance where President Biden employed markers of all subcategories except epistemic modals more frequently than Trump, in terms of effective stance, Trump was the one to employ markers of each subcategory more often than Biden. Despite lacking the same level of prior experience as President Biden, Trump's tendency to use effective stance markers more often than epistemic stance markers may be partly attributed to Trump's background as a businessman, where he primarily was a real estate developer, and television personality. In the corporate and business world, assertiveness, confidence, and persuasiveness are often seen as a positive traits and desirable qualities (Barrett 2006; DiSalvo *et al.* 1976). Thus, Trump may have carried this business approach and rhetorical style over into his political communication, where he tends to demonstrates a tendency to prioritize directness and assertiveness, confidently expressing his intended accomplishments and displaying a strong sense of volition, rather than solely focusing on conveying specific information. In addition, Trump frequently adopted and gained recognition for his informal communication style (Ahmadian *et al.* 2017), and with the help of markers of effective stance, he would resort to assertive language to underscore confidence, certainty, and more.

Regarding the dimension of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the findings demonstrate certain differences. Trump's use of implicit and explicit subjectivity may be, once again, attributed to the factors mentioned above, as several of the effective stance markers which he employed most, consisted of modal auxiliaries that occasionally included, or excluded, the first person singular pronoun *I*. Although Donald Trump demonstrated preference for implicit subjectivity, Joe Biden exhibited a

greater degree of explicit subjective dimension. This indicates that Biden is not hesitant to take responsibility for his statements and actions by explicitly stating himself as the subject, which could be attributed to the factors mentioned earlier, such as his prior extensive experience in politics. It can also be observed that both politicians demonstrate a willingness to assume shared responsibility, regardless of whether it is conveyed through explicit or opaque intersubjectivity.

Concerning the limitations of this study, while it was intended to account for the potential influence of the two chosen president's political affiliations on the distribution of epistemic and effective stance markers, as well as the dimensions of (inter)subjectivity in their speeches on economy, it cannot be definitively claimed that Trump's use of effective stance markers over epistemic is solely attributed to him being part of the Republican party or that Biden's higher frequency of epistemic stance expressions over effective is because he is a member of the Democratic party. To determine whether political affiliation plays a role in the types of stances adopted by presidents, further analysis of speeches delivered by a broader range of presidents from both the Republican and Democratic parties concerning economy would be required. Only then will we be able to determine whether there exists a correlation between political affiliation and the predominance of certain types of stance. This additional aspect may prove to be valuable in shaping research concerning this topic. An additional aspect which may also be included in further research is the inclusion of negated forms of modal verbs, which were not included in the current study. This additional component may lead to interesting results, potentially altering the findings obtained from the current analysis.

Data Sources

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Summary in Lithuanian

Šis darbas yra tekstynu paremtas tyrimas, kuriame analizuojama epistemiškumo (angl. *epistemic stance*) ir autoriaus pozicijos paveikumo (angl. *effective stance*) žymiklių vartosena buvusio JAV prezidento Donaldo Trumpo ir esamo prezidento Joe Bideno kalbose ekonomikos temomis. Tyrimo duomenys buvo surinkti iš patikimų šaltinių, tokių kaip Baltųjų Rūmų internetinė svetainė, Baltųjų Rūmų archyvai, „Times" ir „Pasaulio ekonomikos forumo" leidiniai. Iš parinktų kalbų buvo sukurtas 42697 žodžių dydžio tekstynas. Į tekstyną įtrauktos kalbos apima 2016–2023 metų laikotarpį. Šio darbo analizei atlikti pasirinkta metodologinė prieiga buvo Marín-Arrese epistemiškumo ir autoriaus pozicijos raiškos paveikumo kategorizacija (2021a, 2021b) bei jos keturlypė subjektyvumo ir intersubjektyvumo skirtis (2011). Šio darbo tikslai buvo nustatyti žymeklius, kurie perteikia epistemiškumo ir autoriaus pozicijos paveikumo JAV prezidentų politinėse kalbose susijusiose su ekonomika, ir pateikti jų taksonomiją, nustatyti žymeklių vartojimo panašumus ir skirtumus (kiekybinius ir kokybinius), ir ištirti (inter)subjektyvumo dimensijas analizuotose kalbose.

Duomenų analizė parodė, kad Donaldas Trumpas pasitelkia autoriaus pozicijos paveikumą šiek tiek dažniau negu episteminius žymiklius, ypač ketinimų (angl. *intentionality*) žymiklius (pvz. *I will, I am going to, I want to*), kas parodo kalbėtojo ketinimus ir pasiryžimą. Joe Bidenas, kita vertus, gerokai dažniau vartoja episteminius žymiklius, lyginant su autoriaus pozicijos paveikumu. Tai jis daro vartodamas episteminius modalinius veiksmažodžius (pvz. *may, could, might, will*), kurie demonstruoja jo išsakomų teiginių (ne)užtikrintumą. Joe Bidenas taip pat pasitelkia atviro tvirtinimo (angl. *marked enunciational positioning*) frazes (pvz. *as I said*, *let me say*, *as I mentioned*), kurios jam leidžia ne tik perteikti mintį, bet ir sustiprinti savo tvirtinimus bei teiginius, atvirai nurodant save, kaip teiginių šaltinį, naudojant pirmojo asmens asmenvardį *I* 'aš'. Kalbant apie (inter)subjektyvumo dimensijas, pastebėta, kad subjektyvumas yra ryškesnis negu intersubjektyvumas abiejų prezidentų kalbose. Pažymėtina, jog Trumpo kalbose pastebimas pirmenybės teikimas numanomam subjektyvumui (angl. *implicit subjectivity*), kuris jam leidžia išvengti atsakomybės, kai tuo tarpu Bideno kalbose dažniau randamas atviras subjektyvumas (angl. *explicit subjectivity*), kuris parodo, kad jis nevengia prisiimti asmeninės atsakomybės.

Šis tyrimas taip pat siekė nustatyti galimą pasirinktų prezidentų politinių pažiūrų poveikį autoriaus pozicijos raiškos paveikumo, epistemiškumo ir (inter)subjektyvumo žymiklių vartosenai prezidentų kalbose ekonomikos temomis. Deja, šio tyrimo duomenys ryškios politinių pažiūrų įtakos neparodė. Šiam tikslui pasiekti reikėtų sudaryti didesnės apimties ir įvairiapusiškesnį tekstyną, apimantį daugiau skirtingų prezidentų, atstovaujančių dviems pagrindinėms JAV politinėms platformoms, kalbų įvairesnėmis temomis.