| Abstract [eng] |
This paper seeks to explain foreign and security policy conducted by the Polish Republic during the 2014-2020 period. Poland, at that time, was conducting a two-way policy. At first, Poland sought to gather more security from the US and NATO alliance. Still, at the same time, Poland strove to become a regional leader and security guarantees in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, Poland sought to host more US and NATO troops but at the same time has contributed its military resources to secure other states. Thus this work seeks to explain the paradox that Poland, as a middle power, was striving to become a security provider and was still a security consumer. Various authors in the past analysis explained Polish foreign policy fluctuations and engagements in the region, but it was noticed that there was a lack of studies on how Poland actually combines these two strategies. Building on such premise, the main hypothesis is formulated – Poland seeks to engage in Bucharest 9 region to attract more security guarantees from the US. This, in turn, dictates the main aim of the thesis – to analyze how Poland interprets and combines two different, and seemingly opposite, foreign and security policy vectors. In the first part of this thesis, a theoretical model is deduced from the realism theory paradigm and D. Spero's other-help model. The main premise of the developed model is based on the assumption that middle powers can conduct self-help via foreign policy. Middle power can bridge the big power and its region in order to solve regional security issues. In the context of this thesis, this model in operationalized: Poland feels growing security dilemmas, thus conducting bridging policies towards B9 and the US. In the second part of the thesis, after analyzing the empirical evidence, it is possible to deduce that Poland indeed conducted two-way foreign policy in order to gain more security guarantees from the US and to have its agenda promoted more effectively in the forums of NATO. The systematized empirical evidence showed that the operationalized theoretical model has explanatory power – Poland indeed showed interest in becoming a security provider and consumer. As research showed, after the 2014 Russian occupation of the Crimean peninsula and the outbreak of war in the Donbas, Poland effectively identified a growing security dilemma. In turn, it showed great interest in promoting cooperation in the region. Poland underlined the need to have more cooperation in regards to pushing the joint agenda in NATO upwards and requesting to boost up the defenses of the NATO eastern flank. At the same time, Poland conducted extremely active diplomacy with the US. On multiple occasions, Poland tried to persuade the US to deploy more of its troops to Polish soil – thus strengthening American security obligations to Poland. Studies showed that in pursuing such a two-way policy, Poland indeed had become a bridge between B9 and the US. On several occasions, Polish officials mentioned that Poland would like to become an extension of American power in the region and thus make the region more secure. Even when the US showed little enthusiasm for completing the Polish requests to bolster the defenses, Poland still pursued its policy. As a result, Poland succeeded in strenghening and uniting the B9 region and deepening its bilateral relations with the US. Thus is it possible to confirm the hypothesis? Given the novelty of such research on Poland, especially in light of the provider vs. consumer dichotomy, further research questions arise for future studies. Based on this study, it may be of use to continue the research on this topic with broader time scope or using different theoretical paradigms. |
