

Vilnius University
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Eastern European and Russian Studies Programme

Faustas Norvaiša
2nd year

The Fear and Trembling: Redemptive Violence and Its Ethical Underpinnings in PiS and Fidesz Political Narratives

MASTER'S THESIS

Tutor:
Linas Jokubaitis, PhD

2022-01-10
Vilnius

MASTER'S THESIS FLYLEAF

Conclusions of the tutor of the Master's thesis (concerning the public defence):

.....
.....
.....

.....
(date)

.....
(name, surname)

.....
(signature)

The Master's thesis has been submitted to the Commission of Defence:

.....
(date)

.....
(signature of the secretary of the Commission of Defence)

Reviewer of the thesis:

.....
(name, surname)

Evaluation of the Commission of Defence:

.....

Head of the commission:

Members of the commission:

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ENTRY

Norvaiša, Faustas: “The Fear and Trembling: Redemptive Violence and Its Ethical Underpinnings in PiS and Fidesz Political Narratives”: Master in Eastern European and Russian studies program, Master thesis / Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science; tutor: Linas Jokubaitis, PhD. Vilnius, 2021. – 62 pages

Key words: redemptive violence, narrative, PiS, Fidesz, populism, refugee crisis, LGBTQ+, EU

Summary:

This thesis touches on the phenomenon of Redemptive Violence in terms of narratology and its manifestation in two populist parties, PiS and Fidesz. The research provides an effective framework of five-trope cycle to deconstruct populist parties' narratives for the purpose of answering two major questions: first, how do tropes of Redemptive Violence manifest in PiS and Fidesz narratives; second, what is Redemptive Violence's effect on the political institutions and their respected society. For argumentation, the thesis employs all textual sources: public announcements, press releases, and other publications presenting claims of the PiS and Fidesz parties' members. Specifically, the thesis outlines three prominent issues recognized in Poland and Hungary alike including the government's response to the refugee crisis, attitude toward the LGBTQ+ people and the European Union. It has been found that both parties utilized storytelling as a means of propagating their self-righteous statements, mobilizing supporters (electorate) and discrediting their opponents. The thesis comprehensively explains how vital facts are being deliberately omitted from populist parties' claims making them invincible in their own artificial narratives.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
1. Defining Populism	2
2. The Backgrounds of the Research and Theory	4
3. Theory of Redemptive Violence.....	7
4. Methodology	9
5. PiS and Fidesz - The Prelude	12
6. Redemptive Violence and Refugee crisis of 2015	16
6.1 Polish Case	17
6.2 Hungarian Case	22
6.3 Redemptive Violence and Refugee crisis of 2015: Concluding statements.....	26
7. Redemptive Violence and LGBTQ+.....	28
7.1 Polish Case	29
7.2 Hungarian Case	31
7.3 Redemptive Violence and LGBTQ+: Concluding Statements.....	34
8. Redemptive Violence and the EU	36
8.1 Polish Case	36
8.2 Hungarian Case	40
8.3 Redemptive Violence and the EU: Concluding Statements	43
Concluding Statements	44
Bibliography.....	47

Introduction

The discourse of the moral backbone of violence is a prominent one among scholars. Quite substantially, the subject of violence and its ethical driving forces are seen in the works of political philosophy; yet, usually ignoring a field of narratology. Indeed, the concept of violence is ambiguous and heavily relies on the given context, and is even further complicated if being placed under political and narratological considerations.

To illustrate narratology's contribution to the philosophy of violence this thesis will focus on Poland's Law and Order (PiS) and Hungary's Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance), two populist political parties. These two political groups have been discussed and criticized by various groups of people and considered responsible for the illiberalization of their countries' democracies, opposition to the liberal ideals, and discrimination.

The thesis will examine preconditions that led to the rise of PiS and Fidesz; then narratological tropes these two parties use to justify themselves. Further, it will trace the emergence of their narratives' tropes and content in terms of myth and ideology, and their modern application as an act of a new kind of Redemptive Violence. The research is about to provide a clear framework which would allow to deconstruct populist narratives, exhibit their making use of a fact as a political tool; thus, providing help to the scholarly effort that aims to detect the emerging populist political groups and, if necessary, prevent them from acquiring power in near future elsewhere; therefore, putting a stop to repetitiveness of Polish and Hungarian cases.

It's important as never before, especially now, as democracies face a challenge to gain the people's trust. In the report concerning "The State of Populism in Europe – 2020" it was indicated that the groups with populist tendencies are growing both in number and political power all around Europe¹. The analysts of the Pew Research Center argued that the discontent with democracy is connected to anxieties concerning the economy, the pandemic, and social divisions; democratic governments' failure to address these issues effectively². For instance, in 2021, Freedom House reported that both Poland and Hungary have been experiencing rapid disintegration of democracy

¹ Tamas Boros et al., "The State of Populism in Europe – 2020" (Brussels, Belgium: FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2020): 130-136, from https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/state_of_populism_in_europe_2020_final.pdf.pdf.

² Richard Wike et al., "Citizens in Advanced Economies Want Significant Changes to Their Political Systems," Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center, November 23, 2021), <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/10/21/citizens-in-advanced-economies-want-significant-changes-to-their-political-systems/>.

whose democratic character of the governmental system was rated between 3.75/ 3.00 points out of 7³⁴. It is a result of a succesful attempt to centralize power into the hands of a single individual or a narrow group of people, taking control over the media, and harassing the opposition.

The thesis will argue that Redemptive Violence is an unprecedented phenomenon that differs essentially from other forms of oppression known to us such as divine violence, despotism, totalitarianism, or biblical Redemptive Violence, because instead of applying direct terror to subjugate mass populations and political adversaries; this kind of aggressive attitude is rather strongly focused on keeping up with its narrative and using it as a starting point to carry out whatever these two parties aim at any given moment. Redemptive violence is about a terror through storytelling, distortion of reality which happens through a precise process.

Some limitations need to be articulated. Since this research relies on translated and / or reported pieces of texts which puts into the question the techniques utilized such as if the copy was made according to the principles of literate translation (direct word to word) or paraphrase method (summarizing the essence of the meaning). Yet, since the thesis is not focusing on pure grammar-based rhetoric analysis which might require to determine the quality of each word (lexical) as well as speaking environment, the direct-implied overall meaning of the spoken or written text will suffice as long as it fits the cluster topic category.

1. Defining Populism

Populism is one of the main political trigger words of the 21st century. The term can be used very broadly to describe both left-wing and right-wing associated political groups, individuals and movements. Consequently, making the usage of populist term a bit problematic. In that sense, it becomes important to offer a clear definition of this contested term.

In *Populism* written by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, populism is defined as a kind of political movement which contains three core concepts. The first one has to do with the people; populist movements tend to show their relatability to the people, meaning that populism appeals to the people by depicting oneself as their sole representative in turn generating a shared identity between the target audience and the movement; thus, permitting the populists to mobilize peo-

³ Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2021 - Hungary,” 2021, accessed October 1, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2021>.

⁴ Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2021 - Poland,” 2021, accessed October 1, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/nations-transit/2021>.

ple effectively and show themselves as the incarnations of the people's will⁵. Through mobilization of people and exhibition of oneself being the ally of the common folk, a second concept is introduced — the elite. Populists tend to criticize the political, economic, cultural, media elite. The crucial aspect here is morality which draws a line separating the pure (common people) and the corrupt ones (the elite and its allies)⁶. The attack on the elites gives populists ground to accuse the elite and their allies of sabotaging populist attempts and ignoring the interests of the people. The last concept which makes populism is the general will; it refers to one's attempt to depict via rhetoric that a movement has mobilized the people into a community which means that populist-enforced legislations are for the common good for the community⁷. From this position, populists can be seen as a democratizing force since it protects the principle of national sovereignty which in theory "empowers" groups that have not been represented by the establishment.

In general, scholars tend to consider both PiS and Fidesz as populist political powers. For instance, "Populist Parties in Contemporary Europe" written by Michal Kubat and Martin Mejstřík argue that both Fidesz and Pis should be observed as populist due to their ideology-driven populist narrative meaning that both parties represent themselves as standing in support for the "ordinary people, national identity, conservative values, anti-establishment, exclusionary anti-refugee, and anti-corruption"⁸. On the other hand, Kim Seongcheol has argued that both political parties contain populist and non-populist characteristics due to their tendency to criticize the elite institutions such as the EU; yet, go behind the very same elites when there is a need for support to solve the matters which are impossible to deal with alone as well as for their promoted patronal politics which has created a new class of powerful and rich elite class loyal to the respected political parties⁹. However, as it was noted in research by Peter Kreko and Attila Juhasz, Fidesz and PiS should be seen in terms of populism due to their tendency to utilize accumulated political power in distinguishing be-

⁵ Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford university press, 2017), 9-10.

⁶ Ibid., 11-14.

⁷ Ibid., 17-18.

⁸ Michal Kubát and Martin Mejstřík, "Populist Parties in Contemporary Europe" (Brussels, Belgium: DEMOS, 2020), 12, accessed October 1, 2021, accessed https://openarchive.tk.mta.hu/424/1/Populist%20Parties%20in%20Contemporary%20Europe_12-06-2020-FINAL.pdf.

⁹ Seongcheol Kim, "... Because the Homeland Cannot Be in Opposition: Analysing the Discourses of Fidesz and Law and Justice (PIS) from Opposition to Power," *East European Politics* 37, no. 2 (September 2020): 332-351, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1791094>.

tween what is good and evil (controlling the narrative), which in turn allows them to use criticized the old elite for their own gain when needed¹⁰. On top of that, the scholars emphasized that both parties via the employment of victimization exhibit their states as mistreated by the local and foreign elites and tackle an idea of the disappearance of the Polish/Hungarian statehood¹¹. Therefore, rallying their support, slowly destroying the institutions of democracies from above to retain power.

2. The Backgrounds of the Research and Theory

On the theoretical level, some academic discussions have been made regarding narratology of the political. For instance, Josefín Graef, Raquel da Silva & Nicolas Lemay-Hebert's "Narrative, Political Violence, and Social Change, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*" explored the utilization of narratology in political science as "coinciding with a growing scholarly interest in the narrative as a sense-making practice in the political realm and a strategic"¹². Pointing out a fact that political discourse counts largely on narrative patterns although it has to be observed critically by its full ontological, epistemological, and methodological implications. Therefore, making necessary to approach the narratological analysis through a framework perspective that could help a scholar to reach the "understanding [of] social and political change" inspired by the stories people tell¹³.

Similar inclinations are held in Shaul R. Shenhav's account on "Political Narratives and Political Reality," who viewed the growing interest in political narratology partly as the outcome of "the human tendency to rely on narrative as a way of understanding the world and endowing it with meaning"¹⁴. According to her, "the dominant role of narratives in political discourse is based on the centrality of narrative in the formulation and maintenance of worldviews"¹⁵. The significance of narrative lies in its ability to offer practical means of facilitating problematic circumstances into a

¹⁰ Péter Krekó and Attila Juhász, "Beyond Populism: Political Tribalism in Poland and Hungary," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (2019): 70-72, http://turkishpolicy.com/files/articlepdf/beyond-populism-political-tribalism-in-poland-and-hungary_en_4755.pdf.

¹¹ Ibid., 73.

¹² Josefín Graef, Raquel da Silva, and Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, "Narrative, Political Violence, and Social Change," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 43, no. 6 (October 2018): 435, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2018.1452701>.

¹³ Ibid., 431.

¹⁴ Shaul R. Shenhav, "Political Narratives and Political Reality," *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique* 27, no. 3 (July 2006): 246, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20445054?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

¹⁵ Ibid., 246-247.

set of events that would divert the public focus from critique against a populist party. In the political setting, narratives are consistent with political logic; they shape the present. Importantly, arguments that are offered by political narratives stem from historical accounts: the patterns of motifs, events, dates, archetypical representations of objects which share meanings and values with the target audience.

Nevertheless, it is also necessary to emphasize the political narrative's ability to move beyond a limited scope of historicization when it comes to shaping political processes. This point is adequately illustrated in Stefen Groth's work on "Political narratives/narrations of the political: an introduction" that presents narratology in the context of political science as capable of offering distinguishable viewpoints of the discourse. First of all, the narrative is practice and ontology expressed "by telling and receiving stories [that] are universal modes of mediating (political) views"¹⁶. Narrative can also be a form of strategy as its employment may allow the speaker to reach specific objectives. Methodologically, the narrative is an analytic approach tackling "sociopolitical realities"¹⁷. Therefore, political narratives can be "interpreted, modified, and coconstructed in everyday stories and as part of popular narratives," to exhibit how political processes and structures transform and transcend actual day-to-day practices¹⁸.

Some attempts were made regarding how PiS' and Fidesz's modes of narratives transformed Poland and Hungary politically. Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska's report concerning political communication upon Polesxit analysis revealed that the Polish political narration was rather populist with a tendency to generalize matters of consideration, lacked substance in providing facts and data in-depth¹⁹. The report also revealed some narratological strategies which would usually navigate toward obfuscation of truth which would imply that Poland is ready to leave the EU although, in reality, that was not the case in practice. Therefore, causing the audience to experience fear which later could be utilized by the PiS to achieve their political objectives. The study upon the storytelling

¹⁶ Stefen Groth, "Political Narratives / Narrations of the Political: an Introduction," *Narrative Culture* 6, no. 1 (2019): 7, <https://doi.org/10.13110/narrcult.6.1.0001>.

¹⁷ Ibid., 11.

¹⁸ Ibid., 1.

¹⁹ Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska, "Polesxit Narrative : A Case Study in Terms of Political Communication," *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne* 64, no. 1 (2019): 211, <https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2019.64.12>.

mode of theoretical Polexit, displayed Polish political reality and current misconception of the European integration process²⁰.

Michael Toomey's study on the relationship between nationalistic discourse and its effect on Hungary's shift from liberalism examined how Orbán constructed narratives while employing mythemes that referred to the Hungarian historical past. The paper argued that Orbán used historical mythemes to shield himself and Fidesz from criticism²¹. Also, it was noticed that the approach of storytelling was used to promote restoration ideals of the Hungarian past; therefore, constructing an exclusionary image of Hungarian nationalism which serves as means to legitimize Orbán's regime and discredit the opposition as false representative of the nation.

In Bozok & Zoltan's study upon Polish and Hungarian populists' take on religion,²² and Kourou's analysis of PiS' and Fidesz position on LGBT issues, emphasized most prominent storytelling motifs of those political parties. However, both attempts struggled to exhibit the clear picture in terms of how materialization and non-linguistic practice came from what was said on the linguistic level by the agent of violence. Similar approach could be found in Grzymala-Buss report of "Global Populism and Their Impact"²³ and Sata and Karolewski's "Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland"²⁴ although they were more successful at identifying both political parties' takes upon social-political challenges and *how* their uttered position shaped socio-political developments in their ruled countries.

Nonetheless, the issue that makes it hard to understand the political parties' narrative leading to the emergence of violence could be articulated in two aspects: one, the absence of clear categorization of how these two political groups communicate against their opponents; two, the absence of clear framework which would allow to detect how violence through storytelling happens.

²⁰ Ibid., 206.

²¹ Michael Toomey, "History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary,'" *New Perspectives* 26, no. 1 (2018): 16-17, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325575526_History_Nationalism_and_Democracy_Myth_and_Narrative_in_Viktor_Orban%27s_%27Illiberal_Hungary%27.

²² Adam Zoltan and Andras Bozoki, "State and Faith Right-Wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary," *Intersections* 2, no. 1 (2016): 98-122, <https://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/143>.

²³ Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Global Populisms and Their Impact," *Slavic Review* 76, no. 1 (2017): 3-8, <https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.152>.

²⁴ Robert Sata and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, "Caesarean Politics in Hungary and Poland," *East European Politics* 36, no. 2 (2019): 206-225, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1703694>.

Yet, some contributions have been made to the overall effort of examining populists as such. For instance, Federman in "Narrative Approaches to Understanding and Responding to Conflict"²⁵, provide some indicators on understanding the narratological essence of the abuser concerning one's intentions against the Other. Also, Federman seems to offer an idea that all groups that commit violence have the essentialist nature that is use of force, either kinetic or non-kinetic. In the light of this proposition, PiS and Fidesz as abusers could be considered as two different sides of the same coin—sharing similar ethics-related backgrounds, rhetorical aspects in the way they communicate with the public, and how it leads to latter's active response afterwards. That said, Federman's offered insights on a framework of analysis and detection make this research possible while focusing on two collectives situated in two different locations which commit rhetorical acts of violence.

3. Theory of Redemptive Violence

The idea of cleansing or, in other words, purifying, has ethics-related underpinnings, especially when it comes to violence within political dimension. Walter Wink in the essay on "The Myth of Redemptive Violence" and book *The Powers That Be – Theology for a New Millennium* refers to violence as being almost sacrificial or religious act employed to recover and preserve social order and tranquility^{26 27}. When one's storytelling is focused on justification of violence as means to reach purification, the archetypical scapegoat motif should be expected as well. That is, just like in traditional Aristotelian storytelling module, the thesis juxtaposes the antithesis, and their clash creates the inciting action that permits the story to be developed. Scholar who seemed to come at highly similar conclusion was René Girard with *The Scapegoat*, who, on top of that, recognized that religious and historical mythemes are commonly employed too. It takes places at the discourse level before Redemptive Violence translates into certain actions taken against the Other who is made an antagonist to the values prized by the presumed majority²⁸. Indeed, mythemes used in political discourse can vary drastically starting from religious down to historical symbolisms. Yet, the use of such narrative units, on the grounds of rhetoric, has one aim — creating a philosophical depth

²⁵ Sarah Federman, "Narrative Approaches to Understanding and Responding to Conflict," *The International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution* 4, no. 2 (2016): 154-171, <https://doi.org/10.5553/ijcer/221199652016004002002>.

²⁶ Walter Wink, "The Myth of Redemptive Violence," *The Bible in Transmission*, (Spring 1999): 1-5, <https://www2.goshen.edu/~joannab/women/wink99.pdf>.

²⁷ Walter Wink, *The Powers That Be: Theology for a New Millennium* (New York: Doubleday, 1999).

²⁸ Chris Fleming, *René Girard: Violence and Mimesis* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327733518_Rene_Girard_Violence_and_Mimesis.

which can tackle all three aspects of effective communication: ethos (the ethical/moral side of the argument), logos (the factual information provided to prove logical nature of the needed action), and pathos (an appeal to the audience by trying to manipulate their emotions; thus, permitting the speaker to incite fear, happiness or interest of the listener); consequently, legitimizing the speaker's authority in terms of credibility and ethical superiority.

Some instances of Redemptive Violence could be seen in other scholarly works. Francisco Wills' account on the Redemptive Violence in prisons exhibits how this subject is being used as a mechanism of control and order in prison systems²⁹. In the work on "The Phenomenology of Redemptive Violence," Thomas E. Beaumont examined how the narrative of Redemptive Violence shapes truth; arguing that sometimes some social institutions employ cultural places and myths as a means of legitimizing violence; therefore, installing a certain ideological perception upon the target audience, who, in turn, would act in a particular way against the Othered³⁰. Slavoj Žižek's introductory essay in the book *Virtue and Terror*, explored the period of Jacobin terror or to be more specific Robespierre's speeches, his observations seem to suggest that Robespierre's way of building a narrative is closely related to the narratological Redemptive violence; the observations were grounded on the close-textual analysis upon Robespierre's arguments on the necessity to purify the French nation from those who have different beliefs unlike the members of the revolutionary movement.

Having said that, the phenomenon of Redemptive Violence can be conceptualized as follows: the individual or collective is chosen to embody the Otherness; therefore, becoming the scapegoat regarding its differences on practiced moral rules or ideological propositions; two, the ones who commit the Redemptive Violence — employ the trope cycle and other elements like mythemes during the stage of linguistic discourse to justify the need for violence along the lines of ethical necessity.

Redemptive violence is a novel form of social-political action. It stands for activities taken against the Other by employing best rhetorical practices. Therefore, making it dangerous since, as Walter Wink argues, the Redemptive Violence's appearance in everyday social lives may orient people in "making violence pleasurable, fascinating, and entertaining. The Powers are able to de-

²⁹ Francisco Wills, "The Myth of Redemptive Violence in Prison," *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 22, no. 1 (2014): 5-20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15456870.2014.860145>.

³⁰ Thomas E. Beaumont, "The Phenomenology of Redemptive Violence," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 45, no. 4 (2020): 184-199, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375421999175>.

lude people into compliance with a system that is cheating them of their very lives”³¹, especially now as the means of transmitting the information is at large an easy pursuit. Plus, Redemptive Violence does not make distinction between the foreigner or the citizen; hence, putting into danger minorities, foreigners, and regular citizen likewise. Emphatically, the thesis will use the definition of Redemptive Violence as being non-materialized (discrimination (LGBTQ+, refugees), reputational damage (EU)) or materialized (legislative actions initiated by the ruling government).

The thesis objects, PiS' and Fidesz's, seem to utilize what both Gerard and Wink indicated on the idea of Redemptive Violence. To excavate it, all accessible linguistic copies produced by the members of these political parties will be treated as artifacts of the research and regarded like unique communication products inspired by ideological, cultural, historical, and economic developments in Poland and Hungary. Each text will be treated as means to detect narratological tropes, arranged according to the topic clusters such as LGBT, refugees and the EU to see what these issues tell about the thesis objects via scope of Redemptive Violence.

The underlying research questions are: how do tropes of Redemptive Violence manifest in PiS and Fidesz narratives; second, what is Redemptive Violence's effect on the political institutions and their respected society.

An attempt to answer the research questions can be made by utilizing various theories. Methodological choices of this thesis are elucidated in a section down below.

4. Methodology

To examine the narrative of PiS and Fidesz and to conceptualize the phenomenon of Redemptive Violence, the critical discourse analysis will provide foundations for most of the research. The discourse study refers to the examination of one's speech regarding its structure, thematic development, and other linguistic properties³². The method is mainly focused on detecting how language correlates with the speaker's reality and its effect on a grand scale of things. It is usually fulfilled by raising a theory leading to a hypothesis which would be later examined to understand if there's confirmatory data to prove the thesis³³. The weakest point of discourse analysis is that it may

³¹ Wink, "The Myth of Redemptive Violence," 5.

³² Mark L. Knapp, "Discourse Analysis," in *Handbook of Interpersonal Communication* (Sage, 2002): 103-104, <http://web.uvic.ca/psyc/bavelas/2002discourse.pdf>.

³³ Ibid., 111.

lack a precise research design if a scholar is looking at the narrative construct, though that can be solved by employing means which stem from narrative studies³⁴.

To make the whole research structured, the thesis will employ an element of trope. This item represents a generic unit of the narrative involving a relationship between a character, an event, and a theme from which a story is constructed. This kind of approach enables a scholar to examine how thematic elements embedded within linguistic utterances work and how, as a result, may convey the speaker's stand upon a matter of consideration³⁵. Trope analysis, as synthesized by Kuypers in *Rhetorical Criticism – Perspectives in Action* allows to examine texts by focusing on a thematic development of one's story and continuously asking a question of what power trope has to affect someone's reality³⁶. Scholar who seem to utilize similar method to the trope analysis was Seongcheol Kim in his account on the Fidesz and PiS discourses who took populist-related thematic categories to examine how both Pis and Fidesz communicate their demands and how they built alternative reality based on their ideological scope³⁷.

To display how the tropes are used could be found in Nussbaum's *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, a part where the scholar examines Seneca's *Medea*, questioning the text's ability to illustrate the universe of Stoic ethics and its critical position upon first century's Roman cultural practices³⁸. For example, some fragments from dialogues between Medea and Jason could be attributed to the mythemes of passion and harsh justice while her discourse with the king of Athens may indicate the opposite nature of passion — care and clemency. Thus, creating the clash of thesis and antithesis — establishing grounds for exploration of the vices of passionate seek for justice.

In that sense, according to the given methodological and theoretical insights, the structural framework is about to be used to deconstruct the research artifacts' stories. The method of analysis

³⁴ Ibid., 112-113.

³⁵ David Maybury-Lewis, "Claude Levi-Strauss and the Search for Structure," *The Wilson Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1988): 82-95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40257769>.

³⁶ Jim A. Kuypers et al., "Chapter 5 Generic Elements in Rhetoric" & "Chapter 6 On Objectivity and Politics in Criticism." *Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action*, 2nd ed. (Lanham etc.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016): 47-63.

³⁷ Kim, "Because the homeland cannot be in opposition," 334-335.

³⁸ Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018): 439-483.

consists of a 5-part trope circle which will be employed to exhibit the transformation of a fact into a political tool; thus, making a funnel to launch the Redemptive Violence against the scapegoat.

The first trope — presumption of guilt. Under normal circumstances, before passing the judgment, it is normal to hear two sides of the story, the accuser, and the accused. It is rooted in a modern legal practice based on the presumption of innocence. However, Redemptive Violence is antagonistic to generic practices since the accusation becomes sufficient proof per se. The assumption of guilt is weaponized by an attacker and it is achieved by abstracting a general statement that makes the potential danger implicated by a question into the imminent one.

The second trope — abstraction, is a point where the fact becomes obfuscated or generalized; thus, providing enough space for one's creativity and manipulation of the truth.

In this stage, abstraction replaces concrete components of a claim to form a more generic assertion. In this transition, a claim, by losing a sense of factual elements, becomes an unverified accusation. Naturally, as it generates a gap in logic it should disturb any listener, consequently, raising some misgivings upon the accusation itself; yet, the listener wouldn't be given a chance to re-analyze the statement's validity. That would occur due to an irregular linguistic shift. Instead of language to describe an action done, present tense would be employed.

For illustration, let's say that subject A has attempted to mislead someone into doing something. The emphasis is put on items of misleading and doing something. However, through the funnel of abstraction of specific facts, the accuser would turn the statement into *is*. Therefore, forging a generalized claim that subject A *is* dangerous and manipulative. Consequently, turning the discourse from the exposition of one's action toward a critique of traits and nature of a subject A. This process of abstraction followed by the linguistic shift upon the critique of one's traits leads to a third trope — essentialism, a stage the scapegoat is considered as the incarnation of a fatal flaw.

Here the idea of stopping the Other is usually introduced — conclusively leading to the fourth trope of purgation — at this point, the proclaimed need for action takes the form. It is being backed by the moralist rhetoric which would include philosophical rigor to nourish the pretext for the purge. In this stage of narrative development, the speaker pretends to be saving the situation. The purgative intentions may manifest as legislative measures, physical oppression, or any other act, which aims at negating the scapegoat's needs and freedoms; therefore, concluding with the final trope — redemption. And that's an assumed idea that the conflict is being resolved and the issue at hand terminated; thus, concluding the trope cycle.

Based on the methodological aspects presented beforehand, the thesis is structured as follows. In the beginning, I will provide a brief overview of Poland's and Hungary's political and his-

torical backgrounds and of the events which led to the rise of PiS and Fidesz. It will be ensued by another section covering collected data and its interpretation in the light of researched literature and applied theoretical approaches. Other secondary factors will be considered or discussed, such as similarities or differences when comparing those two political parties' success in proceeding Redemptive Violence. The final section will consider the analysis results and the implications of Redemptive Violence's narrative.

5. PiS and Fidesz - The Prelude

The dissolution of democratic institutions took place in Hungary and Poland after Viktor Orbán's Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) party came back to power in 2012, and when Jarosław Kaczyński's led PiS (Law and Justice) won 2015 elections in Poland.

Poland and Hungary were once the epitome of CEE (Central-Eastern Europe) ability to lead democratization, pluralism, and rule of law; now, they are the ones that serve as examples of the highest and sharpest drops in levels of democracy in the region³⁹, ousting the very institutions that made them a model of democracy. Both Orbán (Fidesz) and Kaczyński (PiS) have diverted from the course of liberal democracy, framing it as inadequate to the Hungarian and Polish people. Both leaders insisted that repairing the failed transformation needs an instant alteration of liberal democracy to give the power back to "the people"⁴⁰. It was done by launching a conservative-nationalist narrative using a populist rhetoric, omitting away checks and balances, and concentrating power to exert control over public institutions.

Indeed, for the most part, many have believed wishfully that Hungary and Poland achieved democratic excellence, although confidence in democratic values of both nation had been complicated before Orbán and Kaczyński; thus, paving the way for the appearance of Redemptive Violence and populism. Both countries have been showing in recent decades decreasing trust in democracy civil service according to the different datasets of democratic consolidation; thus, making Hungary and Poland stand out as prime candidates to experience fallout in democratic political in-

³⁹ Licia Cianetti, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley, "Rethinking 'Democratic Backsliding' in Central and Eastern Europe – Looking beyond Hungary and Poland," *East European Politics* 34, no. 3 (March 2018): 243-256, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401>.

⁴⁰ Jan-Werner Müller, "Eastern Europe Goes South," *Foreign Affairs*, September 4, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/2014-02-12/eastern-europe-goes-south>.

stitutions⁴¹. According to Eurobarometer, confidence in government in Hungary had been declining at a stable pace and by 2009 was as flat as 14% — a number reached by Poland in 2013⁴². These circumstances empowered both Fidesz and PiS take their positions while mobilising the societies disappointed in their government and politics.

Another factor which have played a significant role for PiS and Fidesz rise has to do with the extreme polarisation on both sides of political spectrum between the left and right wing parties. The public had a great deal of distrust toward the public institutions and parties on both side of the ideological spectrum due to their villainization of each other which in part constructed foundations for exclusionary identity politics and for the emergence of demagogic leaders⁴³. This kind of polarization, as it was noted by Robert Sata and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski in “Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland,” also led to “crystallization of patronal networks: in Poland already in the mid-1990s, social-democratic SLD (Alliance of the Democratic Left) established a “royal court” system of privileged businessmen, media moguls and clergy representatives. Similarly, Orbán’s college roommate, László Simicska became Fidesz’s financial mastermind running a vast business and media network that consolidated during the first Fidesz government in 1998–2002”⁴⁴.

The turbulences of the economy both in Poland and Hungary had a great impact on the rise of the populist parties as well. The sense of people’s hopelessness in the democratic transition from the communist past has made them feel lost and forgotten; apparently, this kind of sensation was the outcome of the past governments’ incapability to efficiently reform their states’ labor market, boost the welfare systems, and stabilize rising social inequality⁴⁵. The 2008 recession only fuelled the economic fears of the people. Hungary was hit hard by debt and endangered by non-performing mortgages⁴⁶. However, Poland’s economy was rather resilient to the 2008 events; yet, it did not help

⁴¹ Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno, “The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies,” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 18, no. 1 (January 2006): 31-48, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh081>.

⁴² Eurobarometer (European Commission), accessed December 9, 2021, <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm>.

⁴³ Sata and Karolewski, “Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland,” 210.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ András Körösenyi, “The Theory and Practice of Plebiscitary Leadership: Weber and the Orbán Regime,” *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures* 33, no. 2 (2018): 280-301, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325418796929>.

in encouraging the public's feeling of security about their economic status⁴⁷. To make things worst, the elites, which have ruled before the emergence of populist governments in Poland and Hungary, failed to respond to the growing corruption on all levels of public institutions, which, as a result, discredited their credibility and authority in the public⁴⁸.

Under these circumstances, the foundation for Redemptive Violence in both countries was laid. Nevertheless, it was only the 2010 Fidesz and 2015 PiS governments that activated the phenomenon challenging the democratic rules of the game.

Both Hungary and Poland have undergone legislative reforms permitting a sole rule of a single power by the book⁴⁹. An in-depth left-wing elite purge was carried out as well to create fresh grounds for the installation of the patronal network on all levels of public governance⁵⁰. Both parties appropriated the media to securitize the flow of information. It was done to control the coverage so it would adhere to political party-related narrative and of their patronal network needs with the hope of improving the general public support⁵¹.

With the attempts to build a pro-loyalist elite class, Kaczyński and Orbán have managed to build a far-reaching hierarchical patronal network that reached all state's sectors. It was carried out under the banner concerning the need to deal with the post-communist and pro-left elite. It allowed both political parties to manipulate the governmental apparatuses; for instance, upgrading the electoral system made contesting against Pis and Fidesz a difficult endeavor; thus, limiting political competition and pluralism in both states⁵². On top of that, all levels of state-run enterprises and public administration have been packed with political supporters⁵³. The President's Office has been del-

⁴⁷ Sata and Karolewski, "Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland," 208, 210.

⁴⁸ Béla Greskovits, "The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe," *Global Policy* 6 (2015): 28-37, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12225>.

⁴⁹ Lucyna Rajca, "Reforms and Centralization Trends in Hungary and in Poland in a Comparative Perspective," *Przegląd Sejmowy* 5(160) (2020): 133-151, <https://doi.org/10.31268/ps.2020.69>.

⁵⁰ Kim, "Because the homeland cannot be in opposition," 331.

⁵¹ Jamie Wiseman, "'The Hungary Model': How Poland Copied Illiberal Tactics for Weakening Independent Media," *International Press Institute*, March 5, 2021, <https://ipi.media/the-hungary-model-how-poland-copied-illiberal-tactics-for-weakening-independent-media/>.

⁵² Sata and Karolewski, "Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland," 211, 214.

⁵³ Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, "The Uncertain Road to Sustainable Democracy: Elite Coalitions, Citizen Protests and the Prospects of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe," *East European Politics* 34, no. 3 (March 2018): 257-275, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1491840>.

egated to loyal party members who would stand in support of the legislative efforts of PiS and Fidesz.

Another aspect that took part in the prelude for Redemptive Violence has to do with the control of the media. In Hungary, news media was dictated: “to correct leftist bias” and propagate a right-wing narrative⁵⁴. The Media Council, a body within the Media Authority, observed and implemented the set of new media laws which have been focused on installing individuals associated to the ruling party. The new system of media observation gave the government *de facto* control over the state's media outlets. Despite public opposition over these media laws, the entire media was subordinated to Orbán's patronal network to serve Fidesz's propaganda purposes⁵⁵.

In 2016, PiS undergo similar changes when it established the Council of National Media. The body was made accountable for appointing the head of the Polish Television, Radio, and the Press Agency. Since the event, Polish state-owned media was turned into a platform for hate campaigns against politicians and journalists critical of the ruling party. As an example, in 2016, Kaczyński associate, Jacek Kurski, was made the head of the state-owned TVP. The very same person, who had later become notorious for organizing smear campaigns against PiS opponents⁵⁶.

As a result, PiS and Fidesz took over the media, while using the need to reform as their banner, it helped these parties to build vast networks of control reaching all spheres of society. The establishment of patronal networks were extended and thickened via use of legislative power to further the deconstruction of former institutions and regulations to enhance the parties' political power.

Apart from ensuring the political-cultural dominance, PiS and Fidesz dismantled the rule of law. It was done under the slogan of the “will of the people.” who, according to the parties' narratives, felt betrayed by the liberal elite and democracy.

The process of taking control over the legal system, helped populist powers to weaken the judiciary to the extent that would allow parties' pass legislation without concern of being vetoed, as a result, demolishing the checks and balances. To respond to the critics, PiS and Fidesz responded with ethno-nationalist rhetoric, claiming exercising their legitimate power granted by the “will of the people” and justified due to the need to purify their homelands from the political enemies, re-

⁵⁴ Marius Dragomir, “How the Hungarian Government Nationalized Criticism,” MediaLaws, May 29, 2019, <https://www.medialaws.eu/how-the-hungarian-government-nationalized-criticism/>.

⁵⁵ Sata and Karolewski, “Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland,” 212.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 213-214.

ducing pluralism, and complete decommunization⁵⁷. With this stand, both parties passed reforms while violating parliamentary procedures and norms; for example: ignoring the opposition, pushing laws at night and quickly to prevent any debate; therefore, taking parliamentary procedures as means of executing their political hegemony.

The Other has been a prominent subject in PiS and Fidesz's narratives as it strengthened homogenous “true people” whom both parties “served.” The “Others” were minorities, refugees, international organizations like the European Union (EU) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or even the citizens who held critical stand upon the populist parties⁵⁸. In this sense, PiS and Fidesz's exclusionary identity politics shifted from being merely based on ethnic or religious concerns and turned against anybody, even a regular citizen, who have opposed the regimes.

Media control became crucial here as means for propaganda to develop and spread narratives depicting the nation besieged by adversaries both from within and without. This method is used to justify PiS and Fidesz's policies and discredit their opponents.

PiS and Fidesz's machine of the securitized narrative is a concerted storytelling activity in order to control the narrative. The operated discourses would usually focus on demonizing political enemies as well as praising the ruling parties and boosting the public confidence in them. Controlled narratives and means of transmitting them have taken a central role when it comes to justifying the undertaken socio-political changes of PiS and Fidesz, portraying both parties like the bastions of their respected nations, while contestants — a traitor, a foreign foe, or as an enemy of the national cause. The traitor in PiS and Fidesz's narratives is found anywhere: ethnic, religious, and other minorities; foreigners or among political opponents. In that sense, securitized narrative allows flexible framing of exclusive identity. This way, Fidesz and PiS politics strategically uses identity politics, adapting to their needs whether it would be cultural, religious, political, or any other aspects.

6. Redemptive Violence and Refugee crisis of 2015

This case of Redemptive Violence will focus on the developments which have taken place during the EU migrant crisis. This event was marked by a large influx of refugees and migrants whose management appeared challenging for the whole union on many levels. Over 75% of those arriving in Europe were fleeing away from conflict and persecution in Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 216.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 208, 217.

Others were economic migrants, attempting to cross the border of the EU to seek better social life. However, the flood of migration was mixed with series of terrorist attacks in Paris (January and November 2015), and a suicide attack in Brussels in March 2016, all committed by Muslim individuals. During these events, stormy political debates were present regarding the method of handling the migrant crisis and how union members should share the responsibility eventually leading to internal conflicts due to fear of terrorist attacks, especially in Poland and Hungary whose leading political parties (PiS and Fidesz) used the migrant crisis and the fear of terrorist attack to achieve their political aims.

6.1 Polish Case

The 2015 migrant crisis happened in the same year as Polish parliamentary elections. The parliamentary bid was a battleground between Law and Order (PiS) and Civil Platform (PO).

The migrant crisis and potential danger of terrorism were hot topics in the political discourse during that time. In Poland, the polarization of opinion was present. The negative attitude toward accepting refugees had been continuously increasing after the first terror attack in Paris, although, there was a reasonable amount of people who supported the acceptance and integration of the migrants too as shown in Table 1 and 2⁵⁹. Some of the reasons which made the Polish to consider accepting the refugees were out of perceiving it as a moral obligation⁶⁰. In contrast, the main reasons of those who thought that Poland should refuse to accept refugees claimed that their country had a lack of resources and difficult economic situation or respondents feared about their security. That said, it could be claimed that those who had positive inclinations held idealistic views on the grounds of morality, while the opposing side held concrete reasons (economic or security related) for their stand.

Table 1. Do you agree that Poland should receive some of the refugees arriving in Europe from the near East and Africa (%)?

	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Moderately agree</i>	<i>Moderately disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
<i>V 2015</i>	3	30	32	21	14
<i>VIII 2015</i>	6	30	29	26	9
<i>IX 2015</i>	8	38	19	29	6
<i>X 2015</i>	7	36	21	30	6
<i>XII 2015</i>	5	25	30	34	6

Source: "Stosunek do uchodźców po atakach terrorystycznych w Paryżu," *Komunikat z badań CBOS*, Nr172/2015, p. 3.
[stream/2115/06072/172_03_BELUGORU.pdf](http://www.cbos.pl/STRUKTUR/172_03_BELUGORU.pdf).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Table 2. Should Poland accept refugees from countries affected by military conflict (%)?

	<i>Admitting settlement</i>	<i>Admitting stay until conflict ends</i>	<i>Should not receive refugees</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
<i>V 2015</i>	14	58	21	7
<i>VIII 2015</i>	6	50	38	6
<i>IX 2015</i>	8	48	40	4
<i>X 2015</i>	8	46	43	3
<i>XII 2015</i>	5	37	53	5

Source: "Stosunek do uchodźców po atakach terrorystycznych w Paryżu," *Komunikat z badań CBOS*, Nr172/2015, p. 2.

In this situation, PO politicians were reluctant to accept the so-called obligatory migrant quota; yet, the ruling government eventually accepted the EU demands which gave the PiS space to take the opposite side of the discourse enabling them to criticize the ruling party, the EU and keep up with the rhetoric of antipathy towards accepting migrants, especially Muslims inciting fear about the latter. This could be illustrated by Jarosław Kaczyński's, the head's of PiS party, statement delivered in October 2015 claiming that "migrants have already brought diseases like cholera and dysentery to Europe, as well as "all sorts of parasites and protozoa"⁶¹. Additionally, after the first terrorist attack on Paris, and growing havoc in refugee targeted European cities, PiS instrumentalized the war in Syria and the migrant crisis even further, launching a campaign regarding the protection of Poland from terrorism threats and importance of putting a ban against welcoming the refugees. This rhetoric worked well after the public opinion grew reluctant toward refugees and disliked the idea of the EU pressuring Poland to obey the quota demands. The general election in October was held in these circumstances.

PiS' skillful electoral strategy in the 2015 election ensured its victory because its focus on the social-welfare trope concerning economic and national security had been of the utmost importance for the public. Plus, the party, by choosing Beata Szydło as a candidate for the premier, lured the women's vote for the party's favor. Yet, beneath that, there was something more residing in the storytelling of PiS.

The 2015 discourse led by the PiS party in respect of refugees experienced some change in specifics. Indeed, most refugees had been crossing the border illegally; yet, the terrorist attacks were organized by the Muslims who had come to the EU before the 2015 events or belonged to the second generation of non-Christian community. However, the party obfuscated the claim by changing the concrete facts; thus, altering the claim that Muslim refugees who crossed the border were

⁶¹ Jan Cienki, "Migrants Carry 'Parasites and Protozoa,' Warns Polish Opposition Leader," *Politico*, October 14, 2015, <https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-asylum-poland-kaczynski-election/>.

terrorists. This claim led to the imagined threat of Muslim terrorists from Syria disguised as a refugees which dominated the public discourse on the migrant crisis in Poland as well as shaped the public perception upon the EU's ability to protect its citizens. Consequently, it enhanced as Kasia Narkowicz issued her work on "Refugees Not Welcome Here': State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland," the populist narrative portraying EU and refugees as the Others who had been besieging Poland. Moreover, it depicted the EU as a tyrant "forcefully trying to push refugees through Polish borders and the Muslim refugees as invaders determined to wipe out Poland's European (Christian) civilization"⁶². However, in reality, unlike with Germany or the United Kingdom, only very few refugees desired to come to Poland. Merely 300 Syrians delivered their applications for refugee status in Poland in 2016 while in Germany there were over 250,000 Syrian refugee seekers⁶³. As a matter of fact, the danger of a Muslim invasion was fictitious and not corresponding to Polish reality.

Nonetheless, the PiS managed to win elections with a landslide margin and became the dominant political party in Poland. The narrative with claims focusing on the character of Muslim refugees and emphasizing their terrorist-like tendencies has helped the PiS party to mobilize their targeted electors. Eventually, the time came for the trope cycle of Redemptive Violence to leap forward to the stage of moralism.

After having won the election, the PiS' public communication revolved around the claims pointing at the party's moral superiority against its opponents. The following statements published by PiS in their official website claimed that they were chosen by the "Poles to solve their problems"⁶⁴ since they, or in other words "We are here for Citizens!"⁶⁵ – thus, drafting a storyline of the party acting by the will of the people and for their benefit.

⁶² Kasia Narkowicz, "'Refugees Not Welcome Here': State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 31, no. 4 (2018): 358, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-018-9287-9>.

⁶³ "Five Main Citizenships of (Non-EU) Asylum Applicants" (Eurostat, 2016), [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Five_main_citizenships_of_\(non-EU\)_asylum_applicants,_2016_\(number_of_first_time_applicants,_rounded_figures\)_YB17.png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Five_main_citizenships_of_(non-EU)_asylum_applicants,_2016_(number_of_first_time_applicants,_rounded_figures)_YB17.png).

⁶⁴ PiS, "Poles Chose Us to Solve Their Problems," *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, December 16, 2015, https://pis-org-pl.translate.google/aktualnosci/polacy-wybrali-nas-abysmy-rozwiazywali-ich-problemy-1?_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=lt&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_sch=http.

⁶⁵ PiS, "We Are Here for Citizens!," *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, December 15, 2015, https://pis-org-pl.translate.google/aktualnosci/jestesmy-tu-dla-obywateli?_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=lt&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_sch=http.

The image of being a mere instrument of the nation granted the party a credit of moral superiority to do as they would culminating with Beata Szydło's, the Polish Prime Minister's, refusal to grant asylum to the share portion of refugees: "I will be very clear. I don't see the possibility for migrants to come to Poland at this time" ⁶⁶ since it was more important to ensure "the safety of Poles. We understand the previous government <...> signed commitments which bind our country," yet "We cannot allow a situation in which events taking place in the countries of Western Europe are carried over to the territory of Poland"⁶⁷. Later she tried to shift the discussion by claiming that the Polish stand "is very cautious, which gives rise to major criticism from other countries in what we call the old EU, which hastily agreed to this influx of migrants into Europe,"⁶⁸ therefore, implying that Poland was being forced to obey the EU quota even though it stood in opposition to the Polish national security needs. Besides, Kaczyński insisted that Poland did not have moral obligation to help refugees since the state "have not exploited the countries from which these refugees are coming to Europe these days <...> used their labor force and finally [have] not invited them to Europe. We have a full moral right to say 'no'"⁶⁹.

PiS leading party members argued that they were acting according to the moral obligation to their nation which, in turn, made their decisions morally right since they had to prioritize above everything the security of their fellow citizens. The party also urged the Europe not to accept "thousands of migrants who come here only to improve their living conditions" having in mind "there are also terrorists"⁷⁰. Rafal Bochenek, the spokesman for the Government of Poland, told the journalists that the government would prevent the attacks which happened in Paris and Brussels from recurring in their country. Szydło later threw the blame on the EU by proclaiming "that the EU is not drawing lessons from what is happening"⁷¹.

As the events developed, Poland was warned of being fined for its refusal to fulfill quota requirements. The PiS utilized the image of Muslim threat to rebuke the European Commission

⁶⁶ DW News, "Poland Abandons Promise to Take in Refugees after Brussels Attacks," March 23, 2016, <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-abandons-promise-to-take-in-refugees-after-brussels-attacks/a-19137258>.

⁶⁷ Jan Cieski, "Poland Slams Door on Refugees," *Politico*, March 23, 2016, <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-slams-door-on-refugees-beata-szydlo/>.

⁶⁸ DW News, "Poland Abandons Promise to Take in Refugees after Brussels Attacks."

⁶⁹ Agnieszka Barteczko and Pawel Sobczak, "Poland Did Not Invite Refugees, Has Right to Say 'No': Kaczynski," *Reuters*, July 1, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-migrants-idUSKBN19M3H8>.

⁷⁰ DW News, "Poland Abandons Promise to Take in Refugees after Brussels Attacks."

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

proposals for the imposition of fines over countries which had failed to act according to the refugee distribution quotas. To discredit the EU itself and intensify the image of the union being a tyrant and Polish enemy, Kaczyński, in a 2016 interview started a campaign to exhibit the EU as an instigator of the crisis, claiming that “such a decision would abolish the sovereignty of EU member states – of course, the weaker ones. [I] don’t agree to that, we have to oppose that, because we are, and we will be in charge in our own country.”⁷² In addition to the contemporary propagated threat of Muslim invasion monitored by the EU, the situation was aggravated even further when Kaczyński made several statements that Muslim migrants could be a problem for Poland’s homogeneous society. In the interview with the *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*, Kaczyński warned that Poland would have to completely change its culture, lower the standards of safety if became open to the Muslims; yet, since it was not what the people had wanted, Poland “would have to use some repression” to prevent “a wave of aggression, especially toward women” from the part of asylum seekers⁷³. Therefore, having progressed from the trope of obfuscation of truth, toward moralism and down to attempts to materialize the political discourse, and that was by limiting refugees’ ability to enter the country.

In fact, after the election victory of the right-wing PiS party, many changes were implemented to change the treatment of the ethnic and religious minorities. In 2016, when hate crimes against minorities were on the rise⁷⁴, the PiS instigated the Council Against Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia — the governmental institution that was responsible for tackling racial discrimination problems and crimes⁷⁵. While the government dismantled services which would be focused on providing support for ethnic and religious minorities, it simultaneously empowered the far-right groups; consequently, legitimating their presence in the public sphere⁷⁶. In one example, the gov-

⁷² Jovan Kovacic, “Kaczynski: Poland Will Not Accept Any Refugees,” *New Europe*, May 9, 2016, <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/457318-2/>.

⁷³ Jan Przemyński, “Kaczyński: Nie Możemy w to Wchodzić,” *Gazeta Polska*, 2016, <https://gpcodziennie.pl/64284-kaczynskiniemozemywtowchodzic.html>.

⁷⁴ Szymon Bujalski, “Polska Walczy z Obcymi. Rośnie Liczba Ataków Rasistowskich i Ksenofobicznych,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, September 16, 2016, <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,20699634,polska-walczy-z-obcymi-rosnie-liczba-atakow-rasistowskich-i.html>.

⁷⁵ Narkowicz, “‘Refugees Not Welcome Here’: State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland,” 366.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

ernment cut out sections on far-right ideology from educational material on hate crimes aimed at police forces⁷⁷.

As a result, creating many difficulties for the ethnic and religious minorities, the ones who were considered as ideologically different and potentially dangerous to the homogenous Polish society. On top of that, PiS leading rhetoric focused on the aggressive stand upon the refugees made the country to look unwelcoming. That might explain why such a small portion of migrants applied for the asylum in Poland.

Moreover, exploiting the refugee crisis to create a trope that made images of refugees and terrorists indistinguishable played a significant role in making the PiS victorious in 2015 elections. The fear of the Otherness mobilized the society and candled the far-right groups into action in the public sphere. These developments allowed the party to take the state's apparatuses, rule by inciting the public fear, and, most importantly, consolidate PiS hegemony over Poland's socio-political life.

6.2 Hungarian Case

In November 2014, after the Fidesz' election victory, the Orbán's government faced anti-government protests due to the government's corruption, illiberal policies, and rising authoritarianism⁷⁸. According to the public survey conducted by TARKI, the ruling coalition lost 12 percent of support during the protests⁷⁹. The migrant crisis erupted at that time and provided Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, with the opportunity to mobilize Fidesz supporters. In 2015, Hungary received 177,000 asylum applications due to being the first Schengen country on the Western Balkan route⁸⁰. For Hungary, it was an unprecedented refugee flow although most asylum seekers left Hungary quickly. However, the Orbán's government used the event itself to politicize migration - carrying out public campaigns against the refugees by presenting them as an existential threat to Hungary and Christian-Western civilization.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Enes Bayralki, et al. "Islamophobia in Poland: National Report 2016" (SETA, 2016): 411-443, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315490054_Pedziwiatr_K_2017_Islamophobia_in_Poland_National_Report_2016_In_E-nes_Bayralki_Farid_Hafez_European_Islamophobia_Report_2016_Istanbul_SETA_411-443.

⁷⁸ BBC News, "Thousands Attend Hungary 'Public Outrage Day' Protest," November 14, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30086497>.

⁷⁹Gül Ceylan Tok, "The Politicization of Migration and the Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism in Hungary," *Akdeniz Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, (July, 2018): 88-117, <https://doi.org/10.25294/auibfd.420805>.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 98.

⁸¹ Ibid., 99-100.

On August 25, 2014, Orbán delivered a speech to the assembly of the Hungarian diplomatic corps promising to harden official and domestic policies against immigration. While in January 2015, refugees and illegal migrants, after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, were considered as “undesirable”⁸². “Economic immigration is a bad thing in Europe. One should not regard it as useful because it only brings trouble and dangers to the European people, therefore it has to be stopped—this is the Hungarian position,” Orbán concluded that it would be undesirable “to have significant minorities with different cultural traits and backgrounds” because Hungary should stay and be for Hungarians only⁸³.

On top of that, Orbán utilized the situation to attack Brussels’s quota policy, which circulated about accepting the refugees and sharing the burden among all union member states⁸⁴. Orbán avoided as much as possible to use the term “refugee” and preferred “migrant” and “illegal immigrant”⁸⁵ discrediting the true nature of the refugee crisis and reasons these people left their home countries for, having in mind that most of them were Syrians running away from the civil war. It led to the construction of a narrative trope of refugee-terrorists targeting at the Hungarian nation and the Western civilization displaying EU as an enabler of this process.

In May 2015, a poster campaign contributed to consolidating the narrative representing migrants as a threat. The billboards contained these messages written in Hungarian: “If you come to Hungary, you must respect our laws”; “If you come to Hungary, you must respect our culture”; and, finally, “If you come to Hungary, you must not take the jobs of the Hungarians”⁸⁶. In September, a new set of print posters and visuals for online media emerged, declaring: “The people have decided: The country must be defended”⁸⁷.

To that point, the narrative development of Fidesz had presented additional claims which fully shifted the discourse on migrant crisis to the concern of the refugees’ character. The first one

⁸² Boldizsár Nagy, “Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation,” *German Law Journal* 17, no. 6 (January 2016): 1053, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200021581>.

⁸³ ITTHON, “Orbán: Gazdasági Bevándorlóknak Nem Tudunk Menedéket Adni,” *Hvg.hu*, January 2015, https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150111_Orban_gazdasagi_bevandorloknak_nem_tudunk.

⁸⁴ Gergely Gullies, “National Consultation on Immigration to Begin” (Kormany.HU - Prime Minister's Office, April 24, 2015), <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/national-consultation-on-immigration-to-begin>.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Nagy, “Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation,” 1054.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

was about refugees being illegal migrants. The second claim characterized “illegal migrants” as terrorists. The following epithets centered around refugees being a cultural threat to the Hungarian nation and being those who would steal the Hungarians’ jobs.

In a similar tone, the Hungarian Parliament passed a resolution titled: “Message to the leaders of the European Union,” which stated that “[w]aves of illegal immigration threaten Europe with an explosion” continuing that the EU was responsible for this crisis due to irresponsible European politicians who had encouraged the immigrants to come to the continent and seek a better life; which in turn made the elected representatives and the government to defend Hungarian culture, language and values^{88 89}. Eventually, it constructed another element of Fidesz’ narrative representing the political party and its members as defenders of the nationhood as well as the centralized argument exhibiting their actions against the “illegal migrants” as ethically right since these Fidesz politicians were acting for the sake of national security.

Later from these events, the border was fortified by installing fences and other security installations, and daily arrivals decreased. Yet, the Fidesz’ public stand did not change. On November 16, 2015, three days after the Paris terror attacks, Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, delivered a speech in the Parliament, stating that:

“Hungarians have been advocating the closure of our borders to stop the flood of people coming from the Middle East and Africa . . . Which approach is more humane: To close the borders in order to stop illegal immigration, or to put at risk the lives of innocent European citizens? . . . We feel that the very existence of Europe is at stake . . . We have warned the leaders of the EU not to invite these people into Europe”⁹⁰

Viktor Orbán summarized this statement by claiming that Muslim refugees are Muslim invaders. It was later followed by proclamations of making the immigration law tougher and boosting national security⁹¹.

⁸⁸ Resolution 36/2015 (IX. 22) of the Parliament, Magyar Közlöny No. 136, (22 September 2015), <http://www.magyar kozlony.hu/dokumentumok/30d4e493298b407e098990414cb8387e7c1caaf8/megtekintes> § (n.d.).

⁸⁹ Nagy, “Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation,” 1055.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Harriet Agerholm, “Refugees Are ‘Muslim Invaders’ Not Running for Their Lives, Says Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán,” *Independent*, January 9, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugees-muslim-invaders-hungary-viktor-orban-racism-islamophobia-eu-a8149251.html>.

Orbán's speech delivered on March 15 during the national holiday commemorating the Hungarian revolt against Hapsburg rule in 1848 once again tackled a nationalistic-moral trope — the vox populi vs. the Other, and the EU, demonstrating his monitored identitarian populism:

Europe is not free, because freedom begins with speaking the truth. In Europe today it is forbidden to speak the truth. A muzzle is a muzzle— even if it is made of silk. It is forbidden to say that today we are not witnessing the arrival of refugees, but a Europe being threatened by mass migration. It is forbidden to say that tens of millions are ready to set out in our direction. It is forbidden to say that immigration brings crime and terrorism to our countries. It is forbidden to say that the masses of people coming from different civilisations pose a threat to our way of life, our culture, our customs, and our Christian traditions. It is forbidden to say that, instead of integrating, those who arrived here earlier have built a world of their own, with their own laws and ideals, which is forcing apart the thousand year old structure of Europe. It is forbidden to say that this is not accidental and not a chain of unintentional consequences, but a planned, orchestrated campaign, a mass of people directed towards us. It is forbidden to say that in Brussels they are constructing schemes to transport foreigners here as quickly as possible and to settle them here among us. It is forbidden to say that the purpose of settling these people here is to redraw the religious and cultural map of Europe and to reconfigure its ethnic foundations, thereby eliminating nation states, which are the last obstacle to the international movement. It is forbidden to say that Brussels is stealthily devouring ever more slices of our national sovereignty, and that in Brussels today many are working on a plan for a United States of Europe, for which no one has ever given authorisation.⁹²

This oration marked the breaking point of the refugee narrative from the Fidesz' side. The storyline presented a constructed parallel reality to depict refugees as illegal migrants, terrorists, and cultural invaders. The sense of reality was neutralized behind a narratively constructed false reality, which, according to the logic of ensuring national security, produced an enemy figure aiming to jeopardize Hungary - a country that had to defend itself by imposing stricter rules and observation upon its borders. Those who were in support of the Other were also targeted since they had been “directing” the whole crisis all along. Consequently, pointing out the need to make fast decisions to protect the nation and its soul by all means.

⁹² Viktor Orban, in *Miniszterelnok.hu* (Budapest: Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister, 2016), <https://miniszterelnok.hu/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-15-march/>.

Consequently, the produced narrative about the necessity to defend the nation led to the implementation of laws and regulations directed against the Muslim refugees, making the asylum seeking a process hard to apply and follow through, plus, criminalizing the illegal border crossing⁹³. Moreover, in 2016, the Hungarian police recruited 3,000 “border hunters” force to patrol Hungary’s southern borders to keep refugees out. In spring 2017, during the swearing-in ceremony in Budapest, Orbán told the hunters that Hungary had to act to defend itself since “the storm has not died, it has only subsided temporarily”⁹⁴. The EU and NGOs demanded to soften the stand on the matter and asked to stop withholding food for refugees imprisoned at Hungarian transit zones at the border with Serbia; yet, all of that was ignored on the pretext of national security or by responding with further accusations of the institutions acting as foreign intruders⁹⁵. Hungary, alongside erecting fences, recruitment of border hunters, closed down existing refugee camps too. From December 2016, Orbán closed refugee camps such as the two-decades-old Bicske refugee facility known for its importance in successfully integrating refugees into the Hungarian society⁹⁶. In the aftermath, the refugees were relocated to Kiskunhalas, a remote camp in southern Hungary.

6.3 Redemptive Violence and Refugee crisis of 2015: Concluding statements

As the analysis of both cases indicates, the Redemptive Violence occurred through the depiction of refugees the alien Other invading Europe on the purpose to destroy its values, culture, and commit terrorist attacks. It was done by altering the facts, manipulating the discussion by avoiding tackling the actual reasons the migrants crossed the EU border for but dragging the focus on the trope of negative Muslim refugee character in the light of terrorist events which had taken place both in Paris and Brussels.

The main factor which probably worked in the favor of PiS was that the recent generations shared discontent of the contemporary situation about their standing in Poland which was only exacerbated by this migrant crisis in 2015. Sengoku Manabu's analysis titled “2015 parliamentary

⁹³ Nagy, “Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation,” 1045-1053.

⁹⁴ Elżbieta M Goździak, “Using Fear of the ‘Other,’ Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity” (Migration Policy Institute, October 10, 2019), <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/orban-reshapes-migration-policy-hungary>.

⁹⁵ Rita Palfi, “Why Is Hungary Withholding Food from Migrants in Its Border Zones?,” *Euronews*, July 31, 2019, <https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/31/why-is-hungary-withholding-food-from-migrants-in-its-border-zones>.

⁹⁶ Goździak, “Using Fear of the ‘Other,’ Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity.”

election in Poland: Does the migrant / refugee issue matter?" put it bluntly: "the rising feeling of insecurity, lack of hope for the future, alienation, and distrust of the political class among the youngest generation [believing that] government should take care of the young [and the] country, instead of accepting refugees"⁹⁷. Having that said, PiS managed to use the fear and sense of isolation of many Poles by delivering an image of the enemy invading their state to steal their jobs, culture, and havoc stability.

Similar trends are seen in Hungary as well. By 2015, even 70% of Hungarian people indicated negative attitudes towards migrants from countries outside of the EU⁹⁸. Some of the reasons had to do with fear of cultural mix, growing amount of crimes, terrorism, and potential loss of working space which could be taken by the non-Hungarians.

These trends show that before the refugee crisis, Polish and Hungarian societies had dealt with serious existential issues concerning their welfare and security. The top issues of that day were employed and incorporated into the narratives of PiS and Fidesz and had been manipulated via fear about the imminent invasion of Muslim migrants. The constructed alternative versions of the reality delivered the tired populations the arch-enemy to hate and re-focus their attention on, mobilizing them in support of PiS and Fidesz parties.

Indeed, the constructed narratives about PiS and Fidesz being sole representatives of their national communities was a central piece. The narratives revolved on the idea that both Poland and Hungary were culturally, religiously, and linguistically homogenous communities that had strong values⁹⁹. Besides, the narratives furnished a chance to accuse the political elite (the EU) of being incapable of dealing with the imaginary Muslim invasion. The Muslim terrorist in the characterization of a refugee was identified as the Other, who allegedly was ready to undermine the communities' values or prosperity. With that said, Othered individuals and groups of people were indicated as social-cultural threats, and to defend the "heartland," PiS and Fidesz saw it as their duty to instigate the culture of physical and psychological violence against the migrants as selected representatives called themselves to act by the will of their people.

To enhance the support, the fear of identity loss was employed on a prominent level. It likely worked more effectively on the older generation which could have felt uprooted and bewildered

⁹⁷ Sengoku, "2015 Parliamentary Election in Poland : Does the Migrant/Refugee Issue Matter?," 47.

⁹⁸ Bori Simonovits et al., "The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary" (TÁRKI Social Research Institute, March 2016): 18-20, https://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160330_refugees.pdf.

⁹⁹ Nagy, "Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation," 1041.

in the new world of globalism which resulted a high level of insecurity and anxiety concerning identity loss¹⁰⁰. As a result, people clung to their values and traditions seeking reaffirmation to get a sense of security and belonging; it promoted the construction of closed communities that would forsake foreign influences.

The narrative of the majority identitarian on the grounds of traditions and values is another major factor on the dividing line between the imagined Us and the Other. Plus, it provided the soil from which the ethical reasons for the Redemptive Violence could be created. Due to assumingly clashing religions and ethnicities, the Polish and Hungarian cultures were recognized as needing protection, thus making the oppression of the Other a necessary effort. Having drawn sharp lines between Us and the Other, both political parties granted themselves a permission to act for the sake of their national soul to install laws and policies focused on bugging the Other. In turn, radicalizing the entire generation toward hatred against the Othered. It was done with the intent to bring deliverance to both nations so that they presumably could sustain their pureness and integrity of what makes their countries unique from external contamination. Violence, both legal and physical, purifies the nation in a sacrificial way, by pressing the Other and denying the Other's existence - Polish and Hungarian leaders turned to heroes in their own narratives who saved another day for their respected nations.

7. Redemptive Violence and LGBTQ+

PiS and Fidesz have a negative inclination towards the community of homosexual and queer individuals; it stems from religious, ideological, and cultural premises. This section will take a closer look at how the trope cycle of Redemptive Violence have been executed by both parties leading to the scapegoating of the LGBTQ+ community.

To illustrate Polish case, this study will consider events which took place between 2019-2020 — starting from a moment when Rafał Trzaskowski, mayor of Warsaw, signed the LGBTQ+ rights declaration; therefore, promising to establish shelters for teenagers rejected by their families, promote anti-discrimination and sex education in schools¹⁰¹, and leading down to Polish

¹⁰⁰Annika Morath, “‘Poland for the Polish’ ? Taking a Closer Look at the Polish Rejection of Refugees,” *The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung*, June 14, 2017, <https://eu.boell.org/en/2017/06/14/poland-polish-taking-closer-look-polish-rejection-refugees>.

¹⁰¹ Amy Labarrière, “The Story behind Warsaw’s New LGBT+ Declaration,” *URBACT*, March 2019, <https://www.blog.urbact.eu/2019/03/warsaw-lgbt-declaration/>.

presidential elections of 2020¹⁰². Looking at the Hungarian side, the developments of 2020-2021 will be observed regarding the latest anti-LGBTQ+ law which outlawed the promotion of homosexuality and sex reassignment to minors including heavier restrictions on how the sexual education is being carried out in schools.

7.1 Polish Case

Even though LGBTQ+ declaration signed by Trzaskowski stands against homophobia and discrimination and promote positive change in social behaviour — the declaration itself has experienced opposition from the PiS members, who questioned the true nature of homosexual agenda upon their children.

The obfuscation of the truth happened in ideological terms. For instance, Jarosław Kaczyński, on 16 March 2019, claimed that the declaration is about “the affirmation of same-sex relationships, about marriages from these relationships; the objective is for them to have the right to adopt children.” Concluding that the homosexual should stay away from the children as in Kaczyński’s view the family is made from the male and female — a natural union according to the rule of nature^{103 104}. Kaczyński’s take was followed by other members of the his party, who raised similar concerns on homosexuals’ focus on children; thus, making some to believe that LGBTQ+ members are trying to indoctrinate children or rape them¹⁰⁵. At this stage, as we see, the nature of Trzaskowski’s signed LGBTQ+ rights declaration was put into question while raising questions that had little to do with the exact content of the document. This type of discourse is also known as straw man fallacy which refers to one’s misrepresentation of opponent’s arguments. This was enhanced by the employment of mythemes and their specific arrangement such as: heterosexual (-natural) family vs. homosexual (-unnatural); safety vs indoctrination and rape. Consequently, deforming the whole discourse in the way it could lead to a final question which would be regarding gays as targeting children due to their sickness or perversity.

¹⁰² Monika Scislowska, “Poland's Ruling Chief Speaks Strongly against LGBT Rights,” *AbcNews*, March 19, 2019, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/polands-ruling-chief-speaks-strongly-lgbt-rights-61730330>.

¹⁰³ Monika Scislowska, “Poland's Ruling Chief Speaks Strongly against LGBT Rights.”

¹⁰⁴ Jakub Szymczak and Piotr Pacewicz, “PiS’ Homophobia. How the President, Chairman, Ministers and Deputies Aroused Hatred of LGBT in Poland,” *OKO.press*, 2019, <https://oko.press/pis-homophobia-how-the-president-chairman-ministers-and-deputies-aroused-hatred-of-lgbt-in-poland/>.

¹⁰⁵ “Piontkowski's Testimony to the LGBT map2019,” *Newsbeezzer*, June 5, 2019, <https://newsbeezzer.com/polandeng/piontkowskis-testimony-to-the-lgbt-map-comments-from-politicians/>.

The discourse about LGBTQ+ targeting children transformed into a story-arc framing homosexuals as pedophiles seeking kids to satisfy their sexual cravings and ideological needs. To enforce the sublime terror, Kaczyński, in 2020, claimed that queer theory is equal to nazism¹⁰⁶; therefore, inherently evil ideology. Przemysław Czarnek, head of Ministry of Education and Science, compared LGBTQ+ to a neo-Marxist ideology “which turns everything on the streets of our cities upside-down in terms of our culture, customs, tradition — everyone can do anything, except for Catholics”¹⁰⁷.

The motif of Christianity – and the sublime object being under danger by the Other’s ideology seems prominent while looking at how PiS was constructing the storyline. Nonetheless, it should not appear unique if to believe in Girard’s phenomenon of scapegoatism. The motif of religion is necessary because it provides ethics-related argument for the agent¹⁰⁸. In that sense, the constructed philosophical depth legitimizes the ethical necessity to take action against the Other. Making violence necessary as there is a need to purify the community or protect its members from what is considered as the growing disease within the community.

That is the point where the necessity of purgation becomes plausible. It is the act of cleaning and attempting to reconstruct the lost order — equal to patriotic act for the sake of national existence.

The use of purification is being committed to regain the “paradise lost” which is embodied by the mythemes, like religious ones, since they empower the actors and their arguments to act. The violence is being transformed into moral obligation to oppose ideas considered virulent. Henceforth, specific actions were to be expected from the PiS against the LGBTQ+ community. Indeed, that is what happened, in 2020, the Polish court ruled that the campaigns linking LGBTQ+ and pedophilia were normative and adequate¹⁰⁹. Also, in some of Poland’s regions, there was permission to use anti-LGBTQ+ signs regarding themselves as free zones¹¹⁰. In the 2020 presidential elections,

¹⁰⁶ Szymczak and Pacewicz, “PiS’ Homophobia. How the President, Chairman, Ministers and Deputies Aroused Hatred of LGBT in Poland.”

¹⁰⁷ Adam Leszczynski, “Czarnek: Nazism Is a Marxist Ideology. Nonsense of a PiS MP,” *OKO.press*, August 26, 2020.

¹⁰⁸ Fleming, *René Girard: Violence and Mimesis*, 41-67.

¹⁰⁹ Daniel Tilles, “Polish Court Rules Campaign Linking LGBT and Paedophilia Is ‘Informative and Educational,’” *Notes from Poland*, February 20, 2020, <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/02/20/polish-court-anti-lgbt-stop-paedophilia-campaign-is-informative-and-educational/>.

¹¹⁰ Lucy Ash, “Inside Poland’s ‘LGBT-Free Zones,’” *BBC News*, September 20, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-54191344>.

the current president Andrzej Duda employed slogans in his presidential bid calling out LGBTQ+ as communists. The number of offensive acts against homosexuals in Poland had increased; thus, making the whole country to be considered as one of the most unfriendly countries towards LGBTQ+ individuals¹¹¹.

7.2 Hungarian Case

From the Hungarian side, the case of the phenomenon of Redemptive Violence against the LGBT+ will be observed from the events which started in mid-2020, after a scandal concerning Gábor Kaleta, Hungary's former ambassador to Peru, who was accused of containing a vast number of pornographic pictures of minors on his computer¹¹². Following this event, the topic of pedophilia candled a hot political topic in Hungary. To respond to the public outrage, Fidesz vowed to impose harsher laws against sexual predators leading to the final submission of the legislation's first draft to the Parliament in late May 2021. The reform itself had faced criticism and been an object of dispute upon its technicalities. Though, on 8 of June, the reform was finally passed.

Fidesz's complicated relationship with the subject of homosexuality and its assignment close to the concept of pedophilia has not been a nuance when it comes to discussing how political party's politicians have been seeing the LGBTQ+ community members in general. The organizations which fight for the rights of sexual minorities in all respects have been demanding for years for the government to launch a set of reforms to allow homosexuals to marry and adopt children. In 2019, László Kövér, the speaker of the National Assembly of Hungary replied to these demands claiming that homosexuality by its nature is equal to pedophilia; thus, stating that it would not be possible to provide homosexuals equal rights that heterosexual individuals enjoy of having. On top of that, he added that "a normal homosexual knows the order of life, that this is how she / he was born and this is what she / he became. A normal homosexual tries to adapt to society and does not consider herself / himself equal"¹¹³. Meaning that homosexuality is seen as social and moral deviance and they

¹¹¹ Daniel Tilles, "Poland Ranked as Worst Country in EU for LGBT People," *Notes from Poand*, May 14, 2020, <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/05/14/poland-ranked-as-worst-country-in-eu-for-lgbt-people/>.

¹¹² Péter Cseresnyés, "Hungarian Ambassador Charged with Child Pornography Pleads Guilty in Court," *Hungary Today*, July 4, 2020, <https://hungarytoday.hu/ambassador-kaleta-guilty-child-pornography/>.

¹¹³ Kitti Erdő-Bonyár, "Hungarian House Speaker: 'Normal Homosexuals Don't Consider Themselves Equal'," *Daily News - Hungary*, May 18, 2019, <https://dailynewshungary.com/hungarian-house-speaker-normal-homosexuals-dont-consider-themselves-equal/>.

should stay silent. The politician deformed the discussion of equal rights into a discourse on the ethical property of homosexuality and its presumed place in Hungarian society.

After the Hungarian anti-LGBT+ law was passed, various statements of Fidesz politicians were published as well which signifies the further drift from the exact discussion on the equal rights and integration of homosexual individuals into society. In 2020, May 22, Judit Varga, the minister of justice, claimed that debates over the law are not political or legal but “in fact about ideological differences, like those about migration, family, faith or national identity, and they will never be settled. Because these debates represent the clash of two worlds”¹¹⁴. Her statement was followed up with Fidesz’ statement published in July 7 which claimed that “law ensures the protection of children; that decisions on the upbringing of children remain in the hands of parents and that they cannot be exposed to self-serving sexual propaganda” and those who criticize it are interfering in “a matter of national competence”¹¹⁵. Plus, in a similar fashion as it was done in the Polish case, the discourse in this statement was also obfuscated with fallacies which aim at turning the debate to other subjects. For example, claims that the EU, which has been most active in criticism over the new law, are focusing only on the matters of sexual minorities but not the indigenous ones; consequently, raising questions on the credibility of the EU’s nature of judgment.

Later, Fidesz’s campaign on dismantling the credibility of critics by raising skepticism on the true nature of their affiliations and ideological stand transformed the discussion from socio-political to ideological-cultural conflict. This kind of obfuscation of fact could be best illustrated by the following statement published in 2021, July 14. The Fidesz official announcement asserted that “EU institutions are putting strong pressure on Hungary to admit LGBTQ+ activists to Hungarian schools and kindergartens”¹¹⁶. Therefore, forcing the government “to let sexual propaganda spread among our children”¹¹⁷. Later it moved to an ethos-based argument depicting the political party as “self-identical, consistent, and telling the truth” because it stands for a good cause: “protect chil-

¹¹⁴ “The Main Obligation Is to Guarantee the Undisturbed Development of Our Children,” *Fidesz.hu*, June 22, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/the-main-obligation-is-to-guarantee-the-undisturbed-development-of-our-children>.

¹¹⁵ “The European Parliament Has Crossed a Red Line,” *Fidesz.hu*, July 7, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/the-european-parliament-has-crossed-a-red-line>.

¹¹⁶ “Judit Varga: There Is No Hungarian Debate, Only a European One.,” *Fidesz.hu*, July 14, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/judit-varga-there-is-no-hungarian-debate-only-a-european-one>.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

dren's and parents' rights"¹¹⁸. Concluding, the debate on LGBTQ+ rights becomes a conflict between pan-European identity and Hungary's national sovereignty that Fidesz endeavors to protect.

By looking at the transformation of the general debate on the rights of homosexual people, which ended up on discussion about ideological war, depicting homosexuals equivalent to pedophiles aiming at indoctrinating the youngest ones with anti-national ideas, it is evident that Fidesz has been reconstructing the overall discourse to look similar to a cultural and existential war. This notion has been usually delivered by claims that Hungary as well as Poland have been frequently attacked by the liberal media because they been defending Christian values¹¹⁹. The logical argument is embedded here as well, tackling the point that Hungary was in a difficult demographic situation¹²⁰. Therefore, pointing out the necessity of taking actions against the Other. The latter was finally grounded in Viktor Orbán's speech delivered in 2021 at Peace March that marked the 65th anniversary of the 1956 revolution:

"There will be a referendum, and we will protect our children. Hungary will be the first country in Europe in which we stop aggressive LGBTQ propaganda at the school gates, <...>

*They have been competing to see which of them could rule over Hungarians by the grace of Brussels and George Soros as their governor in Hungary: who could be the new pasha of Buda, the new chief of the royal council of governors, or the new party secretary-general. They openly say that to regain the power they will even join forces with the devil. Their aim is to take Hungary from the hands of Mary and put it at the feet of Brussels"*¹²¹.

From obfuscation of facts leading to the emphasis of the scapegoat's fatal flaw the conflict is produced. The violence upon the scapegoat becomes necessary out of the need to protect the sovereignty of the nation which could only be achieved by overcoming the ideology of Otherness and its agents. The mytheme of Christianity and family, as opposed to homosexuality and decadence, pro-

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ "Katalin Novák: We Must Leave the Propaganda Outside the Schools," *Fidesz.hu*, July 26, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/katalin-novak-we-must-leave-the-propaganda-outside-the-schools>.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ "PM Orbán: Europe's High Dignitaries Are Once Again Trying to Go over Our Heads to Make Decisions about Our Fate, but without Our Consent," *Fidesz.hu*, October 4, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/pm-orban-europes-high-dignitaries-are-once-again-trying-to-go-over-our-heads>.

vides ethical grounds for the violence to ensue. That said, the linguistic terms articulated are to be implemented and should become the basis of practice limiting the rights of the Other; therefore, reducing Others' capabilities to interfere in the matters of nation, or the their annihilation. The purgation of such sort is meant to purify the group of people and strengthen the virtues and practices which are meant to keep the nationhood alive.

In fact, the latter Fidesz's legislation of Anti-LGBTQ+ did include provisions that focused on limiting the topic of homosexuality in the public discourse. In the new laws, "content featuring depictions of homosexuality or sex reassignment cannot be made available to minors"¹²². On top of that, the educators responsible for running sex education are forbidden from touching themes of homosexuality and sex reassignment as well. Thirdly, only state-approved NGOs can hold sexual education classes; and, broadcasting ads with LGBTQ+ content to minors has become unlawful.

These provisions were outlined in the document as prerequisite to protect the mental health of children. Plus, to strengthen the ninth amendment which declares that "the father shall be a man and the mother shall be a woman"¹²³; and to protect the youngest from organizations that represent certain sexual orientations that are presumably trying to impact children's sexual development, causing severe damage to their physical, mental, and moral development¹²⁴.

7.3 Redemptive Violence and LGBTQ+: Concluding Statements

Negating the Other, the citizen of the state, and his / her humanity is what makes the Redemptive Violence genuinely novel. The marginalized are denied being human and turned into the evil incarnate who could be blamed for the decaying nation state. The idea of decay, utilization of mythemes such as family (mother and father) put in juxtaposition to another element of homosexuality (father and father or mother and mother) provide needed arguments which stem from ethos periphery pointing at unnaturalness of the latter. Through the image of containing ethical depth, and emphasizing the deviance of the Other, PiS and Fidesz fabricated ideals of nationalism and the emerging need to strengthen the nation; thus, representing themselves as defenders of European

¹²² Zoltan Kovacs, "Portrayal and Promotion – Hungary's Latest Anti-LGBT Law, Explained," *Telex*, June 23, 2021, <https://telex.hu/english/2021/06/23/hungary-anti-lgbt-law-sexual-minorities-portrayal-promotion-paedophilia-viktor-orban-ursula-von-der-leyen>.

¹²³ Zoltan Kovacs and Rovo Atilla, "Hungarian Constitutional Amendment to Crack down on Gender Issues, Narrow Definition of Public Funds," *Telex*, November 10, 2020, <https://telex.hu/english/2020/11/10/hungary-constitutional-amendment-gender-family-public-funds-special-legal-order>.

¹²⁴ Kovacs, "Portrayal and Promotion – Hungary's Latest Anti-LGBT Law, Explained."

Christianity and everything that entangles it. Therefore, through obscuration of history and manipulation of discourse both parties find themselves justified to coerce the LGBTQ+ members; consequently, passing legislations which promote homophobia and social constraints upon homosexual individuals.

The negation of Otherness could also be seen from the perspective of Marxist critics. Slavoj Žižek in *Virtue and Terror* claims that sharp employment of virtue brings violence upon the Other as it is seen as necessary means of defending a social norm¹²⁵. Moreover, the Other is seen, just as in Polish and Hungarian LGBTQ+ cases, not only as a somewhat mystified being which is somewhat possessing special powers to bring down the nation, but also as a narratological instrument — the antithesis to the hegemonic ideology represented by both political parties, which in part means that the conflict between two ideologies and their representatives is unavoidable. In that regard, the LGBTQ+ community, representing liberal values of integrity and ultimate freedom, stand as ideological Other to PiS and Fidesz right-wing ideas and for its electorate. LGBTQ+ minority and the liberal ideals that the group signify remind of the possible political failure of the conservative position of PiS and Fidesz; thus, pointing out at the possibility of them being overthrown; so, from political parties' perspective, to protect the favorable status quo, all possible actions are made including the act of violence to clean the society of “unethical practices” whose definition is of their artificial making.

The Redemptive Violence here emerges through collective being turned into a scapegoat that, consequently, experiences a set of violent acts denying their humanity and fundamental rights. The scapegoat is the Other, which means it opposes the virtues or certain meanings (e.g., family, husband, wife, natural order etc.) that the mainstream group holds. Consequently, leading to the last trope, and that is — the redemption, which is coined from the Bible texts, also usually referred to as deliverance or fulfillment of the promise that extends to Abraham's times¹²⁶. The deliverance (redemption) is being carried out via a set of actions which brings the order and stability becomes re-established. Because of these, the Other is forced to obey the status quo of the day — and just as in Polish and Hungarian LGBTQ+ cases — withdraw from claims to pursue equality and existence in their own right.

In 2021, ILGA Europe, a non-governmental organization responsible for the observation of human rights both in Europe and Central Asia concluded that both in Hungary and Poland, the legal

¹²⁵ Slavoj Žižek, et al. *Virtue and Terror*. (London: Verso, 2017): i-xvi.

¹²⁶ *English Standard Version Bible*, (Crossway, 2016): 1 John 4:4, 1 John 5:4-5, 1 Peter 5:8-9 & 2 Corinthians 10:3-4.

and policy practices upon the LGBTQ+ people have gotten worse in years; thus ranking these states 27th and 43rd place respectively¹²⁷. In recent years, Statista conducted research indicated the rise of negative attitudes upon homosexuals reaching about 76%¹²⁸. While in Hungary, according to World Values Survey, 54% of people think that homosexuality is not justifiable, and 53% do not accept a homosexual relationship¹²⁹. In recent research, conducted by the European Union Agency For Fundamental Rights, concerning the rights of LGBTQ+, it was reported that only 5 % of homosexual respondents in Hungary revealed reporting experienced sexual assaults due to their sexuality, articulating the fear of the justice system being biased on the grounds of sexual orientation¹³⁰.

8. Redemptive Violence and the EU

To follow up with the recent discussion when it comes to the EU's role per se in PiS and Fidesz' narratives, the thesis will tackle this matter of concern separately. Both political parties have been known for their resistance to follow the EU lead on various matters just as for their tendency to blame the union for most of the issues which have befallen Polish and Hungarian states. To make the case, this section will employ the current developments happening in respect to the relationship among the actors, and, more importantly, how these processes may have affected the occurrence of Redemptive Violence.

8.1 Polish Case

Since PiS came to political prominence in Poland, conflicts with the EU occurred on many occasions. The recent conflict has taken place over the PiS reformed justice system which in past was blamed by Jaroslaw Kaczyński for undermining his political program by the ideals of separation of powers compromising what he considered as his party's right to rule.

PiS's critical perception of the court system has been negative for the most time. For instance, during the 2015 election, PiS's campaign included a claim that courts were corrupted by po-

¹²⁷ "Rainbow Europe 2021," 1st ed., vol. 1 (ILGA Europe, 2021), <https://www.ilga-europe.org/rainboweurope/2021>.

¹²⁸ Adriana Sas, "Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Poland 2001-2021" (*Statista*, 2021), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1277115/poland-attitudes-towards-homosexuality/>.

¹²⁹ "Justifiability of Homosexuality: Surveys: Equaldex," LGBT Rights by Country & Travel Guide, accessed January 2, 2022, <https://www.equaldex.com/surveys/justifiability-of-homosexuality>.

¹³⁰ "A Long Way to Go for LGBTI Equality" (Viena, Austria: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2020), <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2020/eu-lgbti-survey-results>.

litical bias, ineffective due to the system being taken by post-communists, and called for a justice system's comprehensive reform. "Without a deep reform of the courts, fixing the country is very difficult, as this is the last barricade, the last level of decision-making in many different cases," Kaczyński said in a 2018 interview¹³¹. Meaning that subordinating the courts was a fundamental key to take full control of the state apparatuses eliminating the last powers which could interfere in PiS' politics.

The problem PiS had was that Poland, as a member of the EU, had its courts integrated into a pan-European justice system meaning that their reforms, laws and other activities had to conform both to Polish and the EU legal jurisdiction. It made the political capture of the state a complicated matter.

In these circumstances, PiS started a campaign to discredit the EU and the judicial system linked to the union's institutions. In 2016, October, during an interview with the German newspaper "Die Welt" Kaczyński mandated an urgent reform of the EU, claiming that the course Europe was taking and how it would look like in six years felt discouraging, pointing out that the EU was weak and incapable of defending itself from outside enemies; concluding "either we reform the EU or it collapses." Adding to that, Kaczyński affirmed that he believed in the EU dream, but in a decentralized one. That being said, he emphasized the critical need for the EU to reform and decentralize its observance of member states, for example, in the sphere of legal matters. He explained this decentralization as follows: "We must return in Europe the concept of nation-states because only capable institutions can guarantee democracy, freedom, and cultural diversity. The cultural unification of Europe would be a dangerous development — it would mean degradation"¹³².

At that stage, several developments could be noticed. Firstly, the claim regarding the court system was introduced concerning its flawed bureaucracy and association with the EU court institutions¹³³. This claim later endured transformation through abstraction leading to the accusation circulating around the Polish holding that courts were flawed due to their shared corrupt nature with the

¹³¹ Polska, "Kaczyński: Reforma Sądownictwa Idzie z Kłopotami, Ale Doprowadzimy Ją Do Końca," *Polsatnews.pl*, October 16, 2018, Kaczyński: reforma sądownictwa idzie z kłopotami, ale doprowadzimy ją do końca <https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2018-10-16/kaczynski-reforme-sadownictwa-doprowadzimy-do-konca/>.

¹³² PiS, "Jarosław Kaczyński: the EU Must Reform or It Will Collapse," *ECR Party*, October 16, 2016, https://www.e-crparty.eu/article/jaroslaw_kaczynski_eu_must_reform_or_it_will_collapse.

¹³³ PiS, "The Polish Government Will Not Operate under Pressure of Blackmail," *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, October 21, 2021, https://pis-org-pl.translate.google.pl/aktualnosci/polski-rzad-nie-bedzie-dzialal-pod-presja-szantazu?_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=lt&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_sch=http.

degrading EU. Most importantly, proof was not provided to back this claim, yet it delivered enough space for the targeted audience to assume that the legal system's failure had something to do with its association with the EU nudging to speculate upon the level of the union's decay.

The trope of the enemy conducting the failure of the Polish legal system was enhanced during the party convention in 2018 when Kaczyński fended his party's policies and blamed its critics of working in service of the "powerful interests and making deals with the mighty of the world," in so stressing the EU's imperfection and its ties to the legal troubles in the "heartland." "I had said we would face an uphill battle and that stones would be thrown," Kaczyński stated, continuing to assert his allegations that the union had been trying, through Polish institutions and certain groups of people, to instigate havoc in the state. Later he reached the morality-related (ethos) premise: "it's easy to serve the interests of the most powerful. If you want to serve the society, the nation, it's much more difficult." Concluding on the danger of the nation becoming "infected with social diseases that dominate" the West and the EU¹³⁴.

Similar claims had been made later as well which might have had a strategic goal to construct the moral backbone of the party even further as well as to consolidate the narrative about Poland being under siege by the great Other. The party's deputy leader, Ryszard Terlecki, in 2021, stated that if the government attempts would fail to reform courts according to the nation's will: "we will have to search for drastic solutions," later he added that the EU was functioning like a dictatorship¹³⁵, from which it could be inferred that Poland must have sought judiciary independence to protect its general sovereignty. Marek Suski, another leading party member, also tried to question the union's reputation by expressing her views regarding Brussels (the EU) as an occupier similar to "the Nazis and Soviets in the past," later adding, that the union had sent its "overlords" who put Poland on its knees in order to make it "a German state, and not a proud state of free Poles"¹³⁶; meaning that Poland was under threat of becoming occupied, therefore, there was a rising need to fight off the occupier and set Poland free.

¹³⁴ Euractiv.com, "Defiant Kaczynski Says Poland Must Avoid EU's 'Social Diseases,'" *Euractiv*, September 3, 2018, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2019/news/defiant-kaczynski-says-poland-must-avoid-eus-social-diseases/>.

¹³⁵ Vanessa Gera, "Leader Says Poland Wants to Be in EU, but Remain Sovereign," *AP News*, September 15, 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/europe-business-poland-european-union-jaroslaw-kaczynski-ff52c9205154ff21aef56b5119dd8e3b>.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*.

PiS' utilized moral argument covered with fearful claims of state's occupation had one effect - gathering a trust credit which PiS could use as a banner of ethical superiority over the EU. The base of this premise, as seen in the statements, had to do with the EU's moral degradation and alleged service to the unseen powers which wanted to take the control of the Polish state. The indicated moral duty then was implied and the necessity of taking action — to stop the Other from corrupting and occupying the homeland which PiS saw as its major priority.

In practice, PiS did make a political capture of the legal system. Over the years since the party was elected, PiS has taken over the public prosecutor's office, exercised its authority over all levels of courts, took direct control to nominate judges despite the criticism of the Court of Justice of the EU¹³⁷.

Constitutional Tribunal, the very top court that is meant to determine if one's actions are aligned with the constitution, has been a subject of PiS's political coup as well. PiS has planted judges to the tribunal who have been closer to the ruling party. In that very court, piloted by Julia Przylebska, a close ally of PiS and its leader, issued a decree stating that the Polish constitution has preeminence over several parts of the EU Treaties¹³⁸. Consequently, sparking further conflict with the EU institutions and non-EU bodies.

Despite the growing opposition from the EU institutions, the PiS government has been pushing ahead. As EU has failed on various accounts to stop the country's slide into the hands of PiS, the latter has corrupted Poland's rule-of-law, the institutions responsible for ensuring the check and balances influencing the country's decline in democratic standards¹³⁹.

The European Commission tried to pressure Poland by opening Article 7 procedure in 2017 taking away from the EU country its voting rights for serious misconducts regarding the union's principles¹⁴⁰. Yet, it did not do much. The same scenario reiterated in 2021 too when the EU had

¹³⁷ *Curia* (Judgment in Case C-791/19, Commission v Poland., July 15, 2021), <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-07/cp210130en.pdf>.

¹³⁸ Lauren Lewis, "Polish Court Rules European Rights Pact Is Incompatible with Its Constitution in Nation's Latest Clash with the EU," *Daily Mail*, November 24, 2021, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10239405/Polish-court-rules-European-rights-pact-incompatible-constitution-latest-EU-clash.html>.

¹³⁹ Laurent Pech, Patryk Wachowiec, and Dariusz Mazur, "Poland's Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU's (in)Action," *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 13, no. 1 (2021): 1-43, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-021-00151-9>.

¹⁴⁰ "European Commission," *European Commission*, December 20, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5367.

reacted to Poland's recent statements on having a legal superiority to the EU law¹⁴¹. These events have indicated the EU's sterility — incapability to deal with radicalized governments practically when it is needed, which, in turn, allowed political powers like PiS to instrumentalize false allegations to manipulate the socio-political developments to strengthen its control over the state; thus, permitting PiS to run unfair and unjust legal system in the country.

8.2 Hungarian Case

The following case will examine how Fidesz is constructing the narrative when it comes to Hungary's relationship with the EU (Brussels). Fidesz historically has had various conflicts with the establishment since its rise to power in 2010. This section will try to look at why and how the EU is an integral part of the Fidesz' storytelling.

Fidesz has been active for some time when it comes to controlling the narrative about the EU. In its official webpage, an idea of the EU being corrupt is a prominent one. This topic usually reoccurs within the announcements which inform either about current developments on the diplomatic level or the EU's pressure pushing Hungary to revise its take on legal matters.

The claim about the EU as pressuring Hungary to respect the rule of law has experienced certain alterations and obfuscation when it comes to specifics. For instance, in 2018, Sargentini's report was published to outline the systemic transgressions of Orbán's government regarding the EU's fundamental principles of democracy, some of them were: the abuse of refugees, restrictions on the freedom of press, corruption, misuse of private data, violence on the basis of gender and sexuality, and, most importantly, violations of the principles of rule of law¹⁴². To discredit the whole matter, Fidesz launched an anti-EU campaign by dubbing the document a "Soros-report"¹⁴³. Fidesz rebuke was later followed by Hungarian foreign affairs minister's, Peter Szijarto's, statement claim-

¹⁴¹ "European Commission," *European Commission*, December 22, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_7070.

¹⁴² Judith Sargentini, "On a Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on Which the Union Is Founded (2017/2131(INL)," April 11, 2018, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20180411RES01553/20180411RES01553.pdf>.

¹⁴³ Emma Beswick, "Article 7 Sanctions: What Does the Sargentini Report Accuse Hungary of?," *Euronews*, September 18, 2019, <https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/10/article-7-sanctions-what-does-the-sargentini-report-accuse-hungary-of>.

ing that in the EU "there is a politically motivated staged trial against Hungary, where everything counts, except the facts and the reality <...> you can see it's a collection of qualified lies"¹⁴⁴.

Fidesz' response to Sargentini's report greatly exemplified how the party used narratological means to cover up their systemic failings. Instead of trying to fix the issues indicated, Fidesz ran a campaign denouncing the report followed by accusations that the whole document was false since the author, the EU itself, had been acting by the orders of a single man, billionaire financier George Soros. Eventually, another claim emerged that would state that the EU was being corrupted itself and acted to corrupt or discredit the Hungarian state. Then Fidesz would start arguing that the whole union and its institutions infiltrated into the public life of Hungary and caused havoc:

*"Liberal, progressive politicians and mainstream media in Hungary and abroad chose to launch an extensive campaign against the government based on lies about curbing democratic principles and rule of law. Their allies in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe are shamelessly taking part in this political campaign"*¹⁴⁵.

Purposefully, Orbán made a statement proposing a hypothetical reason to explain why Hungary was confronted for its abuse of the rule of law:

*"People are a bit angry with us in Brussels because <...> we ran an information campaign in Hungary, essentially exposing what Brussels was up to <...> [we] have exposed them and, naturally, they are angry. Our job now is to continuously inform the people about what Brussels is up to"*¹⁴⁶.

By looking at these two statements, several things could be discerned. First, the assertion of the EU being corrupted and trying to rig the Hungarian system with the help of Soros experienced proliferation with additional premises regarding the EU as vindictive and potentially oppressive. This created an alternative version for the Hungarians where the Other, in this case, the whole EU institution, looked like a grand schemer, a manipulator. As the stage of discrediting was complete

¹⁴⁴ Sallyann Nicholls, "Hungarian Lawmakers Reject 'Lying, Slandorous' Report Approved by EU," *Euronews*, October 18, 2018, <https://www.euronews.com/2018/10/16/hungarian-lawmakers-reject-lying-slandorous-report-approved-by-eu>.

¹⁴⁵ "Left and liberals playing petty games instead of crisis management," *Fidesz.hu*, April 7, 2020, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/left-and-liberals-playing-petty-games-instead-of-crisis-management>.

¹⁴⁶ Lousie Miner, "Viktor Orban Says He May Resume Media Attacks on EU Institutions," *Euronews*, March 25, 2019, <https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/24/orban-hits-out-at-critics-over-epp-decision>.

and the EU's flaws were outlined, the moral considerations had to be included in the production of the narrative as well.

In the published announcements of Fidesz, multiple attempts to depict the party as if a savior could be witnessed. For example, some published claims would try to incite fear by accusing the EU of practicing the "unprecedented abuse of power over the constitutional institutions and identity of sovereign states" as well as that "many high-ranking EU bureaucrats working with the Soros network" aimed to create a unified empire where European nations allegedly would be oppressed by the great Other¹⁴⁷. As a response to this ill-image, Fidesz would show itself as a master of all things being capable of achieving great results when it came to protecting people's safety¹⁴⁸, EU funds¹⁴⁹, and the contemporary status quo with Fidesz being in the leader's role in Hungary¹⁵⁰.

On top of that, the communication campaigns would try to inspire the idea of violence by delivering an image of Hungary being under siege by the Left and the Other who "always went behind our backs and harmed us in any way they could. As everyone can see, once more they are organizing and threatening vengeance, sowing the seeds of discord, hatred, strife, and violence"¹⁵¹. Therefore, Orbán, while delivering one of his speeches in 2021 to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the 1956 revolution, would utilize the mytheme of national unity, solidarity, ideological mobilization, thereon, proposing the resolution to implement actions to oppose "the might of the enemy" by mobilizing the citizens for the effort since the popular movement "is strength, this is our power base; and not even all the dollars or euros in the world could take it away from us. We came,

¹⁴⁷ "Hungary Backs Poland amid 'the Attack from Brussels,'" *Fidesz.hu*, September 10, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/hungary-backs-poland-amid-the-attack-from-brussels>.

¹⁴⁸ "Europe Must Not Succumb to the Soros Network," *Fidesz.hu*, November 25, 2020, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/europe-must-not-succumb-to-the-soros-network>.

¹⁴⁹ "The EU Has Become Ever More Ideologically-Driven: Higher Taxes, More State Intervention, Less Competitiveness," *Fidesz.hu*, December 20, 2020, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/the-eu-has-become-ever-more-ideologically-driven-higher-taxes-more-state-intervention-less-competitiveness>.

¹⁵⁰ "Joint Declaration on the Future of the European Union," *Fidesz.hu*, July 2, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/joint-declaration-on-the-future-of-the-european-union>.

¹⁵¹ "PM Orbán: Europe's High Dignitaries Are Once Again Trying to Go over Our Heads to Make Decisions about Our Fate, but without Our Consent," *Fidesz.hu*, October 4, 2021, <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/pm-orban-europes-high-dignitaries-are-once-again-trying-to-go-over-our-heads>.

we saw, and we will win again! God above us all, Hungary before all else! Go Hungary, go Hungarians!"¹⁵².

The ability to mobilize Hungarians and the party's perseverance in making continuous accusations upon the EU have helped enormously to exhibit Fidesz and its leader as capable to defend the national interests against the great Other. Mobilization of people under fear, alternative claims, and accusations of the corrupted institutions that try to steal people's freedom may help a lot when it comes to gathering support during critical moments of Hungarian political life. Also, it might be considered that turning the blame on the EU could have also helped to drive off the attention from Fidesz's failures as well, helping the party to find itself on safer grounds during critical moments.

8.3 Redemptive Violence and the EU: Concluding Statements

The EU is a vital object when it comes to the narratives of PiS and Fidesz. Both political parties use this institution to blame for everything that has been wrong with the West according to their ideological considerations. Plus, by manipulating their narratives to scare the audience about the great Other aiming to steal freedom, culture and rights, the parties mobilize the society which, in turn, experiences great encouragement to perceive the union in negative terms.

Research on Polish views of the EU indicates that only 9% of Poles supported the overall EU integration, while 39% wished everything to stay as it is¹⁵³. With that being said, it seems that the narrative opposed to the EU may have made the Poles to oppose any change which would bring their country closer to the union and make their state more dependent on it. It also appears that Poland features some nativist tendencies. It falls on fertile grounds since the state is well-known for its homogeneous society in terms of ethnic and religious aspects, therefore, it could be assumed that in upcoming years as PiS is likely to continue their anti-EU / anti-Liberal campaign, xenophobic and conservative views will continue to grow enhancing the Polish's isolationism and opposition to the European integration. Quite likely, those who are in support to liberal ideas and virtues, for which the EU stands, will experience even larger pressure, both socio-cultural and political.

Just like in the Polish case, when discussion moves to specific EU values and trust in the process of integration, the statistics of Hungarian public attitudes indicate that it is divided by 50%

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Adam Balcer et al., "Polish Views of the EU: the Illusion of Consensus" (Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2017): 1-18, https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/rap_otw_eu/Polish%20views%20of%20the%20EU.pdf.

on each question¹⁵⁴. Meaning, that the Hungarians featured less susceptibility to the narrative that focused on opposition to the EU. Borbála Göncz and György Lengyel in the report regarding the Hungarian public's attitude toward the EU suggest that this might be likely due to the public getting accustomed to the repetition of similar accusations against the EU which Fidesz has been employing to divert the focus from its own flaws¹⁵⁵. The resistance may stem due to the hectic environment as well, generated by the coronavirus crisis which has made the public less inclined for a stable support toward Fidesz as it has been indicated in the Politico polls concerning the party's popularity between 2020-2022¹⁵⁶. On top of that, Fidesz has faced a serious challenge — a united front made by several opposition parties which has been winning electoral support since the end of December, 2021 posing a real threat for Fidesz¹⁵⁷. Consequently, these tendencies about the EU and other related matters raise a question about the outcome of the upcoming Hungarian elections in 2022 and if the party will manage to mobilize people via utilization of Redemptive Violence once again.

Nonetheless, it could be argued that the EU has been and is a significant mytheme for both PiS and Fidesz narratives since the institution per se incarnates the ideological Otherness in terms of inclusivity and tolerance as opposed to PiS and Fidesz' nativism and their rhetoric about sovereignty. The conflict between Poland and Hungary with the EU becomes a moral need to return the sovereign powers of the people back to the "heartland." The parties take political actions (e.g., declaring judiciary supremacy to the EU court) to execute the deliverance for the Hungarian and Polish nations - the right to act and choose their future independently without being accountable to the large community of nations.

Concluding Statements

In conclusion, the analysis revealed how PiS and Fidesz obfuscated the facts in their claims to validate their narratives which would, in turn, serve their political goals. The thesis examined political parties' storytelling which was conceptualized by employing the narratological analysis.

¹⁵⁴ Borbála Göncz and György Lengyel, "Europhile Public vs Eurosceptic Governing Elite in Hungary?," 2nd ed., vol. (*Intereconomics*, 2021): 86-90, <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2021/number/2/article/europhile-public-vs-eurosceptic-governing-elite-in-hungary.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 90.

¹⁵⁶ "Politico Poll of Polls - Hungarian Polls, Trends and Election News for Hungary," POLITICO, January 9, 2022, <https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/hungary/>.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

Throughout the research, the 5-trope cycle proved to be appropriate in deconstructing the populist parties' narratives.

It was noticed that both parties tended to obfuscate the relevant facts to turn the discourse unfavorably upon their opponents; it was done by evading specifics and linguistically shifting the discourse from one's action to the discourse upon the Other's character flaw; hence, damaging the opponent's credibility intentionally.

Nonetheless, both parties were inclined to use morality-based arguments to build the trust credit in their respected societies and show off their moral superiority. It helped both PiS and Fidesz to promote the image of the parties being the sole representatives of their nations; therefore, emerging as virtuous heroes. Moreover, when it came to the political parties' narratives, there was a consistency in articulating the need for violence against the Other under the pretext of defending the Hungarian and Polish states. The violence was intended to "purify" the nation and restore order. This need was usually expressed through the use of mythemes which would frequently stem from an idea of nationhood, victimization by the great Other, the will of people, Christianity, or other motives. However, violence did not occur in a literal way. It rather happened as an attempt to harm the Other psychologically, spiritually, limit their freedom of speech and action which means that violence here was versatile and subtle; yet, with a common intent to coerce and oppress the scapegoat.

Importantly, the thesis showed that the myth of Redemptive Violence is a mode of storytelling that is constructed via a five-trope cycle: the presumption of guilt, abstraction, essentialism, purgation, and redemption. The agents of Redemptive Violence may choose their victims from a broad category of individuals which means that anyone, both citizen and a foreigner can be scapegoated. This makes this phenomenon a novel form of violence as the agents are rather opportunists than the propagators of some well-defined ideology they would assert to believe in firmly. Having that said, Redemptive Violence is about the victory of order over some picked up chaos perpetrators by any means of violence; it is the doctrine of conquest and the defense of the status quo. It is a prominent narratological paradigm of the Polish and Hungarian populists.

However, it does not mean that one could not oppose it. The trope cycle may act as a handbook of symptoms to diagnose if a movement may have populist tendencies. Therefore, allowing to prevent such groups from gaining significant political power to bring havoc in a democratic state. Likewise, it helps to understand how populists' arguments are usually produced; henceforth, permitting one to expect where logical fallacies could be detected; it may allow to oppose the populists in

a constructive way by pointing out their logical inconsistencies while participating in the public discourse.

Bibliography

- Agerholm, Harriet. "Refugees Are 'Muslim Invaders' Not Running for Their Lives, Says Hungarian PM Viktor Orban." *Independent*, January 9, 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugees-muslim-invaders-hungary-viktor-orban-racism-islamophobia-eu-a8149251.html>.
- Ash, Lucy. "Inside Poland's 'LGBT-Free Zones'." *BBC News*, September 20, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-54191344>.
- Balcer, Adam, Grzegorz Gromadzki, Piotr Buras, and Eugeniusz Smolar. Rep. *Polish Views of the EU: the Illusion of Consensus*. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2017. https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/rap_otw_eu/Polish%20views%20of%20the%20EU.pdf.
- Barteczko, Agnieszka, and Pawel Sobczak. "Poland Did Not Invite Refugees, Has Right to Say 'No': Kaczynski." *Reuters*, July 1, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-migrants-idUSKBN19M3H8>.
- Bayralki, Enes, Farid Hafez, and Konrad Pędziwiatr. Rep. *Islamophobia in Poland: National Report 2016*. SETA, 2016. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315490054_Pedziwiatr_K_2017_Islamophobia_in_Poland_National_Report_2016_In_Enes_Bayralki_Farid_Hafez_European_Islamophobia_Report_2016_Istanbul_SETA_411-443.
- BBC News. "Thousands Attend Hungary 'Public Outrage Day' Protest," November 14, 2014. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30086497>.
- Beaumont, Thomas E. "The Phenomenology of Redemptive Violence." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 45, no. 4 (2020): 184–99. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375421999175>.
- Beswick, Emma. "Article 7 Sanctions: What Does the Sargentini Report Accuse Hungary of?" *Euronews*, September 18, 2019. <https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/10/article-7-sanctions-what-does-the-sargentini-report-accuse-hungary-of>.
- Boros, Tamas, Maria Freitas, Gabor Gyori, and Gergely Laki. "The State of Populism in Europe – 2020." FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies. Policy Solutions, March 2020. <https://euagenda.eu/publications/the-eu-strategic-autonomy-central-and-eastern-european-perspectives>.
- Bujalski, Szymon. "Polska Walczy z Obcymi. Rośnie Liczba Ataków Rasistowskich i Ksenofobicznych." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, September 16, 2016. <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,20699634,polska-walczy-z-obcymi-rosnie-liczba-atakow-rasistowskich-i.html>.

- Catterberg, Gabriela, and Alejandro Moreno. "The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 18, no. 1 (2006): 31–48. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh081>.
- Ceylan Tok, Gül. "The Politicization of Migration and the Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism in Hungary." *Akdeniz Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2018, 88–117. <https://doi.org/10.25294/auibfd.420805>.
- Cianetti, Licia, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley. "Rethinking 'Democratic Backsliding' in Central and Eastern Europe – Looking beyond Hungary and Poland." *East European Politics* 34, no. 3 (2018): 243–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401>.
- CIENSKI, JAN. "Migrants Carry 'Parasites and Protozoa,' Warns Polish Opposition Leader." *Politico*, October 14, 2015. <https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-asylum-poland-kaczynski-election/>.
- Ciensi, Jan. "Poland Slams Door on Refugees." *Politico*, March 23, 2016. <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-slams-door-on-refugees-beata-szydlo/>.
- Cseresnyés, Péter. "Hungarian Ambassador Charged with Child Pornography Pleads Guilty in Court." *Hungary Today*, July 4, 2020. <https://hungarytoday.hu/ambassador-kaleta-guilty-child-pornography/>.
- Dimitrova, Antoaneta L. "The Uncertain Road to Sustainable Democracy: Elite Coalitions, Citizen Protests and the Prospects of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe." *East European Politics* 34, no. 3 (2018): 257–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1491840>.
- "The Disciplinary Regime for Judges in Poland Is Not Compatible with EU Law." *Curia*. Judgment in Case C-791/19, Commission v Poland., July 15, 2021. Court of Justice of the European Union. <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-07/cp210130en.pdf>.
- Dragomir, Marius. "How the Hungarian Government Nationalized Criticism." *MediaLaws*, May 29, 2019. <https://www.medialaws.eu/how-the-hungarian-government-nationalized-criticism/>.
- DW News. "Poland Abandons Promise to Take in Refugees after Brussels Attacks," March 23, 2016. <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-abandons-promise-to-take-in-refugees-after-brussels-attacks/a-19137258>.
- English Standard Version Bible*. Crossway, 2016. 1 John 4:4, 1 John 5:4-5, 1 Peter 5:8-9 & 2 Corinthians 10:3-4.
- "The EU Has Become Ever More Ideologically-Driven: Higher Taxes, More State Intervention, Less Competitiveness." *Fidesz.hu*, December 20, 2020. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/the-eu>

has-become-ever-more-ideologically-driven-higher-taxes-more-state-intervention-less-competitiveness.

Euractiv.com. “Defiant Kaczynski Says Poland Must Avoid EU’s ‘Social Diseases.’” *Euractiv*, September 3, 2018. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2019/news/defiant-kaczynski-says-poland-must-avoid-eus-social-diseases/>.

Erdő-Bonyár, Kitti. “Hungarian House Speaker: ‘Normal Homosexuals Don’t Consider Themselves Equal’.” *Daily News - Hungary*, May 18, 2019. <https://dailynewshungary.com/hungarian-house-speaker-normal-homosexuals-dont-consider-themselves-equal/>.

Eurobarometer. European Commission. Accessed December 9, 2021. <https://ec.europa.eu/comm-frontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm>.

“Europe Must Not Succumb to the Soros Network.” *Fidesz.hu*, November 25, 2020. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/europe-must-not-succumb-to-the-soros-network>.

“The European Parliament Has Crossed a Red Line.” *Fidesz.hu*, July 7, 2021. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/the-european-parliament-has-crossed-a-red-line>.

Federman, Sarah. “Narrative Approaches to Understanding and Responding to Conflict.” *The International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution* 4, no. 2 (2016): 154–71. <https://doi.org/10.5553/ijcer/221199652016004002002>.

Fleming, Chris. *René Girard: Violence and Mimesis*. ResearchGate. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327733518_Rene_Girard_Violence_and_Mimesis.

Gera, Vanessa. “Leader Says Poland Wants to Be in EU, but Remain Sovereign.” *AP News*, September 15, 2021. <https://apnews.com/article/europe-business-poland-european-union-jaroslav-kaczynski-ff52c9205154ff21aef56b5119dd8e3b>.

Goździak, Elżbieta M. Rep. *Using Fear of the “Other,” Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity*. Migration Policy Institute, October 10, 2019. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/orban-reshapes-migration-policy-hungary>.

Graef, Josefin, Raquel da Silva, and Nicolas Lemay-Hebert. “Narrative, Political Violence, and Social Change.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 43, no. 6 (2018): 431–43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2018.1452701>.

Greskovits, Béla. “The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe.” *Global Policy* 6 (2015): 28–37. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12225>.

Groth, Stefen. “Political Narratives / Narrations of the Political: An Introduction.” *Narrative Culture* 6, no. 1 (2019): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.13110/narrcult.6.1.0001>.

- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. "Global Populisms and Their Impact." *Slavic Review* 76, no. 1 (2017): 3–8. <https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.152>.
- Gulyás, Gergely. Rep. *National Consultation on Immigration to Begin*. Kormany.HU - Prime Minister's Office, April 24, 2015. <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/national-consultation-on-immigration-to-begin>.
- Göncz, Borbála, and György Lengyel. Rep. *Europhile Public vs Eurosceptic Governing Elite in Hungary?* 56. 2nd ed. Vol. 56. Intereconomics, 2021. <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2021/number/2/article/europhile-public-vs-eurosceptic-governing-elite-in-hungary.html>.
- "Hungary Backs Poland amid 'the Attack from Brussels.'" *Fidesz.hu*, September 10, 2021. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/hungary-backs-poland-amid-the-attack-from-brussels>.
- "Hungary: Nations in Transit 2021 Country Report." Freedom House, 2021. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2021>.
- ITTHON. "Orbán: Gazdasági Bevándorlóknak Nem Tudunk Menedéket Adni." *Hug.hu*, January 2015. https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150111_Orban_gazdasagi_bevandorloknak_nem_tudunk.
- "Joint Declaration on the Future of the European Union." *Fidesz.hu*, July 2, 2021. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/joint-declaration-on-the-future-of-the-european-union>.
- "Judit Varga: There Is No Hungarian Debate, Only a European One." *Fidesz.hu*, July 14, 2021. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/judit-varga-there-is-no-hungarian-debate-only-a-european-one>.
- "Justifiability of Homosexuality: Surveys: Equaldex." LGBT Rights by Country & Travel Guide. Accessed January 2, 2022. <https://www.equaldex.com/surveys/justifiability-of-homosexuality>.
- "Katalin Novák: We Must Leave the Propaganda Outside the Schools." *Fidesz.hu*, July 26, 2021. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/katalin-novak-we-must-leave-the-propaganda-outside-the-schools>.
- Kim, Seongcheol. "... Because the Homeland Cannot Be in Opposition: Analysing the Discourses of Fidesz and Law and Justice (PIS) from Opposition to Power." *East European Politics* 37, no. 2 (2020): 332–51. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1791094>.
- Knapp, Mark L. "Discourse Analysis." Essay. In *Handbook of Interpersonal Communication*, 102–29. Sage, 2002. <http://web.uvic.ca/psyc/bavelas/2002discourse.pdf>.
- Kovacic, Jovan. "Kaczynski: Poland Will Not Accept Any Refugees." *New Europe*, May 9, 2016. <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/457318-2/>.
- Kovacs, Zoltan, and Rovo Atilla. "Hungarian Constitutional Amendment to Crack down on Gender Issues, Narrow Definition of Public Funds." *Telex*, November 10, 2020. <https://telex.hu/eng>

lish/2020/11/10/hungary-constitutional-amendment-gender-family-public-funds-special-legal-order.

Kovacs, Zoltan, and Rovó Attila. “Hungarian Constitutional Amendment to Crack down on Gender Issues, Narrow Definition of Public Funds.” *Telex*, November 10, 2020. <https://telex.hu/english/2020/11/10/hungary-constitutional-amendment-gender-family-public-funds-special-legal-order>.

Kovacs, Zoltan. “Portrayal and Promotion – Hungary's Latest Anti-LGBT Law, Explained.” *Telex*, June 23, 2021. <https://telex.hu/english/2021/06/23/hungary-anti-lgbt-law-sexual-minorities-portrayal-promotion-paedophilia-viktor-orban-ursula-von-der-leyen>.

Krekó, Péter, and Attila Juhász. “Beyond Populism: Political Tribalism in Poland and Hungary 18, No. 3 (2019): Pp. 70-72, [Http://Turkishpolicy.com/Files/Articlepdf/beyond-Populism-Political-Tribalism-in-Poland-and-hungary_en_4755.Pdf](http://Turkishpolicy.com/Files/Articlepdf/beyond-Populism-Political-Tribalism-in-Poland-and-hungary_en_4755.Pdf).” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (2019): 69–81. http://turkishpolicy.com/files/articlepdf/beyond-populism-political-tribalism-in-poland-and-hungary_en_4755.pdf.

Kubát, Michal, and Martin Mejstřík. Rep. *Populist Parties in Contemporary Europe*. Brussels, Belgium: DEMOS, 2020. https://openarchive.tk.mta.hu/424/1/Populist%20Parties%20in%20Contemporary%20Europe_12-06-2020-FINAL.pdf.

Kuypers, Jim A., Matthew T. Althouse, William L. Benoit, Edwin Black, Adam Blood, and Stephen H. Browne. *Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action*. 2nd ed. Lanham etc.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016.

Körösényi, András. “The Theory and Practice of Plebiscitary Leadership: Weber and the Orbán Regime.” *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures* 33, no. 2 (2018): 280–301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325418796929>.

Labarrière, Amy. “The Story behind Warsaw’s New LGBT+ Declaration.” URBACT, March 2019. <https://www.blog.urbact.eu/2019/03/warsaw-lgbt-declaration/>.

“Left and Liberals Playing Petty Games Instead of Crisis Management.” *Fidesz.hu*, April 7, 2020. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/left-and-liberals-playing-petty-games-instead-of-crisis-management>.

Leszczynski, Adam. “Czarnek: Nazism Is a Marxist Ideology. Nonsense of a PiS MP.” *OKO.press*, August 26, 2020. <https://oko.press/czarnek-nazizm-to-marksistowska-ideologia-zlowrogie-glupstwa-posla-pis/>.

Lewis, Lauren. “Polish Court Rules European Rights Pact Is Incompatible with Its Constitution in Nation's Latest Clash with the EU.” *Daily Mail*. November 24, 2021. <https://www.daily->

mail.co.uk/news/article-10239405/Polish-court-rules-European-rights-pact-incompatible-constitution-latest-EU-clash.html.

“The Main Obligation Is to Guarantee the Undisturbed Development of Our Children.” Fidesz.hu, June 22, 2021. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/the-main-obligation-is-to-guarantee-the-undisturbed-development-of-our-children>.

Maybury-Lewis, David. “Claude Levi-Strauss and the Search for Structure.” *The Wilson Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1988): 82–95. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40257769>.

Miner, Lousie. “Viktor Orban Says He May Resume Media Attacks on EU Institutions.” *Euronews*, March 25, 2019. <https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/24/orban-hits-out-at-critics-over-epp-decision>.

Morath, Annika. “‘Poland for the Polish’ ? Taking a Closer Look at the Polish Rejection of Refugees.” *The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung*. June 14, 2017. <https://eu.boell.org/en/2017/06/14/poland-polish-taking-closer-look-polish-rejection-refugees>.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford university press, 2017.

“The Myth of Redemptive Violence.” *The Bible in Transmission*, 1999, 1–5. <https://www2.goshen.edu/~joannab/women/wink99.pdf>.

Müller, Jan-Werner. “Eastern Europe Goes South.” *Foreign Affairs*, September 4, 2019. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/2014-02-12/eastern-europe-goes-south>.

Nagy, Boldizsár. “Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation.” *German Law Journal* 17, no. 6 (2016): 1033–82. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200021581>.

Narkowicz, Kasia. “‘Refugees Not Welcome Here’: State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland.” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 31, no. 4 (2018): 357–73. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-018-9287-9>.

Nicholls, Sallyann. “Hungarian Lawmakers Reject 'Lying, Slandorous' Report Approved by EU.” *Euronews*, October 18, 2018. <https://www.euronews.com/2018/10/16/hungarian-lawmakers-reject-lying-slandorous-report-approved-by-eu>.

Nussbaum, Martha Craven. *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

- Orban, Viktor. "Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 15 March." In *Miniszterelnok.hu*. Budapest: Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister, 2016. <https://miniszterelnok.hu/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-15-march/>.
- Palfi, Rita. "Why Is Hungary Withholding Food from Migrants in Its Border Zones?" *Euronews*, July 31, 2019. <https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/31/why-is-hungary-withholding-food-from-migrants-in-its-border-zones>.
- Pech, Laurent, Patryk Wachowiec, and Dariusz Mazur. "Poland's Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU's (in)Action." *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 13, no. 1 (2021): 1–43. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-021-00151-9>.
- "Piontkowski's Testimony to the LGBT map2019." *Newsbeezzer*, June 5, 2019. <https://newsbeezzer.com/polandeng/piontkowskis-testimony-to-the-lgbt-map-comments-from-politicians/>.
- PiS. "Jaroslaw Kaczynski: the EU Must Reform or It Will Collapse." *ECR Party*, October 16, 2016. https://www.ecrparty.eu/article/jaroslaw_kaczynski_eu_must_reform_or_it_will_collapse.
- PiS. "Poles Chose Us to Solve Their Problems." *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, December 16, 2015. https://pis-org-pl.translate.google/aktualnosci/polacy-wybrali-nas-abysmy-rozwiazywali-ich-problemy-1?_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=lt&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_sch=http.
- PiS. "The Polish Government Will Not Operate under Pressure of Blackmail." *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, October 21, 2021. https://pis-org-pl.translate.google/aktualnosci/polski-rzad-nie-bedzie-dzialal-pod-prezjasa-szanta-zu?_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=lt&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_sch=http.
- PiS. "We Are Here for Citizens!" *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, December 15, 2015. https://pis-org-pl.translate.google/aktualnosci/jestesmy-tu-dla-obywateli?_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=lt&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_sch=http.
- "PM Orbán: Europe's High Dignitaries Are Once Again Trying to Go over Our Heads to Make Decisions about Our Fate, but without Our Consent." *Fidesz.hu*, October 4, 2021. <https://fidesz.hu/int/news/pm-orban-europes-high-dignitaries-are-once-again-trying-to-go-over-our-heads>.
- "Poland: Nations in Transit 2021 Country Report." Freedom House, 2021. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/nations-transit/2021>.
- "Political Narratives and Political Reality." *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique* 27, no. 3 (July 2006): 245–62. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20445054?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

- “Politico Poll of Polls - Hungarian Polls, Trends and Election News for Hungary.” POLITICO, January 9, 2022. <https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/hungary/>.
- Polska. “Kaczyński: Reforma Sądownictwa Idzie z Kłopotami, Ale Doprowadzimy Ją Do Końca.” *Polsatnews.pl*, October 16, 2018. Kaczyński: reforma sądownictwa idzie z kłopotami, ale doprowadzimy ją do końca <https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2018-10-16/kaczynski-reforme-sadownictwa-doprowadzimy-do-konca/>.
- Przemyski, Jan. “Kaczyński: Nie Możemy w to Wchodzić.” *Gazeta Polska*, 2016. <https://gpcodzien.pl/64284-kaczynskiniemozemywtowchodzic.html>.
- Rajca, Lucyna. “Reforms and Centralization Trends in Hungary and in Poland in a Comparative Perspective.” *Przegląd Sejmowy* 5(160) (2020): 133–51. <https://doi.org/10.31268/ps.2020.69>.
- Rep. *A Long Way to Go for LGBTI Equality*. Viena, Austria: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2020. <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2020/eu-lgbti-survey-results>.
- Rep. *Five Main Citizenships of (Non-EU) Asylum Applicants*. Eurostat, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Five_main_citizenships_of_\(non-EU\)_asylum_applicants,_2016_\(number_of_first_time_applicants,_rounded_figures\)_YB17.png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Five_main_citizenships_of_(non-EU)_asylum_applicants,_2016_(number_of_first_time_applicants,_rounded_figures)_YB17.png).
- Rep. *Rainbow Europe 2021* 1. 1st ed. Vol. 1. ILGA Europe, 2021. <https://www.ilga-europe.org/rainboweurope/2021>.
- Resolution 36/2015 (IX. 22) of the Parliament, Magyar Közlöny No. 136, (22 September 2015), [http://www.magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/30d4e493298b407e098990414cb8387e7c1-caaf8/megtekintes § \(n.d.\)](http://www.magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/30d4e493298b407e098990414cb8387e7c1-caaf8/megtekintes%20(n.d.)).
- “Rule of Law: Commission Launches Infringement Procedure against Poland for Violations of EU Law by Its Constitutional Tribunal.” *European Commission*, December 22, 2021. The European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_7070.
- “Rule of Law: European Commission Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in Poland.” *European Commission*, December 20, 2017. The European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5367.
- Sargentini, Judith. Rep. *On a Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on Which the Union Is Founded (2017/2131(INL))*, April 11, 2018. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20180411RES01553/20180411RES01553.pdf>.

- Sas, Adriana. "Poland: Attitude towards EU Membership 2021." Statista, November 30, 2021. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/957570/poland-attitude-towards-eu-membership/>.
- Sas, Adriana. Rep. *Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Poland 2001-2021*. Statista, 2021. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1277115/poland-attitudes-towards-homosexuality/>.
- Sata, Robert, and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski. "Caesarean Politics in Hungary and Poland." *East European Politics* 36, no. 2 (2019): 206–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1703694>.
- Scislowska, Monika. "Poland's Ruling Chief Speaks Strongly against LGBT Rights." *AbcNews*, March 19, 2019. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/polands-ruling-chief-speaks-strongly-lgbt-rights-61730330>.
- Sengoku, Manabu. "2015 Parliamentary Election in Poland : Does the Migrant/Refugee Issue Matter?" *Journal of the Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University* 13 (March 2018). https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/68695/1/13_03_SENGOKU.pdf.
- Simonovits, Bori, Aniko Bernat, Blanka Szeidl, Endre Sik, Daniella Boda, Anna Kertész, Fruzsina Marta Toth, and Judit Barta. Rep. *The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary*. TÁRKI Social Research Institute, March 2016. https://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160330_refugees.pdf.
- Szymczak, Jakub, and Piotr Pacewicz. "PiS' Homophobia. How the President, Chairman, Ministers and Deputies Aroused Hatred of LGBT in Poland." *OKO.press*, 2019. <https://oko.press/pis-homophobia-how-the-president-chairman-ministers-and-deputies-aroused-hatred-of-lgbt-in-poland/>.
- Tilles, Daniel. "Poland Ranked as Worst Country in EU for LGBT People." *Notes from Poland*, May 14, 2020. <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/05/14/poland-ranked-as-worst-country-in-eu-for-lgbt-people/>.
- Tilles, Daniel. "Polish Court Rules Campaign Linking LGBT and Paedophilia Is 'Informative and Educational.'" *Notes from Poland*, February 20, 2020. <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/02/20/polish-court-anti-lgbt-stop-paedophilia-campaign-is-informative-and-educational/>.
- Toomey, Michael. "History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary.'" *New Perspectives* 26, no. 1 (2018): 1–23. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325575526_History_Nationalism_and_Democracy_Myth_and_Narrative_in_Viktor_Orban%27s_%27Illiberal_Hungary%27.

- Wike, Richard, Janell Fetterolf, Shannon Schumacher, and J.J. Moncus. "Citizens in Advanced Economies Want Significant Changes to Their Political Systems." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center, November 23, 2021. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/10/21/citizens-in-advanced-economies-want-significant-changes-to-their-political-systems/>.
- Wills, Francisco. "The Myth of Redemptive Violence in Prison." *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 22, no. 1 (2014): 5–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15456870.2014.860145>.
- Wink, Walter. *The Powers That Be: Theology for a New Millennium*. New York: Doubleday, 1999.
- Wiseman, Jamie. "'The Hungary Model': How Poland Copied Illiberal Tactics for Weakening Independent Media." International Press Institute, March 5, 2021. <https://ipi.media/the-hungary-model-how-poland-copied-illiberal-tactics-for-weakening-independent-media/>.
- Zalas-Kamińska, Katarzyna. "Polexit Narrative : A Case Study in Terms of Political Communication." *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne* 64, no. 1 (2019): 203–15. <https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2019.64.12>.
- Zoltan, Adam, and Andras Bozoki. "State and Faith Right-Wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary." *Intersections* 2, no. 1 (2016): 98–122. <https://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/143>.
- Žižek, Slavoj, Jean-Numa Ducange, and John Howe. *Virtue and Terror*. London: Verso, 2017.

Santrauka

Šis magistrinis darbas nagrinėja „Atperkamojo Smurto“ fenomeną iš naratologinės perspektyvos bei jo pasireiškimą dviejose populistinėse partijose – Lenkijos PiS ir Vengrijos Fidesz. Tyrimas siūlo efektyvią penkių tropų ciklo sistemą, leidžiančią dekonstruoti populistinių partijų naratyvus, siekiant atsakyti į du pagrindinius šios darbo klausimus: pirma, kaip „Atperkamojo Smurto“ tropai pasireiškia PiS ir Fidesz naratyvuose; antra, koks yra „Atperkamojo Smurto“ poveikis politinėms institucijoms bei jų atstovaujamos visuomenės. Argumentacijai yra naudojami visi viešai prieinami tekstiniai šaltiniai: vieši politikų pasisakymai, jų komentarai spaudai ir kiti leidiniai, kuriuose pristatomos PiS ir Fidesz partijų narių citatos. Bendrai, magistriniame darbe nagrinėjamos trys iškilios problemos, kurios pastarųjų metų laikotarpiu buvo aktualios Lenkijos ir Vengrijos valdžioms: pabėgėlių krizė, požiūris į LGBTQ+ asmenis ir santykis su Europos Sąjunga. Darbe yra įrodoma, kad abiejų šalių valdančiosios partijos kūrė naratyvus, kad sutelktų elektorato palaikymą ir diskredituotų savo oponentus. Taip pat tyrime yra detalai paaiškinama, kaip populistinės partijos manipuliuoja faktais, kad išlaikytų politinę valdžią savo rankose.

Confirmation

I confirm that I am the author of submitted thesis: *The Fear and Trembling: Redemptive Violence and Its Ethical Underpinnings in PiS and Fidesz Political Narratives*, which has been prepared independently and has never been presented for any other course or used in another educational institution, neither in Lithuania, or abroad. I also provide a full bibliographical list which indicates all the sources that were used to prepare this assignment and contains no un-used sources.

Name, Surname

Signature