| Abstract [eng] |
Modern Russian warfare is rich in Western conceptual definitions, but the latter mostly highlights different means and methods of influence and lacks an evaluation of Russian strategic thinking. This leads to a problem definition that focusing on tactical-operational level limits comprehensive understanding of principles behind modern Russian warfare, which raises concerns about the state’s ability to identify and intercept threats in a timely manner. Given the current problem, this research aims to define the concept and characteristics of modern Russian warfare by applying a liminal warfare framework. This paper calls attention to the critical need for strategic judgment of Russian warfare to better enable states’ identification of national security gaps. The object of this research is an intended 2016 Montenegrin coup. Following the aim of this research, the main objectives are: (1) to define the role of non-conventional warfare in current conflicts; (2) to analyze the evolution of Russian military thought in their perception of threats in a geopolitical context; (3) to explore liminal warfare framework and elements; (4) by applying the liminal warfare framework to identify indirect involvement in the intended Montenegrin coup in 2016. This research seeks to prove the hypothesis that the strategic impact of Russia’s modern warfare is best reflected by the liminal warfare concept whose phased stages and ambivalence help to achieve goals without provoking a response. This hypothesis was confirmed by analyzing the evolution of warfare and Russian military thought, the specifics of liminal warfare and the case of the intended Montenegrin coup. The case of Montenegro spotlights the vulnerabilities of the state if political fragmentation, lack of internal stability and ethnical polarization are evident. These characteristics not only increase vulnerability but also create conditions for destructive activities without direct response. Additionally, the liminal warfare framework constitutes an assumption that if the region or governance specific vulnerabilities are properly accounted for, the framework can be applied to states with much greater political stability. |
