| Abstract [eng] |
The subject of this thesis From Non-Compliance to Retaliation: South Korea’s Response to Economic Conflicts with China and Japan is the response of the South Korean government to the economic sanctions it was subjected to by China in 2016-17 and by Japan in 2019 and onwards. Considering the fact that both China and Japan are important to ROK as trading partners and as regional partners, it is important to understand the logic behind ROK’s response to these two conflicts. The reasoning behind ROK’s choice to oppose economic pressure despite the obvious negative consequences, first and foremost to its economy, is also important on a bigger scale since it could help better understand how middle powers respond to and deal with economic pressure from (regional) great powers. The research question guiding this thesis is why ROK reacted differently to economic pressure employed by China than to the one employed by Japan. The main aim of this study is to find out the key factors that influenced different responses by the ROK government to economic pressure imposed by China in 2016 and Japan in 2019. In order to reach the main aim and answer the research question five objectives were set 1) Set out the theoretical framework which would explain why states choose the non-compliance in case of economic sanctions; 2) Define South Korea’s foreign policy towards its neighbours before the trade disputes; 3) Evaluate South Korea’s economic power compared to that of China and Japan; 4) Analyse the two instances of economic sanctions ROK was subjected to, their primary and secondary aims and the results that were achieved; 5) Compare the response of ROK to the sanctions of China and those of Japan and the reasoning behind it. Three hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework were tested. H1 that a stronger reaction to the Japanese sanctions was due to the lessons ROK learned from previous instances of economic sanctions was not confirmed as after the conflict ROK did not make any efforts to decrease its dependence on China, on the contrary, the trade volume with China only increased. H2 that the salience of the issues in question in the two cases of economic disputes was different for the ROK’s government was partially confirmed. Both issues carried great significance for the government for different reasons, however, the issues affected the public differently and the public’s stance on the issues influenced the government and its decisions significantly. The public’s reaction to the conflict with Japan did not allow the government to act passively and has given the decision makers the mandate to retaliate, while the more passive reaction to the THAAD sanctions due to domestic issues at the time made the government to be more careful in its responses. In short, the salience of the issues for the public was different and thus due to the government’s sensitivity to the public’s opinion, the issues carried different significance for the government as well. Finally, H3 that the power (a)symmetry with the sender state dictated the measures ROK could employ was fully confirmed. The power asymmetry with China was substantial. The reliance on both trade with China and its tourists was unprecedented and there was no area where ROK could inflict significant damage to China. Japan could not use the same tactics as China did - there was no area where sanctions would have damaged ROK and yet leftJapan unscathed. Considering the fact that an agreement to return the bilateral relations back to ‘normal’ was reached without ROK yielding to sanctions and without China reaching the primary aim of its sanctions, further research could concentrate on the reasons as to why the new government of ROK was able to come to an understanding regarding THAAD despite having much less time to do so and despite the fact that there was no strong personal relation between the officials as it was during the Park era. |
