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CHANGING MEMORY REGIMES: REMEMBERING VICHY AND ALGERIAN WAR IN FRANCE

MASTER'S THESIS

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This thesis aims to explain how and why memory regimes change in France and attempts to make a step towards creating a framework for memory regime analysis. By modifying and expanding Henry Rousso's scheme of Vichy memory transformation and applying it to the Algerian War memory, this thesis finds that the two memory regimes followed a similar path of change, from repression of difficult memories of perpetration towards their acknowledgement and normalisation. It also reveals often overlooked role of cultural and scholarly vectors of memory besides the official ones in transformation of memory regimes. Finally, it presents causal mechanisms that explain why memory regimes change the way they do. The findings make a compelling case for further application of the theoretical scheme for cases beyond France and take the development of the theory of memory regime change one step further.

Confirmation

I confirm that I am the author of submitted thesis: *Changing Memory Regimes: Remembering Vichy and Algerian War in France*, which has been prepared independently and has never been presented for any other course or used in another educational institution, neither in Lithuania, or abroad. I also provide a full bibliographical list which indicates all the sources that were used to prepare this assignment and contains no unused sources.

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Marx once said, "France is the only country of the 'idea,' that is to say, the idea it has of itself."[1] While it could be claimed that importance of the idea of nation's grandeur, stemming from its past, is common to all countries, France is an exceptionally interesting case for analysing national memory and memory regimes. National memory plays a crucial role for French self-awareness; common understanding of history and memory is central to the formation of traditional Republican national identity.[2] The fact that the studies of collective memory and its role in the nation is a French invention, is also telling. Maurice Halbwachs in his seminal work 'On Collective Memory' laid the basis for scholarly analysis of memory as a social subject. According to him, both individual and collective memory are socially constructed as it is impossible for individuals to remember outside social frames or group contexts.[3] While it is only individuals who can actually have a memory (because they have minds), being part of the group can 'produce' in individuals memories that they have never actually experienced.[4] Memory is a mechanism through which the essential fragments of the past are arranged into a particular worldview, a system through which we perceive our present and live in it.[5] A generally accepted version of memories works like a 'glue for the society' and is crucial for common identity and nation-building.[6] Such a view is championed by another French scholar Pierre Nora, famous for carrying out extensive and highly referenced research of symbolic objects important for France's national memory and for coining the concept 'lieux de mémoire' (memory places) which is included into the French dictionary.[7] However, Nora focuses on positive aspects of French identity, around which there is a widespread consensus in the country. While it serves the purpose of uniting the nation through its history and identity, some scholars, notably Henry Rousso, have argued that such memory can nevertheless be seriously challenged by dramatic, painful and troubling events, such as war, that shake the whole base of values and identity of the nation, and memory studies should look precisely at these events and their aftereffects.[8]

Post-revolutionary France distinguishes two major events that led to creation of new French Republics, new chapters of history: the Second World War (WW2) and the Algerian War of Independence. Although these two cases may at first appear very different, their intersection is

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[1] Maximilien Rubel, *Karl Marx devant la Bonapartisme*. Paris: Payot, 1960, 139.
[2] W. James Booth, 'Communities of Memory: On Identity, Memory, and Debt,' American Political *Review*, 93(2), 1999, 249-63.
[3] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1992, 53.
[4] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 1992, cited in Tamara Banjeglav, 'Memory of War or War over Memory? The Official Politics of Remembering in 1990s Croatia.' Institute for Human Sciences, 2012.
[5] Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991.
[6] Jo McCormack, *Collective Memory, France and the Algerian War, 1954-1962*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007, 38.
[7] Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les Lieux de Mémoire*. Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992.
[8] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 11.

inescapable. First of all, it was mostly the same generation that actively experienced both WW2 and the Algerian War. Moreover, the same people were in power at the time, the most notable example being the leader himself – Charles de Gaulle led the French effort in both liberation during WW2 and the Algerian War. Secondly, it is agreed that these events brought major shifts in French history and identity, and created significant discrepancies in the national memory. During WW2, France lost around 400 000 people. While the war was devastating for all countries involved, the particularity of French experience was Vichy, a wartime government created after the Nazis defeated France, led by Marshall Philipe Pétain from the unoccupied 'Free zone.' The Vichy regime collaborated with the Nazis on its own initiative: it enacted laws permitting racial discrimination, set up concentration camps and was responsible for deportation of 76 000 foreign and French Jews, less than 3% of whom survived.[9] The Algerian War of Independence, which lasted from 1954 to 1962, was exceptionally brutal, even by the standards of colonial liberation wars, and while its consequences were more severe for the Algerians, who lost around 300 000 people, compared with 25 000 French, the war has nevertheless caused great instability in metropolitan France, not least because Algeria was French for more than a century and, contrary to other colonies, was legally an integral part of France. One of the most controversial aspects of the war was the officially sanctioned French use of torture against the Algerian rebels. This type of warfare created a moral dilemma for the French, especially the intellectuals, who claimed that torture was not only a crime against humanity, but also against France itself, who had suffered Nazi occupation during WW2 - and now herself behaved like the Nazis.[10] Despite the fact that after such traumatic events it is especially important to acknowledge the truth and perform the necessary apologies, it is precisely then that the memory work is hardest. It is not surprising that France, unable to deal with the difficult memories, has had a troublesome relationship with its past. In the aftermath of both WW2 and the Algerian War, the French state authorities chose to suppress memories surrounding dishonourable crimes committed by French officers.

Today, memory studies boom, and there is a growing field of research looking into how Vichy and Algerian War are remembered in France and how these recollections affect the contemporary French identity. Memory of the Holocaust if often analysed across countries and viewed as a traumatic experience that erased the boundaries of national collective memories. For example, Aleida Assmann researches the post-WW2 transnational memory[11] and Holocaust as a memory site across and beyond Europe.[12] However, every country has its own individual story. Henry Rousso in his landmark book 'The Vichy Syndrome' concentrates specifically on France's struggle to come to terms with an

[9] Michael Neiberg, *The Blood of Free Men – The Liberation of Paris, 1944*. New York: Basic Books, 2012, 5.
[10] Andrew Hussey, 'Emmanuel Macron should be lauded for confronting France's last great taboo,' The Guardian, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/16/macron-algeria-torture-admission-landmark-in-france-post-colonial-history > [2019 05 19]
[11] Aleida Assmann, Sebastian Conrad (eds.), *Memory in a Global Age*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
[12] Aleida Assmann, 'Transnational Memories.' *European Review,* 22(4), 2014, 546-56.

uncomfortable past and the role of perpetrator, which does not fit easily into the national narrative.[13] Proposing a socio-psychological approach, he claims that France's obsession with its past, decades after the events took place, could be explained by the fact that these tensions were silenced and unresolved in the aftermath of WW2. They were instead replaced with an idealistic myth - the idea that resistance was widespread in France, while Vichy was just a marginal group of traitors. However, this myth could not sustain the tensions, and Rousso demonstrates the evolution of the return of repressed memories. His analytical framework, based on 'vectors of memory,' helped conceptualise the fluid and ambiguous nature of memory, while psychoanalytical concepts, despite having received criticism for ascribing humane features to the state,[14] have nevertheless gained prominence in the field and are employed by other scholars, notably analysing memories of Algerian War.[15] Richard J. Golsan, continuing where Rousso left off, explores the continuation of Vichy's afterlife, characterized by constant clashes between competing narratives and different pasts that create explosive consequences.[16] He notes that the role of writing Vichy history was given to so many - historians, politicians, filmmakers, judges - that the result was a lack of a unified and definitive version of the Vichy period, which contributed to its long lasting afterlife.[17]

As for the Algerian War, according to historian Todd Shepard, specialising in France's post-Algeria history, after the war, French bureaucrats, politicians and other public figures retold the history of French imperialism as if decolonization was a "predetermined end point."[18] In 'The Invention of Decolonisation', Sheppard demonstrates how Algeria, inseparable from French national identity and memory, has been swiftly and radically transformed into a "colonial project that has passed its expiration date."[19] Reimagination of Algeria's meaning to France was necessary to accept its loss but has also led to formation of a distorted memory regime of the Algerian War. Jo McCormack in his study analyses transmission of Algerian War's memory through three memory vectors: family, media and school education.[20] Drawing information and data from a wide range of sources, including interviews with historians and school communities, he observes a lack of transmission of the Algerian War memories which further perpetuates divisions in the French society. He finds that the difficulty of writing history created difficulties in teaching it, and thus more memory

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[13] Henry Rousso, Eric Conan, *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past.* Hanover: New England UP, 1998.

[14] Justin W. Silvestri, 'An End to the 'Vichy/Algeria Syndrome'?: Negotiating Traumatic Pasts in the French Republic,' Master's Thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2014, 88. <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/546/> [2020 05 15]

[15] Ibid.; David L. Schalk, 'Has France's Marrying Her Century Cured the Algerian Syndrome?' *Historical Reflections*, 25(1), 1999, 149–164; Claire Mauss-Copeaux, *Appelés en Algérie*: *La parole confisquée.* Paris: Hachette, 1999, 7, quoted in McCormack, *Collective Memory,* 31.

[16] Richard J. Golsan, *Vichy's Afterlife: History and Counterhistory in Postwar France.* Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 2000, 18.

[17] Ibid., 22.

[18] Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonisation: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France.* Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006, 4.

[19] Ibid.,7.

[20] McCormack, *Collective Memory,* 99.

work needs to be done. Laetitia Bucaille echoes these ideas in her book on ex-North African combatants and their relationship with the former colonies, claiming that to this day, there is little research looking into the effect the Algerian War has had on the "political and symbolic order of contemporary France."[21]

However, despite increasing academic interest in the memory of these events and changes of its representation through time, there exists no systematic theory and framework that would help identify how and why memory regimes change, what are the stages painful memory has to go through before part of it can be integrated into the official memory and what is left – put to rest without repressions? To put shortly, there is no memory regime change theory applicable to France. This is not to say that France necessitates a special theory – on the contrary – what is lacking, is a memory regime change theory applicable to different countries. While it is true that memory regimes depend highly on a national historical and political context, there is a need for a theory enabling comparison among different cases in order to gain better understanding of how difficult collective memories are dealt with.

The most notable of the very few works aiming to come up with a consistent theory for memory regimes is Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubick's 'Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration.'[22] Authors compare seventeen post-communist countries' politics of memory and their effects on processes of democratization. They develop a typology of memory actors who advocate a particular interpretation of the past and various combinations of these actors result in different memory regimes. However, their theory presents memory regime construction and change as a completely top-down process. The actor-centered approach looks at the self-interest of political actors who treat history instrumentally in order to establish a vision of the past that they think will give legitimacy to their efforts to gain power. Any memory representations coming from the society through cultural channels are excluded. The most likely reason for such approach is the fact that the authors analyse post-communist countries, which did not inherit a strong culture of republicanism, democracy and participation. In the French case however, trying to understand memory of war and its representations excluding the voices of actors other than state officials and politicians would be a significant loss of the picture. In France, societal actors play an important role in (re)constructing national memory regimes, and there is a need for a theoretical framework that could also take account of their memory, often countering the official version. Perhaps memory studies and frameworks of analysis are best developed regionally, targeting the particular historical circumstances?

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[21] Laetitia Bucaille, *Making Peace with Your Enemy - Algerian, French, and South African Ex-Combatants*. Philadelphia: Pensylvania UP, 2019, 62.
[22] Michael Bernhard, Jan Kubik (eds.), *Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*. New York: Oxford UP, 2014.

The main **object** of this thesis - national memory regime and its changes. By modifying and expanding Henry Rousso's scheme of Vichy memory transformation and applying it to the Algerian War memory, this thesis **aims** to explain how and why memory regimes change in France. Additionally, recognising the need for a framework comparing memory regimes across different countries, this thesis attempts to make a step towards creating it. Taking into account the specificity of each country's history and its way of dealing with its past, it will look at two cases of memory regimes and their changes in the same country through the same framework. This is called snowballing outwards strategy, whereby comparing the most similar cases and moving outward to more different cases, one can enlarge or restrict the boundaries of applicability of the framework. If such approach proves to be useful for the below analysis, this framework will be considered potentially applicable for the analysis of other countries' memory regime changes.

The analysis is centered around the memory of perpetration as this aspect in both events proves to be the most incompatible with the French identity based on republicanism and human rights. As Rousso focused on Vichy's responsibility in rounding-up and extermination of Jews, in the Algerian case, the focus is on the memory of torture, which is understood to be one of the key reasons behind the official politics of amnesia in France and an "inevitable result of a particular type of colonial power that France established in Algeria."[23]

The **structure** of the thesis is as follows: the first chapter will present the theory and methodology. It will define memory regime, memory vectors, and explain how to recognize and research them. In the second chapter, drawing on Rousso's research and conclusions, however, taking them further (pinning down the most important memory vectors, covering more factors and longer time period than Rousso), evolution of Vichy memory will be analysed. The third chapter will present analysis of Algerian War's memory regime change by identifying the phases and memory vectors that contributed. In the fourth chapter, Vichy and Algerian memory regimes' transitions will be compared in order to identify systematic features that could form the backbone of draft theory to be tested further. Finally, the key reasons why memory regimes change the way they do will be outlined and further implications of research findings will be discussed.

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[23] Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie*. Paris: La Découverte, 2001, cited in Nicolas Bancel, 'Torture in Algeria: Past Acts That Haunt France,' Le Monde Diplomatique, 2001. <https://mondediplo.com/2001/06/10torture> [2020 05 14]

Chapter I

Theory and methodology

This part will discuss the theoretical framework and methodology employed in the thesis. It will present the key elements of the analysis of memory regime change in France: 1) explain the key concepts used (memory regime, memory vectors) and what they entail; 2) outline the model of memory regime change (what are the theoretical phases of memory regime change and how to recognise them); 3) explain what factors affect such changes. Based on Henry Rousso's framework with slight adaptions, the model of analysis looks at three categories of memory vectors[24] which are most indicative of manifestations of memory and its change. This part will present the logic behind the choice of these of memory vectors and explain the method of selecting specific events and acts as the most important in mapping memory regime change.

1. What is a memory regime and memory vector?

A stabilised configuration[25] of the various organised ways of remembering a specific issue, event or process at a given period[26] constitutes a memory regime. It resembles a cognitive framework; that is, a matrix of perceptions and representations,[27] which are consolidated into a particular version of a memory of the particular event in the history of the nation. Memory and its regimes are not just about remembrance, but also forgetting. According to Pierre Nora, author of the seminal 'Les Lieux de Mémoire' ('The Realms of Memory'), the two are impossible without each other.[28] Ernest Renan famously said that forgetting is an essential factor in the creation of a nation.[29] Eric Hobsbawm in 'The Invention of Tradition' argues that national memory is inevitably selective and is a result of political and intellectual negotiations among different actors, that is, acts of politics of memory. The concept of memory regime, however, goes beyond the more usual 'politics of memory': besides memory acts or memory vectors, as Rousso calls them, coming from government institutions and politicians, memory regimes also include the result of state interactions with informal channels, whereby memory patterns existing in the society demand public recognition through various unofficial memory vectors: films, literature, historical books, etc. Although holders of power have

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[24] Vectors, representations, carriers, sources of memory will be employed as synonyms in this thesis.
[25] Johann Michel (ed.), *Gouverner les Mémoires. Les Politiques Mémorielles en France*. Paris: PUF, 2010, 16.
[26] Bernhard, Kubik, 16.
[27] Michel, 16.
[28] Pierre Nora et al., *Realms of Memory, Rethinking the French Past.* New York: Columbia UP, 1996, 3.
[29] Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* Paris: Presses-Pocket, 1992.
<http://ucparis.fr/files/9313/6549/9943/What_is_a_Nation.pdf> [2020 05 13]

asymmetrical resources and abilities in the memory domain,[30] memory regime is a result of interaction and negotiation between both these spheres. This methodological aspect can be traced to the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas and elaborated on by Peter Verovšek. He claims that "research on the politics of memory should focus on both (1) the substantive content of collective memory expressed by actors within state institutions and (2) on the interactive channels through which ideas about the past are conveyed, disputed, silenced, and negotiated outside these formal settings."[31] Such an approach, integrating formal and informal vectors of memory, helps identify how previously marginalised memories become assimilated into national narrative. Verovšek offers this framework as a response to what he identifies as the key problem of political memory studies – it mediates between the institutional approach to the politics of memory that is too narrow, "ignoring the important role that broader debates in civil society and the cultural sphere play in influencing political expressions of collective remembrance, and conceptions that are too broad, thus lacking analytical rigor and making comparison across different studies impossible."[32] Such an approach to memory regimes is employed in this thesis.

Although memory regime is a stabilised configuration of memories, it is not set in stone. Individuals change as they grow, and so does the political and social environment, which changes interpretation of both personal and collective memory[33] and, in turn, memory regimes. According to the social constructionist view of memory, the past is constantly re-evaluated and rewritten.[34] Also, in between the changes, at any given time, memory regime is not unanimous. Different groups may (and will) have differing memories of the same event. There are often tensions between official and informal spheres, especially pertaining to dishonourable and shameful moments of the nation's past, such as the abuse of human rights during wars. Memories which are not convenient can be repressed by official actors because they do not coincide with ideas that they seek to uphold. However, such exclusion of memories does not mean they will be forgotten. Benjamin Stora acknowledges that after painful events, silence prevails, however only temporarily, because traumatic memories will inevitably resurface.[35] Painful but unrecognised memories can become counter-hegemonic narratives, sites of resistance that challenge the prevailing official memory. This, paired with the natural process of constant reinterpretation of memory as it traverses time and generations, can lead to formation of memory regimes characterised by constant competition, negotiations and disputes

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[30] Rogers M. Smith, *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership.* New York: Cambridge UP, 2003, 32; cited in Peter J. Verovšek, 'Collective memory, politics, and the influence of the past: the politics of memory as a research paradigm,' *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 4(3), 2016, 535.
[31] Verovšek, 531.
[32] Ibid., 535.
[33] David Thelen, 'Memory and American History,' *The Journal of American History*, 75(4), 1989, 1121.
[34] Cillian McGrattan, *Memory, Politics and Identity - Haunted by History.* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 149.
[35] Claire Eldridge, 'Processing Problematic Pasts: Recent Works on the Legacies of the Algerian War of Independence.' Review no. 957 <https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/95> [2020 05 13]

about memory representation, or even 'memory wars.' This expression, sometimes used to describe memory debates in France regarding the Vichy and Algerian War indicates the difficulty of reconciliation with painful but meaningful periods of a nation's past. Memory wars can disrupt unity of the society and pose challenges for the government. Only substantial memory work, collectively undertaken by memory actors can lead to a change in memory regime that reflects a more united and inclusive national memory. In the memory work, participation of both official and unofficial actors is crucial. Memory regimes change slowly and the change is rarely straight-line – there are pauses, setbacks, outbursts and turning points. But when looked at retrospectively, it is illuminating to observe the ways in which the memory of difficult events of the nation's past is transformed, the wrongs are increasingly acknowledged and the nation reconciles with its past from within.

2. How to recognise memory regime change?

2.1. What are the phases of memory regimes?

The depiction of Vichy memory's evolution is largely built on Rousso's 'Vichy Syndrome', critically reviewed and distilled by the author of this thesis, supplemented by other scholars' insights and author's findings, which do not always align with Rousso's. This is important especially regarding the end of the memory evolution which stretches beyond Rousso's 'Vichy Syndome' time wise and also turns away from his further research on the topic. The analysis nevertheless follows Rousso's categorisation of the phases of Vichy syndrome's evolution and applies similar markers to the analysis of Algerian War's memory, or Algerian syndrome.

The first phase begins when the war ends. It is chaotic at first, the feelings of loss and grief are mixed with relief that the war has ended. This phase is nevertheless extremely important as it sets the tone for how the event will be remembered in the future. It is when the heroes, the victims and the perpetrators are given their roles that will go down in history; when decisions are taken on whether to hold trials of war criminals or enact amnesties; when the important dates are assigned (or not, which is also indicative) and the first anniversaries are commemorated. In this phase, the role of the government is crucial in forming the memory regime. And often, it is when the uncomfortable aspects of the war – those of perpetration – are silenced; first of all, by officials, excluding this part of the story in their speeches and through their actions, but also by society and the victims, who just underwent unspeakable pain. Thus, in this phase, the memory regime of the event might not be fully formed yet but is showing clear features of selective official remembering.

The second phase marks a period when suppression and silencing of particular memories becomes more firmly entrenched into the fabric of the society, and official amnesia is cultivated by

the government. Uncomfortable memories are suppressed and excluded, and so are the groups that represent them. For example, if new facts come to light, or historiographical research reveals fallacies of the prevailing official narrative, they are largely ignored by society and the government.

The third phase marks a turning point – a 'broken mirror,' whereby occluded memories suddenly resurface with great power, cause controversy and uproar that occupies public discourse, disturbs the prevailing memory regime and provokes the government's reaction. This usually happens when the memory regime becomes too saturated with conflicting memories and narratives that are not represented on the national level. In such a context, one event – an interview, a film – can lead to a memory explosion, creating a chain of reactions and responses that are too strong to be susceptible to ignorance or silencing anymore. There is a new generation that wants to learn the truth about what happened, and the first-hand witnesses are now more prepared to speak: perpetrators defend their actions, while victims claim for recognition of their suffering and place in the nation's memory.

The fourth phase is characterized as 'obsession' with the previously occluded memories: the public arena is overwhelmed with heated discussions and debates on the previously repressed memories of the nation's past; victims and perpetrators openly speak of their experiences; many films and literary books take the difficult and controversial aspects of the past as their main subjects; as archives are open, historians provide a more accurate picture of the war, including the shameful moments; society is actively engaged in the debate and previously neglected voices are now heard. Eventually, the government responds – through acknowledgement of responsibility, apology, commemorations, financial or moral restitution and belated trials. The previously silenced memories and their bearers are now recognised at official level. Various regularly performed symbolic acts eventually lead to ritualisation of that memory in the political and public field.[36] This change is reflected in schools' history lessons. As previously oppressed memories become largely domesticated and integral to the national memory, a stage of normalisation is reached and the memory regime changes. Now the nation has reconciled with this period of the past, and while the memory does not disappear – parts of it remain difficult and continuously cause pain, shame, or guilt – the official memory and the memory of different groups of the society is more in line with each other and people can exercise their national identity together.

The boundaries of these phases are not definite or sharp, as usually one event follows another and they are highly intertwined. There is inevitably an amount of author's bias and choices in mapping out these phases, but they nevertheless provide a useful structure for understanding the evolution of memory regimes.

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[36] Jeffrey K. Olick, 'What Does It Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics since 1989.' *Social Science History*, 22(4), 1998, 553-54.

2.2. How to recognise the different phases?

The main method employed in this study is discourse analysis, as it enables capturing different sources of memory and the processes through which they interact. Analysis of the transformations of the Vichy and Algerian War memory regimes is mostly based on an extensive academic literature review with a particular attention given to acclaimed works of historiography. Primary sources, such as laws, memoirs, testimonies, political speeches were consulted, as well as media publications that allowed to better capture the sentiment of politicians and the public. Overall, the analysis is based on recent sources as well as those produced in the early periods after the events, in order to trace how the representation of the memory has been changing. Analysis of memory regimes begins in the immediate aftermath of the events and finishes, in the case of Vichy, as the phase of normalisation is reached, marking a change of the memory regime, and in the case of the Algerian War, at the current year 2020, which is seen as having reached a relative normalisation but is still underway.

Extensive analysis of a variety of sources was necessary to capture the complexity and diversity of memory and how it manifests itself through various representations. Recurring patterns were observed in the evolution of the two memory regimes, which enabled to identify the most important components of the memory regime change and map the chronology of the phases, while at the same time not losing the complexity of the issues. Indicators that the memory regime has changed: 1) there is a change in the way the perpetration is understood – its scale, importance and place in the nation's memory are acknowledged, and official commemorations are held; 2) responsibility for previously neglected crimes is ascribed to perpetrators and/or acknowledged by the state and victims are honoured; 3) previously repressed and contentious aspects are openly discussed in the public sphere, by politicians, artists, scholars, etc. and taught in schools' history classes.

3. Model of analysis - vectors of memory

The views differ among scholars as to whom can be considered an actor in the formation of national memory regimes. For example, Bernhard and Kubik or Duncan Bell argue that the content of an official reconstruction of the nation's past, the myth, is decided in a process of negotiations among political actors and the memories privileged in individuals' minds may not be included into it.[37] There are, however, those that acknowledge memory actors outside of political circles. For example, Henry Rousso, or Peter Verovšek, while still ascribing the main weight to political actors, recognise the role of informal channels and unofficial memory vectors – such as films or history

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[37] Duncan S. A. Bell, 'Mythscapes, Memory, Mythology and National Identity.' *British Journal of Sociology*, 54(1), 2003, 76.

books – in the formation of the national memory, and see the process of memory formation as both top-down and bottom-up. When it comes to collective memory of post traumatic events in France, it can be observed that no single representation of memory dominates. Different vectors of memory engage people in different ways: through imagination, knowledge, emotions, etc. There are many vectors, or carriers, that transmit memories, but not all of them receive attention in the public sphere. It would be impossible to try to analyse all memory vectors in order to create a coherent image of the memory of a particular event. Additionally, trying to take account of all possible memory representations risk undermining the whole concept. That is why one must carefully select the limits and framework within which the memory will be analysed.

Henry Rousso draws four blocks of memory carriers. This thesis will employ his framework, albeit with slight modifications. First of all, there are *official carriers* of memory, such as ceremonies, monuments, celebrations and burials organised by the government.[38] They offer a comprehensive, unitary representation of the event. As already established, often there are different collective memories of the same episode that compete for official representation in the national memory. Official memory is thus a result of a compromise among various contending forces. However, as official carriers have the most weight and power in the formation of national memory, those in power may use their influence to shape the memory in their interest, ignoring other voices from the society; such strategy is, nevertheless, unsustainable. Trials are also included into this group,[39] as they are seen as having a central role not just in enforcing justice but also shaping memories of the wars. Additionally to these elements, this thesis also includes law as an official carrier of memory, because France has an extensive practice of enacting memory laws.[40] The role of official memory carriers will prove to be important in repressing memories of Vichy and Algerian War in the early aftermath of the events and will also play an crucial role in the transformation of memory regimes of the two cases decades later.

Secondly, there are *cultural carriers* of memory, which express highly individualistic views of the past in literature, film and other arts. These accounts of memory are often intentionally highly subjective and emotion-provoking. They might not seek to present the big picture – on the contrary, their strength is in their ability to portray in depth a particular side of the story, which can be in complete opposition to the official narrative of the government. Through their artistic forms, cultural vectors of memory are often able to capture the attention of the public more effectively than other vectors of memory. The impact of these sources is thus predicated on their ability to attract interest and start a discussion. If they manage to do that, these informal carriers are able to influence the

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[38] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 220.
[39] Ibid., 220.
[40] Stiina Löytömäki, 'French Memory Laws and the Ambivalence About the Meaning of Colonialism.' In Berber Bevernage & Nico Wouters (eds.) *The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored History After 1945*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

official ones and contribute to the transformation of the official memory. In the following analysis, these vectors will prove to be of critical significance in prompting transformation of memory regimes.

The third category, *scholarly carriers*, reconstruct the facts of the past and propose ways of interpreting them.[41] Scholarly works are influential as they are produced by historians who are ascribed the primary role in studying and explaining events of the past. They are entrusted with the verification of facts and their authenticity, thus their interpretation is a powerful source of memory construction. In the analysis, scholarly carriers will manifest themselves in memory wars, as different versions of history will clash in the quest for acknowledgement, and will prove to be of critical importance in establishing a veritable account of the past. Rousso also includes history textbooks and school curricula in this category,[42] but in this thesis, they are considered to be more supplementary, for despite their role in shaping the way the future generations will remember the past, they are more a reflection or result of a shift in memory regime, rather than vectors facilitating that change. Archives also fall into this category – despite having power over memory, they are not a source of it. The influence of archives should not be overestimated because change in the memory regime comes rarely when new facts or information come to light, but when particular political conditions, the worldview, and moral infrastructure of the society change.

Finally, Rousso distinguished organisational carriers of memory, encompassing groups of deportees, resistance members, soldiers and other organisations which unite personal memories into bigger collective memories. Rousso notes that such groups sometimes become attached to a static image of the past which they then promote.[43] This group of carriers is concerned specifically with actors of memory. This thesis, however, will understand actors in a broader way – it will see them acting as groups and individually, through speeches, protests and books. Films can also be seen as actors – ultimately, there is a person behind them. Thus, in the following analysis, various actors will be visible, engaged in disputes, lobbying for recognition or silencing of particular memories. However, organisational carriers as associations and other groupings of those affected by the events in question will be rather implicit in the overall analysis of the memory evolution and not discussed explicitly.

The above groups of carriers of memory by no means constitute an exhaustive list. Scholars consider many other vectors of memory. One of them is family, a primary source of memory and identity construction through various recounts, stories told by the family members, especially elders, and generally growing in a particular environment.[44] However, such sources are hard to access and analyse – memory is conveyed through intimate conversations in private environments. Museums are

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[41] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 220.
[42] Ibid., 220.
[43] Ibid., 220.
[44] McCormack, *Collective Memory,* 99-132.

another memory vector. There, everything matters – location, architecture, mapping of exhibits, descriptions and opening ceremonies. Museums are therefore seen as very complex and requiring a separate analysis. Also, similar to a school's curricula and state archives, they are more often a reflection of a consolidated memory regime, rather than related to prompting a change in it. Museums are also a contentious vector of memory, especially those related to colonialism. Many of the African art collections exhibited in European museums are stolen during colonial empire times and there are increasing calls from African countries today to give back these artefacts. In France, Emmanuel Macron commissioned a study on the possible restitution of African art which concluded that artefacts 'taken without consent' should be returned.[45] Consequently, museums as vectors of memory are undergoing a major overhaul in recent years. Thus, there are a variety of memory vectors beyond the three groups outlined above, however, they are not considered in this thesis due to their complexity, a lack of access to materials and because they are seen as supplementary rather than key vectors of memory for this analysis.

Having outlined how to recognise a change in memory regime and defined the memory vectors, it is important to explain the way of tracing their impact, that is how to know which memory vectors provoke and influence change. The issue with memory of perpetration is that it is often repressed and occluded from the official memory and thus distorts the memory regime, leaving the painful truth present but unspoken. Therefore, what such memory seeks is representation and recognition. There might be a number of history books released that speak about the unrecognised wrongs, but if no one reads them, if the public is not eager to discuss these issues, let alone seek for change in the way they are (not) represented, then the media will not report on them, film creators and writers will not search for creative inspiration in them, leaving these memories silenced and the memory regime unchanged. There is a difference between the memory vectors' aims and their impact. Therefore, one way to trace the most important memory vectors is to look for public resonance. As cultural or scholarly memory vectors are often individualistic representations of memory, their real impact depends on how much attention they receive. If a film is widely publicized and reviewed in the media, if it becomes an inspiration for and subject of spin-offs and further research into the subject, if it receives success at home and worldwide recognition, it will likely have an impact on re-shaping the way the subject is remembered.

Secondly, it is important to look at the government's reaction to cultural and scholarly representations of repressed memories. Does the government or its institutions attempt to prevent this memory from going public? Or do they use the opportunity to officially acknowledge what has been long repressed and give tribute to those whose memory was neglected? If the schools' history

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[45] Felwine Sarr, Bénédicte Savoy, 'The Restitution of African Cultural Heritage. Toward a New Relational Ethics,' 2018. <http://restitutionreport2018.com/sarr_savoy_en.pdf> [2020 05 13]

programs are updated to include readings from the new history book which provides materials pertaining to the previously repressed past, this means that the memory vector was important in altering the memory regime. Thus, if a non-official memory vector receives the government's attention and reactions, regardless of what they are – either further repressions or acknowledgement – this signals that this memory representation is important and might induce memory regime changes, in the short or long term.

Finally, official memory vectors are usually associated with breaking points in memory regime change. Presidential speeches, official commemorations, trials and laws are all powerful memory vectors that can change memory regime. Because the political sphere has the strongest influence over the national memory, their acts can be decisive. If a president admits state-responsibility for long denied crimes, or if a war criminal gets sentenced, even many years after the events, this can serve as a powerful reconciliatory tool and give the previously denied past a place in nation's memory. Officials have the power to compensate, to honour and punish, to recognise and apologise. They are also responsible for the way future generations will remember the event – through ritualised commemorations and via the content of schools' history programmes. Therefore, it is important to analyse the acts and decisions of the government regarding the memory of the issue in question.

Despite the fact that all these aspects are highly interlinked, an in-depth analysis of the wider social, political context and chronology of the events makes it possible to evaluate the impact of a particular book or a film on people's perceptions and a government's actions and how they contribute to the change of memory regime.

Chapter II

Vichy memory regime

The period of Vichy France, which lasted between 1940 and 1944, today is commonly referred to as the Dark Years, not just because of the experiences of the occupation, but also due to Vichy's willing and large-scale involvement in the Holocaust. After WW2, while subsequent French governments recognised Vichy's criminal activities, in their view, this was not the responsibility of the French state, since Pétain's authority was not constitutionally legitimate. Memories of France's role in the Holocaust were effectively silenced and repressed by reducing Vichy to a handful of traitors while simultaneously imposing a myth of France united in resistance against the Nazis. However, after several decades, the occluded memories have resurfaced and shattered the myth of resistance and the memory regime built on it. Vichy syndrome, a term coined by Henry Rousso, is a process of evolution of memory regime, whereby the trauma and the silenced memories reveal

themselves. [46] In his seminal book with the same title, Rousso distinguishes four phases, demonstrating the evolution of Vichy memory, which he metaphorically calls 'neurosis.' Below, each of these phases is briefly revisited, highlighting their key features and complementing them with additional insights and findings.

1. Unfinished mourning (1944-1954)

The first 10 years after the war, between 1944 and 1954, Rousso identifies as a phase of unfinished mourning. It was a contradictory period: celebrations of victory were obscured by the purge of the collaborators, while resistants, despite being glorified in public, failed to gain representation in politics, and the overall portrayal of the Resistance movement was distorted to serve the myth of resistance.

In 1944, Paris was liberated from Nazi rule, as the French army took over the city. General Charles de Gaulle gave his famous speech in August 25th: "Paris! Paris outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the French armies, with the support and the help of all France, of the France that fights, of the only France, of the real France, of the eternal France!"[47] The help of the allies is mentioned only at the end of this high-spirited speech, and from this excerpt it is clear that de Gaulle wanted to ascribe the victory to something hard to grasp but easy to take pride in – eternal France. Rousso calls this speech the beginning of General's effort to rewrite history and create a myth that was based on his imagination, rather than the truth.[48] De Gaulle has given himself the role of uniting the nation and providing continuity for its republican universalism. In his view, this was only possible by excluding Vichy from France's history. Thus, de Gaulle's principal claim was that Vichy did not represent France.[49] The resistance myth, or the Gaullist myth, functioned as an official vector of memory that repressed the history of French collaboration during WW2 and instead focused on nationwide suffering. Drawing on universal republican values, de Gaulle claimed that most Frenchmen were members or supporters of the resistance, reducing Vichy regime to a handful of traitors. The resistants, however crucial as a source for de Gaulle's myth, could not fit into society as deserving heroes and the new leaders of France. Firstly, they knew better than anyone that the narrative of a widespread French resistance was false and felt betrayed by de Gaulle's homogenisation of the resistance. Secondly, the whole nation wanted to come back to 'the usual' which prevented any radical changes in replacing

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[46] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 28.
[47] Charles de Gaulle's speech after liberation of Paris, 1944.
<http://www.emersonkent.com/speeches/paris_liberated.htm> [2020 05 14]
[48] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 16.
[49] Booth, 259.

the key figures of the political realm.[50] As Rousso sums up, the idea of the whole nation in resistance was superimposed onto the complex realities of the occupation.[51] Memory regime based on the Gaullist myth that excluded collaboration began to take form.

After the war, an internal purge, commanded by de Gaulle took place with the goal of getting rid of collaborators. The role of the official carriers of memory here was played by the courts. The purge, however, left everyone dissatisfied, as for some it seemed too moderate, while for others – too harsh.[52] Apart from the purge, during the first couple years after the war, the French were celebrating liberation and victory without any concrete institutionalisation of national memory. However, as soon as a national commemoration date for the armistice had to be set, issues began.[53] WW2 was highly ideological and heterogenous, leaving French society fractured into different groups – the deportees, concentration camp victims, resistance members and collaborators – whose stories were opposing and impossible to reconcile through a joint commemoration. Thus, the date was constantly changing in the period between 1945-1981.[54] Robert Frank rightly said, "what is sadly memorable is not easily commemorable."[55] It seems that the silences of the aftermath of the war in France were too oppressive and too present to allow for a unanimous agreement. This example is illustrative of the first 10 years in the aftermath of the war in France – the unfinished mourning.

Between 1950 and 1953, the amnesty processes took place. Pardoning collaborators was not just an act of mercy – it was seen as a means for national reconciliation and rectification of the injustices of the purge.[56] However, with the release of prisoners, in Rousso's words, the nation missed an opportunity to remember.[57] As Vichy and its wrongdoings have been officially forgotten, the repressed memories have begun to develop outside the official memory, leading to the formation of a fragmented memory regime.

To sum up, the first decade after the war was chaotic – despite victory in the war, France was left to deal with its internal issues: the purge and later amnesties of collaborators, glorification of the eternal nation in resistance but no honouring of the actual Resistance. These years were formative of Vichy memory regime, whereby French collaboration with the Nazis and its extent was put into oblivion, and the experiences and memories of resistants and the Jews were not recognised. The official vectors of memory, or rather forgetting, played a key role in this phase.

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[50] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 19-20.
[51] Ibid., 18.
[52] Ibid., 21.
[53] Hanna Diamond, *Fleeing Hitler, France 1940*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007, 209-210.
[54] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 35.
[55] Robert Frank, 'Bilan d'une enquête,' in *La Mémoire des Français*, ed. Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent (Paris: Edition du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986), 377, cited in Henry Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 225.
[56] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 51.
[57] Ibid., 54.

2. Repression of memories (1954-1967) [58]

For memories of Vichy perpetrations, this period signifies 17 years of repressions and a memory regime of collective amnesia. With the aid of the Gaullist myth, the official memory based on the idea of French nation as a whole resisting the Nazis became established in the society during this period.[59] The only notable outburst of Vichy memory took place from 1958 to 1962, during the Algerian War.

As a result of the crisis in France caused by the Algerian War, General de Gaulle was called to return to power in 1958. This marks the point from which parallels of Vichy and Algeria started appearing in public and political debates. While some likened de Gaulle's return to 1940, when special powers to govern the country were given to Marshal Philippe Pétain,[60] de Gaulle was seen by many as the liberator of France, the only man who will be able to find a way forward with Algeria and ensure the continuity of 'eternal' France, which was in great danger again, too soon after WW2.

In power, de Gaulle continued reinforcing his myth - it permeated his war memoirs, published in 1954 and was further supported by French writer Robert Aron's 'Histoire de Vichy' ('History of Vichy'), the first major historical study of the period. Aron advocated de Gaulle's idea of a whole France in resistance and contributed to its consolidation. The book quickly became the key reference on Vichy's history, serving as a scholarly vector of memory reinforcing de Gaulle's myth.[61]

The myth reached its peak in 1964, during the reburial of resistance hero Jean Moulin at the Pantheon, where traditionally national heroes are put to rest.[62] A solemn official ceremony was aimed at reinforcing the idea that all French people shared Jean Moulin's spirit of resistance and that he represented the France's struggles in WW2.[63] The event was exemplary of the power the official vectors can have in forming the national memory regime, as it was engraved into the memory of many Frenchmen.

However, the myth and memory regime built upon it could not last. It did not represent the true experiences of the war and silenced the truth about Vichy collaboration. Official acts of memory could not sustain this memory regime without the support of society, which was increasingly fading.

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[58] The author of the thesis chose slightly different dates from those indicated by Rousso (1954-1970).
[59] Guinevere Kern echoes Rousso's classification, stating that the Gaullist myth was the dominant narrative in 1944-1971. Guinevere Kern, 'The Legacy of Historical Memory: The Holocaust, Identity and the Question of Belonging in France,' *Saeculum Undergraduate Academic Journal*, 11(1), 2016, 6.
<https://saeculumjournal.com/index.php/saeculum/article/view/27110/20116>[2020 05 14]
[60] Patrick Finney (ed.), *Remembering the Second World War*, Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2017, 15.
[61] Manuel Bragança, Fransiska Louwagie (eds.) *Ego-histories of France and the Second World War– Writing Vichy,* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 5.
[62] Audrey Mallet, 'Vichy against Vichy: History and Memory of the Second World War in the Former Capital of the *État français* from 1940 to the Present', Doctoral thesis, Sorbonne and Concordia Universities, 2016, 276.
<https://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/982160/3/Mallet_PhD_S2017.pdf> [2020 05 21]
[63] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 83-92.

3. The broken mirror - return of the repressed (1968-1973)

The late 60s and beginning of the 70s signified a turning point in the Vichy memory regime, whereby the Gaullist myth was shattered.[64] Questions of the political legitimacy and actions of Vichy, as well as wider dissatisfaction with the French government in the late 60s were central reasons leading young students to the streets in 1968.[65] Cultural and scholarly memory interventions reflected the change in society's outlook on the myth of resistance and distorted portrayal of Vichy. The government, however, persistently maintained the position that Vichy was not France.

The May 1968 revolts were led by students and intellectuals who did not subscribe to the memory regime brought upon their parents, that of 'invented honour.'[66] They wanted to understand what happened during Vichy and what it means today, which was proof that the past was not settled. By rioting against 'fascism', evoking memories of WW2, according to Rousso, the young tried to disturb official silencing on the issues of Vichy and even the Algerian War, which had just ended.[67] These protests paved the way for a new representation of Vichy.

The release of Marcel Opul's documentary 'Le Chagrin et la Pitié' ('Sorrow and the Pity') in 1969 is often considered a watershed, whereby the Gaullist myth was stripped of its credibility and power.[68] The film presented a counter-narrative: that of Vichy-led French collaboration with the Nazi Germany. The documentary was backed by a number of interviews with former government officials who admitted lying or keeping silence all the years since the end of the war. This cultural vector of memory was considered a 'game-changing work,'[69] as it had a major impact in prompting a change of Vichy memory regime.

Complementing memory outbreak in cinema, in 1972, American historian Robert Paxton published a book 'Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944', which presented a more objective, fact-based version of 'Le Chagrin et la Pitié'. He deconstructed Robert Aron's version of Vichy by revealing that Vichy asked the Germans to accept collaboration and the subsequent anti-

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[64] Mark A. Wolfgram, 'A Model for Comparative Collective Memory Studies: Regime Types, Cultural Traditions and Difficult Histories,' *Croatian Political Science Review*, 51(5), 2014, 28-29.

[65] Maud A. Bracke, 'From politics to nostalgia: the transformation of war memories in France during the 1960-1970s,' *European History Quarterly*, 41(1), 2011, 9.

[66] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 99.

[67] Ibid, 99.

[68] Jim House, Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, state terror and memory*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006, 10; Golsan, *Vichy's Afterlife*, 73.

[69] Gayle Levy, 'Divided Memory by Olivier Wieviorka,' *Triquarterly*, 2012. <https://www.triquarterly.org/reviews/divided-memory-olivier-wieviorka> [2020 05 14]

Semitic policies were implemented at their own initiative.[70] Paxton's book was highly influential and changed the way academia and officials understand the past and present it to the society.[71]

Radical 'breaking and replacing' was characteristic of the early 70s, which constituted a brief but important episode for the change of Vichy memory regime. In this phase, cultural and scholarly interventions played a prominent role in exposing the fallacy of the Gaullist myth. Importantly, the emerging manifestations of the repressed Vichy memory found eyes and ears in the public, especially the young generation, who were willing to face previously silenced and uncomfortable chapters of the past. These elements constituted the core power behind memory regime change.

4. Obsession with memory and normalisation (1974-1997)

In 1991, as Rousso published the 'Vichy Syndrome,' he characterised the years since 1974 as a phase of reawakening of Vichy memory in French political and cultural debate, and all across the world. Previously occluded aspects of the period were now discussed openly and constantly, as a 'duty to memory.' Scholarly, cultural and even official manifestations of memory flourished. However, Rousso found this reversal, leading to the excess of memory, equally as problematic as denial[72] and finished his book without any prognosis on when the Vichy memory regime would reach the phase of normalization. Here, however, it is argued that normalisation of Vichy memory has taken place and the memory regime has transformed from oppression to acknowledgement.

First of all, this period signified a notable shift in Vichy historiography from politically biased, myth-based memoirs and testimonies to objective, dispassionate research based on facts. This was enabled in part by the gradual opening of the national archives to scholars.[73] A growing number of history books and academic publications on the subject marked an increased presence of scholarly vectors, stimulating a change in the representation of Vichy memory. In history classes, French history of WW2 became a discipline in itself, topics of collaboration and resistance were taught in much more depth.[74] Opening of the archives were political decisions, but they were clearly prompted by the growing public interest and new revelations about the period, as seen in the third phase. This proves how politics is dependent on the citizens and reflect their views and demands. Thus, while it is true that politicians have a key role to play in (re)constructing memory regimes, they are reluctant to introduce change until prompted by society.

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[70] Ibid.
[71] Moshik Temkin, ''Avec Un Certain Malaise': The Paxtonian Trauma in France, 1973-74.'*Journal of Contemporary History*, 38(2), 2003, 304.
[72] Henry Rousso, *La Hantise du passé: Entretien avec Philippe Petit. Paris: Textuel*, 1988, 28, cited in Golsan, *Vichy's Afterlife,* 10.
[73] Sandra Ott, *Living with the Enemy.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017, 22.
[74] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 259-65.

Cinematic and other cultural representations of memory followed a similar path and gave voice to previously silenced stories. Claude Lanzmann's documentary 'Shoah,' released in 1985, portrayed the genocide during WW2 as remembered by the survivors, victims, torturers and bystanders. It was highly praised by critics and widely watched in France, and its effect was compared to that of the 'Le Chagrin et la Pitié.'[75]

The fourth phase has also witnessed return of Vichy to the courts, marking the beginning of an active government's engagement in the memory regime change through the official vectors of memory. Rousso said that the role of these late trials was 'above all to teach a lesson in civics.'[76] They opened the way for former resistants and survivors of the genocide to speak up their memories[77] and resulted in establishment of an official historical record of what happened during Vichy and who is responsible. Thus, the belated trials of Vichy criminals in the 80s and 90s played an important role in reformulation of official memory of the events and their meaning to contemporary France.

At the end of 'Vichy Syndrome,' Rousso leaves the reader in the phase of obsession with Vichy memory and further asserts this diagnosis in his subsequent work. Rousso's Vichy analysis received criticism for leaving France's memory ill with a syndrome that seems to be incurable.[78] Some scholars criticised Rousso for overestimating the divisiveness and 'neurosis' of what are healthy French memory debates.[79] In the same vain, several scholars have identified the 1990s, and 1997 in particular as a conclusion of Vichy syndrome.[80] As historian Bertram Gordon has pointed, Rousso's analysis is not exhaustive and is subject to updates, and Rousso himself admitted that.[81] The analysis will therefore now look beyond the 'Vichy Syndrome' and diverge from Rousso's subsequent research.

In 1995, Jacques Chirac, the first post-war president to not have had any involvement with the war, officially recognised France's responsibility for deportation of Jews during World War II, two months after taking the office: 'Yes, the criminal folly of the occupiers was seconded by the French, by the French state.'[82] It was a ground-breaking official presidential acknowledgement that Vichy was France.

Two years after, the trial of Maurice Papon is considered a conclusion of Vichy Syndrome.[83] It stands out as the last relating to WW2, longest (95 days) and perhaps one the most widely publicised

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[75] Ibid., 238.

[76] Rousso, Conan, 74.

[77] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 214.

[78] Justin W. Silvestri, 86-89.

[79] Ibid., 88.

[80] See footnote 83.

[81] Philip Daileader, Philip Whalen (eds.), *French Historians 1900-2000: New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*. West Sussex: Blackweel Publishing, 2010, 549-53.

[82] Marlise Simons, 'Chirac Admits France's Guilt in Fate of Jews,' The New York Times, 1995. <https://nyti.ms/29d9HJa> [2020 05 14]

[83] Neil MacMaster, 'The Torture Controversy (1998–2002): Towards a 'New History' of the Algerian War?', *Modern and Contemporary France*, 10(4), 2002, 449–59; McCormack, 'Social Memories in (Post)colonial France' 1135; Stiina Löytömaki, *Law and the Politics of Memory – Confronting the Past*, Oxon: Routledge, 2014, 3.

trials in French history.[84] Every major French newspaper and TV channel provided regular updates on the proceedings,[85] which have also attracted vast attention from international media.[86] A former civil servant and minister was tried for crimes against humanity committed under the Vichy government, 55 years after the events. Convicted for unlawful arrest, deportation, and killing of Jews,[87] at the age of 87, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison, of which he served only three due to health reasons.[88] This trial was widely perceived as an official recognition of the French state's responsibility for Holocaust and its extent, and a symbolic condemnation of Vichy regime's actions. It marked a final step in the change of Vichy memory regime, as the previously oppressed memory has now been recognised in the official, public, cultural, scholarly expressions of memory and has been institutionalised through commemorations, state-acknowledgement and inscription into judicial and historical records.

In summary, the fourth phase of Vichy syndrome was characterised by a high saturation of Vichy memory manifestations. Through scholarly, cultural and in turn official vectors of memory, previously silenced aspects of Vichy past gradually found their place in history, arts, politics and public discourse. France has taken major steps to reconcile with this difficult period, which led to memory regime change from obsession to normalisation, whereby Vichy and French collaboration has become an established part of French national memory.

It took more than half a century to cure the Vichy syndrome. Memories pertaining to the French collaboration with the Nazis were silenced and replaced with a myth of a 'whole France in resistance', coined by de Gaulle. Efforts to engrave the myth in the French memory through official acts were successful, and Vichy memory regime, silencing the real motives and extent of French collaboration, became established. However, by the 70s, the mirror broke, and the repressed memories resurfaced with great power and resonance in the form of films, history books and other cultural as well as scholarly interventions. The public, especially the young generation, demanded to openly face the history of the dark years. In the fourth phase, French public debate was overcrowded with Holocaust memory discussions, and politicians have actively engaged with the subject. Gradually, through numerous official acts as well as various artistic and scholarly representations, Vichy was recognised

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[84] Golsan, *Vichy's Afterlife*, 160-161.

[85] Robert Boyce, 'The Trial of Maurice Papon for Crimes against Humanity and the Concept of Bureaucratic Crime,' in R A. Melikan (ed.), *The Trial in History: Domestic and international trials, 1700-2000*. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003, 157.

[86] Golsan, *Vichy's Afterlife*, 160-61.

[87] Mary Howell, 'The Changing 'Vichy Syndrome': Sites of Holocaust and Algerian Traumas in Official French Memory,' Honors Thesis, University of North Carolina, 2014, 49.

[88] Jo McCormack, 'Social Memories in (Post)colonial France: Remembering the Franco-Algerian War,' *Journal of Social History*, 2011, 1135. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30630781.pdf> [2020 05 14]

for what it was. Difficult memories surrounding this period were officially placed in French history and became a part of national memory, signifying a change of memory regime.

Vichy syndrome's key vectors of memory

In 'Vichy Syndrome,' after demonstrating how the memory evolved through the four phases, Rousso presents what he sees as the three 'representative examples' of vectors of memory in the portrayal of the syndrome – official commemoration, film and historiography (history books and school teaching) – and elaborates on them separately.[89] While they alone cannot provide a comprehensive picture alone, as no mode of representation has dominated the memory of Vichy,[90] they are interpreted as having played the most decisive role in the evolution of the syndrome.[91] Interestingly, however, not all vectors chosen by Rousso figure in his overall analysis and therefore this choice lacks proof. For example, the teaching of Vichy memory in schools is barely mentioned in his analysis and seems somewhat extraneous. Schools in France are traditionally seen as shaping country's identity and official memory, however, the changes in the way Vichy history was taught were observed only in late 70s and 80s, and while reflecting an important shift in memory regime, did not constitute this change. Official commemoration as a memory vector also seems to have gained significant weight only after President Chirac's speech in 1995, acknowledging French responsibility in the Holocaust and the commemorative acts of his successors. All of these events took place after Rousso's book was published. Meanwhile, trials as official vectors of memory, whilst given significant attention in Rousso's depiction of Vichy syndrome, are not seen by him to be representative. This thesis, however, takes the view that the purge in the aftermath of the war, and the 80s and 90s' trials in particular were decisive elements of syndrome's evolution. Trials are generally seen as important vectors of memory by the scholars, especially in the context of the Holocaust – there is research looking specifically into their contributions to the creation of collective memories.[92] Returning to Vichy syndrome, Rousso himself, in his later work, written together with Eric Conan, admits that trials have become a vector of memory par excellence since the early seventies,[93] because this is where, essentially, a big part of the history of French involvement in the Holocaust was both written and assessed. Therefore, films, historiography and trials are perceived as the key vectors of memory in the evolution of Vichy syndrome.

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[89] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 221.
[90] Ibid., 221.
[91] Ibid., 11.
[92] See Löytömaki, *Law and the Politics of Memory – Confronting the Past*.
[93] Rousso, Conan, 74.

Cultural vectors - films

The influence of 'Le Chagrin et la Pitié' and 'Shoah' on the evolution of Vichy syndrome is rightly highlighted by Rousso. Both of these films were not only important for changing representations of Vichy memory, but became historical documents themselves, often remembered in today's context.[94] 'Le Chagrin et la Pitié' marked a turning point in Vichy syndrome by shattering the myth of resistance.[95] Based on archival footage and numerous interviews, it presented a silenced side of WW2 story through first-hand accounts of French collaboration and anti-Semitisim and juxtaposed this narrative with the official version of the events, exposing the audience to the disturbing fallacy of the Gaullist myth. Not surprisingly, the film was denounced by French government institutions as being unpatriotic or one-sided[96] and encountered difficulties trying to access French cinema. The government-controlled agency opposed its screening on TV until 1981. However, since 1971, one Parisian cinema started screening it and the film became a hit among the public and critics, with queues stretching outside. The number of views grew to about 15 million by 1981, when the film was broadcast on TV.[97] By that time the film had received wide acclaim from European and US audiences and was nominated for an Oscar. The film has inspired numerous filmmakers to take on this subject and approach the war in a critical way,[98] which also contributed to the changing understanding and portrayal of the period. Some have even saw the film as having influenced the return of the memory to the courts and the sentencing of Nazi officer under Vichy Klaus Barbie to life imprisonment.[99] The film is thus credited for having "launched a new cycle of Vichy reconception."[100] To this day, it is seen by many as an "essential documentary about the years of occupation during WW2 in Vichy France,"[101] and included in French schools' history programs.[102]

The almost ten hour-long documentary created in eleven years by French filmmaker Claude Lauzmann, 'Shoah,' marked another important transition in changing understanding of the Holocaust,

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[94] Ibid., 182-183.
[95] Golsan, *Vichy's Afterlife*, 73.
[96] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 109-110.
[97] Richard Phillips, 'Collaboration and resistance in Vichy France,' Sydney Film Festival, 2001. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/08/sff3-a16.html> [2020 05 14]
[98] Bill Desowitz, 'The Long Shadow of 'The Sorrow and the Pity,''The New York Times, 2000. <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/07/movies/film-the-long-shadow-of-the-sorrow-and-the-pity.html> [2020 05 14]
[99] Ibid.
[100] Nathan Heller, 'A Vichy Scholar Held in Houston,' The New Yorker, 2017. <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-deep-irony-of-a-scholar-of-vichy-france-being-detained-in-houston> [2020 05 14]
[101] Jill Harsin, 'The Sorrow and the Pitty (1969), Fifty Years Later,' Reflections on France, 2019. <https://jharsin.colgate.domains/blog/history/the-sorrow-and-the-pity-1969-fifty-years-later-part-1/> [2020 05 14]
[102] Ministère Éducation Nationale, Thème 1 – Le rapport des sociétés à leur passé, 2012. <https://cache.media.eduscol.education.fr/file/lycee/41/0/LyceeGT_Ressources_Hist_02_Th1_Q2_memoires_213410.pdf> [2020 05 18]

in France and worldwide.[103] For cinema, this film, based entirely on eyewitness accounts, signified a move from militant and explicitly didactical, towards subtler and deeper portrayals[104] of Holocaust memory. It speaks of a living memory of the genocide in the minds of concentration camps' survivors, witnesses and perpetrators, and problematises the relationship between history, as abstract and simplified, and memory, as very much alive, subjective and painful. The film represents the voice of those who were forgotten and not included in the national narrative. Soon after the release, the film was recognised by critics and scholars as a masterpiece.[105] The film remains influential through thousands of articles, studies, debates and is part of French schools' curricula.[106] 'Shoah' was awarded two British Academy Film Awards and the French César. Its wide and positive reception in France created a significant step forward in re-evaluation and reconsideration of Vichy memory and inspired the creation of an archive of video testimonies of Holocaust survivors and witnesses, to be preserved as historical materials.[107] Thus, in France it succeeded not so much in revoking the memory of the Holocaust, which was already in the phase of obsession in 1985, but rather inscribing it into the national memory as an unforgettable event that remains impactful in the present.

Scholarly vectors – historiography

Two history books led to establishment of two different interpretations of Vichy memory and history which dominated in different periods of the syndrome. Robert Aron's 'Histoire de Vichy', built on eyewitness accounts and legal documents, presented a view that Pétain's Vichy played a double game - while publicly collaborating with the Nazis, it was engaged in secret talks with the Allies, awaiting the moment to resume the fight against Nazism.[108] His position, although different to de Gaulle's, nevertheless supported the myth of resistance – Aron also claimed that the vast majority of the French were resistants, including the Vichy regime (at least in their thoughts).[109] Aron's book received commercial success[110] and became an official point of reference, serving as a scholarly vector of memory, strengthening the myth fabricated by de Gaulle.[111] This 700-page

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[103] Judith Miller, 'Erasing the Past: Europe's Amnesia About the Holocaust,' The New York Times, 1986. <https://nyti.ms/29pl4yD> [2020 05 14]

[104] Henry Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 237.

[105] Ferzina Banaji, 'The Shoah after 'Shoah': Memory, the Body, and the Future of the Holocaust in French Cinema,' *L'Esprit Créateur*, 50(4), 2010, 124.

[106] Franceinfo Culture, ''Shoah' de Claude Lanzmann: un film entré dans l'histoire du cinema,' 2018. <https://www.francetvinfo.fr/culture/cinema/shoah-de-claude-lanzmann-un-film-entre-dans-l-histoire-du-cinema_3286357.html> [2020 05 14]

[107] Nelly Furman, 'Viewing memory through Night and Fog, The Sorrow and the Pitty and Shoah,' *Journal of European Studies,* 35(2), 2005, 179-80.

[108] Kim Munholland, 'Wartime France: Remembering Vichy,' *French Historical Studies*, 18(3), 1994, 804.

[109] Julian Jackson, *France - The Dark Years, 1940-1944*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001, 9.

[110] John Horne, 'The Paxton Revolution,' 2014, 1. <https://www.tcd.ie/history/assets/pdf/ug/france/Paxton_revolution.pdf> [2020 05 14]

[111] Manuel Bragança, Fransiska Louwagie, 5; Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 246.

historical account of Vichy remained unchallenged until the 70s, when at the beginning of the third phase, a new groundbreaking history of Vichy left Aron's work obsolete.

In 1972, an American historian Robert Paxton challenged the long-established memory of the Vichy period in France with his book 'Vichy France: Old guard and New order, 1940-1944.'[112] He revealed that Pétain's regime was in fact not trying to protect France but was a willing Nazi accomplice. Additionally, only two percent of the adult population in France had actively participated in the Resistance.[113] Paxton's book received widespread reactions from historians, both positive and negative. The criticism was often aimed at the person himself: for being young, foreign, and never having seen the events that are the objects of his study.[114] Although Paxton was a foreigner, and perhaps it was easier for a foreigner to reveal the dark pages of history, he inspired a young generation of French historians, who, not having any personal memories, were eager to further reveal the repressed memories and hidden facts of their country's past.[115] In subsequent years, less celebratory scholarly works on resistance have begun to appear.[116] Paxton's book 'shattered the remains of the Aron paradigm and established a new dominant memory.'[117] It served as a powerful vector of scholarly memory and contributed to the transformation of the Vichy memory regime.

Official vectors - trials

Trials of Vichy criminals in the 80s and 90s were manifestations of the return of official vectors of memory into the Vichy memory debate. They indicate that the state had recognised the need to revisit and revise the official memory of Vichy, which ceased to resemble interpretations and discussions in the society. In a way, these trials were a belated continuation of the post WW2 purge, where some high-ranking officers escaped the conviction under the statute of limitations. They marked the first time when French citizens were convicted of crimes against humanity.[118] However, the trials of Paul Touvier, Maurice Papon and others all took place more than forty years after the events, as the defendants were of a respectable age; some of them even died having never stood trial.[119] The trials were therefore perceived as highly symbolic state gestures, more aimed at establishing historical record than justice.[120] They indicate the official will to alter the existing

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[112] Temkin, 292.
[113] Ott, 21.
[114] Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, 254.
[115] Debbie Lackerstein, *National Regeneration in Vichy France – Ideas and Policies, 1930–1944*. New York: Routledge, 2016, 3.
[116] Munholland, 805.
[117] Temkin, 304-305.
[118] Nancy Wood, 'Vichy Memories,' New Formations, 1992, 154.
<https://www.newformations.co.uk/sites/default/files/nf17_15reviews_0.pdf> [2020 05 14]
[119] Pierre Nora, in an interview with Nicolas Weill and Robert Solé in *Le Monde*, 1 October 1997, published in Golsan's *The Papon Affair*, 176, cited in Howell, 49-50.
[120] House, MacMaster, 299.

memory regime of Vichy – to officially recognise atrocities committed by Vichy administration and in turn, France.[121] They mark a key vector of memory in the evolution of Vichy syndrome, as it was through them that the previously silenced crimes and memories were officially acknowledged. This is exactly what memory needs – recognition.

The trial of Maurice Papon, besides concluding the Vichy syndrome, shed light on another significant but excluded memory of the French past which, interestingly, Papon was also part of – the Algerian War. Papon was a chief of Parisian police at the time and was responsible for the infamous massacre of Algerians in 1961. According to Richard Golsan, "there was a trial within a trial" in 1997[122] and although Papon was convicted only of crimes committed during WW2, the trial drew public attention to the issue of the Algerian War memory and encouraged comparisons between the two.[123] Thus, it could be said that the last Vichy trial symbolically opened the way for France to address one more national memory 'gap' – Algerian War.

Chapter III

The Algerian War's memory regime

The Algerian War of Independence has caused great instability in metropolitan France: the collapse of the government and plea for de Gaulle to return to power in 1958, followed by the establishment of the Fifth Republic and a decoupling with Algeria after a brutal war. The Algerian quest for independence was met differently to any other French colony. The French were 'at home' in Algeria, and Algeria to them was France, more than any other colony, not just because of its status as an integral part of France, but because it was a part of their consciousness and identity, which Kristin Ross depicted as marriage, with its long history and dirty family secrets.[124] That is perhaps why after assuming the post of President, de Gaulle's initial policy was to preserve French Algeria. However, failed attempts to bargain and the increasing power of the Algerian independence movement Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) finally led de Gaulle to declare that Algeria was entitled to self-determination.[125] On 18 March 1962, the peace agreement – Évian accords – was signed, and Algeria officially declared independence. In France, although the official account for the Algerian War was immediately neglected through amnesty laws, the war's memory lingered. A memory regime of forgetting Algeria could not contain the painful memories of the brutal war, where

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[121] Löytömaki, *Law and the Politics of Memory – Confronting the Past, 51.*
[122] Richard Golsan cited in Löytömaki, *Law and the Politics of Memory – Confronting the Past, 75.*
[123] Howell, 49-50.
[124] Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies – Decolonisation and the Reordering of French Culture.* London: The MIT Press, 1996, 124.
[125] Phillip C. Naylor, *Historical Dictionary of Algeria.* London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981, 21.

the French had undermined their republican principles and values. Below, the evolution of Algerian memory regime in France, or Algerian syndrome, is explored.

1. Silencing (1962-1979)

The first phase marked the beginning of a long period of silence for the memory of the Algerian War. Imposed through legal means, memory regime of official amnesia has soon become established in the society.

Immediately after the war, de Gaulle started issuing amnesties. They applied to both sides, French and Algerian, on equal terms. The first amnesty was included already as part of the Évian accords in 1962, and three others followed in 1966, 1968 and 1982.[126] The amnesties came in several waves and ensured that almost every person who could be put against the court for war crimes was freed from responsibility. While presented as a means to calm the post-war situation, historians interpret the amnesties as a wish to erase the crimes from the national memory of France[127] and implement official amnesia.[128] American historian William B. Cohen sums up that "no legal accounting regarding the Algerian War occurred in France."[129] From an ethical point of view, amnesties seem immoral,[130] they also deprive victims of the agency and a chance to forgive, because pardon is given in the name of the state.[131]

In the late 60s and 70s, while the government was preoccupied with Vichy memory and continued to maintain silence about memory of Algeria, a number of testimonies of the Algerian War came out, that challenged the silence surrounding the war and revealed its most controversial aspects. The first was Gillo Pontecorvo's 1966 film 'La Bataille d'Alger' ('The Battle of Algiers') – filmed just several years after the war in the same streets where actual battles had taken place, starring ordinary Algerians who themselves experienced the war, it was shockingly accurate and documentary-like[132] in its portrayal of Algerian guerrilla warfare, as well as torture by the French soldiers.[133] The film was able to reconstruct the recent horrors to the point that it was too disturbing and difficult to watch for the French. While not officially censored, the film was 'banned' form French

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[126] 1982 amnesty was issued by President Mitterrand, the rest - by de Gaulle. Stiina Löytömäki, 'Legalisation of the Memory of the Algerian War in France,' *Journal of the History of International Law*, 7, 2005, 168.
[127] William B. Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory.' *Historical Reflections,* 28(2), 2002, 223.
[128] Lara Marlowe, 'Recalling the War France Wanted to Forget,' The Irish Times, 1998. <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/recalling-the-war-france-wanted-to-forget-1.206168> [2020 05 14] Richard L. Derderian, 'Algeria as a lieu de mémoire: Ethnic Minority Memory and National Identity in Contemporary France,' *Radical History Review*, 83, 2002, 29.
[129] Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory,' 225.
[130] Löytömäki, 'Legalisation of the Memory of the Algerian War in France,' 168.
[131] House, MacMaster, 264.
[132] Nicolas Harrison, 'The Battle of Algiers,', Oxford Bibliographies, 2015.
[133] The FLN also used illegal warfare methods and the film portrays that.

TV and cinemas due to strong lobbying by the war veterans who could not agree with a negative depiction of French presence in Algeria. One cinema in Paris started regular screenings of the film since 1971 and had its windows broken several times.[134] Despite receiving worldwide recognition - nominated for three Oscars and recommended by Pentagon as a 'training video' on counterinsurgency for the American soldiers before going to war in Iraq[135] - the film was broadcast on French television only in 2004.[136] 'La Bataille d'Algers' was a powerful cultural vector of memory of the Algerian War, but it was approached by the French similarly as the war itself - with repression and silence. The film's significance has also been proved by Jacques Massu, one of the leading French generals in the Algerian War, who published war memoirs entitled 'La Vraie Bataille d'Alger' ('The True Battle of Algiers') - a response to Pontecorvo's film, as evident from the title. In the memoirs, Massu acknowledged French use of torture and justified it as a military necessity.[137] However, the content of these representations of memory failed to reach the wider public in the ways they intended and have been met more or less indifferently, even the aspect of torture. Despite public opinion polls of the time indicating that the French were aware of their country's conduct in Algeria,[138] there was little debate or questioning of the state's policy of amnesia. Perhaps the aforementioned accounts were ahead of their time - as will be seen later, the question of torture and the Algerian War memory regime would become central to public debate in 2000, causing a tremendous outcry.

Only in 1977, soon after de Gaulle's death, did one of the first few acts of official recognition take place: a body of an unknown soldier from the Algerian War was buried under the Arc de Triomphe next to others who fell in recognised conflicts. But even then, the French President at the time, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, did not use 'Algerian War' in his speech and instead spoke of 'the unknown soldier of North Africa.'[139]

To sum up the first phase, the silencing of the Algerian War memory through the amnesty laws, as official vectors of forgetting, has paved the way for the formation of a memory regime of amnesia. While several cultural carriers of memory challenged the silence and brought up the controversial aspects of the Franco-Algerian War, society did not show willingness to engage in debates about the repressed memory.

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[134] McCormack, *Collective Memory,* 27.
[135] Abdelkader Cheref, 'Films Effecting/Affecting Politics: La Bataille d'Alger and Indigènes,' *Quarterly Review of Film and Video*, 34(5), 2017, 395.
[136] Cheref, 396.
[137] Christopher Cradock, M. L. R. Smith, 'A Reinterpretation of the Influence of the Theory of Guerre Révolutionnaire and the Battle of Algiers,' Journal of Cold War Studies, 9(4), 2007, 69.
[138] '1979 Louis Harris/Express poll showed that 59 percent of respondents believed torture was employed in Algeria,' William B. Cohen, 'The Sudden Memory of Torture: The Algerian War in French Discourse, 2000-2001,' *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 19(3), 2001, 84.
[139] Le Monde, 18 October 1977, cited in Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory,' 225.

2. Silent reawakening in historiography (1980-1990)

In this phase, the war seemed to have become a long-finished and forgotten chapter of France's past. However, the academic research was virtually non-existent and it was time historians took up their duty to write the history of Algerian War, despite little interest in the wider society and politicians.

The 80s mark a phase of growing historiographical interest in the Algerian War.[140] Partly due to increased academic research, starting in 1983, the history of the war has been taught in terminale (final year of high school) classes in France.[141] Nevertheless, it remained marginalised in relation to other episodes of history, not least because official knowledge of the war was still scarce.[142] The difficulty of writing Algerian War history, due to policy of amnesia and closed archives, was reflected in the classrooms, as teachers were not equipped with sufficient facts and skills to convey the complex history of the war of decolonisation to French pupils, especially in schools with children of North African origin.[143]

Growing interest in the Algerian War among historians and scholars, and an increased number of publications did not start a wider debate on the repressed memories. The prevailing memory regime and a lack of public interest in facing the silenced past did not encourage people to speak up about their experiences. While associations of different wartime groups were fully formed by the 80s, they were isolated and hostile to each other. Two opposing camps had formed: supporters of French Algeria and defenders of independent Algeria. The first group, backed by the pied noirs (settlers), harkis (Algerians who fought for France), former members of Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) and the far right was better represented and had stronger networks: as the civil war started in Algeria in 1991, they used this opportunity to portray Algeria as a failed state in the French public sphere, which Laetitia Bucaille named as 'the skill of the vanquished'[144] (with the 2005 law on the positive aspects of colonialism this skill will manifest itself again). Additionally, Yann Scioldo-Zurcher observes that since the 80s a number of politicians in the French government started evoking France's civilising mission narrative.[145]

Despite these setbacks in the public and political sphere, and a mismatch between historical and public interest in the Algerian War, one thing had changed in the 80s – the memory of the war was no longer constrained by silence and there was a growing interest in the meaning of the war and colonisation in general. The prevailing memory regime was on the brink of change.

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[140] McCormack, *Collective Memory*, 27-29.
[141] Ibid., 28.
[142] Ibid., 28.
[143] Ibid., 33.
[144] Bucaille, 83.
[145] Ibid. 83.

3. The breaking of silence (1991-1998)

Since the 90s, a number of calls to recognise what happened during the Algerian War the way Chirac did with Vichy, increased.[146] In the context of an already activated debate in the academia, the 30th anniversary of the Paris Massacre and the Algerian War created an opportunity to break the silence around the memories of the Algerian War through influential scholarly and cultural vectors of memory. The subject became a matter of active public discussion and prompted the government to open the pandora's box of Algerian War memories.

Benjamin Stora, an expert of Franco-Algerian history and memory, became the first to raise the issue of repressed memory of the Algerian War in his landmark book 'La Gangréne et l'Oubli' ('Gangrene and Forgetfulness,' 1991), where he demonstrated how the "unthinkable" loss of Algeria was officially silenced at the outset of the war.[147] It was an important scholarly vector of memory because it shifted the angle of the debate about the Algerian War, just in time for its thirtieth anniversary in 1992, when many reflections in the form of history books and films appeared.[148] In the same year, Bernard Tavernier released a documentary 'La Guerre Sans Nom' ('The War Without a Name'), whose effect is compared to that of 'Le Chagrin et la Pitié,' discussed previously. The film was received eagerly and positively by the French public and launched a widespread debate that changed the attitude towards Algerian War memory in the French consciousness. It was from now on discussed openly and publicly,[149] and also prompted a positive shift in government's recognition of the contribution of these soldiers.

This period was the one where the memory of Algeria began to mirror that of Vichy particularly clearly. The years that followed confirmed once again that the more time passes, the more memory returns. 1996 saw the death of François Miterrand, French President for 14 years, between 1981-1995, which marked another opened window for the return of suppressed memory. Miterrand was the Justice Minister during the Algerian War and made controversial decisions such as authorising the execution of Algerian prisoners, thus the left, which he represented, could not really allow themselves to speak about Algeria until after his death.[150]

During the trial of Maurice Papon in 1997, the painful histories of Vichy and Algeria were brought together through the testimony of Jean-Luc Einaudi. Besides exposing more of Papon's

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[146] Raphaëlle Branche 2005, 95, cited in Löytömaki, *Law and the Politics of Memory – Confronting the Past*, 70.

[147] Benjamin Stora, *La Gangréne et l'Oubli*, Paris: La Decouverte, 1991.

[148] Benjamin P. Nickels, 'France and Algeria at War: Nation, Identity, and Memory,' *History: Reviews of New Books*, 38(4), 119.

[149] Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory,' 232.

[150] Antoine Perraud, 'When François Miterrand ordered deaths of 45 Algerians.' Mediapart, 2010. <https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/culture-idees/021110/when-francois-mitterrand-ordered-deaths-45-algerians?onglet=full> [2020 05 14]

wrongdoings, this testimony functioned as a cultural vector of memory and revealed the previously silenced history of the massacre, which had an enormous impact and refocused the public and political attention on the Algerian War memory.

The third phase has demonstrated the importance of cultural and scholarly intervention for initiating a change in the memory regime. Here, the breaking of silence on the Algerian War was the result of an interplay between unofficial and official vectors of memory: a film or a testimony that attracts public attention can prompt the government to begin memory work on the official level.

4. Obsession and working through the repressed memories (1999-2020…)

At the start of a new century, memory and legacy of the Algerian War became a common subject of cultural, public, academic and political discussions,[151] indicating that France was ready to face and admit its difficult past. While official moves are always behind, the fourth phase has seen the government to take up its part of memory work.

For almost 40 years, Franco-Algerian War was classified as a 'police action', a 'peace mission', or an 'Algerian problem', rather than a war. In 1999, years after official oblivion, it was finally given the status of war – that way, the scale, intensity and significance of the fighting was officially acknowledged.[152] This law was a major indication that the official memory of the Algerian War started aligning with the actual past, and that memory regime change was now also facilitated by the official vectors of memory.

2000 marked the most intensive encounter of the French society with the memory of colonial injustices.[153] The use of torture came out in the open when French daily 'Le Monde' published an interview with a former FLN militant Louisette Ighilahriz, who was imprisoned and tortured by the French Army for several months. The most sensational aspect of her testimony was that war heroes General Jacques Massu and General Marcel Bigeard had personally supervised these actions. Ighilahriz's testimony caused a huge public outcry and for the first time started a public discussion on the issue of torture. It is worth noting that 2000 was not the first time the French society was exposed to stories of torture in the Algerian War. Jacques Massu, the same French General that was accused by Igilahriz, published his war memoirs as early as 1971 and confirmed having used torture

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[151] Rosalie Calvet, 'Thwarting the Other: A critical approach to the French historiography of Colonial Algeria,' Undergraduate Senior Thesis, Columbia University, 2017, 18. <https://history.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2016/06/Calvet_Thesis.pdf> [2020 05 14]

[152] Loi n° 99-882 relative à la substitution, à l'expression „aux opérations effectuées en Afrique du Nord', de l'expression „à la guerre d'Algérie ou aux combats en Tunisie et au Maroc.' 1999. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000578132> [2020 05 14]

[153] Jan Jansen, 'Politics of Remembrance, Colonialism and the Algerian War of Independence in France' in Malgorzata Pakier (ed.), *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010, 284.

but defended its legitimacy as a necessary evil against Algerian terrorism. However, at the time his book did not attract any significant attention as mentioned in the first part of this analysis, the General was not prosecuted, and there was no such discussion as in 2000. This example highlights the importance of cultural memory vectors' ability to get the attention of the public, in order to ignite changes in the memory regime; because for memory, facts matter but in a different way to history. Memory, especially that which is repressed, is concerned with representation and public and political recognition, because the mere existence of particular narratives and facts in books does little to soothe the uneasiness caused by silence or ensure a place for these memories in the nation's identity. The two above cases also prove that memories, especially those of perpetration, are seldom in the government's interest to be dealt with, as they pertain to sensitive and difficult issues that divide the society, and whatever the political leader's reaction, it rarely gives them political credit. However, when the society is receptive to re-emerging memories, when it becomes engaged and loud with demands for the truth, politicians have to respond, and when they do, memory becomes officially acknowledged, and the memory regime changes.

A notable setback in a move towards reconciliation with the repressed memory of Algerian War and colonialism more generally happened in 2005. French government passed a controversial memory law, with one of its articles indicating that schoolchildren should be taught about the positive aspects of colonialism, 'especially in North Africa.'[154] Despite it was revoked in early 2006, a planned signing of a friendship treaty between France and Algeria was taken off of the table, as the law caused outrage in Algeria. It was also an indication that there were strong interest groups in France wanting to maintain a positive image of colonialism and silence French wrongdoings during it, including the Algerian War. However, the change of Algerian memory regime was irreversible at this point.

The impact of cultural memory vectors has manifested especially strongly through 2006 film 'Indigènes,' directed by Rachid Bouchareb. It portrayed North African soldiers fighting for France in WW2 and the unequal treatment and discrimination they were subject to during and after the war. The film received vast public attention in France and was credited for prompting president Chirac's decision to increase pensions to France's former colonial combatants from overseas,[155] numbering around 80 0000, to adjust their pension level to that of French veterans.[156]

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[154] Loi n° 2005-158 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés. 2005.<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000444898> [2020 05 14]

[155] Bucaille, 78.

[156] Jean Dominique-Merchet, "Indigènes fait craquer Chirac,' Liberation, 2006. <https://www.liberation.fr/evenement/2006/09/25/indigenes-fait-craquer-chirac_52394> [2020 05 14]

According to Fionna Barclay, by 2012, marking the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, France fully entered the era of commemoration of the Algerian War.[157] Some previously unseen archives were opened which allowed for a more objective reflection.[158] A big shift occurred in the teaching of the Algerian War in history classes. Newly released history textbooks now dedicated considerable importance to the Algerian War and the slave trade. Today, there is even an obligatory course 'Memory of the Algerian War.'[159] Under the presidency of François Hollande, the government recognised 19 March, the date of signing the Évian peace agreement, as the national day of remembrance of the victims of the Algerian War and other conflicts in North Africa.

However, it was during the 2017 presidential campaign that the ongoing process of Algerian War memory regime change took a decisive turn. Marine le Pen and Emmanuel Macron embodied different interpretations of memory and history from which the French had to choose from. Macron has actively campaigned around reconciliation with Algeria and spoke of crimes against humanity committed by France during the Algerian War of Independence,[160] while Marine le Pen highlighted the positive impact France had had on the colonies and Algeria's "debt" to France.[161] With Macron's victory, a big step in the change of the memory regime was taken: in 2018, he became the first French president to publicly admit that state-sanctioned torture was used by the French in the Algerian War. This acknowledgement was subtly woven into the recognition of torture in one particular case, that of Maurice Audin, a Frenchman who supported Algerian independence. At the age of 26, in the midst of the Algerian War, one day he disappeared. His wife spent all of her life fighting for access to information about him, and for justice. In 2018, Macron visited her home and spoke to her privately, before publicly admitting that Audin was brutally tortured to death by the French military and was a victim of a system "then established in Algeria by France."[162] While Macron is the first French president born after the Algerian War, having no personal relation to that period – contrary to, for example, President Jacques Chirac, who was a veteran of the Algerian War, admitting French

[157] Fiona Barclay, *France's Colonial Legacies: Memory, Identity and Narrative*, 2013, cited in Hugh Dauncey, Chris Tinker, 'Media, Memory and Nostalgia in Contemporary France: Between Commemoration, Memorialisation, Reflection and Restoration,' *Modern & Contemporary France*, 23(2), 2015, 141.

[158] Raphaëlle Branche, 'Histoire et mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie,' Laviedesidees.fr, 2012. <https://laviedesidees.fr/Histoire-et-memoire-de-la-guerre-d.html> [2020 05 14]

[159] Ministère Éducation Nationale, Thème 1 introductif – Le rapport des sociétés à leur passé, 2014. <https://cache.media.eduscol.education.fr/file/lycee/12/3/01_RESS_LYC_HIST_TermS_th1_309123.pdf> [2020 05 14]

[160] Megan G. Oprea, 'In the French Presidential Election, Algerian War Looms Large,' National Review, 2017. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/05/french-election-algerian-war-emmanuel-macron-national-front-marine-le-pen/> [2020 05 14]

[161] MWN, 'Marine Le Pen: 'Algeria Owes a Lot to French Colonisation," Morocco World News, 2017. <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/04/214755/marine-le-pen-algeria-owes-lot-french-colonization/> [2020 05 14]

[162] Adam Nossiter, 'French Soldiers Tortured Algerians, Macron Admits 6 Decades Later,' New York Times, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/world/europe/france-algeria-maurice-audin.html> [2020 05 14]

responsibility for torture in the Algerian was, in French standards, a "monumental reckoning."[163] This move, an official vector of memory, was welcomed by many in France and Algeria,[164] marking an important point in the change of the Algerian War memory regime in France.

However, as Macron himself pointed out, the work of memory did not end with this declaration.[165] After his visit to Audin's widow, Macron also promised to open the archives, some of which are still closed to the public almost 60 years after the end of the war.[166] Soon after, Macron granted the Legion d'Honneur, France's highest honour to a group of harki veterans[167] and announced support packages worth of €40 million euros for harki widows and descendants living in difficult conditions,[168] thus marking a further step towards recognising previously marginalised groups. He sees the reconciliation with the memory of the Algerian War as the most important memory issue for contemporary French politics and set himself the goal of completing this devoir de mémoire;[169] if he succeeds, the Algerian memory regime will have reached the stage of normalisation, and, one could argue, it is more than halfway there.

To sum up the fourth phase, official memory work surrounding the Franco-Algerian War has notably accelerated in the past two decades and reached its highest point in recent years, with Macron's presidency. In this phase, repressed memories have been revealed to a large extent and important acknowledgements have been made on the official level. Openly facing the previously occluded pages of history is a powerful tool of reconciliation. As the memory regime of the Algerian War is getting to the phase of normalisation, one could argue that the previously repressed memories are ready to assume a calmer and more objective place in the French national memory.

While a complicated marriage between France and Algeria ended almost 60 years ago, it has cast a long shadow of memory. In France, the memory regime of repression and occlusion, established largely by amnesty laws, meant that the Algerian War memory was a source of painful resentment, conflicts and identity issues, because it excluded too many people and stories from the national

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[163] Yasmeen Serhan, 'Emmanuel Macron Tries – Slowly – to Reckon with France's Past,' The Atlantic, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/emmanuel-macron-acknowledges-torture-algeria/570283/> [2020 05 14]

[164] Kim Willsher, "My father was tortured and murdered in Algeria. At last France has admitted it,' The Guardian, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/16/algeria-france-war-macron-apology-murder-michele-audin-interview> [2020 05 14]

[165] Déclaration du Président de la République sur la Mort de Maurice Audin, 13 Septembre 2018. <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/09/13/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-mort-de-maurice-audin> [2020 05 14]

[166] Ibid.

[167] RFI, 'France's top honor for Algerian harki fighters,' RFI, 2018. <http://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20180921-france-honour-harki-algerian-loyalists-algeria-war-macron> [2020 05 14]

[168] French Government, '€40m support package for harkis and their children,' 2018. <https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/eu40m-support-package-for-harkis-and-their-children> [2020 05 14]

[169] Kouceila Rek, 'Algérie-France: Emmanuel Macron parle de nouveau de la guerre,' Observalgerie 2020. <https://www.observalgerie.com/algerie-france-emmanuel-macron-parle-de-nouveau-de-la-guerre/2020/> [2020 05 14]

narrative. Although these memories came out in the open early on through first-hand testimonies, exposing the most controversial aspects of the brutal war and the revival of academic interest in the subject, they were not able to awaken the French from oblivion for almost three decades after the war. However, eventually the silence was broken, as numerous cultural, scholarly, and official manifestations of memory were all met with interest and engagement of society. In the fourth phase, through numerous official memory acts, the most difficult aspects of the Algerian War have been openly addressed, and today the Algerian memory regime is on the brink of normalisation. Reconciled and accepted, this past can give new meaning to France's memory and identity.

The Algerian War's key vectors of memory

Having narrated the evolution of the Algerian memory in France after the war of independence, three memory vectors have been identified as the most representative of memory's transition through the different phases towards a new memory regime: laws, films and testimonies. The first vector of memory represents the official carriers of memory, the other two - cultural.

Official vectors - laws

Laws are some of the most important official vectors of memory that shaped the formation of Algerian War memory regime from early on. Amnesty laws provide an interesting example: adopted immediately after the war, they stripped all perpetrators and thus the French state of responsibility for the crimes[170] and acted as a vector of non-memory. Through legal oblivion, the way was paved for decades of silence. However, though in the early aftermath of the war law served as tool to erase the memory, it also contributed to memory regime change towards recognition. An important milestone for the repressed Algerian memory was achieved in 1999, as the French parliament adopted a law recognising the status of the Algerian War. This act is seen as the beginning of the last phase of the memory regime evolution - the obsession with the Algerian War memories. While the law did not change the common perception of the event, giving it a legal status was an acknowledgement that Algeria was, in fact, a separate nation fighting for its independence. It was important for veterans in order to be eligible for pensions and to honour their service. According to Stora, this law was "the indispensable condition for ending the repression of memory."[171]

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[170] Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory,' 222-225.
[171] Benjamin Stora, *Le transfert d'une mémoire*, cited in William B. Cohen, 'The Algerian War and French Memory,' *Contemporary European History,* 9(3), 2000, 500.

Finally, the 2005 law requiring French schools to teach pupils about the positive aspects of French colonialism was an attempt from the officials to reverse the changing perception of the French colonial system and the meaning of the Algerian War in contemporary society. In France, schools are, by law, considered to be the cement of national unity, a place where French Republican identity is formed[172] and targeting them in such way showed attempt at historical revisionism. However, the law was met with fury from academics in France – a petition signed by more than a thousand scholars demanded that the controversial clause be removed.[173] Because of public pressure, after almost a year of controversy, it was withdrawn. Crucially, this case demonstrated that an irreversible change has happened in France regarding colonialism and in turn the Algerian War's memory – even acts coming from the official channels could no longer repress the obsession with the memory of perpetration and the transformation of the memory regime. It has also activated a debate in France about teaching the history of the Algerian War and led to increased amount of class hours dedicated to it.[174]

Cultural vectors - films

Two films stand out as having significantly impacted the change of Algerian War memory regime. Bernard Tavernier's four-hour documentary 'La Guerre Sans Nom' played an important role in breaking the silence and bringing the Algerian War's injustices to public discussions. Based on interviews with 60 former French draftees, who protested against being sent to fight in Algeria, but went nevertheless, the film masterfully depicts the pain and suffering of these French conscripts. Tavernier did not take sides or aim to teach a history lesson,[175] and that is perhaps why, 30 years after the war, these veterans spoke openly and honestly of their experiences for the first time.[176] The sincerity of their accounts and the way they were presented in the film invited many more former draftees to speak to each other and publicly. Although the media systematically stayed away from this film, it has received widespread success among the public. Tavernier toured France with this film and organised after-screening discussions, which would go on until dawn. The film has had an

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172 Assemblée Nationale, *Rapport d'Information Fait en Application de l'Article 145 de Réglement au Nom de la Mission d'Information sur les Questions Memorielles,* 2008. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i1262.asp> [2020 05 14]

173 Petition text, 'Colonisation: non à l'enseignement d'une histoire officielle,' Le Monde, 2005. <https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2005/03/24/colonisation-non-a-l-enseignement-d-une-histoire-officielle_630960_3224.html> [2020 05 14]

174 Itay Lotem, 'A decade after the riots, France has rewritten its colonial history,' The Conversation, 2016. <http://theconversation.com/a- decade-after-the-riots-france-has-rewritten-its-colonial-history-50499> [2020 05 14]

175 Naomi Greene, *Landscapes of Loss– The National Past in Postwar French Cinema*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999, 126.

176 Brigitte Rollet, 'Remembering the Algerian War: Memory/ies and Identity/ies in Téchiné's Les Roseaux Sauvages' in M. S. Alexander et al., *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954–62*. Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2002, 200.

"enormous impact" on the memory of the Algerian War; from then on, it was openly discussed.[177] The film also prompted a small political shift – shortly after the premiere, French president Miterrand received a delegation of Algerian War veterans.[178] Separately, following the film, three French ministers (two of which had seen the film) officially commemorated the Algerian War's ceasefire at the Arc de Triumph for the first time.[179]

'Indigènes' portrayed North African soldiers, recruited to fight for France in WW2, and the ways in which they were discriminated against: for example, their outfits and meals were of inferior quality compared to the French. The Oscar-nominated film demonstrated how French national memory obscured not only the contributions of these soldiers, but also their existence overall – for example, not all of them have been granted veteran status. Those who did, received considerably smaller veteran pensions than the French. The film was a commercial success and inspired a documentary spin-off.[180] However, it was exceptional because of its immediate impact in the political realm, demonstrating how a cultural vector memory can powerfully address and redress political, social and memory issues,[181] and literally amend history.[182] President Jacques Chirac, after a private screening of the film together with his wife, had been immensely moved by the tragedy of these soldiers, who sacrificed so much and yet received little compensation.[183] One day before the official premiere, he announced a change in the policy of pensions for French wars veterans of colonial origin, which had been frozen since 1959, to align them with those received by the French citizens.[184] This has led to an estimated €400 million annual increase of funds dedicated to that policy. This change was a recognition, although belated, of the value of colonial soldiers to France.

Cultural vectors - testimonies

Two testimonies - one legal and the other autobiographical - stand out as key in the transformation of the Algerian memory regime. Testifying in Papon's trial, Einaudi drew public attention to the findings of his book 'La Bataille de Paris' ('The Battle of Paris'), which analyses in

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[177] Patrick Rotman, 'L'énorme impact de 'La Guerre sans Nom,' Le Forum des Images, entretien, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TbzhDZa8x0s> [2020 05 14]

[178] Richard J. Golsan, *Fascism's Return - Scandal, Revision, and Ideology Since 1980*. Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1995, 209.

[179] Ibid, 209.

[180] Catherine Bédarida, 'Indigènes impact,' 2007. Le Monde, <https://www.lemonde.fr/vous/article/2007/09/22/indigenes-impact_958457_3238.html> [2020 05 14]

[181] Michael O'Riley, 'National Identity and Unrealized Union in Rachid Bouchareb's 'Indigènes,'' *The French Review*, 81(2), 2007, 285.

[182] Cheref, 406.

[183] Angelique Chrisafis, 'War film inspires Chirac to raise soldiers' pensions,' The Guardian, 2006. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/28/film.filmnews> [2020 05 14]

[184] Ibid.

detail the massacre and is considered the most influential investigation of the events to this day.[185] Although the archives of that night were inaccessible, Einaudi did an extensive research of alternative sources and conducted a number of interviews with witnesses. On 17 October 1961, in the midst of the Algerian War, a peaceful demonstration of around 30 000 pro-independence Algerians was brutally suppressed in Paris. Police officers attacked demonstrators and threw them into the Seine. The massacre went almost unreported in the media and police officially recognised death of only two people.[186] This repression was exceptional in the wider context of the Algerian War because it took place in Paris, not Algeria, and was a physical manifestation of French involvement in the conflict. Einaudi calculated 200 dead, and this figure was quickly caught by the press and the public.[187] As a result of heightened debates, in 1999 the French government called for the opening of the police archives pertaining to that night.[188] A story told by one man became an influential cultural vector of memory – it spurred public interest and provoked government's action, contributing to the return of repressed memories of the Algerian War.

A testimony by Algerian War survivor Ighilahriz sparked a massive resurfacing of the memories of the Algerian War's most controversial aspect. Over the course of seven months, French newspaper 'L'Humanité' published around 50 articles on the topic of torture during the Algerian War. General Jacques Massu, identified as a torturer by the victim, publicly responded expressing his repentance, and admitted that one could have done things differently and torture was not necessary.[189] The scale of reaction and compassion Ighilahriz's testimony received could have partly been the result of the special purpose of her story – though speaking extensively of the ways she had been tortured, the aim of her testimony was to find and thank the French military doctor who saved her life.[190] This cultural vector of memory, brought into the open the long silenced facts that many elders had kept secret – out of shame, or pain – that were unknown to the younger generation did not know. It highly impacted the transformation of the Algerian War memory regime from amnesia towards acknowledgement.

While these three vectors are deemed by the author to be the most representative of the evolution of the Algerian War memory regime in France, the most recent memory act deserves mention. President Macron's official acknowledgment of the systemic torture used by the French stands on its own, as an official act of memory of the highest importance. It signifies that the memory regime is close to the phase of normalisation, although this analysis is not exhaustive and there will

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[185] House, MacMaster, 14.
[186] Ibid., 7.
[187] Ibid., 7-14.
[188] Ibid., 8.
[189] Cohen, 'The Sudden Memory of Torture,' 86.
[190] Florence Beaugé, 'Louisette Ighilahriz raconte comment elle a été sauvée de la torture par un inconnu pendant la guerre d'Algérie,' Le Monde, 2014. <https://www.lemonde.fr/festival/article/2014/07/28/20-juin-2000-louisette-ighilahriz-retrouve-la-trace-de-son-sauveur_4463627_4415198.html> [2020 05 14]

most certainly be updates on the Algerian memory regime, hopefully in the direction of further reconciliation and normalisation.

Chapter IV

Consistencies between the cases

Having presented the transformation of Vichy and Algerian War's memory regimes, it is now possible to compare them searching for consistencies and more general patterns, that will help to indicate why memory regimes change over time.

The evolution of Algerian memory has undergone a similar afterlife to that of Vichy, going through the four phases, initially characterised by repression and oblivion, but gradually returning, building up the tension and finally bursting into fierce discussions, the so-called memory wars, involving different parts of society – the government, academia, veteran associations, artists and the public. Although in both cases at the beginning of the syndrome the official position on the crimes in question was that they were committed by individual soldiers and not the state, or in Vichy case, that the government was not legitimate, in the 70s, France's relationship with Vichy past had begun to change; twenty years later, a similar process started on memories of the Algerian War, providing almost a textbook comparison, as the Algerian War ended two decades after the end of WW2. As a result of the memory battles and negotiations, memory regimes have changed in both cases, from repression to acknowledgement and (towards) normalisation. Interestingly, the memory transition of both Vichy and Algeria from phase one to phase four took approximately a half of a century.

It should be noted that Algerian memory regime evolution started resembling that of Vichy particularly clearly since it reached the third phase, the 'broken mirror,' while the very beginning of the aftermath of the war was slightly different. Contrary to Vichy memory, where the first ten years were characterised as unfinished mourning with internal chaos, celebration of victory and the purge of collaborators before reaching the phase of memory repression in mid-50s, the Algerian memory entered the phase of amnesia immediately after the Algerian War. Curiously, the period of repression of memories (phase two) lasted for 17 years in both cases. While in the Vichy case it was characterised by the dominance of de Gaulle's myth, oblivion of the Algerian War memories was enabled by the extensive amnesties, covering both fighting sides for their perpetrations committed.

The memory vectors that dominate in respective phases of the Vichy and Algerian memory evolution are different (see table in Appendix 1). The three most representative vectors observed in the Vichy case are films (cultural), books (scholarly) and trials (official), while in Algerian case those are laws (official), films (cultural) and testimonies (cultural). Different memory vectors illuminate

the fact that whilst the memory travelled a similar journey through the phases, the most important 'passengers' were specific to each case. It is noteworthy that in both cases, cultural memory vectors occupied a prominent position alongside official vectors as the most representative of the evolution of the memory regime. The above analyses have demonstrated in detail how the official memory and that of society often diverge, and it is through the constant clashes, disputes, negotiations and dialogue between them that memory regimes can change to better reflect the complex reality that the nations and societies have experienced.

Why memory regimes change?

As Rousso's scheme of Vichy syndrome analysis proved to be applicable to the Algerian memory regime and numerous consistencies were observed in their transformation, it is worth to look for explanations as to why the patterns of change of memory regimes look so much alike. This section is particularly relevant for the broader aim of this thesis – to make a contribution to the development of a theory of memory regime change. It explores whether there are causal mechanisms that provoke these changes.

Why silence?

1. Inglorious events. First of all, both the Vichy regime and Algerian War were internally divisive for France. They contained defeat and state actions and warfare that is not compatible with the ideals of Republicanism, representing the core of French identity. France betrayed these ideals by collaborating with the Nazis during WW2 and using torture during the Algerian War. Torture was just one part of the unjust colonial system but can be regarded as a symbol of wider colonial injustices and domination exerted by the metropolis.[191] The shameful memories of the two events were thus silenced by officials. Robert Frank, however, gives an interesting observation, that out of these two 'événements peu glorieux' (inglorious events), Vichy at least had heroes to be proud of – the Resistance fighters and the Free French forces – while the Nazis were the ultimate evil.[192] In the Algerian War, there were no proud moments or heroes to honour. Algeria was supposed to be the jewel in France's imperial crown. Keeping it French was understood to be proof of continued greatness; losing it has stripped France of its world power status.[193] In 1961, the French voted in a referendum to grant Algeria independence and thus made it impossible to honour anyone who fought

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[191] Löytömäki, 'Legalisation of the Memory of the Algerian War in France,' 164.
[192] Robert Frank, 'Les Troubles de la Mémoire Française,' in Jean-Pierre Rioux (ed.), *La guerre d'Algérie et les Français.* Paris: Fayard, 1990, cited in McCormack, *Collective Memory,* 16.
[193] Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory,' 221.

to keep it French. This observation can partly explain why the immediate aftermaths of the Vichy regime and Algerian War were slightly different, and while post-WW2 France celebrated victory simultaneously repressing memory of collaboration, Algerian War was immediately drowned into oblivion.

2. Silence of the victims. It is observed that after painful experiences, such as wars, people choose to silence their memories due to emotional pain. According Cathy Caruth, such events can never be included in the present, as they need time to manifest themselves.[194] Aleida Assmann spoke of double silence, self-imposed by both perpetrators and victims. The former are silent due to shame and guilt, the latter – for more complex reasons related to trauma.[195] Rousso wrote that after WW2, resistants, especially those most genuinely committed, maintained silence whilst deportees 'found it impossible to describe what they had endured.'[196] After such experiences, victims try to overcome humiliation and regain dignity.[197] Similarities are observed in the Algerian case – many Algerian parents did not speak of their wartime experiences to their children, especially those who fled to France. They chose silence out of fear that their stories will alienate the children from French society or simply wanted to move on and return to normal life.[198] After all, the war was erased from official memory and history, and if testimonies by high ranking French military officers such as general Massu did not receive attention, what could have?

The return of memories

1. Generational change. The findings of the case comparison show that it took approximately the same number of years for the memory regime to change and suggests there is some kind of inherent logic behind that. It is not just the passage of time, but a generational change that is crucial to the change in collective memory. Generational change is named by many memory scholars as a key factor contributing to transformation in the way the key events in the nation's history are perceived and represented.[199] It is important for overall society and also specifically the political domain. Different generations view the event differently – those with first-hand experience have a complicated relationship and deep personal wounds which inhibit their ability to engage in healthy discussions on the past. Subsequent generations, however, see young academics, artists, and active

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[194] Cathy Caruth (ed.), *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1995, 202-203.
[195] Aleida Assman, cited in Jerry Schuchalter, *Poetry and Truth – Variations on Holocaust Testimony*. Bern: Peter Lang, 2009, 3.
[196] Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, 305.
[197] Holly L. Guthrey, 'Victim healing and truth commissions: Transforming pain through voice in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste,' 2015, cited in Ana Mijić, 'Don't Talk About the Elephant: Silence and Ethnic Boundaries in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina,' *Human Studies* 41, 2018, 139.
[198] Cohen, 'The Algerian War and French Memory,'498; House, MacMaster, 271-72.
[199] Cohen, 'The Algerian War and French Memory,' 499-500.

members of civil society who want to learn about their roots and are able to contribute not just to the breaking of silence, but most importantly to healing and reconciling the nation's difficult past, precisely because they do not have the personal painful memories themselves. For example, the 80s mark a time when second generation Algerian descendants entered universities and started searching for their own identity. As there was little known and spoken about the war and colonialism in general, these young people started demanding recognition through works of history, literature, and arts.[200]

While passing generations are generally seen as being able work through difficult memories in a dispassionate way, this is not always the case. French opinion polls indicate that the youth are stricter towards past injustices and crimes committed by their predecessors.[201] The revolts in May 1968, the largest general strike in French history, were full of emotions and anger against capitalism, consumerism, bureaucracy and politics. Protests were led by university students, critical of Charles de Gaulle authoritarian politics, among which were the concealment of collaboration and blind celebration of resistance. Emerging stories of the French use of torture in the recent Algerian War further fuelled revolt against the French hypocrisy.[202] These events, as already discussed, marked a watershed in the French approach to Vichy history, entering the third phase of broken mirror.

Generational change is all the more important in the political realm. De Gaulle's death opened the way for France to start a new relationship with its past – the myth of resistance, inseparable from de Gaulle, now began to be questioned and was overshadowed by the return of Vichy memories and re-examination of the period. A similar development pertaining to the Algerian War began after the death of President Miterrand, who served as a minister during the Algerian War. However, it was not until a completely fresh generation of politicians who did not remember the war took office that more important acknowledgements would take place. The French state assumed responsibility for the crimes of Vichy only in 1995. Jacques Chirac was the first president to not have any involvement with Vichy and thus was free of any emotional attachment or controversial record that could have compromised him. President Emmanuel Macron sees himself as having a duty similar to that of Chirac's 'Vichy moment.' Born after the Algerian War, he sees "decolonisation of French memory"[203] as one of the key tasks for his term and has arguably made a big leap in that direction.

However, while this supposes that future generations find it easier to acknowledge the wrongs of the past and, recognising intergenerational responsibility,[204] compensate for historical injustices

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[200] Benjamin Stora, 'Algérie-France, mémoires sous tension,' Le Monde, 2012.<https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/03/18/algerie-france-memoires-sous-tension_1669417_3212.html> [2020 05 14]; Jansen, 280.
[201] Cohen, 'The Sudden Memory of Torture, 84.
[202] Rebecca Clifford, Commemorating the Holocaust–The Dilemmas of Remembrance in France and Italy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013, 52.
[203] Romain Houeix, 'Guerre d'Algérie : Emmanuel Macron au cœur d'une nouvelle polémique mémorielle,' 2002. <http://f24.my/65lv> [2020 05 14]
[204] Löytömaki, Law and the Politics of Memory – Confronting the Past, 63.

committed by their predecessors, they can sometimes feel too distant to the events to meaningfully reflect on them. Therefore, the passage of generations remains a delicate matter, which cannot be relied on fully for the salvation of past issues. And whilst it was observed as a crucial factor, it cannot fully explain why memory regimes change.

3. Media. Growing media resources contributed to raising popular interest with repressed memories by shedding light on previously unknown events, stories and facts. As memory is concerned first of all with representation, the role of the media can become decisive. For example, Papon's trial was witnessed by 146 accredited journalists and more than 1000 scholars.[205] That way, the trial was not confined to the circle of experts, but became accessible to wide society.[206] Separately, 'Le Monde' can be credited for igniting discussions on torture controversy when it published the testimony of a torture victim, which was followed by dozens of other similar testimonies and stories all over the French media. These two examples show the powerful role that the media can assume as a transmitter of memory. Nancy Wood spoke about the growing power that the media exerts on collective memory, to the point that the media itself is becoming a vector of memory.[207] However, it is worth inserting here a quote by Elizabeth Jelin and Susana G. Kaufman, who said that "for memory transmission to take place, we need 'good transmitters, but also open receptors' that recognise the past and the modalities through which it is represented as meaningful."[208] This brings us back to the previously discussed silence of the victims and generational change – however shocking the narrative is and whatever the medium of its transmission – if the society is not ready to let these memories in, they will not bring about a memory regime change.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to explain how and why memory regimes change in France. It has also sought to take the first step towards creating a comparative theory of memory regimes by using a snowballing outwards strategy. While academic research on national memory is booming, it is primarily concerned with single case studies, and out of the few existing comparative frameworks for analysis of different memory regimes, none is applicable to the Western countries, which deprive the field of theoretical and empirical discoveries that could be made. France has been chosen as a starting point because it is an especially interesting case – home for pioneering memory scholars, it nevertheless has a troubled record of dealing with its national memories; two cases stand out in particular. The French have

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[205] Nancy Wood, *Vectors of Memory: Legacy of Trauma in Postwar Europe*, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999, 113.
[206] Ibid., 9.
[207] Ibid., 9.
[208] Elizabeth Jelin, Susana Kaufman, 'Layers of Memories: Twenty Years after in Argentina', 2017, cited in House, MacMaster, 308.

betrayed their ideals and values during World War Two and the Algerian War, and implemented policies of official amnesia in the aftermath, which led to formation of memory regimes repressing memories of perpetration. This thesis explored the afterlife of these memories and compared the evolution that the two memory regimes have undergone, from oblivion to acknowledgement, that led France to accept its past as we know it.

The findings have confirmed that the evolution of Vichy and Algerian War syndromes followed a similar path, going through the four phases of memory regime change. The first and the second phases were characterised by silence and repression of the difficult memories surrounding the events. In the case of Vichy, it was the French willingness and extent of collaboration with the Nazis, while in the memory of the Algerian War, the most controversial issue was the French state-sanctioned torture against the Algerian rebels. Initially, policy of amnesia was enforced largely through the official vectors of memory and was willingly accepted by the society; in time, however, the repressed memories started reawakening through cultural and scholarly memory vectors, challenging the official version of memory and leading to increased tensions in the memory regimes. In both cases, the mirror of silence broke, marking the start of the third phase whereby the memories of perpetration resurfaced with great power, overwhelming the public debate and finding their way back into the political realm. In this phase, cultural and scholarly vectors of memory played a decisive role and proved that shaping the content of memory regime is not within the purview of any single actor, as is often regarded by those ascribing the power of national memory making to the political actors only. With the explosion of previously occluded memories, the prevailing memory regimes were shattered. In the fourth phase, obsession with memories of Vichy collaboration and Algerian War's torture controversy continued occupying the public and political debate in France. This period saw memories manifesting through various vectors simultaneously, including the official ones, which began to embrace the changed attitudes in the society. Gradually, previously marginalised memories found their place in the nation's memory, leading to a memory regime change. As difficult memories gained recognition, they were not forgotten but became ritualised and inscribed into the national memory. Memory regime of Vichy has reached a phase of normalisation and has fully transformed, while memory regime of the Algerian War is currently in a state of relative normalisation.

The similarities observed in the evolution of the Vichy and the Algerian memory regimes indicate that the changes did not happen accidentally. There are several causal mechanisms that can explain why memory regimes changed the way they did, and why some memory vectors were empowered and became groundbreaking, while others faded away without having any impact. First, there was a period of silence in the aftermath of the wars enforced largely by the officials but also the society; everyone had their own reasons to forget the disgraceful events but all shared a common wish to return to normality, which enabled the establishment of a memory regime excluding memories of

perpetration. Secondly, despite the occasional manifestations of the repressed memory, it was only when a generational change in the society and the political realm occured that a more fruitful and objective discussion could take place, resulting in reformulation of the memory regime and leading to a healthier relationship with the past. The third cause was the increasing role of the media: publicising the previously repressed or marginal memories and silenced stories, the media was making them widely accessible and contributed to their internalisation by the society and in turn, the memory regime change. Observing and bringing these causal mechanisms together contributes to the development of the theory of memory regime change.

Analysis of Vichy and Algerian memory regimes has confirmed the validity of the analytical model encompassing both official and unofficial vectors of memory, as it was the rigorous engagement of all of them that enabled the memory regimes to transform. While the government holds the lion's share of power over formation of the prevailing memory regime and official vectors of memory are paramount when seeking reconciliation with previously repressed memories, it is the shifting attitudes and moral infrastructure of the society, manifesting through cultural or scholarly vectors, that usually prompt the changes in the memory regime. It is illuminating how national memory regime, such an abstract and complex structure, reflecting nation's mentality and identity, can be suddenly torn apart through a single act - book, film or interview - coming from a single 'regular' person.

While previous research has often pointed to the connections between the memory afterlife of the Algerian War and the Vichy in France, this thesis has supplemented the existing studies by comparing them through a single theoretical framework that shed light on interesting aspects and tendencies that were previously undetected. Demonstrating similar patterns in the way memories of perpetration during the Vichy regime and the Algerian War have reclaimed their place in the nation's memory, this thesis makes a compelling case for a further application of the theoretical scheme for cases beyond France. Should it prove to be suitable for analyzing other Western countries' memory regimes, it would be interesting to test in in other regions, for example, in post-soviet countries, where, in the view of scholars such as Bernhard and Kubick, political leaders have all power in the formation of memory regimes.

Repressed memories of the past have haunted France for many years after the events; politics, arts, history and public debate became fields of memory wars, demonstrating the grave consequences that a silenced memory of the past can have for the present. Yet, one does not have to look far to find other examples of nationally repressed memories. Seeing scholarly memory vectors powerfully breaking the silence in France could become an inspiration and a stimulus to take on research about difficult episodes of our own country's past.

Appendix 1: Vichy and Algerian War's memory vectors

	Vichy memory		Algerian memory	
	Key events	**Vectors of memory**	**Key events**	**Vectors of memory**
First phase	1. Internal purge, 2. Gaullist myth of resistance, 3. Amnesties.	a. Official (trials, Gaullist myth, amnesty laws).	1. Amnesties, 2. Film 'La Bataille d'Algers,' 3. Massu's memoirs, 4. Burial of North African soldier.	a. Official (amnesty laws, burial), b. Cultural (film, testimony).
Second phase	1. Robert Aron's book, 2. Burial of Resistance hero Jean Moulin at the Pantheon.	a. Scholarly (book), b. Official (ceremony of reburial).	1. Transitional period in historiography, 2. History taught in terminal classes.	a. Scholarly (historiography and to a small extent teaching).
Third phase	1. 1968 revolts, 2. Film 'La Chagrin et la Pitié', 3. Robert Paxton's book.	a. Cultural (film), b. Scholarly (book), c. Revolts stand on their own as collective cultural vector.	1. Benjamin Stora's book, 2. Anniversaries of Paris Massacre and the end of Algerian war, 3. Maurice Papon's trial, 4. Political decisions to open the archives, 5. Film 'La Guerre Sans Nom.'	a. Official (trial, opening of the archives), b. Cultural (film), c. Scholarly (book).
Fourth phase	1. Political decisions to open the archives which led to 2. More objective historiography works and more objective teaching of Vichy in schools, 3. Belated trials of collaborators (notably Papon's), 4. Jacques Chirac's acknowledgement.	a. Scholarly (historiography and teaching), b. Official (opening of the archives, political acknowledgement, trials).	1. Status of war given, 2. Torture controversy, 3. Petiton 'Appel des douze,' 4. Aussaresses memoirs, 5. Law on positive aspects of colonialism, 6. Film 'Indigénes,' 7. Emmanuel Macron's acknowledgement	a. Official (laws, trials, political acknowledgement) b. Cultural (testimonies, petition, film).

Table 1

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Reziumė

Atminties režimų kaita: prisimenant Viši ir Alžyro karą Prancūzijoje

Bendra atmintis - svarbi tautos identiteto dalis, sutelkianti ir vienijanti skirtingas visuomenes grupes. Reprezentuodama praeitį, ji lemia kaip tauta suvokia save šiandien ir kuria jos ateities tapatybę, todėl yra svarbus politinių tyrimų objektas. Nors akademiniuose tyrimuose pastebimas „atminties bumas," didžioji dalis nacionalinės atminties tyrimų nagrinėja pavienius atvejus; pastebima, jog nėra teorijos, leidžiančios palyginti skirtingus atminties režimus, t.y., tam tikru laikotarpiu nusistovėjusias organizuotas įvykio ar proceso prisiminimo būdų konfigūracijas, tarpusavyje. Viena iš nedaugelio tokių teorijų, sukurta M. Bernhardo ir J. Kubicko, atminties režimų formavimą mato esant tik valdžios ir politinių veikėjų galioje. Tačiau daugelyje vakarų valstybių, tokiose kaip Prancūzija, turinčiose stiprias respublikoniškas tradicijas, ši prieiga pernelyg susiaurina atminties veikėjų lauką ir neleidžia išsamiai ištirti atminties režimų. Prancūzija - įdomi šalis atminties tyrimams: nors čia radosi kolektyvinės atminties studijos, kurių pradininku laikomas Maurice Halbwachsas, o Pierre Nora yra išsamiai aprašęs svarbiausias Prancūzijos atminties vietas, visgi Prancūzijos santykis su kai kuriais praeities prisiminimais yra itin komplikuotas. Išskiriami du įvykiai - Viši režimas Antrojo pasaulinio karo metais ir Alžyro karas - per kuriuos Prancūzija pamynė savo idealus: pirmuoju atveju kolaboruodama su naciais, antruoju - sistemingai naudodama valstybės sankcionuotus kankinimus prieš alžyriečius. Nesugebėdama integruoti „skriaudiko" atminties apie padarytus nusikaltimus į nacionalinį naratyvą, Prancūzija abiem atvejais užgniaužė ir represavo šiuos prisiminimus. Vis dėlto, tokia atmintis neišvengiamai sugrįžta į viešumą.

Darbo objektas - nacionaliniai atminties režimai ir jų kaita, o tikslas - išsiaiškinti kaip ir kodėl Prancūzijoje keičiasi atminties režimai. Taip pat, atsižvelgiant į teorinės prieigos atminties režimams nagrinėti trūkumą, šiuo darbu siekiama žengti žingsnį jos kūrimo link naudojant „snowballing outwards" strategiją. Analitinis modelis, paremtas Henry Rousso Viši analize, žvelgia į tris atminties vektorių, t.y. atminties reprezentacijų, grupes: tai oficialūs, kultūriniai ir moksliniai vektoriai. Oficialūs - įstatymai, teismų nuosprendžiai, politikų kalbos, atsakomybės už nusikaltimus pripažinimai, minėjimai. Kultūriniai ir moksliniai, arba neformalūs atminties vektoriai, kylantys iš visuomenės, menininkų, istorikų, rašytojų, pasireiškia per neoficialias atminties reprezentacijas - filmus, knygas ir kt.

Analizė, atlikta modifikavus ir išplėtus Rousso Viši atminties transformacijos schemą bei pritaikius ją Alžyro karo atminčiai, atskleidžia, jog Viši ir Alžyro karo atminties režimai patyrė panašią transformaciją, pereidami nuo amnezijos politikos ir skaudžios atminties represavimo link jos pripažinimo ir integravimo į nacionalinę atmintį. Išanalizavus atminties režimus ir identifikavus pagrindinius lūžius jų vystymesi, žyminčius keturias skirtingas fazes, atrasta, jog atminties režimui pasikeisti reikalingas aktyvus visų trijų rūšių atminties vektorių įsitraukimas. Nors kultūrinių ir mokslinių vektorių poveikis yra sąlygotas jų gebėjimo pritraukti visuomenės ir politikų dėmesį, jie vaidina

pagrindinį vaidmenį sukeliant atminties režimo pokytį, tuo tarpu oficialūs atminties vektoriai dažnai veikia kaip atsakas į jau pasikeitusią visuomenės pasaulėžiūrą, oficialiai įtvirtindami atminties režimo pasikeitimą. Analizė taip pat atskleidė kaip atminties režimas, sudėtinga ir abstrakti struktūra, gali staiga sugriūti dėl vieno žmogaus sukurto atminties vektoriaus - filmo ar knygos.

Aptikus reikšmingų panašumų Viši ir Alžyro karo atminties režimų evoliucijoje, darbe pateikiami priežastiniai mechanizmai, paaiškinantys, kodėl atminties režimai keitėsi taip panašiai. Nors ankstyvuoju laikotarpiu po įvykių pastebimas ir nusikaltėlių, ir aukų noras užtildyti skaudžius prisiminimus, jie nepasimiršta ir po kurio laiko sugrįžta į viešumą. Tik neturintys asmeninių prisiminimų apie kontraversiškus įvykius gali kurti sveikesnį ir objektyvesnį šalies santykį su praeitimi, todėl kartų kaita lemia, jog praeities klaidos pripažįstamos, o nutildyta atmintis tampa bendros tautos atminties dalimi. Galiausiai, žiniasklaida vaidina vis svarbesnį vaidmenį atminties režimų kaitoje, suteikdama prieigą visuomenei dalyvauti atminties debatuose ir viešindama seniau užslėptus prisiminimus.

Nors ankstesni tyrimai atkreipia dėmesį į sąsajas tarp Viši ir Alžyro karo atminties, šiame darbe atminties režimai išanalizuoti per vieną teorinį modelį, išryškinant jų panašumus ir aspektus, nepastebimus nagrinėjant pavieniui. Šiuo darbu taip pat padedamas žingsnis lyginamosios atminties režimų kaitos teorijos kūrimo link. Tolesnis šio analizės modelio pritaikymas už Prancūzijos ribų galėtų atverti naujų teorinių galimybių ir empirinių atradimų atminties studijų laukui.