| Abstract [eng] |
The dissertation analyses inference to the best explanation (IBE). Firstly, the thesis explicates the concept of IBE, it analyzes what does the concept of explanatory power stands for. Secondly, the thesis evaluates the tenability of the truth aspirations of IBE, it analyzes to what extent a hypothesis can be claimed to be true, given that it is the best explanation for some phenomenon of interest. IBE is explicated as a form of material inference that ascribes truth to the hypothesis that has the highest degree of explanatory virtues among its competitors: is the most consistent with approved background knowledge, unifies the most the relevant phenomena, is the deepest explanation and is the most simple explanation. Probabilistic approaches to IBE are criticized. Four basic ways of justification of the truth-conduciveness of IBE that can be discerned in the literature are described: reliabilist-coherentist, evolutionary, probabilistic and empirical-historical. The thesis concludes that while IBE could facilitate the determination of probability distributions and is a wide psychological practice, due to the bad lot argument, possible incommensurability of explanatory virtues, pessimistic induction and better safe than sorry beliefs all the four ways of justification of IBE in terms of truth-conduciveness cannot be taken for granted which leaves IBE only accidentally valid. |
