| Abstract [eng] |
A phenomenon called legal argumentation is analyzed in the dissertation. The aim of the thesis is to identify the prerequisites that allow to consider the legal argumentation to be correct, also to evaluate those prerequisites logically. Legal argumentation is analyzed as a phenomenon per se, without relating it to any particular arguing subject. Other dimensions of the process of making a legal decision, such as legal reasoning, legal discourse, interpretation of law and others are discussed and compared in the thesis, however the main emphasis is given to the explicit argumentative side of legal reasoning. Thus the thesis enriches Lithuanian legal doctrine with a topic on argumentation that is not widely studied yet. The distinction between the thesis and the studies carried out by researchers in other countries in the area of legal reasoning and legal argumentation manifests by asking a specific question: how and why is the correctness of legal argumentation a problem? The conceptions of law and legal argumentation are revealed. It is demonstrated that the practice of non distinguishing existence from obligatoriness is prevalent in a real legal argumentation: ought is derived from is, what has been is used to justify what should be. Even though this practice does not conform to the standards of logic and positive science, it is effective, has justified itself and thus it could be considered to be legally rational. The results of the research essentially confirm the hypothesis, which states that the prerequisites for correctness in legal argumentation are to be formulated using argumentative tools and practices that are less strict than the standards of logic. |
