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MILITARY AS THE FORGOTTEN DIMENSION OF POLITICAL THEORY

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*“War, however frequently it may recur, is but a temporary interruption of this desired condition [...] the necessary means of restoring peace upon satisfactory terms”, John McAllister Schofield, US Lieutenant General<sup>1</sup>*

*“Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a pleasant one. War is a part of God’s world order. War develops man’s noblest virtues, which otherwise would slumber and die out”, Helmuth von Moltke, German Field Marshal<sup>2</sup>*

## **Introduction**

The words of two prominent 19<sup>th</sup> century officers, despite their fundamental differences, have one thing in common: temporary or not, war is a very important part of human lives. For many this is so obvious that any attempt to deny this might be considered a folly. Yet, often this fact is forgotten or knowingly ignored.

Those familiar with the writings of Sir M. Howard may find resemblance between the title of one of his famous articles and the title of this dissertation.<sup>3</sup> In that article, Howard was lecturing nuclear deterrence-minded strategic analysts to remember that it is people, not technologies, who fight and endure hardships of war and decide the fate of conflicts between the states. According to him, disappearance of discussions about social dimension of strategy from scholar and expert writings was worrisome. Ignorance of human factor could endanger the whole purpose of strategy.

This dissertation might be considered as a continuation of the discussion started by Howard more than 30 years ago. His argument that military theorists have forgotten the social dimension will be reversed in this dissertation by arguing that

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<sup>1</sup>John M. Schofield, ‘Notes on ‘The Legitimate in War’, *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, 2, 1881, pp. 1-10 in Brian Mcallister Linn, *The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup>Daniel J. Hughes (ed.), *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup>Michael Howard, ‘The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy’, *Foreign Affairs*, 57, 1979.

social scientists in their discussions and debates have forgotten the military dimension.

This sense of forgetfulness is based on two assumptions. First is more subjective and based on personal review of situation in the fields of social sciences and history. It seems that comparing with the situation 20-30 years back today there are less serious scholar works where macro level topics like formation of the state, development of international and world systems are analysed. In these works, because of their macro-perspective, military dimension was treated more seriously than today.<sup>4</sup> Contemporary scholars when discussing changes in the society or state give attention to the issues like economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, justice.<sup>5</sup> Only on rare occasions the military appears on the research agenda and even then it is mostly given a secondary role. This subjective impression is confirmed by more firm data after analysing information about citation index, impact factor, number of academic journals, number of articles where topic of military dimension in social sciences in general are discussed.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For instances historians, working in the fields of international, diplomatic history for some time are speaking about swinging fortunes of theme of primacy of foreign policy. According to them, there was ones a historical tradition, which emphasised the primacy of foreign policy, when issues of foreign policy (i.e. diplomatic and military) shaped political life of the states (domestically and externally). Later on, this tradition lost its positions, was forgotten and for the last 25 years is trying to regain its lost place with varying successes. It is hardly a coincidence, that in different academic fields the same subject (military) was pushed away around the same time. Brendan Simms, 'The Return of the Primacy of Foreign Policy', *German History*, 21, 2003, pp. 275 -291; Michael Hochedlinger, 'Who's Afraid of the French Revolution? Austrian Foreign Policy and the European Crisis 1787-1797', *German History*, 21, 2003, pp. 293 -318; William Mulligan and Brendan Simms, *The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660-2000: How Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern Britain*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Probably the best up-to-date work about contemporary trends in historical sociology, social theory is edited volume by Julia Adams, Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens and Ann Shola Orloff, *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005. The pieces of this book and ensuing debate and critique about ideas expressed there clearly shows that contemporary social theory is steadily, but assuredly moving from structural, meta level research questions and objects towards micro level, more contextualized and temporal objects like gender, race, sexuality, family, etc. For critical reception of this book look in a special issue of *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, October 2006, vol. 47; also Matthias Koenig, 'Historical Sociology? Limitations and Perspectives', *European Journal of Sociology*, 47, 2006, pp. 397-406.

<sup>6</sup> Even sketchy analysis of data in ISI Web of Knowledge showed that military topic in main journals of social sciences became rarity for the last twenty years. They did not disappear entirely, but declined in numbers and popularity.

This forgetfulness of military dimension, considering the popularity and importance of the military in our daily lives creates a paradoxical situation. Narratives and symbols of war are all around us: national anthems, holidays, monuments, even casual words and expressions to name just a few.<sup>7</sup> Literature and media about war (military history books, fiction and documentary movies) undoubtedly are one of the most popular genres in their respective industries. It seems that war attracts people with its perceived thrill, danger, courage, action and romance that you find in wartime stories.

However, if we look at war as a ‘fact of daily life’ the situation changes dramatically. People are passionate about war, but only as an event of the past. It seems that it is often unbearable to accept the idea that things that they have read in books or seen in the cinema are actually happening at present. From the perspective of dominant liberal worldview, war is an anomaly, a temporary interruption before reaching perpetual peace.<sup>8</sup> Yet history and present events in places like Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya raises serious doubts about the possibility to reach lasting peace at any moment in the nearest future. War was, is and always will be a part of human life. To deny this is to deny everything that has happened in the past. Wars were one of the main catalysts in creating and destroying societies and political entities. The evidence of the recent past and the present clearly demonstrates that the use of violence will not cease to be one of humanity’s most important and significant activities.

Therefore, the starting position of this PhD dissertation is that by forgetting and ignoring military dimension in our intellectual discussions we may miss a very important factor without which we will not fully understand changes in the contemporary world. This dissertation is an attempt to show how and why military dimension is important for political theory and to find the ways and means on how to bring it back.

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<sup>7</sup> Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*. London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 26-59.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*. Rutgers Univ Pr, 1978, p. 31.

To understand importance of this theoretical problem imagine yourself in a situation when you have to choose what item to acquire first – a hefty purse (money) or a big mace (weapon). Following the first choice, we will situate ourselves in the position of Renaissance Italian cities that, by having a lot of money, could buy their protection and hire mercenaries. If you take the second path, you will find yourself in the position of absolutist France or Prussia, where state, using the words of Ch. Tilly, was conducting an organized “protection racket”.<sup>9</sup> The state using the military coerced its people and took money that was necessary for state activities.<sup>10</sup> The first path represents the liberal point of view: if you have the money, you will be able to buy protection if you need one. The second path represents the perspective of T. Hobbes and C. Schmitt: if you have mace and muscles, than you will get all the money you need for your other ventures.

This dissertation with some reservations and caution follows the tradition of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt.<sup>11</sup> War is a necessary condition for creating political entities and for conducting politics. Imagine a hypothetical situation where someone refuses to pay taxes. Normally, according to all binding rules, the institution responsible for tax collection will try to force that person to pay taxes. However, in this situation, our person refuses to discuss matters with the tax collectors and chases them away by threatening them with a gun. In such a case, the police will come and try to disarm that person, yet he or she is too heavily armed even for the police forces. Facing an emergency, police will have to ask for the help from special police units, like S.W.A.T. If, even these special units fail, the government will not have any other choice but to use the armed forces - the instrument of the last resort. Let us play this fictional situation to the very end.

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<sup>9</sup> Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169-186.

<sup>10</sup> Of course, this example is very simplistic and mainly for the sake of argument. From the following chapters it will be clear that academic debate is more complex and subtle.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan. Parts I and II*. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2005; Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.



The armed forces also fail to disarm this lawbreaker, and consequently the government does not have any other means to force this person to obey the rules. The person steps out from the political entity. In fact, she or he has become a political entity.

This small and fictional interplay shows the logic of the modern state. The armed forces, being the last resort and at the same time being the backbone of the state because there is nothing left behind them. The critical importance of the armed forces shows the importance of war itself. C. Schmitt captured it very well in his writings: “it (war-D.Š) is the most extreme consequence of enmity. It does not have to be common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real possibility for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid”<sup>12</sup>.

### *Aim, goal, thesis*

The *aim* of this dissertation is to bring back the tradition of political theory which based its understanding of political in the state and the society mainly on the perspective of the military dimension.<sup>13</sup> This tradition is associated this scholars like M. Weber, O. Hintze, N. Elias, A. Giddens. Ch. Tilly, T. Skocpol, M. Mann. What unites all of them is the understanding that the military dimension, like the economic, social, or cultural dimensions, is equally important for the formation and transformation of the modern state. Formation and further

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<sup>12</sup> Schmitt, p. 33.

<sup>13</sup> Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton Univ Pr, 1975; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992; Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Vol. I.; Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, Vol. II.; Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988; Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. London: Polity, 1985; Christopher Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day*. Cambridge: Polity, 1990; Brian M Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins Of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992; Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994; Felix Gilbert, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*. New York: Oxford U.P, 1975; Bruce D Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1994.

development of social and political theories were based on continuing debate and tensions among three traditions of sociology, associated with Durkheim, Marx and Weber. However, despite impressive assembly of scholars, Weber's tradition has always had difficulties to be accepted as a mainstream approach in the social theory. It was pushed away from the scene by liberal, Marxist and later by critical political theories. These mainstream traditions see relations between the military and other dimensions as a one-way track: everything that happens in the military sphere is a result of economic, social, political or cultural reasons. Such position is strengthened further by the argument provided by new generation of historical sociologists. They are arguing that Giddens, Tilly, Skocpol and their respective theories were representations of the second wave of historical sociology. According to them, the time of these theories passed over and now we have something like paradigmatic shift and formation of the third wave of historical sociology.<sup>14</sup>

However, there might be some issues that originated in the military sphere and their consequences spread and affected other spheres as well. Therefore, in this dissertation analysis of the role and importance of military dimension is conducted in order to show that there is no paradigmatic shift and that "old" topics (i.e. state formation) are still important in today's understanding of social processes.

In this dissertation, relationships between different dimensions of human activity will be considered not as between a master and a servant, but as between equal partners. Therefore, this dissertation treats all other possible independent variables as *ceteris paribus*. Only in this way can we construct ideal types and a theoretical framework necessary for this research.

Therefore, the *goal* of this dissertation is to update these bellicose, war - centred theories and to modify them by proposing a conceptual framework and tools that may help to bring back the military dimension from the margins of

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<sup>14</sup>Julia Adams, pp., 1-72.

social research into more respectable position. To put it very simple, the update of these theories must be done by turning political science more seriously towards history in general and to military history in particular. The decision to place history into the centre of this dissertation came after an intriguing discovery. If those familiar with historical works about the military's role in the formation of a state, society suddenly entered into the area of political science and sociology, will be surprised that only a few are using this rich and interesting material provided by historians. It becomes even more surprising when one learns, that there was a school of scholars who tried to use elements of this historical knowledge. Therefore, the natural answer and solution of this problem was a proposition for social scientists to take history more seriously and to look there for ideas and conceptual tools, which could better help to explain dynamics of political life.

One more surprising discovery in all this discussion is that main proponents of Weber's sociological tradition and bellicose political theories are associated with historical sociology.<sup>15</sup> That discipline, by definition is taking history seriously, therefore at first sight it seems hard to talk about historical turn in historical sociology. However, it seems that it might not be the case. According to C. Calhoun, "historical sociology has not succeeded enough in historicizing social theory and itself becoming too often atheoretical".<sup>16</sup> It seems, that in order to survive as discipline, historical sociology started playing by the rules of sociology, became "domesticated" and sometimes reduced to conventional sociology applied to the past.<sup>17</sup> All this means that even the most "historical" part of social sciences needs a revitalisation, a new, fresh look into history. It seems that findings of

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<sup>15</sup> The problem is twofold. This dissertation relies very much on findings done by historical sociologists. On the one hand, these scholars are taking history very seriously. However, historical sociology, despite famous members of this community, is kind of minority in the field of social sciences. On the other hand, even when contemporary historical sociologists are using history, they are speaking more about gender, ethnicity, identities. Military aspects are analysed and discussed, but they are far from popular topics and have a flavour of previously mentioned research topics. Look Julia Adams, *Remaking Modernity*, pp. 249-285;

<sup>16</sup> Craig Calhoun, „The Rise and Domestication of Historical Sociology“ in Terrence J McDonald, *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. 306.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 328.

military historians may offer something what may help for social scientists to find new look into history in particular and social changes/transformations in general.

The main theoretical modification proposed here is the idea of *Military Revolution*, borrowed from the field of military history. Michael Roberts introduced the idea of Military Revolution (MR) more than fifty years ago. The main point of Roberts' argument is that between 1560 and 1660 the conduct of war and its relationship with the state changed so dramatically that we must use the term 'revolution' to describe it. This revolution was the result of attempts to solve the bigger problem of tactics: 'the problem of how to combine missile weapons with close action'.<sup>18</sup> The solution to this puzzle caused changes in four critical areas: tactics (role of firearms, siege warfare), size of armies, strategy (war became more complex; fighting on several fronts simultaneously) and the impact of war on society and the state (new forms of administration, tax collection, etc.). Despite the fact that the original debate about MR concerns the early modern period, in this dissertation it is considered that this idea offers theoretical tools that might be useful when discussing contemporary military changes and their relations with the changes outside the military domain.

For this dissertation this idea is important because of its theoretical insights and suggestions how small events, shifts might cause far-reaching consequences. In this case, two things must be emphasised. First – in order to apply this idea of revolutionary change in a wider theoretical discussion about political transformations, it is necessary to analyse in detail all its main premises, logic of argumentation and the main critique. That will help to understand a possible causation, a role of path dependence, critical junctures. Therefore, secondly, the intention is to show how discussion about *the* Military revolution can be changed into debate about *a* Military revolution. This is the essence of this dissertation –

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<sup>18</sup> Michael Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660' in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Clifford Rogers. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1995, p. 3.

to show how an idea, created for one particular case might be applied for other cases across time and space.

The idea of MR is important for one more reason. This dissertation is written following the best traditions of historical sociology, i.e. from macro-level perspective. Only from such perspective it is possible to analyse and understand such processes like state formation and development. However, best historical sociology writing tradition has one more feature, ability to connect micro-level events, processes into bigger, macro-level picture. That is where an idea of MR becomes very helpful. The very essence of MR is macro scale consequences of micro causes. If you are using idea of MR, you have to connect micro and macro levels into one consistent and coherent framework. This PhD dissertation is written in this way: questions and problems of macro-level are addressed by analysing, discussing and using various materials from micro-level researches.

Bearing in mind that there are so many different angles when discussing war and the armed forces, some simplifications are required. This task is solved by relying on the vast research conducted by the so-called historical “war and society” school.<sup>19</sup> The authors of this school are trying to analyse the relationships between the armed forces and the society through different historical times. Usually they do so by asking such questions as how war was understood and how it was conducted in a particular historical period; how the armed forces were organized; who filled the rank and file and how did they live; and, finally, what kind of relationships existed between the armed forces and other institutions of the state.

It is important to emphasise that probably it would be difficult to find any human activity, which could not be affected directly or indirectly by war.

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<sup>19</sup> Geoffrey Best, *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe 1770-1870*. Leicester: Leicester University Press in association with Fontana, 1982; Brian Bond, *War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983; J. R Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620*. Leicester: Leicester University Press in association with Fontana, 1985; Frank Tallett, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495-1715*. London: Routledge, 1992; M. S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789*. London: Fontana, 1988.

However, not all areas are equally explored and analysed by scholars. At the moment, the best researched area is the war effects on the transformations of political institutions through history, exactly the same area, where associates of “war and society” school are working. Recently political scientists, especially in US began looking for causal links between military dimension and such “core” objects of political science like political participation, electoral behaviour and development of political parties.<sup>20</sup> However, these findings and research designs are too fresh and difficult to compare through time and space. Therefore, it was decided that in this PhD dissertation it is better to analyse role of military dimension and its effects on the development of state institutions.

Formation and development of political institutions is very important topic for political scientists and bearing in mind all works done by historians from “war and society” school, it was thought that such research angle is valid and legitimate. This historiographical approach and research strategy fits very well with the framework of MR, where you also must, at first, find how new technological, tactical innovations changed the conduct of war, then – how these changes affected composition and organisation of the armed forces and finally – how all of this changed society and the state. Therefore, by using the method of a structured, focused comparison of cases when the same questions are asked in every case, these aforementioned questions give an opportunity to compare the evolution of the relationships between the armed forces through different historical periods.<sup>21</sup> Such method and use of historical data prove very useful in analysing contemporary changes.

With this in mind, the following two *theses*, schematically illustrated in figure 1, are proposed:

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
<sup>20</sup> Robert P. Saldin, *War, the American State, and Politics Since 1898*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, especially 1 chapter.

<sup>21</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge[Mass.]: MIT Press, 2005, p. 67.

**T 1:** A “historical turn” is a necessary precondition to reveal autonomy of the military dimension in political theory.

**T 2:** The idea of Military revolution provides necessary conceptual and analytical tools to re-establish the military dimension into the mainstream political theory.

Figure 1:



Created by the author.

Trying to prove the proposed theses, research will be as follows:

1) Contemporary trends in social sciences in general and in military studies in particular reflect today’s trends in the social theory (more contextualized, temporal, micro level objects), making sociology a dominant discipline in this field. At the same time, political sciences are too preoccupied with short term issues and problems. Therefore, on main cases contemporary discussions very

often lack the historical depth and width of the argument.<sup>22</sup> A solution to this drawback is a proposal for scholars to take history seriously and to make a historical turn in their theories by applying an idea borrowed from the field of military history, an idea of Military revolution.<sup>23</sup> By doing that, scholars will move political sciences and history closer to each other and that will help to create a more coherent, nuanced approach towards the explanation of social change. However, it is important to emphasise that this call to take history seriously does not mean that social scientists should become historians. Social scientists should have a historical sense, awareness, intuition. It is more historiographical, not proper historical perspective. Therefore, approach and analysis conducted in this dissertation is historiographical, not historical.

2) The second thesis implies that idea of Military revolution is the best out of available conceptual tools which may help to make a historical turn. It is not only an assembling point where military history meets economic, technological, social, international histories. It is also a rallying point where discipline of history meets social sciences. This means that this notion can help to analyse present day issues by placing them into a broader historical context in general and into military questions in particular.

3) The uniqueness of military men comes from their essential task – management of violence. It means that this ability and knowledge how to manage, control and use violence is the reason separating military from the rest of society, making it autonomous. It is exactly the same place where idea of MR starts. The

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<sup>22</sup>It is important to emphasise that social sciences in general and political sciences in particular are not totally ahistorical. Subfields like historical sociology, American political development, historical institutionalism rely very much on history. Therefore, it is not surprising that role of military dimension, its relative importance mainly is discussed and analysed in texts, written by scholars from these subfields. However, even there military dimension mostly is treated as secondary, causally dependent issue.

<sup>23</sup>Main advocates of military's autonomy, mentioned several pages back, are from the field of historical sociology. This subfield after long fight was partly accepted by community of sociologists. However, it is still far away from convincing that serious and fundamental historical approach is necessary for any social inquiry. Therefore, before starting any serious discussions about military's autonomy we have to take history seriously and search for conceptual tools to bring different academic fields closer. Look in Julia Adams, *Remaking Modernity*, pp. 1-72, see especially pages 30-33.



first place where you have to look for signs of military autonomy is the realm of military theory, doctrines, and tactical solutions. The historical perspective implied by MR may help to see, how alongside other influences (political, cultural, and economical) the autonomous military decisions and practises evolved.

4) The changing understanding of war requires the change of military organisation. Therefore, after the review of mainstream military theories the transition and change of organisation of armed forces, especially from a conscripted to professional army, is discussed. Only by making a serious historical turn we can indicate how serious are contemporary changes. It is argued, that historical perspective allows to say that at the present moment we do have a radical and almost a universal change of the armed forces organisation for the first time since the introduction of conscription during the French Revolution. Once again history provides some answers and insights where political sciences and sociology do not manage to.

5) The changing understanding of warfare and structure of military organisation transforms its relationships with the outside world. It seems that currently we are facing a unique situation, when both parts of the military, the officer corps and file and rank, are professionals for whom service in the armed forces is more of a job than a duty. In order to not only state a mere fact of a change, a discussion about possible consequences is required. Therefore, in the last part of the dissertation, theoretical considerations are analysed by discussing the case of the US. Seeking to avoid the trap of a “snapshot” research, contemporary issues are analysed and discussed by putting them into a historical context. This historical perspective helps to see that relationships between the US military and civilians are as tense as never before. It seems that we are facing a new, paradoxical situation when the fully professional US armed forces (in the occupational sense) on the one hand become more isolated from the society, but on the other hand show growing eagerness to intervene into civilian matters. Once

again historical perspective allows to trace this processes in one particular area - the transformation of the US police forces. Historically armed forces and police in western countries were intimately intertwined. Only in the XIX century we saw both of them separate. However, it seems that today these two institutions are merging into one again.

It is important to stress that all these arguments imply that this PhD dissertation will not be based on some detailed empirical research. The main concern in this dissertation is the update and modification of existing bellicose, war-centred theories, not the analysis of some particular case. Of course, arguments will be supported by rich historical material collected from secondary sources.

When speaking about contemporary changes there will be a heavy reliance on the USA case. This dissertation is written from a meta-level perspective. All scholars, who will be presented, quoted in this work spoke about historical development of a modern Western state. Not denying existing differences between different states, these scholars say that at some meta-level all these states are organized and driven by the same principles and forces. The only differences are that these political entities are moving at different speed. Therefore, in this dissertation the following position is taken: because the US militarily is the most advanced Western country, the possible effect of military dimension on socio-political transformations is more easily detectable there than elsewhere.

In the past, countries have copied military innovations from a leading country. Western countries being members of one socio-political and cultural structure could easily copy and imitate military innovations and the necessary political and social institutions associated with these novelties. From all this follows an argument that the case of US is a reflection of changes which will happen sooner or later in other Western countries. Some elements already are apparent in the majority of these states: a similar understanding of war, an end of conscription. For instance, when the theoretical discussion about the changing character of war

is carried out this may be considered equally as an analysis of Western thought in general, or as a part of the US case analysis in particular. It is not too far from truth to say that American scholars are the key players in developing the contemporary military theory in the West.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, by discussing the situation of the Western military thought we will indirectly analyse the American perspective. It is also worth mentioning, that there are some solid academic works on military issues where theories based on a case study of the US are applied more broadly.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, in this dissertation the case of US will be considered more as an illustrative element, not a focal point of this research. The main idea is to develop or renew conceptual tools by using historical approach and by placing present day events in the US and other countries into a historical context.

Accordingly, the structure of this PhD dissertation is as follows: in 1 chapter methodological questions are discussed, especially those related with the case study and use of historical perspective in social science research. 2 chapter deals with issue of how military dimension was integrated into social and political theories and for what reasons it was forgotten. In 3 chapter a detailed analysis of the development ideas of Military Revolution and Revolution in Military Affairs is conducted seeking to show how and why MR is useful for the aim of this dissertation. Chapters from 4 to 7 deals with specific topics (changing character of

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<sup>24</sup> It is important to clarify this argument. Americans are very good at conceptualizing practical application of more philosophical ideas about war. For instance, Americans dictates trends in conceptualization of use of air power. On the other hand Europeans, following long standing tradition are better when speaking about war in more abstract, philosophical way. Such names like H. Strachan, Ch. Cooker, C. Gray, M. Kaldor are more than enough to make the point.

<sup>25</sup> Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R Segal (ed.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians the Civil-military Gap and American National Security*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge [Mass.]: MIT Press, 2001).; Gerhard Kümmel, 'The Winds of Change: The Transition from Armed Forces for Peace to New Missions for the Bundeswehr and Its Impact on Civil-military Relations', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 26, 2003; Hew Strachan, 'The Civil-military "gap" in Britain', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 26, 2003; Pascal Vennesson, 'Civil-military Relations in France: Is There a Gap?', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 26, 2003; Jūratė Novagrockienė, 'Kariuomenės Transformacija XXI Amžiuje: Lietuvos Atvejis', in *Lietuvos Metinė Strateginė Apžvalga 2004*, ed. by Raimundas Lopata. Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2005.

war, transformation of armed forces organisation, widening gap between civilians and military in US, blurring line between American armed forces and police) where by using framework of MR, conducting historiographical research micro level changes are connected into more wider, meta-level picture.

### *Limitations and caveats*

From the previous pages it should be clear that the main object of this dissertation is to explore the importance of the military dimension in the development of the modern Western state. Too often contemporary social scientists are searching, comparing, and measuring the impact of Western culture and civilisation upon other parts of the world. Considering that we are now witnessing quite radical military changes, it is reasonable and legitimate to ask whether these military changes have any impact on transforming Western states.<sup>26</sup>

The change in the military sphere is closely entwined with technology. For good or ill, we have to accept that advanced computer technology is now embedded into day to day activities and will not leave the military domain. It is also clear that all these new technologies are radically changing the conduct of military missions. New weaponry (precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, smart bombs, etc.), new communications, surveillance systems, intelligence systems - the list is endless and the importance of all these new items is undeniable. However, the biggest question is whether these changes are happening only at a tactical level. Or may be they are changing all military levels and, therefore, they are changing the very nature of relations between the armed forces and the rest of the state and the society. The search for these answers will be one of the main tasks of this dissertation. The author of this dissertation will try

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<sup>26</sup> Some very well known scholars, for example military historian Jeremy Black, are constantly criticising the dominant notion that Western military history, theory and practice is the only one in the world. According to them, other parts of the world also have a long, rich and interesting military heritage and practice. However, in this dissertation, not denying the achievements of other regions of the world, we will concentrate exclusively on the Western tradition. Black, *Rethinking Military History*; Jeremy Black, *European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660-1815*. London: Routledge, 2007; Victor Davis Hanson, *Why the West Has Won: Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam*. London: Faber and Faber, 2001.

to avoid taking a deterministic technological perspective as much as possible.

Finally, it is important to emphasize, that in this dissertation, the analysis of the military sphere and war follows the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz. It is very important for two reasons. Clausewitz's idea about the unchanging nature and the dynamic character of war provides an answer how, in one theoretical framework, to combine universal principles with change over time. Secondly, Clausewitz in his analysis relied very much on history. Only deep historical understanding may help us to grasp the universality and limits of military principles at the same time.<sup>27</sup>

This dissertation is a multidisciplinary work, where ideas from many academic fields are used. The author of this dissertation will follow the way laid down by such prominent scholars as D. Avant, F. Braudel, C. von Clausewitz, J. Der Derrian, N. Elias, A. L. George, A. Giddens, C. S. Gray, O. Hintze, S. Huntington, M. Ignatieff, M. Janowitz, M. Kaldor, J. A. Lynn, M. Mann, W. McNeill, W. Murray, G. Parker, P. Pierson, M. Roberts, H. Strachan, Ch. Tilly, A. de Tocqueville, M. Weber, and many other authors.

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<sup>27</sup> There are also third reason why Clausewitz is important for this dissertation. Everyone, who has visited the US Army War College in Carlisle or United States Army Combined Arms Centre, Fort Leavenworth, knows that in these military academic institutions Clausewitz holds position close to a prophet, semi-god. These two institutions every year prepares thousands of officers from rank of captain up to colonel. It means that, the brightest, smartest officers in US Army and their allies are taught in the spirit of Clausewitz.

# 1. Methodology

As was mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation is an attempt to update existing war-centred political theories and to modify them by proposing a conceptual framework and tools that may help to bring back the military dimension into a more decent place in the social sciences. This revision will be done mainly by applying principles of theory development and by case study analysis.

As A. Lijphart in his famous article about a comparative method acknowledged, hypothesis-generating case studies are of equal importance to theory-confirming and theory-infirming case studies: „Their objective is to develop theoretical generalisations in areas where no theory exists yet. Such case studies are of great theoretical value“.<sup>28</sup> The generation of new theories and concepts not always can be done in a empirical way, but we need thought provoking scholarly works in order to have such research tools as ideal types or developmental constructs.<sup>29</sup> However, the decision to make a case study will inevitably involve us into the old debate about the use of quantitative and qualitative methods.

Despite many developments in qualitative methods, quantitative ones are still dominant in social sciences. For many scholars, the comparison and verification of large -N cases by using various statistical, formal methods is the most appropriate and scientific way to test and confirm theories.<sup>30</sup> However, recognizing the unpredictability of discovery, we should remember that there are a many ways and means that may help to develop new theories and construct new hypotheses.

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<sup>28</sup> Arend Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, *The American Political Science Review*, 65, 1971, p. 692.

<sup>29</sup> Max Weber, *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, ed. by Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch, [1st ed.]. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1949; Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Garrison State’, *The American Journal of Sociology*, 46, 1941, pp. 455-468.

<sup>30</sup> Gary King, Robert O. Keohane Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1994.

In this dissertation, a very important place is granted to history and especially to the tradition whose research object is processes lasting not for decades, but by centuries.<sup>31</sup> This tradition of long-cycle historical understanding is closely associated with F. Braudel and his idea of *longue durée*. Like contemporary scholars, he was disturbed by the dominance of the history of events, or how he called it, *l'histoire événementielle*:

[...] it is worth noting that side by side with great and, so to speak, historic events, the chronicle or the daily paper offers us all the mediocre accidents of the ordinary life: a fire, a railway crash [...]. But this mass does not make up all of reality, all the depth of history on which scientific thought is free to work. [...] short time span is the most capricious and the most delusive of all.<sup>32</sup>

Braudel proposed division of historical time into three segments of *l'histoire événementielle* (a short time span), *conjoncture* (a 20-50 year time span), and *longue durée* (a very long time span, centuries) which is instrumental for the research done in this dissertation.<sup>33</sup> All present discussions about revolutionary changes in the military sphere are overwhelmed by mediocre everyday news without any valuable results (*l'histoire événementielle*). The importance of such issues, like the change of military doctrine, tactics, and new institutional structure (in this case – RMA) are better understood, if we look from the *conjoncture* perspective. Finally, the role of the military dimension (Military Revolution) in modern state is better seen when we are looking from the *longue durée* position.

This Braudelian understanding of history helps to better understand the peculiar position of social sciences. Despite discussions about a “historical turn”<sup>34</sup> in social sciences and promises to take history seriously, there are some serious problems. When reading contemporary works in many cases there is a feeling that

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<sup>31</sup> Robert. A Denmark and others, *World System History: The Social Science of Long-Term Change*, 1st edn. London: Routledge, 2000.

<sup>32</sup> Fernand Braudel, *On History*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980, p. 28.

<sup>33</sup> Andrew Latham, ‘Warfare Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the “Revolution in Military Affairs”’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 8, 2002, p. 231.

<sup>34</sup> McDonald; James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (ed.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004; Alexander L. George, *Case Studies*.

these writings are very shallow when speaking about the use of history. According to P. Pierson, social scientists are looking into social processes “from a snapshot position, when there is often a strong case to be made for shifting from snapshots to moving pictures”.<sup>35</sup> They are confining themselves to present day events and are not trying to put them into a historical context. Sometimes social scientists are using historical findings in such a way that at the end we have a situation of ahistorical research. This is not a use, but an abuse of history. This problem is very acute in the area of interests of this dissertation. Various scholars and experts have used historical examples to support the argument of RMA, but they did it in such a fashion that these attempts look very artificial.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, because of this snapshot / *l’histoire évènementielle* situation not many scholars tried seriously consider all RMA debate in a much broader perspective.

The most convenient way to show this broader perspective is the application of the process tracing method. According to Mahoney, “process tracing is perhaps the tool of causal inference that first comes to mind when one thinks of qualitative methodology in political science”.<sup>37</sup> The main idea of this method is to recreate in detail the chain of causal events and causal mechanisms. This recreation is done by detailed historical analysis of a chosen case or cases. It helps to eliminate some explanations or brings about new ones. By using this method, the researcher is forced to “take equifinality into account”.<sup>38</sup> However, the results of the tracing may give enough evidences and data to formulate two or more unrelated hypotheses, thus leaving the researcher with a difficult task to choose one.<sup>39</sup> There

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<sup>35</sup> Pierson, p. 2

<sup>36</sup> Latham, p. 231. For good examples of abuse of history and ahistorical research look Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, *The National Interest*, 37, 1994; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (ed.), *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*. In these works authors are using “cherry picking” method by selecting historical facts, suitable for their arguments. Historical data is drawn out of context. Authors are trying artificially connect historical processes with today’s events by drawing parallels, hinting on repetition of history.

<sup>37</sup> James Mahoney, ‘After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research’, *World Politics*, 62, 2010, p. 123.

<sup>38</sup> George and Bennett., p. 207.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222.



might be different ways of using this method; some of them might be a very detailed historical analysis, others done in a more sketchy form.<sup>40</sup> In this dissertation this method will be used in a more sketchy form, similar to R. Putnam's historical analysis in his book *Making democracy work*.<sup>41</sup> In this dissertation, for instance, this method will be used to analyse the transformation of the armed forces organisation during the different eras.

The processes tracing method fits very elegantly into the framework of historical institutionalism.<sup>42</sup> This political science approach “rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past”.<sup>43</sup> The proponents of this approach are using such concepts like “path dependence” and “critical juncture” whose application requires deep historical knowledge and analysis.<sup>44</sup> All these concepts are important for this dissertation. For example, the “path dependence” concept allows to show how processes that started because of the needs of war (taxation in England and France for instance) pushed countries towards a different path. It helps to explain why different states moved differently, even when the causes of the movement were the same. On the other hand, the idea of “critical juncture” helps to explain why in some countries or at some particular historical moments breakthroughs such as Military Revolutions happen. This approach helps to show how small changes, for instance, tactical innovations or

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 289-325.

<sup>41</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1993.

<sup>42</sup> It also important to emphasize that this entire dissertation is about formation, development and interaction among many different institutions (armed forces, police forces, various governmental institutions, etc.).

<sup>43</sup> P.A. Hall and R.C.R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, *Political Studies*, 44, 1996, p. 941.

<sup>44</sup> Pierson.

new arms, might be the cause or the trigger of a radical political, social, economical change.<sup>45</sup>

## 2. Theoretical Framework

Almost four decades ago Ch. Tilly has written his famous words: „war made state and state made war“.<sup>46</sup> These words might be considered as credo of this PhD dissertation. There are many books about war making or war fighting. However, the problem, defined in the first part of that quotation - the role of war in state formation - is more contested by scholars. Probably nobody will deny that during the history many countries disappeared from the map or emerged on it because of the defeat or victory in the war. However, by saying that “war made state” Ch. Tilly has a bit different idea. According to him:

The building of an effective military machine imposed a heavy burden on the population involved: taxes, conscription, requisitions, and more. The very act of building it – when it worked – produced arrangements, which could deliver resources to the government for other purposes [...]. It produced the means of enforcing the government’s will over stiff resistance: the army. It tended, indeed, to promote territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation of the instruments of the government and monopolization of the means of coercion, all the fundamental state-making processes.<sup>47</sup>

The essence of his idea is that war and most importantly, preparations for war was the driving force in formation of national states in Europe. Such statement was a break with then dominant liberal and Marxist social theories on two accounts.<sup>48</sup> First of all, for Marxists and liberals main drivers of social relations were class conflict or liberal, peaceful interactions among individuals. Secondly,

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<sup>45</sup> These different concepts in this dissertation serve different purposes. For instances, the idea of path dependence is crucially important when analysing how armed forces, conduct of warfare, role of institutions evolved through time. Without this historical analysis to explain today’s changes would be very hard. On the other hand, the concept of critical junctures can explain how processes moved from one path to another. Also it provides healthy critical approach, because critical juncture means that even when you have all ingredients which in the past caused changes/transformations it may not have similar effect today.

<sup>46</sup> Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, p. 42.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 42.

<sup>48</sup> Edwin Amenta, ‘State-Centered and Political Institutionalist Theory: Retrospect and Prospect’, in *Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, ed. by Thomas Janoski and others. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 96-114.

the state, which was created by the war, was autonomous from the society and classes. It was an independent container of social power. Again, this perspective differed from Marxists and liberals who considered state only as an arena where social interactions happened, but not as a player.<sup>49</sup>

The volume, which was published in 1975 and edited by Tilly, was a landmark event which initiated new trend in social theory. This movement is known by many names like “war-centred state theory”<sup>50</sup>, neo-statists<sup>51</sup>, new institutionalism (especially historical institutionalism)<sup>52</sup>, neo-hintzian<sup>53</sup>, organisational materialism<sup>54</sup> and is associated with scholars like T. Skocpol, P. Evans, R. Collins, A. Giddens, M. Mann, Ch. Dandeker, B. Downing and others. Despite their different research interests they all had in common one thing: according to them, war and military matters must be of primary concern for all social scientists.

All of them acknowledged the fact that in their works they did not create a new paradigm in social theory, but revived a classical, yet neglected school of social theory. As in the case with a new version, the classical version also is known by many different names and is associated with a diverse body of scholars. M. Mann called this tradition “the militarist tradition of state theory embodied [...] in the work of predominantly Germanic writers, like Gumplowicz,

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<sup>49</sup> Mann, *State, War and Capitalism*, pp. 1-2; Theda Skocpol „Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of analysis in Current Research“ in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 3-37.

<sup>50</sup> Bob Jessop, ‘Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections’, *International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale De Sociologie*, 11, 2001, p. 149; Colin Hay, Michael Lister and David Marsh (ed.), *The State: Theories and Issues*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

<sup>51</sup> Hay, pp. 8-9, 79-97; Peter B. Evans, ‘The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization’, *World Politics*, 50, 1997, pp. 62-87.;

<sup>52</sup> Hay, pp. 98-117; Peter A Hall and Rosemary C R Taylor, pp. 936-957.

<sup>53</sup> Philip S. Gorski, ‘Review: Beyond Marx and Hintze? Third-Wave Theories of Early Modern State Formation’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 43, 2001, pp. 851-861; Philip S. Gorski, ‘Review: Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe’, *Contemporary Sociology*, 27, 1998, pp. 186-188.

<sup>54</sup> Siniša Malešević, *The Sociology of War and Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 70-78.

Ratzenhofer, Schmitt”.<sup>55</sup> Ch. Dandeker, following the tradition of J. Burnham’s elitist theory<sup>56</sup>, calls this school of thought “Machiavellian social theory”.<sup>57</sup> These and other scholars are arguing that alongside two traditional sociological traditions, liberalism and Marxism, there always was the third one, which have “tended to be more preoccupied with the state as a warlike entity”.<sup>58</sup>

However, this third social theory tradition is a paradoxical one. This school of thought is closely related with the works of Max Weber. The paradox is that it might look odd to argue that tradition of social theory, closely associated with M. Weber, is a forgotten one. It is hard to find serious work in the fields of sociology and political science that would not quote or use M. Weber’s premises. Over and over again scholars were and are using, criticizing and reinventing his ideas about bureaucracy, organisation of society, state, etc.

In his social theory M. Weber gave a lot of credit to violence and coercion. For him “the inherent irrationality of *Weltanschauungen* is often decided on the battlefield while the genesis of capitalism and instrumental rationality in the West are linked in part to the multipolarity of the European militarist feudal states”.<sup>59</sup> According to him, many things in social life started in the military domain, for instance, military discipline was the beginning of discipline and order in other spheres of human activity.<sup>60</sup> Finally in his definition of the state he is very specific on emphasizing the role of coercive element. A political entity becomes the state when “its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Mann., *State, War and Capitalism*, p. 2.

<sup>56</sup> James Burnham, *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom*. London: Putnam, 1943.

<sup>57</sup> Dandeker, pp. 3-6.

<sup>58</sup> Giddens, p. 26. Some scholars are calling these schools (Durkheim, Marx and Weber) a founding fathers of sociology, holy trinity. Look Maleševic, pp. 18-28.

<sup>59</sup> Maleševic, p. 25.

<sup>60</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1978, p. 1152.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Even those, who have a vague understanding of political science and sociology, will agree that the definition of the state, proposed by Weber, is one of the most influential concepts in the field of social theory. Generations of scholars used this concept in their research, revised and criticised it. One way or another Weber's state definition still haunts social theory today. Therefore, it might look strange to argue that the military dimension in social sciences is forgotten when influential, well-known concept puts so much emphasis on it. However, it would be more precise to say that Weber in his writings just gave a hint about possible relationship between military and formation and development of the state. He did not explore it in more detailed way, therefore, "in the thousands of pages in his collected works, at most twenty are devoted to military themes".<sup>62</sup>

For Weber violence and war was important, but overall he did not created a comprehensive theoretical framework concerning these issues, as he did, for instance, in the field of sociology of religion. Weber was more concerned with the role of bureaucracy in modern societies than with the role of military in the state formation. It will not be far from truth to say that he "provided a morally acceptable face to the 'bellicose' tradition: lending to it his impeccable intellectual credentials through which the key arguments of the militarist tradition were kept alive and revived in the contemporary context."<sup>63</sup> Therefore, coming back to the title and problem of this dissertation it is clear that Weber did not provided all the necessary answers. He made us alert about relationships of organised violence and politics, but for inspiration of more detailed, nuanced approach scholars had to look elsewhere. Most of them found answers in the works of two scholars: M.

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<sup>62</sup> Morris Janowitz, 'Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies', *Armed Forces & Society*, 2, 1976, p.188.

<sup>63</sup> Maleševic, p. 71.

Weber's contemporary German historian Otto Hintze<sup>64</sup> and German sociologists Norbert Elias.<sup>65</sup>

O. Hintze in his writings emphasised "the general association between the existence of states and the consolidation of military power, and sees such power both involved with the development of capitalism/industrialism and as shaping their future course of development".<sup>66</sup> In his writings he was saying that it is very important to remember that state is a member of international community and relationships between states are affecting the development of these political entities. He stressed the importance of an international and geopolitical factor in the development of the state. In this way, being the main form of interaction among states in the international arena, war became central in his theories. According to him, "all state organisation was originally military organisation, organisation for war".<sup>67</sup> On this account, Hintze sounds a bit like Schmitt. The type of military organisation defined type and form of political entity. Countries with strong navies were keen on being more democratic and liberal. States with bigger standing armies were more conservative and authoritarian. Probably, Hintze also was the first one who in systemic and scholarly way tried to explain the connection between conscription and expansion of franchise in Western countries.<sup>68</sup> An idea developed later by other scholars, for instance R. Dahl,<sup>69</sup> who tried to find out how the democratic form of rule evolved.

However, the ideas of Hintze have some serious deficiencies. First, his aforementioned idea about two ways of state building in Europe is not supported by historical data. There is much more variety. For instance, the hybrid cases of France, Spain and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth proved that relationships

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<sup>64</sup> Gilbert; Giddens; Mann, *States, war and capitalism*; Mann, *Sources of Social Power I and II*; Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Porter; Downing.

<sup>65</sup> Elias.

<sup>66</sup> Giddens, pp. 26-27.

<sup>67</sup> Gilbert, p. 181.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>69</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*. Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 244-264.

between the military organisation and the type of political entity are more complex. Secondly, historical data does not support Hintze's idea that only "absolutist states built bureaucracies"<sup>70</sup>. Works of J. Brewer, J. Glete, T. Ertman<sup>71</sup> and others<sup>72</sup> clearly show that countries with constitutional political order and naval power (England, United Provinces) were bureaucratized no less than absolutist France, Sweden or Prussia. It is important, because these works show that both dominant forms of military organisation such as standing army and standing navy are equally important and have equally important effect for political entities. It means that despite their organisational, political and social differences England and France were equally affected and changed by war. War and preparations for it were the most important catalyst for the transformation of these countries, only different military organisations and social, economical structures set them on different paths of further development.

What made O. Hintze different from previous scholars was that he supported his arguments by thorough collection and use of historical material. He reached his conclusions by recreating historical processes step-by-step. Exactly the same approach was used by another duen of historical sociology – N. Elias. In his writings he recreates the historical landscape from early medieval to early modern times by detailed and microscopic narrative. With a rare gift of insight he moves from such micro-level stories, as for instances, importance of Montleher family fortress in 11<sup>th</sup> century to macro-level issues, such as formation of France and the European political system.<sup>73</sup> However, from his detailed historical analysis he made a conclusion that the formation and further development of any political

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<sup>70</sup> Ertman, p. 12.

<sup>71</sup> John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989; Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-military States, 1500-1660*. London: Routledge, 2002; Ertman.

<sup>72</sup> Christopher Storrs, *The Fiscal-military State in Eighteenth-century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

<sup>73</sup> Elias, pp. 336 – 355.

entity was driven by two autonomous, but interdependent monopolies: taxation and military. According to him:

The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all in the West, by a certain level of monopolization. [...] The financial means thus flowing into this central authority maintain its monopoly of military force, while this in turn maintain the monopoly of taxation. Neither has in any sense precedence over the other; they are two sides of the same monopoly. If one disappears the other automatically follows, though the monopoly rule may sometimes be shaken more strongly on one side than on the other. [...] Within them a number of other monopolies crystallize around those already mentioned. But these two are and remain the key monopolies. If they decay, so do all the rest, and with them the "state".<sup>74</sup>

As will be seen later in this chapter these words of N. Elias are of profound importance. The way how Elias shows the importance of this dual monopoly for the existence of the state clearly puts him into the company of O. Hintze. His idea about this intimate relationship between taxation and military, later called extraction-coercion cycle, will be widely used by his students, such as A. Giddens and other scholars: Ch. Tilly, S. Finer, and B. Porter. The following summary of theoretical framework used by contemporary scholars reveals how much it owed to N. Elias.

#### *Historical overview*

All scholars, starting with Hintze, Elias and finishing with Giddens and Tilly were following a very similar path in their works. Objects of the research are the same countries (France, England, Prussia, Russia, Netherlands) and the same events (Italian wars in XVI century, Reformation, rise and decline of Habsburgs, Thirty years war, reign of Louis XIV, wars of the XVIII century, French revolution, Industrial revolution, supremacy of England, unification and rise of Germany, First world war). Therefore, in the following pages a sketchy summary (look table Nr. 1) of all these developments and events will be presented emphasising the ideas of different scholars where necessary.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 346.



Table Nr. 1

<b>Period</b>	<b>Major conflicts</b>	<b>Military change</b>	<b>Political, societal and economic changes</b>
1450-1780	Wars of Italy, Thirty Years War, Wars of Louis XIV, Great Northern War, War of Austrian Succession, Seven Years War, War of American Independence.	Introduction of gunpowder; firearms; artillery; new type fortification; linear formation; siege warfare; discipline; permanent armies and navies; increase of armies and navies; bayonet; flintlock	Expansion of state apparatus; centralization of state power; rudimentary welfare system (especially for war veterans); beginning of division of functions between armed forces and police; fiscal-military state; new taxation forms; Bank of England; stock exchange market; national debt; creation of Westphalian international system
1780-1914	Wars of French Revolution; Napoleonic wars; Crimean war; US Civil war; Wars of German and Italian unification; Colonial wars; Russo-Japanese war; Balkan wars	Conscript armies; movement in columns; decline of linear formations; use of skirmishers; importance of battle; introduction of professional officer corps and General staff; short-term military service; rifled firearms and guns; breach-loading artillery; machine gun; introduction of telegraph, telephone, railways; iron clad ships; battleship; torpedo; submarine; Dreadnought	French revolution; nation-state; expansion of franchise; gradual democratisation and liberalisation of Western countries; clear separation of functions between armed forces and police; Industrial revolution; modern taxation system; expansion of political parties; industrial warfare; development of welfare system; nationalism; imperialism; militarism; Great Power competition
1914-1945	First World War; Spanish civil war; Second World War	Trench warfare; Introduction of tank and plane; development of indirect fire; motorization and mechanization of warfare; operational art; aircraft carrier; atomic bomb	Expansion of franchise to women; increasing control and expansion of state; expansion of welfare state; increasing role of worker unions; political radicalisation; rise of ideologies; mass politics; expansion of taxation

1945-1989	Cold war; Chinese civil war; Korean war; War in Vietnam; wars of liberation and decolonisation in Africa and Asia; Israel-Arab wars; Soviet invasion in Afghanistan	Gradual decline of conscript armies; nuclear race; missile capabilities; increasing role of airpower; first use of space, cyber capabilities; appearance of precision guided munitions and stealth technologies; guerrilla war; air-land battle doctrine; special operation forces	Welfare state; rise of national security state; decolonization; democratization outside Western world; bipolar international system; post-materialistic society; sexual revolution; neoliberal economy; expansion of higher education system
1989-present	First Gulf war; Wars in former Yugoslavia; Operation in Somalia; Civil wars in Africa (Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo); Chechen wars; Kosovo mission; Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; Global war on terror	Computerisation of warfare; end of conscription; expeditionary forces; private security companies; smaller military formations; network-centric warfare; effect based operations; increasing role of cyber and space dimensions; increasing importance of special operations forces; terrorism; insurgency; counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism; new wars	End of Cold War; technological revolution; globalisation; network society; risk society; erosion of the state; increasing role of none state actors;

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
Historians start speaking about emerging modern state since the beginning of the XVI century. As will be shown in the next chapter, one of the main possible reasons why everything starts at that moment is the wider application and use of gunpowder and the beginning of Military revolution. There is no doubt that needs of war increased dramatically. Some states, for instance Italian city-republic Sienna, lost its independence because it was incapable of keeping pace with rising costs of war.<sup>75</sup> Seeking to survive and consolidate power, political entities had to

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<sup>75</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 12.

change. Scholars named this change extraction-coercion cycle.<sup>76</sup> Increasing costs of war demanded substantial amount of financial (tax of violence)<sup>77</sup>, material and human resources. There is enough historical evidence showing how common people and nobility were not willing to give up easily what rulers were asking from them. Therefore, the extraction and capabilities enabling this were required. In this way, the cycle of war and state formation was established. Figure Nr. 2, summarises how this cycle worked.

Figure Nr. 2.



Source: Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State*, p. 58

The third element in this scheme is the increasing demand of the bureaucratic apparatus<sup>78</sup>, capable of administering the collection of taxes and provision and supply of armed forces. In this way we have all the basic elements of the modern state in place somewhere in the middle of the XVII century.

However, extraction-coercion cycle approach was very criticised by later scholars. Even Ch. Tilly gradually distanced himself from this perspective by

<sup>76</sup> Samuel E. Finer, 'State - and Nation - Building in Europe: The Role of the Military', in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed by. Charles Tilly. Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 96.

<sup>77</sup> John A. Lynn, 'How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions During the Grand Siècle', *The Journal of Modern History*, 65, 1993, pp. 286-310.

<sup>78</sup> The increasing demand of officials is a very good example of how some issues became critical at some particular historical moment. Only countries, which had high literacy rates and some network of universities, could take the advantage, provided by the increasing role of the military domain. T. Ertman provides excellent point on this account. Look Ertman, p. 27.

starting emphasising the role of bargain and consent in further development of the state. Historians specialising in the period of early modern Europe, especially those working with a subject of absolutism, emphasised the importance of bargains between rulers and their subjects.<sup>79</sup> However, the way in which the agreement was reached is of second importance. What is more important is why the bargains started at all, what were the driving causes of changing behavioural pattern, political landscape. Rulers may be were using less violence, when dealing with their subjects, but scope and scale of wars increased dramatically thus making military one of the driving forces of all social, political and economic changes. Considering all existing historical material it seems safe to say that both approaches were used at the same time. Discussion and search for compromise always was backed by force.

Yet, despite all possible critique and ideological preferences, it is hard to deny the importance of the establishment of standing armies and navies. Looking from the present day perspective it is hard to understand the importance and novelty of such institution in the early modern era. The origins of standing armies can be traced back to the mid of the XV century (companies of ordnance in France), however wider transition from feudal levy armies to armies of mercenaries happens in the XVI century. Increasing scope and scale of warfare, tactical and technological changes and social consequences of disbanded soldiers (increased level of crime, banditry, and vagrancy)<sup>80</sup> convinced rulers that it is more efficient and easier to keep at least some parts of armies intact than to disband them. Of course it is impossible to compare the XVI century's permanent army with the present days' one. However, gradually armies acquired features, which today are associated with them: discipline was re-established at the end of XVI century,

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<sup>79</sup>Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*; William Beik, 'The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration', *Past & Present*, 188, 2005, pp. 195-224; Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: Verso, 1979.

<sup>80</sup>J. R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe*.

uniforms, unit formation and officer ranking - in the mid of XVII century, barracks - by the beginning of XVIII century.

If in 1550's French army at least on paper had about 80 000 soldiers then in 1680's this number reached 400 000.<sup>81</sup> To feed, arm, supply and pay 400 000 soldiers is a tremendous task even for the governments of our times. Therefore, you can imagine what it meant in the age where logistics depended on horses, where roads were almost non-existent, not to mention the forms and ways of communication and financial support. Of course, not all countries had such big armies, but if one compared their size to native populations, it would be clear that it was a big institution.

As was mentioned earlier, the creation of standing navies was no less important for the formation and development of modern state.<sup>82</sup> The preparation of ships of the line, supply of food, weaponry and sailors was a very complicated enterprise. It was also very expensive. Biggest ships had 80 and more guns. It meant that one ship had more artillery than the whole field army of 60-70 000 soldiers.<sup>83</sup> All of this required complex administrative infrastructure, capable to handle various bureaucratic tasks, manage huge financial flows.

In addition, it is important to stress that in many cases the war ministry, or war and naval offices, alongside with treasury, were the first bureaucratic institutions of early modern states. By creating vast armies and navies, rulers took the responsibility to take care of the well-being of soldiers and their families. Of course, we cannot speak about sophisticated healthcare and social care systems, but from the end of the XVII century we can see the establishment of public hospitals for wounded and injured soldiers; creation of the veteran support system

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<sup>81</sup> Clifford J Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1995, p. 125.

<sup>82</sup> Brewer; Glete.

<sup>83</sup> John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714*. London: Longman, 1999, p. 95.

(rents, business benefits).<sup>84</sup> In this way, military needs forced rulers to develop a wide network of institutions.

Scholars named states of that period as fiscal-military states, because for the rulers all these military changes meant that they needed substantial financial means to support such an expensive institution which could be lost in one battle. Therefore, it is not surprising that expenditure for military enterprises formed the biggest part of state budgets. Rulers not only spent all their incomes, they also borrowed, or lent future incomes to support their military activities. All states were forced to do that if they wanted to survive. However, they choose different paths: England paid for wars by borrowing from the people through stock market; France got necessary money by selling offices; Prussia and Russia forced nobility to serve in the armed forces in return re-establishing serfdom.<sup>85</sup> These examples are very important for a couple of reasons. On one hand, they confirm the complexity of state formation processes. On the other hand, it proves the importance and vital place of military as an independent variable in this process.

First of all, despite the fact that European countries were engaged in the same wars and had almost identical armies, all these countries moved further and transformed themselves at different tempo. Some of them were successful, some of them failed. Ch. Tilly's words reflect the situation very well: "[...] in 1490 [...] Europe's 80 million people divided into something like 200 states, would-be states, statelets, statelike organisations. [...] By 1990 [...] depending on the rules for counting, the whole of Europe (was-D.Š.) divided into mere 25 to 28 states".<sup>86</sup> All this is not only the consequence of direct victory or defeat on the battlefield. The victory or defeat is only the last phase of long processes. It depends how army or navy was organised, paid, supplied, politically and publicly supported. Political

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<sup>84</sup> Anderson, *War and Society*, pp. 108-109; Tallett, *War and Society*, pp. 112-121; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, p. 106.

<sup>85</sup> Brewer; Downing; Ertman; Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1971.

<sup>86</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, pp. 42-43.

entities that had more flexible and adaptable financial, political and military systems managed to survive. Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is one of the best examples of the country which failed to transform itself. There are many reasons and causes why this state failed, however, one of the main reasons was such that it simply did not have a proper standing army at the beginning of the XVIII century. Commonwealth did not manage to use benefits of Military revolution for its own benefit.<sup>87</sup>

Countries not only used or did not use the military differently, they also used the combination of military with other components differently. Social theorists up to this day are trying to find out how from such big diversity of political entities: “empires, city-states, federations of cities, networks of landlords, churches, religious orders, leagues of pirates, warrior bands”<sup>88</sup>, emerged the winner – the nation state. According to Tilly, it happened because France, England, Prussia and Spain were following the “trajectories of capitalized coercion”.<sup>89</sup> The combination of capabilities to generate capital, create and keep military force and to administrate everything put these countries into advantageous position in comparison with such states like Venice or Russia. Following the same argumentation, A. Giddens stated that, “the gun [...] in the shape of early artillery, helped sharply reduce the significance of the castle and the city as containers of military power”.<sup>90</sup> The artillery (capital intensive), reduced importance of the city which was one of the oldest power containers in the human history.

Therefore, the aforementioned development of standing armies and taxation systems is the story of capitalized coercion (Tilly) or fiscal-military (Brewer) states. In this case, different labels are not so important when the content is the

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<sup>87</sup> Robert I. Frost, *The Northern Wars: War, State, and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721*. Harlow, England: Longman, 2000; Downing, ch.6.

<sup>88</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, p. 5.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143-160.

<sup>90</sup> Giddens, p. 107.

same. However, these differences became very apparent when another turning point in the world history occurred – the French revolution.

The most important change was that states of capitalized coercion became nation states. The result of the French revolution was the creation of a nation. After the revolution people in Europe began to call themselves Frenchmen, Germans and so on. By connecting organisation of an early modern state with this new phenomenon, the result was the nation state. War and the military dimension were one of the main drivers of this transformation. Clausewitz, being the witness of these events, in his famous passage states that

“Suddenly war again became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. [...] The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore [...]”.<sup>91</sup>

Service in the armed forces and fight for the homeland became a duty for every citizen. Of course, it did not happen at the same time in all places, but the main principles were laid down during the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars. It was the beginning of a “military citizenship”<sup>92</sup>, when rights of a citizen (i.e. - a right to vote) were granted in exchange for service in the armed forces.<sup>93</sup> Through all the XIX and the first half of the XX century this contract between the state and citizens was expanding. Every time after the expansion of armed forces, larger segments of society gained the right to vote. Broader perspective of this issue will be given in the chapter 4, where the change of military organisation will be discussed.

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<sup>91</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Translated and edited Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 238.

<sup>92</sup> Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, II, p. 427.

<sup>93</sup> It is important to emphasize that this agreement between state and its people was not of fairy tale type. Despite the fact, that service in the military gave political rights, conscription was not popular among the people. This patriotic fever, so well described by C. von Clausewitz had a short life. Very soon French government and other countries had to use force for bringing young males to the military service. Findings of contemporary historians show that this notion of voluntary nation in arms is supported only by piecemeal evidence. Still there is no doubt that military needs played an important role in the transformation of political landscape. Look Alan Foster, “The Nation in Arms and French Military Identity”, lecture delivered at Oxford university, 30<sup>th</sup> November, 2010.



A couple of other important issues happened during the XIX century. First of all, the role and functions of armed forces and police were firmly established. As will be seen in chapter 7, the separation of these two institutions started in the late XVII century. However, only in the XIX century this separation was institutionalised. This separation was tremendously important for further development of the nation state. The internal pacification<sup>94</sup> and decline of domestic militarism<sup>95</sup> marked the change of the role of the military dimension in the state formation. Following the tradition of Foucault, A. Giddens and Ch. Dandeker argue that state was increasing its surveillance capabilities that were more efficient than military institutions when dealing with domestic disorder.<sup>96</sup> The state, by creating a more sophisticated network of institutions, was increasing its administrative power (Giddens interpretation)<sup>97</sup>, infrastructural power (Mann's interpretation) or moving from indirect to direct rule (Tilly's interpretation)<sup>98</sup>. Differently than Giddens, Mann is trying to argue that, despite the growth of surveillance network, military became a less visible, but nonetheless, a very important factor in the processes of state formation.<sup>99</sup> Tilly, a bit differently, also shows how expanding military dimension and increasing scale of warfare at the end of XVIII century transformed state's rule towards its subordinates from indirect to direct rule. Increasing demand for more manpower and money forced state to bypass intermediaries (privileged groups, classes).<sup>100</sup> This search for direct rule was one of the reasons why state increased its infrastructural power and created wide networks of policing, surveillance.

Increasing network of the surveillance systems was part of a much broader state expansion. In the XIX century, Western states expanded the scope of their

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<sup>94</sup> Giddens, p. 192.

<sup>95</sup> Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, II, pp. 403-412.

<sup>96</sup> Giddens, pp. 181-192; Dandeker;

<sup>97</sup> Giddens, pp., 172-192; Mann, *States, war and capitalism*, pp. 5-12.

<sup>98</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, pp. 103-114.

<sup>99</sup> Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, II, pp. 403-412.

<sup>100</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, pp. 103-114.

activities. According to Tilly, at the beginning of that century the state had only four major activities: state making, war making, protection and extraction. However, after some time all states started “venturing into three other risky terrains: adjudication (dispute settlement-D.Š.), distribution, production.”<sup>101</sup> It will not be far from truth to say that military became the victim of its own success. Needs to have a better military organisation and changing styles of warfare forced states to create a wide network of institutions which in due time bypassed the military and became more important for the state than it. Such issues like social care, healthcare and education became more important for governments than war fighting. A vicious circle was formed: political elite was expanding the franchise mostly due to military reasons, but increasing electorate started to demand more state activities in other spheres, not only military.

According to Mann, in 1881 Great Britain reached the point when government “devoted more of its central state finances to peaceful than warlike activities”.<sup>102</sup> Very soon, other countries also chose this path. It meant that for the first time in modern era, if not in human history, war making was not the main activity of the political entities. The transition from warfare state to welfare state had begun. This transition was very fast because after the First World War and especially after the Second World War all Western countries were spending more money on welfare activities while military expenditures were declining.

In this sense, the First World War was very important for the development of the modern state. Such issues like expansion of women’s political rights, increasing role of labour unions and others were direct results of this war.<sup>103</sup> After this war, state was in charge of many things that were in the hands of private companies and businesspersons before the war. The words of A. J. P. Taylor very well illustrate these changes:

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., pp. 96-97;

<sup>102</sup> Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, II*, pp. 376-377.

<sup>103</sup> Porter, pp. 161-179;

Until August 1914 a sensible, law abiding Englishmen could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. [...] for that matter, a foreigner could spend his life in this country without permit and without informing the police. [...] He could also ignore, if he chose, the demands of national defence [...].”<sup>104</sup>

All of that has changed during the First World War. Misleading perceptions, mistakes at all military levels, hesitant politicians - all these and many other issues were the reason why this war lasted so long. War caught countries unprepared for such a waste of human, financial and material resources and all of them had to adapt. Once again, war was directly and indirectly responsible for another shift in the development of the modern state.<sup>105</sup>

During the interwar period, the state continued to expand its control over the society and people. The interwar and the succeeding Cold war era confirmed one of the biggest fears of the liberals: wars helped central governments to enlarge their administrative apparatus and infiltrate deeper into lives of its citizens. The historical data clearly shows the direct correlation between war making and increasing size and control of the central government. The cases of Great Britain and especially of US are very good examples of these processes.<sup>106</sup> Scholars started discussions about “garrison states”<sup>107</sup> and “national security state”<sup>108</sup>. All this was happening at the same time when governments were spending less and less money for military activities. Because of the increasing destructive firepower and introduction of nuclear weapons, wars became the instrument of the last resort.

Beside these changes there were lots of indirect consequences related with military dimension during Cold war era. For instances, US higher education

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<sup>104</sup> A.J.P. Taylor, *English History, 1914-1945*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, p. 1 in John Gray, *Liberalism*, 2nd edn. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995, p. 26.

<sup>105</sup> First World War had very transformative effect to US. It will not far from truth to say, that thanks to this war US in many areas caught up European countries, especially when speaking about increasing role of executive branch of government. Look in Saldin, pp. 65-99; Porter, pp. 269-278.

<sup>106</sup> Porter, pp. 243-296.

<sup>107</sup> Lasswell, pp. 455-468.

<sup>108</sup> Brian Waddell, *Toward the National Security State: Civil-military Relations During World War II*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International; Oxford, 2008.

system was very much affected by American military policy.<sup>109</sup> The same might be said about family and gender policy. Social movements in 1970's and 1980's in Western countries definitely had military flavour, even if their were anti-war movements. Military themes, again positive and negative, were and still are one of the most popular subjects in Hollywood and in entertainment industry. However, lack of "hot" superpower war during this period and relative peace in the West meant that there were less physical, material consequences of the military dimension as was in previous eras. Cold war was based on perception: perception of use nuclear weapons, deterrence, etc. Therefore, effects of military dimension during Cold war were more cultural, discursive. Biggest challenge is that there still is lack of proper research tools and methods which could help to identify and track these indirect results of military influence. All these questions and possible solutions will be discussed in the last chapters of this dissertation.

However, what did not change, was that states sustained movement from warfare to welfare state. This process when warfare state was replaced by welfare state really provides many opportunities to say that military dimension is no longer important, that warfare state fell.<sup>110</sup> N. Elias warned about such kind of thinking. According to him, "without the monopoly organisation of physical violence and taxation [...] exertion of "economic" power [...] would be impossible over any length of time".<sup>111</sup> To understand contemporary situation we must put it down into a wider historical context. Looking from this perspective, Elias was proposing the same what P. Pierson had in mind when he spoke that we need to look at social changes from the moving pictures position. Following this

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<sup>109</sup>Male students, avoiding military service was one of the reasons that accelerated expansion of universities. US military was one of the main contractors and donors of US research centres. Considering how much American model of higher education influenced global trends of education the role and influence of military dimension becomes not so trivial. Look Saldin, pp. 158-160.

<sup>110</sup>Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000*. London [etc.]: Allen Lane, 2001, pp. 23-51.

<sup>111</sup> Elias, pp. 354-355.

advice, it is really hard to agree that during the last 60 years human activity, which was essential for its advancement for centuries, was pushed away and sidelined.

Talking about contemporary world, it is obvious that Western countries are living in more peaceful times than ever before, therefore it might be not surprising why there are less discussions about military's role in humans lives. However, all ideas and historical evidence discussed early shows that military always was one of the main drivers of all changes. The question is how to find out what role military plays today and what kind of theoretical instruments we need to trace it. But before answering these questions and finding solutions, it is necessary to discuss what obstacles delayed even the raising of such questions. Following pages will reveal that the theoretical framework proposed by Tilly and Mann faced serious inside and outside obstacles.

#### *Theoretical implications*

From what was just presented, we could formulate such a theoretical perspective: war, preparations for it and military organisation were one of the most important factors driving the formation and development of the modern Western state. However, looking from contemporary perspective it is obvious that all theoretical concepts and empirical data did not wholly convince the wider academic community. The works of Weber, Hintze and Elias were continued by their students and followers in the late 80's and early 90's. For a while, it was quite a popular research subject. However later it gradually disappeared from main academic discussions and nowadays it is difficult to find a serious work on this topic. Three reasons could be named as possible causes of such a trend: lack of coherence, consistency and explicitness among members of the Neohintizian school; changing trends in social sciences in general and a decreasing interest in the "state" as an object of social theory in particular; diversity of the military history discipline.

Speaking about the first issue it seems right to say that M. Weber not only inspired the generation of scholars working in 70'ies and 80'ies. It seems that scholars like Giddens and Skockpol not only were influenced by his ideas, they also inherited his argumentation style. In many cases they had interesting insights, but did not keep their promise to explain their arguments in a more detailed manner.

For instance, A. Giddens at the beginning of his book stated that “in this book I also place a good deal of emphasis upon the role of military power in the organisation of traditional and modern states”.<sup>112</sup> On one hand, he keeps his promise. The book speaks quite a lot about the role of the military organisation and its importance in the development of the modern state. Giddens admits that he favours Hintze over Durkheim and Marx. However, the way he addresses and presents some important issues bears more resemblance with Weber than Hintze. He provides interesting, insightful illustrations about the military dimension, but nothing more. Positioning his book as a critique of historical materialism, Giddens mainly addresses issues about the role and the development of capitalism and classes. Thus, the military theme is of secondary importance.

Another scholar, Ch. Dandeker in his book also says that “the view defended here is that such an account should draw especially heavily on the Machiavellian standpoint”.<sup>113</sup> By saying this, he meant that he would follow the tradition of J. Burnham and of the classical elitist school that paid a lot of attention to military. Despite the interesting interpretation and collected data about the role of military in the modern state, Dandeker did not keep his promise. In his book, he adapts ideas of M. Foucault about surveillance. Actually, he tries to show that the main driver in the modern era is increasing state's surveillance capabilities and that military organisation is the tool in these processes alongside with bureaucracy.

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<sup>112</sup> Giddens, p. 2.

<sup>113</sup> Dandeker, p. 6.

Thus, he promises to treat military as an independent variable, but ends up by turning it into a dependant variable.

Tilly and Mann are more consistent in their writings about the role of the military. They both accept that military is only one of the few drivers in the formation and development of the modern state. Tilly is trying to interpret this process as an interaction between capital and coercion, but he is more convincing when he talks about the role of coercion than capital. Also, after having read his book *Coercion, Capital and European States* it is evident that an important shift happened to his ideas about the role of the military in state formation. In his edited book *Nation State Formation* in 1975, he with colleagues emphasised more the role of coercion-extraction cycle. However, in 1990's he speaks more about bargains and cooperation between different social groups. This is more the coercive-cooperation cycle than the coercive-extraction cycle. This transition from extraction to cooperation is important, because it shows Tilly's acceptance of some liberal interpretations about state formation. These interpretations say that before taking any serious political changes rulers had to get consent from dominant social classes; that it was not a top down process supported by force. Tilly accepts the importance of bargain and consent. Yet, the military retained its importance in his theoretical framework. In his interpretation, these bargains are supported by force and it is an unequal bargaining: "cannon versus staves".<sup>114</sup> The moral of this transition is that the process in which "war made state" was more complicated and multi-layered than it had been anticipated at the beginning.

Probably the most ardent advocate of this bellicose approach is Michael Mann. What makes him different from other members of this movement is that he argues that there are four autonomous sources of social power: political, economical, ideological and military.<sup>115</sup> He treats military as an independent and equal to other drivers: "[...] they (*military innovations* – *D. Š.*) also had

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<sup>114</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, p. 102.

<sup>115</sup> Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, I, p. 18.

intrinsically military, emergent, interstitial power of reorganisation – a capacity through particular battlefield superiority to restructure general social networks [...]”.<sup>116</sup> To support his argument he provided an example of pikemen phalanx (Flemish, Swiss), which defeated armies of mounted knights on many occasions during XIV and XV centuries. Alongside many other factors which enabled the creation of this new military formation (egalitarian communities, capital economy) there was a pure military reasons, borne from tactical needs on the battlefield.<sup>117</sup>

His novelty is separation of political and military powers into two separate units. From the perspective of classical social theory, there have always been three sources of social power: economical, ideological and political. Therefore his decision to add the fourth one is a landmark, the most “distinctive part of Mann’s model”.<sup>118</sup> From the arguments, that he provided to explain his decision, the main idea is that in most historic times, “states have not possessed a monopoly of organized military force and many have not even claimed it”.<sup>119</sup> There he differs from Weber, whose ideas he embraced elsewhere.

However, because of this separation of powers Mann received harsh critique. He was blamed that by granting independent role for military “he deprives political power of the conceptual identity bestowed upon it by centuries of theoretical reflection”<sup>120</sup>. Probably Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel or even Kant would have had some disagreements with Mann concerning relationships between politics and military. Therefore, probably because of such unconventional approach, this particular episode in comparison to other Mann’s insights, for instance, idea of despotic and infrastructural power, is ignored in contemporary

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 19.

<sup>118</sup> J.A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (ed.), *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 1.

<sup>119</sup> Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, I, p. 11.

<sup>120</sup> Gianfranco Poggi, „Political power un-manned: a defence of the Holy Trinity from Mann’s military attack“ in J.A. Hall, *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, p. 136.



social theory. However, as will be seen in following chapters, Mann could be right because military historians provide interesting insights supporting his idea about the dimension of autonomous military. All of that brings us back to the argument that we need to take a historical turn seriously; otherwise, we will have serious problems when trying to explain contemporary events and processes.

Before moving further, it is important to mention why all these scholars are not popular among contemporary political scientists. All of them wrote from the perspective that today is called organisational materialism.<sup>121</sup> All the aforementioned scholars were concerned about the military (armed forces, weapons, technologies) and financial means. But there you will hardly find coherent and detailed analysis of such issues like ideology, culture, mentality, ethnicity and gender, that are dominant research topics nowadays. However accepting the importance of all these issues, we cannot deny that the material dimension still matters. Money, military force - they still have a role and, as was said in the Introduction of this dissertation, this dissertation is about finding the place for military in this complex and diverse academic world.

Therefore, the ideas of Giddens, Tilly and especially Mann are best suited for advancing the main argument of this dissertation. Mann is also more suitable for this dissertation because he develops his theory starting from the early periods of human history. He shows that military and other factors were important in all periods, in all systems, not only in modern times. This argument becomes very important when we start talking about the decreasing interest in the “state” as an object of social theory.

#### *The role of the ‘state’*

One of the reasons why the discussion about the military’s role in state formation was forgotten is a peculiar situation of the concept of the *state* in social sciences. Probably it would not be a mistake to say that political sciences evolved

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<sup>121</sup> Malešević, pp. 70-78.

because of discussions concerning the concept of the state. Someone was criticizing the whole notion of the state, others tried to defend it. J.P. Nettl in 1968 wrote: “the concept of the state is not much in vogue in the social sciences right now”.<sup>122</sup> At that time, he was a lone voice who advocated for the usefulness of this concept. However, a decade later it was obvious that the ‘state’ was regaining its centrality in social sciences. This turn in theoretical discussions were initiated by neo-Marxists, who, according to B. Jessop,

“only in the last ten years (*in late 1960’s and early 1970’s – D.S*) that they have rediscovered the state as a problem in political economy. [...] It is unfortunately true that much of the Marxist debate is esoteric and often inaccessible and/or irrelevant to those working in other traditions.”<sup>123</sup>

Therefore, Marxists set the goal to create the comprehensive concept of the state. Overall, it must be concluded that these attempts were successful. Marxists proposed the idea of the capitalist state.<sup>124</sup> The main idea of this concept is that the state is an autonomous actor. Realising the possibility that capital accumulation may create a situation when danger to the whole capitalist system may appear, it is necessary to create a safeguard that could control all these processes. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to give the state such autonomous powers that will make it more than a mere political instrument. The state should have such powers that it could “intervene against capital as well as the working class”.<sup>125</sup> This idea of the capitalist state received harsh critique<sup>126</sup>, but the idea about the autonomy of the state very soon attracted attention of scholars from other schools.

In the late 80’s, Skocpol with colleagues initiated a movement in social sciences whose main task and idea was to establish the state as a proper and valid

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<sup>122</sup> J. P. Nettl, ‘The State as a Conceptual Variable’, *World Politics*, 20, 1968, p. 559.

<sup>123</sup> Bob Jessop, ‘Recent Theories of the Capitalist State’, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol. 1, 1977, p. 353.

<sup>124</sup> Claus Offe, ‘Structural Problems of the Capitalist State: Class Rule and the Political System. On the Selectiveness of Political Institutions’, in *German Political Studies*, ed. by K. von Beyme, 1974, Vol. I, PP. 31-57; Ralph Miliband, ‘State Power and Class Interests’, *New Left Review*, 1983, pp. 57-68.

<sup>125</sup> Jessop, *Recent Theories of the Capitalist State*, p. 363

<sup>126</sup> Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 3-37; David Easton, ‘The Political System Besieged by the State’, *Political Theory*, 9, 1981, pp. 303-325.

object of research. It was a reaction to Marxist and liberal thinking, where, despite all attempts, the state was given a secondary role. The so-called “back in” or statist school reformulated the Marxist idea about the autonomous state. According to them, state is such an organisation that may “formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society”.<sup>127</sup> What is very important for this dissertation is that associates of this school based their conceptual framework upon the works of M. Weber, O. Hintze and N. Elias.<sup>128</sup> This means that the military dimension was very important for this school. Even more, this movement coincided with the publishing of books written by A. Giddens and M. Mann. It seems that Skocpol’s team, Giddens and Mann came to the same conclusions concerning the role of the military dimension independently.<sup>129</sup>

However, probably this coincidence and timing between these research projects were the reason why the ideas advocated by Giddens, Mann and Tilly were silenced and neglected. The “back in” school was criticised severely because of its attempts in granting the state the autonomous role.<sup>130</sup> For instances, G. Almond declared that Skocpol’s proposal “is hardly a “paradigmatic shift”; and it has been purchased at the exorbitant price of encouraging a generation of graduate students to reject their professional history [...]”<sup>131</sup>. Moreover, this statist and war-centred state theory in the early 90’s was only a small part of a huge debate which existed at that time. As Dunleavy and O’Leary showed, there are pluralist,

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<sup>127</sup> Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 9.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

<sup>129</sup> Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, p.xiii.

<sup>130</sup> Gabriel A. Almond ‘The Return to the State’, *The American Political Science Review*, 82, 1988; Timothy Mitchell, ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics’, *The American Political Science Review*, 85, 1991, pp. 77-96.

<sup>131</sup> Almond, p. 853.

Marxist, elite and many other theories of the state.<sup>132</sup> This means that there are many schools that offer different explanations about the nature of the state.<sup>133</sup>

The end of the Cold war did not help either. The increasing theoretical discussion about globalisation and new international actors, especially in the economic sphere, made a serious discussion about the state futile. Scholars started to talk about decline and erosion of the state.<sup>134</sup> Alongside this discussion, the idea about informational, network society made situation of 'state' advocates even more difficult.<sup>135</sup>

The rise of new generation of scholars, like third wave in historical sociology also had its effects. Because of placing materialism first the older generation (second wave) faced an opposition from those who wanted to place in centre of debate micro level issues, forgotten players, like gender, minorities, etc. Also, as mentioned in the Introduction, historical sociology in late 80's became "domesticated". It means, that it get used to the status of sub-field, lost its edge and drive.<sup>136</sup> It also meant, the tone of the older generation became more conciliatory, as it might be seen in works of Skocpol and Tilly, and that helped to make such concepts like "state" easier target for critique coming from younger generation of scholars.

The end of the Cold war and apparent victory of the liberal and capitalist West also meant that social sciences would be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon tradition, whose members, at least at that time, were known as countries with weak traditions of stateness. In the late 60's Nettl wrote that "one has only to read Lipset or Mitchell to see that an American socio-political self-examination simply

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<sup>132</sup>Patrick Dunleavy, Brendan O'Leary, *Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987.

<sup>133</sup> It is possible to trace some elements of statist ideas to the camp of elitist school. Mosca, Parretto, Mills, all of them noticed importance of military. However their ideas are a distant call of what members of war-centred said years later about military's role. Dunleavy; Lister; Malašević.

<sup>134</sup> Susan Strange, 'Supranationals and the State', in *States in History*, ed. by J. Hall. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 289-305.

<sup>135</sup> Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*. Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1996; David Held and others, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

<sup>136</sup> Calhoun, pp. 303-307.

leaves no room for any valid notion of the state.”<sup>137</sup> However, for the last 30 years the enormous number of books, articles and papers were written where scholars provided ample evidence that the US from the beginning has had a very expansive state apparatus.<sup>138</sup> Taking into account the recent research done on Great Britain<sup>139</sup> it becomes obvious that the myth of Anglo-Saxon stateness tradition is rapidly disappearing. Therefore, this shift can be an indicator that the state as an object of political sciences is not going away, but on the contrary has firmly entrenched itself on research agenda.<sup>140</sup> Yet these developments, especially in the field of American political development discipline leave some concerns. Scholars working in this field did a tremendous work of showing that state can and must be an object of study, when speaking about US. These scholars also rely heavily on history. However, even there, having all this historical perspective, military with few exceptions gets minimal attention.<sup>141</sup>

Therefore, this survival of the state does not mean that along with it the military dimension has also regained lost positions in the scholar debate. As Lister and Marsh say: “[...] the stress in much literature on the state on its control over legitimate coercion is misguided in a period (*present times-D.Š.*) where rule depends much more heavily on consent than it did.”<sup>142</sup> This means that coercion is replaced by consent as the main driver of the processes in the state.

Moreover, all this critique towards the validity of the state coincided with the moment when military historians made serious attempts to consider wider social,

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<sup>137</sup> Nettl, p. 561.

<sup>138</sup> William J. Novak, ‘The Myth of the “Weak” American State’, *American Historical Review*, 2008, pp. 752-772.

<sup>139</sup> Brewer; Glete.

<sup>140</sup> Hendrik Spruyt, ‘War, Trade, and State Formation’, in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. by Susan C. Stokes and Carles Boix (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 211-235. Also it is worth to mention that after the recent global financial crisis the governments around the world and especially in the West took under their control lots of activities, previously prescribed to private sector. For instance, banking system in UK probably for the first time after its establishment in 18<sup>th</sup> century became so dependent and controlled by the government. ‘The Growth of the State: Leviathan Stirs Again’, *The Economist*, 1/23/2010, Vol. 394 Issue 8666, pp. 23-26; ‘The Ever-growing State: Taming Leviathan’, *The Economist*, 3/19/2011, Vol. 398 Issue 8725, Special section, pp. 3-6.

<sup>141</sup> Saldin, pp. 1-26.

<sup>142</sup> Hay, p. 256.

political and economic consequences of particular military changes. However, because of diminishing interest in social sciences towards the concept of the 'state', there were only few serious attempts to revitalize the discussion started by scholars like Tilly and Mann.

Before moving forward, one very important point must be made. Everything what was said so far deals with the past. However, the research and analysis of historical material provided not only valuable insights, but also helped to identify areas where main changes did happen. Having in mind the complexity of today's world, this knowledge of a historical context is very valuable. It is obvious that Western countries after the Second World War have not faced existential threat and therefore fought limited wars. This disappearance of a wide scale, industrial war, together with increasing welfare system, thriving economies, expanding network of security and intelligence institutions creates an atmosphere where military is easily lost. As was said in the Introduction, this dissertation is an attempt to fix this problem. All scholars, mentioned in this chapter, considered military one of the most important drivers of social changes through centuries. Having all this historical knowledge, it is possible to create a theoretical framework/map that could help to trace military's role in the contemporary world.

However, when all these scholars wrote their works one important link in this story was missing. In order to have clear understanding how changes of a military origin transformed institutions, society and state, proper historical knowledge about military was necessary. Social scientists depend on material and ideas collected and analysed by historians. The discipline of military history in the last decades of previous century had a turbulent life. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss in detail the development of this discipline, because it has important implications for this dissertation.

## *Military history*

Military history is not as unitary as one might think. There are several different strands of military history. According to J. Lynn, military history could be divided into three distinct genres: popular, applied and academic.<sup>143</sup> Popular military history is made for a broad audience: war memoirs, popular stories about heroic deeds during the wars, TV documentaries and channels.

Applied military history is taught in military academies and schools and its purpose is to form the professional education of officers, and a guide to help to establish doctrine of planning and waging war.<sup>144</sup> It is history of the operational level of war, where examples and lessons for the future conflicts are drawn. The biggest problem with this genre of military history is that soldiers are interested in practical aspects and they search for particular examples or historical cases that could be directly applied to contemporary issues.

The third genre - academic military history is concerned with and devoted to the analysis of historical events analysed in their immediate context and it does not have the aim to convey some particular advice for present day activities.

Yet as military history itself is not unitary, neither are its academic subdivisions. Historians are divided it into three different types: old military school (so called school of “Drums and Trumpets”), new military history and military history using cultural, linguistic methods and approaches. Each of them is important in its own way and contemporary research in the field of military history is difficult without using a combination of all three.

The school of “Drums and Trumpets” is an old school of military history, concerned with analysis and description of actual fighting, operations, battles and conduct of particular commanders. Representatives of this school were not

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<sup>143</sup>John A. Lynn, „Breaching the Walls of Academe: The Purposes, Problems, and Prospects of Military History”, *Academic questions*, Vol. 21, Iss. 1, March, 2008, p. 20.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22.

interested in the wider effects caused by war.<sup>145</sup> Quoting Geoffrey Best, this school “sometimes sinking to uniforms, badges and buttons, rarely rose above campaigns and battles; [...] it tended to extract the fighting side of war from its total historical context [...]”<sup>146</sup>

This old military school was blamed for narrow, conservative outlook that glorified military conduct. Liberally minded scholars after the WWII blamed and criticised this old-fashioned military history for encouraging militarism.<sup>147</sup> Seeking to fix this situation some military historians in the 60s and 70s concentrated their attention on the military institutions, their role in the state, and relationships with the society. It was the development of the “new military history”, by which military historians tried to silence their critics and adapt this academic field to the new trends in academia.<sup>148</sup> Peter Paret’s definition of this new military history summarises this new genre: new military history is “an expansion of the subject of military history from the specifics of military organisation and action to their widest implications, and also a broadening of the approaches to the subject, [and] of the methodologies employed.”<sup>149</sup> Military historians took this new approach very seriously. Under the subheadings like “war and society” they analysed how soldiers were recruited, to what social strata the soldiers and officers belonged to and what their relationship was with the rest of society.<sup>150</sup> This approach was taken too far and it began to ignore the main thrust

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<sup>145</sup> Of course it is too radical to say, that all historians before and immediately after the WWII were not placing military actions and war into broader context. The best example is the German historians H. Delbruck and Otto Hintze.

<sup>146</sup> Geoffrey Best, ‘Editors preface’ in J. R Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985, p. 7.

<sup>147</sup> Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military*. London: Hollis & Carter, 1959; John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, pp. 13-77.

<sup>148</sup> Peter Karsten, “The “New” American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored,” *American Quarterly*, 36, 1984, pp. 389-418; Edward M. Coffman, “The New American Military History,” *Military Affairs*, 48, 1984, pp. 1-5; Richard H. Kohn, “The Social History of the American Soldier: A Review and Prospectus for Research,” *The American Historical Review*, 86, 1981, pp. 553-567.

<sup>149</sup> Peter Paret, “The New Military History” in John Whiteclay Chambers, “Conference Review Essay: The New Military History: Myth and Reality,” *The Journal of Military History*, 55, 1991, p.397.

<sup>150</sup> Geoffrey Best, *War and Society*, p. 336; Brian Bond; Frank Tallett, *War and Society*.



of this revisionism - the conduct of war itself. As M. Howard vividly described, the situation in this field of military history reminded him the “flight to the suburbs”:

“A populous and lucrative industrial estate has grown up around the older centre of military history, populated by social and economical historians who [...] feel no necessity to visit that centre, and are barely aware that it exists.”<sup>151</sup>

The popularity of this new strand of military history forced some historians to make public remarks that no matter which school analyses military history it should not be forgotten that its essence is war and warfare and it is worth remembering this from time to time.<sup>152</sup>

In spite of this, new military history at the present is an irreplaceable part of military history. According to Citino, “it (new military history – D.S.) has been around so long, in fact, and has established itself so firmly, that it seems silly to keep calling it “new””.<sup>153</sup> This new military history moved this discipline closer to sociology, economical, social history. That was a very important step for establishing a wider, more intimate dialog between military history and other disciplines.

Since the early 90s, military history has undergone another transformation by adopting the new trends in the other fields of history and social sciences, more specifically - studies of race, gender, ethnicity and labour.<sup>154</sup> Historians began to write about the role of black and other minorities, women recruits in the armies, their contribution during the war and on the battlefield. The popular notion about the Western way of war forced scholars to pay more attention to the cultural differences. Surveys by Citino and Lynn demonstrate that this new trend already

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<sup>151</sup> Michael Howard, “Military history and the history of war” in *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession* ed. by Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 17.

<sup>152</sup> Dennis E. Showalter, “A Modest Plea for Drums and Trumpets,” *Military Affairs*, 39, 1975, pp. 71-74.

<sup>153</sup> Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction” *American Historical Review*, 112, 2007, p. 1071.

<sup>154</sup> John A. Lynn, “The Embattled Future of Academic Military History,” *The Journal of Military History*, 61, 1997, p. 781.

established itself as a complementary part of academic military history.<sup>155</sup> However, despite these changes, in the academic world military history is not received very well.

The old school of “Drums and Trumpets” was rightfully criticised for its narrowness, yet the situation has not changed even after the introduction of the new military history. Despite interesting and fruitful cooperation between military, economic, political and social historians, military history is still regarded as a stepson to the discipline of history. Lynn in one of his articles described the situation between military history and other disciplines of history as a war itself.<sup>156</sup> Military history has always been regarded as morally and politically questionable. New trends in history have also had an impact. The discipline of military history is perceived as untheoretical when current trends speak about theories. It is dominated by men not only as objects of research but by male historians too which is intolerable at a time when feminist and gender studies are so popular.<sup>157</sup>

The sad situation with military history was also noticed by the mass media.<sup>158</sup> Surveys of Citino and Lynn showed that situation was steadily becoming worse. According to Citino, “while military history dominates the airwaves, [...], its academic footprint continues to shrink, and it has largely vanished from the curriculum of many of our elite universities.”<sup>159</sup> Lynn concluded that the disagreement with other fields of history is fundamental: “they really do disdain us for who we are; that is, for our basic values and opinions.”<sup>160</sup> On the other hand, there are some signs of recovery. Judging from the discussions in organisations, uniting the US military historians, there is an increasing interest in military history. Such organisations as American Historical Association and

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<sup>155</sup> Citino; Lynn, *Breaching the Walls of Academe*.

<sup>156</sup> Lynn, *The Embattled Future of Academic Military History*, p. 778.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 782.

<sup>158</sup> John J. Miller, “Sounding taps: why military history is being retired”, *National Review*, Vol. 58, Is. 18, Oct 9, 2006; Justin Ewers, “Why Don’t More Colleges Teach Military History?”, *U.S. News & World Report*, April 3, 2008; Josiah Bunting, “Why Military History?”, *Academic Questions*, 21, 2007, pp.12-17.

<sup>159</sup> Citino, p. 1070

<sup>160</sup> Lynn, *Breaching the Walls of Academe*, p. 33.

Organisation of American Historians in recent years increased number of events related to military history.<sup>161</sup> Strengthening position of military history is essential for the task, which is advocated in this dissertation. In order to bring back the military dimension into mainstream discussions about political and social changes scholars need trustworthy historical data, insightful ideas and conceptual “lenses”. Without serious historical research and a proper historical turn, it will be difficult to propose new concepts and reach meaningful conclusions. While military historians would not find an agreement among themselves and between this discipline and other subfields of history, to speak about position of autonomous military in political theory is difficult.

However, there is one solution, already proposed by military historians themselves. According to Lynn and Citino, the idea of Military Revolution has capacity to unite different fields of history under one roof.<sup>162</sup> Actually, Citino finishes his superb review about the situation in the field of military history with MR.

It (MR debate – D. S.) has engaged a wide range of methodologies and schools; it involves political and social historians, historians of technology, as well as those who emphasize the primacy of operational history; and it goes well beyond parochial boundaries to touch upon fundamental issues of state formation, absolute monarchy in early modern Europe, and the subsequent Western domination of the globe.<sup>163</sup>

Summarising what Lynn, Citino and others have said about the situation of military history, it has to be admitted that because of the loyalty they have to history they have not noticed another possible solution. Raising the importance of military history is possible by cooperating with social sciences and the concept of MR can play an important role there.

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<sup>161</sup> Carol Reardon, “President’s Report”, 1 May, 2006, Historical Records of the Society for Military History (SMH), ACC. No. P 2006.05, Box No. 81/F-13; Carl Reardon, “Vice President’s Report for 2003-2004”, 5 May, 2004, Historical Records of the Society for Military History (SMH), ACC. No. P 2004.05, Box No. 78/F-5; Brian McAllister Linn, „President’s Report“, *Headquarters Gazette*, Society for Military History, Vol. 24, No. 1 Spring 2011, p. 11.

<sup>162</sup> Lynn, *The Embattled Future of Academic Military History*; Citino.

<sup>163</sup> Citino, p. 1090.

MR with the capability to link tactical and operational military history with the ideas of new military history and social, economical and technological histories offers new ways to support the idea of war's importance in the formation and development of the state for the social scientist.

After all, the armed forces remain one of the main institutions in the state. As was mentioned earlier, changes there may have effect on the changes in the structure of the state. However, for better understanding it is important to place all of this in the historical perspective.

War-centred, bellicose social theory tradition facing pressure and competition from contemporary, third wave representatives needs a fresh look and insights. Scholars may get that fresh look only from history, by using meta perspective. Because only in this way the paths of their main theoretical concern and object – state formation and development can be seen clearly. That's where idea of MR may help to solve this problem. The war-centred state theories may be updated by integrating into their theoretical framework the idea of MR. By doing so it is possible to find out whether contemporary events and changes in the warfare are revolutionary. In this case, the idea of MR may help to link military history with the dominant approaches in political sciences and sociology.

### **3. Rivaling Ideas: Military Revolution and Revolution in Military Affairs**

The German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein compared words and language with a tool-box:

“Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a glue-pot, glue, nails and a screw. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.”<sup>164</sup>

If with the help of tools people are able to build houses and machines then words can describe and give meaning to surrounding objects and processes that

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<sup>164</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958, p. 6

they create. It is worth remembering another great author, George Orwell, and his novel *1984* where he shows how the world, thinking and lives of people may change by changing the language.<sup>165</sup>

This chapter is about concepts and ideas used by scholars and students when they analyse and describe military events. The historical facts by themselves are useless unless they are systemised using particular conceptions and theories. The aim of this part of the dissertation is the analysis of two related but at the same time different notions: *Military Revolution* (MR) and *Revolution in Military Affairs* (RMA). It will be an attempt to analyse these two ideas by looking at their origin, original meaning and interpretations. It is important because the MR is constantly confused with RMA.

As was mentioned in the introduction, the idea of MR was introduced by Michael Roberts more than fifty years ago. He argued that between 1560 and 1660 the conduct of war and its relationship with the state changed so dramatically that this transformation could be called a 'revolution'. Seismic waves of changes on the tactical level ended in transforming political entities.

However, until now there has been no consensus among historians with regards when, where, how, why and if at all such a revolution or revolutions occurred. All these debates will be discussed shortly. As for this moment it will be enough to say that initially in this dissertation MR will be perceived as a radical change in military, political, social and economical spheres caused by a combination of military, social, and political factors.

Following detailed analysis about the evolution of this idea is essential for this dissertation. In order to prove the second thesis it is necessary to trace how the argument about MR was created, what historical data was used, what are its weakest points and main critique. Only by knowing all this it will be possible to try to use this idea for broader ends.

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<sup>165</sup> George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990.


This genealogical MR analysis becomes even more important when debate about RMA is taken into account. The idea of RMA became a popular topic after the First Gulf war in the early 90s. American successes in the First Gulf war, the growing importance of the computers, Internet and other new technologies related to communications, precision and stealth, forced experts in the military field to speak about revolutionary changes in warfare. There RMA will be defined as changes in the structure of military institutions, conceptual framework (doctrine, tactics, and field manuals), technologies and weapons. Broadly speaking, RMA in this dissertation will be seen as a concept that explains changes in armed forces.

One of the main problems with the use of these two notions is that there have only been a few attempts to connect them and to use the two as complementary ideas.<sup>166</sup> Furthermore, almost in all cases the MR is reduced to the changes in military sphere, neglecting its social and political impact.<sup>167</sup> In other words, MR is used as a synonym of RMA. The aim of this chapter in particular and the dissertation in general is to prove that to treat these ideas as equals is wrong conceptually and that such move has far reaching negative consequences. In this work, RMA will be treated as a subsidiary concept and process in regards to MR. RMA is only one part of the MR (see figure Nr: 3).

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<sup>166</sup>Clifford Rogers, “‘Military Revolutions’ and ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’: A Historian’s Perspective’ in *Toward Revolution in Military Affairs: Defense and Security at the dawn of he Twenty-First Century*, ed. by Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.

<sup>167</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*. London: Frank Cass, 2002; MacGregor Knox, Williamson Murray (ed.), *The dynamics of military revolution, 1300-2050*. Cambridge; New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2001.



**Military Revolution:** changes - new type of armed forces, new forms of administration, tax collection and distribution apparatus, etc; source of origin: social, technological, political (mostly some mix of all of them); level of change – state.

**Revolution in Military Affairs:** changes - technological (new weapons, technologies), structure and organisation of armed forces, doctrine and training; source of origin: technological, institutional-political; level of change – armed forces

Figure Nr: 3. Created by the author.

The use of these two notions is not simply a semantic game depending on one's intellectual taste. As was previously said, RMA is concerned with changes in armed forces and MR is concerned with much broader changes in the state. In such cases when MR is reduced to the level of RMA, academics and politicians lose track of the bigger picture. At present, the consensus is that RMA has spread from United States to other parts of the world under the name of military transformation. New technological changes, new fighting doctrines (for example – network centric warfare, swarming) are discussed around the globe. Only few scholars have raised broader questions: what changes in the state and society does this military transformation bring?<sup>168</sup> Reducing the meaning of MR to the level of

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<sup>168</sup> The postmodernist philosophers, who are concerned with the increasing role of technologies in our daily life, raise these questions. James Der Derian, (ed.), *The Virilio reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998); Jean Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995; James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2001. Chapter about virtual war in M. Ignatieff's book *Virtual war* perhaps is the best short, concentrated description of possible impact and changes which could be caused by RMA on broader level - Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. London: Chatto & Windus, 2000. Also look Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization, And war at the End of the Twentieth Century*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991; Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

RMA threatens to ignore and undermine the military's position as one of the independent source of change that might cause transformation at the state level.<sup>169</sup>

One of the reasons that prompted an analysis of these two ideas was that the last few decades saw a proliferation of the cases that claim to be MR or RMA. In addition, more concepts with the word *revolution* appeared: military-technical revolution, revolution in strategic affairs, and revolution in attitudes towards the military.<sup>170</sup> Attempts to name all more or less important changes in warfare as revolutionary and the introduction of more concepts brought confusion. Sometimes it is difficult to track the differences between these concepts and the large number of possible revolutions inflates the meaning of using such a word at all.

Therefore, in this dissertation advice of William of Ockham in the form of his famous principle of razor is taken into consideration: "it is futile to do with more what can be done with fewer".<sup>171</sup> The concept of MR and RMA is more than enough to explain changes in the military sphere and beyond it.

The guidelines given by Ockham's principle are important considering all theoretical debates discussed in the previous chapter. In order to show why military dimension is important and how it might be brought back we need an elegant, but not cumbersome theoretical framework. The analysis of MR and RMA as its subsidiary will be placed in the context of various theoretical approaches and disciplines. It will be argued that the idea of MR might be one of the focal points connecting different schools of military history, different fields of history as a discipline and most importantly - connecting the history with social sciences.

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<sup>169</sup> It is important to stress that because of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan discussions about counterinsurgency replaced debates about RMA in military and political circles. However, this change is more superficial than real. Computers, UAV's and all other technological force multipliers are essential for American and European armed forces. The emergence of counterinsurgency theme only brought healthy competition and balance in military, strategic thinking.

<sup>170</sup> Colin S Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*. London: Phoenix, 2006, pp. 116-117.

<sup>171</sup> Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, Vol. 1. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987, p. 156.



### *Military revolution*

For the last few decades, one of the main topics in the field of military history has been the debate about MR. The initial idea was that MR concept could help to explain the military history of the early modern period. However, during the debate in chronological scale it spread down to medieval history and up to the history of the XIX and XX centuries. Many prominent military historians took part in this debate. Some of them were in favour of this concept, some were more critical. The result, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, is that the idea of MR might be a possible conceptual bridge that connects history with social sciences.

### *Roberts-Parker's paradigm*

In his inaugural lecture at the Queen's University of Belfast, Roberts introduced the idea of MR by saying that it was the result of interrelated changes in four areas. According to him, in the period between 1560 and 1660, Dutch and Swedish rulers were looking for a solution to the problem of an efficient use of firearms and this initiated radical reforms. The result of these reforms was fighting in linear formations where trained and disciplined soldiers in smaller units using counter march could hold constant firing.<sup>172</sup> At the same time, discipline and drill also helped to coordinate actions of pike men, musketeers, cavalry and even artillery.<sup>173</sup>

Also during this period, the European countries began to fight systematically on more than one front: "Wallenstein sends Arnim to fight on the Vistula; [...] Olivares dreams of seizing Goteborg, and of Spanish naval base at Wismar".<sup>174</sup> Roberts links this revolution in strategy with a tactical revolution. According to

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<sup>172</sup> Roberts, pp. 14-15.

<sup>173</sup> It is worth remembering that at that time, in the end of 16<sup>th</sup> century, the discipline and drill were not self-evident and related with military, as are now. As M. Howard said, it was a brand new thing at that time. Michael E. Howard, *War in European History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 56.

<sup>174</sup> Roberts, p. 18.

him, tactical superiority of the Swedish army on the battlefield encouraged King Gustav Adolph to pursue his more ambitious goal of conquering Germany.<sup>175</sup>

The increased scope of warfare demanded more troops and logically it led to an increase in the size of armies. The armies not only became bigger, they also became permanent. This meant that cost and supply increased in order to keep armies on the field. Only the state “could supply the administrative, technical and financial resources required for large-scale hostilities”.<sup>176</sup> This is perhaps the most important part of Roberts’ MR idea. There he states and argues that to meet the increasing complexity and scope of war, European rulers had to introduce new forms of administration, taxation, and financial systems. The result of this process was concentration of more power in the hands of the rulers what helped to speed up centralization and at least partly paved the way for absolutism. Summarising the effects of all these changes Roberts concluded that:

By 1660, the modern art had come to birth. Mass armies, strict discipline, the control of the state, the submergence of the individual, had already arrived; the conjoint ascendancy of financial power and applied science was already established in all its malignity [...].<sup>177</sup>

These words imply that the essence of MR is not pure technical/tactical military changes, but the impact of these changes on the processes of the development and transformation of the state and the society.<sup>178</sup> Such proposition for this dissertation is important at least for two reasons. First, Roberts advocates the idea of the autonomous military dimension and in this way, it nicely fits into the framework proposed by Mann. The only difference is that Mann spoke of the military’s autonomy through centuries, while Roberts speaks only about the early modern times. However, looking into things from this perspective, it is worth to ask what stop us to use Robert’s model in a wider historical perspective.

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid, p. 19.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid, p. 20.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid, p. 29.

<sup>178</sup> Deividas Šlekys, ‘More Than Semantics: The Difference Between the Concepts of “military Revolution” and “revolution in Military Affairs”’, in *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 2007*. Vilnius: Vilnius university Press, 2008, pp. 51-87.

Secondly, as Robert's argument goes, tactical and technological innovations have led to far reaching consequences. This means that small causes could trigger big structural changes. Therefore, in light of this connection of the wider political, social and economic changes with the transformation in the military field, Roberts, in this idea, concealed a very powerful theoretical device which, despite strong and well-reasoned critique, forced most of its critics to accept Roberts' proposal.<sup>179</sup>

For the first couple of decades after its introduction in 1955, Roberts' idea was left at peace. Nevertheless, in 1976 Geoffrey Parker seriously revised the concept for the first time. Parker entered the MR debate as its critic but finally emerged as its biggest supporter and gave new impetus to this idea. As was mentioned, Roberts created the concept of MR mostly by drawing examples from the history of Sweden. This attempt to create a general theory, which relies heavily on one case study, may encounter problems when other case studies are analysed. This happened in the case of Parker. Being a specialist in Spanish history, especially in the reign of Philip II, Parker had some serious doubts about Roberts' idea of MR as it strongly criticised Spain's military conduct. In his revisionist article, he made the argument that: "[...] tactical innovations, described by Roberts, derived at least some of their 'revolutionary' character from a rather unfair portrayal of the 'prerevolutionary' warfare of the earlier sixteenth century"<sup>180</sup>. First, he emphasises the case of Spanish army.

One of the main points of Parker's critics is that Roberts was incorrect by choosing 1560 as the starting date of the MR. According to him, permanent

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<sup>179</sup> Speaking about Roberts' idea and the critic, which followed in later decades a few remarks about his academic background, might be helpful. Roberts was an expert of Swedish history in early modern times. He drew his idea about MR after lifelong research of Swedish history. The political, administrative, financial, social, military reforms, implemented by Gustav Adolph so radically changed Swedish state that it really deserves to be named "revolution". All these changes helped to win wars and to create Sweden empire. Military area was the focal point of these changes and achievements. Because of this remarkable Swedish achievement, Roberts created the concept that he tried to apply to the cases of other European countries.

<sup>180</sup> Geoffrey Parker, 'The 'Military Revolution', 1560 - 1660' – A Myth?' in Rogers, *The Military Revolution Debate*, p. 39.

military units, standing armies, and greater professionalism of the soldiers existed from the XV century in Renaissance Italy and other countries.<sup>181</sup> However, he admitted that innovations introduced by Maurice of Nassau and his relatives were important and novel.

Parker also doubted the strategic aspect of Roberts' "revolution" saying that strategic thinking existed before Gustav Adolph. According to him, military thinking in the XVI century was concentrated on the appearance of a new type of fortification - *trace italienne*.<sup>182</sup> Building of these fortresses, besieging and capturing them were the main occupation of armies. The battle, which, according to Roberts, came back in favour during the Thirty years war, actually very rarely helped to achieve a "decisive" end. The capture of important fortress was more likely to end war or campaign than victory on the battlefield.

If Parker only partly accepted the tactical and strategic aspects of MR then the third aspect, the growth in army size, he accepted fully. According to him, "between 1530 and 1710 there was a ten fold increase both in total numbers of armed forces [...] and in total number involved in the major European battles".<sup>183</sup> However, Roberts' and Parker's agreement ended when they tried to explain the causes of this increase of armies. For Parker, the growth of armies predated the reforms introduced by Maurice of Nassau and Gustav Adolph. The increase of armies in the early XVI century, according to him, was the result of the changes in fortifications and siege warfare. The capture of fortresses became a much longer and a more difficult job that ultimately required more soldiers.

The increasing size of armies required more money and better supply. To achieve this, better administration and financial management were required. Therefore, Parker agrees with Roberts' idea that changes in warfare, especially increasing size of armies, had profound impact on political and social structures in

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid., pp. 38-40.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid, pp. 41-42.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

Europe. This is why in the conclusion of his article, he states that even his critique “has failed to dent the basic thesis: the scale of warfare in early modern Europe was revolutionized, and this had important and wide- ranging consequences”<sup>184</sup>

In the next decade, in 1988, Parker published a book, where he not only defended Roberts’ idea, but also developed it in a more nuanced way, making it even more resistible to critics.<sup>185</sup> In this book, Parker clarifies his ideas, written in the article a decade earlier, and puts them in a more systematic way.<sup>186</sup> Firstly, he differs from Roberts by saying that MR started not in 1560 but in 1500. The key that explains this change of timing is gunpowder.<sup>187</sup> According to him, “the catalyst of major change was the French invasion of the peninsula [Italy] in 1494-5”<sup>188</sup>. With artillery’s help, the French took town after town. The walls that for decades or centuries were impregnable could not resist the power of artillery. But the Italians very soon found the antidote in the *trace itallienne* which could withstand the destructive power of artillery. The consequence of this change was the increase in size of armies because sieges and garrisoning of the towns and fortresses required a lot of manpower<sup>189</sup>.

Firearms were another important change in warfare. Despite the fact that performance of the early firearms was uninspiring, they remained attractive “because it required virtually no training for use”<sup>190</sup>. That is why at first in slow tempo, but later faster and faster firearms were replacing its biggest rival, the pike. Increasing armies and use of firearms required order. This is where Roberts’ idea of tactical revolution fits in. Parker corrects some aspects, but mainly he agrees with Roberts.

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid, p. 49.

<sup>185</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500 – 1800*.

<sup>186</sup> He even raised stakes by implying, that it was MR, which caused the rise of the West.

<sup>187</sup> In this book, Parker is more technology minded and his theory is more technologically deterministic than Roberts’.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-24.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

He also adds one more important element to the idea of MR. Parker develops and shows that revolutionary changes were happening not only on land, but also at sea at the same time. The introduction of new types of ships, cannons, four-wheeled truck carriages, and the linear formation led to creation of permanent navies.<sup>191</sup>

Parker also in a more detailed way showed how changes in the military area were changing the structure of the state and the society. Supply of food, weapons, cloth; medical care and treatment of wounded and disabled soldiers, new ways of financing war - all of these issues forced rulers to take new responsibilities. Because of all these changes in technological, tactical and political areas, Parker saw the creation of a mechanism that helped Western countries to have the advantage when fighting on other continents.

Summarising both Roberts' and Parker's views, it is possible to speak about one, not two concepts of MR. Both of them agree that in the early modern period changes in the military sphere had profound effects not only in the military, but also in the political and social spheres. It is even more important, bearing in mind that this MR was happening at a time when the foundations of the modern, contemporary state were laid down. Military factors, not only because of pure military victory or defeat, but also because of more sophisticated and deeply rooted reasons, contributed to creation of the modern state too. Also, it is important to see these military changes as independent variables which happened because of new types of weapons, new types of military organisation and fighting doctrine. Of course, there were other factors: economic, social, geopolitical. However, at this moment any serious academic discussion about military, political, economic and social history in early modern Europe cannot ignore the Roberts-Parker's paradigm of MR.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid., pp. 82-103.

<sup>192</sup> For instances, in their writings prominent scholars like Paul Kennedy, William McNeill or already mentioned Ch. Tilly, M. Mann in their writings pays a lot of attention to this MR. For instance, in Kennedy's interpretation, this early modern MR was a very important factor developing Western

### *Critique of the idea of military revolution*

Owing to its wide scope and generalisation, the idea of MR has faced a lot of critique. Scholars were criticising the timing of this revolution, the way in which cases of particular countries were analysed, its technological determinism or even the need for such kind of idea at all.

The most serious critique came from scholars who are specialists in medieval and XVIII century history. According to them, it is unfair to ignore the changes in the warfare that happened during other periods.

One of the main critics of the early modern MR is Clifford Rogers. According to him, the timing of MR in the chronological scale should be moved back to medieval ages, in particular to the period of the Hundred Years war (1337-1453):

“I believe, however, that the focus on the centuries after 1500 obscures the importance of the period in which the most dramatic, most truly revolutionary changes in European military affairs took place [...]”<sup>193</sup>

Rogers argues that during the Hundred Years war not one but two revolutions took place: infantry and artillery revolutions. The first is associated with the increasing role of infantry on the battlefield. The English archers, Flemish, Swiss pike men during the XIV century managed to stand by and defeat superior armies of mounted knights in many battles. They helped England dominate the first half of the Hundred Years war and were the key for the Swiss gaining their independence. Rogers even follows the guidelines of Roberts and Parker and tries to look for social and political consequences of this “infantry revolution”. The main political outcome of this revolution was the introduction and growing

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international system. However, when speaking about the role of military in later periods scholars are not using idea of MR and all its conceptual potential. Look, Paul M Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988; William Hardy McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*; Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. II .

<sup>193</sup>Clifford Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’ in Rogers *The Military Revolution Debate*, p. 56.

importance of the parliaments. Common people demanded more political rights as their military importance grew.<sup>194</sup>

The artillery revolution gained its importance in the first part of the XV century helping to end the Hundred Years war in favour of France. The artillery was very expensive, therefore, only strong and rich, or well connected rulers could afford it while others were compelled to surrender. In this sense, artillery made the centralisation of countries like France or Spain faster.<sup>195</sup>

Following his analysis of the Hundred Years war, Rogers proposed an alternative idea. For him the changes in the military field were more evolutionary than revolutionary, and he proposed to use the idea of a punctuated equilibrium evolution. The idea of this concept is that evolution proceeds in short, rapid revolutionary changes followed by a long period of stasis. In the case of military history, it may help to explain why infantry and artillery, for a long time being part of military system, suddenly became important. The whole processes then could be seen as series of small revolutions, but not as one big revolution.<sup>196</sup>

The biggest weakness of Rogers argument is that it is unclear how significant were the political and social changes that infantry and artillery revolutions brought. The increasing role of infantry did not end the role of a mounted warrior. The chivalric ideas were as strong as they were in the XII century. The Swiss in many ways were lucky because of their geographical terrain. The victories achieved by English archers owed much to the simple fact of French incompetence, not inflexibility.<sup>197</sup> The increasing role of parliaments probably owed more to increasing financial demands of the rulers to fight wars, not to political demands of the common people. The artillery's revolution also raises doubts. Why then it did not provoke the massive reconstruction of fortresses like

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid., pp. 61-62.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid, pp. 74-75.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, pp. 76-77

<sup>197</sup>Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Vol. 2, Trial by fire*. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.



in the early XVI century? Accordingly, the results that Rogers presented as the consequences of military changes are smaller compared to the changes in the XVI and the XVII centuries.

These Rogers ideas have a lot of in common with so called Princeton school, mainly associated with the historian Joseph Strayer. Strayer in his many researches was advocating evolutionary, incremental changes through time, tracing origins of modern state in medieval ages. According to him, administrative, judicial solutions made by English and French kings set these kingdoms on the track leading to the modern state long before Roberts Military revolution.<sup>198</sup> Military in this intellectual tradition has a secondary role. However, the question remains, why states created all these institutions and what role military played in this processes. Some scholars, like Rogers, Downing, Ertman, combined evolutionary ideas of Princeton school with the idea of MR. The result is an idea that even when speaking about evolutionary changes and other causes military realm still remains important and may have long lasting political consequences.

Another important critic of the Roberts-Parker's paradigm is Jeremy Black who, despite his wide-ranging writings, might be considered an expert of XVIII century history. Therefore, it is not surprising that in his view, if a MR took place at all, it started at 1660 and continued into the XVIII century.

In so far as a military revolution occurred in the early modern period it could be dated more appropriately to the hundred years, especially the first fifty (1660-1710 – D. S), after the period highlighted by Roberts.<sup>199</sup>

According to Black, the introduction of flintlock, the bayonet, increasing firepower and manoeuvrability of infantry, huge increases in the size of armies

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<sup>198</sup> Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins Of the Modern State*, 2nd ed. Princeton University Press, 2005; Spruyt, *War, Trade, and State Formation*; Downing; Ertman.

<sup>199</sup>Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1660-1815*. London: UCL Press, 1994, p. 93.

and their organisation were as much radical changes in the warfare as the changes indicated by Roberts and Parker.<sup>200</sup>

Black uses the same indicators like Roberts and Parker trying to deemphasise their arguments. Black places a lot of emphasis on the increasing size of armies, which at the end of the XVII century reached unprecedented levels: “the bulk of the growth [...] was of such order that it cannot be described simply in terms of a continuation of already established patterns of growth”.<sup>201</sup> Moreover, following this argument he makes one more, an even stronger criticism. He states that: “it can be argued that it was more stable domestic political circumstances of most states of that period [...] that made these changes possible (military change – D. S)”.<sup>202</sup> It was not military changes, that brought political reforms as Roberts and Parker argues, but on the contrary.

This argument really threatens the foundations of Parker’s idea of MR. However, Black leaves a lot of caveats that make all his arguments a bit shaky. His idea that the reconciliation of the nobility and the crown in the European states was the main condition for this military change is ambivalent. Why were the nobility discontented? One of the possible answers is that because of the military demands and increasing control from the centre. The nobility’s discontent was provoked by the fact that rulers forced the noblemen to obey the orders because of the permanent armies. These bargains were made in the format: “cannon versus staves”<sup>203</sup>. However, as it was already mentioned in the second chapter, Black is not alone proposing the idea of a bargain and consent between nobility and rulers. The question is why this bargain took place at all. The research of other scholars is in favour of Parker’s argument showing that by the beginning of the reign of

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<sup>200</sup> Jeremy Black, ‘A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective’ in Rogers, *The Military Revolution Debate*, pp. 97-98; Black, *European Warfare*, pp. 20-34.

<sup>201</sup> Black, *A Military Revolution*, p. 98.

<sup>202</sup> Black, *European Warfare*, p. 67.

<sup>203</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, p.102

Louis XIV the basic structures and principles of the modern state were in place already.<sup>204</sup>

In his latter texts, Black is more cautious on this particular aspect. He concentrates more on pure military changes and on the spread of western weapons and way of fighting around the globe.<sup>205</sup> Overall, his critique leaves mixed feelings because at some points he makes quite interesting remarks, but at other points it seems that he did not grasp the essence of Roberts' and Parkers' idea.

Other scholars concentrated their critique mostly on analyzing the growth of armies. Black also based his critique on that point. Mostly the arguments are drawn from analysis of the French case, as its army and organisation were the paradigm that was followed by other countries. David Parrot in his research of French army during the government of Richelieu brings a lot of worrying news to MR followers.<sup>206</sup> He concludes that during the Thirty years war the French army actually did not grow as radically as has been perceived and there was no administrative or financial reform that paved the way for the more bureaucratized state mechanism of Louis XIV.<sup>207</sup>

At the same time, another prominent historian John Lynn counters this view, showing that Parrot is not correct and that the French army did really increase significantly during the reign of Louis XIII.<sup>208</sup> This entire historical dispute in one sense is very important, but at the same time, it is very perplexing. The growth of armies and the development of administration that took care of them are very important in the discussion of MR, especially in the case of France. However, at

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<sup>204</sup> Downing; Ertman; Porter; Colin Jones, 'The Military Revolution and the Professionalisation of the French Army Under the Ancien Regime' in *The Military Revolution and the State, 1500-1800*, ed. by Michael Duffy. Exeter: University of Exeter, 1980.

<sup>205</sup> Black, *European Warfare*.

<sup>206</sup> David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France, 1624-1642*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

<sup>207</sup> David Parrott, during the interview with author of this dissertation, confirmed, that he did not change his position concerning MR issue. For him the transformation of French army and state was not linear as Parker would like to show. According to him, the best description of immediate period after Richelieu's death is devolution of state power, not centralisation

<sup>208</sup> John A. Lynn, 'Recalculating French Army Growth During the Grand Siècle, 1610-1715' in Rogers, *The Military Revolution Debate*.

the same time, for the social scientist it is difficult to make a generalisation when historians are making contradicting historical conclusions. The dominant version that emerged among historians and social scientists is that armies since the beginning of XVI century were constantly increasing till the end of the XVII century. Armies were increasing at such tempo that was facilitated by demographic, economic and political conditions. The creation of governments' administrative and financial institutions was reaction to this increase. Therefore, the increase of armies was happening in stages and the increase of armies during the reign of Louis XIV was the last in this chain. It was bigger because there were better demographical and economical conditions than 50 or 60 years ago and also because of that that there was more wars than previously.

There was also some criticism concerning the technological determinism, which is apparent in Parker's texts. Some criticised his neglect of technological changes in the XV century or for his concentration on the *trace italienne*.<sup>209</sup> All this critique actually improved rather than damaged the idea of MR. Lynn's words in his paper about MR probably reflect the broader picture of relations between MR and its critics: "Parker's theory survives this critique, but not intact".<sup>210</sup>

Parker himself in reply to all these criticisms defended his idea, making only one serious concession in that the military change and political developments were independent but at the same time closely connected processes: "[...] we should perhaps envisage something like the [...] the structure of DNA molecule, with two complex spirals interacting [...]".<sup>211</sup> For some scholars MR together with the Reformation, the geopolitical struggle between Habsburgs and the rest of Europe was the driving force of all changes in the Europe.<sup>212</sup> It is true that there

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<sup>209</sup> Bert S. Hall and Kelly R. DeVries, 'Essay Review – The "Military Revolution" Revisited', *Technology and Culture*, Vol. 31, No. 3, Jul., 1990; John A. Lynn, 'The *trace italienne* and the Growth of Armies: The French Case' in Rogers, *The Military Revolution Debate*.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>211</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, p. 341.

<sup>212</sup> Porter; McNeill; Paul M Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.

must be reasons why wars are fought, but once they start, they are governed by their own logic.

### *Some reflections on MR critique*

When reading articles and books that criticised the idea of MR one thought occurred: most of these critics are missing the point of MR, or are not willing to look towards all these processes from the distance. According to Robert Frost:

“[...] many historians [...] preferring to understand the Revolution (MR – D. S) as a purely military phenomenon [...] miss the point: Roberts was concerned not with warfare as such, seeing changes in military technologies [...] as merely the precipitants of the true revolution which was social and political [...]”.<sup>213</sup>

The processes in which the military played a very important role were the creation of the modern state. After the wars between 1540 and 1660 in Western Europe a political organisation emerged, the one that had all the basic elements of a modern state, “territorial sovereignty, centralized government, bureaucratic administration, permanent military establishments, [...], an international system of states”.<sup>214</sup> Of course, it was not a linear processes, it did not happen in all countries at the same time.<sup>215</sup> However, by the rule of Louis XIV the principles and foundations of the modern state had already been laid down. Later generations perfected these mechanisms and introduced some new cogs into them, but at the very core they were following the rules placed in the middle of the XVII century. In this light Black’s proposal to move the date of MR does not stand up. The same could be said about Rogers’ proposal. Many scholars have shown how a lot of processes and phenomenon has found their way from medieval ages to the modern, but despite this we still are speaking about medieval ages and modern times. Despite much continuity some radical changes appeared during the XVI

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<sup>213</sup> Robert I Frost, *The Northern Wars*, p. 18.

<sup>214</sup> Porter, p. 101.

<sup>215</sup> The case of England is very good example. Being latecomer into European politics in the age of Louis XIV England, very fast transformed itself. The creation of military-fiscal state in England was the result of MR like absolutist France or Prussia. The war and its demands were driving force for the transformation of political, financial, social institutions. Look John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*.

and XVII centuries. The simple example of important change was the establishment of permanent armies and navies which is one of the most important features of the modern state. It does not matter if you look from a theoretical perspective, the size of army could be 10, 0000 or 200, 0000, of the utmost importance are the organisation, role and place of the armies in the structure of state.

One important conclusion appears from all these discussions: majority of historians like social scientists in their works are following tradition of M. Weber, not O. Hintze or N. Elias. For them political and military dimensions are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, we have Princeton school or ideas expressed by Rogers, Black. Roberts and Parker hold position in the field of military history and history in general like M. Mann holds in social sciences. They tried to show autonomy of military dimension and equally met resistance. Parker's example of military and political as interacting spirals of DNA perfectly shows the difficulties and complexity of identification and separation of these two domains. Nevertheless, it is possible to separate them and idea of Military revolution is that tool.

### *How many MR ?*

All scholars, discussed in 2 chapter spoke about the Military revolution of early modern times. When speaking about military domain, its effects during other periods, for instance, French revolution or First World War they do not name them as military revolution. As was already said, social scientists, familiar with the idea of MR, are not using it when they speak about developments in late modernity. It is interesting, that accepting the idea of transformation in political, social spheres caused by tactical, technological, organisational changes in the military during early modernity these scholars are not trying to apply the same framework when discussing about other historical periods. They are not speaking about *a* military revolution. One of the reasons is that military historians did not

tried to use this Roberts'- Parker's paradigm when analysing later historical events. That's probably why Williamson Murray following all these ideas proposed the idea of not one but of a few MR.

Murray states that the creation of the modern effective nation-state is based on the organized and disciplined military power in the 17th century, the French Revolution and the Industrial revolution beginning at the same time during the period 1789–1815, and the First World War were MR's.<sup>216</sup> Later on in his other articles he discusses nuclear MR which is debatable.<sup>217</sup> Bearing in mind contemporary changes related with computer and communication technologies in the military and other spheres it is possible to speak about new MR.

MR, according to Murray, might be compared to earthquakes: "they brought with them such systemic changes in the political, social, and cultural arenas as to be largely uncontrollable, unpredictable, and above all unforeseeable".<sup>218</sup> In addition, it is important to remember, that these MR may happen not only by technological, but also by social and political causes.

Probably there is a consensus that everyone could agree with the list of the proposed MR. All these events brought about radical changes, and in all of them war's and the military's needs have played the important role in changing the state. The conscription and the expansion of franchise, women's rights, the rise of the importance of labour unions, the introduction of welfare state, to mention a few. None of these issues could be analysed ignoring the role of war.

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<sup>216</sup> Williamson Murray, 'Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs', *Joint Force Quarterly* 16, Summer 1997, p., 70.

<sup>217</sup> Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution*, p. 13. The question of nuclear MR is very good example how different perspectives see the same object. Following the line of Roberts and Parker we should look for some big, structural changes in the state or society. But during the Cold war nothing comparable with changes after French revolution or WWI did not happened. On the other hand scholars from the field of international relations or strategic studies see nuclear era as tremendously important. For example Colin Gray is in favour of calling introduction of nuclear weapons as one more MR. It is true, that nuclear weapons forever changed strategic thinking, relations between politics and war. But at the same time it brought stalemate. And looking from nowadays perspective, information technologies have better chances to change not only warfare, politics, but also the ways how people live and are governed.

<sup>218</sup> Murray, *Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs*, p. 71.

It is not the aim of this dissertation to analyse these military revolutions. The analysis of Roberts-Parker's MR was important because it showed how the concept developed, what was its essence and what strength and weakness it has. In the cases of all the other MR it is clear that issues of purely military origin have had much bigger impact.

The idea that there might be more than one MR is important to this dissertation because it helps to analyse contemporary issues and changes in military and warfare from a historical perspective. It becomes even more important when we include the RMA into this picture.

### *RMA*

For the last two decades, RMA was the focal concept for any discussion or question concerning military issues, changes in warfare in the USA and Western countries and in other parts of the globe. From theoretical and academic discussions this concept has moved into politics under the name of "transformation". It is difficult to find an advanced country, which is not pursuing military transformation. As Murray noted:

"[...] the persistence of the RMA concept over the past decade, in a town where concepts and their acronyms appear and disappear with startling speed, suggests that there is something to the idea of revolutionary transformation".<sup>219</sup>

One of the possible reasons of such success is that RMA has become a conceptual umbrella which covers topics ranging from discussions about procurement planning to the cyber space warfare or fictional discussions about cyborg-warriors.<sup>220</sup> However, such popularity has come at a price. According to Gray, "American RMA debate generated much more noise than illumination".<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Williamson Murray, 'Foreword' in Colin S Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*. London: Frank Cass, 2002, p. xi.

<sup>220</sup>Very good and massive overview of RMA and all related topics could be found in the site of the *Project on Defense Alternatives*, <<http://www.comw.org/rma/>>.

<sup>221</sup>Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*, p. xiii.



Alongside good, solid academic works on this issue it is possible to find texts where industrial or service interests are barely concealed under the flag of RMA.

The goal of this section is to look at the beginnings of this debate. Despite huge amount of papers which appear every year they all are based on assumptions, concepts and ideas introduced at the beginning of this debate. Repeatedly scholars, analysts and experts are quoting the works of the Soviet military thinkers, Andrew Marshall, Andrew Krepinevich or Eliot A. Cohen who laid down the foundations of the RMA.

### *Soviet military thought and the birth of MTR concept*

The origins of the RMA dates back to the period between mid 1970's and early 1980's and are traced to Soviet military writings about MTR.<sup>222</sup> At that period, the Soviets started to discuss that American innovation in the areas of electronics, precise targeting, information processing and other technologies created a fundamental discontinuity in warfare. The Chief of the General Staff at that moment, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, in a number of texts emphasised that:

“Both the latest state-of-the art technology, [...], and the organisational changes, which had to be made to accommodate this emerging weaponry, would not constitute a phase in a process of evolutionary adaptation but a genuine discontinuity in military affairs”.<sup>223</sup>

The explanation why Soviets saw radical changes in warfare is twofold. The first is related to the ideological-theoretical background in which Soviets developed their military thought and secondly the reaction and search for a remedy to the Western doctrines such as Air Land Battle (ALB) and Follow on Force Attack (FOFA) in early 1980's.<sup>224</sup>

The ideological differences between Western countries and the Soviet Union set a different normative, theoretical point of view to the surrounding world.

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<sup>222</sup> It is important to note that Soviet thinkers also used the term “revolution in military affairs”, but more often, they used term “MTR”. Because of that, the accepted version is that Soviets developed MTR concept, which was succeeded by American RMA.

<sup>223</sup> Dima P. Adamsky, “Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 31, 2008, p. 264.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 262.

According to David M. Glantz, for the Soviets “war could either accelerate or retard the march toward world socialism”.<sup>225</sup> Therefore, trying to avoid defeat in the war, the Soviets perceived the study of war as a science which has its own laws and rules. In this scientific framework of military science the military-technical aspects were one of the main foundations of the whole military science.<sup>226</sup> In this context, it is not surprising that the Soviets saw Western technological innovations as revolutionary. If Americans saw the development of a single weapon or platform as an incremental and evolutionary process, then the Soviets saw all these changes in a holistic way, seeing all technological innovations as one system. Such a holistic approach helped to see not only individual trees, but also the whole forest. Having a strict theoretical framework where technical aspects were prime the Soviets could see how new technologies could affect the lower stages of military sciences: military art, organisation, military strategy, operational art, and tactics. The conclusion of this assessment was that there was a new MTR.

At the same time, the introduction of new doctrines by the USA and NATO only strengthened the Soviet belief about MTR. After a detailed assessment, they concluded that new technologies, allowing long range precise strikes linked with advanced command and control systems, could alter the whole military planning and doctrine.<sup>227</sup> The conclusions showed that during Soviet attack on Germany Soviet’s second echelon could be destroyed before entering the conflict zone; that the conventional phase of war was considerably increasing and that the volume of tasks for forces using conventional weapons also was increasing.<sup>228</sup> New

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<sup>225</sup>David M Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle*, London: Frank Cass, 1991, p. 1.

<sup>226</sup>*Ibid.*, pp, 3-4.

<sup>227</sup> The essence of ALB and FOFA doctrines was that Western countries by using new technologies with deep strike capabilities could compensate their quantitative disadvantage. With the help of deep strike operations Soviet second echelon could be stopped or reduced while main NATO forces could fight advancing first Soviet echelon. John L Romjue, ‘The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept’, *Air University Review*, May-June 1984; Richard Lock-Pullan, “How to rethink war: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28, 2005; Adamsky, pp. 259-261.

<sup>228</sup> Adamsky, p. 268.

conventional capabilities could have not only tactical and operational consequences, but also even strategic ones. The Soviet strategic planners were even considering the potential use of new conventional weapons on a global scale. This meant that conventional weapons could help to achieve results which in the past were possible only by using nuclear weapons.<sup>229</sup>

All these technological changes required a new operational and doctrinal approach. The Soviets started discussing about the *reconnaissance strike and fire complexes* which had to integrate reconnaissance, surveillance targeting assets with precision weapons and command and control systems into one system. These complexes had to be supported and organically united with *operational manoeuvring groups*. The whole point of all this was the destroying of the deep strike capabilities of the West while at the same time striking at the enemy's rear and creating operational shock.<sup>230</sup>

Summarising this it is clear that the Soviets saw new conventional weapons and technologies as triggers which started MTR. From their perspective, this revolution affected all levels of the war, and was probably replacing nuclear weapons. Because of that, radical changes were required in the organisation of armed forces and fighting doctrines.

#### *Development of the RMA concept*

The most surprising aspect in the history of RMA is that Americans who invented and introduced all these new technologies did not see their revolutionary potential as the Soviets did. The Americans only picked up this theoretical framework of the Soviet MTR a decade later. The slowness of the Americans to

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<sup>229</sup> Andrew W. Marshall and C. Wolf, 'The Future Security Environment'. Report of the Future Security Environment Working Group, submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy. Washington DC: DoD Oct. 1988, p. 142.

<sup>230</sup> Adamsky, pp. 272-275.

grasp the importance of Soviet achievements is more surprising bearing in mind that they were following the development of this concept from the beginning.<sup>231</sup>

It is important to note that the Americans and their Western allies during this period were discussing new technologies, their impact on military doctrines, strategies and political consequences'.<sup>232</sup> However, these discussions were more concentrated on individual technologies or weapon systems. The new technologies were seen as evolutionary, as a further step in strengthening existing capabilities:

“U.S. forecasting efforts tend to be more piecemeal and less ambitious, extrapolating forward from current capabilities rather than trying to anticipate qualitative leaps that can bring about what the Soviets call a “revolution in military affairs”.”<sup>233</sup>

If the Soviets saw ALB and FOFA doctrines driven by new technologies, the Americans and their allies put more emphasis on doctrinal innovations which to some extent were revolutionary by themselves.<sup>234</sup> Americans “[...] shifted the relationship between technology and army doctrine to one where the doctrine dictated the technological requirements”.<sup>235</sup>

The American defence establishment started paying more attention to the Soviet ideas about MTR only late in the 1980's, despite the fact that through the decade there was a constant call to look more seriously into the Soviet findings.<sup>236</sup>

After they started, it did not take long for Americans to grasp and understand the importance and magnitude of Soviet findings. In 1988, a work group was established by the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy and chaired by A. Marshall and Ch. Wolf. It reported that Soviets were right in what they stated about profound changes in the war:

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<sup>231</sup> Ibid., pp. 276-279.

<sup>232</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi paper, Nr. 318. London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998, p. 21-27

<sup>233</sup> Marshall, *The Future Security Environment*, p. 35.

<sup>234</sup> The new doctrines focussed on the campaigns rather than on battles at the front line. It also showed that American military thinking shifted from tactical level to operational which by itself was a radical move, opposite to existing American military tradition.

<sup>235</sup> Richard Lock-Pullan, p. 684.

<sup>236</sup> Adamsky, p. 281

“The Working Group believes that the Soviets are correct in their assessment that the advent of new technologies will revolutionize war, and not merely make current forces marginally better at what they do. [...] the new technologies will profoundly alter tactical requirements, operational possibilities, and even, in some cases, strategic choice in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century”.<sup>237</sup>

According to the report, the changes in war resulted from the innovations in the areas of stealth, unmanned vehicles, precision, long-range munitions, space and information technologies, etc. It was almost identical to the list of technological innovations which the Soviets saw as revolutionary in the previous decade. The report also concluded that new technologies might require “[...] radical surgery – in our current organisations, military doctrine, and philosophy of command”.<sup>238</sup>

In 1991, all these predictions had been vindicated during the Gulf war. Despite the fact that this war had been fought according to the rules of industrial warfare, the media ensured that world attention was fixed on the precision-guided munitions destroying their targets. The use of computers, space satellites, new reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting systems, the speed of decision-making - all these things surprised not only other countries, but also the Americans themselves. A worldwide consensus was reached that a new era of warfare had arrived.

In the wake of this war, reflection and analysis appeared quickly. In the same year, future Defence Secretary William J. Perry wrote that “in Operation Desert Storm the United States employed for the first time a new class of military systems that gave American forces a revolutionary advance in military capability”.<sup>239</sup> Politicians and scholars alike echoed this view.

During the war, the head of the Office of Net Assessment in the Defence Department, A. Marshall, asked his colleagues to undertake an assessment

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<sup>237</sup> Marshall, *The Future Security Environment*, p. 26.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>239</sup> William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence”, *Foreign Affairs*, 70, 1991, p. 66.

concerning the changes in warfare. The result of this assessment was probably the most important and fundamental text about RMA that was to lay down guidelines for future research and debate on this issue.

Report “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment”, prepared by A. Krepinevich from the beginning stressed that the world was facing MTR and that “sooner or later leading military powers will exploit available and emerging technologies”.<sup>240</sup> He defined MTR in the following way:

“A Military-Technical Revolution occurs when the application of new technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organisational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of military operations.”<sup>241</sup>

As this definition shows, American understanding about revolutionary changes in the war was a bit different from that of the Soviet’s. Despite using the same acronym, MTR, Americans tried to emphasize that technologies alone are not enough to make revolution a reality.<sup>242</sup> They especially stressed the importance of organisational innovation and adaptation. Without it new technologies, weapon systems and doctrinal innovations were not sufficient “to affect MTR”<sup>243</sup>.

Another important difference from the Soviets was that the Americans thought that the world was facing only the beginning of MTR and the Gulf war was not a proof of an already existing revolution, but more as a hint of the future warfare.<sup>244</sup> Krepinevich and Marshall liked to compare the situation of early 1990’s with the closing days of World War I and the Interwar period. For them the Gulf war was like battle of Cambrai in 1917 where the tank was introduced. On the other hand the example of the interwar years, especially the British case, is a

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<sup>240</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment*. Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002, p.1.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>242</sup> It is important to notice that Soviets also were speaking about importance of organisational and doctrinal change. However, the technologies still were the driving force. American view is more balanced by giving more credit to other factors.

<sup>243</sup> Krepinevich, *The Military-Technical Revolution*, p. 32.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid, p. 8.

good reminder how countries could not grasp the importance of change in the warfare brought by new technologies.<sup>245</sup>

The last important difference between American and Soviet perceptions of MTR is the priorities placed in the list of technologies. Soviets stressed importance of deep strike and precision weapons, while Americans emphasised importance of information technologies: “establishing information dominance could well be the *sine qua non* for effective military operations in future conflicts”.<sup>246</sup>

This assessment was well received by the U.S. defence establishment. A year later, the second version was distributed. This document repeated ideas of the first document in a more comprehensive form, except one important difference, the acronym MTR was replaced by *RMA*.<sup>247</sup> The reason of this change was that “MTR denoted too great an emphasis on technology. Therefore interested community now uses the term RMA, which focuses on *revolution*, and places *technology* in a supporting role”.<sup>248</sup>

This “RMA introduction project” was finished by Krepinevich’s article in the journal *National Interest* where he put contemporary RMA into its historical context. According to him, “there appear to have been as many as ten military revolutions since the fourteenth century”.<sup>249</sup> Into this list he included revolutions such as the infantry revolution in 14<sup>th</sup> century, Napoleonic revolution or nuclear revolution.<sup>250</sup> The analysis of these historical revolutions could help to compose something like a chart of indicators, which will help to recognize new revolutions and verify the contemporary one. Reading this article it is possible to see how

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<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p. 9; Der Derrian, p. 32.

<sup>246</sup> Krepinevich, *The Military-Technical Revolution*, p. 22.

<sup>247</sup> Andrew W. Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, *Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions – Second Version*. Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 23 Aug. 1993.

<sup>248</sup> Jeffrey R. Cooper, *Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War, 1994, p. 25, note 1; Krepinevich, *The Military-Technical Revolution*, p. iv.

<sup>249</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich, *Cavalry to computer*, p. 30.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid, pp. 31-35.

Krepinevich blends ideas of MR and RMA into one, thus creating misconceived impression that these two ideas are similar/identical.

Summarising this it is possible to say that in merely a couple of years a group of scholars and experts laid down the framework of RMA by identifying its main features, displaying main requirements of this revolution, and supported the idea with strong historical evidence.

All these publications set the tone and showed the path for future research concerning RMA. Scholars started to analyse different parts of this revolution. Some concentrated on the technological issues, others on organisational and doctrine innovations. Scholars argued about the positive and negative aspects of RMA.<sup>251</sup> However, despite the enormous size of all these publications all of them followed the definitions introduced by Krepinevich and Marshall.

It did not take a long time to transit ideas from RMA debate to practical politics. The proponents of such doctrinal ideas like system of systems, network centric warfare, swarming<sup>252</sup> were demanding to transform American forces by making them more mobile, agile, lethal and capable of using and pursuing the informational dominance in the battle space. Soldiers of such armed forces on the battlefield would be connected with the whole range of reconnaissance, surveillance, precise targeting, information collection and processing and dissemination assets into one seamless network. This is the essence of well-known

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<sup>251</sup> Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power.," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, Iss. 1, 1994; Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare.," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, Iss. 2, 1996; Steven Metz and James Kievit, *Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War, 1995; Michael J. Mazarr, *Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework*, Washington, D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1993; Russell F Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, The Macmillan Wars of The United States (New York [N.Y.]: Macmillan, 1967).; William E Odom, *America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War*. Washington, D.C: American University Press, 1993.

<sup>252</sup> William A. Owens and Offley Ed, *Lifting the Fog of War*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 296; William A. Owens, "The American Revolution in Military Affairs", *Joint Force Quarterly*, Nr. 10, Winter 1995/1996; William A. Owens, "The Emerging U.S. System-of Systems", Strategic Forum. National Defense University, February, 1996; A. K. Cebrowski., and J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future", *Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine*. January, 1998; Sean J. A.Edwards, *Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future*. RAND, 2000; John Arquilla and Ronfeldt David, *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*. RAND, 2000.



U.S. military transformation. At this moment, it is possible already to see some practical results of this transformation.<sup>253</sup> The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq showed how these transformed armed forces fight.<sup>254</sup> Simply, the theoretical ideas about contemporary and future war were transformed in practical politics, spending billions of dollars on creating and transforming new military capabilities. Because of that the definition, understanding and critics of the concept of RMA are very important. It is not simply a theoretical discussion among scholars. It has profound economical, political and social effects on daily life.

### *RMA critics*

The concept of the RMA and its proponents sustained quite harsh criticism from many directions. Being not only the object of theoretical but also of political discussions criticism of this concept came from diverse areas like the military theory or particular procurement politics.

One of the main criticisms of RMA is concerned with the role of technologies. As was mentioned, Krepinevich and Marshall tried to show that technologies are only one ingredient of this RMA. However, looking at the definition of RMA it still seems that technologies are the driving force, the catalyst that pushes forward doctrinal and organisational innovations. Scholars like Murray and Gray, to some extent accepting idea of RMA, always stress that technologies at best is only one dimension of complex world and at worst, only the secondary issue compared to political and social changes.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> U.S. Army changed its organisational structure making brigade, not division as the main operational unit; increasing role of Special Forces; procurement plans for increasing number of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles; increasing use and dependence of informational technologies, etc. Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Yellow smoke: the future of land warfare for America's military*. Lanham, Md.; Oxford : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

<sup>254</sup> Max Boot, 'The New American Way of War', *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 82, No. 4, July/August 2003; Donald H. Rumsfeld, 'Transforming the Military', *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 81, Iss. 3, May/June 2002.

<sup>255</sup> Murray, *The dynamics of military revolution*, pp. 177, 192; Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, pp. 98-131; Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*, pp. 4 -5.

Another criticism of RMA is also related to the role of technologies. For some of its ardent proponents it seems that RMA with all new technologies may eliminate friction from the battlefield. The lifting of the fog of war “is the strategic ambition of the RMA”.<sup>256</sup> According to Admiral Bill Owens, the most famous promoter of this idea:

“The technology that is available to the U.S. military today [...] can revolutionize the way we conduct military operations. That technology can give us the ability to see a ‘battlefield’ [...] with unprecedented fidelity, comprehension, and timeliness; by night or day, in any kind of weather, all the time”<sup>257</sup>

Such approach was criticised by neo-Clausewitzian’s such as Gray, Murray and Watts.<sup>258</sup> According to them, the victory in war depends not solely on technologies. Such things as morale and will of soldiers, training and leadership to mention a few are equally or even more important.<sup>259</sup> Present technologies have diminished some obstacles like the impact of weather or information collection. However, at the same time they created others. For example, the previous problem of lack of information was now transformed into the problem of informational overload. Combined with a greater tempo and speed of contemporary operations all this leaves a lot of ground for friction. Also it is worth to remember that humans with all their deficiencies still are part of all this process.<sup>260</sup>

On the other hand, scholars like Martin van Creveld and proponents of idea of 4<sup>th</sup> generation warfare criticised RMA because it promoted the Clausewitzian way of war, that is conventional warfare. For these critics the time of war between states is a secondary issue compared with threats rising from asymmetrical threats

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<sup>256</sup> Rasmussen, p. 53.

<sup>257</sup> Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, p. 14.

<sup>258</sup> Williamson Murray, ‘Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris’, *The National Interest*. Summer, 1997; Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Barry D. Watts, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*, McNair Paper, Nr. 52. Washington, D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October, 1996.

<sup>259</sup> Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, p. 100.

<sup>260</sup> Watts, p. 126.

like terrorism or insurgencies.<sup>261</sup> Therefore, the U.S. and other countries are implementing wrong defence and military policies and developing wrong capabilities.

Another important dimension of the criticism of RMA concentrates on the notion that there is nothing revolutionary in RMA and that it is actually more of an evolutionary process. The leading scholar in this area Stephen Biddle argues that operation in the Gulf war, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq and their relative success is not a result of superior technologies, but more of a product of the incompetent enemy and innovation skills of American soldiers. In reality the effects of new weapons were not as enormous as had been perceived with the old ways of fighting still being very much alive.<sup>262</sup>

The universality of RMA is also questioned. In many publications it is referred to as the American RMA, as the concept which promotes specific and unique American fighting traditions. However, it is important to remember that the U.S. being the strongest military power in the world could dictate the trends in this field. In the past, countries copied the Frederician, Napoleonic or Prussian concepts and ideas of fighting, making them universal. Therefore, in this case the present situation with American RMA is not unique. Actually, the ideas of RMA already spread around the world. European countries, Australia, Israel, Russia, and China at present moment are implementing the transformation of their own armed forces more or less by following the lines of American transformation.<sup>263</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*. New York: Free Press, 1991; William Lind, 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation', *Marine Corp Gazette*, October, 1989; Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: on War in the 21st century*. St. Paul: Zenith press, 2004; 'Symposium: debating Fourth-Generation Warfare', *Contemporary Security Policy* Volume 26, Nr. 2. Routledge, August 2005.

<sup>262</sup> Stephen Biddle, 'Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict', *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Autumn, 1996; 'The past as prologue: Assessing theories of future warfare', *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1998; 'Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare', *Foreign Affairs*, Mar/Apr 2003.

<sup>263</sup> Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff (ed.), *Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2000; Robbin F Laird, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives*, McNair papers. Washington, D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999.

The last but not the least criticism is related to the notion that idea of the RMA was and is developed in astrategic context. According to Gray, “[...] the great RMA debate of the 1990’s was unusually apolitical [...] and therefore it appeared hazardously astrategic”.<sup>264</sup> The supporters and critics of RMA so heavily engaged in the discussion about various particularities that they made it an end in itself. The RMA for them became a substitute for strategy; it became the way to “define the rationale of strategy”.<sup>265</sup> The Western countries, particularly the U.S. pursued and developed capabilities suitable for the war which they wanted to fight in the future. However, by doing this they so immersed into some kind of futurology that lost sight of the real and present changes in the world. Therefore, Lawrence Freedman concluded that “it will hardly be a RMA if it leads those who embrace it to avoid most of contemporary conflicts”.<sup>266</sup>

Finishing this overview of the RMA critics just a few words in defence of RMA could be useful. The technological dimension of this concept has some strong sides. The computer and all other related technologies came to the military and will remain there. It is difficult to imagine the armed forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> century fighting without all these technologies. The use of these technologies requires a different approach, different training and despite all critics - different fighting.<sup>267</sup> Moreover, all these changes could be seen as revolutionary, only the best way to see them is look at the present situation through glasses of MR, not RMA, because the former provides a meta-historical perspective that helps to disengage from hazards of *l’histoire évènementielle* that surrounds discussions about contemporary military changes.

The goal of this chapter was to analyse the concepts used by scholars and experts as theoretical tools that try to explain the changes in the military sphere

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<sup>264</sup> Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*, p. 37.

<sup>265</sup> Rasmussen, p. 49.

<sup>266</sup> Freedman, p. 78.

<sup>267</sup> Eliot A. Cohen, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 27, Iss. 3, 2004.

and beyond it. At the first look, the ideas of MR and RMA look very similar. However, they have one crucial and fundamental difference. They differ on the object which they have to explain. The object of MR is the changes on the level of the state. On the other hand RMA concentrates its attention on the armed forces (new weapons, new doctrines, and new organisation). In other words, RMA could be considered as a part of MR. It is important to notice that only handful of scholars have pointed to this relation between MR and RMA.<sup>268</sup>

However, the biggest problem is that scholars mostly use these two concepts as synonyms. Moreover, what is even more important is that MR is considered as a synonym of RMA, not vice versa:

“[...] while most would accord them status of super-RMA’s (or MR’s), I elect to refer to them as simply as RMA’s”<sup>269</sup>

“In this context, *military revolution* refers to changes in the weapons used to fight battles; the targets they attack; the systems that provide command and control, logistical, and intelligence support for the weapons; and the organisations that use the weapons and systems”.<sup>270</sup>

There is no competition trying to find out which concept and acronym is fancier. It could be argued that concentration on the concept of RMA and its identification with MR threatens to ruin all work and efforts done by social scientists and historians. As was mentioned in previous chapters, scholars tried to show that the military could be, and must be, perceived as an independent variable explaining the processes in the political, social, economical spheres.

The problem of the concept of RMA is that it is perceived and understood as a technological revolution. Despite best efforts to emphasise other factors, the RMA first of all is associated with technologies. Because of the influence of the media, the new weapons are the main story: “more and more, new military technologies,

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<sup>268</sup> Murray, *Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs*; Rogers, “*Military Revolutions*” and “*Revolutions in Military Affairs*”.

<sup>269</sup> Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*, p. 70.

<sup>270</sup> Jeremy Shapiro, “Information and War: Is It a Revolution?” in *Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*, ed. by Zalmay Khalilzad, John P. White, Andrew W. Marshall. RAND, 1999, p. 129.

more so than the soldiers operating them, were apt to be profiled in leading television news segments [...]”.<sup>271</sup>

This perceived importance of the technologies leaves RMA open to harsh criticisms, as was already mentioned previously. By criticising the technological determinism scholars emphasise the secondary role of technologies in comparison with political and social changes. By criticising the role of technologies, the whole importance of RMA as driving factor of military change is neglected. By doing that, the changes in the military sphere are seen as a result of political, strategic and social change, but not as an independent transformation. In such a case, we have a situation when the military factor in the past events and processes could be analysed as an independent variable, but at present, because of concentration on the technological aspects of RMA, it is not. However, if in the past the military continuously through the ages was important in the development of political, social spheres, why does the situation have to be different now? More light on this paradoxical situation could be shed if we look at the present changes through lenses of MR idea.<sup>272</sup>

This idea is neglected and ignored because it is a historical concept. According to Gray, “the realm of the strategist is the realm of possible RMA, not of MR”.<sup>273</sup> It is very strange to hear this from a scholar who always emphasises the multidimensional and complex nature of the strategy.<sup>274</sup> MR is much more complex and more multidimensional than RMA concept. Scholars like Gray and Freedman are looking into the RMA from the perspective of strategy trying to find out how these possible changes could affect the strategy of the state. They are

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<sup>271</sup> J. Marshall Beier, ‘Outsmarting Technologies: Rhetoric, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Social Depth of Warfare’, *International Politics*, Vol. 43, 2006, p.269.

<sup>272</sup> Some scholars are trying to do that, but it could be argued that at this moment they were only partly successful. They still are often confusing the MR with RMA, emphasizing the importance of technologies, and only hinting on possible political, social transformations as result of military changes. Murray, *The dynamics of military revolution*; Max Boot, *War made new: technology, warfare, and the course of history, 1500 to today*. New York : Gotham Books, 2006.

<sup>273</sup> Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*, p. 70; Also see Shapiro, p. 138.

<sup>274</sup> Gray, *Modern Strategy*.

quite right by saying that even if RMA is important, the changes in geopolitical and strategic situation in the world are equally important. However, at the same time by ignoring idea of MR they are ignoring the possible changes in other areas which eventually may change the strategy of the state. The essence of MR is that changes in the military sphere will influence the changes in the political and social sphere, more precisely, in the state. By changing its political, social, and economic structure in particular, the state may change its strategic priorities and interests. For example, the French revolution was a domestic issue, but it changed the nature of the French state in such a way that it altered not only its strategic interests, but it also changed all international order.

By equalizing MR with RMA, scholars are creating self-isolation. There are other important issues and changes in the military sphere happening now, but all of them are analysed separately without one united framework. This situation is similar to the situation when the Soviets saw the new American technologies as part of one system, while Americans only saw many different technological innovations and improvements.

Bearing in mind that because of operational needs in Iraq and Afghanistan RMA topic lost its popularity in the military community and was replaced by discussions about counterinsurgency. Because of tendency to treat MR and RMA as synonyms, this decline of RMA theme had negative impact on MR's application for future researches. That's why it is necessary to combine idea of MR with wider theoretical considerations, like ideas proposed by Giddens, Tilly, Mann. Their ideas provide a theoretical clout for MR for a wider application, not only for analysis of early modern times. On the other hand the model of MR and its proposed analysis angle may help to collect, collate, systemise and provide historical material which is sometimes missing in the Tilly's, Mann's arguments.

At the present, we can see some very interesting and possibly fundamental changes in the military: conscripted armies are replaced by professional armies, reliance on the private security companies is increasing, there are talks about post-

modern, hybrid armed forces and finally the RMA itself.<sup>275</sup> Actually some of these changes, like end of conscription and use of private companies, are partly related to the technological changes in warfare. If we place all these changes under the umbrella of the concept of MR, we could see quite an interesting picture. We could ask questions like how the relationship in the spheres of civil-military, armed forces and society are affected. How, for instance, the military transformation in U.S. or European countries will change their civil-military relations. In this case, the concept of RMA will not be very helpful.

It is difficult to imagine contemporary discussions about military changes not using the term *revolution*. The debate of RMA created this discourse. However, if we have to choose which notion is better to use, RMA or MR, it would be better to use MR. Because of its complexity and historical depth this idea could help scholars, experts and politicians to see and analyse the changes in the military sphere far better than by concentrating on the discussions about technological determinism of RMA.

The idea of MR, by uniting different strands of military history and sub-disciplines of history gives a broader view, it places present events into the historical context and all this helps to see different changes in a more coherent picture. In order to avoid dangers of Braudelian *l'histoire événementielle* we need deeper and wider perspective than RMA may offer. Actually on many cases discussions about RMA is history of this moment, full of informational noise and problems related to that fact. The following chapter is exactly about this issue, about importance and advantages provided by MR framework when talking about contemporary military thought.

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<sup>275</sup> K. W. Haltiner, 'The Definite End of the Mass Army in Europe?', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1998; Charles C. Moskos, *The Postmodern Military*; John Allen Williams, 'The Military and Society Beyond the Postmodern Era', *Orbis*, Vol. 52, Iss. 2, 2008; P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. New York, Cornell University Press, 2004; David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi paper Nr. 316. London: Oxford University Press, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998; Robert Mandel, 'Privatization of Security', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 28, Iss. 1, Fall, 2001.



## 4. Contemporary Understanding of War

As was shown in previous chapter, the discussion about beginning of MR in early modernity first of all was concerned how to create systemic way of military thinking, which accordingly would help to use existing armed forces and technologies more efficiently. In other words, the autonomy of military dimension starts with the creation and development of military thought. Different perceptions of war are leading to different tactical, conceptual (doctrines) and institutional solutions. At the same time, all these different ideas demand different types of armed forces, different training, different weapons, etc.

Those, who for the last twenty years are following debate about military thought, may tell that this academic field has been very busy. Scholars one after another proposed their own interpretations and definitions about war: virtual war, virtuous war, post-modern war, postheroic war, fourth generation warfare, network centric warfare, small wars, new wars, spectator sport war, hybrid wars to mention a few.<sup>276</sup> After reading all these works it is difficult to realise that all authors are speaking about the same phenomena. In some visions war looks like the one from movies “Terminator” or “Universal soldiers”. Others have defined war so that you may find more resemblance with “Mad Max” or “Blood diamond”. Finally, some of the descriptions are more realistic, like situations from “Black Hawk down”.

However, this havoc does not end there. Some additional factors make the situation even more complicated. Firstly, on many occasions different levels of

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<sup>276</sup>James Der Derian, *Virtuous War*; Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*; Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2006; Christopher Coker, *The Future Of War: The Re-enchantment Of War In the Twenty-first Century*. Malden, Mass; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.; C.H Gray, *Postmodern War: The New Politics Of Conflict*. London: Routledge, 1997; Rupert Smith, *The Utility Of Force: The art Of War In the Modern World*. London: Penguin Books, 2006; Colin McInnes, *Spectator Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict*. Boulder, Colo.; London: Lynne Rienner, 2002; Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*; Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict In the 21st Century: The Rise Of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington, Virginia: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007; Cebrowski; Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare.’, *Foreign Affairs*, 74, 1995, pp. 109-122.

analysis have been mixed up. Very often authors confuse two different concepts: war and warfare. On one hand, war is much more than fighting, it also contains social, economical and other dimensions. War exists before the fight and after it. Thus, warfare is an element, a moment of war when blood is shed, when armies and soldiers clash into each other. A very well known expression “victory on the battlefield does not mean victory in the war” precisely shows differences between those two concepts. Quoting Colin S. Gray: “states and other political communities wage warfare in order to prosecute their wars”.<sup>277</sup> Therefore it is necessary to treat with caution ideas and theories which argue that new technological solutions (computer), new dimensions (cyber, space) or new warfighting types (terrorist attacks, or ethnic cleanings) are the proof that nature of war is changing.

Another trend which might be traced by reading academic literature and listening political speeches is that a lot of issues and processes are called *war* even when they do not have any relations with war: war against poverty, drugs, economic wars, etc. On some occasions, such expressions are only a rhetoric trick to give more importance for some political issues or problems. According to J. Black, such and similar use of war and other military labels is a proof that our mentality is still bellicose.<sup>278</sup> However, such inappropriate use of “war” concept has a negative side. All these actions devalue and diminish the meaning and importance of war. Something similar is happening in neighbourhood with the meaning of “strategy”. In bookshops, we can find books with titles like - *Sun Tzu: the Art of War for Managers – 50 Strategic Rules*, *Sun Tzu Strategies for Marketing: 12 Essential Principles for Winning the War for Customers*.<sup>279</sup> We often hear discussions about strategies in the contexts that are far away from the realm of war. This diffusion and usage of concepts is the reason why there are so

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<sup>277</sup> CS Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction To Strategic History*. London: Routledge, 2007, p. 6.

<sup>278</sup> Black, *Rethinking Military History*, p. 16.

<sup>279</sup> Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning Of Strategy’, *Survival*, 47, 2005, p. 34.

many different definitions of “war” and why it became difficult to explain what exactly war is.<sup>280</sup>

To clarify and define the meaning of war in 21<sup>st</sup> century is very important for this dissertation. It determines how wars are fought, what kind of armed forces and weaponry are required. Therefore, if we want to prove that we live in the times of another military revolution, it is important to clarify what war is.

Three different schools, trying to explain the changes in war and warfare will be analysed in this dissertation. These schools are: new wars theory, theories related to fight against terrorism and insurgencies and conventional war theories. The best way to understand differences between these schools is to compare conflicts that are paradigmatic for their theories. For example, the paradigmatic war for new war theory is Bosnian war (1992-1995), and the conflicts, like civil wars in Africa, Chechnya or Columbia are considered as new wars.<sup>281</sup> For insurgency school paradigmatic conflicts are contemporary missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>282</sup> Both Gulf wars are the foundation for conventional wars school. The NATO air campaign in Kosovo in 1999, overthrow of Taliban in 2003-2004 and Georgian-Russian conflict in August, 2008 are assigned to this group too.<sup>283</sup> Simply speaking the associates of new wars camp think that in future all wars will be like the one in Bosnia. For insurgency school the future military conflicts will be a repetition of Iraq and Afghanistan, and conventionalist argue that the future belongs to the type of Gulf war and Kosovo campaign conflicts. The most intriguing thing is that all schools are trying to prove their “ownership” of the same conflicts, e.c. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since all three schools are

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<sup>280</sup>Hew Strachan, ‘The Changing Character Of War’ (presented at the A Europaeum Lecture, The Graduate Institute of International Relations, Geneva, 2006).

<sup>281</sup> Kaldor; Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*. Cambridge: Polity, 2005; Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming anarchy: Shattering the Dreams Of the Post Cold War*, 1st ed. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

<sup>282</sup> John A Nagl, *Learning To Eat Soup With a Knife Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago [Ill.]: The University of Chicago Press, 2005; Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘The Petraeus Doctrine.’, *Atlantic Monthly*, 302 (2008), 17-20.; Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies : Guerrillas and their Opponents Since 1750*. London: Routledge, 2001.

<sup>283</sup> Max Boot, *The New American Way Of War*; Robert Anthony Pape, *Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coercion In War*. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1996.

giving different advices on how to gain victory in these conflicts, it is very important to resolve this complicated situation.

### *Ghost of Clausewitz*

One of the ways to solve this puzzle is to start from the place where everything has started. All discussions about the nature of the war and its character eventually touch the ideas of one author – Carl von Clausewitz. Ideas, expressed in his book “On War” nowadays are so influential, even pervasive. Paraphrasing Liddle Hart - “the ghost of Clausewitz” is still haunting us.<sup>284</sup>

The position held in this dissertation is, that contemporary schools of military thought misunderstood and misinterpreted the ideas of Clausewitz, and that is the reason why we have such a big mess and chaos when speaking about the nature of war.

Some of the reasons of such situation are entirely the fault of Clausewitz himself. It is well known, that when he died, he left an unfinished book. Situation became more complicated when shortly before his death Clausewitz decided to rewrite the book. One of his personal notes states: “if an early death should terminate my work, what I have written so far would, of course, only deserve to be called a shapeless mass of ideas”.<sup>285</sup> He was afraid that in such case his ideas would be liable to misinterpretation. According to his notes, he only succeeded to rewrite Chapter One of Book 1 (14 pages out of 562) before his death. However, for the last couple of decades this conventional interpretation was challenged. It is argued, that when Clausewitz decided to rewrite the book, he actually had in mind Book 8. According to this new interpretation, after rewriting Book 8 he planned to revise other parts of the book.<sup>286</sup> It means that if we follow this version, we may argue that Clausewitz revised more of his book than it was thought previously. In

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<sup>284</sup> Clausewitz; Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *The Ghost of Napoleon*. London: Faber & Faber limited, 1933.

<sup>285</sup> Clausewitz, p. 70.

<sup>286</sup> Azar Gat, *The Origins Of Military Thought From the Enlightenment To Clausewitz*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989; Hew Strachan, *Carl Von Clausewitz's On War: A Biography*. London: Atlantic Books, 2007.

such case, we can read and interpret very important passages from Clausewitz book with more trust.

This story about Clausewitz book becomes even more important when we read it more carefully. On many occasions, it is possible to see that Clausewitz contradicts himself. However, it is unavoidable because there is a collision of two Clausewitz's: a historian and a theoretician.<sup>287</sup> Clausewitz, the theoretician, looks for a timeless universal model, which could explain the nature of war, and simultaneously Clausewitz, the historian, understands very well that every different historical period has its own way of conducting war.<sup>288</sup> This internal contradiction and confusion created by Clausewitz seems to be working in his favour. Most likely, this contradiction between the historian and the theoretician is the reason, why his ideas are still important nowadays despite the fact that the conduct of war had been changing dramatically for the last 200 years.<sup>289</sup>

According to his biographers, around 1827 Clausewitz had a crisis.<sup>290</sup> He understood that his ideas about the nature of war contradicted his historical vision of it. During his career, he criticised theoreticians who tried to create universal war principles based on the case of one war or experiences of particular general. However, while criticising others he started creating the universal theory of war based on the achievements of Napoleon himself. The realisation of this mistake was the reason he decided to rewrite the book. All his biographers agree on one more thing - according to them, Clausewitz's solution for combining universal nature of war with its constantly changing character was politics.<sup>291</sup>

According to Clausewitz, "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will".<sup>292</sup> However, if there are no constraints, the use of force may not have

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<sup>287</sup> Strachan, *Carl von Clausewitz's On war*, pp. 97-105; Azar Gat, *A History Of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment To the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 192-200.

<sup>288</sup> Clausewitz, pp. 586-593

<sup>289</sup> Strachan, *Carl von Clausewitz's On war*, p. 26.

<sup>290</sup> Gat, *A history of military thought*, pp. 201-202; Strachan, *Carl von Clausewitz's On war*, pp. 72-77.

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>292</sup> Clausewitz, p. 75.

limits. A human being will resist in such way that it will start a never-ending spiral of violence.<sup>293</sup> In that case, we will have war in its absolute form. However, the absolute war is a theoretical construction, which will never become a reality. There are war restraining factors in real life, and the most important one is politics. It defines and sets the object and limits for war: “war is [...] a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”.<sup>294</sup> Clausewitz called a politics restrained war - a real one. Politics is that connection, which limits the war without changing its nature. As politics change, it simultaneously affects the objectives, forms, and character of war.

Nevertheless, it is important to stress, that despite the importance of politics, Clausewitz mentions two additional war limiting factors: moral and chance. These three elements together form, what Clausewitz calls, a “remarkable trinity”. This trinity consists of “[...] primordial violence [...], of the ply of chance and probability [...], and of its element of subordination”.<sup>295</sup> Because of all these three elements, war cannot reach its absolute form. However, the nature of war does not disappear, it stays the same in absolute and in real war, the changing element is the character of war. According to Clausewitz, subordination of war to politics is permanent like its nature. War will never replace politics. Politics will always be superior.

Do political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.<sup>296</sup>

At this moment, it is worth to remember the difference between war and warfare. The ideas of Clausewitz may help to understand the differences of these two concepts. The logic of war is constant because it always depends on politics. However, warfare (military means and forms) is changing in every historical

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<sup>293</sup> Ibid., pp. 76-77.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., p. 605.

period together with changing social, political, economical, and cultural conditions.

These Clausewitz ideas may raise questions concerning military's autonomy. His idea of war as continuation of politics is a serious challenge for this dissertation. From this perspective it is clear that politics is above war and war depends on it. In such case, speaking about autonomy of the military domain is problematic. However, the mere fact, that war should be contained and limited, shows that in some sense this phenomenon is autonomous. Clausewitz ideas about war's own grammar suggest that there is some autonomy for the military.<sup>297</sup> Also, when speaking about relationships between generals and politicians Clausewitz is more complex and subtle than it looks at the beginning. He is speaking more about dialog, not monolog. For him, good statesman will try to listen to his military commanders' advice.

In summary, it should be clear that war consists of two elements: nature and character. Nature remains unchanged - it seeks the extreme application of violence. However, war's nature is limited by politics. Limited, but not changed. Only means and forms, by which politics limits nature of war, are changing. These changing means and forms are different use of military force, different character of war, different warfare. Therefore, it seems that in contemporary discussions of changing nature of war scholars are missing the point. It is the character, not the nature of war, what changes. War was, is and will be the bloodshed. The only difference is how the blood is shed.

Before discussing another school of contemporary military thinking, it is important to mention, that there was resurrection of Clausewitz studies in the last 10 years. Handful of works appeared where leading scholars are trying to adapt and reinterpret Clausewitz's ideas for the needs of XXI century.<sup>298</sup> This sustained

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<sup>297</sup> Strachan, *Carl von Clausewitz's On war*, pp. 167-170.

<sup>298</sup> Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz In the Twenty-first Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Strachan, *Carl Von Clausewitz's On War*; Antulio Joseph Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz's*

effort is a good example and proof that Clausewitz is still relevant in the age of cyber and space warfare and insurgencies.

### *Theory of new wars*

The end of Cold war did not bring the promised peace and stability to the world. In many countries around the world frozen tensions erupted into bloody civil wars. On many occasions, the participants of these conflicts were none-state actors. Therefore, it is not surprising that questions about the changing nature of war were raised. Actually, events of post-cold war era confirmed the trend, which gradually took dominant position during American-Soviet confrontation: after the end of World War II, the number of intrastate conflicts around the world was increasing, while conventional, interstate conflicts became rare.<sup>299</sup>

Seeing all these processes famous military historian and theoretician M. van Creveld proposed his interpretation of transformation of war.<sup>300</sup> According to him, the increasing role of none-state players was the sign that the role and importance of the state was diminishing. Following this line of thinking, the diminishing role of state meant that the Clausewitzian understanding of war should also go away. This should happen because “Clausewitzian Universe rests on the assumption that war is made predominantly by states”.<sup>301</sup> M. van Creveld made such conclusions by reinterpreting Clausewitz’s idea about the remarkable trinity. When speaking about this trinity the German thinker said that: “the first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people (primordial violence-D.Š.); the second the commander and his army (chance-D.Š.); the third the government (subordination-D.Š.).”<sup>302</sup>

Despite the fact that the general mentions this second trinity only once, van Creveld thinks that it is the essence of Clausewitz’s understanding of war.

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*Puzzle: The Political Theory Of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His theories, and His Times*. Princeton, N.J; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007.

<sup>299</sup> Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, ‘Resort To War: 1816 - 2007’ (CQ Press, 2010) <<http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>>, [accessed 2010, June 23].

<sup>300</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>302</sup> Clausewitz, p. 89.



Therefore, by criticising this Clausewitzian idea of trinitarian war van Creveld builds his theory of war transformation.

On one hand, van Creveld has chosen a bad time to criticise Clausewitz. US remarkable victory in the First Gulf war not only vindicated American military, but also confirmed the validity of Clausewitzian ideas. In 1980's American military re-evaluated their doctrines and training system by following new interpretations of Clausewitz's ideas.<sup>303</sup> Entire generation of officers in US Army and Marine Corps was educated and taught to use Clausewitz's understanding of war: primacy of politics, unpredictability, friction, importance of moral forces.

On the other hand, van Creveld's book was very timely. Wars in former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda and crisis in Somalia confirmed at least some ideas proposed by van Creveld. It seemed, that states are not capable to control situation and provide stability anymore. The ferocity and cruelty of these conflicts fostered scholars to speak about the coming of anarchy, of new medieval age, implying that world is falling apart.<sup>304</sup>

Another famous military historian – John Keegan, sustained the critique of Clausewitz. In his book *History of Warfare*, written almost at the same time as van Creveld's book, Keegan argued that Clausewitz was wrong by assuming that human beings are rational. According to him, human beings are cultural animals:

“We are cultural animals and it is the richness of our culture which allows us to accept our undoubted potentiality for violence but to believe nevertheless that its expression is a cultural aberration”.<sup>305</sup>

For him war is not an instrument, it is a way of life. For Cossacks, Scottish Highlanders and other similar ethnic groups warfighting was the way of living. History also gives us knowledge on how these groups were living and fighting. It

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<sup>303</sup> The United States Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, 1st ed. New York: Doubleday, 1994; Murray, *Clausewitz out*.

<sup>304</sup> Philip G. Cerny, ‘Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma’, *Naval War College Review*, Winter, 2005; Kaplan.

<sup>305</sup> John Keegan, *A History Of Warfare*. London: Hutchinson, 1993, p. 4.

was definitely different from how Western countries were fighting. Pillage and plunder, ambushes, annihilation of civil population - was their style of fighting.

Despite all critique, which Keegan and van Creveld received<sup>306</sup>, their ideas could better explain why, for instance, such terrible things were happening in former Yugoslavia. Their ideas and status of leading military historians guaranteed that the Clausewitzian understanding of war would face serious challenge. This challenge came from a group of scholars who advocated “new wars” idea.

M. Kaldor who, following the ideas of van Creveld and Keegan, was saying that the role of the state is decreasing, coined the name of this idea. According to her, new wars “involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (political motives – D.Š.), organized crime (financial motives-D.Š.) and large-scale violations of human rights”.<sup>307</sup> Kaldor based her theory on the case of Bosnian war, where all the features of new wars were present. To this list of characteristics another one might also be added: privatization of the organized violence. The post-cold war era saw a proliferation of legal private military companies, various paramilitary organisations and illegal units (organized crime groups). For new wars advocates it is an indicator, that the state is losing its position and monopoly over the use of violence.<sup>308</sup>

These new wars are fought not only for political reasons. Actually, political reasons are least important. Economical and questions of ethnic identity are the dominant causes of these new type conflicts. Globalisation for these wars is an enabling factor. It creates situations where people have to rethink and reinvent their identities, which in many cases cause conflicts. The economical dimension

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<sup>306</sup> Christopher Bassford, ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: a Polemic’, *War in History*, 1, 1994, pp. 319 -336.

<sup>307</sup> Kaldor, p. 2

<sup>308</sup> Münkler, pp. 51-73.

of globalisation is also very important for new wars. Conflicts in one part of the world may finance wars in another one.<sup>309</sup>

Oil, diamonds, ore of precious metals extracted in one country may be sold or exchanged into weapons or money necessary to keep on fighting in another one. In such situations, nobody is interested in finishing the war. Local warlords are making money for keeping wars unfinished. In such grey zones where no legitimate authority exists, black market and organized crime flourishes: drugs, human and arms trafficking or even terrorism. The history of such wars like in Columbia, Chechnya and Afghanistan shows that the argument of war economy is a reasonable one.<sup>310</sup> Wars become an end in themselves. Battles are replaced by plunder, pillage, systemic racket and killing of human population. According to Münkler, new wars are like a flashback into the time of Thirty years war. This war might be an analytical framework that might help to understand how and for what reasons today's wars are fought.<sup>311</sup> The moral of this comparison is clear. The Thirty years war is one of the cruellest wars in human history after which some parts of Europe never recovered or it took a century and even more to reach pre-war level of population and prosperity. Therefore, even the idea to compare present day situation to this war is not very cheerful.

Another specific feature of new wars concept is that the driving force causing wars is not geopolitical or ideological factors, but the identity politics. Kaldor defined this politics as “the claim to power on the basis of labels – [...] tend to relate to an idealized nostalgic representation of the past”.<sup>312</sup> This new identity politics is the key when trying to understand the changes in the warfare. Wars in Bosnia and African states showed that systemic ethnic cleansings, genocide, systemic rape, phenomenon of child soldiers are becoming the norm. It is the new war. That is why, according to Kaldor, international community has failed in

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<sup>309</sup> Kaldor, p. 74-75.

<sup>310</sup> Münkler, pp. 90-98; Kaldor, pp. 95-118.

<sup>311</sup> Münkler, pp. 42-50.

<sup>312</sup> Kaldor, pp. 7-8.

Bosnia. Peacekeepers were trying to create “safe havens” for civilians and stop disputes over the territory. However, it turned out that the fighting sides did not want the territory; their primary target was the civilians.<sup>313</sup> New wars advocates are saying that in the beginning of the XX century 85-90 percent of war casualties were military, but by the end of the century, figures were reversed: approximately 80 percent of casualties were civilians.<sup>314</sup>

As the solution to stop these wars, scholars are proposing to develop cosmopolitan community based on cosmopolitan values and institutions. Speaking about the military dimension, they are proposing to create international law enforcement forces. Such kind of forces supposed to be a mixture, hybrid forces that will have elements of armed forces and police. Only such type of forces may be capable of stopping new wars.

Despite the convincing argumentation, the new wars theory was seriously criticised. One of the main flaws of this theory is that advocates of this school were making generalising conclusions supporting them with meagre historical evidence. Conflicts were analysed from present day perspective and neglected historical context. Therefore, critics almost unanimously are saying that, for instance, to speak about some novelty in the African civil wars is a mistake. These wars are not so new, they started during Cold war era or even earlier.<sup>315</sup>

Contemporary analysis of fighting methods, provided by advocates of this school also fails the examination. Ethnic cleansings, genocide, systemic rape, and child soldiers – all of this existed in the past.<sup>316</sup> The conduct of Western countries in their colonies, Russian, Spanish civil wars are only a few examples of unrestricted war. Wars in Western world were probably never only conventional.

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<sup>313</sup> Ibid., pp. 60-71.

<sup>314</sup> Münkler, p. 14; Kaldor, p. 107.

<sup>315</sup> Mats Berdal, ‘How “new” are “new Wars”? Global Economic Change and the Study Of Civil War’, *Global Governance*, 9, 2003; Stathis N. Kalyvas, ““New” And “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?’, *World Politics*, 54, 2001, pp. 99-118; Edward Newman, ‘The “New Wars” Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed’, *Security Dialogue*, 35, 2004, pp. 173-189.

<sup>316</sup> Newman, pp. 182-183; Kalyvas, pp. 113-116.

Alongside the strict rules binding conventional war fighting, an irregular, unconventional, more dreadful way of fighting always co-existed. The advocates of new wars are seeing the transformation of war as a linear process, but it was never the case. There always were two traditions of warfighting coexisting together, only changing their forms in a different historical era. In this case, new war theory could be a good example of “snapshot” political science. Present day events are seen as a radical shift from the past without checking the past.

The biggest flaw in the theory of new wars would probably be its attempt to argue that the nature of war is changing. The nature of war is not changing, its character does. War without bloodshed, without atrocities is not a war. It was always cruel. As American general Sherman said: “War is a Hell”. Therefore, it is a bit surprising when scholars are speaking about barbarization of war. It is hard to be cynical when almost every day thousands of people are killed and hundreds of women raped. Sadly, it is nothing new. You can easily find similar stories when speaking about the wars in the past. It seems that new war advocates are confusing the nature of war with its character. War remains a bloody event, only the way of bloodshed is changing.

This theory was also criticised for emphasising identity, globalization and economical factors too much. Kaldor is not very specific when she speaks about identity politics and globalisation in her books; thus, it is not entirely clear what she has in mind. In addition, microanalysis of conflicts, e.g. in Africa, shows that logic and rational behaviour exists behind all this cruelty and inhumanity.<sup>317</sup> The perceived importance of war economy was also criticised. Once again, historical microanalyses are showing that the causes of war are more complex than they appear to be.<sup>318</sup>

Yet, it seems, that the advocates of this school got something right. Their concentration on increasing atrocities and barbaric behaviour actually identifies

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<sup>317</sup> Kalyvas, pp. 110-112.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid, pp. 104-105; Newman, p. 184.

the diminishing role of law in warfare. According to van Creveld, two meanings of war exist in Western world: Clausewitzian (use of organized violence to achieve political/social ends) and Ciceronian (war is perceived as a legal situation in which use of organized violence is permitted).<sup>319</sup> Van Creveld continued the work started by medieval military historians who wrote that Western states got present features because of “military-legal framework of discourse”<sup>320</sup>. This discourse was important for the state formation because it created an environment where people could negotiate with the state. The essence of this discourse was that war was perceived as a legal activity and “legal actions carried on through military means”.<sup>321</sup>

By summarising these ideas, it is clear that historically war in Europe has very strong legal connotations. This military-legal framework helped to separate and define war and peace. This separation is of vital importance. It creates conditions under which specific rules of war and peace are created. Without these rules, “you are going to have a wild bunch of warriors running around, massacring everybody [...] like in Bosnia, East Timor, Sierra Leone”.<sup>322</sup> It seems, that today we are facing situation when the use of organized military force for political means in some regions is not perceived as legal situation anymore. Legal part of this dual chain is disappearing and that might have serious implications.<sup>323</sup>

Despite all this critique, new wars theory gained recognition in political circles. In their reports, the leaders of powerful countries, UN, international NGO’s are accusing the organized crime groups and local warlords for keeping

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<sup>319</sup> Martin Van Creveld, ‘The Meaning Of War’. Presented at the Defining War for the 21st Century. U.S. Army War College XXI Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010.

<sup>320</sup> John France, ‘War and Sanctity: Saints’ Lives as Sources For Early Medieval Warfare’, in *Journal Of Medieval Military History*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005; Stephen Morillo, ‘The Sword Of Justice: War and State Formation In Comparative Perspective’, in *Journal Of Medieval Military History*. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006.

<sup>321</sup> Morillo, p. 7.

<sup>322</sup> Van Creveld, *Meaning of war*.

<sup>323</sup> This issue becomes more problematic and controversial because in the Western world we are facing movement into opposite direction. Legal discourse in the form of such concepts like responsibility to protect, lawfare, increasing importance of human rights, and increasing role of International Criminal Court frames conduct of war into very legalized environment.

wars unresolved, because it brings them huge profits.<sup>324</sup> In addition, it is possible to find the traces of new wars theory in the proceeding reform of US military. In the last 5 years US has radically changed its military training. As will be shown shortly, American way of fighting was always more concerned with idea to defeat the enemy, and such missions like peacekeeping, peace enforcement and law enforcement were alien to American tradition. However, new military doctrine introduced in 2008 declares that “commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force”.<sup>325</sup> It means that stability operations and traditional operations should be treated equally. Simply speaking, now American soldiers are trained not only to kick out the door, but to put it back in too. It is certainly a revolutionary step in the American military thinking. However, this revolution coincided and was equally affected by another school of military thought – insurgency and counterinsurgency. The best way to understand this school and its importance is to discuss how Americans are fighting and how they understand war. In this way only, we would understand the theory of counterinsurgency, which is so popular in recent academic and political discussions.

#### *American way of war*

Military historians argue that each of main military powers has its own way of understanding the war and how it should be fought.<sup>326</sup> Speaking about American way of war, scholars are tirelessly debating about specific features, which could help to identify it. The father of the American way of war concept is an American military historian Russell F. Weigley. In his book *The American Way of War: a History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* he formulated the main

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<sup>324</sup> Kalyvas, pp. 101-103; Newman, pp. 175-179.

<sup>325</sup> United States, ‘Operations. Field Manual 3-0’, 2008, Foreword.

<sup>326</sup> Robert Michael Citino, *The German Way Of War: From the Thirty Years’ War To the Third Reich*. Lawrence, Kan. University Press of Kansas, 2005; David French, *The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990; Michael Howard, *The British Way In Warfare: A Reappraisal*. London: Cape, 1975.

features of this tradition.<sup>327</sup> In his book Weigley, following the ideas of prominent German military historian Hans Delbrück, argues that the American way of war is based on the strategy of annihilation (destruction of adversaries' armed forces):

“at the beginning (War of Independence – D.Š.), when American military resources were still slight, America made a promising beginning in the nurture of strategists of attrition; but the wealth of the country [...] cut that development (attrition warfare – D. Š.) short, until the strategy of annihilation became characteristically the American way of war”<sup>328</sup>.

It means, that since its independence US was fighting in the same manner. For Americans victory in the war, meant victory on the battlefield. It could be named as one-dimensional perspective that ignores diplomatic, economical and legal dimensions of the war. For Americans warfare and war are synonymous.

According to Weigley, American fixation on annihilation strategy happened because of the influence of a military thinker Antoine-Henri Jomini. Being the witness of the Napoleonic wars, Jomini like Clausewitz based his theory of war using Napoleonic experience.<sup>329</sup> Contrary to Clausewitz, Jomini was more practical and his theory about war was less philosophical and metaphysical than Clausewitz's. The essence of Jomini's military theory is the principle of massed armed forces that concentrate all their power and attacks an enemy at the decisive point.<sup>330</sup> In addition, he paid a lot of attention to the logistical issues because without good logistical system it was impossible to concentrate and supply mass armed forces<sup>331</sup>. However, the most lasting influence of Jomini is probably

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<sup>327</sup> Russell Frank Weigley, *The American Way Of War a History Of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

<sup>328</sup> Weigley, p. xxii.

<sup>329</sup> Both were using Napoleonic wars as a starting point for their theories. They thought that these wars were proof that warfare is radically changing. Both developed similar ideas because of similar experience, gained during the Napoleonic era. Yet, fundamental difference between them was that Jomini's interests in war was more instrumental/technical. He tried to find universal principles of war following the tradition of Enlightenment thinking. Especially it is obvious from his inclination to use geometry and mathematical methods. Clausewitz on the contrary was very sceptical about all these attempts to explain war using mathematical methods.

<sup>330</sup> Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The art Of War*. London: Greenhill, 1992.

<sup>331</sup> American logistical system always was and still is regarded as the best in the world. According to C. S. Gray, for Americans logistics is one of few elements, which helped to conquer vast distances of America and to settle in. Thanks to logistics, settlers could get ammunition, food supplies on time and in many cases, it saved their lives. *The Making Of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, ed by Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox and Alvin H Bernstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 590.



contained in his definition and understanding of strategy. For him strategy is “selection of the theatre of war, and the discussion of the different combinations; the determination of the decisive points of these combinations; [...] Strategy is the art of making war upon the map”.<sup>332</sup> This definition is a narrow one, comparing with Clausewitz version. Following this definition, it is difficult to transform military victory on the battlefield into political victory in the war.

Jomini was popular in US for a very simple reason. In the mid of XIX century he was the leading authority on military questions. Clausewitz replaced him only in 1870's. US, still being a young state at the time, copied European military theory, i.e. Jomini.

For a very long time works of Jomini were one of the basic textbooks in the West Point military academy where future military leaders of US were taught. The American Civil war is considered the best example of how Americans used the ideas of Jomini in practice<sup>333</sup>. After this war, his ideas not only preserved their popularity, but, with the help of Alfred T. Mahan, made transition to naval warfare.<sup>334</sup> The influence of Mahan's work on future generations of American sailors and experts of international relations (geopolitics) guaranteed the lasting influence of Jomini upon American military and especially upon strategic thinking. Therefore, it seems that Colin S. Gray was right by saying that “the true parent of American thinking on national security is Jomini, not Clausewitz. [...] his [...] obsession with reducing the complex and ambiguous to a few apparently simple principles has also characterized American military thought and practice”.<sup>335</sup> Therefore, we have a very interesting situation in present time. As it was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Clausewitz is currently considered

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<sup>332</sup> Jomini, pp. 68-69.

<sup>333</sup> Weigley, pp. 92-192.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid., pp. 200-250; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*. London, 1892, Vol. 1 and 2.

<sup>335</sup> Gray C. S., „Strategy in the nuclear age: The United States, 1945-1991“, Murray W., Knox M., Bernstein A., (ed.), *The making of strategy: rulers, states, and war*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 592.

an essential guide for understanding contemporary conflicts. However, Jomini has major influence on Americans. It is important to mention again that U.S. military sets the tone in the world when speaking about warfighting and armed forces. Therefore, all these subtleties about American strategic, military thinking have global consequences.<sup>336</sup>

Despite the increasing Clausewitz influence, ghost of Jomini still haunts Americans. They are still not very good in transforming military victory into the political one. It is enough to remember the case of Vietnam when being victorious on the battlefield Americans lost on political level. The present day cases of Iraq and Afghanistan only confirm that US has problems with strategic thinking. When analysing this situation, leading American military theorist A. Echevarria states that US does not have a way of war. What it does have is only a way of battle.<sup>337</sup> Nothing that is not related to proper, traditional fighting is considered as war, for instances, calling such missions as military operations other than war. Under the auspice of this term missions like peacekeeping, arms control, peace enforcement and crisis management were hidden. For Americans peacekeeping was not a war. This one example is more than enough to understand conceptual differences existing between European allies and the US.

The emergence of RMA helped to keep this situation intact. RMA was perceived as the “new American way of war”.<sup>338</sup> All new technologies, weapons, increased intelligence and surveillance capabilities, new doctrines and military units only enhanced traditional way of fighting. US military was “becoming more efficient at killing and breaking”<sup>339</sup>, but that was all.

The events in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that old thinking about war fighting is not working; therefore, an old American fighting tradition was

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<sup>336</sup> Deividas Šlekys, ‘The Importance and Anxiety of the American Way of War’, in *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2007*, ed. by Raimundas Lopata, Jūratė Novagrockienė and Gediminas Vitkus. Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2008, pp. 25-47.

<sup>337</sup> Antulio Joseph Echevarria, *Toward an American Way Of War*. Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

<sup>338</sup> Boot, *New American Way of War*, pp. 41-58; Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Transforming the Military*.

<sup>339</sup> Echevarria, *Toward an American Way Of War*, p. 10.

rediscovered, reinterpreted and used there. It is small wars, counterinsurgency tradition. According to M. Boot, US had this military tradition for a very long time. Since the creation of the state Americans were continuously fighting small wars all over the world. Some of these wars were merely small missions, boarding small units into the shore, but some of them lasted for years.<sup>340</sup> In his book, Boot traces the history of wars and missions conducted by Navy and Marines in Latin America, Pacific, Asia and Europe. In many cases, the American society knew very little about these missions and achievements of their soldiers. These wars were called “forgotten wars” for a reason. However, the argument provided by Boot remains valid: US has a centuries long fighting tradition. The question is why it was forgotten and not used by US military establishment.

One of the main reasons is that such kind of fighting was practised only by Marines and later by Special Forces - the two military services, which are not very popular inside the US military establishment. Army, Navy and Air force services always were sceptical if not hostile towards these two services. Since the establishment of Joint Chiefs of Staff, highest US military institution, in 1942, Marine commander was its chairman only once (general Peter Pace in 2005-2007). Most likely it was not an accident that a Marine was in charge of military policy during the direst period in Iraq, when US urgently needed different perspective on how to fight war. Yet the military experience gained by Marines and Special Forces were ignored until the beginning of the XXI century. Only due to the enormous size of US military establishment, it was possible to find some places, where this fighting tradition was kept and cultivated.

The breakthrough came in 2006, when the new US doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN) was introduced. This document, together with new doctrines concerning operations and stability operations, confirmed in 2008,

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<sup>340</sup>Max Boot, *Savage Wars Of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise Of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

formed the core of new thinking in US military circles.<sup>341</sup> The departure from existing tradition is already noticeable in the foreword of COIN doctrine:

A counterinsurgency campaign [...] requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with non-military agencies. [...] It requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand grenade while taking on missions [...]. Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help re-establish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law.<sup>342</sup>

As you can see, this new document requires from US soldiers to not only conduct military functions, but also be able to provide legal, political or simply engineering services. To understand how radical this shift was, it is enough to remember the words said by Condoleezza Rice during US presidential elections campaign in 2000. When asked about participation in peacekeeping missions, Rice replied that “we don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten”.<sup>343</sup> 6 years later, Rice as the Secretary of State together with all the US administration had to accept the fact that changing security environment required soldiers to not only escort children to school, but do even more non-military functions.

Very soon, this new doctrine was given the name of its creator – Petraeus doctrine. Petraeus went to Iraq in 2007 and used his own doctrine trying to stabilize the situation in this country. Discussions trying to find out what caused the ease of tensions in Iraq will probably never end. Yet, there is no doubt that new war strategy and doctrine was at least in part responsible for that. It meant

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<sup>341</sup> United States. Dept. of the Army., ‘Counterinsurgency. Field Manual No. 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5’, 2006.; United States, ‘Stability Operations. Field Manual 3-07’, 2008; Operations. Field Manual 3-0. United States and Dept. of the Army., ‘Operations. Field Manual 3-0’.

<sup>342</sup> Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Foreword. The ideas, expressed in this document were not very new. It is enough to remember the idea of Three block war, proposed by Marine general Charles C. Krulak. Krulak argues that it is time to prepare strategic corporal. According to him, the fighting environment is changing so fast that the lowest ranking officers or non-commissioned officers should be trained and taught to make strategic decisions in the glimpse of the seconds. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership In the Three Block War’, *Marines Magazine*, 1999.

<sup>343</sup> Michael R. Gordon, ‘The 2000 Campaign: The Military; Bush Would Stop U.s. Peacekeeping In Balkan Fights’, *The New York Times*, 21 October 2000, section U.S.

instant rise of Petraeus' status and influence in US military and political circles. Counterinsurgency became the key word when speaking about the US strategy.<sup>344</sup>

It seemed that future of RMA and all programs associated with it were doomed. The reality in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the Rumsfeld's advocated transformation did not deliver the promised victory. However, Petraeus and his associates did not convince everyone. According to A. Bacevich, very soon the Great Debate unfolded. In this debate, the Crusaders (COIN defenders) were arguing that war in the changing security environment required skills necessary to coerce adversaries and skills of social engineering. Conservatives mostly were concerned with the attempts to transform US Army into constabulary forces. They argued that the flexibility of armed forces is sacrificed because of operational needs.<sup>345</sup>

At the same time, attempts were made to find some middle solution. In his article in the journal of *Foreign Affairs* Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence in those days, wrote about a balanced strategy. According to him, the US needs to find a balance between the use of military and other instruments, especially diplomacy. Military balance should be found between future capabilities (possible conflict with China) and present day needs (conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan), between net-centric and counterinsurgency capabilities.<sup>346</sup> On one hand, it meant that the transformation driven by RMA would be slowed and redirected. Yet, on the other hand, it was sending a message that expansion of counterinsurgency discourse had limits.

In February of 2010, US Department of Defence published Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the most important military planning document, where every four years main trends and directions of the US military are discussed. After

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<sup>344</sup> Very good indicator of changing trends in US military, especially Army is review of the titles of articles in military journals like *Parameters*, *Joint Force Quarterly*. In these journals since 2005 the topics about irregular wars, counterinsurgency, and stabilisation missions replaced discussion about RMA.

<sup>345</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Petraeus Doctrine*, pp. 17-20.

<sup>346</sup> Robert M. Gates, 'A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age', *Foreign Affairs*, 88, Jan, pp. 28-40.

reading this document it is clear that US is not abandoning the military transformation associated with RMA. Maybe it is more diverted to Navy and Air Forces, while Army and Marines will be concentrated on a full spectrum of operations including stabilisation and counterinsurgency.<sup>347</sup> Overall, it seems that at this moment the US is trying to create two different types of forces at the same time. The US armed forces are now trying to combine ideas advocated by proponents of RMA, new wars and counterinsurgency.

From what was said it is clear that we cannot speak about one source, which caused these shifts in the military thought for the last twenty years. It is obvious that changing geopolitical and international environment, economical and cultural issues played their part in these processes. However, it is also clear, that military independently invented and implemented doctrinal, tactical solutions, which now require changes in all structure of the armed forces. Therefore, military is facing daunting challenges that will require radical changes in the armed forces and its relationships with society and the state institutions altogether.

However, the trends in military thought for the last twenty years show that there is a need for serious corrections. Very often, reading all these contemporary writings is like a *déjà vu*. Such claims like: who controls the cyberspace or space; who can win hearts and minds will win all wars and will dominate in the world, sound very familiar. It reminds of a century old Mahan's dictum about sea power (who controls the sea, controls the world)<sup>348</sup> or ideas of air power proponents (power through air).<sup>349</sup> It seems that contemporary scholars and especially military are repeating the same tune over and over again, only area of control changes. From all of this it is also clear that there is serious lack of historical sense. Historical past, mistakes done by scholars and soldiers in the past are ignored. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why the same clichés are repeated.

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<sup>347</sup> *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, United States of America Department of Defense, February 2010.

<sup>348</sup> Mahan.

<sup>349</sup> *Victory Through Air Power* (movie), Walt Disney, 1943, narrated by Alexander Seversky.

Advocates of RMA are continuing American tradition in search for “silver bullet” thinking that technologies will solve everything. When concentrating on the role of technologies it is not surprising that only few are looking into the past. There was no internet, computer, cell phone in the past, so why should we care about previous experiences? On the other hand, advocates of new wars and counterinsurgency represent the cultural turn in military thought. The identity, ethnicity, cultural sensitivity and many others are the key to win wars.

Experiences of recent wars and conflicts clearly showed that ideas of contemporary military thinker are not working so well in practise. The reason they were not successful is that they were not historically grounded. That is why Clausewitz remains important today and it is important to turn contemporary military thought towards history. History will not solve the problems or help to win wars without making a mistake, but it definitely will help to reduce a margin of failure and the loss of people’s lives. Historical turn may help to solve other dilemmas and problems. Today’s military and scholars understand that new forms of fighting and threats require new type of armed forces. However, many of them do not realise, what consequences these changes may have outside military realm and that is where the idea of Military revolution may help. Following the framework of MR, the development of military thought showed how military from inside, autonomously generates ideas and perceptions. The idea of MR can not only help practitioners see how pure, autonomous military innovations affect relationships between military and others institutions, but also show the scholars how wide range of changes in many areas can be related.

## **5. Transformations of Armed Forces through History**

Organisation of armed forces is the first place where to look how theoretical considerations about fighting are gaining shape in real life. Types and formation of armed forces varied through ages depending on ideas how to fight, on

technologies, threats or social needs. Therefore, in order to show and to prove that military is an autonomous dimension, the review and discussion about what place and role armed forces had and have in the state is required. Since the times of first historical records up to these days military was one of the key institutions in almost all political entities.<sup>350</sup> In ancient empires like Persia, Assyria, Macedonia, Rome, Greek city-states, medieval kingdoms, town-republics and modern states military did hold a specific position. According to O. Hintze, armed forces were “foreign body in the state” that had its own police, judicial and religious system.<sup>351</sup> Military in some sense could be described as a state within a state, a condition very well captured by J. Keegan:

War is wholly unlike diplomacy or politics because it must be fought by men whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time, and the warrior world adapts in step to the civilian. It follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the culture of the warrior can never be that of civilisation itself. All civilisations owe their origins to the warrior; their cultures nurture the warriors who defend them, and the differences between them will make those of one very different in externals from those of another.<sup>352</sup>

If armed forces are something different, something foreign to the other institutions, it means that they have their unique way of development, unique sources of change. Following such logic of argumentation, we can speak about military as an independent dimension of social life. However, some caution is required. If we look at the history of the West, we will always find that the main social changes coincided with major changes in military: Greek polis and introduction of hoplite infantry; paid and professional legionaries and Rome’s shift from republic towards the imperial rule; feudal society and dominance of heavy cavalry (knights); monetary economy and mercenaries, etc. The simultaneous transition from one type or form of activity in parallel dimensions of social life is doubtfully a mere coincidence. Everyone who is working on these

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<sup>350</sup> Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. I.

<sup>351</sup> Gilbert, p. 200.

<sup>352</sup> Keegan, *History of Warfare*, p. xvi.



issues agrees that there are causal links between these transitions. The question is, where the causes of these changes originate from and why? The following detailed analysis of military changes in different historical periods will present the explanation of these events from the perspective of the military dimension. However, in order to conduct this analysis, the classification of military changes and types is required. Therefore, in the following passages the existing classifications of military changes and types will be revised and updated.

### *Classification of the development of armed forces*

The starting position for discussion is the list of armed forces' styles proposed by historian John A. Lynn. According to him, since medieval ages Western countries had seven different styles of armed forces: feudal, medieval-stipendiary, aggregate-contract, state-commission, popular-conscript, mass-reserve, and volunteer-technical.<sup>353</sup> Lynn proposed this evolutionary perspective as an answer and alternative to Roberts-Parker's idea of the Military revolution.

As it was mentioned in the chapter about MR, in this dissertation the place and role of military as source of social power is more important than the debate about military's revolutionary or evolutionary development. Essentially as long as military is recognized as an equal source of social change, it does not matter how fast it develops. The novelty of Lynn's idea lies in his proposal to look at the changing styles of armed forces from an institutional perspective. Technologies or major wars are not the factors, which drive the forces of changes, it is "institutional characteristics, like recruitment, social composition, motivation, administration" instead.<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>353</sup> John A. Lynn, 'The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000', *The International History Review*, 18, 1996, pp. 505-545.

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid*, p. 507.

*From medieval to aggregate-contract*

However, the answers, provided by Lynn, are not satisfactory enough. He convincingly shows that speaking about mono causality in military sphere is a great mistake. The weak spot in this argumentation is that Lynn did not provide a clear answer on how much military is independent from other human activities. For example, why medieval-stipendiary army was replaced by aggregate-contract (mercenaries)? Was it because of increasing reliance of capital economy or because of changing geopolitical situation in Western Europe or because of simple military rationale? All are true to some extent. Those, looking to social changes from an economical perspective, may say that this transition happened because of increasing reliance on money economy. Nobles were more interested in trade and manufacturing than in warfare, British and Italian cases being classical examples.

At the same time, conflicts and wars between European countries were getting bigger on unprecedented magnitude: wars of Italy, Habsburgs bid for European mastery engulfed regions from Scotland to Muscovy. The rulers needed more soldiers, and the armies of older style were too small and inefficient. Money economy provided some solution to these problems. Rulers could hire/buy soldiers like goods of the shelf. The supply of armed men was continuous and inexhaustible. Like never before war and preparation for it started to look like another business activity. For the people engaged in this business peace was unwelcome. “Don’t you know that I live from war and peace would destroy me?”<sup>355</sup>, condottieri John Hawkwood famously answered to the greetings of two monks. War became a profitable activity not only for the rulers, nobility or for some financiers, it attracted numbers of commoners who also wanted to get a share from the spoils of war.<sup>356</sup> In such way changing geopolitical situation

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<sup>355</sup> William Caferro, *John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary In Fourteenth-Century*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 1.

<sup>356</sup> Philippe Contamine, “The Growth of State Control. Practices of War, 1300-1800: Ransom and Booty” in Philippe Contamine (ed.), *War and Competition Between States*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000, pp. 163-193.

together with the new way of economical life created conditions for military change.

These were necessary, but not sufficient reasons to cause military changes. It does not explain why nobility became less interested in warfare, why older styles of fighting were not efficient. Looking for the answers to these questions, it is worth quoting M. Mann who vigorously tried to show that military is one of the four sources of social power. Trying to give more substance for this argument, he provides example from historical period, which is discussed in this passage. According to him, the rise of European pike phalanx, mainly associated with the Swiss pikemen, had “an intrinsically military, emergent, interstitial power of reorganisation - a capacity through particular battlefield superiority to restructure general social networks [...]”.<sup>357</sup> Mann does not deny the importance of other factors, such as social (egalitarian communities) or economical (capital economy), but he wants to say that tactical superiority of massed infantry against cavalry, discovered by mere accident, was probably of the same importance as monetary economy in dismantling feudal order.

The increasing reliance on infantry and dominance of pikemen meant that on the battlefield unit cohesion and coordination was essential for achieving victory. It implied that in such kind of warfare there was no place for individualistic, heroic military endeavours. Collective action was more important than individual. Soldiers replaced warriors. On practical ground it meant that there was no time to take prisoners during the battle. Soldiers were forbidden to break the ranks. If you cannot take prisoners, you kill most of potential captives. Battles became bloodier. More soldiers were killed in comparison to older times. The prohibition to take prisoners had important economical consequences. The capture of prisoners and ransoms was an essential element in medieval warfare. Knights and their dependents during the battle tried to capture knights of high birth hoping for

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<sup>357</sup> Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, I Vol., p. 19.

generous ransoms. The fortunes made in such way were one of the main sources of income for the nobility.<sup>358</sup> Therefore, the increasing reliance of infantry and policy of no taking prisoners was a very important step in transforming feudal order and diminishing importance of knights and cavalry.<sup>359</sup>

This brief description of transition from one style of army to another, serves as an illustration of interaction and interrelationships between different dimensions of social life. It is obvious that in the process of transition, economical, social factors were very important. However, it was impossible to replace one social order by another without tactical changes on the battlefield and the change of cultural and societal attitudes towards military activities.

#### *Aggregate-contract and state commissioned*

Historical periods and transitions from one army style to another witnessed the same processes and interaction among different dimensions of human activities. In accordance with the evolution of armed forces, proposed by Lynn, aggregate-contract was a dominant style of army organisation in XVI and XVII centuries. This style of army organisation was already discussed in the chapter about MR and the development of this style and later state-commissioned armies are closely associated with changes in military tactics, weaponry. There might be multiple reasons why people fought wars at that time: in some cases it was religious issues (wars in Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Mediterranean region, during the reign of Philip II, French religious wars), in other - dynastic solidarity (Spain's help and support provided to the Austrian Habsburg branch during Thirty years) or simply craving for glory (Louis XIV as classical example).<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> Maurice Hugh Keen, *Chivalry*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 219-237; Contamine, *The Growth of State Control. Practices of War*; Sumption, pp. 463-470.

<sup>359</sup> It is important to emphasise that taking prisoners did not disappear entirely. Prisoners remained integral part of warfare. However, in modern times it definitely lost its economical importance. Look in Contamine, *The Growth of State Control. Practices of War*.

<sup>360</sup> Jeremy Black, *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, Edinburgh: Donald, 1987; Geoffrey Parker and Simon Adams (ed.), *The Thirty Years' War*, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1997; John A. Lynn, "A quest for glory: The formation of strategy under Louis XIV, 1661-1715" in Murray, *The making of strategy*; Kennedy, *The rise and fall of the Great Powers*, pp. 31-71.

However, in every case, from the moment when military campaigns were unleashed results and achievements were different from what rulers and their ministers had anticipated. Wars became longer and more sophisticated. States fought on multiple theatres. Longer wars meant bigger expenses. Fighting simultaneously in several places meant more soldiers, bigger armies and again more money. The speed of events happening on the battlefield was too fast for the political systems of the time to adapt properly. It took time for countries to adjust to these new circumstances. Therefore, when existing capabilities were exhausted, rulers turned to private persons, entrepreneurs. These businessmen not only provided money for the military campaigns, they provided soldiers too. However, at the same time Western countries were looking for the ways to gain more control. The creation of standing armies and navies is the best example of this search. Eventually governments took over the business of war from entrepreneurs and armies became state commissioned. Despite this transition, the way of recruitment remained the same and the dominant type of soldier was still a professional one. Only now soldiers were recruited by state officials instead of private entrepreneurs.

Yet, this transition would not have happened without a bargain between rulers and their nobility. In all European countries, rulers persuaded or forced nobility to become officers in armed forces. When feudal way of fighting and role of cavalry declined, nobility was in a state of confusion. However, increasing size of armed forces required many officers to supervise and lead soldiers. Therefore, if at the beginning of contract armies we can find officers who were of commoner's descent, in later stages officer's class was reserved exclusively for the nobility.<sup>361</sup> That might be called a trade-off between the rulers and nobility. Nobility agreed to accept the change of political system in their countries for exclusive rights in the

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<sup>361</sup> Very important exception from this rule was the service in more technical branches of armed forces: artillery, engineering. Work in these services required technical skills, scientific knowledge. Therefore, nobility was less interested to serve there and in such way it created opportunity for commoners to enter officers corp.

fields of military and other privileges in return. In countries like Prussia and Russia, where nobility was forced to enter state service, the rulers confirmed the right of the aristocracy to bond their peasants in the form of serfdom. The result of this was that nobility was associated with the military domain again, and it easily transformed elements of its medieval knightly past into these new times.

However, it could not have happened, if rulers had not have found some agreement with the ruling elite group – the nobility.<sup>362</sup> It means that only after this bargain was done, rulers could proceed to another level of state expansion, as it happened in France after the Fronde, or in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great. Yet, it is important to emphasise that rulers bargained with nobility mainly because of increasing military needs and its financial burdens.<sup>363</sup> This argumentation is opposite to the Marxist interpretation initiated by Perry Anderson. In his writings about origins and development of absolutism, Anderson was arguing that, for instance, in France the Crown was making bargain with nobility because of class solidarity and in defence of its interests.<sup>364</sup>

In conclusion, the period since the beginning of XVI century to French revolution saw many changes in the military dimension. However, despite all these technological and social changes the way of composing armed forces remained the same. State officials replaced entrepreneurs, national volunteers and recruits replaced foreign mercenaries, but for all of them military was a profession, a way to earn money. All of this changed during the French revolution.

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<sup>362</sup> Beik, pp. 195-224.

<sup>363</sup> The article of W. Beik is symptomatic, when talking about the role of military in the formation of modern state. By presenting and analysing various interpretations about the development of absolutist regime in France, Beik mentions a new surprising aspect, that will help to understand French absolutism better – studies of army. His argument is that the analysis of French armed forces sheds new light about the development of French state. It gives an impression that this additional, military argument, surprises a bit social scientists and historians, because it provides many new helpful insights about the French absolutism.

<sup>364</sup> Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*.

*Popular-conscript, mass-reserve*

There is no doubt that fever of French revolution released such powers, which enabled people to take arms in the name of such abstract notions like La Patrie, Liberty, Freedom and Equality. However, such new doctrinal concepts as divisional system, advanced artillery and the idea of conscript army was realization of ideas, which existed well before the assault on Bastille.<sup>365</sup> The French after the disastrous Seven years war (1756-1763) were looking for answers and solutions on how to avoid repetition of Rossbach in the future. The most influential French military thinker of the time Comte de Guibert wrote “how it is easy to have invincible armies in the state where the subjects are citizens [...] terrible in its anger, it will carry fire and sword to its enemy”.<sup>366</sup> The military rationale and needs were already preparing ground for changes, which French revolution accelerated, but did not create. Therefore, the genius of Napoleon lies not in invention of all these means and ways of fighting, but in original application of them in the battlefield.<sup>367</sup>

However, it is misleading that the recruitment into armed forces in the form of conscription was very popular. People very soon became disenchanted when the increasing war demands required more soldiers. Males tried to avoid military service by running away or hiding in countryside. Eventually government in Paris had no other option as to organize forced recruitment.<sup>368</sup> Therefore, after the downfall of Napoleon, there were serious attempts in France to abandon the idea of conscription and to leave only a small, but efficient professional army. However, it was impossible to ignore or dismantle political, social and cultural

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<sup>365</sup> Gat, *A History of Military Thought.*, pp. 27-80

<sup>366</sup> General Menard (ed.), „Ecrits militaires, 1772-1790, par le Comte de Guibert”, Paris, 1977, p. 63 in M. S. Anderson, *War and Society*, p.201.

<sup>367</sup> Jean Lambert A. Colin, *The Transformations Of War*. London: Rees, 1912.

<sup>368</sup> Best, p. 90; Geoffrey Wawro, *Warfare and Society In Europe, 1792-1914*. London: Routledge, 2000, p. 3.

structures created by French revolution, and France ended up with the system of professional conscripts serving for a term of six years.<sup>369</sup>

Even more important was the fact that other European countries did not share France's caution towards conscript army. Russia has conscript army since the times of Peter the Great. Of course it was based on forced recruitment, but it was still a conscript system. Prussia kept conscription and volunteer militia *Landwehr* which was later transformed into reserve forces. However, despite the variety of armed forces' organisations in different countries, it is important to stress that all of them applied some form of conscription that made all the difference if compared to the XVIII century armies.

The mass-reserve style armed forces that became dominant after wars of German unification (1870's) were simply just another form of conscript army. Standing armies in times of popular-conscript style "was seen as the state's primary fighting force, during stage six (*mass-reserve – D.S*) it was seen as a device to train a large reserve that could be mobilized in time of war".<sup>370</sup> It was armies of this style, which fought in both World wars and was prepared for fight during the Cold war.

As was mentioned in 2 chapter, at this time Western countries started to spend more money on non-military activities. The conscript army with the large reserve was a cheap army, compared to a smaller, but more professional army. At the same time changing industrial and technological breakthroughs (railway, telegraph, rifled guns, metallurgy, canned food, etc.) created conditions for mobilization of much larger number of soldiers, for arming and moving them rapidly into the battlefield than ever before.<sup>371</sup> Military dimension is a perfect place to look for an example of how the principle of zero-sum works. European countries, despite their different political systems, militarily were similar.

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<sup>369</sup> Best, pp. 217-218; Lynn, *The Evolution of Army Style*, pp. 520-521.

<sup>370</sup> Lynn, *The Evolution of Army Style*, p. 521.

<sup>371</sup> McNeill, pp. 223-256.



Therefore, slightest change in technologies and army organisation could bring victory in the war. For instance, the mass use of rifled needle-gun was a decisive factor which brought victory for Prussia against Austria in 1866. But four years later, in 1870 during Franco-Prussian war Prussians were matched by French on this account and victory was decided because Germans were better and more proficient in other aspects of warfare. Therefore, the organisation of army, form of recruitment in one country had a snowball effect on others. France, Austria, even Britain could not afford to ignore the Prussian case.<sup>372</sup> Political elite in these countries debated about duration of conscription (3, 2 or 1 year), but there were few voices proposing its abolishment.

Finally, the need to enlarge armies was associated with the need to expand people's political rights, especially, the right to vote. It is possible and legitimate to explain expansion of voting rights as the way to solve social, economical and political tensions created by demographic blow and industrialisation. However, as it was already mentioned in 2 chapter, the expansion of franchise rights were closely related to military needs. If in early modern period rulers had to negotiate and bargain with the nobility, so after the French revolution governments made a bargain with common people: citizenship in an exchange of acceptance of universal military service.

During the same period, there were important shifts in officer corps. The main change brought by French revolution was the opening of officer's class to commoners. Of course, acceptance and tolerance towards officers of non-noble descent was long and gradual.<sup>373</sup> However, since the French revolution we may start speaking about professional officer corps, where people were promoted because of their knowledge and expertise, not because of their high birth. The officership gradually became a profession whose members have their code of

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<sup>372</sup> Deborah Avant, 'From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War', *International Organization*, 54, 2000, pp. 41-72.

<sup>373</sup> It is enough to mention the fact, that Britain abandoned the purchase of officer's position, centuries old tradition, only in 1871.

conduct, formal rules and procedures of advancement. It was the essential difference between officers of aggregate-contract, state commissioned and popular-conscript, mass-reserve armies. In former, for the “mercenary, officership was a trade; for aristocrat, a hobby”.<sup>374</sup> In later stages, it became a full time job, a profession.

It probably would not be an exaggeration to say that these two last army styles are the sources of still popular understanding of what is a proper army, a proper officer. However, changes in the military domain for the last 40 years require speaking about one more transition in army style.

### *Volunteer-technical*

According to Lynn, in early 1970s the seventh stage of army style evolution started, he calls it - volunteer-technical.<sup>375</sup> This style of army organisation was already discussed in chapter 3 when speaking about RMA. The beginning of this new stage is mainly associated with the decision of US from 1975 to abolish conscription and establish all volunteer, zero draft armed forces. It meant smaller professional armed forces capable of using sophisticated weapon systems and technologies. A. Bacevich, speaking about changes in US society after the Vietnam war noticed change in the understanding what citizenship was. If previously it meant service in armed forces, then since the 70'ies it became more associated with the support of military. Your duty as a citizen is to support the military, not serve in it.<sup>376</sup> The US set an example, which was followed by almost all Western countries. After the end of Cold war countries one by one have abolished or frozen the conscription.<sup>377</sup> Some countries (Scandinavian) still use

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<sup>374</sup> Jacques van Doorn, *The Soldier and Social Change*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975, p. 33.

<sup>375</sup> Lynn, *The Evolution of Army Style*, p. 523.

<sup>376</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 108

<sup>377</sup> Karl W. Haltiner, *The Definite End Of the Mass Army In Western Europe?*

this system, but it has changed considerably and is based more on volunteers than on conscription.<sup>378</sup>

There are multiple reasons why Western countries moved away from mass-reserve army style. One of the best known explanations is that quality of life in Western countries reached such levels that people started to care more about such issues like gender, sexuality, environment, etc. Therefore, the attitudes towards military and armed forces became more critical and negative. For instance, analysis of empirical data revealed the fact that volunteer forces are more suitable and flexible to employ women than mass armies. It means that volunteer armed forces are a more suitable format for seeking gender equality in the military.<sup>379</sup>

However, this sociological explanation is very limited. It is enough to mention the fact that the conscription survived in countries, which had very high living standards and were considered champions of post-materialistic lifestyle - Germany and especially Scandinavian states. Therefore, it is clear that there are other reasons why it happened. That is where all discussions about RMA come to the scene. In early 1970's military sociologists started to trace evidence that Western countries became more eager to replace mass armies into volunteer style forces. One of the leading military sociologist of that time, Jaques van Doorn, wrote in 1975:

It looks as though the Western world has now reached a historic stage in which the mass army as an institution is on the way out. It is not a political-cyclical trend, but a structural change spelling the end of a process, which began with the French revolution and the national revolutions of the early nineteenth century. [...] this period of history is now coming to an end. "The nation in arms" is an obsolete conception. The armed forces have steadily evolved into an instrument of deterrence with a high degree of technological specialization, which holds little attraction for the young people today.<sup>380</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> In summer 2011, Germany ended conscription. It still might be resumed in the case of an emergency, but otherwise from now on German armed forces are fully professional. 'Germany's Armed Forces: At Ease', *The Economist*, 2010, Vol. 396, Issue 8691, p55-56 [accessed 3 October 2011].

<sup>379</sup> Haltiner, pp. 24-27.

<sup>380</sup> Van Doorn, pp. 52-53.

It is interesting that Western countries became reluctant towards mass armies in the midst of Cold war. US and Great Britain's transition to volunteer forces was quite understandable, since conscript armies were alien to their political systems and traditions. However, it is more difficult to explain the cases of continental Europe. Looking from military rationale, Western countries were always aware that, if war would start over Fulda gap in Germany, they would be overrun by Soviets, who always had more soldiers than the West. To compensate this deficiency, Western countries, starting with US, decided to enhance their military capabilities by applying new technologies and by devising new operational and tactical schemes. These new schemes eventually became known as "AirLand Battle" doctrine and were the main operational doctrine for U.S and NATO in the last decade of Cold war. As it is seen from the title of this new doctrine, it called for coordination between land and air components, which was possible because of better communication, intelligence and surveillance technologies. However, appropriate skills were required in order to use all these technologies. To provide such skills for the conscript army was difficult and expensive; thus, an employment of long serving experts, professionals was needed.

Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the trend of transition from mass-reserve armies to volunteer armies started before the end of Cold war. The end of this global struggle gave additional impulse to end conscription. In 1990's Western countries very actively engaged in expeditionary and overseas missions, which required small, mobile, well-equipped military forces. Researchers came to conclusions that countries, which participated in overseas missions more often, abolished conscription more rapidly.<sup>381</sup> Overall, there is no doubt that now the dominant military style is a small, professional army. The following summary in the table N. 2 shows how contemporary changes look like when compared with the situation in previous historical eras.

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<sup>381</sup> Haltiner, p. 33.

Table Nr. 2

Social scientist classification (Tilly) <sup>382</sup>	Historians classification (Lynn) <sup>383</sup>	File and rank	Officer corps	Ties with society and state/government	
				File and rank	Officers
Patrimonialism (up to 15 <sup>th</sup> century)	Feudal (8 <sup>th</sup> -10 <sup>th</sup> centuries)	Unqualified folk, distracted from their daily life activities and farming	Commanding positions granted according to status in social class, not because of expertise.	No separate group, part of society	Interests of social class, nobility, first, military needs-second.
	Medieval-stipendiary (12 <sup>th</sup> -14 <sup>th</sup> centuries)	Volunteers, paid soldiers. Soldierly begins to be perceived as trade	Feudal levy is gradually replaced by nobility, who are paid for their services	First mercenary companies	Social class first, military second
Brokerage (1400-1700)	Aggregate-contract (late 15 <sup>th</sup> – early 16 <sup>th</sup> centuries)	Mercenaries; paid volunteers; Soldier as a trade/profession	Mercenary commanders, mainly from nobility. Officership as trade	Distinct group, separated from society	Despite the commercialization, needs of nobility are the priority
	state-commissioned (late 16 <sup>th</sup> – early 17 <sup>th</sup> centuries)	Paid volunteers. Soldier as profession	First attempts to have a formal officer education; predominantly from the noble class. Officership as hobby	Distinct group, uniforms, barracks.	Social class first
Nationalisation (1700-1850)	Popular-conscript (1789-1810)	Conscripts	Officers appointed by the state; open to all classes; officership as profession.	Short term service, rapid return to civilian life	Distinct group
Specialisation (1850-present)	Mass-reserve (1866-1905)	Conscripts	Officers appointed by the state; Increasing number from middle class; officership as profession.	Short term service, rapid return to civilian life	Distinct group

<sup>382</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>383</sup> Lynn, *The Evolution of Army Style*, pp. 536-545.

	Volunteer-technical (1970-present)	Volunteers, professional. Soldierly as profession.	Officers appointed by the state. Continuous formal military education. Officership as profession.	Distinct group	Distinct group
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We can draw two major and far reaching conclusions from the information provided in Table Nr. 2. First of all, slightly updating van Doorn's ideas we may say that at the present moment Western countries live in the times of gradual, but radical shift. It is the first time after the French revolution, when Western world radically changed the organisation of armed forces. Lynn's proposal to divide era between French revolution and Vietnam War into periods of two army styles is more of operational nature. Despite pure military differences, both styles were based on conscription system. It was conscription that made both of them different from army styles of the past. It is conscription that makes them different in our times.

It is very important to emphasize that there was no historical period, when only one army style existed. In times of aggregate-contract armies, we may find elements of feudal levy.<sup>384</sup> During the era of state-commissioned armies, we may find military units assembled by conscription.<sup>385</sup> After Napoleonic wars, conscript and long service professional armies coexist alongside each other.<sup>386</sup> In our times many countries have not abolished conscription entirely. They are still applying it in some form or another like, for example, in Lithuania. However, despite this complexity, there was always one dominant type of military organisation, like

<sup>384</sup> Hale, pp. 75-126; Michael Mallett, *Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy*. London: Bodley Head, 1974, pp. 207-230

<sup>385</sup> Tallett, *War and Society*, pp. 69-104; Anderson, *War and Society*, pp. 111-131.

<sup>386</sup> Best, pp. 207-256; Bond, pp. 40-71; Wawro, pp. 100-159.

there is always the paradigm army that provides an example of the new ways of fighting and new military thinking.<sup>387</sup>

As was shown in Chapter 2 and in this part of dissertation, transition from one style to another always has wider social, political, economical, cultural and, of course, military implications. Therefore, having in mind all this historical context, the discussion about RMA might be seen in another light. It is hard to believe that such radical shift in military organisation and processes related to RMA are not part of a bigger change.

The second conclusion, taken from Table Nr. 2 is closely related with the first one. It concerns the role of rank and file, and officer corps in the state. As it was already mentioned and emphasised, armed forces are a distinct, autonomous organisation that has specific relations with other state institutions and society. However, the relations between all parts of this interaction are not so simple and easy. Peter Feaver described this peculiar situation very well by saying, that: “[...] because we fear others, we create an institution of violence to protect us, but we fear the very institution we created for protection.”<sup>388</sup> On many occasions, this fear became sad reality when armies made *coup d’etat* or found other ways to control the state. Therefore, political entities of all times had to find or create ways and mechanisms to control the military, to make it a part of political body and deny the possibility of creating a state within the state.

When speaking about armed forces it is important to remember that there are two groups: file and rank, and officers. The minimum task for any political entity is to integrate at least one of these groups into the wider political community. Looking at Table Nr. 2 we may see how Western countries managed to control armed forces. Before the French revolution file and rank were paid soldiers, professionals separated from society and political life. They were not interested in

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<sup>387</sup> Lynn, *The Evolution of Army Style*.

<sup>388</sup> Peter D. Feaver, ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 23, 1996, p. 150.

what was happening in the political life. Society did not bother or care how soldiers lived, especially having in mind their social composition (mainly from the lowest level of society, criminals, etc.).

On the other hand, officers came from the nobility. The solidarity and defence of class interests for them was more important than military service. As it was mentioned, military service for them was a hobby. In such way, by using nobility governments succeeded to temper the military.

After the French revolution, countries found a new way to control armed forces. However, this time the same players got different roles. This time it was file and rank, who tied armed forces to society and the state. Taken to the military by conscription, they served a short term. Therefore, there was not enough time to make these conscripts into a group with deep commitment to military traditions or some particular interests. Of course, even short-term service was enough to indoctrinate some patriotic feelings, discipline.

The change of officer corps role was no less dramatic. After the French Revolution, we started talking about the professional military group. This group gradually obtained traditions, ethic codes, sense of solidarity, corporateness. It steadily detached itself from society and active political life. It devoted its time for perfection of their expertise – war fighting. Being an officer is the same as being a lawyer, doctor or teacher. It becomes a profession.<sup>389</sup> However, this separateness of officers' corps is counterbalanced by conscript rank and file. Conscription did not allow transforming all armed forces into a separate and distinct group, which might have interests, virtues, traditions of its own.

However, situation radically changes when the last transition happens. As it is shown in Table Nr. 2, after the transition from conscript to professional armies, we have both parts of armed forces as distinct group. Both of them consider military work as profession. Therefore, probably for the first time in modern era,

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<sup>389</sup>Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State the Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations*. Cambridge [Mass.]: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 7-18.



we have a situation when both groups of armed forces are separated from the state in a sense that there is no one able to play the role, which in the past was played by nobility and conscripts. Keeping in mind that all transitions in the past had far reaching consequences not only in the military dimension, but also in the political, economical and cultural dimensions it is valid and legitimate to ask what might happen today.

In 1975 van Doorn, when speaking about possible consequences of transition to volunteer forces, was saying that it might have several important effects. The armies would have to compete in labour market for soldiers, and because of that, armed forces would mainly be composed of people from lower social classes or ethnic minorities. The end of draft would create conditions for the military to become a separate and isolated social sect, a state within the state, which eventually might even lead to creation of the garrison state.<sup>390</sup>

These van Doorn's insights are a good starting point for a discussion about today's situation. It seems that on many accounts he was right. Political scientists, sociologists in Western world, and especially in the US are speaking about the widening gap between military and the rest of the state; that daily life is full of various tensions between military and civilians; that there are serious crisis, which by some is again defined as another step towards the garrison state.

However, before moving to another chapter, it is important to stress the importance of history and relevance of MR as a conceptual tool necessary to show military's autonomy. From what was said in this part of dissertation, it must be clear that without historical perspective it would be extremely difficult to realise how important contemporary changes in military organisation are. History helps to see that military organisations through ages were changing not only because of economical, cultural, social reasons, but also because there were pure military causes of these changes. Knowledge of historical past helps to anticipate, where

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<sup>390</sup> Doorn, pp. 57-60

and how contemporary military transformation may affect changes in other areas of human activity. Looking from such perspective the importance of the conceptual framework, provided by the idea of MR is very clear. Its requirement to look at everything from above, to see a big picture helps to notice, how military dimension is interacting with other dimensions and how it keeps its autonomy. This conceptual framework helps to connect changing ideas about war, transformation of armed forces with issues of the last two chapters of this dissertation: tensions in American civil-military relations and militarization of police in the US.

## **6. Civil-Military Relations in the US**

The way how idea of MR is designed indicates that implications of military changes may be felt almost in every human activity. Therefore, it is a challenge to find ways and means to trace these possible effects. In this dissertation, it was decided to follow a track laid down by historical “war and society” school. The primary concern and object of research for members of this school and creators of the idea of MR was institutional changes. Therefore, there is extensive literature about various institutional changes caused by military transformation. Civil-military relations are one of the first areas where is possible to see how processes that originated in military sphere spreads into other dimensions, in this case – political. New military organisations require new institutional arrangements between military and their counterparts – civilians. The search for these arrangements created and creates many tensions that sometimes are serious problem for domestic political stability and security of national interests abroad. Because civil-military relations are the area where military meets politics it is hard sometimes to separate these two domains.

It always surprises, when members of the military are trying to say, that armed forces are apolitical institution, whose duty is to protect national interest, not to

pursue some political interests. As H. Strachan mentions, “it is almost tautologous to refer to the politics of an army”.<sup>391</sup> The problem there is the understanding what does intervention or participation in politics mean. Probably the first idea, which comes to mind, is that about coup d’etat, establishing of some military dictatorship. However, this possibility is the most radical version of military’s participation in politics. To avoid such reductionist thinking broader perspective is necessary. S.E. Finner proposed such perspective many years ago by classifying intervention of military into four levels: influence, pressures or blackmail, displacement, supplement.<sup>392</sup>

Western countries are in the group of states, where typical levels of interference are the first two: influence and blackmail. Influence, according to Finner, means that military like any other bureaucracy are trying to convince civilian authorities by reason or emotion. Blackmail, on the other hand, “can range from hints or actions that are just barely constitutional at one end to intimidation and threats that are clearly unconstitutional at the other”.<sup>393</sup> Therefore, even being very specific institution, military still is part of the state apparatus, where it has to participate in various bureaucratic, political dealings. Military is apolitical if we speak in the context of politics of parties, but it is definitely a political player when speaking about bureaucracy.

Moving away from theoretical considerations about military’s autonomy towards issue of its interference into politics the case of U.S will be discussed. By primarily using secondary sources this case analysis suppose to show how military changes affects some political changes. As was said previously, U.S is the most advanced military country in the world. Therefore, many processes, which just start emerging in other Western countries, are well advanced in America. U.S case

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<sup>391</sup> Hew Strachan, *The Politics Of the British Army*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 1.

<sup>392</sup> Samuel E. Finer, *The Man On Horseback: The Role Of the Military In Politics*, 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 77-78.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

may give us a hint what waits European countries in the area of civil-military relations

### *U.S case*

Probably the best way to start discussion about the case of U.S. is the short review of President Obama Afghanistan's surge story. In his book about this issue, Bob Woodward paints a gloomy picture, where civilians in general and President Obama in particular had many difficulties to pursue his politics. The military was trying to corner president and to get what it wanted.<sup>394</sup> At that time, commander of US forces in Afghanistan general Stanley Allen McChrystal made the report about situation in this country public, even when that document was for internal use. Later, general in public spoke about the necessary steps for achieving breakthrough in Afghanistan.<sup>395</sup>

All these actions were perceived as pressure aimed to force President Obama to accept military's proposal. Finally, existing tensions and disagreements were revealed in the article about general McChrystal in the *Rolling Stones* magazine. In that, article general and his associates gave harsh remarks about their civilian superiors.<sup>396</sup> The cost of this article was the carrier of General McChrystal. President Obama recalled him from Afghanistan command and general went to retirement. This story has several morals. First, the swift reaction from White

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<sup>394</sup> Bob Woodward, 'Military Thwarted President Seeking Choice In Afghanistan', *The Washington Post*, 27 September 2010 <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/26/AR2010092603766.html>> [accessed 17 October 2010]; Bob Woodward, 'Biden Warned Obama During Afghan War Review Not To Get "locked Into Vietnam"', *The Washington Post*, 28 September 2010 <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/27/AR2010092704850.html>> [accessed 17 October 2010].; Bob Woodward, 'Obama: "We Need To Make Clear To People That the Cancer Is In Pakistan"', *The Washington Post*, 29 September 2010 <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/28/AR2010092805092.html>> [accessed 17 October 2010].; Neil Sheehan, 'In Bob Woodward's "Obama's Wars," Neil Sheehan Sees Parallels To Vietnam', *The Washington Post*, 3 October 2010 <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/30/AR2010093005857.html>> [accessed 17 October 2010].

<sup>395</sup> 'General Stanley McChrystal, Special Address On Afghanistan'. The International Institute For Strategic Studies, London, 2009. <<http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/general-stanley-mcchrystal-address/>> [accessed 17 October 2010].

<sup>396</sup> Michael Hastings, 'The Runaway General', *Rolling Stone*, 2010 <<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236>> [accessed 17 October 2010].

House to *Rolling Stone's* article showed, that civilians still are in charge. However, President Obama did not have any other option, but only to recall McChrystal. More serious is the fact that military can and are willing to make publicly its distaste and critics about their civilian superiors. In Finner's classification these acts probably will be somewhere in the middle between influence and blackmail. However, it would not be a big deal, if it would be only a single, isolated misfit from military side. Yet, general McChrystal's story is only the last episode of events, which, especially for the last twenty years, are disturbing scholars and politicians in U.S.<sup>397</sup>

The main question is how much if at all military may intervene or participate in politics. S. Huntington and M. Janowitz provided the two competing versions of answer into this question back in late 1950's. Both scholars were concerned how to control military not jeopardising the strategic goal of Cold war – win against Soviet Union. Before Second World War, the U.S. had small professional armed forces. However, the war and ensuing Cold war changed everything. Washington had to keep a large military force and provide substantial resources for it. U.S entered unfamiliar waters, because there was new, strong and influential member of political system. What was necessary was some theoretical framework, which could provide solutions for civilians towards military.

In order to control the military, Huntington advised to establish an objective civilian control. According to him this form of control is directly opposite to subjective civilian control:

Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianising the military, making them mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. [...] the antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics. [...] The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.<sup>398</sup>

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<sup>397</sup> Bernard I. Finel, 'The Failed Secretary', *Armed Forces Journal*, 2011 <<http://armedforcesjournal.com/2011/09/7558137/>> [accessed 15 September 2011].

<sup>398</sup> Huntington, p. 83

Huntington was proposing to control military by making it more military. His logic was such: if government will provide military enough financial and material support the armed forces will pay all its attention to perfection of its skills and profession. In this way military will not have enough time to intervene into politics. The political and military spheres should be kept autonomous from each other. The key reason why military, having more financial, human and material resources will not intervene into politics is the professionalism of military, especially its officer corps.

He considered officership as a profession, whose members are experts united by specific code of conduct, particular values and worldview and by particular skills/expertise - the management of violence.<sup>399</sup> In other words, it would be against nature of officer as a member of specific profession to intervene into politics. However, he understood that by militarising military there might appear ideological gap between liberal civilians and military that are more conservative. To avoid such situation he advised to shift civilian virtues towards more conservative. In other words, society should move towards military not vice versa.

Janowitz, on the other hand proposed alternative solution, which on some accounts was totally opposite to what Huntington was suggesting. He emphasised that in era of “strategic deterrence, limited warfare, and enlarged politico-military responsibility”<sup>400</sup> it was hardly possible to separate military sphere from political. Such complexity of tasks demands from officers a better understanding of political issues. It requires participation in discussions and decision making in the spheres, which are far away from stereotypical activity of officers. Therefore, military should move towards civilians and integrate more into civilian world.

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<sup>399</sup> Ibid., pp. 11-16

<sup>400</sup> Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. New York: Free Press, 1964, p. vii.

Increasing dependence on various new technologies and weapon systems pushed military even more towards civilians. All these new gadgets required managerial and administrative skills. Therefore, according to Janowitz, the biggest part of all military system does not differ from any civilian big enterprise.<sup>401</sup> The only difference between the officer and civilian manager is that the former wears uniform with stars and is responsible for a delicate business – management of violence. Finally, Janowitz was advocating for constabulary forces, which will be capable to fight high intensity warfare, but also will know how to conduct paramilitary, military aid operations.<sup>402</sup>

These two models, despite all the critics<sup>403</sup>, remains the starting point for any serious discussion about contemporary civil-military relations. In the case of U.S. Huntingtonian alternative for a very long time was more acceptable than Janowitz's model. The long tradition of conventional American way of war, discussed in Chapter 4, helped to institutionalize ideas proposed by Huntington,<sup>404</sup> However, U.S. military during the Cold war and especially after its end were conducting missions, which were less associated with high intensity fighting. In such way, even when the institutional arrangement of U.S. defence system was based on Huntingtonian model, the military became involved in political debates on various topics as Janowitz predicted.

However, both authors gave too much credit to the idea of professional officer by ignoring some basic features of military organisation. Both agreed that military embraces more conservative virtues, but they thought that ethics of the profession would force to abolish some negative traditions. Yet, the events of the

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<sup>401</sup> Ibid, p. 21-78.

<sup>402</sup> Ibid., p. 418.

<sup>403</sup> Feaver, *The Civil-Military Problematique*; Michael C. Desch, 'Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control', *Armed Forces & Society*, 24, 1998, pp. 389 - 405; James Burk, 'Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society*, 29, 2002, pp. 7 - 29; Edward M. Coffman, 'The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State', *The Journal of Military History*, 55, 1991, pp. 69-82.

<sup>404</sup> Robert Egnell, 'Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-military Dimension', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29, 2006, pp. 1041-1075.

last twenty years show, that military is not easily forgetting some worrisome traditions, dating back to the days of American Independence war.

Influential American military historians, like Weigley, Kohn argued that since the times of War of Independence military always participated in the political games and that this negative tradition only became stronger.<sup>405</sup> It is enough to speak about active service generals running for the presidency, or navy members, like A. Mahan, shaping US international politics. Recently historians provided interesting researches, where is shown how during the Interwar period and Second World war the alliance of military and business group forced president F. Roosevelt to correct his New Deal politics. According to historians, US of that time might be called a security state, where everything is seen through the lenses of security (i.e. military).<sup>406</sup>

Cold war was not the period when military could stay out of politics. A mere existence of nuclear weapon forced military to participate in political debates. Of course, we can not speak about some linear progression. There were moments when civilians really were in control of the situation: Truman's victory over D. MacArthur, or Johnson's handling of Joint Chief of Staff during the Vietnam war. However, Vietnam case forced US military to reconsider its relationships with the civilians and in some weird form to follow Clausewitz's dictum about war as the continuation of politics. Military decided, that they must tie civilians in such way, that when the next war will come soldiers will have a voice in the decision-making. General's Abram's famous military reserve reform is an example of such thinking.

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<sup>405</sup> Richard H. Kohn, 'Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-military Relations', *National Interest*, 1994, pp. 3-17. Richard H. Kohn, 'The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today', *Naval War College Review*, 55, Summer 2002, p. 9. Richard H. Kohn, 'The Danger of Militarization in an Endless "War" on Terrorism', *Journal of Military History*, 73, 2009, pp. 177-208; Russell F. Weigley, 'The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell', *The Journal of Military History*, 57, 1993, pp. 27-58; Russell F. Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present" in Feaver and Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians*, pp. 215-246.

<sup>406</sup> Waddell,



However, what followed after the end of Cold war many took by surprise. In 1997 the U.S. Secretary of Defence William Cohen spoke about situation, when “civilian world doesn’t fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn’t understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy makers are so short”.<sup>407</sup> This speech was a reaction to the events and processes that made civilians feel uncomfortable. During the Clinton’s presidency U.S. military became very politicised. Highest-ranking officers, like Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff general Collin Powell, openly and publicly were criticizing their civilian superiors.<sup>408</sup> Officers openly supported political parties, mainly Republicans. However, what was different after the end of Cold war, was the intensity, scope of this militaries intervention into politics. It obviously was far away from the Huntington’s idea of civil-military relations and it definitely was not what Janowitz proposed. It was situation, which R. Kohn, historian with the unquestionable expertise and knowledge about US military history, described as military “out of civilian control”.<sup>409</sup>

The problem was not only with the military’s active participation in politics. There appeared some signals, that military was drifting away from the society, that there was increasing distance between them. Journalist T. Ricks vividly described how it was difficult for the group of marines to come back to civilian life. These soldiers could not understand way of life of their friends: liberal, individualistic virtues, hedonistic and consumer attitude. All of it was so alien to the military traditions, virtues.<sup>410</sup> Some scholars raised the question: will military if necessary defend and protect those who are pursuing such way of life, which is so alien and despised by the military.<sup>411</sup> In some cases, scholars started interpret

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<sup>407</sup> William S. Cohen, “Remarks at Yale University, 1997” in Feaver and Kohn, p. 1

<sup>408</sup> Colin L. Powell, ‘Why Generals Get Nervous’, *The New York Times*, 8 October 1992, <<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/08/opinion/why-generals-get-nervous.html>>.

<sup>409</sup> Kohn, *Out of Control*.

<sup>410</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, ‘The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society’, *Atlantic Monthly*, 280, 1997, pp. 66-78.

<sup>411</sup> Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Civil-military Relations’, *Orbis*, 41, 1997, pp. 177-186.

these events as the beginning of the process, which will end by establishing military dictatorship.<sup>412</sup>

The discussion about increasing civil-military gap became more intensive. According to Feaver, this discussion followed the line of old Huntington-Janowitz debate. Followers of Janowitz saw “all volunteer military drifting too far away from civilian society” in four areas: military became disproportionately Republican; military became alienated with civilian society; military resisted integration of women, homosexuals into the army; that military may lose the support of the society.<sup>413</sup> Supporters of Huntington were more concerned about other four areas: that it is society, not military, who is drifting away from mainstream ideology and values; political elite is using military as social laboratory; excessive micro-management creates obstacles for effective military functioning; the tensions exist not in the relationships between military and public, but between military and civilian-political elite.<sup>414</sup> All these areas of tensions and disagreements are already worrisome if considered separately.

However, more concerning is the number and range of all these disagreements. It is clear, that some of them happened because of the processes, described in previous chapters: changing perception and understanding of war, transition to all-volunteer forces. The intensity and breadth of this civil-military gap might be considered as a sign of the need to remake existing mechanism of civilian control over military. The thorough and deep empirical research, conducted by American scholars revealed that the gap between civilians and military is real.<sup>415</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> Charles Dunlap, ‘The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012’, *Parameters*, Winter, 1992, pp. 2-20.

<sup>413</sup> Feaver and Kohn, p. 4

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 459-474.

One of the reasons why military are becoming more involved into politics is increasing bureaucratization of officer corps, at least in the Army.<sup>416</sup> Because of various management systems, increasing technological sophistication that requires a lot managerial work officers are spending more time dealing with the various civilians from other departments and institutions. It does not mean that bureaucratisation equals politicisation, but bureaucratic tasks creates conditions for officers to participate in daily low level political discussions. Combining this situation with the eagerness of high ranking officers to participate more actively in politics on strategic level and we have very peculiar situation. The changes for the last ten years only strengthened this trend.

The events of 9/11, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that U.S. armed forces have to change they attitude towards the constabulary missions – peace keeping, peace building, state building, and counterinsurgency. Scholars started to speak about new types of officers like officer-politician, officer-diplomat, officer-scholar.<sup>417</sup> The changing philosophy is gradually institutionalised by updating various military doctrines, establishing new institutions. It means that the military is embracing and preparing itself for much wider range of missions that will involve military into daily life of civilians more often.

Nevertheless, scholars are not good in seeing all these events in wider historical context. When reading all these debates about civil-military relations two things are worth mentioning. First, all this debate mainly concerns relationships between elite groups. There are literally hundreds of books and articles about relationships between high-ranking officers and senior civilians. However, it is difficult to find work where by using civil-military relations models relationships between wider community and military would be analysed. Judging from public opinion surveys, the relationships between military and wider public

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<sup>416</sup> Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews, *The Future of the Army Profession, Revised and Expanded Second Edition*, 2nd ed. Learning Solutions, 2005, p. 21

<sup>417</sup> Moskos; Williams, *The Military and Society Beyond the Postmodern Era*.

are warmer than between military and civilian-political elite.<sup>418</sup> Military's attitude towards wider society probably are not so warm, because of such issues like tolerance of homosexuals, individualistic values, etc. Still, military are very active in public life through various channels: mass media, Hollywood, computer gaming and others.<sup>419</sup> For some scholars such activities are signs of increasing militarization of American society.<sup>420</sup>

The case about US society's militarisation is very good example how sociologists may benefit from ideas proposed by scholars like Tilly, Mann. In his writings Mann speaks about two types of power: despotic and infrastructural. Despotic power means, that somebody at the top, officially has a power to make decisions. For instances, when speaking about civil-military relations, there is a feeling that the main concern for all scholars is how to control military and how to avoid situation of coup d' etat in Western countries. Looking from this perspective it is possible to say that such scenario is unlikely. Therefore, all discussions about widening of civil-military gap seem too pessimistic.

However, everything might look quite differently when Mann's idea of infrastructural power is considered. According to him, the essence of this power is "actually penetrate civil society"<sup>421</sup>. It means that in such case it does not matter who is at the top, as long as the state might reach everyone through wide network of institutions. In this case, when speaking about civil-military relations, coup d'etat is the least what we should be afraid. The spread of militaristic values, traditions, gradual militarization, all that are signs of increasing infrastructural power. However, to trace all this and to measure is much harder than in the case of despotic power. That might be the reason why second perspective is not popular among scholars. At least it is not popular among scholars who are more concerned

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<sup>418</sup> <http://pewresearch.org/>; [www.gallup.com/home](http://www.gallup.com/home)

<sup>419</sup> Der Derian, *Virtuous War*; Peter Warren Singer, 'Meet the Sims... and Shoot Them', *Foreign Policy*, March/April, 2010 <[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/meet\\_the\\_sims\\_and\\_shoot\\_them](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/meet_the_sims_and_shoot_them)> [accessed 10 December 2011].

<sup>420</sup> Kohn, *The Danger of Militarization*; Bacevich, *The new American militarism*.

<sup>421</sup> Mann, *State, War and Capitalism*, p. 5.

in their writings about institutional changes, power sharing, etc. Basically, majority of military sociologists when speaking about civil-military relations are concerned with issues raised by Finner, i.e. military's interference into politics through institutional arrangements.<sup>422</sup>

This problem of different approaches is very well illustrated by debate about garrison state. H. Lasswell proposed the idea of garrison state in early 1940's. The main idea of this concept is that facing continuing external threat modern states will have to rely more and more on advice and help, provided by the managers of violence, i.e. military. Lasswell did not speak, that there will be overthrow of the government. He spoke more about hidden, indirect militarization of the society keeping all existing institutions intact, formally, because in reality all these institutions would be empty shells.<sup>423</sup> These discussions about garrison state reperped during the presidency of G. W. Bush. Various commentators, scholars interpreted the situation in 2000's as the beginning of movement towards such kind of state. Increasing reliance on military to tackle various tasks at home and abroad, obvious politicisation of military personnel and especially changes in perception of domestic threats, all of that raised many questions. American government, in order to fight terrorism and be prepared for various other contingencies took harsh, sometimes even illegal measures inside the country (Patriot bill, wiretapping of cell phones and internet, etc.).<sup>424</sup>

However, in many cases various publicists, not serious scholars, initiated all these discussions. The reason of such attitude was the same as in the past: it is

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<sup>422</sup> However, there are some younger generation scholars associated with movement of cultural turn in social sciences who are trying to use various constructivist, discursive conceptual tools to analyse military's influence. This new approach is quiet promising and in future may provide interesting results. However, it is already possible to see that these scholars are repeating some mistakes of their peers, for instance, ignorance of military history. First who comes to mind, when speaking about this new trend is Meyer Kestnbaum and his ideas about the need of new discipline - war sociology. Look in Julia Adams, pp. 249-285; Meyer Kestnbaum, 'The Sociology of War and the Military', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 2009, pp. 235-254.

<sup>423</sup> Lasswell.

<sup>424</sup> The Washington Post in 2010 conducted a wide ranging project "Top Secret America" about hidden domestic security complex in America. <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/>

difficult to find traces of garrison state if you are using conceptual tools and ideas made for looking and explaining institutional changes, i.e. coup d'état. All of that draws main conclusions of this chapter. The scholars, working on the subject of American civil-military relations name many reasons why there are tensions and gap between military and civilians. They speak about changing international security environment, changing virtues and attitudes of society, social problems inside the military, etc. Paradoxically, what is missing, is serious discussion about military changes like RMA, counterinsurgency, as a possible reason why civil-military relations in U.S. for the last twenty years became worse. Because civil-military relations in many cases are research subject for sociologists, the causes of all changes for them are of societal origin. Yet, it is enough to put all these changes into historical context and very different picture emerges.

It is hard to believe, that when Western militaries and their civilian counterparts are experiencing tremendous changes, processes started inside militaries are not seen as one of main reasons why there are tensions between civilians and military. It is enough to remember everything what was told in 5 chapter about evolution of armed forces. Every major shift in organisational style had political, social, economical consequences. If you are using MR framework, there would not be a problem to see today's issues in coherent and consistent way. This framework helps to generate new approaches, new angles. For instance, majority of scholars is searching for signs of military's despotic powers, i.e. control of the government. However, there is only a few, who are trying to trace and find evidence of military's infrastructural power, which mostly is related to the phenomenon of militarization. Yet, if you are using MR's approach and looking into present events through historical glasses, it is quite easy to find area where military's despotic and infrastructural powers meet each other. That area is police and the result of this meeting is militarization of police forces.

## 7. The Blurring Line Between Armed Forces and Police

One of the features that make the modern state different from political entities of the past is the separation of means and forms of controlling domestic and external violence. Everybody knows that police is responsible for the maintenance of domestic order and that armed forces are responsible for the defence from external threats. However, this banal fact is tremendously important when looking from the perspective of the development of the modern state. Such separation is unique for modern times.<sup>425</sup> It did not exist in the past and there is some evidence that it might not exist in the future.

The example of the institution of sheriff that in present times is associated with police work is very telling. The sheriff, probably the oldest public office in the world, created somewhere in IX century in England, was responsible for tax collection, justice and peace in his shire, management of Crown lands, and the summons of armed forces.<sup>426</sup> In modern times, separate agencies and institutions administrate each of these fields. In medieval times armed men, militia, recruits or mercenaries conducted policing. Medieval warfare, weaponry, fighting techniques for common soldiers did not require very specialised skills that could be applied only on the battlefield. Therefore, soldiers could be easily used for policing tasks.

However, starting from XVI century, the separation between armed forces and police started emerging. This development over 450 years took the shape of police as we know it today. The main principles, tasks and role of the police and armed forces were set in force by late XVII century. Everything after that was more of a development of policing techniques, rather than changes in the guiding principles. The main feature of the modern police identity is its antagonism towards the armed forces. The armed forces are taken as a measurement to assess the development of the police; the bigger the difference between these two

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<sup>425</sup> Giddens, pp. 113; Dandeker, pp. 37-65; Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, Vol. II, pp. 402-443.

<sup>426</sup> Strayer, p. 28.

institutions, the stronger the police self-identity and autonomy. These differences include everything, starting from the colour of uniforms, weapons, organisation and rank system, to the most fundamental difference in role and functions.<sup>427</sup> The famous British “Bobby” with his dark blue uniform, helmet, whistle and truncheon as his only weapon is perceived as the epitome of policeman. The Table 3 perfectly presents the differences between police and armed forces.

Table 3. Occupational Group and Job Descriptions

<b>Police</b>	<b>Armed forces</b>
<p data-bbox="227 653 808 716"><b>Occupation Group 375: Police Officers and Detectives, Public Service</b></p> <p data-bbox="227 716 808 919">This group includes occupations concerned with protecting the public; maintaining law and order; detecting and preventing crime; directing and controlling motor traffic; and investigating and apprehending suspects in criminal cases.</p> <p data-bbox="227 953 808 1052"><b>375.263-014 Police Officer I (government ser.) alternate titles: patrol officer; traffic officer</b></p> <p data-bbox="227 1052 808 1745">Patrols assigned beat on foot, on motorcycle, in patrol car, or on horseback to control traffic, prevent crime or disturbance of peace, and arrest violators: Familiarizes self with beat and with persons living in area. Notes suspicious persons and establishments and reports to superior officer. Reports hazards. Disperses unruly crowds at public gatherings. Renders first aid at accidents, and investigates causes and results of accident. Directs and reroutes traffic around fire or other disruption. Inspects public establishments requiring licenses to ensure compliance with rules and regulations. Warns or arrests persons violating animal ordinances. Issues tickets to traffic violators. Registers at police call boxes at specified interval or time. Writes and files daily activity report with superior officer. May drive patrol wagon or police ambulance. May notify public works department of location of abandoned vehicles to tow away. May accompany parking</p>	<p data-bbox="815 653 1385 716"><b>Occupation Group 378: Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel</b></p> <p data-bbox="815 716 1385 884">This group includes occupations, not elsewhere classified, concerned with protecting the nation from enemies and maintaining peace and order during times of martial law or civil disobedience.</p> <p data-bbox="815 953 1385 1016"><b>378.684-01 COMBAT RIFLE CREW MEMBER (military ser.)</b></p> <p data-bbox="815 1052 1385 1745">Opposes members of enemy ground force in effort to destroy or capture enemy forces, using rifle, during combat or training operations, and serving as member of infantry unit: Constructs field fortifications, including wire entanglements and road blocks, using hand tools, barbed wire, and lumber. Camouflages combat equipment and weapons, using items such as paint, nets, leaves, and brush. Places and activates antitank or antipersonnel mines in mine field. Decontaminates weapons and equipment when exposed to chemical or nuclear contamination, using specified procedures. Observes compass, aerial photographs, and maps to determine field position for troop movements. Examines equipment and weapons to detect malfunctions. Repairs weapons and equipment, using items such as handtools, oil, and rags. Fires machine guns, grenade launchers, and rifles to inflict casualties on enemy force.</p>

<sup>427</sup>The police very often are called „dark blue force“ because of the colour of their uniform. Dark blue was intentionally chosen to mark the differences between the police and armed forces, which was associated with red, grey, green and later on, with khaki colours.



meter personnel to protect money collected.	
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Washington, DC: Labor Department, Employment and Training Administration, United States Employment Service, 1991).<sup>428</sup>

The description of these two occupations very clearly shows where the fundamental differences between armed forces and police are. It might be put this way: the task of the police is to protect and serve, while the armed forces are trained to overwhelm and defeat.<sup>429</sup> A police officer opens fire as the last resort, while for the soldier the opening of fire is the primary task. Possible causes of this separation and police transformation will be discussed later on in this chapter. At this moment it is more important to discuss how military changes affected the development of police.

In previous chapters of this dissertation discussed military changes in the early modern period had direct or indirect impact on the separation of control over the violence monopoly in the state. It is worth beginning with an outline of simple change in tactics and behaviour in the battlefield. As was already said in chapter 4, in the medieval battlefield, the goal was to take booty, plunder and capture prisoners who later will have to pay the ransom. Therefore, the mentality of the medieval soldier in some sense was similar to the present day policeman's attitude: disarm, but not kill, unless he was forced to do it. However, the rise of Swiss pikemen in the late XV century and the growing importance of firearms in succeeding centuries changed this tradition. The formations of pikemen and infantry armed with firearms required discipline and cohesion. The key to their victories were close formations. Only fighting as a unit could hope to survive and share war spoils. Also at the same time because of the growing importance of infantry, the role of cavalry, and altogether role of knights were becoming things

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<sup>428</sup>U.S. Department of Labour, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Washington, DC: Labour Department, Employment and Training Administration, United States Employment Service, 1991) in Donald J. Campbell and Kathleen M. Campbell, "Soldiers as Police Officers/ Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States," *Armed Forces Society*, 36, 2010, pp. 339-340.

<sup>429</sup> DJ Campbell and KM Campbell, *Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers as Soldiers*, p. 329.

of the past very fast. In concert with that medieval knightly traditions were disappearing from the battlefield too. The mentality of modern soldier was born.

The same reasons that changed soldier's behaviour on the battlefield also started another process that sustained the separation of policing and war fighting. To make the use of firearms effective on the battlefield required constant training and discipline. It required specific, professional skills that had to be perfected every day. The profession of soldier came into being. The peasant taken from his crops field into the army was of no use if he was not trained how to fight and use firearms or pikes.

Changes in training and mentality, combined with changes in the organisation of armed forces (armies and navies became permanent) gradually, step by step separated soldiers from the society. The introduction of uniforms, special care houses and hospitals, living in specially designated barracks physically isolated armed forces from the society.<sup>430</sup> Armies were professional. The skills of the soldier were very specific, gained by long, tough and painful training and fighting. Bearing in mind that in the XVII and especially XVIII century, the training of soldiers was very expensive and the desertion numbers were very high, rulers and governments tried to isolate the armed forces from the society as much as possible. It meant less connection and communication with civilians. It also meant that armed forces were less used for policing duties. Of course, there never was a clear separation between the armed forces and police. There are plenty of historical examples showing that armed forces were used for controlling domestic violence. However, it should be noted that neither the people nor the governments were happy when soldiers were patrolling the streets. Common people, the gentry and the middle class considered the use of soldiers inside the country as an attempt of the government to consolidate and expand its power. On the other hand, rulers were afraid that longer contact between the soldier and his former

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<sup>430</sup> Hale, pp. 153-178; Tallett, *War and Society*, pp. 138-147; Anderson, *War and Society*, pp. 167-179.

colleagues in the town eventually will result in the soldier's defection or even some kind of a rebellion.<sup>431</sup> Such kind of reasoning was very important when discussing the separation of policing and war fighting. It seems that all parts of the state had an interest in this separation. The biggest problem and question was how policing should be conducted.

However, coming back to the theoretical explanation and historical context of how this separation of police and armed forces occurred it should be stressed, that it was a very complex and uneven processes that varied in time and space. Different countries were following different paths. For example, France was the first to establish modern police. The principles (centralisation) that were set by Louis XIV in 1667, when he established police command in Paris in 1667, would continue to be followed in France up to the present day.<sup>432</sup> On the other hand, at the same time Great Britain did not have an established modern police until 1829. If in the XVIII century Paris, Berlin was well policed and secure cities, London on the other hand was famous for its criminality and violence. The Cabinet Ministers of that time "went armed in the streets of London at high noon protected by gangs of retainers, men of property went to bed with firearms at their sides [...]".<sup>433</sup> This small example of different policing in the main capitals of Europe is important because it sets some doubts to the explanation that modern policing emerged because of population growth in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. There are some difficulties with the role of industrialisation and capitalism in the appearance of modern policing too. In France and Prussia modern policing was started before the huge influx of people into the cities because of population growth and industrial needs.<sup>434</sup> England, on the contrary, established modern police when social unrests (Gordon

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<sup>431</sup> However, Williams McNeill gives a convincing argument that because of the discipline and training soldiers could be easily used against their former fellows. McNeill, pp. 125-139.

<sup>432</sup> David Bayley, „The police and political development in Europe“, in Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, pp. 344-345.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid, pp. 352-353.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid, pp. 352-359.

riots in 1780) became things of the past and the growth of population made older forms of keeping peace and order obsolete a long time ago.<sup>435</sup>

However, even if it is difficult to produce an exact list of reasons why European states transformed their policing practices, it is clear that by the beginning of XIX century the new policing was gaining tempo. No one shows and explains this change as impressively as Michel Foucault in his seminal work *Discipline and Punish*. His main argument that spectacular, public capital punishments from the mid XVIII century were step by step replaced by more uniform, hidden and humanitarian form of punishment is very helpful for this discussion.<sup>436</sup> Public tortures and punishments were the way through which rulers and governments controlled their subjects. The fear of violent punishment was supposed to deter people from wrong doing. The fact that states changed the form of social control meant that other, more penetrating and sophisticated means were found (increasing infrastructural power of the state, according to Mann). The police was one of the first of such kind of social instruments that helped the state to penetrate deeper into the daily lives of the people by conducting constant surveillance. In his other well known text, *Omnes et Singulatim*, Foucault quotes different French authors who described the police as a fourth pillar, alongside the armed forces, justice system and tax collection, which are foundations of the state.<sup>437</sup> Police helped to expand the network of surveillance and in this way to enlarge the state's administrative power.<sup>438</sup>

The question to be answered is where the expansion of the states administrative power began. This brings us back to the role of the armed forces and the separation of domestic and external violence control. To sum up, it seems

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<sup>435</sup> In the case of England, some authors explain its slow modernisation of police because of existing private-public market of crime control (thief-takers, watchmen's). Lucia Zedner, 'Policing Before and After the Police: The Historical Antecedents Of Contemporary Crime Control', *British Journal of Criminology*, 46, 2006, pp. 78-96.

<sup>436</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth Of the Prison*. Vintage: New York, 1995.

<sup>437</sup> Michel Foucault, *Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'*. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University, October 10 and 16, 1979.

<sup>438</sup> Giddens, pp. 1-60; Dandeker, pp. 1-36.

clear that police and armed forces are driven by different logic of action. It is also clear that modern police, being one of the pillars of the modern state, developed differently in different countries. What is not clear is why this division appeared and what was the driving force behind the development of modern policing. It was mentioned already that scholars identified growth of population, industrialism and capitalism as the main causes of policing transformation. However, there are not so many discussions about the fact that the changes, which occurred in the military sphere since the beginning of XVI century, were the first driving element, which helped to develop modern police. Without doubt, later on industrialism and other social processes affected the development of the police. It might be argued that the case of modern policing is a very good example showing that theoretical perspectives, based on Marxist and liberal arguments, can not fully explain how and why policing was transformed. The use of military perspective helps to understand this issue more fully. All this theoretical debate is very important when discussing changes that are happening in present times. When viewing the changes of policing in Western countries, especially in the US, scholars are discussing the diminishing line between armed forces and police and the militarization of police.

### *The militarization of US police*

For the last two decades, scientists from different disciplines are observing interesting processes and changes in the American criminal justice system.<sup>439</sup>

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<sup>439</sup>Der Derian, *Virtuous War*; Peter B. Kraska, *Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles Of the Armed Forces and the Police*. Northeastern University Press: Boston, 2001; Peter B Kraska and Louis J. Cubellis, 'Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond: Making Sense Of American Paramilitary Policing', *Justice Quarterly*, 14, 1997, pp. 607-627; Peter B Kraska and Victor E Kappeler, 'Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization Of Paramilitary Units', *Social Problems*, 44, 1997, pp. 1-18; Campbell, *Soldiers as Police Officers*; Radley Balko, *Overkill - The Rise Of Paramilitary Police Raids In America*. Cato Institute, 2006; Michael Head, *Domestic Deployment Of the armed Forces : Military Powers, Law and Human Rights*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009; Nathan Canestaro, 'Homeland Defense: Another Nail In the Coffin For Posse Comitatus', *Washington University Journal Of Law & Policy*, 12, 2003, pp. 99-144; Gary Felicetti and John Luce, 'Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight On 124 Years Of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage Is Done, The', *Military Law Review*, 175, 2003, pp. 86-183; Tom A Gizzo and Tama S Monoson, 'Call To Arms: The

These changes are related to increasing militarization of American law enforcement agencies and increasing pressure and use of armed forces directly inside the country.

Before starting detailed examination of these changes, it is necessary briefly review the US policing history. US borrowed some policing traditions from Great Britain. Like in Britain, Americans were against centralised polices services like in France. For them such form of policing associated with tyranny. Also like British people Americans did not want the army to do the policing. The appointment of police officers and salary payment was and still is a responsibility of local political institutions. Because of this reason the American police system looks like a mosaic: county police, state police, town police, even university police.<sup>440</sup> Also there are some federal agencies, like Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is responsible for law enforcement in all USA. Another important issue, inherited from Britain, is the way of policing. Like in Britain, the policing in America was reactive, not proactive. The main job for policemen was patrolling and keeping the order in his beat. The officers very often patrolled in the same place their whole career. Such intimate relations on one hand helped to feel pulse of local community, but on the other hand, it created opportunities for corruption and involvement into local political intrigues.<sup>441</sup> Overall, American police forces are localised; its role is more preventive than pre-emptive. However, as was mentioned earlier, for the last two decades profound transformation happened in US policing practices.

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Posse Comitatus Act and the Use Of the Military In the Struggle against International Terrorism, A', *Pace International Law Review*, 15, 2003, pp. 149-180.


<sup>440</sup> Charles J. Edwards, *Changing Policing Theories For 21st Century Societies*. Sydney, NSW: Federation Press, 1999, pp. 251-273.

<sup>441</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 13.

*The increase of paramilitary police units*

Since the mid of 1980's it is possible to detect huge increase of paramilitary police units (PPU). For wider public the PPU are mostly associated with S.W.A.T. (special weapons and tactics teams) teams. PPU is equipped with military weapons and technology. Most popular weapon among members of these units is Heckler and Koch MP5 submachine gun. The organisational structure of these units is also based on the military model and they regard themselves as an "elite" force.<sup>442</sup> Traditionally, these units, introduced in late 1960's and early 1970's had to "respond to civil riots, terrorism, barricaded suspects, and hostage situations".<sup>443</sup> PPU was an expensive unit, therefore only bigger cities could afford it. However, during the presidency of Reagan the situation started to change. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the growth of PPU in communities of 50,000 or more and 25,000 to 50,000 people.<sup>444</sup>

Figure Nr. 4.




<sup>442</sup> Kraska, *Militarizing American Police*, pp. 3-4;

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4.

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6; Kraska, *Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond*, p. 614.

Figure Nr. 5.



Analysing the results of surveys it is not difficult to see the rapid increase of PPU since 1985, especially in smaller communities (Figure 4). There, in the period of 10 years since 1985 till 1995, the number of PPU increased by 255 percent. Growth of the number of PPU was followed by increase of call-outs (emergency or high-risk deployments of the PPUs). In the period of since 1980 till 1995 the number in bigger communities increased from by 538 percent (from 13 to 83). While in smaller communities, the increase is even more profound. In the same period the total number of call-outs increased from 220 to 3,715 (an increase by 1,589 percent).<sup>445</sup>

The main reason of such tremendous increase of call-outs is related to changing functions of PPUs. During the last 20 years these units are more often used in warrant work. Search and arrest warrants became a routine practice because of the increasing fight against drug dealers. The main element of the warrant work is so called “no-knock entries”. Whole procedure works in such

<sup>445</sup>Kraska, *Militarizing American Police*, p. 614; Kraska, *Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond*, p. 7




way: “After securing a warrant, the paramilitary unit conducts a “dynamic entry,” generally on a private residence”.<sup>446</sup> Mostly these entries are done before dawn; all people are laid to the floor while search of the place is conducted. These no-knock entries mark the shift of PPU work from reactive to proactive operations. These proactive operations have clear military resemblance.

Proactive posture of knock-out entries was sustained by other change of PPU functions. These units more often are used in police patrol work. The answer of one respondent very clearly shows how PPU are conducting patrolling:

We're into saturation patrols in hot spots. We do a lot of our work with the SWAT unit because we have bigger guns. We send out two, two-to-four-men cars, we look for minor violations and do jump-outs, either on people on the street or automobiles. After we jump-out the second car provides periphery cover with an ostentatious display of weaponry. We're sending a clear message: if the shootings don't stop, we'll shoot someone.<sup>447</sup>

The Figures 6 and 7 show the year when different communities started to use PPU for proactive patrol. From the beginning of 1990's the number of police departments, which used PPU in patrolling increased sharply.<sup>448</sup>

Figure Nr. 6.




<sup>446</sup> Kraska, *Militarizing American Police*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>447</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>448</sup> Kraska, *Militarizing American Police*, p. 617; Kraska, *Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond*, p. 10

Figure Nr. 7.



The last but not the least element of this story is the training of PPU's. There the connection of the military and PPU's is very clear. The members of the units are trained by active duty and retired soldiers, especially from Special Forces. Armed forces even have special programs designated for the training of paramilitary units. Police officers, who are members of PPU's consider themselves elite and are copying other elite – Special Forces. They are copying language, dressing code and appearance, etc.<sup>449</sup>

Overall, during the last 25 years US police, especially PPU's changed their profile quite radically. At the present there are more PPU's, they are armed with military guns, conducting proactive, almost military operations and are trained by using military practise.

Before moving to another topic, it is important to emphasise few things. First of all, these aforementioned facts describe situation before the events of 9/11. Even without detailed surveys of present situation it can be said that the role of PPU's did not diminish but on the contrary, increased. Some practises, like non-

<sup>449</sup> Kraska, *Militarizing American Police*, p. 11; Kraska, *Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System*, pp. 141-157.

knock entries became routine practise.<sup>450</sup> The fight against terrorism and the establishment of Homeland defence department made PPU and their practise even more necessary than ever before.

*Direct use of armed forces inside the country*

After the events of 9//11 many practices and procedures of ensuring US domestic security were changed, renewed. Probably the most sensitive issue was the question of the direct use of armed forces on the soil of the US. As was mentioned earlier, it is a very delicate question which has a very long history. After gaining the independence, Americans were sceptical and suspicious to any initiatives proposing to establish and use permanent armed forces. Because of these reasons the armed forces are not even mentioned in the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, the use of army inside of the country was always a disputed issue. However, there were times when armed forces were used extensively for domestic purposes. For example, after the end of the Civil war armed forces were responsible for policing and keeping of order in Southern states. But in 1877 the Congress of the US enacted the *The Posse Comitatus Act* (PCA), which put strict rules on the use of armed forces for domestic needs:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, wilfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.<sup>451</sup>

This act is the cornerstone for the whole system of domestic security. It clearly separates armed forces and law enforcement institutions. However, since 1877 Congress has enacted a number of “exceptions to the PCA that authorize the use of the military for domestic law enforcement purposes in specific situations.”<sup>452</sup>

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<sup>450</sup> Balko.

<sup>451</sup> Office of the Law Revision Counsel (U. S. House of Representatives), ‘United States Code’, to present <<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/usc.cgi?ACTION=BROWSE&title=18usc>> [accessed 00:33:01], 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

<sup>452</sup> Ashley J Crow, ‘Call To Arms: Civil Disorder Following Hurricane Katrina Warrants Attack On the Posse Comitatus Act, A’, *George Mason Law Review*, 14, 2007, pp. 829-857.

Before starting detailed analysis of this act one very important issue should be mentioned. The PCA are legally binding only for the Army, Navy, Air Forces and Marine Corps. There are two exceptions. The first is the National Guard. According to the Constitution of the US, every state has its own militia forces - the National Guard. These forces are responsible to the governor of the state. The central government has very limited power on these military forces. However, leaving aside all bureaucratic differences, the National Guard is armed forces, like the ones that are controlled by the central government. National Guard is heavily armed, it has its own air force and navy components, their members are trained as soldiers. From theoretical point of view, the National Guard is the armed forces, only by different name. The second exception is the Coast Guards. However, Coast Guard is not under the direction of the Department of Defence, like other 4 services. That means that it is under different legal regulations and this allows it to bypass the restrictions of PCA.

These exceptions mean that at least two institutions may use military force domestically and avoid more binding legal restrictions. National Guard may be activated for service when state of emergency is declared. It means that these forces might be used to respond to natural disasters (hurricane Katrina) or securing the borders (war on drugs, illegal immigration), etc. People are getting accustomed to see uniformed and armed personnel patrolling in some areas. They start to reflect it as a normal practice and activity, not some kind of anomaly.

During the time there were many interpretations what PCA forbids and what not. The courts interpreted that this act forbids only “active”, but not passive help to law enforcement agencies. According to established doctrine the military did not violate the PCA when it “provides personnel, planes, advice, and supply surveillance, however roadblocks and performing of armed patrols did violate the PCA.”<sup>453</sup> In such case the military can help to devise an operation plan and give

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<sup>453</sup>Ibid., p. 836.

advice on how to implement it while police or other agencies will make the arrestment's.

The reality and new threats also dictated its terms. Since the mid of 1980's the military has been giving passive and sometimes active help in drug enforcement along the border with Mexico. Starting as passive help in one particular area gradually it became more active and subsequently spread to interior areas.<sup>454</sup> In 1990's military established special task force, Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6), responsible for coordination of military support for antidrug activities inside the US.

However, probably the biggest challenge to PCA comes from Civil disturbance statutes (10 U.S.C., sections 331-5), which allow the "President to call up the armed forces and National Guard to suppress challenges to the political order, ranging from insurrections, to domestic violence".<sup>455</sup> The most important and controversial is section 333:

Sec. 333. Interference with State and Federal law

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it:

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.<sup>456</sup>

In 2006 President G. W. Bush tried to extend these powers. It was proposed to widen the section 333 from "insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful

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<sup>454</sup> Kraska, *Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System*, pp. 65-79.

<sup>455</sup> Head, pp. 53-54

<sup>456</sup> 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335

combination, or conspiracy” to “natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident , or other condition if authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order”.<sup>457</sup> This proposal was reversed with great difficulties in 2007 when the Congress forced President Bush to change his mind on this question. However, G. Bush did it in “exchange for measures expanding military budget, giving the National Guard higher status in Pentagon, and closer relations with Northern Command [...]”.<sup>458</sup>

These decisions made by G. Bush may be considered as a reflection of political and theoretical discussions which forcefully are arguing that it is time to review the PCA, especially after the events of 9/11.<sup>459</sup> The threat of terrorist attacks, the never ending war on drugs, increasing illegal immigration and other new threats puts too much pressure on civil law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the use of military for domestic needs looks like an option that should not be missed.

Probably the establishment of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) on October 1, 2002 is the practical application and result of these discussions. For the first time US established specific Pentagon command for domestic intervention. This command conducts “Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests”.<sup>460</sup> Such commands are the main operational level units of the US armed forces. Therefore NORTHCOM should be considered as serious military command, with operational capabilities. In 2008, “the 4000- strong 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Combat Team of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was placed under the command of US Army North, the Army’s component of NorthCom”.<sup>461</sup> It means that there is a special military unit, designed for domestic operations. Even

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<sup>457</sup> Head, pp. 54-55.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid., p. 55

<sup>459</sup> Canestaro; Felicetti; Gizzo.

<sup>460</sup> <http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html> [last entry 2010 01 11].

<sup>461</sup> Head, p. 56.

when it is always stated that this command will work in the team with civilian agencies, the mere fact of its existence is already a significant proof of changing attitude towards the domestic use of the military.

### *Theoretical implications*

What theoretical and practical implications do all these changes in the US have? It is quite clear that there is a profound change in the attitude of using armed forces for domestic policy directly and indirectly. However, to tell that policing practices are changing radically is not so easy. Scholars who are doing research on these issues mark huge ignorance of the academic community to these questions. One of the reasons is that at the same time when all this militarization of American criminal justice system is happening, scholars are locating another, totally different trend. They are speaking about the increasing role of “community policing” when police is working closely with local communities trying to prevent crime.<sup>462</sup> However even this trend of community policing is very militaristic at some moments. The best example of this is the famous “zero tolerance” or broken window policy when police and community is working together and fighting even with small crimes and antisocial behaviour like drunkenness, graffiti artists, drug dealers, etc.<sup>463</sup> However all these problems are tackled by using harsh punishment measures, aggressive patrolling and arresting procedures. If not in practice then at least in attitude these operations are done in military spirit. Therefore, for some scholars ““community policing” model may be more rhetorical than substantive”.<sup>464</sup>

Paradoxical in this situation is the fact that both sides in this discussion are ignoring the changes in the military sphere. Like in the analyses of policing in the past, present day researchers are not trying to connect changes in the military sphere with changes in policing practices. It does not seem that in both spheres

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<sup>462</sup> Kraska, *Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System*, pp. 82-104.

<sup>463</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 85-86.

<sup>464</sup> Campbell, *Soldiers as Police Officers*, p. 329.

radical changes accidentally started and developed at the same time. Those scholars, who are trying to do that, only scratch the surface. They are speaking about the constabularisation of the US military, about role of technologies, but there are more to this. The reason why it is difficult to track the influence of the military towards the policing practices is that it is done in indirect way. That's where we can speak about infrastructural power of military dimension. As was said in previous chapter existing conceptual tools are more useful to explain institutional changes than transformation of mindset and attitudes.

Military changes resulting in adoption of hi-tech weapons, new organisational models and training practices are radically changing the way of how military is fighting. At the present moment US armed forces are undergoing profound changes: on one hand it is radically changing its conventional fighting capabilities while also trying to combine it with more constabulary functions. At this moment American soldiers are trained not only to kill and kick-of the door, but also how to fix these doors and give a candy to the children. Contemporary American soldier is a soldier and a policeman at the same time. That is one of the reasons why military is becoming a convenient option for domestic patrolling. Soldier knows the practices of policing. However, the biggest question remains: do all these new policing skills neutralize the mentality of the soldier?

New military organisational changes also affect the practice of policing. It is not coincidental that increase of PPU's happened at the same time when Special operation units became important and popular in the US armed forces.

The changes in the character of warfare, nature of threats, the relationships between military and civilians also had changed. Scholars are speaking about two parallel processes. On one hand they argue that the gap between armed forces and the rest of the society is increasing. On the other hand, military is expanding its role in the American politics and in people's daily lives. There are arguments, that



people and society in the US are becoming more militaristic, and the militarization of police is an example of this process.<sup>465</sup>

Looking from a broader theoretical perspective the present trends in the US raises a lot of questions. The separation of institutions responsible for domestic and external violence control is one of the main features of the modern state. In reality, this separation was never clear cut; armed forces were often used for keeping the domestic order. However, there was an agreement that on usual circumstances armed forces should not be used on the home soil. The processes that are now happening in the US blur everything. Gradually it becomes unclear what is the difference between a soldier and member of PPU. However, all these changes and their wide ranging consequences, discussed in this and other chapters are realised only when they are seen in historical context. At the first sight, it is difficult to find what connects all of them. Yet, by using ideas like MR it is not difficult to see how all these issues are interrelated and connected into one big coherent framework.

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<sup>465</sup> Kohn, *The Danger of Militarization*.

## Conclusions

1. Military dimension is forgotten in political theory. This happened, because in the last decades social scientists drifted away from macro-level (historical) perspective and research towards micro level (sociological) position. Today's dominant theoretical, methodological perspectives and approaches clearly favour micro level, temporal research objects. In majority cases, political scientists avoid contextualizing their researches in historical past. Macro perspective provides broader picture of social processes and helps to see interactions among various dimensions of human activities as well as their autonomy (i.e. military) more clearly. Historical perspective, deep understanding of social transformations through the history is essential for any serious discussion about contemporary changes. Historiographical analysis conducted in this dissertation shows that historical turn in political sciences will bring macro-level perspective and, alongside with it, – military dimension into intellectual debate. For many, contemporary military changes are more incremental, gradual update of some practises without any serious consequences outside the military realm. Only by using historical perspective, it is possible to “find” a new existence of military dimension in all these changes, and to grasp the importance of today's transformations.

2. To induce consideration of historical turn in political science some new conceptual tools are required. Therefore, it was proposed to use an idea of Military revolution as a provider of conceptual framework, a bridge, which connects macro-historical perspective, military dimension and contemporary social changes into one coherent unit. The essence of MR is an idea that military dimension is autonomous, i.e. capable to generate innovations and changes without interference from outside. Also, the idea of MR shows how micro-level changes (tactical, organisational, technological innovations) may have consequences in macro-level, and in this way provides a very insightful

perspective, which helps to integrate various small changes and shifts into a bigger and wider picture.

3. In order to show, how the idea of MR might help to make a historical turn and bring back military, it was essential to indicate that the theoretical device concealed in this idea can be used not only for discussions about a particular historical time (early modernity), but also in analysing processes in other periods. It was necessary to transform historical idea of *the* Military revolution into *a* Military revolution. However, in order to use this idea, it was necessary to discuss in detail the differences between this notion and the idea of Revolution in Military Affairs. Extensive historiographical research and analysis revealed that ostensibly there are many similarities between those concepts, while in reality both of them serve fundamentally different purposes. The whole idea of RMA only concerns how new technologies changed weaponry, conceptual understanding of fighting (doctrine) and constitution of armed forces. While, at the same time, the MR, is trying to look beyond the armed forces. To put it simply, these two ideas have different research objects. RMA is a supplementary part of MR. However, because of the popularity of RMA, these two notions were used synonymously, and when criticising RMA, one was indirectly criticising the MR too. RMA was mostly accused for its technological determinism, where in MR case technologies are only a part of the driving force of change. This juxtaposition of these two concepts explains, why political scientists did not use the idea of MR more widely.

4. Macro-historical framework of MR helped to identify the place, where to start looking for signs of autonomous military dimension. This perspective revealed that changes in war understanding and conduct not only transform military realm, but also radiate into other domains of human activities. Despite of all the criticism idea of RMA received, the analysis of the development and application of this idea showed that the introduction of new technologies affected the conduct of

warfare in many ways. However, the same analysis showed that RMA is only a part of changes in this field. The changing threats are compelling armed forces to transform into constabulary forces, capable of conducting missions ranging from high intensity fighting to patrolling and policing operations. Therefore, we may trace a couple of important changes in the way the war is conducted. First, even when the ideas of RMA and constabulary forces are considered separate, both of them require different armies than twenty or thirty years ago. Today these both forms of warfighting are put under one roof and pursued simultaneously. It means that soldiers will be required to have skills and knowledge for multiple tasks. It is hardly surprising, that facing such profound changes and increasing requirements Western countries are replacing conscription into volunteer armies.

5. However, through macro-historical perspective it is possible to see where narrative, imposed by RMA debate, places obstacles for further and wider discussion. That is where the theoretical insights, provided by the idea of MR, become helpful. The approach, provided by this idea, helps to see how changes in military thought are affecting transformation of armed forces organisation, and how these changes look when seen from historical perspective. After starting to look for wider implications, it became clear that recent transition in Western countries from conscript to volunteer armies is the first radical shift in the form of military organisation since the French revolution. There are multiple reasons for this transition, starting with changing social values and the end of Cold war. However, the changes in the way the war is conducted are no less important. Pure military reasons of why this shift has happened exist. It is dangerous to ignore this fact, because of the following reasons. The historiographical analysis, conducted in this dissertation revealed that every time, when the style of military organisation changed, the transition has political, social and economical implications (expansion of the state, welfare system, expansion of civic rights, democratisation, etc.). It means that we live in a time of some important shifts,

and only history may give us a hint of possible places and areas, where far-reaching changes may appear. However, if we ignore the military's role in these changes, we would not be able to fully understand their importance. This historiographical analysis also showed that innovations and changes initiated in the dominant paradigm armed forces (French, Germans, etc.) of the time were enough to start most of these transformations. It means that when speaking about contemporary changes the case of US is an obvious target for analysis and search of wider socio-political implications created by changes in the American armed forces.

6. The transition to volunteer professional armed forces created a unique situation in Western armed forces, when both groups - file and rank and officers - are professionals and service in the military is a job, a profession for them. In the past, at least one of these two groups always had wider connections with the outside world. Before French revolution, it was nobility, and it was conscripts after it. We do not have such situation nowadays. Volunteer armed forces are always smaller than conscript armies. It means, that military has less daily contact with surrounding world. When all groups in the military are professionals, only interested in their job, this separateness from the rest of the society and state becomes wider. Diminishing contact between all the actors may create situation when all participants have a different worldview and are living by different traditions and virtues.

7. Historiographical analysis and macro-historical MR framework provide insights, which help to locate contemporary changes in the US military, political spheres in historical context. Such move sheds a new light on issues of civil-military, military-police force relations. The analysis of increasing tensions between civilian political elite and military in the U.S. gives an impression that all the previously mentioned shifts contributed to the creation of such environment. Historically there always were tensions between civilians and military in the U.S.

However, for the last twenty years, this situation reached new heights, forcing to speak about military, which is out of control, out of civilian supervision. All discussions about the increasing gap between civilians and military, and open politization of officer corps are the result of the changes in the military sphere. The idea of constabulary armed forces requires officers, who could be politicians, diplomats, scholars. However, in such case officers are becoming more capable to participate in politics, intervene in civilian life, while the civilian's military skills and understanding are diminishing. Such increasing military intervention into civilian life may be traced to the area of police. Armed forces and police are perceived as two sides of one coin: one is responsible for external violence, and second for domestic. The separation of these two institutions was closely related with military changes, especially in XIX century. However, for the last twenty years it is possible to trace the increasing militarization of police forces in Western countries, particularly U.S. Increasing number of paramilitary police units, like S.W.A.T., changing style and conduct of police operations, resemble military operations more than old-fashioned police raids. Simultaneously, the idea of direct role and participation of armed forces inside the country is getting more ground in political debates. There are clear trends of further retrenching of legislative limitations and obstacles, which now forbids a more active military's role inside the country.

8. Placing such issues like changing style of armed forces, condition of American civil-military, and military-police forces relation into historical context revealed interesting things. Analysis of all these contemporary processes showed that historical perspective is essential, if we want to comprehend the importance of military dimension. Historical perspective helped to see unwillingness or inability of contemporary scholars to grant autonomy for military dimension even when speaking about changes in military realm. Concentration on "snapshot", short-time perspective led scholars to a situation where changes in military sphere are

explained by various social, economical, cultural factors providing only secondary role for military factors. Therefore, historical turn in general and the use of MR idea in particular provide answers and tools, which may help to treat military dimension more seriously.

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