Abstract [eng] |
In 2018 Donald Trump administration issued tariffs on Chinese exports. This irrational move later was labelled – Trade Wars. But it was more than just a political zero-sum game, it showed that the strategic competition between USA and China started. These tariffs mainly where put on Chinese most advanced companies, who was making telecommunication technologies and computer components. Second phase of trade war was on 2019 when U.S. administration implemented sanctions on China’s telecommunication giants like “Huawei” and ZTE, mainly because of their espionage capacity building. This phase later was labelled - Technology war. This concept means a new strategic competition between great superpowers to strengthen their capacities at the technological level. With the use of emerging technologies great powers are trying to get strategic power in future conflicts and try to reshape strategic balance. There is also rising disruption in the global value chains where controllers of those strategic resources and hubs are weaponizing them for their greater advantage. In the long-term China seeks to be the master of technologies and a global holder of most strategic resources by implementing - Made in China 2025 strategy. US is trying to push back against it by their own techno-nationalist agenda and tries to decouple from China economically. European Union is also a player. Relating to changing strategic environment, last year European Commission have published a “de-risking” strategy, but it was very unclear what this strategy truly means. So, in this research we are trying to find out what place does the European Union and its member nations, who is most technologically advanced, like France, Germany, Netherlands tries to take in between the US-China Tech War. By using theoretical approach, in this research there is a trying to find out are they a more techno-nationalist, or techno-globalist type of country. Also, there is a task to find out who has more influence on the current “de-risking” strategy: member nations or EU institutions and why this approach is taken. This academic research is based on comparative analysis between member states technological strategies and political actions, and they are compared between those states strongest technology company outlooks and actions in China. By comparing them, we can see, how “de-risking” works, except by now. One of the main findings is that Europe for now is a techno-globalist type of player, mainly having green technology advantage, but this advantage is made in Chinese factories, this makes Europe vulnerable. There is a change of course in European institutions, they are trying to make instruments useful for technology war and “de-risk” China, but the two main Europe’s member nations – France and Germany is trying to navigate and take “de-risking” slowly by not harming their companies in China. |