| Abstract [eng] |
After Russia started its full-scale war against in Ukraine on 24th February 2022, one of the public discussions that occurred immediately was about how Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and other countries in the region “were right” or were not properly listened to by their partners before the full-scale war, as talking about Russia’s threats was something that these countries have been actively doing for many years. Living next to Russia and understanding threats that it poses is part of Lithuania’s identity, especially its foreign policy. Was Lithuanian position not fully understood by its partners before Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine? This study aims to find out how do the roles that Lithuania assigns to itself in the euroatlantic community correspond to the perception of those roles by Lithuania’s partners and whether this perception has changed since February 2022. It is claimed that now Lithuania’s own perception corresponds better to the perception of others which sets better conditions for a successful foreign policy. Principles of the importance of the external perceptions in role theory that’s gaining more popularity in the discipline of foreign policy analysis but still remains less adapted to empirical research are combined with the ideas of the importance of effective foreign policy for small states and the most prominent identity aspects in Lithuania’s foreign policy, an unique theoretical approach is constructed. Based on a unique set of data - 9 semi-structured interviews with experts with interest in Lithuania, Baltic states, European security from the United States, United Kingdom and Germany, a qualitative discourse analysis is conducted trying to identify expert views on certain aspects of Lithuania's role in the world and the general perception of Lithuania, its identity and foreign policy and shifts in these perceptions since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine. Main tendencies, results and recommendations for further research are presented. Research concludes that it is true that Lithuania’s self-perception and understanding of its roles in the international community are now better in line with the perceptions of Lithuania’s partners in the US, UK and Germany. After Russia started its full-scale war against Ukraine, the overall Russian-imposed threat and its magnitude for Lithuania, as well as other countries in the region, became seen and understood better. This led to more attention to Lithuania’s position by those partners. Nevertheless, it is important to admit that Lithuania is a small country that is partly restricted by its size. Although being small is not understood as a weakness, it creates some obstacles in achieving foreign policy goals in the most effective way. Nonetheless, Lithuania is valued as a reliable partner, with good knowledge of Russia and threats imposed by it, it’s well-understood as a keen supporter of Ukraine, democracy, and its ideals, as well as EU and NATO enlargement processes. Lithuania is seen as a loud, courageous and active actor, successfully expressing its priorities and readiness to support and take leadership in building coalitions and rallying support for the ideas and causes that are important to it. Yet, there are still opportunities for Lithuania to improve their positions. This study shows that role theory can be successfully combined with with theoretical assumptions about small states and be successfully used to better explain the effectiveness of small states‘ foreign policy activities and yield meaningful results in the academic justification of prevailing discourses. The study also reveals that the tendencies that have dominated research on the relationship between Lithuanian foreign policy and its identity so far are still relevant today. Further research could be relevant to better explain the shifts of overall understanding of European security since Russia started its full-scale war against Ukraine. |
