| Abstract [eng] |
The Master’s thesis “Navigating Great Power Dynamics: Ukraine – China Relations in the Aftermath of Russia‘s Invasion in 2022” has sought to address the problem of yet under-explored Ukraine-China relations following the Russian aggression. The Western literature has classified China as rather pro-Russian, alleging its alignment with the aggressive state aimed at challenging and destabilizing the established rules-based international order. However, it was determined that amidst the broader geopolitical clash between the democratic and authoritarian regimes, Ukraine, in quite a paradoxical move, chose to acknowledge China's stance as “neutral” and was eager to actively pursue closer economic and political ties with the rising power. While the existing academic discourse extensively delves into Sino-Russian, American-Russian, and Sino-American relations, there still remains a conspicuous void in comprehending recent Ukrainian-Chinese relations, which this thesis endeavored to fill. The presented analysis aimed to explain Ukraine’s foreign policy towards China in the aftermath of the war despite China’s close alignment with Russia, as well as the apparent contradiction with Ukraine’s primary foreign policy objective of aligning with the Western sphere. To execute this goal, the author has conducted an extensive review of the academic literature on the historic evolution of Ukrainian-Sino bilateral relations, presented and applied the theoretical framework of hedging strategy, analyzed China’s response to the war in Ukraine and how it impacted bilateral relations between Ukraine and China, explored Ukraine’s and China’s perception of each other amidst the war in Ukraine and how it reflects current bilateral relationship between the two countries, explained Ukraine’s motivation in choosing to accept China’s pro-Russian “neutrality”, as well as provided an overview of the great power competition of U.S-Russia, Russia-China, and U.S-China and to demonstrate how the rivalry between these great powers provides Ukraine with an opportunity to avoid full alignment with either of them. The thorough analysis of the wide array of primary and secondary sources, including the semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian international relations experts, diplomats, and politicians, conducted by the author, allowed to confirm the thesis hypothesis that Ukraine’s foreign policy can be explained by hedging strategy and was aimed at instrumentalizing rivalries within the broader U.S.-Russia-China triangle. This global competition also prevented Ukraine from openly taking sides, except in relations to Russia. In particular, the hesitation by the West to expressly aim for Ukraine’s victory as well as the prolonged delays in supplying military aid, was the deciding factor forcing Ukraine to seek alternative options, with China emerging as a prospective partner to curb Russia’s aggression and to potentially pressure it into ending the war. |
