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**Metaphoricity of Right(s) in the Handbooks on European Law Issued by the European
Court of Human Rights**

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of MA in Language for
Specific (Legal) Purposes

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Abstract

Metaphors in legal language are widely researched by scholars. However, the research of the language of legal texts intended for educational purposes is still limited, especially focusing on the texts published by an institution responsible for issuing legal acts and regulations, namely the European Court of Human Rights. This paper would offer additional insights on the metaphors used in legal language that are aimed at law professionals for instance judges, prosecutors, legal practitioners who may not be specialised in the specific field of law, as well as other organisations that may assist people in need. The object of the investigation is the analysis of five handbooks on European Law released from 2016 until 2022. The aim of the study is relying on the principles of conceptual metaphor theory, metaphorical pattern analysis and the key principles of MIP, to identify major tendencies of metaphors employed in the texts on European law relating to access to justice, non-discrimination law, European law relating to the rights of the child, European data protection law and European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration. Since the key notion in all the above texts is that of right(s), the paper will focus on the metaphoricity of right(s). The results demonstrate that right(s) are primarily conceptualized through the source domain OBJECT.

1. Introduction

The importance of legal language and its peculiarities have been extensively discussed by different researchers (Mellinkoff 2004; Cheng and Kui Sin 2008; Tiersma 2012; Zozula 2019; Kapinus and Bailo 2020). The most predominant features defining the legal language include the use of archaic expressions (Mellinkoff 2004), as well as the use of words of Latin and French origin (Mellinkoff 2004; Tiersma 2012). The language of legal discourse aims to be strict and formal, and it can be achieved by using various polite expressions and set phrases (Mellinkoff 2004). It is evident that legal language as such is different from other discourses, for example the language of education. Furthermore, the complexity of the legal language is also observed in terms of various genres included in the understanding of legal language. The language of court judgments and various legal documents shape the concept of legal discourse. For instance, the court judgments tend to perform the function of a bridge ensuring the dialogue “between the legislature and courts” (Cheng and Kui Sin 2008: 268).

The frequent use of metaphors in legal language also contributed to the growing interest in the investigation of metaphors prevailing in legal discourse (Watt 2012; Šeškauskienė and Stepančuk 2014; Deignan and Armstrong 2015; Šeškauskienė and Urbonaitė 2018). The investigation of abstract concepts understood through metaphors was also performed to identify the purposes served by metaphorical expressions, and those include the contribution “to justification and legitimation of court decisions” (Ebbesson 2008: 260), influence on people’s reasoning about specific concepts or problems (Boroditsky and Thibodeau 2011) and the simplification of the understanding and memorisation of legal notions (Richard 2014: 14-15).

As mentioned previously, the metaphor use in legal language is an extensively researched area. However, the language of legal texts intended for educational purposes has not yet been extensively researched, especially focusing on the texts published by an institution responsible for issuing legal acts and regulations, namely the European Court of Human Rights. Educational texts are crucially important, especially when such texts deal with specialized discourse. Furthermore, the importance of educational texts is evident when these texts are used by such a wide audience. Therefore, this paper would offer additional insights on the metaphors used in legal language that are aimed at law professionals for instance judges, prosecutors, legal practitioners who may not be specialised in the specific field of law, as well as other organisations that may assist people in need.

The object of this thesis. The object of the investigation is metaphors used in the five handbooks on European Law released from 2016 until 2022. These five handbooks are a joint publication by the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, European Union Agency

for Fundamental Rights, and the Council of Europe. The handbooks are accessible on the official website of the European Court of Human Rights (www.echr.coe.int). The topics covered by the handbooks include European law relating to the access to justice, non-discrimination law, European law relating to the rights of the child, European data protection law and European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration. These handbooks function as practical guides for law professionals such as judges, prosecutors, legal practitioners who may not be specialised in the specific field of law, as well as other organisations that may assist people in need. Due to the limited scope of the study, only major source domains referring to the target domain RIGHT and RIGHTS are analysed.

The aim of the thesis. The aim of the study is to identify major tendencies of metaphors employed in the texts on European law relating to access to justice, non-discrimination law, European law relating to the rights of the child, European data protection law and European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration. Since the key notion in all the above texts is that of right(s), the paper will focus on the metaphoricity of right(s). The objectives of the paper include:

1. To identify the source domains of metaphors with the target domain of law identifiable in combinations of *right* in its singular and plural forms.
2. To identify and compare the most frequent metaphors of right(s) across the five handbooks.

The present paper follows a usual structure set out for research papers. After this introduction, there is a section focusing on the review of previous research explicating all major concepts of legal discourse and legal language relevant for the present research framework, further, it discusses the notion of metaphor and offers an overview of metaphoricity in legal discourse in previous studies. In section 3 the paper gives a thorough description of the data, methods and procedure of the investigation. Section 4 introduces the results and discusses major tendencies in two parts, the first part dealing with an in-depth analysis of the major source domains and subdomains used with the *right* and *rights* and the second part providing a discussion about the tendencies in the use of metaphors in all five handbooks on European law. The conclusions section sums up the main tendencies in the use of metaphors in the contexts of matters relating to the access to justice, non-discrimination law, European law relating to the rights of the child, European data protection law and European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration. The final sections of the paper include references and sources, summary in Lithuanian and two appendices.

2. Literature review

This section introduces the review of literature relevant for this thesis. The first two parts of this section focus on the concepts of legal discourse and legal language, Then, the third part defines the concept of metaphor. Part four of this section provides an overview of metaphoricity in legal discourse in earlier studies. Lastly, this section includes a brief introduction to metaphors in educational discourse.

2.1. Legal discourse

Legal discourse is known to be complex, usually following a certain strict style of writing, yet it employs various distinct features, such as peculiar legal concepts and specific terminology. Such a variety of linguistic features used in legal discourse can be explained by the application of different legal systems across the world, namely common law (found in the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and continental law (existing in Germany, Lithuania and in most of the European countries). These previously discussed characteristics of legal discourse only form a small part of the peculiarities found within the legal domain; thus, it imposes the need to consider other features of legal discourse in depth.

2.2. Legal language

The language used by lawyers and other law professionals can be referred to as a language for specific (legal) purposes, which is distinct from a language for general purposes. According to Mellinkoff (2004), features of legal language that differentiate it from other types of languages lies in the use of archaic words from either Old or Middle English (e.g., *thereof*, *aforementioned*), Latin words and various phrases (e.g., *alibi*, *corpus delicti*) as well as words of French origin (e.g., *arson*, *crime*). The exceptional use of Latin and French words and phrases is also mentioned by Tiersma (2012). According to Tiersma (2012: 16), the “nativization” of Latin expressions, the introduction of equivalent words (e.g., Lat. *Codex* as *code* in English), reduced the use of Latinisms, however expressions such as “*causa, ex aequo et bono and culpa in contrahendo*” are commonly used contractual relations. Similar observations are made in the context of French phrases used in legal language. The author claims that France was also extremely influential and for example, the idea of cassation courts in Belgium and the Netherlands originates from “the French high court” that regulates the work of the lower courts (2012:18).

Moreover, legal language is known for its formality that ensures the strictness and unambiguity of legal documents. Mellinkoff (2004: 19-20) showcases that the formal tone of legal language is usually expressed by the use of polite expressions, such as *approach the bench instead of come here*, as well as “circumlocutions”, that can be found in judgments, for example *Now Therefore. It is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed*. Legal language also tends to have longer sentences, resulting in being often difficult to understand. Despite the aim of legal language to be strict, precise and to leave no room for ambiguity, lengthy legal documents tend to pose difficulties understanding the language of law for people without legal education.

Furthermore, legal language as such consists of various genres, such as court judgments, and legal legislation. This variety further introduces specific qualities of each of the legal genres. For instance, court judgments are unquestionably of paramount legal significance and have a binding nature issued to serve the same communicative purpose of providing legal information to people of interest. However, despite having the literal function of being a legal text, court should also be viewed as a tool for “institutional dialogue between the legislature and courts” (Cheng and Kui Sin 2008: 268). Court judgments tend to share a number of features characteristic of legal language. According to Kapinus and Bailo (2020), judgments of the European Court of Human Rights preserve a set standard and follow certain established patterns, to ensure the quality of the judgment. The uniformity of such judgments can be observed in the use of certain patterns with verbs, such as *in accordance with the legislation, the Court finds* (ibid. 2020: 110). Furthermore, the language of the European Court of Human Rights judgments employs a variety of terminology that ensures “the accuracy and credibility” to it (ibid. 2020: 110). Since the European Court of Human Rights applies the European Convention on Human Rights to its judgments, the terminology of such convention tends to prevail in judgments. Examples of such terms would include words such as *right to a court* and *normal civic obligations* (ibid. 2020: 110). The authors suggest that the terminology used in the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights can be divided into terms that do not appear in other legal documents (e.g., *exhaustion of domestic remedies*) and those that can be found in other legal documents but referring to the European Convention of on Human Rights can be independently interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, for example, *civil rights and obligations* (ibid. 2020: 110). Since the purpose of the European Court of Human Rights is to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms, the ability to interpret the terms independently ensures the lack of ambiguity in the interpretation of the terminology. It is especially important because of the employment of a different legal system that may result in possible errors in the meaning comprehension of certain terms (ibid. 2020: 110). As mentioned

earlier, legal language tends to use a variety of archaic expressions and such a tendency can be observed in the language of the court judgments. For example, judgments of the European Court of Human Rights employ archaisms such as *according to*, *whereby* and *hereto* that are used as articles or pronouns (ibid. 2020: 110). Lastly, the use of Latinisms prevails in the language of court judgments, for example, *appendix*, *prima facie* and *res judicata*. According to Kapinus and Bailo (2020: 111), the excessive use of Latin expressions suggests that Latin terms and phrases are employed to convey a level of professionalism of the lawyers and judges. The overall features of court judgments issued by the same court may suggest that texts published by one institution tend to follow a certain established style of legal language. This style can be achieved using a simplified language describing complex legal notions, as well as the usage of set phrases.

The language of legal document (or statutes) also has its own peculiarities. According to Zozula (2019), the study of ‘statutory instruments’, including Codes and Constitutions of three countries, namely Poland, Indonesia, and the United States of America, showed that legal language across these countries employs variety of specific features, such as context specific ‘conventionalised sentences’, ‘performative verbs’, archaic and Latin structures (ibid. 2019). The author claims that the use of almost entirely context specific sentences and phrases is especially noticeable in the context of “agreements concerning transfer of real estate property laws” (ibid. 2019: 72) since the documents under investigation included texts that “had the form a notary act” (ibid. 2019: 72). Furthermore, the analysed legal texts were employing various performative verbs, referring to the action a certain action, for instance, *to demand*, *to sell* and others. However, here, the author emphasizes that texts in all three languages, in Polish, Indonesian and English seem to follow the same pattern of employing the archaic adverb *hereby* + *performative verbs* (ibid. 2019: 77- 78). The results also demonstrated that archaisms are mostly used in Indonesian legislation, rather than in Polish or English legal texts. The author also highlights that archaic expressions in the Indonesian language are of Dutch origin and “most of Indonesia’s codified laws are based upon Dutch codes” (ibid. 2019- 79). The study by Zozula (ibid. 2019: 79-81) suggests that Dutch archaisms preserving over the employment of their equivalents in Indonesian, may be due to the lack of Indonesian legal terminology in the earlier times. The use of Latin expressions over their equivalents in Polish, English and Indonesian was observed in all three languages and the purpose served by Latinisms was purely ‘stylistic’ (ibid. 2019: 81-83).

2.3. The concept of metaphor

The meaning of a sentence “You’re wasting my time” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 7) is easily understandable; however, few would consider its metaphorical meaning. The comprehension of such expressions is attained subconsciously, and listeners understand when they should interpret an expression literally or metaphorically. To understand an abstract idea of *wasting time*, people instinctively consider *time* as a more concrete, countable and physical object, thus *time* is in this case understood in terms of *money*. Our perception of metaphorical expressions is based on “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (ibid. 1980: 5). Furthermore, the process of understanding such conceptual metaphors relies on the two conceptual domains, such as source domain and target domain (Kövecses 2002: 4). The source domain provides “metaphorical expressions” that help comprehending another conceptual domain known as the target domain (ibid. 2002: 4). This entire procedure of a metaphorical expression can be portrayed as CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (A) IS CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (B), where (A) represents the target domain and (B) indicates the source domain (ibid. 2002: 4). Following the aforementioned structure, the metaphorical expression *to waste time* can be understood as a conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY, where the more concrete domain of MONEY is perceived in terms of the more abstract domain of TIME.

2.4. Metaphors in legal discourse

Metaphors can be found in discourse types, such as educational, academic and they are also present in legal discourse. Studies conducted by a number of scholars demonstrate that metaphorical expressions are commonly used in legal language, and they are implemented for various purposes, such as the contribution “to justification and legitimation of court decisions” (Ebbesson 2008: 260), to influence people’s reasoning about specific concepts or problem, such as crime (Boroditsky and Thibodeau 2011) and to simplify the process of understanding and memorising complex legal notions (Richard 2014: 14-15). Some authors (Ebbesson 2008; Boroditsky and Thibodeau 2011) tend to agree that the use of certain metaphors can affect people’s perceptions of legal concepts as well as the understanding of law in general. For instance, Ebbesson (2008) claims that to convey the idea of what courts do, without going into detail, metaphors of *finding* and *source* may be used. Boroditsky and Thibodeau (2011) demonstrated that the use of metaphors, such as CRIME IS A VIRUS and CRIME IS A BEAST when the problem related to crime was discussed, affected people’s reasoning. For example, when the crime problem was portrayed using the metaphor CRIME IS A VIRUS, the treatment of it would focus on social reforms, rather than the implementation of punishments regulated by law, as

was the case with the metaphor CRIME IS A BEAST (ibid. 2011: 4-5). The findings of the study seem to suggest that metaphors influence the way people understand crimes and their decisions on possible solutions for it. Nevertheless, the authors claim that people “do not recognize metaphors as an influential aspect of their decisions” (ibid. 2011: 10). Another study on lexical items conducted by Deignan and Armstrong (2015) has demonstrated that the word *act* is used to refer to a ‘piece of legislation’ originates from its basic meaning (i.e., of doing something) and in the context of legislation becomes a technical term.

Watt (2012: 64) suggests the interpretation of metaphor being a bridge connecting “the mind of the subject and the matter of the object”. This ‘bridge’ lets people perceive abstract matters, that exist in the universe without a solid body, as concrete objects. The author mentions that metaphors can be identified in law and provides an example of a metaphorical expression *fee simple absolute in possession* (i.e., referring to the interest in the ownership of land applied in common law). This expression is understood as metaphorical since the person who acquires this fee simple absolute in possession does not get to own a concrete land with its trees etc. but is only “entitl[ed] to enjoy the space for a time” (ibid 2012: 63).

Metaphors are also frequently used in legal documents and during court hearings. For instance, the study of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania demonstrated that the meaning of *laisvė* ‘liberty, freedom’ is often expressed through the source domains of OBJECT, PERSON, and CONTAINER (Šeškauskienė and Urbonaitė 2018: 181-182). The use of legal metaphors in the context of criminal matters was also observed by Šeškauskienė and Stepančuk (2014) in the study of the transcripts from court hearings of the Supreme Court of the United States. The authors, conclude that the major metaphorical tendencies are the understanding of the concept law in terms of an OBJECT and a PERSON. Šeškauskienė and Stepančuk (2014: 108) further provide a variety of lexical items signaling that legal concepts are interpreted in terms of the source domain OBJECT. These words include numerous verbs indicative of an action, for instance, *to give, get, take, lay, obtain, accept* (ibid. 2014: 108). Furthermore, the authors claim that the personification of legal items can be understood with the emphasis on the context, where the legal item acquires human-like qualities, such as being able to speak, travel, compete and evaluate (ibid. 2014: 112). Moreover, the use of the source domain PERSON referring to legal concepts adds to the existing perception of law “as strict and imposing” (ibid. 2014: 114). It seems that legal notions are most commonly conveyed through subdomains of OBJECT, PERSON and in other instances CONTAINER.

2.5. Metaphors in Education

Metaphors are not only common in legal discourse, but are also extensively used in the language for education. The reasons for the employment of metaphors varies; however they are useful when a complex abstract idea needs to be explained referring to another more concrete and understandable object. For example, the study of chemistry and history textbooks revealed that only the chemistry books include certain chemistry specific metaphors that are entirely educational and may perform a special function, namely “to map concrete onto abstract domains and thus to link everyday experiences of the students with unfamiliar subjects” (Goschler 2019: 86) The history textbooks, on the other hand, rely on the casual metaphors that can be heard every day, for example “HISTORY IS A PATH/JOURNEY” (ibid. 2019: 89).

3. Data and Methods

For this study, the data were retrieved from the official website of the European Court of Human Rights (www.echr.coe.int). The data set contains five handbooks on European law which were all drafted in English and date from 2016 until 2022. These books were a product of a joint publications by the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe. Each of the handbooks provides a summary of legal principles in various areas of European law, namely the access to justice, non-discrimination law, the rights of the child, data protection law and law on asylum, borders and immigration. It is important to mention that the five publications are designed as practical guides for law professionals such as judges, prosecutors, legal practitioners who may not be specialised in the specific field of law, as well as other organisations that may assist people in need. The five handbooks on the European law matters published by the European Court of Human Rights were chosen for this study due the lack of studies on the language of legal texts intended for educational purposes, especially texts published by an institution responsible for issuing legal acts and regulations, namely the European Court of Human Rights.

For the study of the data the corpus-driven (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001) approach was chosen. The compilation of the corpus and extraction of the concordance lines was performed using the tool AntConc (Anthony 2022). The size of the whole corpus of five handbooks on European law is 537,358 tokens. The present paper focuses on the analysis of the words *right(s)*; therefore, these items were searched for in the corpus data. Later, the extracted data was examined by applying qualitative and quantitative analyses.

For the data analysis the method introduced by Stefanowitsch (2004) named metaphorical pattern analysis was employed. This method offers an effective way for corpus-based extraction of all possible source domains by selecting only one particular target domain, or in other words only one word (ibid. 2004). According to Stefanowitsch (ibid. 2004), metaphorical pattern analysis solves the most prominent problem of the corpus-based research, namely the identification of target domains. The author (ibid. 2004: 138) claims that corpus tools fail to grasp target domains, when “metaphorical expressions do not necessarily contain words from the target domain”. Meaning that corpus-based tools can extract data for the analysis of target domains primarily with the application of metaphorical pattern analysis, namely searching for one particular lexical item. The identification of metaphorical patterns for this paper was performed with the application of the aforementioned method, that is by corpus-based search of the lexical items *right* and its plural form *rights*. The results are interpreted with the application of the principles of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), where one conceptual (target) domain is understood in terms of another (source) domain (for more information refer to Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/ 2003, Kövecses 2002/ 2010 and for further studies see Deignan, 2005, pp 13-32, etc.).

Moreover, the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) method was partially applied to this study. This method was introduced by the Pragglejaz Group (2007:3-4) containing four main steps and heavily relying on the close reading of the text. In the present study only a part of this method will be applied, namely the step of determining whether the basic meaning of the lexical item differs with its contextual meaning reflected in the text. According to step 3B of MIP method the more basic meaning can be defined as follows:

“More concrete; what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell, and taste.

Related to bodily action.

More precise (as opposed to vague)

Historically older.” (ibid. 2007: 3).

The present analysis primarily focuses on the first three points of this classification. The difference of the meaning in context and the basic meaning of the word further signals that the lexical item is metaphorical. In order to establish the basic meaning of the word, their meanings should be checked in the dictionary. For the determination of the basic meaning of the words *right(s)* the consultation with the two online dictionaries, such as the Oxford Learners Dictionary (OLD 2024) and the Cambridge Learners Dictionary (CLD 2024). The inspiration for adopting the combination of methods, namely the use of metaphorical pattern, MIP and

consultation with the above mentioned dictionaries comes from the previous study by Šeškauskienė and Urbonaitė (2018).

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Overview of the source domains used with *right(s)*

The present section introduces the main findings of the study and offers an in-depth analysis of *right(s)* metaphors discovered in the five handbooks on the European law. In order to ensure clarity, the main findings are systemized and illustrated in Table 1 below, later each category is examined in detail.

Table 1. The most frequent source domains found with the word *right(s)*

| Source domain | <i>Right</i> | <i>Rights</i> | Total No. instances | Normalized frequency per 10,000 words |
|-------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| OBJECT | 623 | 736 | 1359 | 25.29 |
| PHYSICAL ACTIVITY | 57 | 113 | 170 | 3.16 |
| AREA | 79 | 83 | 162 | 3.01 |
| PERSON/PEOPLE | 31 | 38 | 69 | 1.28 |

The discussion of the discovered results follows the pattern illustrated in Table 1, from the most prominent to least prominent source domains used with *right(s)*. It is important to emphasise that only the first source domain OBJECT is discussed in two parts. The first part contains the most frequent expressions used to convey the meaning of RIGHT(S) AS AN OBJECT, while the second part focuses on four most prominent concrete subcategories of the source domain OBJECT, namely POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP, FRAGILE OBJECT, INSTRUMENT and PRODUCT.

4.1.1. RIGHT(S) IS/ARE AN OBJECT

As can be seen in Table 1, the most prominent source domain appearing with *right(s)* is OBJECT. However, as mentioned previously only four concrete subcategories are completely identified,

while other interesting expressions seems to fall under the broader idea of an OBJECT. The most frequently used expressions referring to an OBJECT are illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2. The most frequent expressions of the source domain OBJECT used with *right(s)*

| Contextual clue | <i>Right</i> | <i>Rights</i> | Total No. instances | Normalized frequency per 10,000 words |
|-----------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Protect | 33 | 190 | 223 | 4.14 |
| Interfere | 62 | 34 | 96 | 1.79 |
| Enjoy | 26 | 33 | 59 | 1.10 |
| Safeguard | 6 | 21 | 27 | 0.50 |

The most frequent way to refer to the source domain OBJECT is to employ structures, such as *to protect right(s)*, *to interfere with right(s)*, *enjoy right(s)*, as can be seen in examples (1), (2) and (3) provided below:

- (1) *This reinforces Article 35 of the ECHR, which requires individuals to exhaust domestic remedies before they have recourse to the ECtHR – and provides an additional guarantee to ensure that rights are protected¹, first and foremost, at the national level. (AtJ²)*
- (2) *In S. and Marper v. UK (73), the ECtHR found that the retention of fingerprints on the authorities' records can be regarded as constituting an interference with the right to respect for private life. (ABaI)*
- (3) *The ECtHR held that the interference was not considered necessary in a democratic society, because the protection of medical data was of fundamental importance to the enjoyment of the right to respect for private and family life, in particular when it came to information about HIV infections, given the stigma attached to this condition in many societies. (DPL)*

In example (1), the idea of *right(s)* understood as an OBJECT is expressed by the structure *to protect right(s)*. The meaning of the verb *to protect* is “to make sure that somebody/something

¹ All patterns will be further underlined.

² All handbooks will be further codified. Full titles of the handbooks are provided in the sources.

is not harmed, injured, damaged, etc.” (OLD 2024). Similarly to the suggestion that the word *right(s)* with the verb *to protect* are interpreted as an OBJECT (Mannoni, 2022: 37). Here, it is important to emphasise that *right(s)* in example (1) seems to be understood as an OBJECT, rather than a person and the abstract concept of *right(s)* may be here understood as a valuable OBJECT that must be protected. The pattern *to protect right(s)* is almost five times more frequent referring to multiple *rights* (190 instances), compared to a single *right* (33 cases). Furthermore, the idea that *right(s)* must be protected is also expressed using other structures, such as *to secure right(s)* and *to safeguard right(s)*, as provided in examples (4) and (5):

(4) *Consequently, the Court found that Poland had failed to secure to the applicant the right to respect for his family life, in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR. (RoCH)*

(5) *Ensuring the data subject's rights are safeguarded when data are transferred outside the EU allows the protection afforded by EU law to follow the personal data originating in the EU. (DPL)*

According to the OLD (2024), the verb *to secure* means “to protect something so that it is safe and difficult to attack or damage”. The definition suggests a certain emphasis on the prevention of an attack on something and primarily the items to be secured are physical objects, such as a window or a property (ibid. 2024). Thus, the expression *to secure the right* suggests that the concept of *right(s)* can be understood as a physical OBJECT. The second expression *to safeguard* is most frequently used to refer to *rights* (21 instances) and only in 6 instances it was employed with a single *right*. The meaning of the verb *to safeguard* is “to protect something/somebody from loss, harm or damage; to keep something/somebody safe” (OLD 2024). Here, the definition does not explicitly mention an attack on something, however, it seems to attribute certain physical qualities to something that may suggest the item to be safeguarded is an OBJECT.

The structure *to interfere* is predominantly used with the *right* (62 cases) and almost twice less with *rights*, only in 34 cases. According to the OLD (2024) the meaning of the phrasal verb *to interfere with* is “to touch, use or change something, especially a piece of equipment, so that it is damaged or no longer works correctly”. This definition focuses on the alteration of a certain object that seems to have physical qualities to it. The phenomenon *right(s)* in example (2), on the other hand, is an abstract concept that does not have a physical form and cannot be physically modified. Thus, the phrase *to interfere with the right* demonstrates the metaphorical meaning of the *right* where it is understood in terms of an OBJECT.

Another common way to express that *right(s)* can be understood in terms of an OBJECT is the use of the structure *to enjoy right(s)* as in example (3) mentioned above and example (6):

(6) *Article 14 of the ECHR applies in relation to the enjoyment of all substantive rights guaranteed by the ECHR, and Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR covers any right which is guaranteed at the national level, even where this does not fall within the scope of an ECHR right. (NDL)*

This structure was primarily used referring to the plural form *rights* (33 instances) and fewer instances are present with a singular form *right* (26 cases). The basic meaning of the verb *to enjoy* is “having and using something” especially when it provides “pleasure from something” (OLD 2024). The act of enjoyment in the basic meaning of the verb *to enjoy* does not apply to the literal understanding of *right(s)* in example (6) since it is an abstract concept. However, it seems to suggest that *right(s)* can be understood as an OBJECT that is used by the people and thus brings joy.

After this discussion of the major tendencies used to refer to *right(s)* as an OBJECT without certain defining features, the following subsections are looking into more specific subcategories of the source domain OBJECT, namely POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP, FRAGILE OBJECT, INSTRUMENT and PRODUCT. The following Table 3 illustrates the distribution of the most common subdomains under the domain OBJECT:

Table 3. The major subdomains of the source domain OBJECT

| | <i>Right</i> | <i>Rights</i> | Total No. of instances | Normalized frequency per 10,000 words |
|----------------------|--------------|---------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP | 328 | 275 | 603 | 11.22 |
| FRAGILE OBJECT | 71 | 87 | 158 | 2.94 |
| INSTRUMENT | 19 | 30 | 49 | 0.91 |
| PRODUCT | 8 | 21 | 29 | 0.54 |

4.1.1.1. RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP

The most common source domain under the OBJECT domain is POSSESSION. According to Steen et al. (2007: 50), the POSSESSION of an object can be expressed by the verb *to have*. In this analysis ways of expressing the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP in a singular and plural form of the word *right* varied, thus three ways will be discussed in this

chapter, namely with the employment of the verb *to have*, the use of the noun *a holder*, the possessive case of the noun and the verbs *to give*, *to grant* and *to keep*.

Firstly, the analysis of the five handbooks on the European law demonstrated that the lexical item *right* is predominantly understood as an OBJECT that is acquired and belongs to the mentioned person. This pattern was the most frequent only in cases where the word *right* was used in the singular form, and in a few instances in plural form of the word *right*, as illustrated in the following examples:

(7) *Every data subject has the right to information about any data controller's processing of his or her personal data, subject to limited exemptions. (DPL)*

(8) *Every child has the right to respect for family life, recognised under Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 8 of the ECHR (see Chapter 5). (RoCH)*

(9) *This states that persons with disabilities have the same rights as other court users to go to court, take other people to court, act as witnesses and take part in what happens in court. (AtJ)*

(10) *Domestic courts are not always required to hear a child in court on the issue of access to a parent who does not have custody rights. (RoCH)*

All of the above-mentioned examples (7-10) demonstrate that the word *right(s)* belongs to various people, such as a data *subject*, a *child*, a *person* and a *parent*. The metaphoricity of the expression *to have a right(s)* arises from the basic meaning of the verb *to have*. According to the OLD (2024), the basic meaning of the verb *to have* is “to own, hold or possess” a certain object, for instance, a car or money. As can be seen, the verb is used with objects that have physical qualities and which can be manipulated by hand, for example, money can have a physical form as in banknotes and can be counted. Nevertheless, this cannot be said about *right* since it is a rather abstract entity with no physical qualities, existing in space that is regulated by law, but cannot be touched. Thus, the meaning of *having a right* in examples (7-10) can be deemed metaphorical and categorised via the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP.

Secondly, the analysis of the plural form of the lexical item *rights* uncovered an interesting pattern when the possession of *rights* was identifiable in combination with the noun *holder*. It is significant that the use of such construction was observed only with the plural form of the word *rights*. Moreover, there were two ways to express the ownership of *rights*, namely in the pattern *holders + of + rights* as in example (12) and employing a compound noun *rightsholders*, as in example (11) provided below:

(11) *The CRPD confirms that persons with disabilities are holders of equality rights - not charity recipients. (AtJ)*

(12) *Children as rightsholders are beneficiaries of all human/fundamental rights and subjects of special regulations, given their specific characteristics and needs. (RoCH)*

The OLD (2024) provides that use of the noun *holder* states that the person “has or owns the thing mentioned” and the entries refer to holding physical items such as documents, e.g., a license or a passport. Therefore, the noun *holders* employed with the word *right(s)* suggests the metaphorical nature of the word *rights* due to its physical qualities and may be understood in terms of POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP.

Thirdly, the metaphorical meaning of the word *right(s)* as in the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP was also identified in contexts where it was used in the possessive case, i.e., the use of possessive ‘s and s’ after the noun referring to the person the *right(s)* belong to. The pattern was extensively used with both singular and plural form of the word *right* as it can be seen in the following examples:

(13) *[...] are two core components of children’s right to respect for family life. (RoCH)*

(14) *The right of victims to access justice was not always seen as compatible with ensuring the rights of defendants, and this right has only recently been afforded the same kind of standing as defendants’ rights. (AtJ)*

In examples (13) and (14), the possessive case performs one of its primary functions of indicating an object that “belongs to a person” (OLD 2024). Similarly to the previously discussed verb *to have* and the noun *holder*, the basic meaning of the possessive ‘s is having or owning concrete objects, such as a bicycle or a house (ibid. 2024). Therefore, the word *right* in its singular form as shown in example (13) and its plural form *rights* (14) are used as metaphors due to physical qualities that are attributed to the abstract concept of *right(s)*.

Furthermore, *right(s)* can be metaphorically understood as an OBJECT that is handed to a person in contexts where it is combined with the verbs *to give* and *to grant*. The pattern of *granting the right(s)* can be seen in example (15) below:

(15) *It also recommends granting all children the right to be dealt with in the context of juvenile justice and not to transfer 16- and 17-year-olds to the adult criminal system in cases of serious offences. (RoCH).*

The use of this pattern in example (15) is observed with both a singular form of the word *right* and referring to its plural form *rights*. However, the expression *to grant the right* primarily

appears with the plural form of the word *rights*. The basic meaning of the verb *to grant* is to “give somebody what they ask for, especially formal or legal permission to do something” (OLD 2024), as for example a visa or asylum. The word *right(s)* in example (15) thus can be understood in terms of the source domain OBJECT that can be physically given to a person. Moreover, the metaphoricity of the word *right(s)* seems to suggest not only its physical nature, but also that *right(s)* as an OBJECT are handed to a person and becomes the POSSESSION of that person.

As mentioned earlier the possessiveness of the word *right(s)* can be expressed not only in its combination with the verb *to grant* but also the use of the construction to give *right(s)*, as can be seen below:

(16) *To ensure the practical effect of the rights given to data subjects, the CJEU held that “that right must of necessity relate to the past. (DPL)*

In example (16) the *right(s)* is used metaphorically as an OBJECT that can be seen, touched, and handed to someone and becoming the POSSESSION of that person. This construction predominantly appears referring to a single *right* (12 instances) and only in one case with multiple *rights*. According to the definition of the verb *to give* the meaning of it is to “hand something to somebody so that they can look at it, use it or keep it for a time” (OLD 2024), especially a physical object such as a present, a letter or a box (ibid. 2024). This definition emphasises physical qualities of an OBJECT such as its physical presence that can be touched and observed. Furthermore, the *rights* in example (16) can be understood in terms of POSSESSION. Possessiveness of the OBJECT arises from the action of giving this object to the taker with the implication of transferring giver’s rights of possession to the taker.

The last instance of the construction RIGHT IS/ARE A POSSESSION/ OWNERSHIP was observed in cases when the word under investigation is combined with the verb *to keep* as in example (17) provided below:

(17) *Family members who are third-country nationals will keep the right of residence in the event of the EU citizen’s death, if they have been residing in the host Member State, as family members, for at least one year before the death (Article 12 (2) of the directive). (RoCH)*

This pattern is present only once when conveying the meaning of the singular from *right*. However, it is important to investigate this construction. The basic meaning of the verb *to keep* provided in the dictionary is to “have something and not give it back or throw it away” (OLD 2024) as, for example, a letter or the change (from a hundred-dollar bill) (ibid. 2024). It seems

that objects appearing with the verb *to keep* have physical qualities and are concrete in nature. Therefore, the use of the word *right(s)* in example (17) may suggest that *the right* can be metaphorically understood as an OBJECT that is kept as someone's possession and is being actively targeted, thus the source domain OBJECT can be specified as the subdomain POSSESSION or OWNERSHIP.

4.1.1.2. RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A FRAGILE OBJECT

Another subdomain identified under the category of OBJECT was subdomain that refers to the fragile state of an OBJECT. The analysis revealed that as a FRAGILE OBJECT the singular form *right* appears in 71 instances, and the plural form *rights* in 84 instances. The distribution of the verbs used with lexical item *right(s)* is provided in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. The percentages of verbs *violate*, *infringe* and *breach* used with *right(s)*

As can be seen in Figure 1, *right(s)* are understood as FRAGILE OBJECTS using the same three verbs, while the most frequent way to express the idea of fragility is the use of the verb *to violate*, since it is observed in more than half of the instances. The use of all three verbs to *infringe* (18) and *breach* (19) and nominalizations of the verb *violate* (20) can be seen in examples (18), (19) and (20) provided below:

(18) Processing of personal data may also infringe on the right to private life, as shown in the examples below. (DPL)

(19) It lays down absolute rights, which the States can never breach, such as the right to life or the prohibition of torture [...]. (RoCH)

- (20) *The ECSR considers trafficking in human beings to constitute a grave violation of human rights and human dignity, amounting to a new form of slavery. (RoCH)*

The fragile state of an OBJECT is exclusively expressed using the three verbs *violate*, *breach* and *infringe* as well as their nominalizations. The definitions of all the three verbs refer to the same act of breaking an OBJECT. Therefore, the idea of breaking an object suggests that the said object should have physical qualities, in this case, the object is FRAGILE and can be easily broken.

4.1.1.3. RIGHT(S) IS /ARE AN INSTRUMENT

The pattern of *right(s)* being an object that can be further categorized as an INSTRUMENT, is primarily used to refer to the plural form *rights* (in 30 instances) and slightly less with the singular form *right* (in 19 cases). Most commonly the idea of RIGHT(S) IS AN INSTRUMENT is conveyed through the direct use of the verb *to balance* and the noun *balance*, as demonstrated in the examples (21) and (22) below:

- (21) *Requests for access to documents or information held by public authorities may therefore need balancing with the right to data protection of persons whose data are contained in the requested documents. (DPL)*
- (22) *The non-recognition of a formal parental link had thus struck a fair balance between the applicants' right to respect for family life and the general interests that the state had sought to protect by the ban on surrogacy. (NDL)*

It is important to mention that the use of the verb *to balance* and its nominalized form *balance* convey the same meaning of physically spreading the weight of an item to ensure that it “remains standing, especially because your [the object’s] weight is equally distributed” (CLD 2024). Thus, the idea of the balance of *right(s)* seems to suggest that the word *right(s)* is metaphorically understood as an object, namely an OBJECT with physical qualities that can be weighted and spread out. Moreover, the domain of OBJECT can be further described as the subdomain of an INSTRUMENT.

Interestingly, the analysis of the plural form *rights* also revealed the use of another verb *to abuse* (in 4 cases) to convey the meaning of an OBJECT being used as an INSTRUMENT, as can be observed in the following example (23):

- (23) *Example: In *Vojnity v. Hungary*, 586 the applicant, a member of the Congregation of the Faith, had his access rights to his child withdrawn after the*

national authorities found that he had abused his rights to influence the child in pursuit of his own religious beliefs. (NDL)

According to the definition of the verb *to abuse*, its basic meaning refers to “the use of something in a way that is wrong or harmful” (OLD 2024). The definition provided in the Cambridge Dictionary (CLD 2024) elaborates the previous meaning by adding that the *abuse* also refers to a “morally wrong” action to achieve certain detrimental purpose as for example “abusing alcohol” (ibid. 2024). The lexical item in its plural form *rights* used in the construction *to abuse rights* in example (23) suggests that the word *rights* can be metaphorically interpreted as an OBJECT. Furthermore, the analysis of the dictionary entries seems to highlight the immorality and detrimental nature of the action, as well as focuses on the fact that this action of *abuse* can be achieved by utilizing certain objects serving the purpose of a tool. Therefore, the word *rights* in the construction *to abuse rights* suggests that *rights* can be considered an OBJECT and even further categorized as an INSTRUMENT to influence the child.

4.1.1.4. RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A PRODUCT

The last subdomain singled out under the category of OBJECT is the subdomain PRODUCT. The analysis uncovered that the plural form of *rights* is understood in terms of a PRODUCT almost twice more frequently than the singular form *right*, only in 8 cases compared to 21 cases.

The interpretation of *right(s)* as a PRODUCT is primarily conveyed using the verb *to promote* and the noun *promotion* is identifiable, as can be seen in examples (24) and (25) below:

(24) *In its Recommendation on the protection and promotion of the right to freedom of expression and the right to private life, in respect of network neutrality, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recommended that internet service providers [...] (DPL)*

(25) *The Treaty on European Union sets forth the Union’s obligation to promote the protection of the rights of the child. (RoCH)*

The use of the verb *to promote* and its noun form *promotion* predominantly appears with the word *right* in the plural form. Furthermore, the analysis shows that this pattern is used in various handbooks on European law, especially in handbooks touching upon issues of non-discrimination law, data protection and rights of the child, while the pattern with the singular form *right* appeared only in the handbook on data protection law. In examples (24) and (25) it is evident that the object of promotion is considered to be the *right(s)*. According to the dictionary, the basic meaning of the verb *to promote* is to “help sell a product, service, etc. or

make it more popular by advertising it or offering it at a special price” (OLD 2024). This definition itself draws attention to the OBJECT that is being promoted and suggests that it can be a PRODUCT. Therefore, the *right(s)* as a phenomenon can be understood in terms of an OBJECT. Furthermore, the way the concept is promoted suggests that the *right(s)* can be further distinguished by the type of an OBJECT and refers to a PRODUCT.

This metaphor RIGHTS ARE A PRODUCT can also be achieved by the implementation of the verb *to realise*, and its nominalised form *realisation* or *realization*, as illustrated below:

(26) *Under CoE law, the ECSR notes that, when the realisation of a right is exceptionally complex and particularly expensive to resolve its progressive realisation is assessed against three criteria [...]. (RoCH)*

(27) *Under both EU and CoE law, it is also recognised that states have obligations to ensure reasonable accommodation to allow persons with disabilities the opportunity to fully realise their rights. (NDL)*

According to the dictionary, the basic meaning of the verb *to realise*, or the noun *realization* would be to become aware of something or to achieve something (OLD 2024). Another meaning of the verb *to realise* is concerned with the act of selling something owned by the seller, for example, a property or other goods for pecuniary benefit. In example (26) the contextual word *expensive* seems to highlight the previously mentioned idea of selling an object for profit. Thus, the use of the verb *to realise rights* suggests that the word *rights* is understood as an OBJECT with physical properties and can be evaluated in monetary terms. Similarly to example (27) where the plural form of the concept *rights* can be interpreted as a metaphor of an OBJECT, more specifically, a PRODUCT. This explanation can be demonstrated with the use of the metaphor RIGHTS ARE A PRODUCT, where the lexical item *rights* is a physical product that can be sold.

4.1.2. RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A PHYSICAL ACTIVITY

The study of the five handbooks on European law revealed that the phenomenon *right(s)* can be interpreted as a PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, including movement in general. This metaphorical meaning of the notion of *right(s)* is expressed using of one particular pattern, that is *to exercise right(s)*. The analysed concordance lines uncovered that this pattern is primarily employed to refer to the understanding the plural form of *rights* and is observed in 113 instances. While the number of cases used to convey the meaning of the singular form *right* is twice lower and is

present only in 57 concordance lines. The cases of the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A PHYSICAL ACTIVITY are provided in the following examples (28) and (29) below:

28) *The circumscribed autonomy of children, which gradually increases with their evolving maturity, is exercised through their right to be consulted and heard. (RoCH)*

29) *There is protection for family members in the event of the death, divorce or departure of the EEA national who exercised free movement rights (Articles 12 and 13 of the Free Movement Directive). (ABaI)*

As can be seen from examples (28) and (29), the abstract entity *right(s)* seems to be strongly attached to the verb *to exercise something*. According to the OLD (2024), the verb *to exercise* is always used to refer to a certain “set of movements or activities that you do to stay healthy or develop a skill”. The basic meaning of this verb focuses entirely on the active movement and physical activities performed by the person with the intention to preserve a healthy body and mind. The use of the expression *to exercise right(s)* in examples (28) and (29) seems to transfer certain physical qualities of activities to the phenomenon *right(s)*. Furthermore, a long-lasting need to perform active movements and actions in order *to exercise right(s)* also correlates to the idea of actively performing certain actions to preserve person’s health and skills. Thus, the *right(s)* as such can be interpreted as a PHYSICAL ACTIVITY that must be actively performed to achieve a certain purpose, for example to defend a person’s interests.

4.1.3. RIGHT(S) IS/ARE AN AREA

The abstract nature of the concept of *right(s)* in the handbooks on European law is also conveyed through the source domain of AREA. The analysis of the extracted concordance lines concluded that the use of the source domain AREA most frequently appeared in the understanding of *rights* in its plural form (in 83 cases). The abstract concept of *right(s)* in terms of the domain AREA as a singular *right* is interpreted in 79 instances, while the concept of plural form of *rights* is understood as an AREA in 83 cases. The difference in the frequency of its use is not as significant as the patterns that are employed to refer to the abstract entity of *right(s)* as an AREA, as demonstrated in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Most common patterns used to refer to the notion of *right(s)* as an AREA.

| | Right | No. of instances | Rights | No. of instances |
|--|-------|------------------|--------|------------------|
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----------|-----------------------------|----|-----------------------|----|
| Pattern 1 | Restrict the R ³ | 27 | Limit Rs ⁴ | 20 |
| Pattern 2 | Limit the R | 25 | Restrict Rs | 18 |
| Pattern 3 | The scope of the R | 16 | Access (to) Rs | 17 |

Table 4 provides patterns of expressions that are predominantly used to make the meaning of the abstract item *right(s)* more understandable by conveying its meaning in terms of a certain AREA. These and other additional patterns are further discussed in this section. The data from Table 4 shows how differently the concept of *right* is expressed dealing with its singular and plural forms. The meaning behind the singular *right* is most commonly expressed by employing the expression *to restrict the right* as in the example provided below:

30) *Family members of EEA and Swiss nationals cannot be subjected to restrictions on their right to access housing, including socially supported housing (558). (Abal)*

According to the OLD (2024) the verb *to restrict* means “to limit the size, amount or range of something”. The definition suggests that the item that is restricted can be understood as being put in an isolated place to prevent its expansion or movement. Therefore, the action of *restricting the right* highlights the metaphorical meaning of the *right* that can be interpreted as an AREA. This pattern of *restricting the right* can also be observed in the use when referring to plural item *rights*, but the number of such cases is twice lower compared to the use of this pattern to refer to the *right* as a singular notion. The pattern *to restrict rights* referring to *rights* as an AREA appears only as the third most common pattern in Table 4.

The second most common pattern used to refer to the singular notion of *right* and its plural form differ, therefore, both patterns are discussed in this section. The second predominant pattern used with the singular *right* employs the expression *limit the right*, which is also present when conveying the meaning of *rights* as an AREA as in the examples (31) and (32) below:

(31) *In certain circumstances, the ECHR imposes limitations on the right of a state to detain or turn away a migrant at its border (see introduction to this chapter and Sections 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9), regardless of whether the migrant is in a transit zone or otherwise within that state’s jurisdiction. (Abal)*

³ R is used to refer to the singular form of the word *right*.

⁴ R is used to refer to the plural form of the word *rights*.

(32) *These rights may, however, be temporarily limited for the purpose of internal investigations. (DPL)*

According to OLD (2024) the term *limit* and *limitation* refer to the restriction of the “greatest or smallest amount of something that is allowed” and may also be used to speak about “the furthest edge of an area or a place”. The fact that an abstract phenomenon that is *right(s)* is being restricted seems to suggest that *right(s)* can be metaphorically understood in terms of an AREA that can be limited. Table 4 also points out that the expression *to limit rights* is often used with numerous *rights* compared to the single one. It is important to discuss the second pattern used to refer to the meaning of the *rights*, namely *access (to) rights* as in the examples (33) and (34) provided below:

(33) *This chapter provides a brief overview of both EU and CoE standards relating to access to economic and social rights, namely the rights to work, education, housing, healthcare and social protection. (ABaI)*

(34) *An acknowledged right to remain is normally necessary to access the full range of social rights. (ABaI)*

The definitions of the term *access* primarily refer to a certain place that someone is interested in “entering or reaching” (ibid. 2024). The *rights* as an abstract notion cannot be physically reached or entered, thus, the expressions *to access rights* and *access to rights* seem to suggest that *rights* can be understood as an AREA that can be reached by the person. It is important to mention that such patterns are observed only when interpreting the plural notion of *rights*, which may suggest that it is important to people to accessing numerous *rights* as a complex phenomenon rather than being able to access and employ a singular *right*.

The third most common pattern referring to numerous *rights* is the expression *the scope of the rights* as illustrated in example (35):

(35) *The scope of the right is considered together with the requirement for legal assistance to be effective. (AtJ)*

The expression *the scope of* stands for “the range of matters considered” (CLD 2024) and can also refer to a certain limited space that can be understood as certain place or land (ibid. 2024). This seems to suggest that *rights* as an abstract phenomenon can be interpreted referring to a certain place, thus understood in terms of the source domain AREA. The pattern employing the expression *the scope of* is also apparent when referring to the singular *right* and despite the number of instances being the exact same, this pattern is only the fourth most common pattern, thus not included in Table 4.

Other peculiar patterns that are used to convey the meaning of right(s) as an area include *the range of rights*, *to extend the right(s)* and *rights landscape*. These patterns are less frequent than the ones discussed earlier; however, each pattern seems to highlight a certain aspect that helps to convey the meaning of right. For this reason, these patterns are to be discussed in this section. Firstly, the expression *the range of rights* despite being similar in meaning to the pattern mentioned earlier, that is *the scope of the right* is discussed separately because the expression *the range of* was only present when defining the meaning of the plural form of *rights*. According to the CLD (2024), the term *range* usually refers to the fact that something is “limited to a particular length, amount, or area”. Thus, *rights* are metaphorically understood as an AREA that is limited by certain qualities. The second pattern *to extend the right(s)* is present with *right* and *rights*; however, it is twice as frequent when referring to the concept of *right* in its singular sense. Furthermore, the meaning of this expression denotes ‘extending something’ as for example “[...] to extend the children's play area” (OLD 2024). This seems to refer to the *right* having qualities of an AREA that can extend and cover larger spaces. Lastly, the pattern *rights landscape* that is only used to convey the meaning of multiple *rights*. Despite that the number of instances is relatively small, only 4 examples were uncovered, this pattern offers an interesting insight into the interpretation of the concept of *rights*. The meaning of the noun *landscape* refers to “everything you can see when you look across a large area of land, especially in the country” (OLD 2024). In this case, we can see that *rights* are not only represented as an AREA, but emphasis is put on the *rights* being interpreted as a larger AREA that may be covering even the entire country.

4.1.4. RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A PERSON/PEOPLE

The study of the concordance lines demonstrated that the fourth most common source domain is PERSON. The employment of the source domain PERSON appears with both singular form of *right* (31 instance) and plural form *rights* (38 instances). Table 5 below provides an overview of the most common patterns used to denote the meaning of *right(s)* being interpreted as a PERSON.

Table 5. Most common patterns used to refer to the notion of *right(s)* in terms of a PERSON.

| | Right | No. of instances | Rights | No. of instances |
|-----------|--------------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|
| Pattern 1 | Establish the R | 6 | Risks to Rs | 22 |

| | | | | |
|-----------|--------------------|---|--------------------|---|
| Pattern 2 | Conflict | 3 | Rs interact with | 5 |
| Pattern 3 | Threat(en) the R | 2 | Establish Rs | 3 |
| Pattern 4 | Govern the R | 2 | Threat to Rs | 3 |
| Pattern 5 | Obstacles to the R | 2 | The harm to the Rs | 1 |

As can be observed from Table 5 the most frequently appearing pattern is *risks to the right(s)*. This pattern is 11 times more frequent with the plural form *rights* (in 22 cases) than with the singular form *right* (2 cases). According to the OLD (2024), the meaning of the noun *risk* is a certain threat that is especially dangerous or harming to a person. The first common pattern for both singular and plural form of *rights* is the expression to *establish the right(s)*. According to the OLD (2024) the verb *to establish* is primarily used to refer to people since its basic meaning is “to start or create an organization, a system, etc. that is meant to last for a long time”. This definition, thus, emphasises that *right(s)* as an abstract concept cannot be established and should be interpreted as personification of this concept. Table 5 illustrates that the interpretation of *right(s)* as PERSON can also be achieved employing other expressions such as *threaten the right*, *govern the right*, *right requires something* and *obstacle to the right*. According to Šeškauskienė and Stepančuk (2014: 113-114), the personification of law concepts is often achieved using specific expressions, such as ‘require’ and ‘authorize’ that usually indicate human features. The first expression *threaten the right* and *threats to rights* both seem to refer to a certain person who is threatened as in example (36) and (37) below:

(36) SNS may threaten the right to private life and the right to freedom of expression.
(LDP)

(37) The latter processing, which is governed by Article 1 (2) of Regulation No. 2252/2004, constitutes a threat to the rights to respect for private life and personal data protection. (LDP)

The OLD (2024) defines the noun *threat* as “a statement in which you tell somebody that you will punish or harm them [...]”. The definition seems to emphasise the recipient thus contribute to the fact that the phenomenon *right(s)* used in examples above can be interpreted as PERSONS. The second pattern of *govern the right* is primarily present referring to a single *right*, but can also be observed when conveying the meaning of numerous *rights*. The basic meaning of this expression means “to legally control a country or its people and be responsible for introducing new laws, organizing public services, etc.” (OLD 2024). The meaning of the expression *to govern something* used in the context of the phenomenon *right(s)* seems to carry the metaphorical meaning of the *right* and suggests that the interpretation of the abstract notion *right(s)* is a PERSON, or a group of people. Table 5 also illustrates two additional expressions used to carry the meaning of the concept *right* as a single unit. The said expressions are *an obstacle to the right* and *the right requires something*. The structure *an obstacle to the right* was primarily used to refer to a single *right* as can be seen in example (38) below:

(38) *The situation created an obstacle to the right to “the provision of information about services and facilities available for elderly persons and their opportunities to make use of them” as guaranteed by Article 23 (b) of the ESC. (NDL)*

According to OLD (2024) the expression *obstacles to something* is used to refer to any difficulties appearing on someone’s path, for example, “[t]he huge distances involved have proved an obstacle to communication between villages.”. The entire focus shifts from the obstacle itself to the subject who deals with such difficulties on his or her path, and as illustrated in example (38) provided above it seems that obstacles appear mainly on the path of a PERSON. Lastly, the pattern of the verb *require* to provide the meaning of the phenomenon *right* appears only when referring to the single *right* as in example (39) provided below:

(39) *In such a case, the CJEU emphasised that the right to an effective judicial remedy requires that individuals must be able to challenge such a decision before the national courts, who may refer the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Commission decision. (DPL)*

The structure of *the right requires something or someone* differs from the basic meaning of the verb *to require* that usually stands for the action of “need[ing] something; to depend on somebody/something” and is most commonly used to refer to living creatures, such as animals or PERSONS. It is notable, that this expression is only used to convey the meaning of the single *right* which acquires human like characteristics and may be interpreted as a PERSON. Here, the discussion of the most prominent patterns referring to RIGHT(S) IS/ARE AN AREA is concluded. However, the analysis of the extracted concordance lines uncovered fewer peculiar instances,

which are briefly overviewed in this section. As mentioned, the number of the following instances is not as significant but can provide an insight on the interpretation of the abstract phenomenon *right(s)*. The patterns observed referring to both *right(s)* include *right(s) interact with something/ someone*, *right(s) protect something/ someone* and *the nature of right(s)*. All these examples, slightly differ from the basic meaning of the verbs *to interact* and *to protect* and the noun *the nature*. According to the CLD (2024), the verb *to interact* is often used to convey the idea of “to communicate with someone or react to something”. The definition emphasises the importance of the physical action required for the communication or a certain reaction. Thus, the notion of *right(s)* acquires qualities of a person and can be interpreted as one. Similarly to the previous expression, the second expression *right(s) protect something/ someone* also focuses on the process of minimising or preventing the damage to the other party or an object. According to the examples with the use of the pattern to protect something/ someone it is primarily the person or any other human like creature that becomes the subject who is performing the act of protection, as for example, “[t]roops have been sent to protect aid workers against attack.” (OLD 2024). This example, therefore, suggests that the abstract entity *right(s)* can be interpreted as a PERSON who aims to protect other people or objects. Lastly, the common expression *the nature of right(s)* is present referring to a single right as well as multiple rights. From the first glance the use of such expression seems to convey the basic meaning of “the basic qualities of a thing” (OLD 2024) that has no metaphorical meaning to it. However, the use of the noun *nature* referring to the phenomenon *right(s)* highlights the shift in the meaning from ‘the basic qualities’ to those describing the ‘character’ (ibid. 2024). The character is primarily used to convey the way a person “behaves that is part of their character” (ibid. 2024). Thus, the interpretation of *right(s)* having its nature resembles the character of a person and the *right(s)* becomes the PERSON.

4.2. Major tendencies of metaphoricity in different types of texts on European law

This section aims to introduce major metaphorical tendencies arising from the investigation of the five handbooks on European law. The structure of this part follows the structure of the discussion of the source domains and subdomains in the previous section.

The first matter of this discussion is the entire domain OBJECT including its subdomains such as POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP, FRAGILE OBJECT, INSTRUMENT and PRODUCT. This source domain OBJECT is the most prominent one and is used with *right* and *rights* in all five handbooks on European law, as illustrated in Table 6 below.

Table 6. Normalized frequencies of the source domain OBJECT in five handbooks

| | Right | Normalized frequency | Rights | Normalized frequency |
|------|-------|----------------------|--------|----------------------|
| AtJ | 73 | 11.25 | 120 | 18.48 |
| NDL | 82 | 8.43 | 73 | 7.51 |
| RoCH | 157 | 15.12 | 259 | 24.94 |
| DPL | 202 | 15.04 | 224 | 16.67 |
| ABaI | 109 | 7.96 | 60 | 4.37 |

Overall the source domain OBJECT with the singular form *right* is mostly found in the handbook on Data Protection Law (202 times), in the handbook relating to the Rights of the Child (157 cases) and in the handbook relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration (109 times). Interestingly, the analysis of the source domain OBJECT appearing with the plural form of *rights* shows a similar result. The idea of the abstract concept of *rights* understood as an OBJECT can be found primarily in the handbooks on the Rights of the Child (259 times), on Data Protection (224 instances) and in the handbook relating to Access to Justice (120 times). Table 6 provides the normalized frequencies of the source domain OBJECT, and it seems that the most prominent difference between the use of OBJECT with the singular and plural forms of *right* can be observed in the Handbook on the Rights of the Child (RoCH). The normalized frequency for the singular form of *right* in the Handbook on the Rights of the Child is 15.12 (157 instances), while the plural form *rights* is significantly more frequent – 24.94. Another, striking observation is that the normalized frequency for the singular form *right* in the Handbook on Asylum, Borders and Immigration (ABaI) is 7.96 (109 instances) and the plural form of *rights* – 4.37 (60 examples). The use of the source domain OBJECT across the five handbooks on European law demonstrates a preference to convey the meaning of *right(s)* as an OBJECT, especially in the contexts of Data Protection Law, the rights of the Child and right to Asylum, Borders and Immigration.

The analysis of the subdomains of OBJECT, namely POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP, FRAGILE OBJECT, INSTRUMENT and PRODUCT, shows that the use of these subdomains differs referring to a singular form *right* or its plural form *rights*. The phenomenon *right(s)* as a POSSESSION is represented in a variety of contexts throughout the five handbooks, as provided in Table 7 below.

Table 7. Normalized frequencies of the subdomain domain POSSESSION in five handbooks

| | Right | Normalized frequency | Rights | Normalized frequency |
|------|-------|----------------------|--------|----------------------|
| AtJ | 18 | 2.77 | 30 | 4.62 |
| NDL | 55 | 5.66 | 10 | 1.03 |
| RoCH | 76 | 7.32 | 149 | 14.35 |
| DPL | 114 | 8.49 | 66 | 4.91 |
| ABaI | 65 | 4.74 | 20 | 1.46 |

The investigation of the use of the source domain POSSESSION referring to a single *right* and multiple *rights* shows that both concepts share more differences than similarities. Both *right* and *rights* are most commonly interpreted as POSSESSION in the same context of the Rights of the Child and the Data Protection Law. The abstract concept *rights* in the Handbook on the Rights of the Child appears 149 times (normalized frequency 14.35), while the singular form *right* is found in 76 instances (normalized frequency 7.32). The normalized frequency of the singular and plural forms of *right* differs two times in the context of the Right of the Child. A similar tendency can be observed in the Handbook on Data Protection, where the singular form *right* (114 instances) is two times more commonly interpreted as a POSSESSION, compared to the plural form of the word *rights* (66 instances). Despite this significant difference in the frequency of the cases, it seems that the concept of *right(s)* referring to both a singular form and plural form of the *right* is crucial to the matters relating to the rights of the child and data protection. These similarities in the understanding of *right(s)* as a POSSESSION may indicate the

importance of owning those *right(s)* especially when it is related with the topics of the rights of children and data protection.

The metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A FRAGILE OBJECT most commonly present referring to plural form *rights* (87 cases) and is less frequent with a single *right* (71 items). However, a major difference is observed in the variety and frequency of topics where the metaphor is employed, as illustrated in Table 8 below.

Table 8. Normalized frequencies of the subdomain domain FRAGILE OBJECT in five handbooks

| | Right | Normalized frequency | Rights | Normalized frequency |
|------|-------|----------------------|--------|----------------------|
| AtJ | 7 | 1.08 | 28 | 4.31 |
| NDL | 4 | 0.41 | 6 | 0.62 |
| RoCH | 23 | 2.22 | 14 | 1.35 |
| DPL | 21 | 1.56 | 27 | 2.01 |
| ABaI | 16 | 1.17 | 12 | 0.88 |

Table 8 demonstrates that the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A FRAGILE OBJECT is mainly used in the context of the Access to Justice, the Rights of the Child and the Data Protection Law. The difference in the use of the singular or plural form of *right* in the Handbooks on the Rights of the Child and the Data Protection Law is not as significant. The use of *right(s)* in the Handbook on the Access to Justice, on the other hand, grasps our attention. The normalized frequency of the plural form *rights* (28 instances) interpreted as an OBJECT in the Handbook on the Access to Justice is almost four times more frequent compared to the singular form of the word *right* (7 instances). The difference in the topics where *right(s)* can be interpreted as a FRAGILE OBJECT, may refer to the different scope of the matters that are discussed in each handbook. For instance, the focus on *rights* as a FRAGILE OBJECT seems to be especially relevant to the topics of Data Protection, Access to Justice and the Rights of the Child. This may be the result of the high

demand to regulate and protect all kinds of information, including sensitive and personal information and matters to ensure the interest of the majority of the population.

The analysis of the use of the subdomain INSTRUMENT with the abstract phenomenon right(s) demonstrates that the concept of one *right* and multiple *rights* is equally important in relation to the topics of Data Protection and Non-discrimination Laws. Both *right* and *rights* are almost equally used as crucial INSTRUMENTS in the matters of Data Protection (i.e., the *right* appears in 12 cases, and *rights* in 15 cases) and referring to the topic of Non-discrimination (i.e., the *right* is present 2 times, and *rights* 3 times). Interestingly, the *right* as an instrument appears in the handbook related to the Right of Child (in 4 cases), but cannot be found in the context of Access to Justice and Asylum, Borders and Immigration. The analysis of the use of multiple *rights*, on the other hand, demonstrates the completely opposite result. *Rights* as an INSTRUMENT is employed in the handbooks on Access to Justice (6 cases) and Asylum, Borders and Immigration (3 cases) matters, but is completely missing from the topic of the Rights of the Child. The motive behind such peculiar use and omission of *right(s)* as an INSTRUMENT is difficult to grasp. However, the use of *right(s)* as an INSTRUMENT in the matters related to Data Protection may be the result of the universal need for such protection. Furthermore, the data to be protected is frequently related to personal information, thus any actions with the intent to collect, alter or store such data would require the person's consent or authorization. Data protection offers various rights to be informed of the data collected, the right to consent to the actions related with data storage, as well as the right to decline such offers and most importantly, the right to defend your rights. All these aspects under the umbrella data protection may be conveyed through the use of the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE AN INSTRUMENT since data protection aims to introduce rights that can be used in order to ensure interests of people.

The investigation of the least frequent subdomain PRODUCT demonstrates that the singular form of *right* appears only in the four Handbooks on The Rights of the Child (normalized frequency 0.29), Non-discrimination law (0.21), Data Protection law (0.15) and on the Asylum, Borders, and Immigration (0.07). The plural form *rights*, on the other hand, is present in all five handbooks 1) The Rights of the Child (normalized frequency 0.67), 2) Non-discrimination law (0.72), 3) Data Protection law (0.30), 4) the Asylum, Borders, and Immigration (0.15) and the Access to Justice (0.15). It is important to mention that the singular form *right* is not identified in the Handbook on the Access of Justice. The fact that both the singular form *right* and plural form *rights* are conveyed employing the subdomain PRODUCT, especially in the context of Rights of the Child and Non-discrimination law may suggest the need to not only introduce the rights for data protection but also to actively promote and share the information about such

rights. Thus, the use of the concept *right(s)* in the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A PRODUCT emphasises the meaning of the promotion of rights.

The source domain PHYSICAL ACTIVITY is the second most frequent source domain used to convey the meaning of the abstract phenomenon *right(s)*. The closer analysis of this source domain shows that the concept of *right(s)* interpreted as a PHYSICAL ACTIVITY is predominantly employed referring to the singular form *right* and plural form *rights* especially on the topics of Data Protection and matters relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration. The use of the plural form of *rights* (normalized frequency 3.42, 46 instances) in the handbook on Data Protection is almost twice more frequent than the employment of the single *right* (normalized frequency 1.94; 26 items). Similarly, to the second most common context of Asylum, Borders, and Immigration, where both the *right* and *rights* occur, the plural form of *rights* (normalized frequency 2.48; 34 instances) are almost twice as common, compared to the singular form *right* (normalized frequency 1.39; 19 instances). Furthermore, the tendency to primarily refer to the plural form of *rights* as a PHYSICAL ACTIVITY is observed in the handbook on the Rights of the Child. The results show that *rights* (normalized frequency 1.64; 17 cases) are interpreted as a PHYSICAL ACTIVITY almost twice as often as the singular form *right* (normalized frequency 0.58; 6 cases). These findings may suggest that the reason the concept of *right(s)* is more often represented by referring to the plural form of *rights* rather than a singular *right* is to emphasise the importance of actively using rights especially those related to data protection, asylum, borders and immigration matters, as well as rights of the child.

The investigation of the third source domain AREA demonstrated that both the single *right* and multiple *rights* understood in terms of an AREA appear in all five handbooks on European law. Most frequently *right(s)* are understood as an area in the context of Data Protection and Access to Justice. In the context of Data Protection the difference between the frequencies is not as significant, the *right* as an AREA appears 31 time (normalized frequency is 2.31), while *rights* are present 24 times (normalized frequency – 1.79). However, in terms of the topic Access to Justice, the results vary considerably. *Rights* as an AREA is employed twice more often in 26 cases (4.01), compared to the singular form *right* appearing only in 14 cases (2.16). The use of the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE AN AREA, especially in the context of Data Protection and Access to Justice may be justified by the scope of the matters discussed in these handbooks. Both topics on Data Protection and Access to Justice introduce matters that affect a multitude of people across the world, and it inevitably covers larger numbers of lands and spheres. Thus, it may be argued that the expansion of such matters can be conveyed through the source domain AREA, where *right(s)* may be interpreted not as an OBJECT, but rather an AREA.

Lastly, the source domain PERSON appearing with both the *right* and *right(s)* is mostly found in the handbook on Data Protection. The difference in the number of instances where *right(s)* are understood in terms of a PERSON, is significant. In the Handbook on Data Protection, the *right* in a singular form appears 14 times (normalized frequency 1.04) that is twice lower than *rights* in a plural form (normalized frequency 2.31; 31 instances). These findings may suggest that *right(s)* understood in terms of a PERSON contribute to the idea that matters discussed in the handbook on Data Protection are similar to people, who can be threatened, governed and may meet obstacles on their path of execution and implementation of rights.

Overall, the analysis concludes that the *right* and *rights* used with the source domains, and also the subdomains of OBJECT provide a variety of metaphorical tendencies, where similarities and differences emerge. Almost in all cases, both the *right* and *rights* share the same context and are present in each of the five handbooks on European law, except for fewer instances, for example, the *right* as an INSTRUMENT not appearing in the texts on Access to Justice and Asylum, Borders and Immigration, while *rights* are present in the context of the Rights of the Child, which is not the case for the *right*.

5. Conclusions

The analysis of metaphors in the five handbooks on European law issued between 2016 and 2022 revealed that both *right* and *rights* are used metaphorically and predominantly appear in four source domains, such as OBJECT, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, AREA and PERSON. The first source domain OBJECT is the most common domain where *right* (603 instances) and *rights* (777 instances) are present. Relying on the principles of conceptual metaphor theory, metaphorical pattern analysis and the key principles of MIP, the analysis of the extracted concordance lines revealed that the singular form *right* and the plural form of *rights* are predominantly understood in terms of OBJECT. Contextual clues included certain shape, form and the quality of being tangible; however, in some cases *right(s)* were also perceived as a specific type of OBJECT with such qualities as, for example, being owned by someone, its fragility, its purpose to be used to achieve something and its price. Therefore, the analysis of *right(s)* understood through the source domain of an OBJECT also includes investigation of the four most common subdomains of the source domain OBJECT, namely POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP, FRAGILE OBJECT, INSTRUMENT and PRODUCT.

The analysis of the source domain OBJECT revealed that patterns, such as *to protect right(s)*, *to interfere with right(s)*, *enjoy right(s)* are commonly used in both singular and plural form of the

word *right* to refer to an object in general, without specifying its type. The most common pattern *to protect right(s)* appears almost five times more frequently in the plural form *rights* (190 instances), than in the singular form *right* (33 cases).

The analysis of the subdomains of OBJECT, revealed that the most common source domain under the OBJECT is POSSESSION. The metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP in both, singular and plural, forms of the word *right* is expressed employing a variety of patterns. The most frequent contextual clues include the verb *to have*, the noun *a holder*, the possessive case of the noun and the verbs *to give*, *to grant* and *to keep*. The use of the pattern *to have the right(s)*, similarly to other patterns used to convey possession, primarily focuses on the *right(s)* having physical attributes and belonging to people, such as *a data subject*, *a child*, *a person* and *a parent*.

The second most common subdomain of the source domain OBJECT is FRAGILE OBJECT. The singular form *right* (71 instances), and the plural form *rights* (84 instances) point at a FRAGILE OBJECT, which signalled by the above contextual clues and the verbs *to violate*, *breach* and *infringe*; also as their nominalizations. Predominantly, the idea of fragility is expressed through the combination of *right(s)* with the verb *to violate*; the singular *right* appeared in 53 instances out of 71; and the plural form *rights* was identified in 52 instances out of 84.

The third subdomain is INSTRUMENT. It is often used in the plural form *rights* (in 30 instances) and less in the singular form *right* (in 19 cases). Predominantly the idea of RIGHT(S) IS AN INSTRUMENT is expressed using the verb *to balance* and the noun *balance*. Another way to convey the meaning of *rights* as an INSTRUMENT is the use of another verb *to abuse*. However, this expression is found only in the singular form of the word *rights* and in 4 cases.

The last subdomain of OBJECT was PRODUCT. The analysis revealed that the plural form of *rights* is interpreted as a PRODUCT almost twice more frequently than the singular form *right*, found only in 8 cases compared to 21 cases. The understanding of *right(s)* as a PRODUCT is primarily conveyed using the verb *to promote* and the noun *promotion*. A less frequent way to convey the metaphor RIGHTS ARE A PRODUCT can be achieved using the verb *to realise*, and its nominalised form *realisation* or *realization*.

The second most frequent source domain was PHYSICAL ACTIVITY. The metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ARE A PHYSICAL ACTIVITY is conveyed by one particular pattern, that is *to exercise right(s)*. The analysis revealed that the pattern is primarily employed to refer to the plural form *rights* (113 cases) and almost twice less with the singular *right* (57 cases). The expression *to exercise*

right(s) suggests that *right(s)* can be interpreted as a physical activity that requires active movement and performance to achieve a certain goal, for example to defend a person's interests.

The third source domain is AREA. The analysis showed that both the singular form of *right* and its plural form can be interpreted through the source domain AREA, with almost insignificant difference (i.e., *right* in 79 cases, and *rights* in 83 cases). A major difference between the patterns employing the singular form *right* and those employing the plural form is in the variety of expression used to achieve this purpose. The singular *right* is most commonly used with the expression *to restrict the right*, in 27 instances out of 79. The plural form of the word *rights* usually appears in the pattern *to limit rights*, in 20 out of 83 cases. The *right(s)* acquire certain qualities of an AREA, namely being able to extend and cover larger grounds. The analysis also revealed an interesting pattern *rights landscape* confined to the plural form of *right*. The number of instances with this pattern is small (only 4 examples) but this pattern also provides another perspective in the understanding of the concept of *rights*. Namely, the use of the pattern *rights landscape* suggests a certain emphasis on the size of an AREA since landscape covers enormous grounds.

The fourth domain is PERSON. It is identifiable in patterns with both the singular form of *right* (31 instance) and the plural form *rights* (38 instances). The plural form *rights* is employed in the pattern *risks to the right(s)*; since it appears with the plural form 22 times compared to the singular form of *right* (2 times). The singular and plural forms of *right* share the common pattern *to establish the right(s)*. The metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A PERSON can also be conveyed by other structures, for example, *threaten the right*, *govern the right*, *right requires something and obstacle to the right*, while the *rights* seem to be interpreted only with expression *threats to rights* and *rights interact with something or someone*.

The study of the major tendencies of metaphoricity in different types of texts on European law revealed that the source domain preferred to convey the meaning of *right(s)* is an OBJECT. This can be observed in the Handbooks on Data Protection Law, the Rights of the Child and Right to Asylum, Borders and Immigration. The source domain OBJECT is often used in the Handbook on the Rights of the Child (RoCH), especially with the plural form of the word *right* (normalized frequency 24.94) and almost twice less with the singular form the *right* (normalized frequency 15.12). The singular form *right* (normalized frequency 7.96) in the Handbook on Asylum, Borders and Immigration (ABal) is almost twice as common as the plural form of *rights* (normalized frequency 4.37).

The *right(s)* is/are conceptualized as a FRAGILE OBJECT is more frequent in contexts with the plural form *rights* (87 cases) than with a single *right* (71 items). RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE A FRAGILE

OBJECT metaphor is found in the Handbooks on the Access to Justice, the Rights of the Child and the Data Protection Law. The use of *right(s)* in the Handbook on the Access to Justice shows that the plural form *rights* (28 instances) is interpreted as an OBJECT almost four times more frequently compared to the singular form of the word *right* (7 instances). Preference to the source domain FRAGILE OBJECT in the texts of the Handbook on Access to Justice, the Rights of the Child and the Data Protection Law may refer to different scope of the matters of each handbook. It might be due the special kind of information and matters that involve not only personal data, but also private information.

The meaning of *right(s)* conveyed by the subdomain POSSESSION is represented in a variety of contexts throughout the five handbooks. Both the singular form *right* and the plural form *rights* conceptualised as POSSESSION were primarily in the Handbooks on the Rights of the Child and the Data Protection Law. The normalized frequency of the singular form *right* is 7.32 that is two times less frequent compared to the plural form *rights* (14.35) discovered in the Handbook on the Rights of the Child. A similar, yet slightly different tendency can be observed in the text of the Handbook on Data Protection, namely the singular form *right* (114 instances) is two times more common, compared to the plural form of the word *rights* (66 instances). It seems that the interpretation of *right(s)* in terms of POSSESSION refers to the ownership of rights. This aspect is especially important referring to the topics of the rights of children and data protection.

The analysis of the subdomain PRODUCT reveals that the singular form of *right* appears only in the four Handbooks on the Rights of the Child (normalized frequency 0.29), Non-discrimination Law (0.21), Data Protection Law (0.15) and the Asylum, Borders, and Immigration (0.07). The plural form *rights* was used in all five handbooks including the Handbook on the Access to Justice (0.15). The emphasis of the singular and plural form of *right*, especially in the context of Rights of the Child and Non-discrimination law, may refer to the constant need to actively promote and share the information about various rights.

The concept of *right(s)* interpreted as a PHYSICAL ACTIVITY most predominantly appears in the Handbook on Data Protection and matters relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration. The use of the plural form of *rights* (normalized frequency 3.42) in the Handbook on Data Protection is almost twice more frequent than the employment of the single *right* (normalized frequency 1.94). The same can be observed in the context of Asylum, Borders, and Immigration, where the plural form of *rights* (normalized frequency 2.48; 34 instances) is almost twice as common, compared to the singular form *right* (normalized frequency 1.39; 19 instances). The emphasis on the plural form of *right* may convey the idea of actively using rights related to data protection, asylum, borders and immigration matters, as well as rights of the child.

The third source domain AREA mostly appears in the Handbook on the Data Protection and Access to Justice. In the context of Access to Justice, the results between the singular and plural for of *right* differ drastically. *Rights* is employed twice more often in 26 cases (4.01), compared to the singular form *right* appearing only in 14 cases (2.16). The use of the metaphor RIGHT(S) IS/ ARE AN AREA, especially in the context of Data Protection and Access to Justice may be justified by the scope of the matters discussed in these handbooks. Both topics of Data Protection and Access to Justice introduce matters that affect a multitude of people across the world, and it inevitably covers larger numbers of lands and spheres.

The source domain PERSON appears with both the singular and plural form of *right* and is primarily associated with the topic of the Data Protection. In the Handbook on Data Protection, the *rights* in the plural form appears twice more frequently compared to the singular form. It may imply that *right(s)* viewed in light of a PERSON are similar to people, who can be threatened, governed and may encounter obstacles when implementing their right.

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8. Summary in Lithuanian

Šiame magistro darbe analizuojami Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo (EŽTT) leidžiami Europos teisės vadovai, publikuoti nuo 2016 iki 2022 metų. Šio darbo tikslas buvo nustatyti metaforas, siejamas su teisėmis, t.y. pagal raktinį tikslo srities žodį RIGHT(S) ir palyginti metaforų vartojimą skirtinguose Europos teisės vadovuose. Medžiaga analizei buvo surinkta iš oficialaus EŽTT tinklalapio. Tyrimo metodai: AntConC, MIP, metaforų modeliai ir bendrieji konceptualios metaforų teorijos principai, panašiai kaip ši metodų visuma taikyta tiriant metaforų vertimą iš lietuvių į anglų kalbą (Šeškauskienė, Urbonaitė 2018). AntConc programa (Anthony 2022) buvo naudojama konkordansams su žodžiu RIGHT(S) išgauti. Iš metaforų nustatymo procedūros (MIP, Pragglejaz 2007; Steen et al. 2010) perimtas pagrindinės, arba bazinės, reikšmės nustatymo principas, metaforinių modelių metodika taikyta pagal Stefanowitsch (2004) principus. Be to, tyrimas grindžiamas Konceptualiosios metaforos teorijos samprata ir vėlesnių metaforų tyrimų principais (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003; Deignan 2005 ir pan.) Tyrimo rezultatai parodė, kad objekto metafora vartojama dažniausiai. Kitos ištakų sritys buvo FIZINĖ VEIKLA, TERITORIJA ir ASMUO/ŽMOGUS. OBJEKTO metafora vyravo daugumoje vadovų, tačiau kai kuriuose išryškėjo kiek kitokios tendencijos: metaforos TERITORIJA ir FIZINĖ VEIKLA dažnai vartojamos Europos Duomenų Apsaugos teisės vadove.

9. Appendices

9.1. Appendix 1. Results Right (Excel)

9.2. Appendix 2. Results Rights (Excel)