

VILNIUS UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF PHILOLOGY

Deimantė Janulytė

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**EXTERNAL ENEMIES IN CONTEMPORARY DISINFORMATION DISCOURSE
ON THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR**

BACHELOR THESIS

Academic Supervisor – Asist., Dr. Adam Mastandrea

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INTRODUCTION

With the rise of social media, it has become much easier to spread and consume disinformation. While spreading disinformation about something or somebody, people tend to create “external enemies”, which is a phenomenon where one side is blaming the other, for example the nation blaming the government for their misfortunes in life. This helps to divert the attention from oneself, while creating an illusion that it is not us, who are at fault, but the others. As this is an interesting phenomenon prevalent nowadays, it became the reason why this Bachelor thesis is going to focus on “external enemies” in contemporary disinformation discourse. As Boler (2019, p. 187) highlights, discourse acts as a battleground, mainly for politicians as the centrality of emotion is visible through examples of immigration, race, or other sensitive topics, which evoke a reaction from the public. Anderson (2020, p. 212-215) notes that we are going to support the news that we get if it fits our worldviews, even if it is false. This is why it can be difficult to distinguish truthful information from false.

It is the nature of humankind to blame other people, institutions or even religions for the things which do not seem appropriate or when we want to divert attention from ourselves (Arbatli, 2016, p. 116). It is not the internal enemy who is at fault, it is the external one, only because it is easier to blame others and it helps to persuade the audience of the wrong doings of the “external enemy”. The definition of the collocation “external enemy” is given by Mastandrea (2023), which says that an “external enemy” is when the author blames someone for being the bad guy for example, a religion, the government etc. The author also notices that disinformation is everywhere. Manfredi (2022) maintains that disinformation can be noticed in politics and is used to shape public opinion without destroying the system and its existing beliefs. Using an “external enemy” is a great way to spread disinformation about a chosen entity and harm its reputation, which, as Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) notice, is an important aspect in disinformation. **A great amount of research has been done on the topic of *disinformation*, but not so much on the “external enemies” in disinformation discourses, which this thesis is going to deal with while analysing the speeches given by two presidents of countries that are currently at war.** This will help to better understand how the semantic marker “external enemies” is used in political speeches in the context of war.

This thesis delves into the semantic marker “external enemies” in contemporary disinformation discourses surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war, with a specific focus on the political speeches given by Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. By conducting a case study, this research aims to answer in what ways the semantic marker “external enemies” is expressed in the public

speeches given on the Russia-Ukraine war? This Bachelor thesis is going to explore the semantic marker “external enemies” in contemporary disinformation discourses and answer the following questions.

The subject of the thesis is the semantic marker “external enemies” in contemporary disinformation discourse concerning the Russia-Ukraine war from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022.

The aim of the Bachelor thesis is to compare the semantic marker “external enemies” as it is used in the public speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy about the Russia-Ukraine war.

In order to achieve the aim, the following **objectives** have been set:

1. To examine scientific literature on disinformation, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the semantic marker “external enemies”.
2. To categorize the “external enemies” used in the transcripts of speeches given by Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
3. To analyse the usage of the semantic marker “external enemies” in political speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy.

The structure of the BA paper consists of six sections. The first section is the introduction, which provides an overview of the subject and why it is relevant and addresses the problem that is being investigated. Research questions, the aim, and the objectives of the thesis are also given in this section. The second section is a review of the scientific literature on the definition of *fake news* and its categories, including disinformation, since this Bachelor thesis is focusing on the semantic marker “external enemies” in disinformation discourses, the techniques of disinformation spread and diversionary war theory. The third section focuses on the research methodology. This involves outlining the process of creating a research tool, data collection and data analysis. The fourth section delves into the analysis of the semantic marker “external enemies” in contemporary disinformation discourses. It entails examining the political speeches given by two politicians on the Russia-Ukraine war from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022. Additionally, the section involves identifying and comparing the semantic marker “external enemies” used in the previously mentioned speeches through narrative analysis. The fifth part of the paper comprises the conclusions, where the research findings are summarized and presented. The sixth part of the paper includes summaries in both English and Lithuanian languages. Finally, at the end of the paper, the references, sources, and appendices are given.

I. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE

1.1 Defining fake news

Most people use the term *fake news* today as the phenomenon is becoming more and more prevalent, especially during times of war. This phenomenon has become so common that people tend to call truthful stories as *fake news*, even when they know that it is true, yet they do not want to believe the information. Yet, there is no specific definition concerning *fake news* and many scholars argue how to define it correctly, but we can most certainly say that it connects many aspects which are being spread on social media, the television, or even newspapers as there are many outlets to do so. However, we can still try and define *fake news* while using some ideas from various scholars. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017, p. 213) define *fake news* as news, which is intentionally false in order to confuse or mislead readers. According to Tandoc et al. (2017), with analysis of contemporary discourses, it can be noticed that viral posts from accounts, which are not official news outlets, but make the posts look like news reports, can be considered *fake news* (p. 138). Nizamani (2019, p. 16) uses the definition from *Cambridge Dictionary* which is as follows: “false stories that appear as news, spread on the Internet and usually created to influence political views or as a joke.”. All these definitions suggest that it can be hard to distinguish jokes and truthful information from false accusations and information.

One thing is to define the process and the other is to put it to practice and since there are many variations of the definition of *fake news*, even if they are similar to one another, scholars try to categorize the phenomenon. For example, Englmeier (2020) notices that *fake news* is usually expressed through different aspects, but the most common ones are fabrications, hoaxes, which are news about non-existent events made to attract readers, and humorous news (p. 2070). He also notes that the language of *fake news* is similar to hate speech, especially in conspiracy theories, where the vocabulary is offensive or even threatening. If we look at categorization, there are three categories of *fake news* explained in Wardle and Derakhshan’s (2017) work. They distinguish dis-information, which is false news meant to harm others, mis-information, which is the opposite of disinformation, since no harm is meant and lastly mal-information, where truthful information is shared in order to cause harm to others, such as leaks or hate speech.

Finally, we can say that *fake news* comes in many shapes and forms, some forms are meant to cause harm to others, and some are meant to confuse the audience. It is important to remember that *fake news* is a relatively new expression, this is why many scholars argue over how to define

it in one way as it is hard to so. There are many types of *fake news*, which fall into certain categories, and which are going to be discussed in the following subchapters, which helps us to understand the phenomenon better.

1.1.1 Misinformation

Misinformation is one of the tools used to split society and cause havoc (Englmeier, 2020, p. 2069). Englmeier discusses the elements of misinformation, specifying that the process is increasing mistrust in trustworthy institutions and people, however it is not meant to cause any harm to others. Anderson (2020) describes the process as one that is meant to confuse the society by making it difficult to distinguish between reality and fiction (p. 211). It has become easier to do so with pseudoscientific statements, since they may look trustworthy to some people, which highly depends on person's educational level (Pop and Ene, 2019). People with higher educational levels tend to question the information more, while those with a lower level tend to believe the first thing they see.

The case of misinformation's dependence on one's educational level can be illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. An article "Education levels impact on belief in scientific misinformation and mistrust of COVID-19 preventive measures" published on the University of Portsmouth site (2023) discusses a study conducted on COVID-19, which shows that people who did not have higher education were more likely to trust misinformation being spread about the pandemic and the safety of vaccines. Of course, not all people with a university degree are immune to misinformation, yet they were less likely to trust false information. The results did not show any relation to religion or likelihood of the participant having contracted the virus; it was purely related to education levels of the participants.

To sum up, misinformation is used to confuse and split society by spreading knowingly false information. While misinformation can be trusted by many, people with a university degree are less likely to do so.

1.1.2 Disinformation

Disinformation has become one of the biggest problems of the modern world. As Mastandrea (2023) notes, whilst the topic itself is not connected to disinformation, it still could have some incorporated into the discourse, even if it seems unlikely. Bennet and Livingston (2018) point out that disinformation depends on the country, and he gives four types of sources that one might find: *news sites promoting nationalism*, which the French might find attractive since they

are known for their extreme nationalism, *party and movement website networks* where political information might be posted, *foreign 'non linear warfare' operations* so loved by the Russians and *enterprising fake news businesses* (p. 128). A great example of the '*non linear warfare*' operations done by Russia is the invasion of Ukraine first in 2014 and then in 2022. It is noted that disinformation is intentional, often strategic false information spread as news stories and it has malicious intent. It can be done through false flag operations, which means hiding the primary source and pinning the blame on others, spreading biased quotations or news both through real and fake accounts (Weedon et al., 2017; Bennet and Livingston, 2018, p. 133). As the authors and Manfredi et al. (2022) highlight, a great amount of this phenomenon can be noticed in politics as disinformation is used to achieve political goals, or to weaken other institutions by making the audience question the credibility of mentioned structures (Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Manfredi et al., 2022).

Disinformation can be used to talk about both domestic and foreign issues of the country towards which the phenomenon is being used. Bennett and Livingston (2018) point out that both foreign and domestic disinformation seeks to disturb the order of political organs and create confusion (p. 130). Manfredi et al. (2022) add that disinformation does not want to destroy the system, its objective is to shape public opinion and set negotiations through appealing to already existing beliefs without changing them (p. 211-213). This can be illustrated by the Russian politics as the country uses both domestic and foreign disinformation. Russia spreads false information about its domestic politics, while also fighting the pressure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and many other issues concerning the country (p. 132-133). Livingston (2018) also distinguishes two types of disinformation. The first one deepens social distrust by making people believe that they are a part of common moral community where you must trust others and hyperbolised threats like LGBT+ rights or gun violence are frequent topics. The second type includes tactical propagation of opposing explanations for the same event (p. 10-11). The second type is commonly used to hide the war crimes committed by Russia and employing troll factories helps a great amount.

Considering all the facts we can say that disinformation is false news spread with intentions to cause harm to other people or institutions or to protect the country from its own people by appealing to their current beliefs without changing them. Both domestic and international disinformation aims to disrupt the order of public institutions, but it does not seek to destroy them, and Russia does so successfully by applying both types of disinformation mentioned by Livingston (2018) and employing troll factories to propagate many explanations of the same event, especially to hide committed war crimes, and to spread disinformation.

1.1.3 Summary of *fake news*

While disinformation and misinformation might look like the exact same thing, their functions, however, are different. They are both part of *fake news*, which knowingly false information spread in order to confuse the public. Both misinformation and disinformation spread lies about others, for example another institution, religion, or a country, but disinformation's and misinformation's aims are different.

As discussed before, misinformation seeks to cause havoc and to split society (Englmeier, 2020, p. 2069). The process does not seek to cause harm to somebody's reputation or the whole system of the country, it only seeks to confuse the society by making it harder to realise what is real and what is fabricated (Anderson, 2020, p. 211). There is a thin line between misinformation and disinformation, since misinformation is not used to cause harm to others, while disinformation is and with the spread of misinformation, mistrust in higher institutions is increasing, which is harming. This is why it might be hard to distinguish between misinformation and disinformation and scholars need to investigate the cases in great detail and decide whether the speaker, text or other means of information meant to cause direct harm to the person or institution, which the lies are being spread about.

On the other hand, disinformation is meant to cause harm to others. It is also knowingly false information, yet we spread it with a malicious intent. Disinformation is everywhere, even if we think that we are safe from it, every single topic existing on Earth, has some disinformation in it (Mastandrea, 2023). And this phenomenon has become one of the biggest problems nowadays, since it has become easier to spread disinformation due to the growth of social media. The spread can happen through false flag operations or spreading biased quotations both from real and fake accounts of politicians, celebrities, or civilians. Weedon et al., 2017; Bennet and Livingston, 2018, p. 133). As Manfredi et al. (2022, p. 211-213) highlight, disinformation does not want to destroy the system, its objective is to shape public opinion and set negotiations through appealing to already existing beliefs without changing them.

As this Bachelor thesis is focusing on "external enemies" in contemporary disinformation discourse on the Russia-Ukraine war, only cases of disinformation are going to be analysed. Since disinformation discourse has become the most prominent playground for politicians, V. Putin and V. Zelensky are no exception (Boler, 2019, p. 187). Both of them use disinformation in their public speeches, which are going to be analysed later, to cause harm to one another by lowering each other's reputation, the reputation of one another's countries or other governments.

To sum up, misinformation is used to confuse and split society by spreading knowingly false information, while disinformation aims to disrupt the order of public institutions and cause harm to those, who are considered as the “external enemy”, in this case Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky blaming each other and seeking to cause harm to one another.

1.2 Methods and motives for spreading disinformation

Motive is needed to do various tasks and the spread of disinformation is no exception. If people did not have any secret motives to share false information about other institutions or people, disinformation campaigns would not exist. But the success of disinformation campaigns does not depend purely on motives and motivation, it depends on the methods used to spread it. When it comes to motivation, Tandoc et al. (2017) notices two main factors: financial and ideological.

Financial motives depend on clicks and shares and advertising on the sites where the information is shared and due to the growth of internet, which is internationalised and liberal, disinformation does not need to operate on the dark web to benefit as legal advertising is being posted on their sites on the open web (Nizamani, 2019, p. 20). It becomes even worse if bots pick the information and spread it on a larger scale (Bennett and Livingston, 2018, p. 127-128).

Ideological motives seek to spread information that is not financially profitable, but in number of supporters and damage caused to those, who do not fit into their worldviews (Bennett and Livingston, 2018, p. 138). Adding more chaos to the spread of disinformation, not only *fake news* producers share their stories, but their supporters too, since the information benefits them morally and the unregulated nature of the internet helps to do so more easily which maximises the spread of *fake news* (Manfredi et al. 2022, p. 212; Nizamani, 2019, p. 16). As Bennett and Livingston (2018, p. 127-128) notice, the phenomenon becomes even worse if bots pick the information and spread it on a larger scale.

Sometimes personal motivation is not enough to spread disinformation effectively, you may need to understand your audience. People might not engage with your shared content if they are not interested in the topic that you are talking about or they might not agree with your statements, this is why you need to understand your audience for effective spread of disinformation. Bayer et al. (2019) points out that disinformation is not restricted to time or place, but it intensifies during important social events and the ones spreading false information analyse the state of the country, beliefs of the people, their age and other traits that might help making disinformation campaign successful. With the growth of social media, there are many outlets to spread disinformation quicker, such as Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), or

Telegram, which is one of the main platforms to spread disinformation and other harmful material. It is worth noting that original sources are hidden, and the attention of the supporters is diverted from them. This phenomenon is called laundering by scholars (Bayer et al., p. 29-31).

Once there is motivation and understanding of the audience, the work on the spread of disinformation can begin. Wardle and Derakhshan (2017, p. 25) explain the production of disinformation in a simple way. First comes *creation*, where an article is written, then comes *production* when the article is published. After this, the article is *distributed* by people working for the sites and lastly comes re-production, where supporters share the information.

As there are many websites to spread disinformation, there are also many types of the phenomenon, which Tandoc et al. (2017, p. 141-147) name: news satire, news parody, news fabrication, photo manipulation, advertising and public relations (using clickbait to attract readers), and propaganda. *News satire* does not fully fall into the category of *fake news* as it focuses on current affairs in the format of a TV-broadcast while using humour or exaggeration to present the news. *News parody* on the other hand presents fictional stories in order to mock current affairs. Even if it is similar to satire, it falls into the category of disinformation for making up facts. *News fabrication* means publishing articles with no factual basis which look like authentic news and cause confusion whether the information is real or fake. *Photo manipulation* is easier than ever with artificial intelligence (AI) tools, since AI generated images look like real photos and editing tools like Photoshop are introducing new AI functions into their programs. Propaganda refers to stories created by politicians to influence the beliefs of the society on particular people, actions, or domestic affairs. The purpose of propaganda is not to inform, but to gain support from people by persuading them. All these types of disinformation are related by how real they all feel to the reader and how they hide the real facts behind them. Russia is known for having troll factories, which carry out attacks internationally. Bennett and Livingston (2018) point out that ‘St Petersburg troll factory’ (called IRA) is one of many troll farm firms and in 2013 employed about 600 people, who were expected to write at least 50 articles, make multiple Facebook and X posts a day (p. 132). Troll farms are a whole business which is thriving and many fear the attacks of Russian bots since their actions include hacking and hijacking. So many bots are made since Russia believed that the country is in constant war with the West, so they opened a government-run cyber training schools and operate programs in search of the most talented cyber warriors (Kollars and Petersen, 2019, p. 146; Roche and Blaine, 2023, p. 133). Russia has started many cyber wars, which is the strategic use of national networks to harm the opponent and it is often defined as information or psychological warfare (Roche and Blaine, 2023, p. 131-132). Weaponizing information is one of the strategies in

Russia as it uses it to exploit it for tactical gain and employs their resources during peace and wartime (Kollars and Petersen, 2019, p. 146-148). Russian bots spread disinformation about US, NATO and EU as anti-Western framing is one of the main topics in their disinformation campaigns, which usually do not cause much harm but during the annexation of Crimea in 2014 they did not only disrupt the cyber infrastructure but seized it completely. This gave the world a message that cyber war of Russia and the world could have serious consequences and troll farms can cause a great deal of damage (Manfredi et al., 2022, p. 213; Roche and Blaine, 2023, p. 137).

To sum up, Tandoc et al. (2017) points out two main motivations for spreading disinformation: financial and ideological. They also give the types of disinformation which are news satire, news parody, fabrication, photo manipulation and propaganda. After finding what motivates the producers of disinformation, Nizamani (2019) gives five steps that they tend to follow: production of websites, stealing ideas from others, monetization, expansion, and repetition. The very same steps are applied when spreading disinformation in the Russia-Ukraine war.

1.3 The rise of social media and how it helps disinformation

In the 21st century it is easier than ever to spread disinformation as humanity has highly progressed and now, we have many social media and even radio apps, where people can share their own thoughts on various topics. During the pandemic podcasts have grown a great deal, there people talk about their daily lives, some educate others about different topics and some talk about problems in their country or even global disasters, post events they witness first-hand. Facebook is one of the most popular outlets where people consume and produce various types of information (Tandoc et al., 2017, p. 139). Because of this people might share disinformation without understanding the meaning of the message and this phenomenon can be called peer-to-peer propaganda (Haigh et al., 2018, p. 2069). It should be noted that people are choosing free options to get their news, which means that they turn to social media instead of reading authentic news websites, where most of them have a paywall now in order to survive (Starr as cited in Bennet and Livingston, 2021, p. 71). Anderson (2020) notices that emotional disinformation is the most popular since it is most likely to go viral, which means more likes, shares, and clicks and they release dopamine in the poster's brain, which makes us addicted to creating and publishing content as if it were a drug. The repeating of the same content causes a "flooding" effect, which helps to shape one's views as our brain accepts repeated facts as being truthful. The virality also attracts advertisers because they want their products to be clicked on more as it gains them more value (p. 217-220). Because social media reduces the cost of

communication and information spreads quicker, most of world leaders have their own social media accounts where they post information, raise funds, or invite people to take action for different causes (Zeitsoff, 2017, p. 1970, 1978-1979). Another reason why disinformation spreads so fast is because there are many different social media platforms with different audiences and advantages (listed in Table 1).

Table 1

Digital platforms used for disinformation operations (Bayer et al., 2019, p. 38-39)

Digital platform	Main advantages of disinformation
Facebook	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The most popular social media platform worldwide • Wealth of user data • Very precise micro-targeting • Algorithm-driven feed curation prioritises content on the basis of popularity, not truth • Easy to game the system for popularity • Source of (dis)information seen as trustworthy • Groups create a feeling of community while keeping manipulated content out of sight, making it hard to trace or debunk
Twitter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easy to set up bots and semi-automated accounts that enable the fast spread of (dis)information • Anonymity, multiple accounts allowed • Ranking algorithm (trending hashtags) can be cheated
Instagram	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Younger audience, maybe more easily radicalised • Users do not expect to be confronted with partisan, political content; they are more vulnerable • Visually oriented app ideal for memes • ‘Explore’ feature promotes related content • Uses hashtags, which can be gamed
Messaging apps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Dis)information comes from what is perceived as a trusted source • Messages spread in closed groups, not visible to fact-checkers on the outside • Encrypted conversations – hard to track

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Group messages allow (dis)information to spread quickly
YouTube	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Younger users, more easily radicalised • ‘Autoplay’ feature automatically plays content it deems related • Recommendation algorithm pushes viewers towards the extreme • AI-curated ‘trending news’ ranks videos on the basis of popularity, not the quality of information

1.4 The fight against disinformation

In the past it was easier to control the flow of disinformation with better gatekeeping and less ways to spread it. Nowadays, there are many ways to distribute disinformation and social media platforms can spread disinformation inadvertently, especially when everyone points the right of free speech everywhere. These social media platforms need to be careful not to damage their business and customer relations by disapproving of disinformation being spread (Bennett and Livingston, 2018, p. 124-134; Anderson, 2020, p. 222). According to Anderson (2020), complete removal of disinformation is ineffective and even impossible as it is shared quicker than it can be checked for truthfulness, yet governmental action is needed. The government could initiate the introduction of school programs or courses about media literacy, which is understanding the framing of disinformation and managing to distinguish between truth and fiction. The purpose is not to make every person a fact-checker, the purpose is to slow down the spread of disinformation by teaching people of the effects and how to evaluate information (p. 224-226, 240).

Even if the government is involved, sometimes volunteers do a better job in countering disinformation than official institutions. A great example is the StopFake organisation founded in 2014 by Ukrainian journalism graduates. Their mission is to analyse information that is posted online and sent to them. If they are not capable of proving information wrong, or even if it is partially false, they do not post it on their website. They also host media literacy workshops since 2015 in collaboration with IREX Ukraine and it has become an essential part of StopFake’s work. Their articles are multilingual as they are providing their results to domestic, Russian, and Western consumers. When they started there were only two languages available (Russian and English) yet they keep on adding new ones to reach an even larger audience worldwide and now in 2023 they offer fourteen different languages. Sites like

StopFake are needed to minimise the spread of disinformation and teaching people of media literacy (Haigh et al., 2018, p. 2062-2063, 2069).

Since not many people know about such fact-checking sites, Nizamani (2019) offers some actions that might help to minimise the spread of disinformation. The first option is *automated blacklisting*. This practice means keeping lists of websites and social media accounts that are spreading false information or spam. Another way is to *employ self-regulation of web industries*. This involves advertising companies keeping whitelists of websites that are authentic and supporting legitimate sites instead of purchasing advertising on disinformation sites even if the placing for advertisement is cheaper there. Lastly, *utilising AI*, which can recognise “deepfakes” and false information, which will be flagged and then fact-checked. This might help with building stronger security against disinformation campaigns since their posts would be checked constantly.

In conclusion, As Manfredi et al. (2022) point out, denying false information is costly and exhausting, even if defender is successful, psychological effects of accusations are still prevalent (p. 212). This might be the reason why the president of Ukraine does not try to deny the disinformation coming from the other side of the Russia-Ukraine war, instead he encourages the nation to stay strong and asks for help from others. On the other hand, Putin describes the invasion of Ukraine as a “special operation” and denies the fact that it is the aggressor, blaming others for the country’s actions as it has always done, and it is costly for the government. Also, it is nearly impossible to destroy disinformation but there are some measures to minimise the spread of it, which are teaching media literacy, keeping blacklists of *fake news* sites, asking advertising companies to cooperate and not buy cheaper advertisement spots on disinformation sites, and lastly, utilising AI to flag possibly false information which will be fact-checked by organisations like StopFake or other volunteers. Such actions might help to gain more support for Ukraine in the ongoing war as disinformation would spread slower reaching fewer people, whose opinions might be affected by it.

1.5 Defining the semantic marker “external enemies”

Perhaps the most important part in understanding this research is defining the semantic marker “external enemies”, described as words or phrases that place the blame on religion, official institutions, or other people (Mastandrea, 2023). It is similar to scapegoating, which is a phenomenon, where all the blame is placed on one object or individual (Dorr, 2010, p. 92). The more disinformation we encounter about the “external enemy”, the more likely people are going to believe it and eventually not only those in charge of the evil but also the innocent ones. If the

scapegoated or the “external enemies” try to counter the attack, in some cases it might be seen as avoiding the guilt (Dorr, 2010, p. 96). A great example can be taken from the Covid-19 pandemic as when it started, many were thinking whether the virus was created in a lab or if it really came from an animal. Another topic related to Covid-19 is vaccination. When first vaccines against the virus were created and people started to massively vaccinate themselves, some started speculating that it is the vaccines that are killing people and not the virus itself. You could only decide which side you support and who your “external enemy” is going to be – vaccines or the virus. Nobody was safe from the attacks from those, who blamed the vaccination process and doctors could not do much to help the situation. However, there are cases when one or another side might be considered as less guilty or even innocent and it all depends on the circumstances of the action and the reputation of the performer of the action. (Nadler, 2012, p. 1). As Nadler (2010, p. 1) notices, this is related to the psychology of humans and our perception of whether the guilty one poses a threat to others.

Since this thesis focuses on the speeches of two politicians of countries at war, it means that they can put the responsibility of their actions on others to lose the pressure or to simply explain the situation that is happening by seeking to cause some harm to the opposing side at the same time. Balzacq and Rousseau (2020, p. 293-294) highlight that such action has become a regular strategy when dealing with the reputation of the government or the country itself both domestically and internationally. When the leader of the country is accused of violating human rights, he usually tends to deny such accusations through social media posts or news reports. Making an “external enemy” helps to take the blame from their shoulders, or so it appears.

In conclusion, “external enemies” are agents, who are usually scapegoated. Dorr (2010) notes that politicians use “external enemies” to contradict the accusations of their wrongdoings and to try to gain sympathy from others. It might be hard to do so sometimes as the success of the creation of the “external enemy” depends on your reputation and the circumstances that surround your actions. As Boler (2019, p. 187) highlights, the phenomenon has become normalised and even a regular strategy in politics.

II. METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH

The research focuses on the semantic marker “external enemies” in public speeches given by the presidents of Russia and Ukraine on the Russia-Ukraine war from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022. As mentioned before, this is a descriptive case study, which means that it identifies the problem and analyses an event, in this case the Russia-Ukraine war, where numerous cases were collected from speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy (see Appendices). The main point of a descriptive case study is to help the reader to understand the topic better, not to give solutions to the problem (Monash University, n.d.). With the intention to fulfil the aim, which is to investigate, categorize and compare the “external enemies” used in the previously mentioned speeches, the research was divided into four stages:

1. Generalisation of scientific literature;
2. Design of a research tool;
3. Data collection;
4. Data analysis;

The first stage of this Bachelor thesis referred to the review of scientific literature related to disinformation, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the semantic marker “external enemies”. The literature review presented insights by Bayer et al., Englmeier, Manfredi, Mastandrea, Nizamani and other scholars on definitions of disinformation, how it is spread and why social media plays a big part in the spread. The literature review also introduced the semantic marker “external enemies” as it is the most important part of the thesis and to better understand what the semantic marker “external enemies” means and what could be the examples of it, a table from Mastandrea (2023) with the four semantic markers of emotional discourse was used.

Table 2

Semantic markers of emotional discourse (Mastandrea, 2023)

External Enemies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Words or phrases that place responsibility for perceived social ills on the media, the government, banks, corporations, technology, billionaires, or religious or ethnic groups
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The second stage is related to designing a research tool. The design was based on Riessman’s (2008) work. According to him, there are different steps to conduct a narrative analysis. The first step is the thematic analysis, where we decide on the theme of the narrative that a person might have created. According to the author, thematic analysis is the most common when conducting a narrative analysis. As a result, it can be seen what feelings arise when the speaker creates a narrative. The second step is the structural analysis. This is the main step, which

inspired the creation of a research tool for this thesis. The structural analysis seeks to look at “how are narratives organized – put together – to achieve a narrator’s strategic aims?” (Riessman, 2008, p. 114-115). Special attention was paid to identification and marking of “external enemies” and Mastandrea’s (2023) table on semantic markers of emotional discourse (see Table 2) helped to identify them. The red font marking of “external enemies” helped to put the focus on them, which later helped to create the types of “external enemies” used, which were: *Foreign Governments*, *International Organizations*, *Supranational Alliances*, *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural*. According to these 5 types, the collected samples were grouped, and their usage frequency was detected, which helped with further analysis of the “external enemies” used in V. Putin’s and V. Zelenskyy’s speeches given from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022. “External enemies” from the speeches listed in the description of the third stage of this research were grouped into the created categories based on their content.

The third stage of this Bachelor thesis was data collection. Indicated period of data collection from 24 February 2022 to 28 February 2022. It included the identification and classification of different political speeches and the semantic marker “external enemies” in them. The sample comprised **206 primary examples** which were distinguished from kremlin.ru and president.gov.ua as these are the official sites of the Russian government and the Ukrainian government.

The fourth stage of the research was dedicated to data analysis. A qualitative method was applied, and narrative analysis was carried out to investigate the collected cases of the semantic marker “external enemies” used by the politicians of the previously mentioned countries. Narrative analysis means looking at the data while examining the background of the narrative, meaning and the effect it has. To conduct the narrative analysis, we can look at the worldviews of V. Putin and V. Zelensky, which might be shaped by the history of the country, by their childhood or other parts of their life, which might have impacted their choice of words or even actions and these parts were discussed in the analysis. The main part is analysing “external enemies”, their effect and categorization of their usage. After “external enemies” were collected and marked, 5 types of external enemies were determined and coded according to their content. The types were: *Foreign Governments*, *International Organizations*, *Supranational Alliances*, *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural*. Then the research was able to identify who or what V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy blame and how “external enemies” appear in their speeches. Data was critically examined by the author and by proof-readers to ensure that

interpretations were not biased. Discussion of the results and whether diversionary war theory, which means diverting the attention from us and creating an “external enemy” as a war tactic, was included in this part.

The limitation of the research is keeping neutrality while discussing the Russia-Ukraine war, not supporting, or defending one or another side. In order to guarantee reliability of data and its coding, active participation of the academic supervisor and two philology students who were writing their theses in the same field, was included. Proof-reading was used to reduce bias as it was one of the limitations of this thesis and also to ensure that the data coding was done in the right way. Regular meetings and discussions were held, where we shared insights on each work.

III. THE ANALYSIS OF THE SEMANTIC MARKER “EXTERNAL ENEMIES”

3.1 Classification of the “external enemies” and grouping of frequency

In this chapter of the bachelor thesis, 206 samples of “external enemies” were chosen from the speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022. This particular period was chosen since these were the very first days of the war and they were the most crucial. Many different decisions were made by foreign governments, fear spread across the globe and people were protesting against the Russian government and its decision to take such an action. After collecting the data, in order to successfully analyse the “external enemies” used in political speeches, 5 types of the semantic marker were created according to the “external enemies” and their narratives in the samples of “external enemies” collected from the speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy, coding them into 5 types presented in Table 3:

Table 3

List of Criteria for the semantic marker “external enemies”


Types	Description
Foreign Governments	Foreign – located outside a particular place or country and especially outside your own country. (Britannica Dictionary) Government – the political system by which a country or community is administered and regulated. (Britannica Dictionary) Often framed with “us versus them” narrative.
International Organizations	Institution drawing membership from at least three states, having activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a formal agreement. (Britannica Dictionary)
Supranational Alliances	The division of the world into a number of separate national entities, or states, that have contact with one another, share goals or needs, and face common threats. (Britannica Dictionary)

Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors	Such groups as Anonymous, state-sponsored hacking groups, or other cyber threats.
The Supernatural	Things that cannot be explained by science and seem to involve ghosts, spirits, magic, etc. (Britannica Dictionary)

These samples were classified and analysed in order to identify the most common types of “external enemies” used in the speeches given by two presidents of countries, who are currently fighting each other in war. To see the frequency of “external enemies” better, with many hours of investigation and examination of samples, 5 different types of “external enemies” used were determined, including *Foreign Governments*, *International Organisations*, *Supranational Alliances*, *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural*. This allowed me to see what or who does each side blame the most and then I was able to conduct a possible narrative analysis. The distribution of collected samples of “external enemies” found in the speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1

“External enemies” used in V. Putin’s and V. Zelenskyy’s speeches



As it can be seen in Figure 1 the distribution of the types of “external enemies” in the speeches of the previously mentioned politicians is quite unanimous. The most prominent “external enemy” in the speeches was *Foreign Governments*. To be more specific 184 out of all the samples belonged to this type, mind you there were total of 206 cases, so only 22 of them

belonged to other types. If we look further, *Supranational Alliances* and *International Organisations* were also quite common if we take *Foreign Governments* out of the picture: *Supranational Alliances* were identified in 16 samples and *International Organisations* were identified in 4 samples. The least used were *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural* with only one case in each type.

It is worth mentioning that some samples were overlapping as the politicians used similar “external enemies” in their speeches or blamed the same organisations, alliances, or governments. Another thing worth mentioning is that the sentences in these speeches employed several “external enemies” in the same sentence, which might impact the numbers of actual cases of “external enemies” used in the previously mentioned speeches.

3.2 The analysis of the most dominant types of “external enemies” in the selected speeches

As it was mentioned before, this bachelor thesis focuses on two politicians V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy, the presidents of two countries that are currently at war. The following subchapters are dedicated to the distribution and analysis of the types of “external enemies” by each politician. The numbers of cases will be presented more in depth, a narrative analysis will be conducted on why each president is blaming *Foreign Governments* the most and which governments they are blaming.


3.2.1 The distribution and analysis of the types of “external enemies” used in V. Putin’s speeches

V. Putin is the president of Russia, and he has been in position since 2012, according to Britannica.com, which puts him in position of a president, who has run his country for the longest time since the Soviet era. He was also the president of Russia from 1999 until 2008 before he was re-elected once again. As Ray (2024) describes V. Putin, he is a quite controversial persona since he is making all these risky decisions with invasions of neighbouring countries or controlling nearly 70 percent of the Russian economy.

Out of 206 samples of “external enemies” 50 samples belonged to him. The collected samples were classified according to the previously mentioned types of “external enemies”. It is important to remind that some cases were overlapping as some sentences in the speeches given by V. Putin employed several “external enemies” in the same sentence. The distribution of the types of “external enemies” found in his speeches can be seen in Figure 2:

Figure 2

The distribution of “external enemies” used in V. Putin’s speeches



The data shows that three out of five types of “external enemies” were used, and they were: *Foreign Governments* with 50 cases, *International Organisations* with 4 cases and *Supranational Alliances* with 12 cases.

As Kollars and Petersen (2019, p. 146) notice, Russia believes that the country is in a constant war with the West, which might have impact on the narrative that Putin has on why he has started the war. At least, it is one of the reasons as in his very first speech given at the start of the 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine, V. Putin has stated that Ukraine has been a part of Russia historically and that some Ukrainians want to be part of the country again. This is why he has started a ‘special operation’ in Ukraine. It sounds as if Ukraine was separated from Russia by force. However, the politician tends to blame the West the most for the war by saying that they provoked it by not listening and cooperating with Russia properly, by crossing the line with the country. Great examples are from V. Putin’s first speech, given on February 24, 2022, where he says “Instead, we saw a state of euphoria created by the feeling of absolute superiority, a kind of modern absolutism, coupled with the low cultural standards and arrogance of those who formulated and pushed through decisions that suited only themselves.”, “To reiterate: they have deceived us, or, to put it simply, they have played us.” and “They have crossed it.”. These are only three out of forty-seven examples, where the blame towards the West not cooperating with Russia can be felt the most. It is worth noting that *they* in these examples stand for the West.

If we look at the most used “external enemy” of V. Putin, we can notice that he blames *Foreign Governments* the most. Five examples from *Foreign Governments* type are shown in Table 4 for better understanding of the data collected:

Table 4

Examples of Foreign Governments in V. Putin’s speeches

No.	Example of <i>Foreign Governments</i>
1.	“I spoke about our biggest concerns and worries, and about the fundamental threats which irresponsible Western politicians created for Russia consistently, rudely and unceremoniously from year to year.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)
2.	“It is a fact that over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)
3.	“This has to do with the entire system of international relations, and sometimes even US allies .” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)
4.	“It seems it will be easier for us to come to terms with you than with this gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis that have settled in Kiev and that have taken the Ukrainian people hostage .” (<i>Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851</i>)
5.	“ They plan to force return fire by Russian strike systems against residential quarters.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (<i>Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851</i>)


Western politicians, the West itself and countries, which are members of *Supranational Alliances* are his main target. The reason behind this could be V. Putin’s narrative that Russia is in an eternal war with the West, which has been going on since the Cold War. The president tends to look at everything from the historical side, where he analyses the connections with the West, Ukraine, the previously mentioned alliances, and organisations. While looking back, he likes to use sarcasm and even mock others. Examples such as “As for our country, after the

disintegration of the USSR, given the entire unprecedented openness of the new, modern Russia, its readiness to work honestly with the United States and other Western partners, and its practically unilateral disarmament, they immediately tried to put the final squeeze on us, finish us off, and utterly destroy us. This is how it was in the 1990s and the early 2000s, when the so-called collective West was actively supporting separatism and gangs of mercenaries in southern Russia.” Or “Do not allow neo-Nazis and Banderites to use your children, wives and elders as a live shield. Take power into your own hands. It seems it will be easier for us to come to terms with you than with this gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis that have settled in Kiev and that have taken the Ukrainian people hostage.”, taken from the first speech made by Vladimir Putin, show how he likes to laugh at the West by saying “the so-called collective West” and what his position towards Ukrainian politicians are. From these two particular examples, we can create an image that V. Putin sees western governments as selfish, who only look at themselves and only act as if they are willing to help others without any personal gain. This point of view is somewhat right. If we look at the Russia-Ukraine war, other countries send equipment, military personnel, and other support packages to Ukraine in hopes that the war ends soon, Ukraine wins and Russia is weakened to the point, where it will not be able to attack other countries, or even worse start a war with NATO countries, which might grow into another world war. However, if we look from the other side, this seems utopian as war analytics nowadays say that Russia has already started to prepare for war against NATO, but at the very start of the war these countries could not foresee what is going to happen two or three years later, they hoped for the best.

Coming back to the analysis of the *Foreign Governments* type of “external enemies”, we can look at the next figure and see who or what Vladimir Putin blames the most (see Figure 3).

Figure 3

The distribution of “external enemies” in the Foreign Governments type (V. Putin’s speeches)



From this figure it can be seen that Vladimir Putin tends to blame Ukraine, its government and allies the most. The Russian politician blames Ukrainian government for the war many times as V. Putin likes to highlight that Ukraine was part of Russia until “neo-Nazis” stole the country and created a separate government which was not part of the Russian Federation. While talking about the Ukrainian government, the president of Russia seeks to humiliate his opponent by calling them “neo-Nazis”, “Banderites” and “gang of drug addicts”, but the most prominent insult is “neo-Nazis”. Which makes it more insulting to the Ukrainian government and Ukraine itself, is that their president Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, and if we look from the historical perspective, the Jews and Nazis do not have the best history as Nazi Germany were committing a genocide of Jewish people. Many people around the world say the same about V. Putin nowadays, they say that he is committing a genocide against Ukraine and its people. Not only does he mock the government of Ukraine, but he also says, “this gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis that have settled in Kiev and that have taken the Ukrainian people hostage”. As it was noticed before, Putin wants to paint a picture that Ukraine was forcefully taken away from Russia and Ukrainian people did not have a choice whether they wanted to be part of Russia or Ukraine. V. Putin in most cases uses diversionary war theory, while giving speeches, by making sure that he points out how the Ukrainian government is “putting up heavy weapons, including multiple-rocket launchers, right in the central districts of large cities, including Kiev and Kharkov” and “they are acting in the same way that terrorists act all over the world – using people as shields in the hope of accusing Russia of civilian casualties”, which makes people

believe the disinformation, which is being spread that Ukraine wants to show Russia as the bad guy to the world and is fighting itself. This tactic is popular among Russian politicians as the same things were said about the events, which happened in Lithuania on January 13, 1991. Back then, M. Gorbachev, who was the last leader of the Soviet Union, said that Lithuanians fought themselves and these were not Russian troops who threatened the nation and definitely not Russian tanks that injured over a thousand people and killed 14 people, who had their whole lives ahead of themselves. It could be said that diversionary war theory is the most popular tactic to use in Russia when trying to fight against different allegations.

The other two most blamed are The US and its allies and the West and its allies, politicians. These results are not surprising since it was mentioned before that Russia thinks that it is in a constant war with the West. It is the worldview that Vladimir Putin has created for himself, and it affects his “external enemies” and decision making. The politician mostly notes that the West, the US and their allies did not want to cooperate with Russia properly and they eventually crossed the line that Russia had drawn, which gave the country to begin to act on its own and this is how the whole world came to where it is at now. Only by creating chaos was Russia able to get the reaction it wanted from the West, and it finally saw that they feared Vladimir Putin and his country, they feared that the West could face the same consequences as Ukraine did and nobody wanted a third world war to begin. This fear has pushed Putin to gain more and more confidence to the point, where he was able to start planning the attack against NATO nowadays. The least blamed were: NATO countries with 3 cases, Nazi Germany with 2 samples and Syria with one case sample. The case of why NATO countries are blamed only thrice might be that they are part of the West, so Vladimir Putin, when talking about the West, could as well be talking about NATO countries and it is a known fact that Putin does not like the idea of NATO being close to him, as he himself has noted in his speeches that he had discussed the fact with the West. It is worth reminding that the numbers of these cases might differ, since some “external enemies” are overlapping or there might be several different cases in the same sentence.

Another popular “external enemy” type was *Supranational Alliances* with 12 cases. If before it was noticed that out of 50 cases, NATO countries were blamed only three times, *Supranational Alliances* type is where NATO gets the spotlight, as it is blamed in all the cases, some of which are presented in Table 5:

Table 5*Examples of Supranational alliances in V. Putin's speeches*

No.	Example of <i>Supranational Alliances</i>
1.	“I am referring to the eastward expansion of NATO , which is moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)
2.	“In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)
3.	“Despite all that, in December 2021, we made yet another attempt to reach agreement with the United States and its allies on the principles of European security and NATO's non-expansion.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)
4.	“Even now, with NATO's eastward expansion the situation for Russia has been becoming worse and more dangerous by the year.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)
5.	“Moreover, these past days NATO leadership has been blunt in its statements that they need to accelerate and step up efforts to bring the alliance's infrastructure closer to Russia's borders.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)

This is exactly where we can see V. Putin's dissatisfaction with the NATO expansion in examples such as “I am referring to the eastward expansion of NATO, which is moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border.” and “In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.”. He shows clearly that he does not like the idea of NATO expanding closer and closer to Russia's border and how he wants it to stop. He also notes how he has discussed his wants with the alliance and its members

and how his wishes were ignored. From V. Putin’s point of view, NATO accepts only these suggestions and ideas, which are useful to the alliance. Others get thrown out and this idea is not acceptable to the president of Russia.

Lastly, we have *International Organisations* with 4 cases, which are presented in Table 6:

Table 6

Examples of International Organisations in V. Putin’s speeches

No.	Example of <i>International Organisations</i>
1.	<p>“There are many examples of this. First a bloody military operation was waged against Belgrade, without the UN Security Council’s sanction but with combat aircraft and missiles used in the heart of Europe.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)</p>
2.	<p>“The illegal use of military power against Libya and the distortion of all the UN Security Council decisions on Libya ruined the state, created a huge seat of international terrorism, and pushed the country towards a humanitarian catastrophe, into the vortex of a civil war, which has continued there for years.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)</p>
3.	<p>“The combat operations conducted by the Western coalition in that country without the Syrian government’s approval or UN Security Council’s sanction can only be defined as aggression and intervention.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)</p>
4.	<p>“We witnessed lies made at the highest state level and voiced from the high UN rostrum.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2024, February 24, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843</i>)</p>

In the samples, which were collected, the UN Security Council is blamed for looking away from certain military operations and not acting properly. Vladimir Putin also blames the UN for spreading lies to sugarcoat the ongoing events, which, from V. Putin’s point of view “can only be defined as aggression and intervention.” and are illegal.

To conclude, the most used type of “external enemies” in V. Putin’s speeches is *Foreign Governments* with 50 cases. There he blames Ukraine’s politicians, the West and its allies and


the US and its allies the most. Before the research began, a hypothesis was made that Russia is going to blame everyone except for themselves, since the Russian government is putting the country in the position of a victim and not the aggressor. The results were not surprising as it was expected that Vladimir Putin was going to blame Ukraine for the Russia-Ukraine war, and then the others. What was surprising is that *Supranational Alliances* did not have many cases, only 12 of them. I was hoping that NATO and its expansion will be blamed more than nine times, since Vladimir Putin is vocal about not liking the fact that the alliance is getting closer to the Russian border. Lastly, *International Organisations* had only 4 cases and there the president of Russia blamed the UN Security Council for looking away from certain war crimes. He also blamed the UN for creating lies to sugarcoat certain situations.

3.2.2 The distribution of the types of “external enemies” used in V. Zelenskyy’s speeches

Another important politician, whose speeches were analysed in this bachelor thesis, is V. Zelenskyy, who is the president of Ukraine and has been in position since 2019. According to Ray (2024), Zelenskyy’s anti-corruption platform was the one, who secured his victory in the elections even if politics was a new field for the current president. Many people have celebrated him over the period of ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and were surprised by his decision to stay in Ukraine and fight alongside others instead of fleeing the country as many have suggested. His words “I need ammunition, not a ride” have become famous worldwide along with other quotes, which were said during the invasion of Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022. Out of 206 samples of “external enemies” 140 samples belonged to him. The collected samples were also classified according to the same previously mentioned types of “external enemies”. It is important to remind that some cases were overlapping as some sentences in the speeches given by V. Zelenskyy employed several “external enemies” in the same sentence. The distribution of the types of “external enemies” found in his speeches can be seen in Figure 4:

Figure 4

The distribution of “external enemies” used in V. Zelenskyy’s speeches.



The data shows the most dominant type of “external enemies” was *Foreign Governments* as 134 cases out of 140 cases, which are from V. Zelenskyy’s speeches, belonged to this type of classification. Less dominant were: *Supranational Alliances*, *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural* with distribution of 4, 1, 1 cases respectively.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy was new in the political field when he was elected, so it is hard to say what kind of tactics he likes or what he thinks overall, however we can see how history of Ukraine could impact his narrative. Growing up he saw all these corrupt politicians, who were cooperating with Russia and gaining thousands, if not millions of hryvnias while the country itself and the citizens were on the edge of poverty. He saw that Russian oligarchs were practically ruling the country and he wanted to change that. This is how his election win-securing anticorruption program was created. This is why now this thesis analyses the “external enemies” of a former comedian.

Foreign Governments was the most prominent “external enemy” in V. Zelenskyy’s speeches, to be more exact 134 cases out of 140 belonged to this type. The narrative of the president of Ukraine is clear – Russia is the one to blame for the war as Ukraine used to be the puppet of this country and now, they are trying to recreate the old system which is suitable for the enemy. Some examples of *Foreign Governments* type are presented in Table 7:

Table 7

Examples of Foreign Governments in V. Zelenskyy's speeches.

No.	Example of <i>Foreign Governments</i>
1.	<p>“But the leadership of the Russian Federation is unlikely to see it.” (<i>Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24,</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137)</p>
2.	<p>“Enemy paratroopers in Hostomel are blocked, troops are ordered to destroy them.” (<i>Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24,</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137)</p>
3.	<p>“Enemy aircraft operate treacherously over residential areas, including the capital.” (<i>Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153)</p>
4.	<p>“The world's most powerful forces are watching from afar.” (<i>Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153)</p>
5.	<p>“I do not want missiles, planes, helicopters to fly to Ukraine from Belarus.” (<i>Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the citizens, 2022, February 27</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-volodimira-zelenskogo-do-gromadyan-73233)</p>

Here the president mostly blames the Russian government for its decision to invade Ukraine, the Russian military, its machinery, and personnel. Oftentimes he gets emotional as the situation hurts him deeply since the Russian president calls the Ukrainian government “neo-Nazis” and V. Zelenskyy is in fact Jewish. This narrative of V. Putin hurts the Ukrainian president from the historical perspective since if we look back in history, the Jews were massively killed by Nazis. Many people call the war a genocide of Ukrainians just as there was a genocide of the Jews. V. Zelenskyy gives out the names of the Russian military machinery like in the following example “Over the city of Kropyvnytskyi he shot down an enemy IL-76, which prevented the landing of Russian troops with weapons.” or “He shot down a Russian IL-76 near Vasylykiv, as well as two Mi-24 helicopters, which prevented the landing of paratroopers and weapons.”, if the machinery is not named, it is mentioned in a broader sense as in “The enemy used everything against us: missiles, fighter aircraft, drones, artillery, armored vehicles, saboteurs,

paratroopers.” or “Enemy aircraft operate treacherously over residential areas, including the capital.”. It is not only the machinery that is being mentioned, but also the Russian soldiers. V. Zelenskyy wants to show the reality of Ukrainians through the lenses of military actions, for example “But since the first hours of the invasion, Russian troops have been hitting civilian infrastructure.” and “Russian forces today brutally shelled Kharkiv with rocket artillery.”. These examples show just how brutally the Russian military has to act against innocent civilians as these were the orders from higher up. And these are only two examples out of many, mind you the period of analysis is from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022. If we looked at the data from the beginning of war until today and only analysed the cases of military personnel brutality, we could write a whole thesis based only on that topic. Even back at the start of the war, it was the reason why the president of Ukraine talked to soldiers of his enemy and asked them to talk to their government, to protest and leave Ukraine. A great example of this would be “Four and a half thousand Russian soldiers have already been killed. Why did you all come here? Why do the columns of your armored vehicles go against us?”. This also shows that V. Zelenskyy understands that not every soldier that comes to fight in this war, is there voluntarily. He mostly blames the Russian government for everything that is happening in Ukraine.


An interesting fact was noticed while analysing the samples that V. Zelenskyy avoids saying the name of the country, instead he says: “the enemy”, “the invaders”, “the Russian state”, “the Russian leadership” etc., this indicates that Volodymyr Zelenskyy does not want other countries to blame Russia itself, he wants them to blame the Russian government for the war. The civilians are innocent, especially those, who do not support the war and the president of Ukraine wants everyone to understand that. In fact, when he talks to Russian civilians, he addresses them by adding a personal touch, for example “Dear citizens of the Russian Federation”. Of course, the name of Russia can not be avoided the whole time, it is still mentioned in the speeches, yet we, as the audience, can understand that he is talking about the government and not the citizens.

Belarus can also be found among the “external enemies” in this type, although in not too many cases. Volodymyr Zelenskyy gave a speech to Belarussian citizens and asked them to make the right choice, to “Be Belarus, not Russia!” and to help Ukraine as he pointed out that “From your territory, the troops of the Russian Federation launch rockets into Ukraine.”, which is not surprising as Belarus, or more specifically its government, is a known partner of Russia. This might make it hard for the citizens of Belarus to show big support towards Ukraine and it takes huge courage to make a referendum, especially if we look back at the events that took place in the country in 2023, when many fled Belarus just to avoid the cruelty of the government.

To better understand the distribution of who or what V. Zelenskyy blames the most, we can look at the next figure (see Figure 5).

Figure 5

The distribution of “external enemies” in the Foreign Governments type (V. Zelenskyy’s speeches)



As it can be seen in Figure 5, Volodymyr Zelenskyy tends to blame the Russian government the most in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, more specifically in 94 sentences. It is worth reminding that some “external enemies” are mentioned more than once in the same sentence, so the number could be even higher. When the president of Ukraine mentions the Russian government, he talks about its decisions in war, how it affects the country and its economy or citizens. He tends to use *logos* and *pathos* in his speeches when talking about the Russian government. *Logos* means that people develop arguments followed by evidence, since we are logical creatures. *Pathos* is a way of evoking certain emotions of the audience by establishing an emotional connection and making your listener to act accordingly (Britannica Dictionary). These emotional speeches, where Volodymyr Zelenskyy talks about the war crimes committed by Russia, made the audience protest against the war, since everyone saw and heard about the war crimes. This is a great example of how certain rhetoric can be used to dehumanise or even destroy our enemies, to make people riot against them.

Then, the president blames Russian military, which is also part of the *Foreign Governments* type. He mentions it 33 times and there he illustrates the crimes that the Russian military and its troops commit against innocent citizens, how they do not have anything holy, and they bomb even kindergartens. Here pathos is extremely strong, as in many cases Volodymyr Zelenskyy

addresses Ukrainians asking them to “stop the enemy everywhere you can”. In these cases, he also addresses the Russian soldiers, asking them rhetorical questions and creating an emotional connection to them. This makes the president to look more humane towards the enemy troops. The usage of *pathos* is also the case when the president of Ukraine talks to Belarussians. In the collected cases he asks them to take action, to not cooperate with Russia as at the time “the troops of the Russian Federation launch rockets into Ukraine” from Belarus. Such language usage evokes feelings of guilt or shame, since people might start feeling as if they are responsible for such things happening in their country.

Other foreign governments are blamed when Volodymyr Zelenskyy touches the topic of Ukraine joining the alliance and how every other country is scared to say anything about the accession.

Another type of “external enemies” that Volodymyr Zelenskyy creates is *Supranational Alliances*. Examples of this type can be found in the following table (see Table 8).

Table 8

Examples of International Organisations in V. Zelenskyy’s speeches

No.	Example of <i>Supranational Alliances</i>
1.	“ They answer that they are with us.” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149)
2.	“But they are not ready to take us to the Alliance .” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149)
3.	“Today, I asked the twenty-seven leaders of Europe whether Ukraine will be in NATO .” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149)
4.	“I asked directly. Everyone is afraid. They do not answer.” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149)

Here we can notice that the president of Ukraine is not happy with how NATO is handling things with not deciding to take Ukraine to the Alliance despite multiple requests. As V. Zelenskyy points out “Everyone is afraid. They do not answer.”. If NATO decided to accept Ukraine’s membership in NATO, it could provoke Russia even more and the risk of a World War III happening would be at an all-time high.

The other two types of “external enemies” were *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural*, where the president notices that “a lot of fakes are being produced now” about the war and the Ukrainian government. He also compares Russian troops to “an evil that has come to our land and must be destroyed.”. This gives a feeling as if Russia was an entity out of this world, an evil spirit, which needs to be banished in order to live a happy life.

To conclude, the most used type of “external enemies” in V. Zelenskyy’s speeches is *Foreign Governments* with 134 cases. There he blames the Russian government and its military the most. The results were not surprising as it was expected that Volodymyr Zelenskyy was going to blame Russia for the ongoing war the most. He also blames Belarus for cooperating with Russia and other countries for staying silent on the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which he does also in *Supranational Alliances* type, which had 4 cases. The least used “external enemy” types were *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural*, which were used only once in each type. It is noticeable that V. Zelenskyy likes to use repetition, rhetorical questions, even metaphors and *pathos*, which is a rhetorical technique that relies on emotion and human connection, in his speeches. These rhetorical devices and rhetorical language in particular, makes these speeches more memorable and creates a closer feeling as if the president was talking to the listener personally or was a close friend, who wants to vent about his misfortunes, which makes the audience to react to speeches more passionately.

3.3 How diversionary war theory was used in the speeches

To understand “external enemies” better, diversionary war theory will be discussed. Arbatli and Arbatli (2016, p. 115) note that “insecure leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies than their more secure counterparts” as it helps to create an “external enemy” and divert the attention from themselves and lower the possibility of a coup d’etat, which, overthrows more than half of authoritarians. This description of attention diversion with “external enemies” could be considered as the definition of the diversionary war theory and a *rally around-the-flag mechanism*. Haynes (2017, p. 338) hints at *gambling for resurrection theory*, which argues that leaders of various countries might take risky decisions and attack others to show their dominance. Arbatli and Arbatli (2016, p. 216) also point out *the feasibility mechanism*, which

suggests that the army loses its effect in internal affairs when a fight is happening with the “external enemy”. Both these mechanisms are applied in the Russia-Ukraine war. This is extremely important as diversionary war theory relies mostly on historical events or *geographical proximity* and Russia attacked Ukraine as Russia considers Ukraine as being part of Russia historically and they are trying to “reclaim” their land (Haynes, 2017, p. 342). Ukraine is shown as the “external enemy”, which helps to create national unity around the leader, and this is the reason why some Russians support the war, and some disapprove of it, it all relies on our beliefs and how the disinformation is perceived. As mentioned earlier, V. Putin tends to use diversionary war theory in most of the cases collected from his speeches, by making sure that he points out how the Ukrainian government is getting ready to fight back by deploying military equipment, and “using people as shields in the hope of accusing Russia of civilian casualties”. This creates a picture for others that Ukraine is fighting itself to make Russia the bad guy and Russia is only trying to save the people of Ukraine from the Ukrainian government. It could be said that diversionary war theory is the most popular tactic to use in Russia when trying to fight against different allegations, yet it is not as effective on some people as it might seem. A coup attempt could heighten the risk of losing the war and most of the time the countries try to avoid it. At the very beginning of the war, some Russians went to protest against the war, yet they stopped as the Russian government took action against the protestors with the police and the military at hand. Many still believe that Putin has been in power for too long but in this case, a coup attempt would have been impossible as nationalistic sentiments are noticed more in the army, than among other groups of people. Arbatli and Arbatli (2016, p. 119) also notice that the longer the military is involved in an external war, the less they will support internal turmoil. To sum up, both rally around-the-flag and feasibility mechanisms are used in Russia-Ukraine war discourse, which are part of the diversionary war theory, whose main point is to diverse the attention from the leader of the country while creating an “external enemy”. It is important to discuss diversionary war theory as it is an important component of the Russia-Ukraine war.

3.3.1 Differences between the speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy

After the analysis of the speeches, it can be noticed that the transcripts of speeches posted on kremlin.ru showed that Vladimir Putin does not tend to speak directly to the audience as much as V. Zelenskyy does, where he uses rhetorical language to appeal to the audience that he is talking to. Another thing that is noticeable is that both presidents blame *Foreign Governments* the most, which is not surprising if we look at the narrative of each president. V. Putin has created his worldviews based on the historical events in Russia. He has a narrative that Ukraine

belongs to Russia historically and was stolen from Russia by the Ukrainian government. This might be the reason why he is blaming the Ukrainian government for “stealing” Ukraine from Russia and holding Ukrainians hostage. Let us not forget the constant war with the West, which has been going on since the Cold War as after that, NATO began its expansion. This might be the main reason why the president of Russia is constantly blaming the West and NATO for pushing V. Putin over the edge and making him to take such drastic actions against Ukraine. This does not come purely from the insights of the author of this thesis as many war analysts see this narrative of the president of Russia as the reason why V. Putin started the invasion in Ukraine (Masters, 2023). As for V. Zelenskyy, his narrative could be impacted by his childhood and teenage years growing up in a Jewish family in Ukraine. He saw the corruption, how oligarchs, who cooperated with Russia ruled the country (Ray, 2024). He witnessed Russia’s attempts to occupy Ukraine and since Volodymyr Zelenskyy loves his country, he can not bear the pain of the ongoing war, he tells everyone about Russia’s wrongdoings and how the country is destroying everything in Ukraine and is the only one at fault for this war. However, there are two differences between the speeches given by the presidents of countries, who are fighting each other.

The first difference that was noticed is that the transcripts of the speeches given, provided by official government pages, differed in the types whatsoever. If we look at the transcripts provided by kremlin.ru, not every speech is given directly by Vladimir Putin to the audience. There were transcripts of V. Putin’s speeches to the citizens, to the whole world, also transcripts of meetings between the officials or businessmen good examples are transcripts named “Meeting with Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov.” And “The President inspected the progress of construction of a National Space Centre in Moscow” (Kremlin.ru, 2022, February 27). Here V. Putin does not talk to the audience, these are transcripts from business meetings between the president and other businessmen and many transcripts, which are provided on the official site are like these two. From this we can see that Vladimir Putin does not like to talk to his people, to give speeches informing the nation about ongoing events. Then we have the transcripts of V. Zelenskyy’s speeches. They are given by the president of Ukraine directly, he is not having any meetings or discussing private matters. Most of his speeches are named “Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to <...>”. He is talking to the people, addressing, and informing them on the events that are happening. This creates an image that he cares about his people knowing what is happening. He knows that the people do not care about his meetings too much, they care about their wellbeing, how much they have achieved during war and when it might possibly end. They need motivation and hope for a better tomorrow.

Since kremlin.ru provided transcript of private meetings between the president of Russia and other people of big status, they were not provided fully. There were way less transcripts from V. Putin's side and many of them ended with "<...>", which shows that a part of the transcript is not included. This could give a feeling of mistrust of the audience to the reader, even if somewhere deep down we understand that private matters of the state are excluded from the speech that was transcribed. If we look at V. Zelenskyy's speeches, they are provided fully and each one of them ends with the words "Glory to Ukraine!". It adds a nice touch of patriotism to his speeches and could even inspire the nation not to give up, to stay strong even in the face of war. Since every transcript is of a different speech, which was given to the audience, where no private meetings are happening, they can be full, and this shows some kind of trust between the president of Ukraine and the audience. He mentions if he was talking to any governing bodies of other countries, sometimes even mentions on what matters they were talking, yet does not disclose any private matters. Even if we, as the audience, do not fully know what the president and these governing bodies were talking about, we still have that trust, since the speech continues and does not end with "<...>", which shows and exclusion of some part of the speech.

These two differences in the transcripts, provided by official government sites, create a big difference to the audience, who is reading them, since they have a different feeling and layout. V. Putin's speeches are more formal, while V. Zelenskyy creates a closer bond with his audience and those, who he is addressing.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis analyses the “external enemies” created by Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. 206 cases were identified and analysed from the speeches given by the two presidents from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022, and after the analysis the following conclusions were made in line with the objectives of this Bachelor thesis:

1. The literature review analysed the definition of fake news and its categories, including disinformation, since this Bachelor thesis is focusing on the semantic marker “external enemies” in disinformation discourses, the techniques of disinformation spread, and diversionary war theory. The literature review presented insights by Bayer et al., Englmeier, Manfredi, Mastandrea, Nizamani and other scholars on definitions of disinformation, how it is spread and why social media plays a big part in the spread. The literature review also introduced the semantic marker “external enemies” and diversionary war theory – to better understand what the semantic marker “external enemies” means and what could be the examples of it, a table from Mastandrea (2023) with the four semantic markers of emotional discourse was used.
2. 5 types of “external enemies” were created and the collected samples from the speeches made by Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy were categorized according to these types. The types of “external enemies” were: *Foreign Governments*, *Supranational Alliances*, *International Organisations*, *Hacker groups of cyber threat actors* and *The Supernatural*. They helped to further analysis of the “external enemies” that were created by each president and what their narratives might be.
3. Overall, 206 cases of “external enemies” were collected in the selected speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy from the period of February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022. After the analysis, it was noticed that both politicians blamed *Foreign Governments* the most, as there were a total of 184 cases. Vladimir Putin blames Ukraine’s politicians for creating a government, which is separate from Russia and is not willing to cooperate. This is due to his narrative that Ukraine belongs to Russia historically and Ukrainians are held hostage by the Ukrainian government. In this type he also creates an “external enemy” in the West and its allies and the US and its allies, this depends on V. Putin’s narrative, since Russia is known to fight an imaginary war with the West. Volodymyr Zelenskyy mostly blames Russia and its military in the *Foreign Governments type*, since he grew up seeing the corruption in his country and how oligarchs ruled Ukraine side by side with the Russian government (Ray, 2024).

Belarus is also shown as an “external enemy” since the country works together with Russia.

What was surprising is that *Supranational Alliances* did not have many cases from both presidents, to be more specific 16 cases. V. Putin blamed NATO for expanding and getting closer to the Russian border, while V. Zelenskyy voiced his annoyance with other countries and the alliance itself staying silent and not commenting anything on Ukraine’s acceptance into NATO. Then *International Organisations* had only 4 cases all of them were from the president of Russia, where he blamed the UN Security Council for its actions in the past.

Lastly, the least used “external enemy” types were *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural*, which were used only once in each type and only by V. Zelenskyy. There he noticed that many fakes were being produced and he compared Russia to an evil entity out of this world.

From this work we learn that “external enemies” are words or phrases that place the blame on religion, official institutions, or other people (Mastandrea, 2023). The analysis of the narrative of each politician helped to understand why V. Putin or V. Zelenskyy uses one type of “external enemies” or another and how their personal background shaped their worldviews. Narrative analysis helped to examine the data better as it was possible to dive deeper into the analysis and have a better understanding of the collected cases. “External enemies” are prominent in disinformation discourses as diversionary war theory has become a regular strategy in politics when spreading disinformation and this war theory is liked as a strategy for creating “external enemies” (Boler, 2019, p. 187). Making an “external enemy” helps to take the blame off their shoulders and even gain sympathy from others (Dorr, 2010). Looking at diversionary war theory helped to understand what motives might be behind the creation of external enemies” and why V. Putin or V. Zelenskyy might use this theory as a strategy in the Russia-Ukraine war. Creating an “external enemy” in disinformation discourses is effective as disinformation seeks to cause harm to those who the knowingly false information is being spread about.

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SUMMARY

External enemies in contemporary disinformation discourse on the Russia-Ukraine war

With the rise of social media outlets, it has become much easier to spread and consume disinformation, where one side is blaming the other and as some scholars notice, this discourse has become a battlefield for some politicians, where they seek to damage the reputation of one another. **A great amount of research has been done on the topic of *disinformation*, but not so much on the “external enemies” in disinformation discourses, which this thesis deals with while analysing the speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy.**

The subject of the thesis is the semantic marker “external enemies” in contemporary disinformation discourse concerning the Russia-Ukraine war from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022.

The aim of the Bachelor thesis is to compare the semantic marker “external enemies” used in public speeches given by Putin and Zelenskyy about the Russia-Ukraine war.

In order to achieve the aim, the following **objectives** have been set:

1. To examine scientific literature on disinformation, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the semantic marker “external enemies”.
2. To categorize the “external enemies” used in the transcripts of speeches given by Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
3. To analyse the “external enemies” in the collected speeches.

In the first part of this thesis, scientific literature was analysed, where insights on the definition of *fake news* and its categories, including disinformation, the techniques of disinformation spread, the Russia-Ukraine war, the semantic marker “external enemies” and diversionary war theory.

In the second part a research tool was created with 5 types of “external enemies”, to which the collected samples from the speeches given by Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy from February 24, 2022, until February 28, 2022, were categorized accordingly.

In the analysis a qualitative method was applied and used to determine and analyse the types of “external enemies” that were used in the speeches given by the previously mentioned politicians. During the analysis it was noticed that both politicians blamed *Foreign Governments* the most. Vladimir Putin blamed Ukraine’s politicians, the West and its allies and the US and its allies in this type. Volodymyr Zelenskyy mostly blamed Russia and its military,

then Belarus and other foreign governments. *Supranational Alliances* type had only 16 cases from both presidents. V. Putin blamed NATO itself, while V. Zelenskyy was not happy about the silence from the other countries on Ukraine's acceptance into NATO. *International Organisations* had only 4 cases all of whom were from the president of Russia, Lastly, the least used "external enemy" types were *Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors* and *The Supernatural*, which were used only once in each type and only by V. Zelenskyy. There he noticed that many fakes were being produced and he compared Russia to an evil entity out of this world.

It is also worth noting that the transcripts of speeches posted on kremlin.ru showed that Vladimir Putin does not tend to speak directly to the audience as much as V. Zelenskyy does, where he uses rhetorical language to appeal to the audience that he is talking to.

SANTRAUKA

Išoriniai priešai šiuolaikiniame dezinformacijos diskurse apie Rusijos ir Ukrainos karą

Socialiniai tinklai turi didelę įtaką mūsų kasdiniame gyvenime, o kartu su jais tapo daug lengviau tiek pasiekti, tiek skleisti dezinformaciją. Kai kurie mokslininkai pastebi, kad dezinformacijos diskursas tapo politikų mūšio lauku, kuriame skleisdami melagienas vienas apie kitą, jie siekia pakenkti priešininko reputacijai. **Dezinformacijos tema yra atlikta nemažai tyrimų, tačiau ne tiek daug apie „išorinius priešus“ šiame diskurse. Dėl to šiame darbe bus siekiama išanalizuoti „išorinių priešų“ atvejus Vladimiro Putino ir Volodymyro Zelenskio kalbose.**

Bakalaurinio darbo objektas – semantinis žymuo „išoriniai priešai“ šiuolaikiniame dezinformacijos diskurse, t. y. imant laikotarpį nuo 2020 m. vasario 24 d. iki 2020 m. vasario 28 d.

Darbo tikslas – palyginti „išorinius priešus“, vartojamus V. Putino ir V. Zelenskio kalbose, kuriose jie nagrinėja Rusijos ir Ukrainos karą.

Siekiat įgyvendinti tikslą buvo išskirti šie **uždaviniai**:

1. Išnagrinėti mokslinę literatūrą susijusią su dezinformacija, Rusijos ir Ukrainos karu, bei semantiniu žymeniu „išoriniai priešai“.
2. Suklasifikuoti Vladimiro Putino ir Volodymyro Zelenskio kalbų transkripcijose vartojamus „išorinius priešus“.
3. Palyginti surinktose kalbose naudojamus „išorinius priešus“.

Pirmoje šio darbo dalyje supažindinama su teorine informacija, kurioje pateikiamos išvalgos apie dezinformaciją, jos sklaidos motyvaciją ir būdus, Rusijos ir Ukrainos karą, semantinį žymenį „išoriniai priešai“ ir diversinio karo teoriją.

Antroje dalyje supažindinama su tyrimo įrankio sukūrimu. Ten galima pamatyti išskirtus penkis „išorinių priešų“ tipus, t. y.: Užsienio Šalių Valdantieji Organai, Tarptautinės Sąjungos, Tarptautinės Organizacijos, Kibernetinių įsilaužėlių Grupuočių ar Kiti Kibernetinių Grėsmių Veikėjai, Antgamtinės Jėgos, pagal kuriuos atitinkamai buvo suskirstyti pavyzdžiai, surinkti iš Vladimiro Putino ir Volodymyro Zelenskio kalbų, pasakytų nuo 2022 m. vasario 24 d. iki 2022 m. vasario 28 d.

Analizės metu buvo taikomas kokybinis tyrimo metodas, kuriuo buvo siekiama nustatyti ir išanalizuoti „išorinių priešų“ tipus, kurie buvo naudojami jau anksčiau minėtų politikų kalbose.

Pastebėta, kad abu politikai labiausiai kaltino kitų užsienio šalių valdančiuosius organus. V. Putinas šiame tipe kaltino Ukrainos politikus, JAV ir jos sąjungininkus, bei apskritai Vakarus. V. Zelenskis dažniausiai kaltino Rusiją ir jos kariuomenę, taip pat Baltarusiją ir kitas užsienio valstybes. Tarptautinių Sąjungų tipas iš abiejų prezidentų kalbų turėjo 16 atvejų, kuriuose Rusijos prezidentas kaltino NATO dėl sąjungos plėtros ir artėjimo prie Rusijos sienos, o Ukrainos prezidentas išreiškė nepasitenkinimą kitomis šalimis dėl tylos įžadų laikymosi ties informacijos suteikimu dėl Ukrainos priėmimo į NATO. Tarptautinės Organizacijos turėjo 4 atvejus, kurie buvo iš V. Putino kalbų. Galiausiai, mažiausiai atvejų turėjo Kibernetinių įsilaužėlių Grupotės ar Kiti Kibernetinių Grėsmių Veikėjai, Antgamtinės Jėgos, kuriuose buvo po vieną atvejį ir jie buvo iš V. Zelenskio kalbų.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. List of speeches given by V. Putin and V. Zelenskyy

The collected speeches included speeches given by V. Putin: “Address by the President of the Russian Federation” (2022, February 24), “Meeting with representatives of Russian business circles” (2022, February 24), “Meeting with Security Council permanent members” (2022, February 25), “Greetings to military personnel and veterans of Special Operations Forces” (2022, February 27), “Meeting with Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov” (2022, February 27), “The President inspected the progress of construction of a National Space Centre in Moscow” (2022, February 27), “Meeting on economic issues” (2022, February 28).

The following speeches are given by V. Zelenskyy: “Address by the President of Ukraine” (2022, February 24), “Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks” (2022, February 25), “Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war.” (2022, February 25), “Address by the President of Ukraine.” (2022, February 25), “Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war.” (2022, February 26), “We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war” (2022, February 26), “Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the citizens” (2022, February 27), “Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war” (2022, February 27), “President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus.” (2022, February 27), “Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy” (2022, February 28), “Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine” (2022, February 28).

APPENDIX 2. „External enemies“ created by V. Putin

Types	Description
Foreign Governments	1. “I spoke about our biggest concerns and worries, and about the fundamental threats which irresponsible Western politicians created for Russia consistently, rudely and unceremoniously from year to year.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)

2. “It is a fact that over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with **the leading NATO countries** regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
3. “This has to do with the entire system of international relations, and sometimes even **US allies**.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
4. “Instead, we saw a state of euphoria created by the feeling of absolute superiority, a kind of modern absolutism, coupled with the low cultural standards and arrogance of those who formulated and pushed through decisions that suited only **themselves**.” (Here V. Putin talks about the West.) (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
5. “I have to recall these facts, because some **Western colleagues** prefer to forget them, and when we mentioned the event, **they** prefer to avoid speaking about international law, instead emphasising the circumstances which **they** interpret as they think necessary.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
6. “The combat operations conducted by **the Western coalition** in that country without the Syrian government’s approval or UN Security Council’s sanction can only be defined as aggression and intervention.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
7. “**They** used the pretext of allegedly reliable information available in **the United States** about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.” (Here *they* stands for the West) (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022,*

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

8. “To prove that allegation, **the US Secretary of State** held up a vial with white powder, publicly, for the whole world to see, assuring the international community that it was a chemical warfare agent created in Iraq.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
9. “Overall, it appears that nearly everywhere, in many regions of the world where **the United States** brought its law and order, this created bloody, non-healing wounds and the curse of international terrorism and extremism.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
10. “To reiterate: **they** have deceived us, or, to put it simply, **they** have played us.” (Here V. Putin talks about the West.) (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
11. “Incidentally, **US politicians, political scientists and journalists** write and say that a veritable “empire of lies” has been created inside **the United States** in recent years.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
12. “But one should not be modest about it: **the United States** is still a great country and a system-forming power.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
13. “**All its satellites** not only humbly and obediently say yes to and parrot it at the slightest pretext but also imitate its behaviour and enthusiastically accept the rules it is offering them.” (Here V. Putin talks about the US.) (*Address by the*

President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

14. “Therefore, one can say with good reason and confidence that the whole so-called **Western bloc** formed by **the United States** in its own image and likeness is, in its entirety, the very same “empire of lies.”” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
15. “As for our country, after the disintegration of the USSR, given the entire unprecedented openness of the new, modern Russia, its readiness to work honestly with **the United States** and other **Western partners**, and its practically unilateral disarmament, **they** immediately tried to put the final squeeze on us, finish us off, and utterly destroy us.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
16. “This is how it was in the 1990s and the early 2000s, when the **so-called collective West** was actively supporting separatism and gangs of mercenaries in southern Russia.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
17. “Despite all that, in December 2021, we made yet another attempt to reach agreement with **the United States and its allies** on the principles of European security and NATO’s non-expansion.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
18. “**The United States** has not changed its position.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
19. “**It** does not believe it necessary to agree with Russia on a matter that is critical for us.” (Here *it* stands for the US)
(*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

20. “**The United States** is pursuing its own objectives, while neglecting our interests.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
21. “As a result, the country was not prepared to counter the invasion by **Nazi Germany**, which attacked our Motherland on June 22, 1941, without declaring war.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
22. “The country stopped **the enemy** and went on to defeat it, but this came at a tremendous cost.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Nazi Germany) (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
23. “The attempt to appease **the aggressor** ahead of the Great Patriotic War proved to be a mistake which came at a high cost for our people.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Nazi Germany) (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
24. “It merely serves as a tool of **US foreign policy**.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
25. “For **the United States and its allies**, it is a policy of containing Russia, with obvious geopolitical dividends.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
26. “**They** have crossed it.” (Here V. Putin talks about the West.) (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
27. “We can see that **the forces that staged the coup in Ukraine** in 2014 have seized power, are keeping it with the help of ornamental election procedures and have abandoned the path of a peaceful conflict settlement.” (*Address by the President*

of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

28. “Focused on their own goals, the **leading NATO countries** are supporting **the far-right nationalists** and **neo-Nazis in Ukraine**, those who will never forgive the people of Crimea and Sevastopol for freely making a choice to reunite with Russia.” (Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
29. “**They** will undoubtedly try to bring war to Crimea just as **they** have done in Donbass, to kill innocent people just as members of **the punitive units of Ukrainian nationalists and Hitler’s accomplices** did during the Great Patriotic War.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
30. “**They** have also openly laid claim to several other Russian regions.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government)
31. “If we look at the sequence of events and the incoming reports, the showdown between Russia and **these forces** cannot be avoided. It is only a matter of time.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
32. “**They** are getting ready and waiting for the right moment. Moreover, **they** went as far as aspire to acquire nuclear weapons. We will not let this happen.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
33. “However, Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat from the territory of today’s **Ukraine.**” (Address by the President of the Russian

Federation, 2022, February 24

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

34. “In 2015, we used our Armed Forces to create a reliable shield that prevented terrorists from **Syria** from penetrating Russia.” (*Address by the President of the Russian*

Federation, 2022, February 24

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

35. “The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the **Kiev** regime.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

36. “To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify **Ukraine**, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

37. “At the same time, we have been hearing an increasing number of statements coming from **the West** that there is no need any more to abide by the documents setting forth the outcomes of World War II, as signed by the totalitarian Soviet regime.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

38. “Let me remind you that the people living in territories which are part of today’s **Ukraine** were not asked how they want to build their lives when the USSR was created or after World War II.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24*

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

39. “We believe that all the peoples living in today’s **Ukraine**, anyone who want to do this, must be able to enjoy this right to make a free choice.” (*Address by the President of the*

Russian Federation, 2022, February 24

<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)

40. “They are connected with the defending Russia from **those who have taken Ukraine hostage** and are trying to use it against our country and our people.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
41. “Today, we will discuss the course of the special military operation in **Ukraine**.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
42. “As expected, the Russian Army’s main armed clashes are taking place not with regular **Ukrainian armed forces’ units** but with **nationalist groups** that, as we know, bear direct responsibility for the genocide in Donbass and the spilled blood of the citizens of the people’s republics.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
43. “Besides, **the nationalist elements** that infiltrated regular **Ukrainian armed forces’ units** are not only prompting **them** to armed resistance but are actually playing the role of anti-retreat units.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
44. “Moreover, according to available information, and this is confirmed by objective monitoring – we are seeing this; **Banderites and neo-Nazis** are putting up heavy weapons, including multiple-rocket launchers, right in the central districts of large cities, including Kiev and Kharkov.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security*

Council permanent members, 2022, February 25
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)

45. “**They** plan to force return fire by Russian strike systems against residential quarters.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
46. “In effect, **they** are acting in the same way that terrorists act all over the world – using people as shields in the hope of accusing Russia of civilian casualties. It is known for a fact that all this is being done on the recommendations of **foreign consultants, primarily American advisors.**” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
47. “Once again, I am appealing to the military of **the armed forces of Ukraine.**” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
48. “Do not allow **neo-Nazis and Banderites** to use your children, wives and elders as a live shield. Take power into your own hands.” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
49. “It seems it will be easier for us to come to terms with you than with **this gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis that have settled in Kiev and that have taken the Ukrainian people hostage.**” (Here V. Putin talks about the Ukrainian government) (*Meeting with Security Council permanent members, 2022, February 25*
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67851>)
50. „You see that **Western countries** are not only taking unfriendly economic actions against our country, I mean the illegitimate

	<p>sanctions of which everyone is well aware, but top officials of the leading NATO countries are indulging in aggressive statements directed at our country.” (<i>Meeting with Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, 2022, February 27</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67876)</p>
<p>International Organizations</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. “There are many examples of this. First a bloody military operation was waged against Belgrade, without the UN Security Council’s sanction but with combat aircraft and missiles used in the heart of Europe.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843) 2. “The illegal use of military power against Libya and the distortion of all the UN Security Council decisions on Libya ruined the state, created a huge seat of international terrorism, and pushed the country towards a humanitarian catastrophe, into the vortex of a civil war, which has continued there for years.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843) 3. “The combat operations conducted by the Western coalition in that country without the Syrian government’s approval or UN Security Council’s sanction can only be defined as aggression and intervention.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843) 4. “We witnessed lies made at the highest state level and voiced from the high UN rostrum.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)
<p>Supranational Alliances</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. “I am referring to the eastward expansion of NATO, which is moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border.” (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)

2. “In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while **the North Atlantic alliance** continued to expand despite our protests and concerns.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
3. “**Its military machine** is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
4. “Where did this insolent manner of talking down from the height of **their** exceptionalism, infallibility and all-permissiveness come from?” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
5. “At the same time, everything **it** regards as useful is presented as the ultimate truth and forced on others regardless of the cost, abusively and by any means available.” (Here V. Putin talks about the alliance) (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
6. “This array includes promises not to expand **NATO** eastwards even by an inch.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
7. “Despite all that, in December 2021, we made yet another attempt to reach agreement with the United States and its allies on the principles of European security and **NATO’s** non-expansion.” (*Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24* <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843>)
8. “Even now, with **NATO’s** eastward expansion the situation for Russia has been becoming worse and more dangerous by the year. Moreover, these past days **NATO** leadership has been blunt in its statements that **they** need to accelerate and

	<p>step up efforts to bring the alliance's infrastructure closer to Russia's borders." (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)</p> <p>9. "In other words, they have been toughening their position." (Here V. Putin talks about the alliance) (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)</p> <p>10. "Any further expansion of the North Atlantic alliance's infrastructure or the ongoing efforts to gain a military foothold of the Ukrainian territory are unacceptable for us. Of course, the question is not about NATO itself." (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)</p> <p>11. "It merely serves as a tool of US foreign policy." (Here V. Putin talks about the alliance) (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)</p> <p>12. "Fully controlled from the outside, it is doing everything to attract NATO armed forces and obtain cutting-edge weapons." (<i>Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022, February 24</i> http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843)</p>
Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors	
The Supernatural	

APPENDIX 3. „External enemies“ created by V. Zelensky

Types	Description
Foreign governments	1. "But the leadership of the Russian Federation is unlikely to see it." (<i>Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24</i>)

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)

2. “If you hear us, if you understand us, if you understand that you are attacking an independent country, please go out to the squares and address **the President** of your country.”
(Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
3. “You are Russians. Now **your military** has started a war.”
(Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
4. “For the world community, **Russia** is becoming an analogue of the so-called DPR - this is complete isolation.” (Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
5. “No one will be able to convince or force us, Ukrainians, to give up our freedom, our independence, our sovereignty. But it seems that **the Russian leadership** is trying to do this by destroying the potential of their country.” (Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
6. “Everything that **Russia** has done since 2000 can now be burned live in front of the world.” (Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
7. “The Ukrainian army, our border guards, police and special services stopped **the enemy's** attacks. In the language of conflict, this can be called an operational pause.” (Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)

8. “Our troops are fighting fierce battles in the suburbs of Kherson. **The enemy** is pushing out of the occupied Crimea, trying to advance towards Melitopol.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
9. “In the north of the country, **the enemy** is slowly advancing in the Chernihiv region, but there are forces to hold it. Reliable defense is built in the Zhytomyr region.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
10. “**Enemy paratroopers** in Hostomel are blocked, troops are ordered to destroy them.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
11. “Any citizen with combat experience will now be useful. It is up to you and all of us whether **the enemy** will be able to advance further into the territory of our independent state.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 24*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137>)
12. “You are brilliantly defending the country from **one of the most powerful countries in the world.**” (*Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
13. “Today **Russia** attacked the entire territory of our state. And today our defenders have done a lot. They defended almost the entire territory of Ukraine, which suffered direct blows.” (*Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)

14. “They regain the one that **the enemy** managed to occupy.”
(Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
15. “**The enemy** strikes not only at military facilities, as it claims, but also at civilians.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
16. “**They** kill people and turn peaceful cities into military targets.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
17. “**They** want to destroy Ukraine politically by destroying the Head of State.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
18. “Today we heard from **Moscow** that they still want to talk.”
(Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
19. “**They** want to talk about Ukraine's neutral status.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
20. “We are not afraid of **Russia**.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks,

2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)

21. “We are not afraid to talk to **Russia**.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)

22. “According to our information, **the enemy** marked me as the number one target.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)

23. “We also have information that **enemy sabotage groups** have entered Kyiv.” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)

24. “At 4 am, **Russian forces** continued to launch missile strikes on the territory of Ukraine.” (Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

25. “**They** say that civilian objects are not a target for **them**.” (Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

26. “This is a lie. In fact, **they** do not distinguish in which areas to operate.” (Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

27. “Just as yesterday, the military and civilians are equally under **Russian** attack.” (Address by the President on the

second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

28. “Our men and women - all defenders of Ukraine - did not allow **the enemy** to realize the operational plan of invasion on the first day. Ukrainians demonstrate real heroism.”

(Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

29. “**The enemy** was stopped in most directions. There are fights.” *(Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

30. “Therefore, **Russia's** attack continues with the expectation that our forces will be tired.” *(Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

31. “Ukraine's air defense forces are protecting our sky. As much as possible. **Enemy aircraft** operate treacherously over residential areas, including the capital.” *(Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

32. “**The world's most powerful forces** are watching from afar.” *(Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

33. “Did yesterday's sanctions convince **Russia**?” *(Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)

34. “Stop **the enemy** wherever you see it. The fate of Ukraine depends only on Ukrainians.” (*Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)
35. “**Russia** will still have to talk to us sooner or later.” (*Address by the President on the second morning of the large-scale war, 2022, February 25* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-na-drugij-ranok-masshtabnoyi-vijni-73153>)
36. “Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz yesterday said **Russia's** invasion of Ukraine is something Europe has not seen for 75 years.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)
37. “This is not just **Russia's** invasion in Ukraine, this is the beginning of the war against Europe.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)
38. “Against **the largest Russian enterprises**.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)
39. “Against **Russia's** access to Western technologies.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)
40. “But **Russian tanks** are still shooting at residential buildings in our cities.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)

41. “**They** already want to split and divide you the same way as they are trying to divide Ukraine today.” (Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)

42. “I want to address **Russian Federation President** once again.” (Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)

43. “Therefore, **the invaders** have to come up with more and more absurd accusations to say at least something.” (Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

44. “Or were they NATO soldiers that threatened **Russia**?” (Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

45. “This night **they** will make an assault upon us.” (Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

46. “Remove special signs that **saboteurs** leave on the roads and buildings.” (Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

47. “Burn **the enemy**’s equipment with anything you can.” (Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the

second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

48. “If even kindergartens are a permissible target for **invaders**, you must not leave **them** any chance.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

49. “**The enemy** suffers very-very serious losses.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

50. “This night **the enemy** will use all the forces available to break our resistance.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

51. “Everyone who has already joined the country's defense or can help defend, stop **the enemy** everywhere you can.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine in the evening of the second day of the large-scale war, 2022, February 26*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-vvecheri-drugogo-dnya-masshta-73189>)

52. “We withstood and successfully repel **enemy attacks**.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

53. “**The invaders** wanted to block the center of our state and put their puppets here, as in Donetsk.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

54. “We broke their plan. **They** did not gain any advantage over us.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*)

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

55. “**The enemy** used everything against us: missiles, fighter aircraft, drones, artillery, armored vehicles, saboteurs, paratroopers.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*)

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

56. “**The invaders** are shelling residential neighborhoods, including with the use of missile artillery, trying to destroy energy facilities.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*)

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

57. “**They** have very treacherous tactics.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*)

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

58. “We already have almost full support from EU countries for disconnecting **Russia** from SWIFT.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*)

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

59. “In each of our cities, **the invaders** are being severely rebuffed.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26*)

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

60. “Uman, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Donbas, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv - wherever **the enemy** kills our people, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are doing everything to stop and destroy the invaders.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)
61. “If you can stop and destroy **the invaders**, do it.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)
62. “And now I want absolutely everyone in **Russia** to hear me.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)
63. “The sooner you tell your **government** that the war must be stopped immediately, the more of your people will remain alive.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)
64. “We know that many in **Russia** are now simply shocked by the meanness and cruelty of the authorities.” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)
65. “Just stop **those who lie to you, lie to us, lie to the whole world.**” (*We withstood: address by the President of Ukraine on the third day of the war, 2022, February 26* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vistoyali-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-tretij-den-vij-73197>)

66. “What **the invaders** are doing to Kharkiv, Okhtyrka, Kyiv, Odesa and other cities and towns deserves an international tribunal.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221>)
67. “Thanks to active diplomacy, we’ve convinced all European countries to disconnect **Russia** from SWIFT.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221>)
68. “**Russia's** criminal actions against Ukraine show signs of genocide. I talked about this with the UN Secretary General.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221>)
69. “**Russia** is on the path of evil.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221>)
70. “The world must deprive **Russia** of the right to vote in the UN Security Council.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221>)
71. “I do not want missiles, planes, helicopters to fly to Ukraine from **Belarus**.” (*Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the citizens, 2022, February 27*
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-volodimira-zelenskogo-do-gromadyan-73233>)
72. “I do not want troops to go to Ukraine from **Belarus**.” (*Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the citizens,*

2022, February 27

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-volodimira-zelenskogo-do-gromadyan-73233>)

73. “Alexander Lukashenko called on the meeting of the Ukrainian and **Russian delegations** on the Pripyat River.” (Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the citizens, 2022, February 27

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-volodimira-zelenskogo-do-gromadyan-73233>)

74. “The fifth day of **Russia's** full-scale war against the people of Ukraine.” (Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

75. “And **Russia** has shown what it has become.” (Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

76. “Just think about it: during the **Russian** invasion - in just four days - sixteen Ukrainian children died as a result of the **Russian** shelling.” (Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

77. “Every crime, every shelling that **the invaders** commit against us, unites us and our partners even more.” (Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

78. “**Russia** did not believe in such a solidary and powerful reaction.” (Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

79. “Europe has closed the sky to all **Russian planes.**” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)
80. “Global business refuses any ties with **Russian companies.**” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)
81. “Let's see how this week will end for **the Russian currency** - what will be the fall of the ruble.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)
82. “As long as this criminal invasion of Ukraine continues, **the Russian state** is suffering losses as if the war passed through their territory.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)
83. “Four and a half thousand **Russian soldiers** have already been killed.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)
84. “Why did **you** all come here?” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)
85. “Why do the columns of **your armored vehicles** go against us?” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)
86. “Once again: four and a half thousand **Russian invaders** killed.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

87. “Throw away **your** equipment. And leave.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

88. “Do not believe **your commanders**.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

89. “Do not believe **your propagandists**.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

90. “Anyone who can join the fight against **the invaders** must do so.” (*Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stoyimo-micno-zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73241>)

91. “**Russian forces** today brutally shelled Kharkiv with rocket artillery.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)

92. “**Russians** knew where **they** were shooting.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)

93. “No one in the world will forgive **you** the murder of peaceful Ukrainian people.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)

94. “I believe that it is necessary to consider the full closure of the sky for **Russian missiles, airplanes, helicopters**.”

(*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy,*

2022, February 28

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)

95. “**The state committing military crimes** against civilians cannot be a member of the UN Security Council.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
96. “The entrance to all ports, channels, airports in the world must be closed for **this state**.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
97. “**Such a state** must not receive hundreds of billions for energy exports.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
98. “Buying **Russian** goods now is to pay money for murdering people.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
99. “He rescued his brothers-in-arms, diverted **enemy aircraft fire** and was shot down by **an enemy plane**.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
100. “Destroyed the group of **enemy equipment**.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)

101. “In an air battle he destroyed two **enemy aircraft**.”
(Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
2022, February 28
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
102. “He died in an air battle, distracting **enemy aircraft**.”
(Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
2022, February 28
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
103. “Over the city of Kropyvnytskyi he shot down **an enemy IL-76**, which prevented the landing of **Russian troops** with weapons.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
104. “He withdrew the Buk SAM unit from **the enemy attacks** and personally destroyed two **Russian helicopters and one plane**.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
105. “He shot down **a Russian IL-76** near Vasylkiv, as well as **two Mi-24 helicopters**, which prevented the landing of paratroopers and weapons.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
106. “He brought people out of **the enemy’s attack**.”
(Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
2022, February 28
<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
107. “For **an enemy**, Kyiv is the key target.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February

28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)

108. “**They** want to break our national statehood.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
109. “**They** want to damage a power station and leave our city without light.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
110. “We did not allow **them** to break the defense of the capital.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
111. “And **they** send saboteurs to us. Constantly. Hundreds.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
112. “All **they** are being neutralized.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
113. “Today, at the initiative of the **Russian** side, the first round of negotiations between Ukraine and **Russia** took place.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28* <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
114. “I believe that **Russia** is trying to put pressure on us in such a way.” (*Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)

115. “Russia has declared its position.” (Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022, February 28 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zlo-ozbroyene-raketami-bombami-j-artileriyeyu-treba-zupiniti-73257>)
116. “Honestly, everyone is afraid.” (Here V. Zelensky talks about how other NATO countries are afraid to support Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which could make Russia to act aggressively towards these countries). (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 24, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
117. “I tell all the partners of our state: now is an important moment - the fate of our country is being decided. I ask them: are you with us?” (Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 24, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149>)
118. “While state institutions in Europe are in no hurry with really strong decisions, every European in the capital can already come to our embassy and offer assistance.” (Address by the President of Ukraine, 2022, February 25 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73165>)
119. “But in the war that is going on now, you are not on the same side with us. Regretfully.” (President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27 <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217>)
120. “From your territory, the troops of the Russian Federation launch rockets into Ukraine.” (President of

Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217>

121. “Our children are being killed from **your territory**, our houses are being destroyed, they are trying to blow up everything that has been built over decades - and, by the way, not only by us, but also by our fathers, our grandfathers.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217>

122. “And we are your neighbors. We, Ukrainians. Be Belarus, not **Russia!** You are making this choice right now. Exactly today.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217>

123. “You know, Kyiv was attacked at 4 am. **Someone** has such a sense of humor, just as in 1941.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217>

124. “You slept, Belarusian brothers. And we woke up. But **you** are still sleeping. And we haven't gone to bed since that moment.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*

<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217>

125. “If there were no aggressive actions from **your territory**, we could speak in Minsk. In your city.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*

[https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-
vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217))

126. “Right now, **you** haven't made your big choice yet. And it is ahead, it should depend only on **you**. Not on **Russia**, not on Ukraine, not on America, but on the people of Belarus.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*
[https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-
vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217))
127. “Warsaw, Bratislava, Budapest, Istanbul, Baku - we proposed to the **Russian** side all of this. Any other city suits us in a country from whose territory missiles are not launched.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*
[https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-
vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217))
128. “I sincerely wish **Belarus** to once again become that kind, safe **Belarus** that everyone saw not so long ago.” (*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the citizens of Belarus, 2022, February 27*
[https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-
vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrainy-vladimir-zelenskij-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-73217))
129. “This night was hard. What do **they** do? This is revenge.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27*
[https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-
prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221))
130. “The people rose to defend their state, and **they** showed their true faces. This is terror.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27*
[https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-
prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221))
131. “**They** are going to bomb our Ukrainian cities even more.” (*Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens*

	<p><i>on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221</p> <p>132. “They are going to kill our children even more insidiously. This is an evil that has come to our land and must be destroyed.” (<i>Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221)</p> <p>133. “They lied that they would not touch the civilian population. But since the first hours of the invasion, Russian troops have been hitting civilian infrastructure.” (<i>Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221)</p> <p>134. “They consciously chose tactics to destroy people and everything that makes life just normal.” (<i>Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221)</p>
International Organizations	
Supranational Alliances	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. “They answer that they are with us.” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149 2. “But they are not ready to take us to the Alliance.” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149

	<p>3. “Today, I asked the twenty-seven leaders of Europe whether Ukraine will be in NATO.” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149)</p> <p>4. “I asked directly. Everyone is afraid. They do not answer.” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149)</p>
Hacker Groups or Cyber Threat Actors	<p>1. “I know that a lot of fakes are being produced now.” (<i>Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia's attacks, 2022, February 25</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-ukrayinciv-naprikinci-pershogo-dnya-73149)</p>
Supernatural powers/beings	<p>1. “This is an evil that has come to our land and must be destroyed. They lied that they would not touch the civilian population. But since the first hours of the invasion, Russian troops have been hitting civilian infrastructure.” (<i>Address by the President of Ukraine to the citizens on the fourth day of the war, 2022, February 27</i> https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-gromadyan-u-chetvertij-den-73221)</p>