| Abstract [eng] |
The dissertation analyses legal aspects of shareholders’ agreements concluded in listed companies using theoretical model provided by agency theory. The author provides qualitative research which identifies the nature, qualifying characteristics of the shareholders’ agreement, as well as different aims of contracting shareholders. Voting agreements and transfer of voting right agreements constitute part of the academic analysis provided in the dissertation. Lithuanian regulation of shareholders’ agreements is compared with Belgian and the UK legal systems. An extensive empirical research is carried out regarding the shareholders’ agreements concluded in companies listed on stock exchanges of the selected jurisdictions. The author concludes that extensive and detailed statutory regulation of shareholders’ agreements is unnecessary. In order for shareholders’ agreements to be a feasible solution for dealing with agency problems, statutory acts have to provide that shareholders’ agreement is a valid contract which can be enforced by courts. Restrictions on the subject matter of the agreement are necessary only to limit possible abusive behaviour of contracting shareholders and expropriation of other corporate constituents. Empirical research has revealed that shareholders in jurisdictions with concentrated ownership structure, compared with jurisdictions where dispersed ownership structure prevails, conclude more shareholders’ agreements. Shareholders’ agreements are mainly used as a control enhancing mechanism by the medium sized shareholders (from 5 % to 30 % of total voting rights) to gain de jure or de facto control of the company. Most of the shareholders’ agreements are concluded between 3-4 parties that have long term goals in the company. |
