| Abstract [eng] |
The dissertation explores the question of the possibility of a moral theory compatible with common sense morality. Common sense morality is limited to its two fundamental features, or suppositions: moral judgements are truth apt and practical, i.e. they are at the same time in some sense objectively right or wrong and necessarily action guiding. In contemporary philosophy, the two fundamental features of common sense morality seem to be incompatible: only descriptions can have truth values, but descriptions are not prescriptions, or, to put it otherwise, from the way the things are, it does not follow straightforwardly how the things should be. However, analyses of the methodological, ontological, epistemological and semantic possibilities of moral theories enable a positive answer: a moral theory which embodies the two fundamental features of common-sense morality is possible, only if it makes coherence its constitutive value and uses the approach of rationalist internalism. In this research, the main controversies and distinctions of contemporary meta ethics (moral realism/anti realism, motivational internalism/externalism) are discussed and an account of rationalist internalism is explicated and enforced. |
