| Abstract [eng] |
Since Islamic Revolution in 1979 relations between Iran and international community are tensed. Though current situation, which could be described as impasse, has emerged just in the 2002, when the scope of Iran’s nuclear capabilities was first made public by the Iranian opposition group. Still the 2005 could be considered as a date, when Iran‘s and international communities relations gained current structure. In the 2005 new president M.Ahmedi-Nejad has been elected and nuclear works were resumed. Whereupon Iran is demonstrating determinacy to continue its nuclear enrichment and officials who are involved in decision making process are using aggressive rhetoric in account to U.S. an Israel. Though mentioned rhetoric is directed towards U.S. and Israel, other interrelated countries have arrogated these signals to themselves. And they were understood completely different: from assessment that their meaning is coincident with Iran’s peaceful purpose declaration to judgement that they are direct menace towards Western world. Consequently the assessment of Iran’s behaviour and intentions became complicated and that happened for several reasons: first, Iran’s rhetoric is controversial – averment that nuclear programme is peaceful logically don’t merge with declared willingness to destroy opponents. Second, rhetoric and behaviour don’t match - peaceful programme doesn’t go with a concealment of nuclear activities. Third, political assessment still rest upon realism postulates that only materialistic factors form foreign politics. In such manner ideological factors are considered not influential. Still in the context of the Islamic Republic their influence could be count not only in cognitive level, but also they could be considered as one of the official formers of the foreign policy. So the main objective of the paper is to find out the type of the strategy Iran is performing. The answer is it offensive or defensive strategy, will also make clear if Iran’s strategy causes potential threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East Region and Israel state or not. As the objects of analysis have been chosen Iran’s nuclear programme, rhetoric and strategic context. In the process of Iran‘s strategic context analysis, the main motives there excluded which could form defensive and offensive strategies. And then these motives were checked in the context of Iran‘s materialistic and ideological capabilities. For the purpose to find out, if Iran has enough material recourses and doesn‘t have ideological restraints to follow the motives. Obviously, Iran‘s behaviour and rhetoric is correlated with it‘s ambitions and inner and outer threats that the state encountered. So its nuclear programme could be considered as an aggressive mobilization programme, but also could be seen as the deffensive strategy and as an action taken to realize its ambitions. Comprehensive analysis of the material Iran‘s capabilities has recovered that Iran still doesn‘t have mass destruction weapons, still Iran is producing a wide range of middle and long range ballistic missiles, what means that Iran while attacked will defend itself not only in the zone of the attack but also will try to revenge. Comprehensive analysis of ideological Iran‘s capabilities has shown that Iran‘s ambitions are restricted by the functionating system of religious and cultural ideas, which has a power of law in Islamic Republic of Iran. Which means that the defence is obligatory for everyone, but the offence can‘t be prosecuted while imam Mahdi is in occultation. Present leadership is limited in their decisions: they are not allowed to declare offensive jihad. In conclusion it could be said that Iran is not causing potential threat, still it‘s deterrence, provocation or coercion strategy can cause limited danger. Still the situation will dramatically change if Iran would be attacked. His defence can hurt interests at least of the countires in the Middle East region. |
