



Research Article

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Arvydas Šliogeris' Perspective on Place: Shaping the Cosmopolis for a Sustainable Presence

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Abstract: This article explores the Lithuanian philosophical conception of philotopy by Arvydas Šliogeris, which, emphasizing the significance of place and experience, imposes limits on Nihil. Philotopy, as conceived by Šliogeris, is a novel method of contemporary philosophy, it is a possible answer to present-day challenges, both existential and environmental. The cosmopolis, as a concentration of things close to humans, primarily allows them to realize their finitude, similar to their place and the things closest to them. Consequently, this realization of the infinity of virtuality extends to an awareness of language as Nihilistic equipment. This mode of thinking also proves to be ecologically beneficial, as it de-virtualizes the individual and establishes a cosmopolis, which remains the beacon of hope and the source of the will to return to the surface of things – because only there can one experience a sparing fullness. This work seeks to illustrate that the fundamental relationship with a place is shaped during childhood, often rooted in the home. Tuan's phenomenological approach justifies the formation of philotopian thinking and its legitimacy. This article argues that the place becomes determinative not only through the relationship where one becomes accustomed to coexisting with the Other, but also in shaping the vocabulary. Research reveals that language, as the fundamental plane of connection with the world, is influenced by place.

Keywords: philotopy, cosmopolis, topophilia, Nothing, Isness, dwelling

1 Introduction

Philotopy can be defined as Lithuanian thinking, not only due to one of the most significant Lithuanian philosophers,¹ Arvydas Šliogeris (1944–2019), but also because of Jonas Mekas, who is more widely known today, especially as the godfather of American avant-garde cinema. One of the aspirations in Jonas Mekas' work is to capture the outside, the reality beyond the camera lens, without imposing one's own subjectivity, perceiving it as the Other. The filmmaker decenters himself as an insignificant subject, focusing all attention on the object. This is a very philotopian aspiration, but the coiner of the term philotopy is Arvydas Šliogeris.

¹ Arvydas Šliogeris, as an intellectual figure in public life, began to emerge with the loosening of the Soviet system, although he was already known in the academic world before. His book *Being and the World* (*Būtis ir Pasaulis*), published in 1990, is considered one of the most significant works published in Lithuania after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Šliogeris was one of the founders of the Lithuanian Liberal Union. In the early years of independence, his Western thinking was important not only in public life but also in philosophy. Šliogeris was characterized by a unique, brave way of thinking, with the goal not only to participate in academic discourse but also to offer his own unique concept of thinking.

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Philotopy is first encountered and elaborated in *Būtis ir pasaulis* (Being and the World, 1990)², his philosophical opus. The philotopian seeks to go beyond subjectivity, which encompasses consciousness and language both of which, by the way, coincide in Šliogeris' thinking, in order to be able to sensually encounter an object beyond himself.

Thus, philotopy, as a Lithuanian way of thinking³, requires a certain Lithuanian dimension. It should be mentioned that this dimension is visible in both Šliogeris and Mekas' approaches. Although Mekas will not be discussed further in this work, this similarity in the thinking of the two creators, in a certain way, roots the thesis raised in the work about the importance of the place of childhood as a determinant of worldview. Both Mekas and Šliogeris, although in different places, grew up in an archaic Lithuanian village that disappeared much earlier in Western Europe. Philotopy, as understood by Šliogeris, is deeply rooted in the unique and limited experience of, in Kant's terms, things-in-themselves, and in Šliogeris terms, substantial individuals.⁴ Šliogeris remains a proponent of a more Kantian conception of things and would oppose himself to Husserl. It is well known that Husserl, for example, has no illusions about the possibility of thinking things beyond here as independent. Therefore, on the one hand, the transcendence of his object becomes immanent, because it remains here, in the sphere of humanity, on the other hand, "If there is a world independent of consciousness, then knowledge of it is a matter of 'truth-making' relations between what is known and our judgments thereof."⁵ The justification of truth as knowledge is based on evidence. The goal of the phenomenologist is to transfer the experience to the level of evidence through reductions and examine how they are formed in consciousness, ensuring that they are presented clearly. Meanwhile, in philotopy, the thing, as the thing beyond immanence, is perceived as the fundamental condition of the possibility of being true, as a source of transcendence. As mentioned by Justas Kučinskas and Naglis Kardelis,⁶ "What is even more important, philotopy, conceived as a methodical approach employed in philosophical thinking, is also a meta-reflection on the way of reasoning about and being in the world defined by that particular place which provides the thinker with his or her existential roots."⁷ In other words, philotopy appears as an opportunity for an individual to realize their metaphysical situation, to overcome the veils of the eyes and consciousness. First of all, by identifying them, and secondly, with the help of knowledge and irony, to go beyond their own limited vision of the world, and most importantly, reasoning, and get closer to reality. However, reality is not the most important thing in this article; the crucial aspect is that achieving reality also brings a secondary benefit – establishing an ecologically beneficial presence.⁸

² This book has not been translated into foreign languages, but it should be noted that Šliogeris can boast of being the Lithuanian author whose most philosophical books have been translated into English. English translations are available for the following books:

Šliogeris, A. *Names of Nihil*. Editions Rodopi B.V, 2008.

Šliogeris, A. *The Thing and Art: Two Essays on the Ontotopy of the Work of Art*. Brill Academic Pub, 2009.

Šliogeris, A. *The Fate of Philosophy*. Hampton Press Inc, 2011.

German translation.

Šliogeris, A. *Post Scriptum: Aus einem philosophischen Tagebuch*. Media GmbH & Co. KG, 2013.

³ Philotopy is called Lithuanian thinking because it arises from personal homeland experience gained through everyday life, an experience closely connected with Lithuanian nature, landscape, and the surrounding environment in general. The environment becomes like a commonality that binds thinking. On the other hand, *topos* highlights the place – Lithuania – where this thinking is developing, emphasizing not only the local but also the cultural and social aspects that allowed the formation of this way of thinking. Philotopy asserts the importance of local experience, it cannot be described, but only experienced. Additionally, philotopy, as an aspiration to think exclusively and uniquely, appears as a way of thinking that, by using the essential elements of the philosophical tradition, seeks to think independently and uniquely.

⁴ In other words, substantial individuals are things that appear momentarily in reality when human consciousness is calm and silent. The thing appears to the human eye – the royal sense – and is soon re-immersed in language.

⁵ Smith and Woodruff Smith, "Introduction," 36.

⁶ Philotopian thinking proved relevant even to Hawaiians as having a deeply local mindset because of geographic location. Naglis Kardelis and Justas Kučinskas presented philotopy at the International Conference *Imagination: The 48th Annual Conference*. University of Hawaii, Manoa (East-West Center), Honolulu (United States) 02-06-2016 <https://bit.ly/3FJKVwo>, in order to popularize the thinking of Arvydas Šliogeris and demonstrate the similarities between Lithuanian and Hawaiian thinking.

⁷ Kardelis and Kučinskas, "The Wisdom of Place," 22.

⁸ For Šliogeris, ecology is one of the many measures of techno-terror against Nature. According to him, "ecology is just a continuation of the same technology," see Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas II t*, 546. In other words, attempting to solve problems technologically deepens the oppression of technology against Nature and establishes human totalitarianism.

With a deeper grasp of Western philosophical tradition, it is easy to connect two seemingly very similar terms – topophilia and philotopy. Topophilia is Chinese-American philosopher Yi-Fu Tuan's concept for love of the place. As Easthope accurately points out, citing the Duncans "Yi-Fu Tuan coined the term topophilia to describe the affective bond between people and place."⁹ Philotopy is a much broader concept, a concept focused more on the metaphysical structure of the human being, the foundation of which is love of the place, or simply put, love of the Other. Perhaps, it can be assumed that topophilia is only one component of philotopy, but being overly phenomenological, it is at the same time contradictory and alien.

If we are already talking about philotopy, love of place, the question arises – where is philotopy possible? For a philotopian, place, the meaning which is already encoded in the word itself, is the most important, because it determines his attitude toward the world. Philotopy is not a pragmatic or instrumental sense of place. Rather, it is love directed to a specific place where an intense experience of reality is possible. In a relationship, individuality disappears, especially if we perceive the other person not as a particular, sensuously experienced individual, but rather as perceived through the relationship. In addition, the relationship is only imaginary, existing only in the virtual realm. It is not an experience that appears as entertainment, vanity or kitsch, rather it is an experience that comes from melancholy and silence. To belong to a certain place, is an existential choice,¹⁰ it is the establishment of a cosmopolis.

2 The Establishment of Philotopian Place – Cosmopolis

To begin with, it should be briefly mentioned that according to philotopian thinking, a human being is in a permanent diatopic between Nothing and Isness.¹¹ For a philotopian, man is in a constant potential to break away to one side or the other. Nothing (*Niekis*), in Šliogeris thinking, should be associated with the fact that for him the understanding that takes place in consciousness means "active imprinting of a meaning or sign on something that would be incomprehensible by itself."¹² In other words, such a movement of consciousness distances a person from what is Reality in Šliogeris understanding. Consciousness understands things on a linguistic level, which is limited. Therefore, it can be said that consciousness, squeezing experience into linguistic meanings, reduces Reality. However, Isness, the antipode of Nothing, is associated with masses of nonhuman sensible things, silence and individual experience that are detached from epistemology. Nonetheless, this is not enough, and philotopy asserts that, foremost, such an encounter necessitates a setting characterized by minimal human presence. Šliogeris says that "in nonhuman things, Transcendence presents in its purest form."¹³

The act of situating oneself in a certain horizon that is already familiar and, above all, limited to the human eye, serves as a means to delimit the boundless realm of virtuality, and therefore nihilism. This act engenders a realization: that the constraints of a finite horizon serve as a representation of a finite corporal being's own inherent limitations. As Naglis Kardelis and Justas Kučinskas note: "Radically rejecting the fall from the optimal point of man's presence in the world, it [philotopy] does not establish new extremes, but returns to man the optimal way of his presence in the world, corresponding to both the nature of man and the nature of things, as well as the optimal natural balance between them."¹⁴ In other words, philotopical thinking

⁹ Easthope, "A Place Called Home," 130.

¹⁰ Kardelis and Kučinskas, "The Wisdom of Place," 160.

¹¹ It should be noted that according to the influences that determined the directions of Šliogeris' philosophy, a distinction is made between the early philosophy up to the "Names of Nihil" (1st edition 1997) and the later one, which began with "Names of Nihil," see Ruzas and Šaulauskas, "Pozityvioji ir negatyvioji tikrovės tematizacija. Šliogeris ir Baudrillard'as," 74). However, we should make a distinction between the early stage up to the two volume "Nothing and Isness" (1st edition 2005), and the late stage starting with this edition. This leads to the fact that in this publication the concept of Isness appears for the first time, which refers to something that is transcendental to human reality. For the late Šliogeris Being is that which coincides with language, hence Nothing.

¹² Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas I t.*, 30.

¹³ Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas II t.*, 156.

¹⁴ Kardelis and Kučinskas, "Pusiausvyros siekis Arvydo Šliogerio filosofijoje," 25.

allows the individual, constantly swaying between Nothing and Isness, to find himself in equilibrium – that means, to be on the way to Isness.

Returning to the topic of place, we should start with the fact that the place can be explored from at least a few different points of reference. For example, one can invoke Kantian rhetoric and claim that a place is already immersed in space, since, according to Kant's philosophy, space and time are *a priori* conditions of man's transcendental possibilities. As soon as a place is discovered, it appears as an outcome arising from the intersection of the physical realm and human intellect. In this case, Kant's epistemological philosophy is not so important, it is more important that a human being already finds himself in space, his body is spatial and three dimensions of space are arranged around him.

Contemplating space, it is tempting to start looking at what is closest, to what the eyes are drawn to in everyday life, and only then move away. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to start from the most innately original of places – the home. This idea will be developed later, but for now, it can only be hinted that: "The nature of building is letting man dwell. Building accomplishes its nature in the raising of locations by the joining of their spaces."¹⁵ Thus, Heidegger's understanding allows us to notice that we first encounter the region, the things-around-us, because: "In the region of 'means not only' in the direction of, but also within the range [*Umkreis*] of something that lies in that direction. The kind of place which is constituted by direction and remoteness (and closeness is only a mode of the latter) is already oriented toward a region and oriented within it."¹⁶ This implies that a person's primal being in the world is being in the region where an object is perceived pragmatically as ready-to-hand, and also according to the relative position of the object in the region, space is structured taking into account the circumstances, the observer's discerning care, directionality, and proximity.

In order to better understand the perspective of the philotopian, it may be contrasted with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's eco-phenomenological approach and should be extended by shifting the focus from place to things. The origins of Tymieniecka's eco-phenomenology¹⁷ should be sought in classical phenomenology, thus in Husserl's philosophy. Of course, their thinking is not identical. It is well known that Husserl understands the object as a phenomenon that appears to us through the transcendent senses, that is, as the subjectivity of consciousness. Meanwhile, in Tymieniecka's understanding, as specified by Massimo Marassi "phenomenology is not about demonstrating that the world exists independently from subjects; it is about showing how men, as transcendental subjects, may achieve a normal and intersubjective representation of the world that is meaningful for all subjects."¹⁸ It should be emphasized that any representation of the world is not a solution in Šliogeris thinking. In his opinion, human perception is not direct because if a thing is perceived as such, it is already reflected upon. We must remember that philotopy seeks to return to the things themselves – we will expand on this thought later. Now, we must say that although philotopy appears to be a way of thinking that strives for stable things, philotopy itself is constantly changing, approaching, and receding – the experiences of reality change it. If we allow ourselves to say that the subject, the human being, never stays longer with the things themselves, at the grace of the Isness, but usually only approaches it and swings away from it; in other words, if we understand philotopian existence as a certain endless processuality, then we will be able to see similarities between the aspirations of Tymieniecka and Šliogeris. After all, both Šliogeris and Tymieniecka¹⁹ (*ibid.*: 74) emphasize that the way a person perceives the world now is harmed by prevailing ideologies that enslave humanity and exalt technology, which means that, in the understanding of both, the individual must constantly purify phenomena. In the case of Šliogeris – until we face the intensity of a speechless thing, but

¹⁵ Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 157. In Heidegger's understanding, a thing combines within itself the fourfold – earth, sky, mortals and deities. Nevertheless, in the perspective of the author of this work, the notion of an object embodying the fourfold has become obsolete in the post-secular, technologically driven era. Therefore, in this study, the fourfold is omitted, and an attempt is made to discuss convergence through the entanglement of labor and the temporal dimension.

¹⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 136.

¹⁷ As Brown and Toadvine (*Eco-phenomenology*, xx) point out "Eco-phenomenology offers a methodological bridge between the natural world and our own." In other words, eco-phenomenology aims to uncover the transformative effects of human activity on nature, and the profound influence of the environment on human consciousness, perception, and experience.

¹⁸ Marassi, "An Insight into the Foundations of Eco-Phenomenology," 76.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 74.

Tymieniecka is more radical in this point of view – she would call Šliogeris' aspirations naive realism. Tymieniecka²⁰ emphasizes sensibility and identifies it as a universal and fundamental quality of life, but more as a primary domain of external experience than a pure experience of reality as Šliogeris. Tymieniecka's experience of reality is, we would say, more Heideggerian – the human being does not impose his order on the world, but the world itself reveals itself to the human. One of Tymieniecka's essential concepts – the logos of life – is perceived as a possibility to open the Earth that is hiding and approach reality, including another important aspect of her philosophy – creative imagination. Tymieniecka especially emphasizes the unique creative abilities of human consciousness, as the role of the herald of meaning and value in the cosmos. However, human consciousness, and especially the linguistic plane, is perceived by Šliogeris as a purely nihilistic milieu, so it is necessary to approach things, to try to get closer to them. This does not mean that Šliogeris believes that it is possible to perceive the thing-in-itself, but in Šliogeris' understanding, language and pragmatic thinking constantly close us off from reality, so even if we cannot reach the thing-in-itself, we must constantly oppose the Nothing.

However, in order to understand why it is necessary to oppose Nothing, and not, like traditional metaphysics, simply start with being, it should be noted that “The radicality of Šliogeris' position is primarily based on the fact that he challenges Being as the primary metaphysical givenness: Nothing, not Being, is the first metaphysical givenness.”²¹ Therefore, we primarily have to limit Nothing and only then approach Being, and in the Šliogeris case – Isness. In order to demonstrate how one can oppose to Nothing it is worth paying attention to Homer's work “The Odyssey,” which is significant in the context of this work in at least several aspects. First, it should be noted that the journey of Odysseus, as an analogy, helps to reveal the ontotopic situation of man, or in Šliogerian terms, of the son of Nothing. Odysseus had to endure various trials during his decade-long journey: he was lured by Circe and the Sirens, who promised eternal bliss in vanity, as well as Calypso, who promised immortality – to stand next to the gods. That means that he was offered the temptations of Nirvana and Caligula syndromes.²² However, Odysseus overcomes his trials and achieves his goal of returning to Ithaca, and the philotopians must overcome the Nirvana and Caligula syndromes that haunt man in order to “to return to the place where we are not only as Sons of Nothing, but also as mortals, as corporeal beings, thrown to the thickness of sensibility, chained to this place and this moment: to return to Plato's cave, or world-here; to return from language, from virtuality, from myth.”²³ Hence, the philotopian seeks to return to the juncture where the “human, all too human” realm concludes, opening the path to encounter the Other – the sensible objects. It is noteworthy that myths and syndromes are born in language, or rather in its games, snares, and shackles that wrap things in an impenetrable cover. Sensuality is the only consolation that allows man to reduce man's linguistic barbarism. Thus, the return to the cosmopolis, to sensually experienced objects, can be likened to a return to Ithaca – a destination that Odysseus desires or knows he must reach. Of course, this requires will not to be satisfied with vulgarity, banality, and vanity, as well as the wisdom to recognize that the surface of things offers a more reliable foundation. In other words, dedication actualizes the Ithaca syndrome, which, as Šliogeris' observes, “forces us to make this simple and slight turn: from blind speech and sightless thinking to speechless sight.”²⁴ This does not imply that we should only observe without speaking or, in a broader sense, even refrain from thinking, and realizing this, Šliogeris' draws a map (rather dotted), indicating that in order to return to reality, we must take three steps, otherwise known as ontotopic reductions.

The first reduction is needed to overcome language and its myths, to look beyond the fog. In other words, it is the knowledge of the falsifying nature of language, and at the same time, an ironic relationship with it. This means that only the possibility of encountering objects is created. Now we can discern the presence from the absence with greater clarity. Things that are materially nearby are inaccessible in their depth, and the

²⁰ Tymieniecka, “The Human Condition within the Unity-of-Everything-there-is-Alive and its Logocic Network,” xiv.

²¹ Šerpytytė, “Nuo ko pradėt?,” 144.

²² Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas I t.*, 385–6. Exactly next to God, because the previously discussed syndromes of Nirvana and Caligula, respectively, coincide: Nirvana syndrome is the desire for bliss, a sense of fulfillment, and Caligula syndrome refers to despotism – the human tendency to become the ruler, master of this world.

²³ Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas II t.*, 389.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 390.

“deepest” thoughts are the closest and most superficial forms of contact with the world, and therefore, are only unreliable expressions of egoism.

Our interaction must be limited exclusively to visual perception, but we are still only on the way, so we must take the second step – the second ontotopic reduction, which in its own way stabilizes the world-here to the only one, to this locality-on-this-side-of-the-sensible-horizon that cannot be replaced by any other world for this mortal.²⁵ It is important to mention that stabilization requires an individuating, second movement that allows you to get to know the object, because “to get to know this [particular] thing, as a sensual singularity, means to tear it out of the net of destruction and move it to the center of the sight.”²⁶ Hence, in the second ontotopic reduction, we make two important moves. First, we realize that we are constantly mythologizing our existence. And in the second movement, we identify with the object, singling it out as a concrete individual, thus overcoming the nihilistic, abstract relation and centering the concrete sensual object. The imperative is straightforward: if it is necessary to talk, you must talk only about things that you see, otherwise, it is again detached from this world and dissolves in virtuality.

The last step remains, which connects, concentrates, and finally returns the person to the field of speechless existential experience. This step is an array of sensuously articulated things, the amalgamation of these things into a unified realm of experience forms – cosmopolis. Of course, the amalgamation, or we could say “establishment” of the cosmopolis, is a metaphysical act, but also conditional, because it does not depend absolutely only on the human being. Cosmopolis is often a given place. However, a human always has the opportunity to deny or accept the cosmopolis, and sometimes “build” a new one. The most important thing is that cosmopolis, as a concentrate of things familiar to me, fundamentally allows me to realize that I am finite just like my place. Philotopy is impossible for a nomad, a virtual, simply because he does not have one specific place that is irreplaceable for him, especially if the nomad is a tourist and seeks fulfillment in adventure, novelty, and sensations. It should be noted that when we talk about nomads, we do not mean nomadic peoples or the generally nomadic way of life that prevailed in early times. Although the advantages of a sedentary, peasant way of existence will be discussed later, here we mean a virtual nomad or a metaphysical nomad. This type of nomad is not only physically unable to attach themselves to things but also cannot limit themselves, maintain attention, or avoid giving in to the abundance of things. A metaphysical nomad is someone who spends their time moving from one thing to another. Therefore, nomadism, as a never-ending search for consumption, especially on a metaphysical level, can be defined as a diagnosis of the contemporary world. Care, closeness, melancholic calm, and familiarity establish a philotopic, exclusive relationship, and such a relationship “brings the person as close to Reality as possible, helps to overcome the horror, emptiness, boredom and anesthesia of Nothing, and thus gives meaning to his [philotopian’s] life and work.”²⁷

Thus, the third step – the purification of the cosmopolis – completes the process that may be called Return (*liet. sangrąža*). If a human spoke about things while being turned away from them and mused, now he should see things and be silent because it is impossible to say anything that has sense.²⁸ Turning back brings back an intense experience in which the Nothing is limited. This experience is called intensity-plus. After it, a person finds himself in a diatopic between Nothing and Isness, in the “am (I)?”²⁹ wave where the alpha point is at the zenith, and this is good, because it is not in Nothing. So, if we believe the rather macabre-sounding grace of Isness – this meeting is not only an unforgettable experience, but also an option, which is always in philotopians sights, and that’s why “Odysseus’ journey is easier than Moses’: first of all, because he knows where to

²⁵ Ibid., 399.

²⁶ Ibid., 430.

²⁷ Ibid., 417.

²⁸ It is important to mention that Šliogeris distinguishes between two terms – “meaning” and “sense.” He interprets “meaning” as the significance that a human being imparts to things. And sense is what lies on the surface of things, the most insignificant experience. In the English language, you can notice a similarity between sense and sensuality.

²⁹ We have to imagine Am (I) wave as mans’ methaphysical position which depends on his relation with reality. Am (I) wave consists of two semiwaves – that’s why man is always in the situation to slip to one side or the other. One of those waves is nihilative – Nothing and the other is positive – Isness. These semiwaves meet at the middle – alpha-point. This point separates and connects at the same time metasensible-nihilative and sensible-Isness, see Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas I t*, 400).

return.”³⁰ This remark by Šliogeris is useful in the sense that it proves that Isness must always be a peripherally assumed option, an aspiration, but not a coercion.

According to Šliogeris' concept, the question “am (I)?” arising in human intuition arises in conditions of uncertainty and lack of Reality. Consequently, the question that has arisen becomes an urge to seek pure support or to dive into Nothing, to destroy oneself in generalities. If Šliogeris' dichotomy of Nothing and Isness was considered a purely illustrative concept, it could be argued that it is impossible to always be one way – being closer to Nothing or Isness, just like being authentic or inauthentic in Heidegger's philosophy, depends on the person – his will and stubbornness.³¹

Heidegger is a productive dialogue partner in order to demonstrate the nuances of philotopian thinking, especially in reflecting on the significance of place. It is noteworthy to mention that Heidegger talks about the importance of place, more precisely, about the birthplace, homeland, or the ensemble of things that are closest to us as the primary possibility of an authentic life. Heidegger realizes the possibility of the disclosedness of truth, which, as can be understood, must be a counterweight to the inauthentic modes of being. As mentioned earlier, Heidegger's world is that which emerges in human contact with things. A relationship that is established in the junction can never be objectified or assimilated, because it will be reduced. The world must be based on something stable, in Heidegger's case, it is the Earth. Heidegger finds the possibility of the revelation of truth in the tension between what he calls the world and the Earth, an event that creates a space for Being to be disclosed. Thus, in Heidegger's foundational disclosedness of truth, man is decentralized because “Disclosive freedom only appears in the absence of the possessive mastery.”³² Hence, in order for transcendence to appear in the hidden, there cannot remain an anthropocentric or overpowering contact with the world; any coercion or overpowering leads to inauthenticity. As Marder observes “The world cannot come about nor can it last without things; it disintegrates the moment we exchange them for consumable objects.”³³ Hence, Heidegger's encounter with the thing also begins with sensory experience, which serves as the impetus for language, but it is also a censorship of Dasein's excessive virtuality. It is noticeable that speech occurs when there is a wordless silence after the junction with a sensual object. However, it is necessary to note that Heidegger's sensuality is not Šliogerian – it is not transcendental.

Heidegger's transcendence lies in language, to be more precisely – in poetic language. Poetic speaking, having its own charge, without absorbing, without reducing the entity, allows transcendence to shine. Poetic language creates a mythical story and allows us to cast veils over the truth. However, as mentioned earlier, language and any relation to it, unless it is irony in relation to language, is Nothing. For Šliogeris, language is only a medium in which the Nothing reigns, and the most important thing is that language falsifies and misleads. Taking into account presented arguments it can be said that Reality, Being, Isness, or Transcendence, depending on the chosen perspective, are structured by the same two sands – sensuality and ideality. However, quite different conclusions are formed, and it should be noted that Šliogeris goes a step further, so the Reality of the philotopian is more radical. Heidegger talks about the importance of place, more precisely, about the birthplace, homeland, or the ensemble of close things as the primary possibility of an authentic life. It is being-toward-death in thrownness, which includes primarily home, homeland, and surrounding people, that constitutes authentic being. But more importantly, Dasein, even when limited by space, remains free to choose authenticity. Dasein always is in the fallenness in various modes. Of course, the question of authenticity sooner or later appears in the categories of fear, anxiety, finitude, or lack, but Heidegger's authenticity seeks to return only to the presence of one's own authentic Self, which has the taste of egocentricity. Of course, to put it in a Šliogerian way, you are always responsible for censoring by the Nothing. But authenticity overcomes Nothing only in the first move – a human being is freed from the masks, duties, and desires imposed on him, but in the second move, Dasein perishes again, because like Narcissus who is infatuated with himself, he falls

³⁰ Ibid., 390.

³¹ While Heidegger himself does not treat authentic or inauthentic presence as inherently evaluative, it also serves as an evaluative term to describe a desirable or preferred mode of existence, see Carman, “Authenticity,” 285–6.

³² Botha, “Heidegger, Technology and Ecology,” 168.

³³ Marder, *Heidegger*, 91.

into the river. In other words, Heidegger's authentic being in the homeland does not establish the possibility of returning to Reality, but to the unique, authentic self. Hence, Other is not necessary for Reality, except as a thing that gathers and directs toward the unconcealedness of truth.

Therefore, Šliogeris needs at least several ontotopic reductions, as well as patience, melancholy, and the desire to go beyond humanity. That is why, for Šliogeris, the standard of a philotopically existing individual is a peasant. Certainly, today's individuals will never fit the old definition of a peasant due to significant changes in the world. However, the primordial image can serve as a standard for man's existence in everyday life, where he not only takes, but also gives.

On the one hand, it may seem that living in the city, a human being is really far from grain cultivation, from the forest and its gifts. But on the other hand, man is still responsible for change. Šliogeris formulated the idea of a peasant as the standard of a mortal living in balance in the book "Būtis ir pasaulis."³⁴ The idea is clear – we must not only take but also give. More than three decades have passed since then, and ecologists have heard the plea of philotopians and found a way to give back to nature what we took from it. Of course, it was not a direct connection, but for that purpose, in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania from January 1, 2024, a new procedure was introduced, which, by the way, has existed in other countries, say Norway, for a long time. It was announced that waste sorting is changing – separating biodegradable and nonbiodegradable waste. Precisely because the aim is to produce compost from biodegradable materials to restore the quality parameters of degraded soils. With this short excursion, I want to demonstrate that such changes do not require special technological equipment or progress. But what is needed is a change in thinking and going the extra mile for the sake of the common good in existence. These changes arise from a pure shift in the dimension of thinking, understanding nature not as a resource but as an opportunity for symbiotic coexistence. As J. Baird Callicott points out: "What does appear to be threatened by global climate change is the Holocene climate and the biota that is adapted to it."³⁵ And this means that we have a responsibility to ourselves and to the existing biotic species that will disappear due to climate change. However, nature will not disappear completely, after all, we have examples of species of living organisms that are much older than humanity, such as Cyanobacteria. It is likely that with the help of technology, humans would also survive, but what is at stake is human civilization.³⁶ After all, nature does not need man, but man needs nature. Of course, tensions may arise when raising the question of what becomes more important in the context of this thinking: man or nature. From the perspective of philotopy, perhaps the answer should be that it is important to realize that not everything you see is human or intended for humans. Philotopy's goal is to reflect the human condition by proposing a worldview in which reality is perceived as something beyond man, so what is beyond him should not be destroyed. Therefore, the protection of nature appears as a secondary outcome in philotopy, as it is necessary to preserve the quality of human life. In Šliogeris' thinking, man is perceived as a pragmatic being, and the recognition of this becomes the way to free oneself from blind destruction. Therefore, the position of the peasant is exceptional, because he stands out first of all for his timelessness and situational freedom and only the Peasant is not only the one who eats, but is also the creator and author of Bread. It represents the only generative existential relationship with Sensual Transcendence.³⁷ Such a moderate exchange of the peasant enables frugal consumption – he is not elevated above nature, he does not see it as a master, he does not yet have the tools with which he can dominate and conquer, so he knows that if he destroys something, he cannot replace it so quickly with a new one.

The complete opposite is the current, or, as philosopher Algis Mickūnas calls it, nomadic consciousness, for it "there is no attachment to 'its' land: after exhausting the entire environment and possibly destroying his subjects, the nomad will travel further in search of new 'resources,' and when he finds them, he will begin to build new strongholds and continue his 'noble, honorable, aristocratic' life."³⁸ In other words, an old, worn-out

³⁴ Šliogeris, *Būtis ir Pasaulis*, 453.

³⁵ Callicott, *Thinking Like a Planet*, 298.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Šliogeris, *Kasdienybės metafizika*, 409.

³⁸ Mickūnas, "Lietuva ir globalizacija," 127.

item can be exchanged for a new one simply for the sake of honor or status. It is no accident that Mickūnas writes adjectives with quotation marks, because it is obvious that honor and aristocracy require a corresponding sacrifice and attitude, not a barbaric, destructive consciousness.

The peasant is in his irreplaceable and necessary cosmopolis, but he is free and frugal. Nomad, who is changing places, does not feel the consequences of his barbaric presence, because he is constantly traveling – virtually or physically. The Lithuanian word “pasaulis” by definition, refers to a limited place under the sun (*po-saule*),³⁹ so there is no room for virtuality. For the virtual, everything is foreign, and even if it is familiar, it is only abstractly, therefore, nihilistically. It can be admitted that the lost field of knowledge is a great tragedy for a mortal. After losing the cosmopolis, the mortal also forgets about his finitude, and such a situation becomes a favorable starting point for myths, ideologies, anthropocentrism, and so on. So, the cosmopolis serves not only as a horizon, but also as a necessary point of return it is a support that is always there; we are metaphysically bound to it; it serves as a solace to which we aspire to return, a source of strength for the will, like knowledge that Penelope is waiting in Ithaca.

3 Cosmopolis in Today's World

After unfolding philotopian, peasant thinking, it is worth looking at the architectonic of today's world, and to consider the possibility of balance that would allow a nurturing being to exist. First of all, it should be mentioned that in Tuan's thought “body and place are inseparable,”⁴⁰ in other words, through bodily habits, constant repetitions, we acquire the familiarity of a place. Then, we should take a look at the beginning – childhood, because it seems that the cosmopolis has the most chances to be found in the homeland, if there are any. As Yi-Fu Tuan⁴¹ observes “the young child is more concerned with things themselves ... than with their precise spatial relations.”⁴² That means that the child, when encountering objects around him, first does not combine them into coherent meaningful units, but looks at them individually, without assigning them to categories, if speaking more precisely – without virtually destroying them, because they are not thought of only as ready-to-hand or only in a contextual relationship with other things. Such a view seems more primitive, but it is worth mentioning once again Šliogeris' fundamental thesis – less thinking, more vision, more Reality, so it may seem primitive when evaluated by significant categories, but in terms of sense, such a view is incomparably more valuable.

Since this section aims to reveal how a cosmopolis is formed, continuing Tuan's thought, it can be said that, “An infant's space expands and becomes better articulated as he recognizes and reaches out to more permanent objects and places. Space is transformed into place as it acquires definition and meaning.”⁴³ It might seem that the child needs the experience of things that can give sense and define the place, or in other words, experience the relationships among things, relationships with his relatives or even his own ready-to-hand things. Of course, such an experience is rather an acquaintance with the unique things that structure his place, because the infant is still too young to reflect his experience, to discern that the places they inhabit have one or another meaning. However, basically everything moves cyclically, a person “starts with experience in infancy or childhood and ends with experience again when he is old.”⁴⁴ Therefore, in order to be able to return or at least comprehend the superiority of a child's perspective, one must reach maturity, acknowledge the mistakes

³⁹ Kardelis and Kučinskas, “The Wisdom of Place,” 164.

⁴⁰ Donohoe, “The Place of Home,” 26.

⁴¹ Attempt to supplement Šliogeris' philotopy concept with Tuan's phenomenological approach may seem like a *contradictio in adjecto*, but Tuan's inclusion from various perspectives becomes paradoxically valuable, as a concept that, one might say, must be exclusively anti-phenomenological, is grounded by phenomenology.

⁴² Tuan, *Space and Place*, 26.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁴⁴ Šliogeris and Gustas, *Pokalbiai apie esmes*, 69.

of youth, so that after experiencing virtuality and being disheartened by it, they could return to where they left off.

An adult individual is already lost and cannot see with a child's, all-encompassing gaze. His concern can be associated with the need to take care of himself and others, which means to think practically, pragmatically. A child, being careless, under normal circumstances feels safe at home because his parents, the walls of the home, are his guardians, and for that reason Tuan states that "Attachment of a deep though subconscious sort may come simply with familiarity and ease, with the assurance of nurture and security, with the memory of sounds and smells, of communal activities and homely pleasures accumulated over time."⁴⁵ Šliogeris agrees with this statement, emphasizing the place experienced in childhood as the one that penetrates deepest and remains closest metaphysically attached.⁴⁶ In other words, because of security, peace, and pleasure, being at home becomes a field of fullness, where you were once without lack, and therefore becomes a landmark, a will that even through the place, the things in it, you will be able to return to the Isness of childhood. Certainly, incorporating traumatic home experiences might complicate the discourse. However, if we refrain from delving into complex psychological analyses and consider childhood as an impartial experience, we can draw upon Donohoe's⁴⁷ insightful observation that the homeworld is the most habituated place. Clearly, this habituation implies a need to adapt, suggesting it's not solely composed of positive experiences. Therefore, our understanding of place is not only through the body, but the place also enables us to experience our body,⁴⁸ revealing not just idealistic connections with it, but also the necessity of dwelling and engaging in physical interaction, and encountering otherness – a topic we will delve into later. It is crucial that the home becomes our primary point of reference, against which we contrast the secondary – the "external" world. Through this process, each of us develops a unique perception of the surrounding world, of good and evil. Of course, this opposition does not in itself guarantee truth or the establishment of a cosmopolis that can be the foundation of thinking oriented toward moderation or sustainability. What is relevant here are the unconcerned experiences acquired in childhood, which can become shallows of experience, which, at best, have learned about the existence of the Other as Other, or at least remain as experiential testimonies of a purer experience.

Tuan emphasizes the perception of place through the prism of a child as a player, which is somewhat reminiscent of H. G. Gadamer's concept of play, when not only we play, but being itself plays with us, we obey the rules, forget and absorb it as it appears to us.⁴⁹ The experience is gained unconsciously, through entertainment, without thinking deeply. The wider context is not important to the child; only his narrow experience of home, which unfolds in the inertia of play, holds significance. Meanwhile, for Šliogeris, the focus lies less on how that place is acquired or how it becomes one, but rather on what it provides. Šliogeris finds greater significance in his resistance to globalization, suggesting that the only way to remain authentic is to find a place with which one can spiritually align and stick to and call it home

Ruyu Hung's insightful observation, made while exploring Tuan's concept of home, is pertinent here. Hung states that "Home is a place where one can recognize and face his or her own weakness and be comforted."⁵⁰ From Šliogeris perspective, home is a sanctuary where he can distance himself from the world, its vulgarity, and the superficiality of civilization. In a sense, it is about finding oneself in an ivory tower, where one can encounter culture and thoughts that hold personal significance. It's about having the space to think deeply and not being content with the hurried pace of today's world, the colorful advertising billboards, or screens. Instead, it's about creating one's own pole, where reality is purified from Nothing, at least to some degree.

Therefore, to transcend everyday superficial experiences, we require more sustainable, long-lasting witnesses than our own memory, which can fade or change. Here becomes relevant Viktorija Daujotytė's remark

⁴⁵ Tuan, *Space and Place*, 159.

⁴⁶ Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas II t.*, 409.

⁴⁷ Donohoe, "The Place of Home," 33.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁴⁹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 109.

⁵⁰ Hung, "Journeying between Home and Nature," 239.

that “Remembering requires impulses, excitations that are sometimes imperceptible,”⁵¹ this implies that encounters with objects physically, their proximity, are best if they happen unintentionally. At this point, it becomes an impulse to encounter the remnants of authentic life. And, it does not matter that it is just remnants, because “philotopy is not a love of particular place *for various reasons* but a love of the *particularity itself* – a love that occurs *because of the particularity*.”⁵² Things may seem old, worn out, worthless, but if we overcome these sheets of Nothing through ontotopic reductions, we can approach a primordial sight and a more stable support that fills the periphery of thought with fullness, leaving minimal space for Nothing.

Šliogeris finds solidity in the sensible surface, which, as mentioned earlier, is best experienced by sight. For Šliogeris, sight is an aristocratic sense that presents the greatest power of contrasts, colors, its tones, and diversity. The uniqueness of vision is also important to Tuan – he claims that “Visual space, with its vividness and size, differs strikingly from diffuse auditory and tactile-sensorimotor spaces.”⁵³ However, it should be noted that Šliogeris and Tuan’s concepts of vision are absolutely different. According to Tuan, “To see and to think are closely related processes,”⁵⁴ and Šliogeris contrasts thinking and seeing – if you see selectively, it is still thinking, because the sense works for the purpose set by the individual, so the things that are here in closeness are further than virtuality. We return to the closeness of things after calming the mind, its lust for sensation and intensity. Šliogeris says that such calm and patience is accompanied by a touch of melancholy, Tuan seems to agree: “rural sentiments were genuine they were often stepped in melancholy,”⁵⁵ but it also raises the question – do we become melancholy after first experiencing patience and calmness, or do we, nonetheless, sink into melancholy when confronted with the proximity of things in our cosmopolis, which in turn makes it easier for us to attain calmness and patience?

However, it is important to pay attention to everyday life of the peasant in order to understand the sincerity of the sentiments. First, the peasant’s place of residence, the world (*pa-saulis* – a limited place under the sun), especially if there is any hill, fits easily in the sight of a mortal, so the scope is thinkable for a man. Both, things and mortals, can be familiar to the peasant, therefore, he experiences individuality, has a deeper relationship with others. The most important thing is that the peasant does not need mathematics, sensors, and other scientific talents to understand that everything he sees is connected in one way or another. This thinking is obviously simple and ancient, as there are obvious parallels with the Greek pole. This concept can also be reasoned by paying attention to the fact that “The ecological groundwork for the polis, affecting the human dwelling, is apparent in the linguistic lineage that ties it to the word *polos*, ‘the pole, the swirl [*Wirbel*] in which and around which everything turns.”⁵⁶ Thus, the life of a peasant is directly related to the community he lives next to, but this community is not only made up of people. The peasant does not live only in his own created world, but constantly lives in a relationship with the Other. It is important to note that through suffering and instability, via muscle pain, and through the scars that adorn the body, one can discern the peasant’s intimate relationship with nature, with the Other.⁵⁷ Without technology, the peasant still knows Nature’s instability, its harshness, yet also appreciates the shelter it offers, without being detached from the rhythm dictated by Nature. By spending time in a limited place and being in close proximity to Nature, he has acquired an understanding of Nature’s behavior in other words “love of place is, in itself, a form of wisdom.”⁵⁸ Now, with the aid of technology, science is able to measure and understand phenomena that were previously well-known to the peasant. This knowledge allows science to speak about the cruelties of nature globally. Of course, we are not opposed to science and wisdom per se, but today science is perceived only as a practical thing that must necessarily improve human well-being, thus crushing the ontological sphere at the same time. Therefore, the peasant does not need utopian visions of conquered Nature, the ghosts of *Gestell* do not appear. According

51 Daujotytė, *Arvydas Šliogeris*, 82.

52 Kardelis and Kučinskas, “The Wisdom of Place,” 161.

53 Tuan, *Space and Place*, 15.

54 *Ibid.*, 10.

55 Tuan, *Topophilia*, 108.

56 Marder, *Heidegger*, 70.

57 Tuan, *Topophilia*, 97.

58 Kardelis and Kučinskas, “The Wisdom of Place,” 160.

to Algis Mickūnas, today's technically educated "specialists" no longer belong to their own or other cultures, but seem to float above them, armed with the globalized ontology of the modern West, which asserts that the universe is a neutral consumable, that everything is mathematical metaphysics, in other words that everything is calculated neutrally.⁵⁹ The easy floating of the "specialist," nomadic consciousness is contrasted with the settled peasant being. Detached from place, expanding and conquering, not limited by his place, man perceives everything as consumable or mathematizable. The nomad neither dwells nor cares, but only seeks and uses. He has no measure or limit because his objective is resources, not relationships. To the wanderer, the Other must obey, and Otherness must be conquered, for the master requires a slave. Thus, this is another mode of emergence of sentimentality, as attachment to place arises from the experience of nature's disobedience.⁶⁰ The right to property is acquired not from ease or pleasure, but through labor – plowing, planting, and other uses of the land – the peasant creates the right to property.⁶¹ However, this relationship is not possessive or coercive, but one that develops over time, through closeness. In such a case, there is no reason for a man to think that he is a master or to go against his nature and place Other on a platform and pretend to glorify him. The concept of community is established in natural dwelling, experiencing the closeness of the Other day by day.

Only a peasant or, at the very least, a philosopher-peasant type of human being can continue to live in moderation. He understands that without a space where there is still room for Otherness, he is condemned to the immoderate anarchy of Nothing. Only in cosmopolis, next to familiar things, the alpha point gets a chance to lean toward Isness. Šliogeris claims that for those who at least once felt the presence of Isness, this game between homey and stranger never ends, so even after recognizing the Motherland, its closeness, getting to know its things and mortals, the awakened guest never falls asleep again, and never forgets the presence of Isness.⁶² Hence, Isness lightning strikes are unique. It is important to emphasize that this experience is what strikes, because, "The most intense aesthetic experiences of nature are likely to catch one by surprise. Beauty is felt as the sudden contact with an aspect of reality."⁶³ Šliogeris agrees with Tuan, but with the proviso that we do not think about aesthetic experience in the classical sense,⁶⁴ but we think that "Beauty, like sense, is a gift of Sensible Transcendence."⁶⁵ In the Šliogeris cosmopolis, beauty is not found in spaciousness, luxury, show-offs, or kitsch. Šliogeris concept of beauty primarily requires a balance, the Other, moderation, closeness, modesty, and simplicity. In an overcrowded house, much like in a city, everything becomes excessive, making it impossible to experience individuality, censor Nothing, or encounter beauty as Šliogeris understands it: "My grandfather's farmhouse is beautiful, but this beauty seems to be in the shadows, so it never gets boring."⁶⁶ We can guess that this farmhouse does not contain the most luxurious things, but it is full of priceless things, which perhaps testify to the past life, the fullness of childhood.

When settling in a limited place from an early age, a human being dwells among the closest sensible things, they determine his vocabulary and, as already mentioned earlier, this vocabulary directly determines his worldview, as Tuan implies "world view, unless it is derived from an alien culture, is necessarily constructed out of the salient elements of a people's social and physical setting."⁶⁷ Perhaps only when a person realizes that the true object of their excessive desire is an experience that will never return, and only by relying on the sensible things of the past, he can seek a more stable foundation. However, this is hard to imagine in a concrete block apartment building, because the main goal of a megalopolis is to overcome nature, bend its existence to the human being's advantage, and overcome the rhythm dictated by it. For this purpose, riverbeds are guided, lighting is installed, and nightlife becomes more popular. Of course, megalopolis goes

⁵⁹ Mickūnas, "Lietuva ir globalizacija," 126.

⁶⁰ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 97.

⁶¹ Mickūnas, "Lietuva ir globalizacija," 133.

⁶² Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas II t.*, 409.

⁶³ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 94.

⁶⁴ Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas I t.*, 61.

⁶⁵ Šliogeris, *Kasdienybės metafizika*, 204.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 391.

⁶⁷ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 79.

hand in hand with capitalism, so certain aspects may be subject to debate, but both megalopolis and capitalism can be linked to the Nihil. To paraphrase Šliogeris:⁶⁸ The objects within the megalopolis are saturated with consumerist information, aligning perfectly with consumption indices and leaving no room for indifference; they forbid us from remaining uninterested. These things are supposed to provide fulfillment or at least the possibility to forget about Reality and encourage buying, consuming, using, giving us senseless meanings. However, these objects are merely simulations that never truly capture the experience of innocent intensity, leaving behind a wistful memory of reality. One of the most prominent Lithuanian prose writers Bronius Radzevičius very accurately describes the current human condition:

And now, many years later, when the day is moving to evening again, when the autumnal day is already ending, he does not know if there will be frost tonight. Here, in the city, you won't understand anything, and he feels anxious among the gray walls. When his feet rest on the cement, he doesn't know if the earth is cold, he doesn't know anything. Maybe because the day is ending, summer is ending, and the fields are emptying around, although in the city, the same roar of cars, and only the pallor of the light and the unexpectedly cool air show that it is autumn.⁶⁹

Bronius Radzevičius seems to agree with Šliogeris and says that the peasant's most intense experience of Nature occurs through his senses, and if he loses the possibilities of the sensual experience of Nature, he has to learn to reorient himself.

It is possible that philotopy is just a naive myth (especially if you have never seen a real archaic village with your own eyes), unfolding in a convincing diatopic of Nothing and Isness, or as Kardelis calls it: A Likely Myth About the Nothing and Isness.⁷⁰ Likely, because it is not necessarily present. There is no longer a peasant way of life, but it is not necessary to strive for it. Instead, it should be seen as an example of a relationship that allows for a nonconquering interaction with the environment. Let it be incoherent because it is harsh, but only a person who is aware of their limitations, differences, and foreignness can remain grounded in reality. The peasant remains only a benchmark for the possibility of coexistence. After all, today's world is moving toward a point where there is no longer nature we could consider untouched by man. However, the essential purpose of philotopy is to remind us that man is not the ultimate truth; man is flawed, but beyond him, there are elements of reality in which the experience of eternity can be discovered. However, this work aimed to show that philotopy can be a real possibility for alternative thinking about an ecological, moderate existence where human destiny unfolds and the possibilities of its coordination. For the alienated resident of the megalopolis, philotopy becomes an adaptable perspective through which they can reflect on their past and rediscover their Ithaca, and discern where the most intense Isness experience is possible, and that elsewhere (in the city, shopping centers, amusement parks, and etc.) are only the furies of the Nihil, instigating an expansive nihilism.

4 Conclusions

1. The philotopian establishment of the cosmopolis and being in it not only censors the Nothing, but such an experience becomes another existential tool for self-understanding next to the awareness of the diatopic of the Nothing and the Isness. Cosmopolis, as a concentrate of things close to man, first of all, allows him to realize that man is finite just like his place and things that are closest to him. Such presence is possible only in a few places, so the philotopian understands its finite, dependence on defined and specific places. Therefore, the cosmopolis remains the hope and strength for the will to return, because only there can one experience a sustainable fullness.
2. The basic relationship with place is formed in childhood, so it is usually settled in the childhood home, or another place from childhood. Tuan's phenomenological approach allows us to realize that the cosmopolis

⁶⁸ Šliogeris, *Niekis ir Esmas II t.*, 338

⁶⁹ Radzevičius, "Šiņnakt bus šalna," 28.

⁷⁰ Kardelis, *Tikėtinas mitas apie Niekį ir Esmą*.

is found in childhood due to the child's limited concept of the past, and moreover, the home is experienced as a secure shelter in which one gradually and intimately resides. Place becomes determining, not only through the relationship in which one gets used to existing next to the Other, but also determines the vocabulary, and through it, a wider capacity for singularization can appear – more closeness, individuality, less alienation. Dwelling is directly correlated with worldview. For a megalopolis resident who has forgotten the Other, philotopy becomes a real opportunity to discover his cosmopolis by reflecting on his past and to know that only there is the most intense experience of Isness possible.

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