| Abstract [eng] |
The dissertation examines Alvin Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for the existence of God. It addresses a question that has received relatively little scholarly attention – namely, which theory of modality shall be assumed in the context of this argument. The study argues that the most suitable theoretical framework for interpreting the modal ontological argument is neither modal abstractionism (adopted by Plantinga himself) nor other widespread possible worlds theories – modal concretism and modal fictionalism. The dissertation claims that a more promising alternative lies in modalism – a theory that holds that modal operators of possibility and necessity should not be analysed in terms of possible worlds semantics; according to modalism, there can be no analysis of modal operators and the truths they express whatsoever. This is, at its core, a simple and intuitive account that allows one to minimise ontological commitments. The dissertation maintains that modalism not only supports a formal derivation of God’s necessary existence but is also compatible with the key tenets of theism. By contrast, each of the aforementioned possible worlds theories is either difficult to reconcile with a theistic worldview or even fails to support the modal ontological argument’s conclusion. The principal contribution of this work is the development of a new theory called theistic modalism – the first attempt to integrate the theoretical backgrounds of theism and modalism. |
