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CLICKS, LIES AND NARRATIVES: CONSTRUCTING RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION IN LITHUANIA

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Introduction

Lithuania, as a small state in Eastern Europe, holds a very delicate and specific geopolitical position. As a country that has been occupied and spent most of the 20th century in the Soviet bloc, it still carries the collective memory and trauma that period has imparted on society, but it is also the country to make one of the biggest leaps of progress and Westernization since regaining independence. Joining strong alliances like the EU and NATO, modernizing the economy and fostering energy independence have all contributed to this shift. These processes all pushed through despite constant meddling and attempts to retain power by Russian state agents, unwilling to let Lithuania out of its zone of influence. To this day, despite increasing safety measures and investment into the security sector, Lithuania is unable to fully shake Russian interference.

One of the cardinal ways it manifests is hybrid warfare—conventional, cyber, and information tactics combined, one of the tactics being non-kinetic operations in the online sphere. Information itself is a critical instrument that Russia uses to attain its goals without directly engaging militarily. Russia, having always invested heavily in its propaganda machine, is able to produce big amounts of articles, comments and other types of media content that supports the goals of their agenda. It allows them to influence perceptions, destabilize political environments and erode trust in democratic institutions and alliances. Lithuania is a prime example target of Russian disinformation, due to its geographical position and international advocacy for Ukraine, but such activity is not isolated—it reflects broader Russian attempts to undermine alliances and political trust in Europe.

The online field is notoriously difficult to regulate and research due to it being highly dynamic and hard to trace, resulting in a lack of studies delineating how online narratives are constructed, what are their primary themes and strategic aims. Studying the Lithuanian case contributes to disinformation studies, which can then be applied broadly to understand Russian strategies globally. Identifying and analyzing these aspects is critical for ensuring effective countermeasures and building resilience in other vulnerable states.

Lithuania, as a state bordering Russia, is exhibiting an increasingly defensive stance and a clear westward move in its policies and alliances, which represents a perceived threat for Russia and a

tangible threat to its influence in the region. The complicated nature of Lithuania's geographical position and political orientation makes it the target of Russian information warfare tactics. The growing set of data suggests the issue is unlikely to diminish anytime soon; therefore, it is crucial to allot it the academic attention needed to widen the understanding of such tactics. The narratives spread by Russian state actors threaten to not only undermine the trust of society in the Lithuanian government and international organizations, but also attempt to shape perceptions beyond the country, making it part of the aim to sow instability in the Eastern European region.

If the academic field of this topic remains underexplored, it imposes limitations on ways to combat such tactics effectively. Only by knowing in detail the scope, meaning and critically assessed aims of the narratives, policymakers shape informed decisions on their impact and countermeasures. This is relevant not only domestically, but also when applied in the broader geopolitical context, as the Russian disinformation framework uses localized narratives to achieve broader strategic goals in the region and globally, like creating internal divisions and destabilising the cohesion of NATO. The increasing geopolitical tensions and the pervasive internal influence Russia exerts on post-Soviet countries delineate the need to deepen the scope of knowledge on information warfare.

This study seeks to answer *how Russian online narratives construct the image of Lithuania*. The findings of this research will contribute to advancing academic debates on hybrid warfare while also informing practical efforts of countering disinformation, supporting Lithuania's position as a key pillar of Western alliances in Eastern Europe.

The paper intends to achieve the following tasks: 1) to analyse how the image of Lithuania is constructed in Russian state-run media; 2) to identify how Russian information warfare fits into the constructivist framework.

Given these challenges, this study addresses the need to deepen the understanding of Russian disinformation processes targeting Lithuania. It will first provide an overview of relevant literature, discuss elements of constructivism instrumental to the overarching theoretical framework of the study, review the methodology and delve into analysis. To achieve this, data will be collected through Repsense, a media analytics platform capable of aggregating and categorizing large volumes of online content. This platform will facilitate the identification of

overarching media outlets that frequently mention Lithuania, and after choosing the most relevant sources, qualitative analysis will then be conducted to code recurring ideas in Russian narratives, outlining the key patterns. Building on these findings, the study will then focus on the most widespread and impactful themes, conducting a detailed critical discourse analysis to examine the specifics of their construction and the underlying strategic intentions of meaning creation.

This in-depth analysis will uncover how these narratives fit into Russia's disinformation framework and explore how they are adapted to target Lithuania specifically. By applying critical discourse analysis, this study aims to provide both a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of how information warfare operates in this context. It brings together the constructivist theory of identity and a discourse analytical methodology in a detailed analysis of the Russian discourse on Lithuania.

Literature review

Since most modern conflicts are not limited to the use of solely conventional methods, a big uptick in the amount of academic literature covering the topic of hybrid warfare is noticeable at the end of the 20th century. Since this study focuses on information warfare tactics used by Russia, the literature review is divided into three parts, firstly covering the existing knowledge about information warfare, then narrowing it down to the Russian context, and finalizing with the Lithuanian case.

A fair amount of articles were found delineating the challenges and means of hybrid tactics, but an even bigger amount delves specifically into the Russian case, which might be caused by the broad influence and unique tactics implemented by it. A limited number of scholars review the Lithuanian context, which this study will contribute to.

Deceptively straightforward, the term "hybrid warfare" has been subject to academic debate, adding to the heap of new terminology coined by scholars and experts trying to make sense of the complexity of modern conflicts. As highlighted by Wither, terms like asymmetrical, non-linear, fourth generation, and unconventional warfare all address the new challenges that

arise from new opportunities and technology[1], but the caveat of defining hybrid warfare lies in its broadness. In trying to explain the shifting nature of this concept, the differing proposed definitions instead broaden the scope. Such inability to narrow it down not only makes the concept unclear but also sparks questions as to whether the term is useful[2].

Full-spectrum warfare, which includes a variety of integrated military and non-military tools of state power and covert acts that a hybrid actor can employ, is now referred to as hybrid warfare. In this description, the concept of contemporary armed conflict widens to include more dimensions (psychological, legal, cultural), making the role of military power less pertinent than before, or rather intertwined with these other aspects[3]. Instead, the strategic focus is shifting onto public perception: influencing and shaping it comes to the forefront of the agenda, namely through non-kinetic tactics.

One of such tactics is weaponizing information; comprised of numerous instruments, it expands the battlefield, which, in turn, makes it harder to control and formulate a response. Tools that allow for the strategic weaponization of information include spreading fake news, conspiracy theories, polarizing messages through sponsored news outlets, bots and troll farms[4]. Such instruments allow participants of the conflict to avoid relying on pure military power for achieving their aims, and although often described as asymmetric (not an instance of equal competing power), the information battlefield is shown not by Soesanto not to be an asymmetric space[5]. Theoretically, any actor can hit any target in the online sphere; the only barriers are language proficiency, cultural familiarity, and social media penetration among the target network. Strategically, everyone participates on the same battlefield, with the exception of the platform owner.

The advantage of 'owning' the platform is precisely why state-controlled and highly funded operations, like those carried out by Russia, have a significant advantage over the free media of

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[1] James K. Wither, 'Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare', *Connections* 15, no. 2 (2016): 73–87.

[2] Cholpon Abdyraeva, 'Hybrid Warfare: Trends, Challenges and Means', The Use of Cyberspace in the Context of Hybrid Warfare. (OIIP—Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 2020), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25102.6.

[3] Wither, 'Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare'.

[4] Abdyraeva, 'Hybrid Warfare'.

[5] Stefan Soesanto, 'The Dr. House Approach to Information Warfare', *The Cyber Defense Review* 6, no. 1 (2021): 119–30.

the West[6]. Delving deeper into the Russian context delineated by Robbins et al. demonstrates a "multichanneled, highly active, relentless propaganda machine that has pumped out a tremendous amount of damaging information." [7] Its plethora of instruments, number of agents and long-standing experience allow for a high volume dissemination of content, creating 'mass hallucinations' that (in their best case scenario) are later converted into social or political action[8].

The destruction of objective truth and reinventing reality to suit the ideological agenda is not a new thing in Russia; such tactics were implemented long before the twenty-first century, cemented by the creation of an official institution responsible for their effectiveness when Lenin established the Department for Agitation and Propaganda after the October Revolution of 1917. This once again highlighted the shift of the gravity center, as noted by Pomeranstev and Weiss, "if previous authoritarian regimes were three parts violence and one part propaganda," "this one is virtually all propaganda and relatively little violence."[9] Although not shying away from violence entirely, Russia clearly understands the value that wielding information can provide, which is illustrated by the ever-growing budget allocation: the 2025 state budget draft allots about 137 billion rubles (more than $1.4 billion) to state propaganda resources, such as media outlets, Internet initiatives, and television channels. The amount spent on propaganda has increased by 13% since 2024[10]. This demonstrates the growing importance that Russia places on information warfare, and the fact that its attacks are only going to increase in frequency and, perhaps, quality.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov, in his 2013 article on "The Value of Science in Prediction" or what is often called the "Gerasimov Doctrine," he did not offer a new perspective on combat; instead, he highlighted the "role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals [which] has grown, and in some cases, they have

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[6] Wither, 'Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare'.

[7] Joseph W. Robbins et al., 'Countering Russian Disinformation', The Diversity of Russia's Military Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26533.8.

[8] Deborah Yarsike Ball, 'Protecting Falsehoods With a Bodyguard of Lies: Putin's Use of Information Warfare' (NATO Defense College, 2017), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10264.

[9] Ibid., 11.

[10] Ivan Slychko, 'Where the Kremlin Gets Money to Boost Propaganda Funding | Центр Протидії Дезінформації', 7 October 2024, https://cpd.gov.ua/en/results/where-the-kremlin-gets-money-to-boost-propaganda-funding/.

exceeded the use of force in their effectiveness."[11] That is perhaps why as soon as Putin took office, he took over Russia's biggest media outlets, including television.

Upholding an authoritarian, statist regime allows the government to not only control the message, but to control the entire spectrum of media—which, in turn, bolsters the regime itself. This loop of control creates a world devoid of objective truth, further reinforced by the fact that only thirty percent of Russians rely on other sources of information, with nearly 90 percent getting their news from state-run television[12]. This has allowed the Kremlin to create a space of uncertainty, where truth is made to be negotiable, and its main objective becomes not an unbiased informing of the population, but instead upholding Putin's two fundamental and intertwined goals: preserving his regime and enhancing Russia's status as a great power[13].

These goals are achieved through a spectrum of techniques domestically and abroad, combining the use of brute force with destabilizing actions like sponsorship of political movements and protests, economic coercion, cyber attacks and, most importantly, an intense and all-encompassing disinformation campaign[14].

As this study will not focus on Putin's domestic efforts of suppressing opposition and strengthening his rule, the second fundamental goal of manipulating Russia's global influence and its perception is more relevant, which subsequently branches out into sub-tasks, such as applying pressure to other states to achieve their collapse from within, so that combat is not necessary to fulfill the objectives[15], preserving resources and manpower: for example, the case of Maidan in Ukraine, when Putin allegedly paid off Yanukovych to not sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The Ukrainian authorities' tactical response was neutralised by electronic warfare (EW) and cyberattacks, while more general media exploitation strategies made it difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction, giving observers who believed the Russian media's version of events a different reality.[16] In this case, the attempt to determine

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[11] Ball, 'Protecting Falsehoods With a Bodyguard of Lies', 10.

[12] Ibid., 11; 'Opinion: Why Russians Stopped Loving America The West's Squandered Opportunities and Moscow's Propaganda Powerhouse', Meduza, accessed 20 November 2024, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/04/25/opinion-why-russians-stopped-loving-america.

[13] Ball, 'Protecting Falsehoods With a Bodyguard of Lies', 2.

[14] Wither, 'Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare', 76.

[15] Ibid., 81.

[16] Ibid., 77.

another sovereign state's choices was ultimately unsuccessful, prevented by an intervention of civil society.

This constant tug of war that Russia engages in with other states is especially prominent in former Soviet Union (FSU) states, which Russia particularly wants to remain in its sphere of influence. By aiming for "confusion, obfuscation and constraining […] decision-making,"[17] Russia targets their ability to form objective perceptions. Including, but not limited to the FSU states, this is attempted by using the so-called "4D approach": "dismiss—as Putin did for over a month with the obvious fact that Russian soldiers had occupied Crimea in the Russian 'news;' distort—as an actress did in playing the role of a pro-Russian Ukrainian; distract—as Russian media did with ludicrous theories about what happened to Malaysian Airlines Flight 17; dismay—as Russia's ambassador to Denmark did […] when he threatened to aim nuclear missiles at Danish warships if Denmark joined NATO's missile defense system."[18]

Employing the four actions delineated in the 4D approach is possible by using three broad categories of information warfare tools that the Russian government is alleged to employ: 1) leakages of personal information, 2) hacking attacks, i.e. creation of automated accounts and bots on social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, 3) spread of fake news and conspiracy theories via state-backed broadcasters[19]. These state-funded media players enable the administration of the stages through a combination of intelligence agencies (GRU, FSB, and SVR), "troll factories," hackers, as well as media outlets (such as Russia Today [RT], Sputnik, and the nation's Internet Research Agency [IRA]). [20]

Aside from state-funded media, disinformation websites also play a crucial role by facilitating the more autonomous dissemination of inaccurate and/or misleading information. They usually propagate conspiracy theories, adopt the worldview of Russia's state-run media, and frequently

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[17] Maria Snegovaya, 'Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia's Hybrid Warfare', PUTIN'S INFORMATION WARFARE IN UKRAINE (Institute for the Study of War, 2015), 17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07921.1.

[18] Ibid., 13.

[19] Cholpon Abdyraeva, 'Information Warfare Operations in the Cyber Domain', The Use of Cyberspace in the Context of Hybrid Warfare. (OIIP—Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 2020), 24, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25102.8.

[20] Robbins et al., 'Countering Russian Disinformation', 33.

use alarming language, fear mongering, and xenophobia in their narratives[21]. They rely on one another for mutual confirmation and work to promote the idea that the opinions they share are widely held by the general public as well as in scholarly or expert circles. Spreading disinformation is also assigned to Russian trolls. These are people who attempt to disrupt online discussions, bombard them with offensive remarks, disseminate false information, and influence them with rhetoric that supports the Kremlin. In contrast, Russian bots are individuals or, more frequently, programmes that automatically send out short, sometimes identical messages in large quantities[22].

The easier and more effective way, in comparison to disseminating completely new ideas, is to take advantage of the domestic weaknesses of other countries. Russia's disinformation works only where it finds prolific ground—not as much due to its own efficiency, but due to the failures and internal problems of other countries[23]. Often, these instruments are applied to make use of an idea or weakness that already exists in the target country, amplifying it, infusing it with conflicting information and problematizing it further. Sometimes, in order to radicalise or fortify internal division within a target group, operations will build upon preexisting views and feelings. Or they will produce new feelings and ideas that contradict the ones that already exist. Static defenders are unable to compete in this dynamic, fast-paced environment or respond quickly.[24] Since Russia's strength lies in numbers, the narratives are then repeated numerous times by bots, trolls and numerous other actors.

In the vein of exploiting domestic weaknesses, Russia also makes use of the nature of Western-style reporting, which promotes free expression and is often eager to give different viewpoints a forum, combined with occasionally a deficiency of critical thinking in European media outlets[25]. Since European media, especially the further westward you go, are often not well versed in the Russian propaganda efforts, they tend to be more trusting and are not opposed to giving 'an opposing voice' a platform to be heard. Unfortunately, that gives Russia much more

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[21] Michal Bokša, 'Russian Information Warfare in Central and Eastern Europe: Strategies, Impact, Countermeasures' (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019), 5, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21238.

[22] Snegovaya, 'Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine', 14.

[23] Ibid., 21.

[24] Soesanto, 'The Dr. House Approach to Information Warfare', 120.

[25] Gerda Jakštaitė, 'Russia's "Sharp Power" Manifestations in Lithuania's Mass Media / Gerda Jakštaitė', *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics*, 2021, 79, https://doi.org/10.2478/bjlp-2021-0004.

room for maneuver, as demonstrated in the case of Lisa F.: a 13-year-old Russian-German girl named "Lisa F." was kidnapped and sexually assaulted by migrants in Berlin, according to a January 2016 report from Russian state media. The German media covered this story extensively. Investigations later showed, however, that the girl had made up the story and the accusations were untrue. The incident was a component of a larger disinformation campaign aimed at eroding public confidence in the German government and provoking anti-immigrant sentiment[26].

This current strategy employed by Russia (establishing a network of foreign-language news outlets and finding sympathizers in Western countries) is nothing new, as these are two instruments that the Soviet Union also implemented widely[27]. Combining old agitprop (how propaganda and agitation were called in times of Lenin) tactics and new strategies that incorporate contemporary elements like social networks is what the current Russian disinformation playbook rests upon. Its channels may be new, but its goals are anything but—as argued by Alexei Levinson, "Russia's new propaganda is not now about selling a particular worldview, it is about trying to distort information flows and fuel nervousness among European audiences."[28] Its aim of confusing the enemy through such strategies allows to not engage militarily, preserving resources and manpower. To achieve this state of confusion, messaging from Russia must be "pervasive, rapid and voluminous,"[29] the spread of which is permitted by the digital battlefield.

This rapid-fire stream of disinformation is sometimes described as 'sharp power'—exerting influence on target audiences by manipulating the information they access. As opposed to soft power, which wields attraction, and hard power, which uses military force, sharp power aims to 'pierce' or 'perforate' the informational environment of the targeted states[30]. By invading their informational space, the opponent gains the upper hand in forming perceptions and planting ideas. Sharp power is mostly exerted by authoritarians (studies focus on mostly Russia and

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[26] 'NATO Review—The "Lisa Case": Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation', NATO Review, 25 July 2016,
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/07/25/the-lisa-case-germany-as-a-target-of-russian-disinformation/index.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[27] Snegovaya, 'Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine', 14.

[28] Ibid.; 'Public Opinion and Propaganda in Russia | StopFake', accessed 21 November 2024, https://www.stopfake.org/en/public-opinion-and-propaganda-in-russia/.

[29] Ball, 'Protecting Falsehoods With a Bodyguard of Lies', 12.

[30] Jakštaitė, 'Russia's "Sharp Power" Manifestations in Lithuania's Mass Media / Gerda Jakštaitė', 77.

China), and its implementation delineates the difference between democracies and authoritarian states—exploiting the weaknesses and fuelling sociopolitical divisions backs their aim to destabilize democracies.

The sowing of instability brings Russia more perceived stability within, as it has long equated the sense of its own security with the limiting the sovereignty of its neighbors.[31] Especially in the countries of Former Soviet Union (FSU), Russia believes its rights to meddle did not disappear with them gaining independence and condescendingly refers to them as 'blizhnee zarubezhe'—the near abroad. Of the FSU countries, this study will focus on the Lithuanian case. The topic of Russian propaganda in Lithuania has been covered by numerous scholars: Darius Buinauskas, Vytautas Keršanskas, and Laurynas Kasčiūnas examined Russia's propaganda in Lithuania, Giedrius Česnakas and Vytautas Isoda concentrated on examples of Russia's use of soft power, and Nerijus Maliukevičius investigated the Kremlin's destabilisation tactics in Lithuania[32]. None of the aforementioned studies focus specifically on deconstructing the narratives circulating in the online dimension, and none of the studies have been done after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which might have changed the course and intensity of the propaganda. This study aims to fill that gap in research.

The existing research on Lithuania, like that of Česnakas, highlights the paradoxical balance of the Self-Other duality in regards to Russian propaganda in Lithuania[33]. The narratives Russia disseminates about Lithuania are negative and heavily concentrated on 'othering.' Considering the fact that all Baltic states have substantial Russian minorities, are FSU states and Lithuania borders Russia, the narrative building could lean either way, but the choice made by Lithuania to orient itself westward, join NATO and the EU may have been the reason for the aggressive 'Othering' strategy that Russia has chosen.

The aforementioned minorities and Russian-speaking part of the population become targets of their own—their position is that of the recipient and (mostly unknowing) propagator of the 'othering' narratives, as Russia aims not to radically change the opinions of those who do not

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[31] Ball, 'Protecting Falsehoods With a Bodyguard of Lies', 17.

[32] Jakštaitė, 'Russia's "Sharp Power" Manifestations in Lithuania's Mass Media / Gerda Jakštaitė', 76.

[33] Giedrius Česnakas, 'You Shall Not Pass: The Strategic Narratives Defining Russia's Soft Power in Lithuania / Giedrius Česnakas', *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics*, 2022, 7, https://doi.org/10.2478/bjlp-2021-0008.

agree, but to mobilize those who are already sympathetic in regard to their viewpoint[34]. By referring to these communities as Russian compatriots, they emphasise strengthening the ties between them and Russia—in effect, promoting foreigners' self-identification with Russia[35]. Individuals who have leftist views, are dissatisfied with the EU's integration and the United States' global position, or harbor nostalgia for Communism are most vulnerable to Russian propaganda.

Russian webs of disinformation, by their intrinsic value, create a network between like-minded social media users, e.g. ones disappointed by the current government's decisions. This echo chamber allows to reinforce the views of the users' views and to further radicalize individual opinions[36], which in turn creates threatening implications to national security.

Narratives most frequently used to attack Lithuania, according to Česnakas, are as follows: "a country that falsifies history," "suppressor of free speech," "the Nazi-occupied territory of the Soviet Union," "neo-Nazi support – a common theme attributed by Russia to the states with anti-Kremlin positions," "object in the relations of greater powers."[37] Russia often "questioned the need to expand NATO infrastructure in the Baltic states" and expressed dismay with the "restrictions of rights of compatriots living in the Baltic states."[38] The range of narratives is wide, starting from belittling Lithuania, discrediting its sovereignty and role in global politics and finishing with all-out lies.

Thoughts on how to combat such narratives remain under discussion, as excessive regulation of social media and the internet in general may also have detrimental effects[39]. As demonstrated above, socially excluded communities tend to explore alternative media sources; therefore, governments should strive to aim media literacy projects and support for local journalism predominantly to the least-developed areas of the region and ones with the biggest Russian-speaking population. One of the most effective limitations on the Russian info ops is

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[34] Ibid., 11.

[35] Bokša, 'Russian Information Warfare in Central and Eastern Europe', 3.

[36] Ibid., 6.

[37] Česnakas, 'You Shall Not Pass', 12.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Bokša, 'Russian Information Warfare in Central and Eastern Europe', 14.

imposed by rising public awareness of disinformation and media literacy[40], so the focus remains on raising the level of resilience of the general population of media consumers.

Nevertheless, one thing remains evident: disinformation and information warfare are unavoidable. In the end, societies and governments in the FSU countries will have to learn to coexist and effectively combat them. Russia's craft of waging informational warfare is not static, it evolves, adapts and constantly finds new ways of getting under the skin of democratic states: this study aims to analyse how exactly it is carried out in the case of the Lithuanian online space in 2024.

Theoretical framework

Since information warfare, security and the media discourse will be explored, the theoretical scaffolding chosen for the research is based on constructivism, supported by elements of newer variants of it, namely critical social constructivism and realist constructivism. The theoretical undertaking, therefore, is to define the main assumptions and concepts of constructivism, to compare its perspective to that of realism and to explore the intersection of the two. Further subsections delve into the concepts of identity, (in)security and systems of shared knowledge and apply the constructivist view of them to the topic at hand.

Constructivism

In the 1990s, the world of international relations (IR) theory witnessed a new turn: constructivism. It undermined the rule of rationalist theories dominating at the time, particularly neo-realism[41]. Constructivism falls into the family of theories named critical IR. They are all concerned with the social construction of world politics, which involves two claims: that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these structures firstly shape actors' identities and interests,

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[40] Ibid., 9.

[41] Runa Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism: "Culturing" Identity, (in) Security, and the State in International Relations Theory', *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 70, no. 4 (2009): 961.

rather than just their behaviour[42]. In line with these claims, constructivism (which sits on the edge between social theory and IR theory) believes that it is human practice that constructs the sociopolitical world, and is concerned with how such construction happens.

Constructivism is not necessarily a paradigm, it is usually identified as a method, an ontology, or an epistemology[43]. When categorized as a theory, it is a theory of process, rather than a real outcome[44]. The processes examined in constructivism happen inside and between social structures, which are defined by Wendt, one of the principal contributors to constructivist theory, as possessing three elements: shared knowledge, practices and material resources. The focus on shared knowledge is one more manifestation of why sociality (as opposed to "materiality") matters in constructivist theory[45].

Relation to realism

Although rejecting the primary role of materiality, constructivism shares numerous assumptions of realism: "that international politics is anarchic, and that states have offensive capabilities, cannot be 100 percent certain about others' intentions, wish to survive, and are rational."[46] The two theories vary in their view towards state interests—realists tend to describe them as exogenous to structures, while constructivists see them as created by the structures themselves. Their perspective on material capabilities also differs: where realism plainly asserts the importance of them, constructivism claims they mean nothing on their own, only acquiring meaning through the structure of shared knowledge[47], e.g. a build-up of NATO forces on Lithuanian terrain presupposes a substantial difference to a build-up of Russian forces on the border of Kaliningrad—although materially the same, they represent drastically different meanings for the state in question.

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[42] Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217.

[43] J. Samuel Barkin, 'Realist Constructivism', *International Studies Review* 5, no. 3 (2003): 325.

[44] Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 196, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267.

[45] Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73.

[46] Ibid., 72.

[47] Ibid., 73.

Because of such divergences and ardent past academic debates between the two, realism and constructivism are at times seen as theories in direct opposition, incompatible for various reasons. One of them is the association of realism to rationalism and materialism, the tendency of constructivists to be utopian or idealist in their explanations of the political world, however, upon inspection, neither argument manages to hold up, as demonstrated by the extensive analysis undertaken by Barkin[48]. Turns out, a realist worldview can go hand in hand with constructivist research and mutually help address blind spots left by both theories.

Such claims of incompatibility often arise from terminological confusion—different scholars use terms with different meanings, redefining concepts until we are left in a situation of terminological haze, making it difficult to claim or analyse anything at all[49]. The theoretical outcome of this confusion leads to three assumptions: "that realist theory 1) focuses on material capabilities, 2) views human nature as materialistic, and 3) emphasizes empiricism."[50]

Each of these three charges is unique, and if any one of them were true, it would show that constructivism and realism are incompatible. However, upon closer examination, none of them are viable, as demonstrated by Barkin's study.

Having underpinned the role of realist ideas in the realist constructivist approach, it is vital to move on to the principal assumptions of constructivism.

The power of practice

Process is one of the important presuppositions of social structure, as claimed by Wendt[51]. He gives the example of the Cold War: it was a structure of shared knowledge for the duration of forty years, dictating the relations of states, but once they stopped behaving in that manner, the existence of the structure was over. Power and material prowess on their own are not capable of effect, since it is the shared knowledge that enables them as such[52].

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[48] Barkin, 'Realist Constructivism', 325.

[49] Ibid., 326.

[50] Ibid., 330.

[51] Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 74.

[52] Ibid.

Nonetheless, power is still central to both the mainstream and the constructivist IR theories, but they regard and conceptualize power in different ways. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism see material power (military, economic) as the single main source of influence in world politics. Constructivism, on the other hand, asserts that both discursive and material power are needed for understanding global affairs. It is crucial to emphasize both, as constructivists are often dismissed as "unRealistic" for their emphasis on the power of knowledge, language and ideas, that is, discourse[53].

The discursive power manifests, for example, in the construction of national interests. Das portrays them as constructed through social interaction processes, during which states are affected by or respond to norms, identities, and cultures in the global or domestic contexts[54]. Another instance where the power of social practices is important, is in their capacity to create the intersubjective meanings that are applied to both social structures and actors. A further power is then vested into social practices, where they "not only reproduce actors through identity, but also reproduce an intersubjective social structure through social practice.[55]" Importantly, practice is powerful in producing predictability and, in turn, order. Within a social structure, practices among actors reduce uncertainty and increase confidence in the pattern of actions being met by consequences or responses from other actors[56]. A state such as Russia exploits this need for predictability, for example, by introducing uncertainty by communicating one thing and behaving in an entirely different manner.

One more important aspect of social practices is their power to produce intersubjective meaning within a social structure[57]—for example, Maidan in Ukraine produced, or rather cemented, the intersubjective view of Ukraine by other actors as an EU-adjacent actor. Actions or practices undertaken by an actor create the subsequent outlook of others on them, which leads to the concept of identity.

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[53] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 177.
[54] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 963.
[55] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 178.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid., 179.

Identity

In constructivism, identities are believed to perform three functions: "they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are."[58] Das sees identities as "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self."[59] Similarly to performed social practices, they become the signifiers of predictability, implying the preferences and actions of a state. Ultimately, the "owner" of the identity can not control how it is perceived by others, here the intersubjective structure comes into play as the final arbiter of meaning. Similar to an artist imbuing their creation with personal meaning that, upon displaying it, must ultimately let it be perceived by onlookers, each of them carrying differing perspectives and imparting their own unique understanding of the initial meaning. Despite actors' efforts to control their image, how their identity is seen globally is not up to their decision.

Constructivism sees it important to theorize identity as an empirical question within a historical, cultural, social and political context, assuming that the selves, or identities, are a variable[60]. For example, the military intervention of the United States consolidated the "international intersubjective understanding of great powers as those states that use military power against others."[61]For example, the recent counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Kursk succeeded in achieving the opposite effect—shattering the long-held international intersubjective understanding of Russia as a state that can not be attacked ("the second greatest military power").

Compared to neorealism, constructivism posits a much wider range of possible choices of action that a state has, and also assumes social structures that are created by the states via social practices will constrain those choices. In the end, although the actions a state can take are numerous, they are rigorously constrained by the "webs of understanding of the practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical contexts."[62]

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[58] Ibid., 175.

[59] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 968.

[60] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 175.

[61] Ibid., 173.

[62] Ibid., 177.

One of the constraints of those actions is meaning—Das claims that "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them"[63], therefore, even though the initial array of choices is much bigger than through the lens of neorealism, it ends up narrowed down by shared knowledge and meanings. One of the aspects that builds meaning are discursive practices, including of those who speak and write on behalf of a state. They construct the state as an international subject[64], this is why the media discourse—what is being spoken—is crucial to understanding the drivers of action, in this case, information warfare.

Insecurity

Constructing meaning by attributing particular qualities to other actors has many outcomes, one of which is the naissance of insecurities. Insecurities are, like other aforementioned cornerstones of the constructivist theory, produced socially and culturally, "rather than being natural facts."[65] Associating the qualities with a collective group of people, such as "Americans" or "Lithuanians," allows to then conceive of a Self and an Other[66]. Weldes, one of the seminal authors of the social critical variant of constructivism, posits that constituted in relation to identity, similarities and divergences, the "difference can [...] be transformed into otherness. When it [does], it becomes a source of insecurity"[67].

The source of insecurities, therefore, is the constructed identity itself: rather than being exogenous to the object which it "threatens," it is "an effect of the very process of establishing and re-establishing the object's identity."[68] With this claim, constructivism entirely subverts realism's understanding of insecurity, and once again displaces the importance from the physical realm to the one of socially assigned meaning. State as an entity with identity and interests becomes simultaneously the subject or Self that defines (in)security, and an object faced by that constructed insecurity. The process of statist discourses that are performed by social actors (state officials, experts, members of national movements) creates identities and, in turn, insecurities by describing the world to themselves and the public.

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[63] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 970.
[64] Ibid., 971.
[65] Ibid., 973.
[66] Ibid., 971.
[67] Ibid., 975.
[68] Ibid.

The construction and consolidation of state identities is also contributed to by crises. They are related to a cyclical process: "first, state identity enables crises; and second, crises enable state identity."[69] One of such instances can be seen in the 1999 Russian apartment bombings, suspected to be orchestrated by the FSB (Russian federal security service). Built on the Russian insecurity (terrorists) that is based on the demonisation of Chechens, the crisis then enabled the then-prime minister Vladimir Putin to rise to power. Similar reasons are discussed in reference to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine—crises make it easier to consolidate state power and allow to reiterate the meanings of identity as an instrument of both constructing and securing it[70]. To justify its domestic hegemony, a state needs an Other in world politics[71]; in this sense, making identity construction a reciprocal process: as one subject performs its identity, it threatens others, who consolidate their own identities as a response[72]. Since the performance of social practices holds the power to define and, in turn, construct the world, identities and insecurities themselves become an important source of power[73].

All social relations are situations of domination, subordination or hierarchy, as seen by critical theory, ironically similarly to the view of (neo)realists[74]. So, knowing that a state is threatening resolves the security dilemma, but only by replacing it with an insecurity. Another state might be seen not as a "state," but as an enemy, ally, threat, a democracy etc. Those labels of identities are once again reinforced by social practices that accompany their reproduction[75]: even information warfare can be seen as such practice that allows for the consolidation of both identities—the one of the subject and the object.

Hopf states that "every Self is incomplete without an Other,"[76] since every identity is construed by aligning with some and opposing oneself to other things, forming interests and insecurities in line with that identity construction. The creation of an Other, according to Hopf, is the level at which all threats should be theorized, since there is no primordial constant of what constitutes a

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[69] Ibid., 976.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 196.

[72] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 976.

[73] Ibid., 980.

[74] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 185.

[75] Ibid., 192.

[76] Ibid., 184.

threat. In the case of the Lithuania-Russia informational space, what needs to be explored is if being constructed as an Other automatically puts the actor in the category of threats.

Objective, material reality is not seen to shape the facts of world politics by constructivists; it is rather the intersubjective (social) reality that reigns supreme. Social norms, ideas and shared structures have a seminal influence on the behaviour of states[77]. As evidenced by constructivism's tendency to focus on the immaterial, the modes and outcomes of theorizing heavily depend on the scholar themselves, the social background and the systems of shared knowledge they belong to. Discourse is not susceptible to a single correct determinative reading, even if done by the author themselves (returning to the concept of perceived meaning), since it will mean different things for different audiences. After all, it is the language that produces meaning, rather than the actors' power of construction[78]. This aspect might, at various times, limit or enrich the research, since the elaboration of constitutive mechanisms and social contexts is also seen as an advantage of the constructivist perspective[79].

Effectively, the "promise of constructivism" is restoring a sort of predictability and a fuller understanding to global politics, that comes not from the narrow range of possible actions or imposed sameness, but from an appreciation of difference[80].

Methodology

CDA

The constructivist approach brings discourse, language and social aspects to the core of IR theory across all branches of the school of thought. Constructivists turn to the notion of discourse when needed to theorize social facts and in demonstration that the facts are not primordial, but

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[77] Barkin, 'Realist Constructivism', 326.

[78] Nasrullah Mambrol, 'Foucault's Concept of Power', Literary Theory and Criticism, 5 April 2016, 972, https://literariness.org/2016/04/05/foucaults-concept-of-power/.

[79] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 197.

[80] Ibid., 200.

rather a result of practices and are constituted by social structures[81]. Not only does discourse help in navigating contested concepts, it is one of them.

Discourse, widely understood as "meaning in use," has established itself as one of the core concepts of constructivism, and its analysis is used to identify underlying structures and meanings of the world, constructed through language. Two distinct types of discourse analysis are categorized as micro-interactional and macro-structural, respectively focusing on the communicative details of discourse and structures of meaning. Both these studies are interested in power relationships that characterize social practice in global politics and the effects of power that discourse itself serves to make apparent[82].

Discourse analysis explores the creation of meaning, strategies employed to do so, and the co-constitutive effects it places on the social structures. It is concerned with how reality is constructed, particularly in situations of insecurity. Discourse can therefore be defined as "the space where intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, transformed and, accordingly, becomes constitutive of social reality"[83].

All branches of discourse analysis may be classified as constructivist in the broad sense, as they are concerned with the co-constitutive nature of relations between text, context and social structures, albeit operating under different assumptions. Discourse, as a concept, is also closely tied to critical and poststructuralist theory, representing a "more general process of (partial) convergence" in frameworks on language and political research[84].

The critical variant of DA (discourse analysis) emerged in the late 1980s and was spearheaded by, inter alia, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak. It has since grown to be among the most well-known and significant areas of discourse analysis. The goal of CDA is to promote social commitment and interventionism in research while integrating social-theoretical insights into discourse analysis[85], or, as presented by Wodak, "opaque as well as transparent

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[81] Anna Holzscheiter, 'Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations', *International Studies Perspectives* 15, no. 2 (2014): 145.

[82] Ibid., 142.

[83] Ibid., 144.

[84] Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 29 (2000): 447.

[85] Ibid.

structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language"[86].

It is criticised for utilising vague concepts, since many scholars provide their redefined versions of discourse, practice, structure, etc. and an interlinking of social theory concepts, adding to the "general fuzziness."[87] The boundaries of CDA (critical discourse analysis) and its methodology are admittedly not entirely fixed, but authors indicate that it might also be one of the principal strengths of the approach, provided that it is accompanied and mitigated by a rigorous methodological process.

The jury is still out on the "best" way to analyze discourse; however, as argued by Holzscheiter and Milliken, discourse scholarship can not declare a single best consensual understanding to study IR from a discourse perspective[88]. The heterogeneity of the field of discourse approaches is both an advantage and a risk: the relative openness of the concept allows to accommodate a wide range of scholarly traditions and methodological frameworks; on the other hand, a weakly defined discourse is at risk of becoming a hollow phrase, rather than a "theoretically and analytically profound concept."[89]

An overview of the field shows that there perhaps might be as many approaches as there are case studies, which corresponds with the frequent argument that discourse analysis methods must be tailored to the empirical subjects rather than the other way around. This does not, however, signify that the scholar is then not burdened by uncovering their analytical decisions: this study, according to empirical standards, is made along the standards of replicability and, through comparison with other cases, has potential for generalization. Holzscheiter also underlines the importance of a meticulously chosen methodological framework and justified data selection for rendering the empirical study systematic and refined, two standards this study is utmostly eager to meet.

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[86] Ibid., 448.

[87] Ibid., 455.

[88] Holzscheiter, 'Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification', 159.

[89] Ibid.

Fairclough's approach

Two important concepts that CDA employs are intertextual analysis and linguistic analysis[90].
Intertextual analysis, as presented by Fairclough, is a three-dimensional approach: firstly
examining discourse-as-text, i.e. the linguistic features, secondly,
discourse-as-discursive-practice, i.e. how and by whom the text is written and circulated, also
instances of intertextuality. Fairclough's model distinguishes between 'manifest intertextuality'
(i.e. overtly drawing upon other texts) and 'constitutive intertextuality' or 'interdiscursivity' (i.e.
texts are made up of heterogeneous elements: discourse types, register, style). The third
dimension—discourse-as-social-practice, i.e. the social structures and strategies the texts uphold,
question or negate.[91]

An examination of discourse concerns itself with the social and political consequences that arise
from using a specific language, rather than just examining how language is used in international
politics[92]. It not only identifies whether such processes are taking place, but also delineates the '
how', allowing for deeper insight into the broader sociopolitical implications.

Framework

Firstly, background data was gathered using Repsense to gauge how many pieces of content are
disseminated by Russian media channels that mention Lithuania in the title or text, in
"independent" or "news agency" websites. Sputnik News Lithuania (lt.sputniknews.ru) has
consistently been the most active in mentioning Lithuania, so it has been chosen as the source for
the corpus of research.

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[90] Norman Fairclough, 'Discourse and Text: Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis',
Discourse & Society 3, no. 2 (1992): 194.

[91] Blommaert and Bulcaen, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', 449.

[92] Holzscheiter, 'Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification', 144.

Mentions by Sources

Source	Mentions
sputniknews.ru	2.7k
russian.city	2.4k
baltija.eu	1.0k
Agency: BNS	958
mirtesen.ru	790
123ru.net	705
kritika.news	704
russia24.pro	695
moyby.com	637
baltnews.com	618
rodina.news	547
tmbw.ru	527
volkovysk.eu	484
rambler.ru	476
Radio: LRT Radijas	473
bulbanews.ru	449
Other (2895)	39.5k

The time frame chosen for the research is one year: to ensure a comprehensive analysis, not skewed by any one particular significant event (e.g. elections, major policy decisions), but also to demonstrate the general perspective throughout the period, starting from 1 November 2023 and ending with 1 November 2024.

Since the articles are written in Russian, manual translation and the DeepL online tool were utilised to translate the text for describing analysis. As highlighted by scholars, this may present a possible limitation, as nuances in translation may skew the meaning[93]. This is mitigated by the fact that the analysis was conducted by a native speaker, the coding was carried out in the original language of the text, and by including original language terms when encountering an ambiguous word.

The analysis is focusing on concepts of identity and insecurity and also centers Lithuania as the main narrative object; therefore, a search was conducted in the Sputnik News database using the keywords "Lithuania" + "war." A general search of "Lithuania" articles yielded an amount that would be impossible to manually review, so an additional filter of war mentions allowed to narrow down the corpus and up the relevance of the results.

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[93] Fairclough, 'Discourse and Text', 196.

The search provided 863 articles in total, out of which 245 specifically mention Lithuania in the title, not just the body of text. In the 245 titles, several actors are mentioned, such as "the Parliament of Lithuania" or "the minister of foreign affairs of Lithuania." Since this research delves into the identity of Lithuania as a state, only articles in which the main subject of the sentence were chosen for analysis. In 88 titles, the main entity mentioned is Lithuania, but in 67 of them it is used in the form "in Lithuania" with passive verb forms, obscuring the agent, whereas 22 mention "Lithuania" as the main actor (Table 1).

Table 1.

Category	Number of articles
Total articles found	863
Articles with "Lithuania" in title	245
"Lithuania" as Main Actor	22
"In Lithuania" with Passive Verbs	67

Source: compiled by author

The texts were selected based on relevance and their alignment with the research question (i.e., articles where Lithuania is the main actor). Since CDA requires a detailed examination of texts, a smaller corpus allows for a more in-depth approach. The analysis is focused on specific concepts (identity and insecurity), therefore, the smaller targeted dataset enables a more detailed approach.

Inductive coding was used so as not to miss valuable insight due to predetermined codes, creating tags in the Taguette software and analysing the texts line by line.

The 22 texts that use Lithuania as the main actor were chosen for further analysis. Inductive coding was used along with Fairclough's three-dimensional model to indicate linguistic,

discursive and social structure elements used in the text. They were then used to identify key patterns and power dynamics, presented in the subsequent parts. The codes themselves are presented in a comprehensive codebook in the annex, exported from the Taguette software.

Qualitative analysis

Linguistic dimension

Starting with the linguistic dimension, the first overarching trend that was identified is belittling lexical choices, a variety of them used in almost every title and article.

Constructions like "(Lithuania) loudly barks" use personification to attribute human/animal traits to a state, metaphor of barking to convey aggressive or attention-grabbing behaviour, and use the adverb "loudly" to add intensity, along with a judgmental tone. This phrase conveys Lithuania as an insignificant and annoying actor, behaving in an aggravating way that the author dismisses, and it is repeated several times throughout the corpus, further cementing the notion of Lithuania as a "barking dog."

Another case of personification is evident in the title "Lithuania bows to China, not having seen money from Taiwan." Here, the personification is conveyed through the act of bowing, putting Lithuania in a subordinate position of an actor that is submitting to hegemony of, in this case, China. "Not having seen money from Taiwan" adds another personified dimension, this time highlighting Lithuania's perceived greed, implying a pre-construed relationship that, once expectations were not met, was betrayed, adding the notion that Lithuania is volatile and unstable.

The lexical choice "the ruling elite" when talking about the Lithuanian government undermines the credibility of Lithuanian democratic institutions, constructing an image of usurped power at the top of the state apparatus, highlighting the divide between the "elite" and "regular people." This is also instrumentalized to sow distrust in the actions of the government and will be explored further.

Metaphors are generously littered throughout the articles, like in the sentence "the social democrats, who were once doves of peace, have turned into real war hawks along with the president." The juxtaposition of "doves of peace" and "war hawks" deepens the contrast of the comparison and adds a mocking tone, once again aiming to delegitimize and belittle the agency of Lithuanian state actors. This is repeated multiple times in the article, e.g. using the adjective "the newly-appeared (hawks)" to emphasise that the perceived change is recent and thus, discredit its legitimacy. Using diminutive adjectives like "a fresh (свеженький) source of revenue for the military" also carries a mocking connotation, further playing into Lithuania's label as greedy and at the same time belittling its behaviour.

Another important instance where the choice of words conveys Russia's view of Lithuania is its use of the word "Pribaltika," which, when translated literally, means "by the Baltic sea." The term has historically been used as a slur, amalgamating the three Baltic nations into one, aiming to belittle and erase national identity.

Describing Lithuanian support of Ukraine during the NATO summit in Vilnius as "kissing the Ukrainian flag by the president" again perpetuates the narrative of submission and questioning the alliances and partnerships that Lithuania forms internationally. This is further made evident by describing Germans as "naive," in turn, portraying Lithuania as an unreliable partner. Using the aforementioned tactic of contrasting, the article goes on to state "In short, the loud announcement that Lithuanians will be protected by German soldiers may turn out to be a loud failure due to a banal lack of money for hired soldiers." The "loud announcement" and "loud failure" juxtapositions emphasise the constructed disappointment in Lithuania's partnerships, and pointing out that the reason is due to a "banal lack of money" portrays Lithuania as having economic problems. Using "in short" in the beginning of the sentence puts it into a conversational tone, simplistically and abruptly summarizing the perceived shortcomings in an attempt to establish rapport with the reader.

The narrative of economic problems is continued in stating Lithuania "is jumping on the last train trying to save the economy from recession," once again utilising metaphor to dramatize events. In some cases, Lithuania is outwardly described as "poor (нищая) Lithuania." In the phrase "Only three years ago, Lithuanian authorities actively welcomed Belarusians to their country," the emphasis provided by the lexical choices "only" and "actively" makes the portrayal

of the situation more aggravated and later allows for a more effective contrast in comparison to the current situation.

The exaggerated wording comes into play again when Lithuania is portrayed as having "lured (заманивала)" and having "tried its best to lure" Belarusians into the country, and afterwards "pushing/forcibly squeezing (выдавят)" them out to Belarus again. These choices of strong wording, aside from their mocking tone, create dissonance between Lithuania's actions and make it appear flighty and lacking in direction.

Moving on from lexical to grammatical and syntactical choices, the main tool identified was the instrumentalization quotation marks.

Russian "aggression" in the texts is always put into quotation marks, aiming to blur the lines of fact and opinion, along with such concepts as "the Russian threat," "deterring Russian aggression," "aggressors from the East," "military threats," and "threat to security."

Usually, quotation marks indicate that the term is being contested or not being used honestly. Enclosing "aggression" in quotes allows the text to detach itself from the term, implying irony or doubt. Instead of framing the charge of aggression as an objective fact, it presents it as a subjective or unfounded assertion. Such use of quotation marks delegitimizes the "aggression," implying that it is part of a biased narrative, or externalising its source (imposed by the West). Framing it as foreign allows to negate it as reflecting reality. The quotation marks also add a mocking or sarcastic tone, which is visible throughout most of the texts.

By questioning the term, the focus is being shifted away from the actions and onto the term and its validity, redirecting attention from the actor committing those actions to those using the term, implying bias or even deliberate anti-Russian agenda (this will be prominent further along the analysis).

The quotation marks help to normalize Russian actions in the eyes of the reader by portraying the accusations as exaggerated or outright false, which fits into the wider narrative that Russia is a victim of Western disinformation rather than an aggressor, and also challenges the hegemony of Western narratives in defining global events (also described as the "multipolar world" that Russia

is aiming to establish). By claiming Lithuanian and Western use of the term to be manipulative and aimed at discrediting Russia, it shakes itself free of blame by positing it on others.

The strategic shift of focus from the act (aggression) to the term allows to escape responsibility and contest the description itself. Questioning who has the authority to define and interpret events contributes to the destruction of objective truth, a tactic known to be used by Russia.

In implementing such tools as deflection and doubt-sowing through quotation marks, Russia interacts with Lithuania's construction of security. Negating the "Russian threat" as an attempt to establish control over the narrative and thus, over reality, can have varied effects depending on the audience. For domestic audiences, it can further entrench the identity of Lithuania as biased and anti-Russian, and for Russian readers in Lithuania, it can build the image of Russia as a peaceful actor that is discriminated against.

Thematically, aside from constructing the concept of aggression, quotation marks are also used to question Lithuanian history. "National hero," "partisan," "monument "desecration": again, a marker of skepticism, an evident strategic tool to delegitimize and question these terms, implying that the concepts are undeserved, exaggerated or illegitimate. Questioning the validity of "national heroes" undermines the heroism and sows doubt on moral and historical legitimacy of these figures, and applying the same technique to "partisans" the validity of their resistance is questioned. The quotation marks suggest a hidden, implicit narrative propagated elsewhere in the texts about the Lithuanian "forest brothers" (also in quotation marks everywhere, though in this case it is difficult to ascertain the motive: whether it is also skepticism or regular quotation marks for a translated foreign name). The narrative undermines the moral justification of the actions of the "forest brothers," implying them to be Nazi collaborators (also a prominent narrative regarding Lithuania as a state) and criminals. Contesting the Lithuanian identity, historical narrative and figures, Russian narratives challenge the moral foundation of Lithuanian independence and sovereignty. This is further demonstrated by the quotation marks used around the word "(Lithuanian) independence." Such tactics position Russia as the higher moral arbiter of history and morality, attempting to skew the power balance by systematically eroding the Lithuanian historical narrative.

One more instance where quotation marks are instrumentalized to carry out strategic tactics is noticed here: "In the Baltic republic it is increasingly attempted to divide the citizens of Belarus into 'right' and 'wrong' ones." The use of passive voice ("it is increasingly attempted") obscures agency, withholding information about the actor of this division, attributing it broadly to the "Baltic republic." Once again, the quotation marks are introduced to suggest sarcasm, skepticism and the externally imposed nature of these labels. They imply moral critique of Lithuania's supposed unethical actions of imposing judgment (e.g., "right" and "wrong") on Belarusians, and the alleged attempt to "divide" them, positioning them as victims of manipulation perpetrated by Lithuania. This fits into the broader narrative that portrays Lithuania as an instigator of conflict and division.

Moving on to rhetorical devices, some metaphors were already touched upon in the lexical analysis section, but will be expanded on here, along with the use of conversational tone and sarcasm/mocking.

The metaphor "at the broken trough (у разбитого корыта)" used in a title about collaboration with Taiwan symbolises disappointment and unmet hopes, as well as economic hardship, feeding into the image of Lithuania as poor and gain-seeking.

"Meticulous journalists" having discovered past membership in the communist party was also subject to ridicule, in a bid to discredit their labour and highlight its perceived pointlessness, so as to discredit Lithuania's efforts to distance itself from the Soviet past.

Speaking about the protests of Maidan, the participation of the Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs at the time was described as "touchingly handed out woollen mittens to protesters, which 'will warm not only the hands, but also the hearts of Ukrainians', and 'communicated' with representatives of the opposition." The word "touchingly" and the chosen quote portray the actors as naive and overly emotional, imbuing the statement with a discrediting tone. Quotation marks are once again instrumentalized in the word "communicated" in order to sow doubt, and his words about Ukraine's Association Agreement with the EU were presented as "sweetly sung," playing into the naivete and irony imposed by the Russian narrative. Further on, it is stated "the pious tales of 'warm mittens' have been replaced by something hotter," again rounding out the contrasting comparison of Lithuania's course of action, "something hotter"

standing in for the statement of the President about Ukraine having to choose its fate. The words of the then-speaker of the Parliament Loreta Graužinienė directed to the newly ("illegitimately," according to the article) appointed speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are presented as a "fiery message (пламенное послание)," mocking the Lithuanian-Ukrainian partnership by attributing a dramaticized descriptor.

Using emotionally charged language such as describing a setback in export talks between Taiwan and Vilnius as "such sad news" also allows to take a stance by using a mere adjective: it is evident that Russia does not support Lithuania's trade and partnership with Taiwan, and using such wording demonstrates the sarcastic portrayal. In the sentence "The Taiwanese officials nodded their heads at this, which the Lithuanian side apparently considered to be an expression of interest," Russia is again positioning itself as the arbiter of reality, portraying the agreement between two states as a misunderstanding, again belittling the agency of Lithuania and showing it as incapable. This is further exacerbated in the outright statement that "It is not worth counting on the reasonableness of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister," undermining the capabilities and rationality of democratic institutions.

Portraying Lithuania as irrational also comes into play in the article "A passport will "adorn" only a select few. Lithuania creates "inquisition" on citizenship." Choosing words like "adorn" and "select few" exaggerates and discredits Lithuanian actions, and when stating that "Apparently, [foreign citizens] will be tested for their loyalty to Russia and its president personally," it is attempted to poke holes in the rationality of its actions, portraying it as foolish (rather than a grounded concern for national security). In saying that foreign citizens "will be summoned for a 'heart-to-heart talk' with the Department of State Security (DSS)," the metaphor is used ironically to portray Lithuanian institutions as aggressive and their attempts to increase security as unreasonable and overreactive.

The narratives of economic poorness and geopolitical misguidedness are also perpetuated in discussing Lithuania's support of Ukraine. Asking "Who demands to take off and give Ukrainians 'the last trousers'," "Who shouts 'Ukraine to the EU!' the loudest'" once again uses the mocking tone, personification and metaphors to make the point of Lithuania as an irrational actor.

The sarcasm is also present in a different case: the metaphorical portrayal of Europe/the EU as "paradise." Its inhabitants are described as "inhabitants of the magnificent garden," the EU as "the pan-European table brimming with viands (богатый от яств общеевропейский стол)" (using the archaic version of the word "food" to emphasize the divide and exaggeration), and the "European Garden of Eden." This sarcastic portrayal criticizes and undermines the image of the EU as a prosperous entity, once again using quotation marks to indicate skepticism and to cast doubt on Europe's stability. The word "paradise" invokes abundance, welfare and idealism, so the sarcastic usage implies the opposite—that Europe is in economic and moral dysfunction. It props Russia up into a superior moral position of someone who sees through the "facade," creating a shared system of knowledge that the reader is invited into. Creating a sense of moral and informational superiority makes it appealing to audiences who already hold skeptical or negative opinions about Europe, fitting into the aforementioned Russian strategy of sowing internal divide and appealing to Russian-speaking minorities in Lithuania. It also creates a strong Self/Other dichotomy, positioning Europe as a sham and Russia as stable and unafraid to call out perceived illusions. The EU generally represents Western discourse hegemony and the rejection of Russian influence in Lithuania, therefore the sarcastic usage of "paradise" divulges the frustration with the perception of the EU as morally and economically superior, and shows the attempt of Russia to subvert the power dynamic and diminish the potential appeal of the EU in the eyes of the audience.

Such are the dominant tools and narratives employed on the linguistic level. By quantity, belittling lexical choices and instrumentalization of quotation marks are ahead (41 and 42 instances, respectively), closely followed by sarcastic tone (29 instances) and metaphors (26 instances).

Discourse dimension

Moving along Fairclough's three-dimensional analysis model, the discourse dimension will now be explored. Starting with the analysis of the dissemination platform, authors and audiences, exploring instances of intertextuality and strategies, tools and identity labels used in the texts of the corpus.

The platform Sputnik News (formerly Voice of Russia or RIA Novosti) is a Russian state-owned and operated[94] media outlet that is active on a variety of platforms, including websites in 31 languages, radio broadcasting, formerly Tiktok, Facebook, X and Youtube. The European Union declared that Sputnik, RT, and their affiliates would no longer be allowed to operate within the EU when Russia invaded Ukraine in late February 2022[95], but even the Lithuania-focused Sputnik News website remains easily accessible using VPN.

Sputnik News describes itself as "showcasing a multipolar world"—a term frequently employed by Russia to indicate disdain for the perceived concentration of power and influence in the hands of the USA or the collective West.

The platform states "Sputnik says what others are silent about" and "We exist to tell the stories that aren't being told," perpetuating various implications. Firstly, the direct contrast between "Sputnik" and "others" (implying mainstream Western media or other countries' state-sponsored outlets) portrays the "others" as malignant actors deliberately withholding or falsifying information, positioning Sputnik as "on their side" and unique. By creating a system of shared knowledge and letting the audience into it, it creates a sense of exclusivity and enlightenment. The word "stories" lends a human touch to the material, giving it an air of empathy, relatability, and inherent worth. The verbs "says" and "exist to tell" portray Sputnik as active, purposeful and convey a sense of responsibility to "uncover the truth" that the "others" are hiding. Both statements implicitly accuse the "others" of wrongdoing without naming specific names, avoiding accountability. The wording appeals to alienated audiences emotionally and humanizes the media outlet, waving the promise of "belonging to the inner circle of awareness."

The "About" section states that Sputnik "occupies a unique niche as a provider of alternative news content and a radio broadcaster in one person." The word "alternative" positions the outlet as a challenger to the dominant media, aligning it with values of openness and honesty (distancing itself from its state-sponsored roots, which is also not stated in the "About" section). This positioning also appeals to people who see traditional media as corrupt and untrustworthy. It exploits existing distrust towards the mainstream media by reinforcing the narrative that the

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[94] Tatiana Romanova and Maxine David, *The Routledge Handbook of EU-Russia Relations: Structures, Actors, Issues* (Routledge, 2021).

[95] 'EU to Ban Russia's RT, Sputnik Media Outlets, von Der Leyen Says – POLITICO', accessed 15 December 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-announces-rt-sputnik-ban/.

audiences are being misled and lied to. This feeds into the process of the already distrustful audiences turning to Sputnik to get the "full picture" that is supposedly withheld. The phrases are a rhetorical shield for spreading state-aligned narratives, especially those that criticise Western policies or present Russia in a favourable light, even though they promise transparency and untold stories.

The platform is transparent about being "fully oriented towards a foreign audience," which is supplemented by having numerous websites in the native languages of the targeted countries; the Lithuania-focused variant, however, is in Russian, presumably because of the relatively large Russian-speaking part of the population.

Aside from the large part of articles that are left without indicating the author, the names that are indicated in the corpus articles are sometimes Lithuanian; although, no further information about the individual is provided upon clicking on them (only the articles previously published in their name on the platform; oft very thematically various). Google searches yield no result either, suggesting the names might be fabricated to reinforce the internal divide and provide credibility ("a native Lithuanian is criticizing the government").

Out of all the articles that mention Lithuania as a main actor in the corpus, all of them carry a negative connotation, either questioning or outright condemning the actions of the state and its representatives. Upon broadening the search to include the articles that mention Lithuania in the title at any capacity, it was ascertained that the only neutral articles were ones where the members of the Eastern Orthodox religious group are being congratulated for Christmas or Easter.

Intertextuality, as an important aspect of the discourse dimension of the analysis, was evident in numerous instances in the texts. The analysis covers instances of manifest intertextuality (quoting) and constitutive intertextuality (interdiscursivity): style, register and references to other texts.

When quotes are presented in the articles, they are, in most cases, presented with a neutral verb "(the actor) noted" or "(the actor) stated." Nevertheless, there are numerous cases of behaviour attribution when presenting quoted utterances, like "Šimonytė had to sadly admit" or "demanded," adding a layer of connotation that was not previously there, had the words been

presented on their own. The connotations are, again, negative-leaning or outright sarcastic ("sweetly sang the Lithuanian minister").

The people selected to quote fall into two categories: they are mostly Lithuanian government officials (the president, prime minister, minister of foreign affairs etc), or representatives of "alternative" viewpoints that have at some point expressed support for Russia, like the "member of the Lithuanian political opposition Algirdas Paleckis" or Ilze Liepa, a ballerina who openly supported Putin. The only instances where the words of non-opposition Lithuanian politicians or experts are used is when they support the main ideas of the author of the article (discrediting the choices of Lithuania in both cases): e.g. the words of then-chairwoman of the Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation (LPSK) are presented as "repeatedly condemned the Lithuanian authorities for leaving hundreds of people 'on the margins of society'." This is another instance of exploiting internal disagreements and exaggerating them to sow distrust in the Lithuanian government and, in turn, make the state appear as morally corrupt.

Regarding constitutive intertextuality, it manifested in the following ways: when talking about increasing the budget allocation for security, the president of Lithuania is attributed the phrase "it's not enough, not-e-nough! (маловато будет, ма-ло-ва-то!)." This is a comedic catchphrase that comes from Russian pop culture (originating from a popular comedy Our Encounters ("Наши встречи"), utilising deliberate repetition and exaggeration, along with a comedic, playful tone. This informal style introduces an element of ridicule, portraying the president as overly dramatic and irrational. It also reinforces the notion of Russian superiority, both delegitimizing security concerns and creating a space of shared cultural identity (in this case, humor) for Russian-speaking readers. Imposing Russian cultural references onto Lithuanian discourse (here and going forward) aims to establish cultural hegemony, remaining in the mocking register that was analysed previously.

Another similar instance appears through the use of the postfix "-s": in the sentence "2024 will bring many political revelations to Lithuania. We are waiting-s (Ждем-с.)" The "-s" postfix is an archaic remnant of the word "sir (сударь)," previously used to indicate politeness, now carrying an ironic undertone through the juxtaposition of formality and humor. It conveys patience or anticipation in a mocking way, here in regards to the political developments in Lithuania in the new year. Thus, the "political revelations" that are anticipated in Lithuania are implied to be

either predictable, unimportant, or unworthy of real attention. The word creates a perception of condescending patience, once again elevating Russia into the position of seeing through facade, aligning with readers who already feel skepticism, fostering a feeling of mutual understanding and emotionally distancing the speaker from Lithuanian politics, allowing to portray them as unimportant or unserious, further alienating Russian-speaking audiences.

One more cultural reference is evident in the use of the idiom "the cart is still there (воз и ныне там)" when describing Lithuania-Taiwan relations. The phrase is derived from the fable the Swan, the Pike and the Crab written by Ivan Krylov, and is used to signify a situation that is lacking in progress. When used in political discourse, it implies stagnation, failure and dysfunction. It not only portrays Lithuania as incapable, but also criticizes its effort to build connection with Taiwan in a way that suggests misaligned interests and lack of unity: in the fable, the cart remains stuck because the three characters pull it in opposite directions. The perceived dysfunction is mocked with a tone of resignation, implying that the situation is hopeless and the actors are incapable of producing meaningful change. The critique is implicit, without identifiable accusations, remaining plausibly deniable and obscured. The use of culturally charged idioms positions the speaker as witty and close to the audience, reinforcing emotional connection through highlighting belonging to a system of shared knowledge.

Another example of referencing is seen in the use of "from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea (от можа Балтийского до можа Черного)." This phrase originates from the Polish expression "od morża do morża," referencing the historical moment when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth spanned the territory between the two seas. The spelling is modified here to include the Polish pronunciation, which implies the author of the phrase, at the same time imbuing it with a sense of humor and dismissiveness. The informal tone reduces the meaning of the historical reference to something trivial or to be ridiculed. It implies that Lithuania, along with Poland and Ukraine, entertain ambitions of influence and expansionism and mocks such notions, portraying Lithuania as overambitious and stuck in the past. The idea is presented as the "Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian project of the Rzeczpospolita 2.0" (there indeed was a conference under such name conducted in 2011, but no other meaningful mentions of the term were found online). This Russian portrayal dismisses the regional unity between the three states, trivializing elements of historical identity.

Other instances of interdiscursivity appear through discursive heterogeneity: the texts are mostly written in the informal register, but occasionally elements of familiar register are added. Both the tone and the structure tend to incorporate elements of conversationism: asking and answering questions ("And where to get the money for that? Same old, same old–"), the addition of the words "like" ("мол," "дескать") when paraphrasing speech (which also add a tone of distrust), informal linking words "in short (короче)" and introducing critique with "as we can see (как видим)." In the last case, the use of first person plural pronouns also creates a sense of inclusion for the audience, as if looking outwards onto the political landscape from an inner circle, and the verb "see" indicates objectivity and grounded knowledge, rather than opinion.

These examples of intertextuality, namely referencing cultural codes of the Self (Russia) and the Other (e.g. shared history of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine) allows the speaker to reflect the insignificance of the history of the Other, utilising humor and a superior moral position to highlight the superiority of the Self while aligning with the Russian-speaking audiences.

Social practice dimension

Moving onto the third dimension of the analysis: discourse as social practice. This section will review the tools and strategies used in Russian discourse to construct the image of Lithuania and the labels that are being attributed to it.

The main strategic tools identified were behaviour attribution, government vs people antagonism, fearmongering, insinuating conspiracy and exploiting internal divisions.

Behaviour attribution manifests by 'putting words into Lithuania's mouth'. In speaking about members of Belarusian opposition, they are described as "having failed to live up to [Lithuania's] expectations," implying that Lithuania's support is conditional and again situating it into the position of gain-seeking and denouncing its perceived higher moral position of being able to set expectations and give out rewards or reprimands on conditions of meeting them. When speaking of Lithuania's support of Ukraine, it is written as "The host of the summit, who the previous day had promised his Ukrainian counterpart that in Vilnius 'it will be possible to agree on commitments to Ukraine that will not disappoint it', only shrugged his shoulders glumly (уныло)." This way of using the word "promised" implies commitment and responsibility, heightening the contrast of expectation and subsequent result, exaggerating the

perceived failure, and perpetuating a narrative of incompetence. The metaphor "shrugged his shoulders glumly" portrays the president of Lithuania as embarrassed or resigned, reinforcing the portrayal of failure, although no such actions were documented, only reinterpreted by the author to make the point of failure and inadequacy. It reinforces skepticism towards the commitment of Lithuania to support Ukraine and toward its ability to do so.

When discussing the concept of consensual decision-making of the EU, it is portrayed as something that the "three Pribaltic states are narcissistically taking advantage of," and as something the "European cruiser" can "crash into." Attributing narcissism (self-interest, manipulation) portrays the Baltic states as selfish and prioritizing their own interests over the collective EU unity. This immediately suggests the states do not have the maturity or responsibility that is required to constructively participate in decision-making. The metaphor of "European cruiser," similarly as the "paradise narrative," implies seemingly positive notions only to use them to emphasize insecurity and vulnerability ("crash into"). This implies that the democratic principles of consensual voting are a weakness and the Baltic states, including Lithuania, manipulate the system for their own benefit. The repeated use of "Pribaltic" dismisses the individuality of the three states and uses an archaic form to trivialize their sovereignty and independence.

Another tactic used by Russian media is sowing antagonism between the government and the people. This is evident in numerous phrasings, starting with "'inquisition' on citizenship." Here, the legitimate actions of the Lithuanian government are likened to that of the Spanish Inquisition, implying aggression, repression and unjustness. The historical connotation of fanaticism and oppressive enforcement of ideology casts Lithuania in a negative light, using hyperbole and analogy. By positioning Lithuania as the persecutor, the author implies the existence of the persecuted (foreign citizens, in this case), perpetuating the idea that Lithuania's policies are excessive, oppressive and illegitimate.

Further, Lithuania is portrayed as having "deceived the trust of Belarusians," implying a relationship of trust that was undermined by Lithuania's actions. The sentence "Being closely engaged in the problems of 'fugitive' Belarusians, the Lithuanian leadership completely distracted from the problems of its citizens" is packed with strategic rhetoric choices, starting with the hyperbole "completely distracted," which implies negligence and ignorance at the hands

of Lithuania's leadership. There is also an instance of fabricated juxtaposition between the "problems of 'fugitive' Belarusians" and "problems of its citizens," trying to create the illusion that attention to one group must come at the expense of the other. This portrayal depicts the Lithuanian government as disconnected from the issues faced by its citizens, exploiting Belarusians as a justification for its neglect. The narrative is then led further by claiming that "At the same time, there have always been funds and efforts to facilitate the relocation of employees of Belarusian companies and their families to Lithuania," portraying the government as deceitful, two-faced and prioritizing material gain over morals (the article also claims that EU grants are the main reason for Lithuanian support of Belarusian migrants). The wronged group switches to Belarusians itself when the text goes on to discuss a situation labeled as "The first 'wake-up call' of hypocrisy," where due to sanctions the bank account of a Belarusian-owned sanatorium in Druskininkai, Lithuania was closed. It is presented as an "extremely sad (печальная)" situation, portraying the authorities as irrational because they "were not even stopped by the fact that the sanatorium is one of the biggest taxpayers in Druskininkai." Workers, predominantly Belarusian citizens, "tried to draw attention to the problem and went to protests and rallies. However, in vain." The portrayal of ignored voices of the "regular people" positions the government as callous and unjust.

Sowing division between the "ruling elite" and "ordinary citizens" is reminiscent of communist ideas of the oppressive ruling class and populism, allowing to establish a closer connection with disappointed audiences. It is said that Lithuania will support Ukraine "till the last cent in the pockets of its citizens," "even at the expense of the standard of living of future generations," "until the last Lithuanian," and "all this will require hundreds of millions of euros more from the pockets of taxpayers—ordinary Lithuanian citizens." Such positioning reinforces the divergence of interests of the two groups, the government irrationally interested in supporting Ukraine at the expense of the material welfare of the citizens. Appealing to the perceived difference of "ordinary citizens" further entrenches the mindset of the "wronged" "victims of the system." Lithuanian leadership is described as the "elite" and "rulers" who make "politicized decisions" and "do not know what a value-oriented policy is and act solely in their own interests without looking at the damage they will do to their own country," positioning them as malignant and self-interested. It is outright claimed that "the main goal of the EU and the US is to worsen the lives of millions of ordinary citizens," part of which Lithuania supposedly is. This posits the

speaker "on the other side," bravely calling out the misguidedness of Western institutions, and Russia as the morally superior judge.

The theme of war in Ukraine is also exploited to this end, claiming "Lithuanian politicians have actively contributed to turning the territory of Ukraine into a battlefield." Redirecting blame is a frequently employed tactic which will be discussed in more detail below; here, the responsibility is transferred onto Lithuanian politicians. They come into light again along with instrumentalized quotation marks: "Lithuanian politicians continue to talk about 'democracy' and 'aggressor Russia', while at the same time supplying the Kyiv regime with lethal weapons that kill Ukrainians." The concept of democracy as seen by Lithuania is mocked, as well as the notion that Russia is an aggressor—by mocking, the speaker creates distance from the claims and distorts reality, making the claims seem foolish and unthinkable. The responsibility for the deaths of Ukrainians is transferred onto the weapons, and by proxy, onto Lithuania, who is the supplier in this phrase, removing Russia from the discursive equation and negating its responsibility in this way.

Another strategic tool employed in the texts is fearmongering, coupled with insinuations of conspiracy. Tactics of fearmongering are centered around the topics of economics, the cohesion of the EU, relations with China and readiness of Lithuania for armed conflict, whereas conspiracy is implied when claiming the Maidan protests were "heated by the West" and other cases, for example that the information about the past membership of Lithuanian politicians in the communist party emerged "out of nowhere," the quotation marks and sarcastic word choice purposely indicating distrust and prompting the reader to question the origins of such information. Another attempt at inciting fear appears when talking about increased security measures when applying for Lithuanian citizenship, presented in the form of a question "Well, based on the results of these inspections, why not build reservations for untrustworthy Lithuanians?," implying the measures are excessive, dehumanising and authoritarian, evoking visuals of confinement, drawing on historical instances of forced exclusion. The phrase "untrustworthy Lithuanians" implies that the institutions are paranoid and overreaching. The phrasing of the question starting with "why not" implies a possible escalation of "already draconian" policies, introducing, seemingly, "another absurd suggestion" in line with the current trajectory of policy.

Exploiting pre-existing internal divisions is also in the toolkit of Russian narrative construction, like in the instance of one of the founders of Brolis Group (a Lithuanian company that designs and manufactures infrared laser sensor systems) critiqued the state hor "not undertaking to meet the demand for ammunition," which, in his words, hinders "the entry of foreign military industry." It is made into a headline stating that "Lithuania wants military plants, but offers nothing in return, business says." Positioning the author of the claim as "business" and quoting a Lithuanian aims at a bid for credibility, and demonstrates internal dissonance between society and institutions, personifying Lithuania in the contrast of "wants," "but offers nothing in return," implying unfairness, irrationality and greed.

Other instances of using existing domestic questions concern readiness for war, namely the construction of shelters: "After all, the existing 2,272 equipped shelters in the country will be enough for only one out of four Lithuanian residents." The claim sits at the intersection of exploiting existing fear and exacerbating it, showing the state as ill-prepared and inciting the residents to feel insecurity.

As for the labels that crystallized during the process of analysis, there are various tropes which will be presented on a spectrum of increasing insecurity (not all practices of othering position the 'Other' as a threat).

The first label that is attributed to Lithuania's identity is 'poor', experiencing economic hardship. It is stated that the "prolonged trade battle with the giant partner" (China) may cause recession, that Lithuania is "at the helm of the poorest EU countries," also constructing a connection to the support of Ukraine ("It is noteworthy that among the 'Zaukrainians' (derogatory term for Ukraine supporters) are mostly economic losers or at most EU middlers." More elaborate constructions are used to the same effect, sarcastically attributing sayings to Lithuania: "Come in, fellow Ukrainians, sit down and eat German sausages and drink French wine. And here, in the corner of the table, try our humble zeppelins with cracklings." Such phrasing mocks the support of Ukraine and alludes to the idea that Lithuania has nothing to offer and instead exploits other member states' wealth.

Another label attributed is 'incapable institutions', appearing very often in phrasings like "if the Lithuanian authorities would think with their heads before going into conflict with anyone,"

"hysterics, not common sense, rule the foreign policy of the Baltic Republic," "it is not worth relying on the reasonableness of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister." The course of action and choices made by the Lithuanian government altogether and separate officials are often criticized in text, in an effort to make them appear irrational and unreliable, undermining public trust in the institutions.

Lithuania is also portrayed as 'unstable and volatile', as if it often changes directions and can not be trusted to remain on one course of action. This is phrased as "Lithuania bows to China after not seeing any money from Taiwan," "formerly welcome guests have become considered almost a 'threat to national security'."

Another oft-attributed label is 'greedy', portraying Lithuania as an actor that is mostly concerned with amassing material resources at the cost of morals. At times, it intertwines with the 'unstable' label, such as here: "Lithuania is still trying to play on Russophobia to get money out of European funds, and at the same time uses Ukrainian refugees to get some funding. Belarusians are no longer paid for."

Another label used to build the image of Lithuania is adopting a 'prescriptive stance over the West', unduly asserting authority over other EU states. An example of an article title where the idea appears states "Lithuania's shaggy tail wags a well-fed European dog." The adjective 'shaggy' implies smallness and untidiness, and assigning the role of the tail suggests Lithuania has influence beyond of its size, while the 'dog', Europe, is associated with wealth and power ('well-fed'), but also complacency or ignorance, so that the image of a dog being wagged by its tail creates dissonance and absurdity. It positions Lithuania as manipulative and undeserving of influence due to its size, and reinforces a narrative of disunity.

Lithuania is also portrayed as 'antirussian/russophobic," six of the articles repeating the phrase "Vilnius has toughened anti-Russian rhetoric even further," calling the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats a "party of russophobes" and claiming "cynical abuse of the Russian-speaking minority."

It is also portrayed as an 'instigator' and 'in irrational war hysteria', claiming "Lithuanian politicians continue to talk about 'democracy' and 'Russia-aggressor', and at the same time

supply the Kiev regime with lethal weapons, which destroy Ukrainians," and "who in a hysterical frenzy destroys monuments to Soviet soldiers."

Lithuania is also labelled as a 'criminal', claiming it "'inhumanely' violates OSCE commitments," "has long been 'a concern of human rights NGOs and civil society activists'." The label of 'Nazi' is also attributed, stating "Lithuanians have experience with the organisation of ghettos and concentration camps during the Nazi occupation in World War II."

All in all, these various labels all contribute to the image of Lithuania that Russian state media seeks to perpetuate.\nPortrait

In sum, the way that linguistic, discursive and social structure tools are manipulated creates a sociopolitical intersubjective reality in the minds of the readers. The subsequent part of the study provides the outline of that reality: the image that Russia constructs of Lithuania by utilising the media.

Lithuanian identity through the lens of Russian discourse is a former Soviet Union state that does not honour common history and instead attempts to rewrite it, turning away from Russian ties and instead moving towards the West. Despite being one of the poorest members of the EU and having incapable institutions, it manipulates other member states and aims to extract as much material gain as possible, undermining morality and friendly relations in the process. Lithuania breaks international laws and discriminates against Russians in a hysterical paranoia about protecting its national security, even though what poses the biggest danger is the influence of Western powers, which use Lithuania as a pawn in their expansion strategy.

Discussion

The subsequent section of the study will delve into the findings of the analysis and connect them to the theoretical framework established earlier in the text.

As previously overviewed, the sociopolitical reality is constructed by human practice[96], in this case, discourse in the online media. The specific practice analysed here instrumentalizes

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[96] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 963.

insecurity to justify narratives, leveraging uncertainty and fear (e.g. alluding to conspiracies and incompetent institutions). One of the most important capabilities of social practice is producing predictability[97] (an actor will behave in accordance with their identity and, in turn, interests), reducing uncertainty and increasing trust that actions taken by other actors will be met with certain reactions and consequences. Russia uses that perception to produce feelings of insecurity not only among the readers of Sputnik, but also among the whole international community, testing the boundaries of EU responses by increasing hybrid attacks.

The speculations about escalating tensions in the region serve to raise the perceived level of threat, and "since what constitutes a threat can never be stated as an a priori, primordial constant, it should be approached as a social construction of an Other, and theorized at that level."[98] Russia exploits this ambiguity of the concept of a threat, never stating outwardly in the text that Lithuania poses one, but attributing various labels that suggest it ('criminal', 'instigator', 'nazi', 'russophobic'). It attempts to exogenize insecurity and displace the focus from their own actions (e.g. war in Ukraine, domestic economic problems).

That attempt at blame dodging, although having a lot of resources dedicated to it, remains an impossible feat, as insecurity as a whole can not be external, being not an objective material constant, but rather the result of the process of (re)establishing one's identity[99]. Viewed through that lens, Lithuania is being portrayed as having the identity of both a threat *to* Russia and threatened *by* Russia, creating a paradoxical dichotomy. The goal of such portrayal can only be guessed at, one of the possibilities being the aim to provide pretext for any 'defensive' action Russia might make but, at the same time, to underline Lithuania's role as the irrational actor.

Taking into account respective military power and history, it is clear that Lithuania can not pose a threat to Russia in the conventional sense; it is not expansionist or revisionist. But when Russian media portrays it as a threat, the author of the image construction displaces the responsibility and creates the illusion of insecurity being outside of Russia, giving grounds to any interest Russia might develop in regards to Lithuania.

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[97] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 178.

[98] Ibid., 199.

[99] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 975.

The way such construction of insecurity takes place is by attributing particular qualities to a subject, positing them against the Self and then linking the qualities to a whole collective of the (Lithuanian) people[100], strengthening the image of Russia as the 'morally superior' 'saviour', and the image of Lithuania as the 'morally corrupt' actor.

Such processes help Putin justify his rule at home: the construction of an Other, as well as crises, help consolidate power internally[101] and allow to rearticulate relations of identity and difference. The war in Ukraine simultaneously the means and the reason for the need of state power consolidation, making it the time to strengthen the efforts of controlling intersubjective meaning. The portrayal of Lithuania including various narratives of othering, some of which are contradictory, demonstrates how crucial to the Russian strategy is the goal of their readers perceiving Lithuania as an Other. The identity of a state is directly tied to its interests and implies consequent actions, and bolstered by accounts of history, it is worth admitting Russia has a record of commencing military actions against states it has othered (e.g. Chechnya).

This leads to the constructivist assumption that information warfare is a reciprocal social practice that reinforces the intersubjective identities of actors, both the aggressor and the target. More than a mere exchange of propaganda or disinformation, it is a practice that reshapes the elements of identity attributed to both actors: since identities are not static and are instead (re)produced continuously through social practice[102], processes like narrative production and label attribution have the power to change the intersubjective meanings in social structures. The aggressor has the interest to shape the perception of both identities in the target audience, since "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them"[103]. This makes meaning creation a powerful and dangerous process, which, if carried out effectively, can have a tremendous effect on the behaviour of affected social structures. The target, in turn, is forced to take control of the narrative by fortifying the intersubjective meanings that serve their interests and beliefs.

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[100] Ibid., 971.

[101] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 196.

[102] Ibid., 178.

[103] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 970.

This idea is further bolstered by the statement mentioned earlier in the theoretical overview: an insecurity is "an effect of the very process of establishing and re-establishing the object's identity"[104], and if one views information warfare as the "process of establishing and re-establishing the object's identity," according to this account, it creates insecurities. Following the logic of this statement, if identity is continually reconstituted through the very acts of labeling and narrative construction, then information warfare—as a site of those acts—not only shapes identities but also creates insecurities.

In describing constructivism, Hopf states "if it is a theory, it is a theory of process, not substantive outcome."[105] Since actors, when viewed through the lens of constructivism, have many ways to behave in response to a given situation, it is difficult to foresee the results of the case, but uncovering the processes through analysis is a step in the right direction because one can not fix what one does not understand.

Proposals

As suggested by Blommaert and Bulcaen, "CDA should make proposals for change and suggest corrections to particular discourses."[106] Knowing how Lithuania is portrayed through the lens of the aggressor, it is possible to work against the attributed image with the target audience of the informational operations. This process of meaning creation, bolstered by the use of belittling language and discursive practices, serves to reinforce narratives of Russian superiority in the communities of Russian speakers, contributing to their system of shared knowledge. Creating such intersubjective meaning in a social structure is a powerful outcome of a targeted social practice that utilises numerous tools to achieve a strategic goal, which can and should be counteracted in the interest of the target state.\nThe facts of international politics are seen by constructivism not as objective material reality but as an intersubjective, social reality[107], and this can be clearly seen in the social groups targeted by Russian information warfare, which creates the reality that the aforementioned groups live in and, subsequently, perpetuate.

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[104] Ibid., 975.

[105] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 196.

[106] Blommaert and Bulcaen, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', 449.

[107] Barkin, 'Realist Constructivism', 326.

In addition to reproducing the identities of actors, social practices also reproduce an intersubjective social structure[108], a cycle that not only turns the Russian speaking minorities against Lithuania by othering it, but also separates the group itself from the collective community of Lithuanian population. It perpetuates a self-sustaining cycle: the Russian-created system of shared knowledge spreads fears and distrust in Lithuanian authority, which, in turn, encourages the audience to keep consuming Russian media.

The way the disinformation is created presupposes establishing a connection to the audience: using cultural references, humour, informal register, all of that creates a bond between the author and the reader and encourages trust. Coupled with strategies like implying conspiracy and fearmongering, this process creates new intersubjective meanings that constitute how they see Lithuania. Since identity presupposes a set of interests ("the identity "great power" implies a particular set of interests different from those implied by the identity "European Union member,""[109]), the audience of Sputnik is inclined to see Lithuania's interests as ones of a greedy anti-Russian state with an incapable government, perpetuating their feelings of insecurity. If they see Lithuania and its institutions negatively, it is bound to impact their engagement with them (e.g. voting, working in state institutions, participating in collective defense), since, once again, "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them"[110].\nAdmittedly, the "owner" of the identity is not in control of its ultimate meaning to any given social group—"the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning"[111]. This is why it is worth working with the structure itself—the community of Lithuanian residents which consume information from Russian media outlets. The voice of Lithuania would have to be stronger than the one of Russia, in order to regain control of the social and, ultimately, the material reality.

Projects of integration and media literacy already exist as such, and are commendable initiatives, although upholding factual integrity remains the most reliable strategy for countering propaganda. Historical precedents illustrate the long-term repercussions of disseminating false or exaggerated information. For example, during World War I, the British government promoted

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[108] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 178.

[109] Ibid., 176.

[110] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 970.

[111] Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', 175.

hyperbolized accounts of German atrocities, only to have those claims refuted and its credibility severely undermined among German audiences[112]. Although Britain used more accurate reporting in World War II, the distrust persisted because the earlier deceptions were not forgotten. This lesson is particularly relevant for Lithuania: any manipulative narratives might yield short-lived gains but will ultimately compromise public trust. Consistent reliance on verifiable information fosters credibility, which is critical against modern Russian propaganda strategies[113]. Moreover, NATO StratCom research indicates that transparent communication, clear sourcing, and prompt correction of errors effectively strengthen public confidence[114].

By adopting this evidence-based approach, Lithuania can mitigate confusion sown by information operations, reinforcing its status as a trusted actor. In effect, securing public trust is more sustainable through prioritisation of truth and transparency than through any short-term advantage derived from misinformation.

Conclusion

This study analyzed how identity-based narratives function within the context of information warfare, examining how Russian state-run media constructs the image of Lithuania. Applying a constructivist lens, the study illuminated how narratives and discourses function as mechanisms through which identities are contested, redefined, and reinforced. This theoretical framework proved highly effective in understanding the dynamic interplay between disinformation strategies and the identities they invoke, showcasing the deep entanglement of identity and insecurity in contemporary information warfare. The results demonstrated that information warfare is not merely a tool of influence, but a reciprocal social practice that actively (re)constructs the intersubjective identities of both aggressor and target actors.

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[112] Angus Mitchell, 'James Bryce and the Politics of Inhumanity', *History Ireland* 23, no. 5 (2015): 1.

[113] Todd C. Helmus et al., 'Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe' (RAND Corporation, 12 April 2018), 77, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html.

[114] 'StratCom | NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Latvia', 82, accessed 4 January 2025, https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/internet-trolling-as-a-hybrid-warfare-tool-the-case-of-latvia/160.

This thesis aimed to achieve two key objectives: to analyze how the image of Lithuania is constructed in Russian state-run media and to identify how Russian information warfare fits into the constructivist framework.

These objectives were pursued to answer the research question: How do Russian online narratives construct the image of Lithuania?. The analysis results demonstrate how linguistic, discursive, and social structure tools are used to construct an intersubjective reality for readers in which Lithuania is presented as an unstable, volatile, greedy, anti-Russian, and criminal actor that acts as an instigator while being incapable of independent action.

To answer the research question and achieve the aims, the analysis utilized a corpus of 22 articles published by Sputnik News Lithuania, chosen from a pool of 863 articles that mentioned Lithuania during a one-year period, from November 1, 2023, to November 1, 2024. The selection criteria included articles where Lithuania was the main actor, and the analysis was conducted using inductive coding and Fairclough's three-dimensional model. The three dimensions are as follows: linguistic dimension (analyzing the language used in the texts, including lexical choices, grammar, syntax, and rhetorical devices), discourse dimension (examining the context of the communication, including the dissemination platform, authors, audiences, intertextuality, strategies, tools, and identity labels used) and social practice dimension (investigating how the discourse relates to broader social structures, power dynamics, and ideologies).

The linguistic dimension of the analysis revealed a recurring pattern of using specific linguistic tools to portray Lithuania negatively. These tools include belittling lexical choices, the instrumentalization of quotation marks, a sarcastic tone, and metaphors. For example, constructions like "(Lithuania) loudly barks" employ personification to depict Lithuania as an insignificant and annoying actor. Similarly, the use of quotation marks around terms like "Russian aggression" and "the Russian threat" aims to cast doubt on their validity and normalize Russia's actions.

The discursive dimension examined the context surrounding the communication, uncovering strategic choices made in terms of the dissemination platform, authors, audiences, and intertextuality. The analysis found that Sputnik News, a Russian state-owned media outlet, consistently presented Lithuania in a negative light, employing various discursive strategies to

achieve this goal. One notable strategy involves the use of potentially fabricated author names, suggesting an attempt to create an illusion of credibility by attributing criticism of the Lithuanian government to supposed Lithuanian citizens. The articles consistently utilized quotes, cultural references, and an informal register to manipulate narratives and resonate with Russian-speaking audiences, fostering a sense of shared identity and distrust towards Lithuania.

The social practice dimension of the analysis delved into how the discourse perpetuated by Sputnik News connects to broader social structures and power dynamics. This part of the analysis revealed that Russian state media utilizes numerous tools and strategies to construct and reinforce a negative image of Lithuania within the minds of its audience. One key strategy involved attributing specific behaviors to Lithuania, creating an image of the country as an irresponsible and untrustworthy actor. The analysis also uncovered the exploitation of pre-existing internal divisions within Lithuania, amplifying disagreements and portraying the government as incapable and corrupt. Fearmongering, often combined with insinuations of conspiracy, emerged as another key tool used to evoke negative perceptions of Lithuania, particularly concerning its economic prospects, the stability of the EU, relations with China, and the country's perceived vulnerability to armed conflict.

The study's findings revealed a set of labels consistently attributed to Lithuania in the analyzed articles: "instigator," "criminal," "russophobic," "unstable," "volatile," and "greedy." These labels, when examined within the context of the broader discourse, contribute to the overall negative portrayal of Lithuania that Russian state media seeks to perpetuate.

The study's findings are consistent with constructivist theory, which posits that social reality is not objective but is shaped by shared knowledge and understanding, often through discourse. The research highlighted how specific practices of information warfare, such as those employed by Sputnik News, utilize insecurity to justify narratives by leveraging uncertainty and fear. This manipulation of insecurity serves to shape perceptions of Lithuania among the target audience, portraying the country as a threat and undermining its credibility.

The study concludes that disinformation campaigns are not merely attempts to spread false information but represent a complex social practice that shapes and reinforces identities. Recognizing this dynamic is crucial for developing effective countermeasures. The research

emphasizes the importance of understanding how narratives and discourses function to contest, redefine, and reinforce identities in the context of information warfare.

Based on the findings, the study proposes several recommendations for Lithuania to counter the negative narratives perpetuated by Russian state-run media: investing in truth-driven counter-propaganda strategies that emphasize transparency and credibility; amplifying narratives that reflect democratic values and challenge the negative portrayals presented by Russian media; focusing on integration and media literacy initiatives, particularly within Russian-speaking minority communities, to foster critical thinking and resilience against disinformation. By implementing these recommendations, Lithuania can work to secure its national security and strengthen societal resilience against disinformation campaigns.

The study underscores the need for further research into the long-term effects of disinformation on national security, particularly within the context of the EU and NATO. Although this study focuses specifically on Lithuania, the findings on the reciprocal nature of information warfare and the strategies employed to construct and reinforce identities hold relevance for other geopolitical contexts as well.

Portrayals of identities and insecurities hold power, as discourses possess the cultural authority to define and, in doing so, shape the world itself[115]. This calls for a recognition of the influence of language—not as something to be underestimated, but as a force to be harnessed in pursuit of a deeper understanding of the world: both the realities we create, and those attempted to impose upon us.

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[115] Das, 'Critical Social Constructivism', 980.

Summary

EN

This thesis explores Russian disinformation narratives about Lithuania within the context of hybrid warfare, focusing on how these narratives shape both Russian and Lithuanian identities. It investigates the reciprocal process of information warfare, where both the aggressor and the target influence each other's identities through narrative production. The research addresses the impact of these narratives on Lithuania's political landscape and national security, as well as their role in the broader geopolitical dynamics between Russia, Lithuania, the EU, and NATO. Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the methodological framework, the research identifies key identity labels, such as "instigator" and "criminal," used to undermine Lithuania's sovereignty and credibility. Lithuania's response must prioritize truth-based strategies and media literacy to counteract these narratives. The thesis recommends further research into the long-term effects of disinformation on national security, especially within the EU and NATO framework.

LT

Šiame darbe tiriami Rusijos dezinformacijos naratyvai apie Lietuvą hibridinio karo kontekste, daugiausia dėmesio skiriant tam, kaip šie naratyvai formuoja Rusijos ir Lietuvos tapatybę. Tiriamas abipusis informacinio karo procesas, kai tiek agresorius, tiek taikinys per naratyvų kūrimą daro įtaką vienas kito tapatybėms. Tyrime nagrinėjamas šių naratyvų poveikis Lietuvos politiniam kontekstui ir nacionaliniam saugumui, taip pat jų vaidmuo platesnėje geopolitinėje dinamikoje tarp Rusijos, Lietuvos, ES ir NATO. Naudojant kritinę diskurso analizę (KDA) kaip metodologinį pagrindą, tyrime identifikuojamos pagrindinės tapatybės etiketės, tokios kaip „kurstytojas" ir „nusikaltėlis," naudojamos siekiant pakenkti Lietuvos suverenumui ir patikimumui. Lietuvos atsakas turi būti paremtas tiesos strategijomis ir žiniasklaidos raštingumu, kad būtų galima kovoti su šiais naratyvais. Darbe rekomenduojama toliau tirti ilgalaikį dezinformacijos poveikį nacionaliniam saugumui, ypač ES ir NATO rėmuose.

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Summary

This thesis examines Russian disinformation narratives about Lithuania in the context of hybrid warfare, analyzing their role in shaping Russian and Lithuanian identities. It explores the reciprocal influence of information warfare on both aggressor and target identities, highlighting impacts on Lithuania's politics and security. Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the study identifies key identity labels, such as "instigator" and "criminal," aimed at undermining Lithuania's sovereignty. It underscores the need for truth-based strategies and media literacy to counteract these narratives, recommending further research on disinformation's long-term effects on EU and NATO security.

Šiame darbe nagrinėjami Rusijos dezinformacijos naratyvai apie Lietuvą hibridinio karo kontekste, analizuojamas jų vaidmuo formuojant Rusijos ir Lietuvos identitetą. Tiriama abipusė informacinio karo įtaka agresoriaus ir taikinio tapatybėms, išryškinant poveikį Lietuvos politikai ir saugumui. Naudojant kritinę diskurso analizę (CDA), tyrime identifikuojamos pagrindinės tapatybės etiketės, tokios kaip „kurstytojas" ir „nusikaltėlis", kuriomis siekiama pakenkti Lietuvos suverenitetui. Jame pabrėžiama, kad norint pasipriešinti šiems naratyvams reikia tiesos principais grindžiamų strategijų ir žiniasklaidos raštingumo, taip pat rekomenduojama atlikti tolesnius dezinformacijos ilgalaikio poveikio ES ir NATO saugumui tyrimus.

Annex

Corpus

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Qualitative coding

громко лает

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: personification, belittling lexical choices, behaviour attribution

решила "выбить" у ЕС дешевые кредиты с помощью России

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: personification, prescriptive stance over the west

считает бизнес

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

У разбитого корыта

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: metaphor, poor

Литва кланяется Китаю, не увидев денег от Тайваня

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: unstable, volatile, personification, belittling lexical choices, greedy

"украсит" лишь избранных

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, metaphor

"инквизицию"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: government vs people, instrumentalized quotation marks

Литва проголосовала против резолюции о борьбе с героизацией нацизма в ООН

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: nazism

Литва "бесчеловечно" нарушает обязательства перед ОБСЕ

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: criminal

Как Литва обманула доверие белорусов

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: government vs people, unstable, volatile

Не оправдали надежд

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

Облезлый

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

Облезлый хвост Литвы виляет упитанной европейской собакой

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor).docx Tags: metaphor, prescriptive stance over the west

Sputnik говорит то, о чем другие молчат.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: system of shared knowledge

провалов

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

киевского режима

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: kyiv regime

Литва-то будет

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone

до последнего цента в карманах своих граждан

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

Нищая Литва

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

громким лаем

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

стыдят

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: prescriptive stance over the west

требуют от них

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: prescriptive stance over the west

раскошелиться

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone

спецоперации

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: svo

киевский режим

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: kyiv regime

напрямую вовлекают страны НАТО в конфликт и являются "игрой с огнем"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

спецоперации

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: svo

Вильнюс еще сильнее ужесточил антироссийскую риторику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

"агрессии"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

требуют у США и Североатлантического альянса

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: prescriptive stance over the west

"защиту"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

страна не планирует ни на кого нападать

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

поведение НАТО является провокационным и враждебным

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

кризиса на Украине

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: svo

спецоперации на Украине

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: svo

Вильнюс еще сильнее ужесточил антироссийскую риторику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

"агрессии" РФ

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

требуют у США и НАТО укрепить

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: prescriptive stance over the west

"защиту"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

в России уже неоднократно отмечали, что Москва не намерена ни на кого нападать

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation, blame dodging

Североатлантический альянс нацелен на конфронтацию

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

расширение НАТО не укрепит безопасность Запада

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

сами действия альянса носят агрессивный характер

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

Вильнюс еще больше ужесточил антироссийскую риторику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

систематически заявляют о "российской угрозе"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation, instrumentalized quotation marks, antirussian/russophobic

"укреплять"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

"сдерживанием российской агрессии"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

Москва многократно выражала обеспокоенность наращиванием сил альянса в Европе

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: blame dodging

политики не отвечают на вопросы представителей бизнеса

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

заявил один из основателей Brolis Group Кристионас Визбарас.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

спецоперации на Украине

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: svo

Вильнюс еще сильнее ужесточил антироссийскую риторику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

"агрессии"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

требуют у США и Североатлантического альянса

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: prescriptive stance over the west

"защиту"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

РФ многократно заявляли, что страна не планирует ни на кого нападать

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: blame dodging

поведение НАТО является провокационным и враждебным

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

Правители Литвы решили утереть нос всем членам НАТО

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, prescriptive stance over the west

даже за счет уровня жизни будущих поколений

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

"агрессорами с Востока"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

до последнего литовца

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

Правящая элита

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

горячие головы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

"утереть всем нос"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone

заявил

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

"маловато будет, ма-ло-ва-то!"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, intertextuality

требует

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

И это при том, что еще несколько лет назад именно соцдемы были единственной парламентской партией, выступавшей против повышения оборонных расходов.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

бывшие в прошлом голубями мира соцдемы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

бывшие в прошлом голубями мира соцдемы вместе с президентом превратились в настоящих ястребов войны

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor, belittling lexical choices

на все это потребуются дополнительно сотни миллионов евро из карманов налогоплательщиков — рядовых граждан Литвы.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

И где взять на это деньги? Да все там же —

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, conversational structure, imperative

у налогоплательщиков и будущих поколений

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

новоявленные "ястребы"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

свеженький источник доходов для вооруженных сил

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

Почуяв многомиллионные контракты, литовские предприниматели уже потирают руки и выстраиваются в очередь со своими предложениями.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

в нагнетание военной истерии

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: irrational war hysteria

"военных угроз"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

Ведь существующих в стране 2272 оборудованных убежищ хватит лишь для одного из четырех жителей Литвы.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: fearmongering, government vs people, exploiting internal conflicts

страны НАТО "играют с огнем",

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation, metaphor

ограничения против России сильно ударили по мировой экономике

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: fearmongering

главная цель Евросоюза и США — ухудшить жизнь миллионов простых граждан

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

"осквернении" памятника

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

В тот раз литовским правоохранителям не удалось установить, кто это сделал

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

"национальным героем"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

по свидетельствам советским документов, а также в глазах многих экспертов и простых жителей Литвы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: system of shared knowledge

"партизану"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

"партизаны"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

националистически настроенным вооруженных группировкам

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism

многие из тех, кто был против советской власти, вставали на сторону фашистской Германии

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: nazism

"Лесные братья" были причастны к уничтожению мирного населения и убийствам советских партийных работников

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism

Прибалтике

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

чувствуют "приближение войны"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: irrational war hysteria

спецоперации на Украине

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: svo

Вильнюс еще сильнее ужесточил антироссийскую риторику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

литовские политики стали еще активнее продвигать риторику об "угрозе" со стороны России

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: irrational war hysteria

"угрозе"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

проводя русофобскую политику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

под предлогом "агрессии" РФ

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic, instrumentalized quotation marks

укрепить "защиту"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

в России уже неоднократно отмечали, что Москва не намерена ни на кого нападать

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: blame dodging

Североатлантический альянс нацелен на конфронтацию

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

расширение НАТО не укрепит безопасность Запада, а сами действия альянса носят агрессивный характер

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

финал скандального дела о коррупции MG Baltic, партбилет президента

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

несколько "знаменательных" событий

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices, instrumentalized quotation marks

Это сладкое слово — саммит

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

целование украинского флага президентом Литвы Гитанасом Науседой

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor, belittling lexical choices

хозяин саммита, накануне обещавший украинскому коллеге, что в Вильнюсе "удастся договориться о таких обязательствах перед Украиной, которые ее не разочаруют", лишь уныло пожимал плечами

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution, metaphor

Мол, закончите конфликт с Россией, а уж потом и о членстве в альянсе поговорим

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone

но многие в мире узнали, что есть такая страна Литва

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

Жителям Вильнюса достались отремонтированные участки дорог, по которым гости добирались из аэропортов в комплекс Litexpo на дорогих иномарках

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

потратили около восьми миллионов евро из карманов литовских налогоплательщиков

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

Наивные немцы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

"финансирование инфраструктуры, необходимой для бригады, оказалось для Литвы "серьезной финансовой проблемой"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

поскольку стандарты помещений, необходимых для немецких солдат, "значительно" выше, чем для литовских

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: intertextuality

Короче, громкое сообщение о том, что литовцев защитят немецкие солдаты, может обернуться громким провалом из-за банальной нехватки денег на наемников.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts, belittling lexical choices, conversational tone

правоохрана вместе с политической элитой ломают головы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

некоторые депутаты сами удивлены

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

разрыли топор политической войны

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

"из ниоткуда" появляются вдруг сведения о коммунистическом прошлом нынешних литовских руководителей

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conspiracy

поведать о своем "коммунистическом прошлом"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks, belittling lexical choices

выяснилось, что действующий президент Литвы Гитанас Науседа незадолго до обретения Литвой "независимости" стал членом Компартии Литвы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

"независимости"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

дотошные журналисты

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking

Так что наступающий 2024 год принесет Литве много политических откровений. Ждем-с.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: intertextuality

Ждем-с.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone

литовские политики активно способствовали тому, чтобы превратить территорию Украины в поле боевых действий

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

массовых беспорядков

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism, svo

подогреваемых Западом

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conspiracy, blame dodging

был незаконно отстранен от власти действующий президент Виктор Янукович

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism, blame dodging

роль Литвы в госперевороте на Украине забылась,

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism

о причастности литовских властей к эскалации и гибели людей есть немало свидетельств

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: system of shared knowledge

заинтересованность официального Вильнюса в конфликте

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation, blame dodging

Разжигать протестные настроения литовские политики начали в ноябре 2013 года

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instigator

стращания не подействовали

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

после саммита в ход пошла тяжелая политическая артиллерия

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

партии русофобов

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

Литва не преминула воспользоваться "уязвимостью" Украины с пользой для себя

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, greedy

Целью Вильнюса было стать "звездой" если не всей европейской политики, то уж восточного фланга — точно

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instigator, instrumentalized quotation marks, greedy

поехал следить за "рукой Кремля" лично

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, instrumentalized quotation marks, metaphor

трогательно раздавал протестующим шерстяные варежки, которые "согреют не только руки, но и сердца украинцев", и "общался" с представителями оппозиции

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, instrumentalized quotation marks

сладко пел литовский министр

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

благодушные рассказы про "теплые варежки" сменились кое-чем погорячее

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instigator, belittling lexical choices, conversational tone, instrumentalized quotation marks, metaphor

стеснение у официального Вильнюса пропало в принцип

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone

пламенное послание

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor, sarcasm/mocking, behaviour attribution

незаконно назначенному спикеру Верховной рады Александру Турчинову

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism

После этого призывы мирно решить конфликт трансформировались в предложения спонсировать Украину не только деньгами, но и оружием

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instigator, escalation

так называемая "военная агрессия" России

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

Как видим, свежих идей у литовских политиков так и не появилось.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, belittling lexical choices, incapable institutions, sarcasm/mocking

Про саму Литву после распада СССР мало кто вспоминал

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

Теперь Украина стараниями Литвы и других западных стран лежит в руинах

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism, blame dodging

ну а литовские политики продолжают рассказы о "демократии" и "России-агрессоре", а попутно поставляют киевскому режиму летальные вооружения, которые губят украинцев

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation, government vs people, instrumentalized quotation marks, blame dodging, instigator

ирония для Вильнюса заключается в том, что если Украину и удалось "оторвать" от России, то Россию от мира оторвать точно не удалось

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

предупредил литовский оппозиционный политик Альгирдас Палецкис после начала СВО

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution, intertextuality

ильнюс так и не нашел замену КНР и не смог компенсировать убытки бизнесу

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

балтийская республика прыгает в последний поезд, пытаясь спасти экономику от рецессии

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, belittling lexical choices, metaphor

Такой печальной новостью

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, belittling lexical choices

с Тайванем у Литвы вообще в последнее время не ладится, несмотря на огромные надежды, которые Вильнюс связывал с этой территорией

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices, conversational tone, incapable institutions

балтийская республика нажила себе серьезных проблем с Китаем

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instigator, fearmongering, exploiting internal conflicts

литовский бизнес стал жаловаться на "притеснение" со стороны Китая

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

чтобы успокоить панику, официальные власти Литвы неоднократно заявляли, что, дескать, Тайвань сможет решить все экспортные проблемы балтийской республики

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices, government vs people, sarcasm/mocking

Звучали громкие обещания. Мол, Тайвань поделится с Литвой полупроводниками

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, government vs people, incapable institutions

Однако прошло почти три года – а воз и ныне там.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, intertextuality

Тайваньские чиновники на это покивали головами, что, видимо, литовская сторона и сочла за проявленный интерес

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions, sarcasm/mocking, metaphor

на которые так надеялись в Министерстве экономики

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

в Литве стали задумываться, стоило ли ругаться с Китаем

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conspiracy

Тайвань бросил балтийскую республику у разбитого корыта

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, metaphor, incapable institutions

Это противоречит всем действиям литовских властей с моменты открытия посольства Тайваня. Три года ушло у властей Литвы, чтобы вернуться к реальности.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

Уже можно заключить, что стратегия Литвы в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе, включающая отношения с Тайванем, не оправдалась.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

если бы власти Литвы думали головой прежде, чем идти с кем-либо на конфликт

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions, belittling lexical choices

надеется на разумность главы МИД Литвы не стоит.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, incapable institutions

Литовские правящие не знают, что такое ценностно ориентированная политика и действуют исключительно в своих интересах, не оглядываясь на ущерб, который они нанесут своей же стране

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people, greedy

Рамунас Карбаускис

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts, conspiracy

очевидно, что Литва поменяла курс на Тайвань в пользу Китая из-за рухнувших ожиданий.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conspiracy, unstable, volatile

из-за продолжительной торговой войны с партнером-гигантом экономике балтийской республике может грозить рецессия.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: poor

внешнеполитическим курсом балтийской республики правят истерики, а не здравый смысл

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

Любопытно, что теперь Литве нисколько не мешает стратегическое партнерство Китая с Россией. А ведь КНР наравне с Москвой фигурировал в отчетах ДГБ о "страшной" и "опасной" угрозе. Как же так?

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, unstable, volatile

Ответ прост: там, где пахнет деньгами, - каждый сам за себя. А за конфликт с Китаем Литве попросту никто не доплачивает.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: greedy, conversational tone

страны Балтии резко ужесточили свою антироссийскую риторику, а также стали активнее поддерживать действия НАТО и оказывать помощь киевскому режиму

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instigator, antirussian/russophobic, kyiv regime

страны НАТО "играют с огнем", поставляя оружие на Украину.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation, instigator

Видимо, проверять их будут на лояльность России и лично ее президенту

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, sarcasm/mocking

раздавал

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

Как утверждали заявители, в ходе подготовки документа, а также после его подписания на счет фонда Адамкуса за несколько раз была переведена поддержка на сумму 400 тысяч литов (около 140 тысяч евро).

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conspiracy

Валентинас Мазуронис.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: intertextuality

МВД Литвы развернуло "охоту на ведьм"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

вызовут на "душевную беседу" в Департамент государственной безопасности (ДГБ) и МВД

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic, metaphor, sarcasm/mocking

Получается, что любое слово против Литвы, ЕС и НАТО стоит расценивать как "угрозу национальной безопасности"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: blame dodging, irrational war hysteria

такого лидера, как Владимир Владимирович Путин, который служит своему Отечеству, верен своему долгу", — ответила Илзе Лиепа

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: intertextuality

Шимоните должна была с грустью признать

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

800 "исключительных" граждан

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks, antirussian/russophobic

"чистоту помыслов" "коренных" литовцев

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks, antirussian/russophobic

Ну а по результатам этих проверок почему бы не построить резервации для неблагонадежных литовцев?

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic, fearmongering, conspiracy

Опыт с организацией гетто и концлагерей во времена фашистской оккупации в годы Второй мировой войны у литовцев имеется.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic, sarcasm/mocking, nazism

Евросоюз, США и их сателлиты, голосуют против

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: nazism

Евросоюз всегда вел долгие вязкие переговоры — они давали множество поправок, которые затрудняли принятие текста

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

стеснялись (раньше. — Sputnik) проголосовать против и воздерживались. Потому что они прекрасно понимали, что в их числе теперь есть государства, где проходят марши известных неонацистов

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: nazism

страны ЕС "ничего с этим не делали, они никак на это не реагировали"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: nazism

Они пытались всячески эту резолюцию утопить и противодействовать ей. Теперь они стали делать это открыто — маски сброшены

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: nazism

страны Балтии находятся в состоянии "националистического аффекта", который только подогревается снисхождением со стороны ЕС и международных правозащитных институтов

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

Литва и остальные страны Балтии грубым образом нарушают свои обязательства перед ОБСЕ в гуманитарной области

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: blame dodging, criminal, antirussian/russophobic

пассажиры столкнулись с "настоящим допросом с пристрастием". Кроме того, некоторые люди и вовсе были сняты с рейса из-за "неправильных" ответов на вопросы таможенников по политике и географии

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

дискриминационное отношение Вильнюса к гражданам России и Белоруссии

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

еще одним примером грубых нарушений со стороны Литвы является миграционная политика

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic, blame dodging, criminal

уже долгое время "является предметом озабоченности правозащитных неправительственных структур и гражданских активистов"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: blame dodging, criminal

все эти примеры свидетельствуют о грубом нарушении тремя странами Балтии своих обязательств перед ОБСЕ "в области человеческого измерения"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: criminal

"цивилизованные" в ОБСЕ и Совете Европы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, instrumentalized quotation marks

не увидят ничего предосудительного в действиях Литвы, в также "не заметят унижения человеческого достоинства, издевательства над здравым смыслом"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: criminal

"жителей прекрасного сада"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: eu as paradise, sarcasm/mocking, instrumentalized quotation marks

власти Литвы еще сильнее ужесточили антироссийскую риторику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

"российской угрозе"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

"укрепления" восточного фланга

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

"угрозу безопасности"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

Вильнюс еще сильнее ужесточил антироссийскую риторику

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: antirussian/russophobic

под предлогом российской "агрессии" требуют у США и Североатлантического альянса укрепить "защиту" восточного фланга

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices, behaviour attribution, prescriptive stance over the west, instrumentalized quotation marks

В РФ многократно отмечали, что Москва не планирует ни на кого нападать

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: blame dodging

поведение НАТО является провокационным и враждебным

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

альянс неслучайно усиливается у российских границ

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation

Всего года три назад литовские власти активно приветствовали белорусов в своей стране

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

прежде желанные гости стали считаться чуть ли не "угрозой нацбезопасности"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, unstable, volatile, belittling lexical choices

западные лидеры закрывали на это глаза

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

некоторые даже с удовольствием подыгрывали белорусским оппозиционерам

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, unstable, volatile

так называемой премии Свободы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

известные кровавыми преступлениями в годы войны "лесные братья"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: history revisionism

литовских властей, давно взявших курс на переписывание истории

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

политизированные решения литовской элиты

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

заманивала

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

шло белорусам навстречу

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

"авторитарного государства"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

Литва всячески стремилась сманить

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

Вплотную занявшись проблемами "беглых" белорусов, литовское руководство совершенно отвлеклось от проблем своих граждан

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people, instrumentalized quotation marks

Председатель Конфедерации профсоюзов Литвы (LPSK) Инга Ругинене не раз осуждала литовские власти за то, что оставляют сотни людей "на обочине общества".

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: intertextuality, government vs people

При этом средства и силы на то, чтобы облегчить переезд сотрудникам белорусских компаний и их семьям в Литву, всегда находились

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people, sarcasm/mocking

Первый "звоночек" лицемерия

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

Ситуация возникла печальная: работники остались без зарплаты, многие лишились единственного источника дохода. Власти Литвы даже не остановило то, что санаторий — один из крупнейших налогоплательщиков Друскининкая

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

пытались привлечь внимание к возникшей проблеме и выходили на акции протеста и митинги. Однако тщетно.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: government vs people

Принимать в страну высококвалифицированных специалистов IT-сектора и бизнес-компании власти Литвы были готовы, а способствовать лечению белорусских детей — нет.

Ведь за это ЕС не выдает балтийской республике гранты.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: greedy

Позабылись громкие лозунги о дружбе народов и взаимопомощи.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: unstable, volatile, sarcasm/mocking

которая поначалу казалась столь дружелюбной к "беглым" белорусам

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, unstable, volatile

как только политическая ситуация изменилась, изменилось и отношение властей Литвы к бывшим друзьям

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: greedy, unstable, volatile

Сперва предложения об унификации санкций против россиян и белорусов звучали не очень уверенно, однако теперь дошло даже до громких заявлений об "угрозе"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks, irrational war hysteria

юбопытно, что дискуссии об унификации санкций для граждан РФ и Белоруссии вызвали волну возмущения как раз среди тех белорусов, кто прибыл в Литву после президентских выборов в 2020 году

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

и вовсе могут представлять "национальную угрозу"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks, belittling lexical choices

Как будто это не власти Литвы обещали соседям золотые горы, чтобы завлечь их в свою страну

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor, unstable, volatile

Литва все еще пытается играть на русофобии, чтобы выбить средства из еврофондов, а заодно использует украинских беженцев, чтобы получить хоть какое-то финансирование. За белорусов больше не платят.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: unstable, volatile, sarcasm/mocking, greedy, antirussian/russophobic

В балтийской республике граждан Белоруссии все активнее пытаются поделить на "правильных" и "неправильных"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks

выдавят назад в Белоруссию

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

польско-литовско-украинском проекте Речи Посполитой 2.0

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instigator

"от можа Балтийского до можа Черного"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: sarcasm/mocking, intertextuality

Вильнюс в это время стал все активнее заигрывать с Германией, от которой поляки требуют многомиллиардных репараций еще за годы Второй мировой войны. И вот литовцы просят почему-то немцев, а не соседей-поляков разместить в балтийской республике на постоянной основе пятитысячную бригаду бундесвера.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: exploiting internal conflicts

решили поставить на место распоясавшихся гостей давно испытанным методом — объявить всех белорусов в Литве "угрозой национальной безопасности"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: instrumentalized quotation marks, metaphor, irrational war hysteria

правящая элита

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

эмигрантов профильтруют на предмет полезности их для Литвы

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: greedy

Видимо, если есть деньги и доходная белорусская компания, обосновавшаяся в Литве и отчисляющая в литовский бюджет налоги, этим гражданам Белоруссии вид на жительство можно и продлить

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, greedy

А если средств и бизнеса не имеется — возвращайтесь на родину и там разжигайте Майдан против Лукашенко.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational structure, imperative, conversational tone

Нечего сидеть на литовских харчах в европейском райском саду!

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: conversational tone, conversational structure, imperative, sarcasm/mocking, eu as paradise, belittling lexical choices

наиболее бедные государства ЕС во главе с Литвой

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: poor

Автор просит прощения за столь циничное сравнение. Но ничего другого не приходит на ум при наблюдении, как из вашингтонского обкома своим прибалтийским вассалам посылают циркуляры на убийство европейских государств-кормильцев. Для этой миссии американских "капо" и заслали в европейский райский сад 20 лет назад.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: eu as paradise, conversational structure, imperative

А сегодня на шею заплывшим жирком бюргерам и рантье собираются посадить еще одного дармоеда — Киев.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor

богатый от яств общеевропейский

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: eu as paradise

Мол, заходите, украинцы родные, садитесь и уплетайте за обе щеки немецкие сосиски и запивайте их французским вином. А вот тут, в уголке стола, попробуйте наши скромные цеппелины со шкварками.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: poor, conversational structure, imperative, sarcasm/mocking

громче всех кричит

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution

Кто требует снять с себя и отдать украинцам "последние штаны"

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: metaphor, sarcasm/mocking

придумывает самые абсурдные санкции

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: incapable institutions

провоцирует Россию на реакцию закрытием границ и циничным издевательством над русскоязычным меньшинством

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: escalation, antirussian/russophobic

Кто в истеричном угаре разрушает памятники советским воинам

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: irrational war hysteria

прибалты

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices

расширить свой отряд вандалов

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: criminal

Примечательно, что среди "заукраинцев" в основном экономические лузеры или максимум середнячки ЕС

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: poor

нищая Литва

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: belittling lexical choices, poor

этим самовлюбленно пользуются три прибалтийских государства — Литва, Латвия и Эстония. Но об это же европейский крейсер может и разбиться

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: behaviour attribution, metaphor

Но в таком случае нужно будет основательно переписать Конституцию ЕС и, возможно, хотя бы на мгновение... распустить Евросоюз. И не факт, что к новому общеевропейскому договору вновь присоединятся все нынешние члены ЕС.

Document: corpus (_lithuania_ main actor articles).docx Tags: fearmongering