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This paper investigates revenge through the interplay of plasticity and imagination. Drawing on C. Malabou's theory, plasticity encapsulates the capacity to receive and bestow form, emphasizing the dual forces of creation and destruction in transformation. This suggests that revenge, often seen as a fixation on the past, can be countered by Nietzsche's concept of active forgetting as a strategy to break cycles of repetition. As a result, Malabou's plasticity aligns with G. Simondon's idea of imagination's transitional potential, challenging postmodern skepticism about facts by viewing their ontology through imagination's transformative work. To explore these considerations, I juxtapose John Wojtowicz's bank robbery and its cinematic adaptation, *Dog Day Afternoon*, with Vladimir Putin's historical manipulations, framing both as efforts to reconstitute true events. This study examines how cultural industries and historical manipulations trap narratives in cycles of schematism. Additionally, I propose my sound work, blending historiography and autobiography to uncover overlooked aspects of history, such as the role of women. Finally, the investigation of revenge through plasticity and imagination, along with the exemplary studies, suggests that imagination can serve as a tool for justice, moving beyond revenge toward creative transformation.

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## Introduction

The concept of revenge is rarely explored in relation to anthropological essence. In this text, I propose an investigation into the conceptual interplay among revenge, plasticity, and imagination. Defined as the capacity to both receive and bestow form, plasticity, as theorized by Catherine Malabou, underscores the dual forces of creation and destruction that drive transformation. This triple meaning invites us to consider revenge as a rigid fixation on the past and, conversely, to employ Friedrich Nietzsche's proposal of active forgetting as an emancipatory strategy for transcending cycles of repetition. As a result, Malabou's plasticity can be aligned with the transitional potential of imagination (as theorized by Simondon). I argue that while the postmodern skepticism regarding the existence of facts must be confronted, the ontology of facts should be understood through the diligent and transformative work of imagination.

To explore these ideas, I turn to Pierre Huyghe's *The Third Memory*, a dual-channel installation that revisits the story of John Wojtowicz. His bank robbery and its subsequent cinematic adaptation (*Dog Day Afternoon*) serve as a lens through which to examine the problematic status of the original version of the story. By analyzing Wojtowicz's reenactment of his "true" narrative, I aim to interrogate the void of origin—a condition both produced and augmented by the state of entrapment within cycles of schematism engendered by cultural industries. In this context, I juxtapose Vladimir Putin's project of historical manipulation with Wojtowicz's efforts to resist the cinematographic distortion of truth, framing both as operating within the same drive to reconstitute "real events". Although primordial indeterminateness remains unavoidable, the status of "true facts" is problematized here through the relational structure of justice.

In this light, Malabou's project of plasticity may be seen as a guiding idea that resists both revisionist and reconstitutional intentions regarding the past. As a case analysis, I detail the process of creating the sound work I was invited to produce for the recently restored and reopened Sapieha Palace. In *Radio Vilnius's* show *Feast (Puota)*, I investigate the palace's history by staging a meta-narrative that intertwines historiography and personal autobiography. I propose this approach as a next step in the cycle of interplay between memory and imagination stages, as a paraphrastic extension of Pierre Huyghe's work. I view it as "the fourth memory" — a work that exemplifies a strategy aimed not at restoring the past, but at revealing what was never part of the story, such as the role of women in history.

## Facts and Representations Revisited

In 1975, Wojtowicz, an inmate at Pennsylvania's Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary serving a sentence for bank robbery, wrote a letter to *The New York Times* and expressed his frustration with the recently released film *Dog Day Afternoon*. The story, which had initially drawn significant media attention, was adapted into a film starring Al Pacino, whose performance in the lead role received widespread acclaim. The movie won an Oscar for Best Original Screenplay and presented its protagonist as a

symbol of anti-establishment defiance. However, the prototype hero of this narrative, i.e. Wojtowicz himself, challenged the verisimilitude of this cinematographic interpretation. In his letter, he addressed what he saw as significant inaccuracies in Sidney Lumet's Hollywood adaptation compared to the real events.

My feelings over all on the movie were that it was a good comedy, but I did not think it was funny because it was about me and my loved ones. I felt the movie was in essence a piece of garbage. It did not show the whole truth, and the little it did show was constantly twisted and distorted. So it left you, the viewer with so many unanswered questions. (Wojtowicz 1977)

Wojtowicz further noted that the film failed to adequately portray the events as they occurred, pointing out shortcomings evident in numerous scenes throughout the production. Despite its claim to be based on a true incident that «occurred in Brooklyn, N.Y. on 8/22/72», he estimated that the film is «only 30% true» (Wojtowicz 1977). According to Wojtowicz, the Hollywood production completely ignored both the true motives behind the event and the far less light-hearted circumstances surrounding it. The real story, he argued, was much more complex than the film's frivolous narrative suggested.

The so-called "factual reality" of Wojtowicz's 1972 bank robbery remains ambiguous. Wojtowicz (1977) claimed his motive was funding his partner Liz Eden's gender-affirming surgery, while Bell (1972) suggested Mafia involvement and robbery proceeds for the Gambino family. Wojtowicz also criticized *Dog Day Afternoon* for misrepresenting key events, including the FBI's killing of his partner, Sal Naturale, and falsely portraying him as betraying Sal. Other inaccuracies included exaggerating a fleeing accomplice and fabricating a scene where he spoke with his mother outside the bank (Wojtowicz 1977).

This argumentation did not persuade William H. Honan, the Arts and Leisure editor at *The New York Times*, who declined to publish Wojtowicz's submission, stating that he was not able to «come to grips with the motives for your crime, and the complex relationship between art and reality in this instance» (Wojtowicz 1977).

By interrogating the whole range of biases, recent developments in this problematic may be considered in light of the so-called polemics on post-truth politics (Kalpokas 2018) – often regarded as a direct legacy of postmodern philosophy (D'Ancona 2017). Particular emphasis is placed on Lyotard's (1984) invitation to liberate thought from metanarratives, as well as Baudrillard's (2001) introduction of the concepts of simulacrum and hyperreality – ideas that disqualified originality as the source of reality.

The question here also implies the inaccessible neutrality of the origin, as articulated in the polemical encounter between David Bordwell and Slavoj Žižek. The former, an American film theorist, proposed a schema of three narrative layers in film: the story, the plot, and the narration. This idea, rooted in Russian formalism, invited to conceive of the story as the moment of origin – a chronological sequence of events. The plot, in contrast, is understood as the selection and arrangement of these events, while the narration may be described through poetic expression (Bordwell 2008, 85-134).

However, Žižek criticized Bordwell's three-dimensional model, arguing that the initial assumptions shape the perspective that organizes the plot. These assumptions not only determine the main elements of the narration but also reveal the most significant – albeit often unspoken – implications, such as the interests, goals, and identities of the authors themselves. According to Žižek (2009, 16n13), strictly speaking, there is no story that precedes the plot: «every story is already a “plot”; it involves a minimum of narrative organization, so the distinction between story and plot is internal to the plot “story”».

One could draw a parallel here, observing how the organization of historical narrative often hinges on the manipulation of origin mythology. Prior to launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin published a pseudo-academic essay titled *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians*. This text, grounded in the deliberate falsification of facts (Wilson 2021), targets the complexity of the very moment of beginning, reframing it as a narrative of unity between nations. As has been noted, [1] this attempt imposes an anachronistic projection of identities, recasting imperial and colonial practices into a supposed longing for organic kinship. One must not forget, following the insights of Cornelius Castoriadis (1997, 305), that radical imagining, which lies at the core of every social-historical institution, is always an act of creation *ex nihilo*. Presenting himself as a historian-philosopher, Putin sought to “hijack” the moment of institutional genesis, exploiting the “fundamental void” to justify imperial aggression as restoring historical facticity.

[1] For instance, Timothy Snyder's (2022) irony: «So I could say: Rus' was founded by Vikings, Moscow did not exist at the time, Kyiv was not ruled from Moscow until late in its history, the story of the brotherly nations is recent, as for that matter is national identity in the modern sense. But you can't really engage in historical argument with people who are set on believing a myth, let alone with presidents who believe that the past is just there to confirm their present prejudices».

Putin's essay can be viewed as an attempt to override the complexity of the origin by offering a logic of causality, instituted post-factum. In this sense, the production and control of historical narratives can become a powerful tool of imperial ideology. In this framework, the principle of coexistence – the cornerstone of social organization – is subordinated to succession, the foundational schema of history (Castoriadis 1987, 184). By contrast, as theorized by Castoriadis, the meaning of history emerges not as a mere sequence of fixed, predetermined events but as «the emergence of radical otherness, immanent creation, and non-trivial novelty» (1987, 184). This perspective allows for the existence of history as a whole, the rise of novel societal forms, and the ongoing transformation of societies. It also presupposes the right of self-determination as project of open identity.

### The Third Memory

At this point, it becomes evident that the complex relationship between facts and representations is deeply rooted in the organization of temporality (Castoriadis 1987, 186-187). Confronting time requires establishing criteria for the order of events, introducing selectivity and raising questions of justice. To do justice to stories, even fictional ones, requires recognizing their relationality to truth. Fiction operates through inclusion, exclusion, revelation, and concealment, emphasizing the need for careful reflection on the conditions and frameworks shaping narrative strategies.

The elements of narrativity – even in historical accounts – are fundamentally relational, connecting both to otherness and the self. As Ricoeur encapsulates in *Time and Narrative*: «fiction gives eyes to the horrified narrator. Eyes to see and to weep» (Ricoeur 1990, 187). Accordingly, narrative imagination has an ethical dimension, recognizing the distance between self and otherness while aiming to place them in carefully considered relationalities. Its purpose is the ethical recalibration of the stories told, which carry a threefold meaning: 1) testimonial capacity: the ability to give voice to an untold or suppressed past; 2) analogizing capacity: the power to make present those who are absent, bridging the gap between temporal and spatial distances; 3) utopian possibilities: the projection of futures with the promise of justice (Kearney 1995, 98).

Despite their opposing intentions, both Putin’s historical manipulation and Wojtowicz’s resistance to cinematographic distortion operate within the same drive for “real events” – the original story. This is why the problem of justice remains as an inextricable element of storytelling strategies. In Honan’s response to Wojtowicz, the domain of art was granted the license to reinterpret and modify elements of reality through creative expression. Yet this raises several questions: what are the ethical limits and obligations of this tendency to exploit *licentia poetica*?

As a way to reconsider the problem of the justice of representation, Pierre Huyghe revisited this story by offering John Wojtowicz an opportunity that had not been provided by *The New York Times*. In 1999, several decades later, Huyghe orchestrated the creation of a work entitled *The Third Memory*. [2] The artist recreated the film’s set and invited Wojtowicz to reenact what he considered the true version of the robbery. This chance for repetition enticed the former convict to finally reveal what, in his view, truly happened on that day in August 1972.

[2] see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UpVoKZeydCg>

However, the dual-channel installation reveals that Wojtowicz’s memory had merged the unique events of 1972 with the reality of the 1975 film, making it impossible to disentangle the threads of the original from those of the cinematographic interpretation. This blending becomes evident in the work itself: while attempting to reconstruct “the real events”, Wojtowicz gradually began to mimic Al Pacino’s behavioral patterns, replicate the actor’s lines, and imitate the intersubjective relationships depicted in the film’s narrative. Moreover, in telling his story in front of cameras, Wojtowicz confessed that just before the robbery, he and his partners had watched Francis Ford Coppola’s *The Godfather*, seeking for some sort of inspiration.

It is noteworthy to recall that fundamental social and, at the same time, technological intertwining between memory and imagination became pivotal in the context of Critical Theory, revisiting creative powers of imagination, as formulated in Immanuel Kant’s theory transcendental of schematism. Schemata, Kant argues, mediate between the sensible and intellectual realms. Crucially, their defining feature lies in their detachment from empirical content. Kant (2009, B177) describes this mediating representation as one that must be both pure – free from empirical influence – and simultaneously intellectual and sensible in nature, encapsulating the essence of the transcendental schema.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes schematism as a «hidden art» Kant (2009, B180-181, A141) within the depths of the human soul, whose operations are difficult to unveil. Hence, schemata do not coincide with determined images; they function as a rule-making process that enables the existence of images in the first place. Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) reframe this mystery in the context of the culture industry, where individual creativity is subsumed by mass production. They argue that the relationship between the images generated by cultural media and the schemata of understanding has become reciprocal and toxic: each reinforces the other.

Huyghe's collaboration with Wojtowicz may be situated exactly at the core of this circularity. As researcher Nicole Crescenzi (2017) observes, *The Third Memory* gradually uncovers the fact that «the relationship between life and its representation is not a separate one». This is how «individual histories confront idiosyncratic image-forms creating an amplification of reality» (Crescenzi 2017). This dynamic is evident when Wojtowicz reveals that the FBI was ordered to kill him to prevent coverage of the “gay bank-robber” disrupting President Nixon's speech. Here, image clashes with image, underscoring how the tangled relationships between reality and its representation find expression through the medium of broadcast (Crescenzi 2017).

*The Third Memory* also uncovers its triadic nature in connection with Bernard Stiegler's concept of inverted tertiaryity. We typically assume that perceptual experience of facts is primary, memory secondary, and imagination third in this cognitive and ontological hierarchy. However, Stiegler (2001) challenges this order by asserting that what is third actually comes first. In *Technics and Time*, he famously reframed the problem of transcendental imagination in technical terms, introducing the concept of tertiary retentions – external memory and mnemonic objects. Unlike Husserl's primary and secondary retentions, tertiary retentions are not rooted in inner experience but take on a material form through technical devices within a temporal framework.

Thus, by taking over the imagination, tertiary retentions sustain the perpetual present on the screen. The expansion of memory, imagination, and information industries results in a profound effect of disconnection and detachment: it creates vast memory voids, severs ties to the past, fosters alienation from the world, and immerses individuals in an excess of information that obliterates the horizons of expectation necessary for sustaining desire (Stiegler 2001, 119).

### Justice and Revenge

In several of her texts, Catherine Malabou examines the problem of repetition and justice in relation to the concept of revenge. Observing that «the human is a being who cannot forget offense» (Malabou 2018, 2), she characterizes our species by its inability to erase the past and its fixation on past forms. Conversely, plasticity refers to the dual capacity to both receive and bestow form. As Malabou notes, «plasticity directly contradicts rigidity. It is its exact antonym. In ordinary speech, it designates suppleness, a faculty for adaptation, the ability to evolve» (2008, 5). At the same time, Malabou highlights the destructive dimension of plasticity by pointing to the specific French meaning of the term, emphasizing its

explosive potential. Plasticity, she argues (Malabou 2008, 5), is plastically explosive. As a commentator (Šerpytytė 2015, 167) aptly noted, plasticity «inhabits philosophy precisely as the annihilating power of form».

Interestingly, for Malabou (2011), the concept of form opens the path to thinking about both determination and indeterminacy – essentially, the idea of change in its various modalities. She argues that plasticity can be understood «as a general principle of change», emphasizing that this concept operates «within this movement», functioning both «as a whole and as its parts» (Malabou, Sabolius 2020). Unlike the criticism found in Derrida, who viewed the concepts of *eidos* or *morphè* as perpetually trapped within metaphysics, or in Gilbert Simondon, who sought to reject hylomorphic ontology altogether, Malabou highlights the emancipatory potential of the idea of form: «what saves Kant from being totalitarian, is namely his notion of form. Because a form can always be transformed» (Malabou, Sabolius 2020, 37).

It is exactly the third meaning of plasticity – its destructive potential which designates the problematic domain of novelty – that enables to juxtapose plasticity and revenge. Although the traces of the past remain, they are often unrecognizable in the new form they take. «Revenge, on the contrary, implies rigidity, incapacity to change, and attachment to sameness» (Malabou 2018, 3). In this light, Malabou questions how repetition – which is fundamentally nonplastic, mechanical, and iterative – could be reconciled with the transformative potential of plasticity. «If plasticity implies explosion and forgetfulness, can it be linked with repetition?» (Malabou 2018, 3). Or, otherwise put, how can justice be freed from the fantasies of vengeance?

One might recall that, in response to the restitutorial intentions of juridical thought, Jacques Derrida speaks of justice beyond the law and emphasizes the fundamental asynchronicity of justice. The law, grounded in calculable retribution, cannot achieve justice. It offers only a quantifiable approximation, transforming revenge into mathematical terms and anchoring an irreparable past in measurable balances. True justice remains impossible, as the present cannot heal the past's wounds. Instead, justice can only exist as a promise – a perpetual return, like a phantom of the past (Derrida 1992, 24).

The imagination beyond revenge urges us to move past the drive for repetition grounded in the mathematical restitution of a factual origin. Accordingly, Heidegger (1985, 169) explored justice beyond calculation in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, reinterpreting the Greek goddess Dike. Paul Ricoeur (2008), reflecting on John Rawls' model of social distribution, suggested that the impossibility of justice might be understood in relation to love. Quentin Meillassoux (2008) describes the spectral dilemma as an aporetic tension between atheism and religion, highlighting the absurdity of life without god and a god who justifies inaction in the face of extreme evil as love.

### Designed by Repetition, Open to Active Forgetting

Research in magnetic resonance imaging has revealed that dopamine is released merely by the thought of revenge (Chester, DeWall 2015). Taking revenge, therefore, brings humans a sense of pleasure. Malabou reminds

us that Nietzsche, in his project of the *Übermensch*, linked this figure's emergence, among other things, to the renunciation of revenge:

This reconsidering of revenge at the centre of the human has to do something important with the concept of plasticity. What I have in mind here is the idea of substitution or replacement. Of course, thinking on the overman, superhuman and figures like that, brings in the idea of substitution. Namely, who will replace the human, who will come next? (Malabou, Sabolius 2020, 34)

In this sense, the underpinnings of the posthuman framework – or at least the aspiration to overcome the human – would begin with curbing the anthropological impulse for retribution. As Zarathustra eloquently declares: «for that mankind be redeemed from revenge: that to me is the bridge to the highest hope and a rainbow after long thunderstorms» (Nietzsche 2006, 77).

Nietzsche compares those consumed by the desire for revenge to tarantulas. However, as Malabou observes, revenge, for Nietzsche, is an exclusively human pursuit. It differs fundamentally from the punishments of divine transcendence or the horrors and cruelties observed in certain animals. Biologically speaking, tarantulas do not take revenge; they hunt or act defensively to deter threats. While such behavior might be linked to revenge in evolutionary biology, Nietzsche identifies a uniquely different dynamic in humans – rooted in the complex relationship between memory and the excessive exploitation of imagination.

Malabou (2015, 66) argues that humans are the only beings to take revenge for being offended. Drawing on Nietzsche through Heidegger's interpretation, she locates the origins of revenge in our relationship with time: «the human is the only being for whom time *is a spiritual injury*. There is in fact one single thing we are trying to get revenge from: the passage of time. Time is the utmost injury» (Malabou 2015, 67). The anthropomorphic form of revenge embodies the almost infantile offense humanity suffers in confronting its own finitude. We cannot accept the past as a sign of our mortality.

Revenge, as a culturally elevated and sophisticated response to the past, is what defines the human condition. Humans cannot help but take revenge because they seek to reclaim the lost events of the past. This compulsion drives the creation of laws, the writing of history, and the maintenance of cultural memory. Justice, institutionalized and rationalized, becomes a de-individualized form of revenge. Yet, as Malabou (2015, 69) points out, it remains revenge at its core, perhaps even its highest realization: «Nietzsche explains that law and the juridical concept of justice are just repetitions of revenge, a more subtle and refined spirit of revenge». Humans are both unforgetting and unforgiving animals, deriving a peculiar pleasure from the past, especially its bitterness. As Zarathustra declares: «we want to exact revenge and heap insult on all whose equals we are not – thus vow the tarantula hearts» (Nietzsche 2006, 77). Malabou emphasizes that this intricate engineering of revenge reveals the unique relationship humans have with repetition. «[T]he human does not exist prior to repetition, but is designed by it. The human is the product, not the origin, of repetition» (Malabou, 2018). Does this not imply that we are fundamentally subordinated to the culture of revenge, perpetually reliant on vindictive forms?

In this regard, Malabou highlights that Nietzsche's reflections invite a reexamination of memory itself – an active gesture aimed at redefining the contours of our mental life. «Revenge means the incapacity to forget. It is precisely the opposite of “active forgetting”. The human is the kind of being who cannot forget the offense, who cannot erase the past and constantly repeats, ruminates, chews over. This incapacity to put an end to the past would be precisely the end of man, its essence» (Malabou 2015, 67).

But what exactly is this state of *Aktive Vergessenheit*? In *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche (1989, 57) offers an important passage that illuminates the creative and transformative potential of these processes:

Forgetting is no mere *vis inertiae* as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression, that is responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one might call the process “inpsychation”) as does the thousandfold process, involved in physical nourishment-so-called “incorporation”.

Active forgetfulness requires creative imagination to break free from the vicious cycle of fixed patterns of repetition. Haunting memories are neither to be passively accepted nor entirely erased by new experiences. It is a strategy of remembering that relies on selective incorporation, laying the groundwork for novelty. One must remember in order to choose what to forget. By fulfilling a therapeutic function, *Aktive Vergessenheit* is not merely a prerequisite for happiness and joy; it is, above all, an active reimagining of a new beginning. As Nietzsche writes: «innocence is the child and forgetting, a beginning anew, a play, a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yea-saying» (2005, 24). A revengeful human, chained to the past, cannot be a playful creator.

139

## The Fourth Memory

In 2024, the restored Baroque Sapieha Palace reopened in Vilnius. Built between 1689 and 1692, the palace was commissioned by the Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Kazimierz Jan Sapieha, and designed by Giovanni Battista Frediani. Political intrigues repeatedly disrupted both its construction and functioning (Jamski 2005, 73). During periods of war and conflict, the palace suffered destruction, reforms, and the loss or transformation of artifacts and architectural elements. For instance, after the Battle of Valkininkai, noblemen who stormed the palace chopped its paintings – particularly portraits of Sapieha family ancestors – into tiny pieces (Janonienė 2007-2008). In 1829, during the Russian Empire's occupation, the governor-general repurposed the palace and its surrounding grounds as a military hospital (Racevičienė 1975, 52). Unlike Trakai Castle or Gediminas Tower, this ambitious project – intended to symbolize royal tradition like Versailles in France – lacks a clear place in Lithuania's collective imaginary today.

There are essentially no reliable sources that can connect the reconstruction project to a coherent historical narrative. Since the palace never fully realized its potential, it is unclear which part of “the original story” should serve as its foundational narrative. This ambiguity becomes apparent in the most intriguing and lesser-known details, which are listed

in inventories compiled during changes in ownership (Purlys, Janonienė 2009; Purlys 2010). These inventories document objects, furnishings, and architectural elements in a descriptive tone, presenting a pseudo-neutral narrative about their functions. However, this falters when unclear functionalities turn the listing into subjective assessment. For instance, a 1795 inventory includes entries such as «one old wardrobe», «two old tin lanterns without glass», and «one lacquered but worthless cabinet», alongside «fourteen glass trays *for entertainment*» and the enigmatic object described as «one (?) – no. 1» (Purlys, Janonienė 2009). Thus, even narratives shaped closer to the palace's origins reveal it as a site of identity ruptures.

Today, the Contemporary Art Centre (CAC) in Vilnius has taken on the responsibility of shaping a new vision for Sapieha Palace. I was invited by CAC curator Asta Vaičiulytė to create a sound work that would engage with the palace's history. In this process, I deliberately chose to intertwine and juxtapose my autobiographical narrative with historiography – as if this piece could be titled, in the manner of Pierre Huyghe, “the fourth memory”. This strategy involved a careful analysis and selection of accessible factual material concerning both Sapieha Palace and my own past. In both cases, we encounter a “second memory” intruding: unclear and fragmented historiographic traces of the palace, questionable authorship comments, or a fictional story shaped, as my autoanalysis reveals, by various literary colonial influences – Western and Russian.

Exploring the relationship between geography and history, I discovered that Antakalnis was the setting for my first literary work. In 2003, I published the short story *The Captivity of Sounds* in *Metai* magazine. However, at the very beginning of my literary history, I find a lack of an authentic voice – a self fundamentally colonized, interwoven with the narrative paradigms of Edgar Allan Poe and Fyodor Dostoevsky. The socio-cultural imaginary here does not call for reconstructing origins through repetition – the self-deception of the “third memory” – but for augmenting history: a higher level of fiction where autofiction amplifies, tests, and re-imagines the historical narrative, reshaping the autobiography. I aim to exploit the circular and genetic relation of imaginary interaction, using Simondon's (2022) cyclic genetic imagination as a model to dismantle the schematism of culture industries. [3]

Consequently, this audio work [4] takes the form of a hybrid between fiction and documentality, integrated into regularly broadcasted *Radio Vilnius* show *Feast*, hosted by Deimantė Bulbenkaitė and Audrius Pocius. In this talk show format, the history of Sapieha Palace becomes a staging of my own past, continually leveraging the transitional potential of this format, which merges fiction and documentality, effectively performing the role of a transitional object (Winnicott 2005). [5]

As Wolfgang Iser (1993, 30) noted, works of art may serve this transitional function as they «hover between the real and the imaginary, linking the two together» (Iser 1993, 30). By housing all the processes of interchange, they lack ontological value as discrete entities – their significance emerges

[3] See my analysis of Simondon's theory of imagination in Sabolius 2019.

[4] The sound work, as well as the radio show, is titled *Puota*, a word that signifies both *Feast* and *Symposium* (along the lines of Plato's dialogue). Curator: Asta Vaičiulytė, Concept, script: Kristupas Sabolius, Sound design: Vytas Rasimavičius, Radio hosts: Deimantė Bulbenkaitė and Audrius Pocius. <https://sapiegurumai.lt/en/exhibitions/sound-works-for-the-sapieha-palace/>.

[5] Winnicott (2005) argued that toys and various other items – such as pacifiers, bibs, plush toys, or even body parts – function as semi-fictional, semi-real objects, offering the child a means to accept reality in a less chaotic and frightening manner.

through these “transformational processes” (1993, 30). These processes are inherently open-ended; the cycle of transformation continues indefinitely. Gilbert Simondon refers to the genetic motion of imagination, where the mental image anticipates (1st stage) and perceives (2nd stage) a real encounter with the milieu. Passing through symbolization and recollection (3rd stage), it culminates in invention (4th stage), transforming the real by solving problems through structural change. External invention aligns with the first stage: mental anticipation.

Indebted to the real in a relational manner, the tactic of this audio work employed the movement of imagination as described by Simondon, connecting carefully selected, factually relevant fragments into a joint meta-narrative of autobiography and historiography. However, this process of selection generated a surplus that led to the reorganization of both narratives. While the palace’s name is traditionally associated with a male figure – Kazimierz Jan Sapieha – the central figure in the new narrative becomes Teresa Korvin Gosievska, a previously underrepresented Lithuanian noblewoman and a significant figure in the palace’s history.

*Puota*, as the paraphrastic “fourth memory”, does not seek to restore the past but accepts that the original history contains elements – such as male figures – that should be less remembered, aiming to reveal what is truly forgotten, like the role of women in history. In parallel, this composite narrative becomes a form of self-critical dialectics, highlighting the attempt to decolonize the literary narrative I found myself in. Active forgetting, perhaps, emerges here as a flexible proposal for critical and creative revision, raising the question of what it means to be authentic to one’s own story-telling. In this light, it becomes increasingly clear how both unexperienced and experienced pasts demand not restoration and repetition, but constant reconsideration and reinvention.

141

## Conclusions

As illustrated in Pierre Huyghe’s *The Third Memory*, the human condition is driven by a desire for representation tied to the illusion of repetition and the promise of justice. The screen and information industries, producing tertiary retentions in Stiegler’s sense, immerse us in a perpetual present dominated by images, creating memory voids and reshaping identities. This complicates the notion of “true facts”, disconnecting representations from their original coordinates.

Plasticity, as theorized by Malabou, may be seen a path to transcend rigid cultural patterns and critically engage with repetition in personal and historical narratives. In my analysis that experiments on the possibility of “the fourth memory”, imagination becomes a relational tool for justice, using fiction to move beyond revenge and toward creative transformations. This strategy employs active forgetting – not as resignation but as a deliberate act to transcend restitution and uncover what was truly forgotten, forging new relationships with the past.

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