| Abstract [eng] |
This Master's thesis examines one of the most complex issues in European Union competition law – the classification of agreements restricting competition into those restricting 'by object' and 'by effect' under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Although this distinction is fundamental to the application of the provision, determining the nature of the analysis and the burden of proof, its practical implementation poses continuous challenges and debates. The thesis systematically analyzes the legal basis of this distinction, the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and the assessment criteria applied therein. It is revealed that the requirement established after the landmark Cartes Bancaires case to determine a 'sufficient degree of harm' and to assess the broad legal and economic context, while narrowing the 'by object' category, simultaneously created significant legal uncertainty. The thesis examines in detail the difficulties in applying these criteria as well as the 'reliable experience' criterion, the observed blurring of the lines between 'object' and 'effect' analysis in practice, and the related doctrinal critique and aspects of institutional practice. It also analyzes how this problematic affects the application of related concepts – the Article 101(3) TFEU exception, the de minimis rule, and the doctrine of ancillary restraints. The main conclusions of the thesis indicate that due to methodological difficulties, ambiguity of criteria, and evolving case law, a systemic situation of legal uncertainty exists, hindering the consistent and effective application of Article 101(1) TFEU and reducing predictability for market participants. It is concluded that the initial classification of an agreement has a crucial impact on the course and outcome of the entire competition law infringement investigation, therefore greater clarity in this area is highly needed. |
