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**Tendencies of Epistemic Stancetaking in Facebook and X Posts on Ukrainian
Immigrants: Ukrainian vs American Perspectives**

MA thesis

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Abstract

The thesis focuses on the epistemic stancetaking of American and Ukrainian users on social media on Ukrainian immigrants by analyzing their social media posts. The corpus-based study investigates epistemic stance strategies' use and categorizes the epistemic stance markers in American and Ukrainian social media posts, adapting Marín Arrese's (2011) framework of epistemic stance markers. The study applies a mixed-method approach to reveal how these two national and cultural groups express their epistemic positioning in their posts on Ukrainian immigrants, which is a significant matter due to the migration crisis caused by an increasing number of Ukrainian refugees in host countries. The results have shown that both American and Ukrainian users most frequently employ epistemic modality markers, such as certainty, probability, and possibility markers, as well as communicative evidential markers in their posts to express their epistemic commitment and refer to external sources of information. Both groups proved to include evidential markers to share their beliefs of Ukrainian refugees and concerning them matters influenced by their cultural/societal norms and personal experience. Thus, American and Ukrainian social media users frequently included epistemic stance markers in their posts, affected by their different cultural backgrounds and national identities, adding to the ongoing discussion on Ukrainian immigrants and participating in shaping the public perception.

Key words: *stance, epistemic stance, epistemic stancetaking strategies, migration discourse, social media discourse, English, Ukrainian*

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1. Introduction

“Ukrainians will become ‘illegal immigrants overnight’”

This is just one of many social media posts where global users refer to Ukrainian immigrants, their current and future situations, and their experiences with Ukrainians in the host countries. Owing to social media’s increasing influence on public perception, online users’ stancetaking in their posts on Ukrainian immigrants is extremely valuable to understand the underlying reasons behind the similar and different tendencies among representatives of different ideological, cultural, and political backgrounds. This study was motivated by the importance and interest of exploring how social media users, particularly Americans and Ukrainians, position themselves concerning information and beliefs regarding Ukrainian immigrants.

This chapter will provide an introduction to the study by first establishing the research territory, followed by establishing and occupying the niche. Different scholars in political and online discourses, such as political discussion forums, newspaper opinion articles, and political speeches, analyze epistemic stance as well as other stance markers that authors often include in their statements to position themselves towards various matters. This study focuses on the epistemic stance strategies online users employ in their social media posts, more specifically, how they express their confidence, belief, or doubt. Building on Carretero’s (2023b: 44-45) argument that “epistemic expressions are more frequent in discussion forums rather than in newspaper opinion articles and political speeches” as “participants in discussion forums have much fewer restrictions for expressing their voice”, social media posts seem to have considerably less restrictions, allowing its users to express their voices more openly. Social media’s freedom of speech made posts, replies, and comments within social media discourse a fruitful source of various stance markers’ choices.

As a result of the refugee crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as many Ukrainian people had to move abroad, traditional media as well as social media published a high number of news media articles and social media posts on Ukrainian immigrants/refugees. More relevant posts and articles keep appearing nowadays from European and American authors, which is not surprising, as according to Chendei (2025: 175), “The current migration crisis, caused by Russian-Ukrainian war... is widely viewed as the largest since World War II”. Due to the 2024th US presidential election and Trump’s victory, whose position against immigrants is well known, Ukrainian as well as American users started actively questioning and discussing the potential outcomes for Ukrainian immigrants, which instigated the analysis of epistemic stance markers’

choices of Ukrainian and American users in their posts on Facebook and X (formerly Twitter).

Despite the scholarly interest in migration discourse, most articles cover Western media representations of immigrants. There is a lack of research on social media posts by ordinary people that include epistemic stance markers, which users add to their posts to express their confidence, belief, or doubt. There is also a gap in research on multilingual epistemic positioning in migration and comparative media studies across media platforms as they do allow a complete understanding of how epistemic markers differ from digital to traditional media (Marín-Arrese, 2021b; Ajana, 2024). This study fills the gap by creating and analyzing corpora that include social media posts written by American and Ukrainian users, which adds unique perspectives and epistemic positioning of ordinary American and Ukrainian people to the ongoing debate in migration discourse. The Ukrainian corpus is especially beneficial in relevant discussion within migration discourse on Ukrainian immigrants as Ukrainian voices are usually suppressed in Western media. For instance, political debate speeches demonstrated a lack of Ukrainian people's agency and a lack of political speakers' engagement with Ukrainian perspectives (Hendl et al., 2024). When Ukrainian voices are included, according to Chendei (2025: 180), "they are usually cast in the roles of tearful witnesses rather than subjects with agency and experts in their own history".

This research aims to identify and investigate the use of epistemic stance markers in social media posts on Ukrainian immigrants by American and Ukrainian users, focusing on truth-factual validity, certainty, and evidentiality markers in their narratives. In addition, this study strives to identify common epistemic stance strategies as well as compare and contrast different epistemic stance choices employed by American and Ukrainian users by discussing ideological, cultural, and political similarities and differences in American and Ukrainian discourses. I will expand the scope of epistemic stance research by going beyond traditional media discourse and examining social media discourse and its effect on the public perception of Ukrainian immigrants. Besides, this paper analyses how epistemic stance makers of American and Ukrainian users in informal writings help to create "popular opinions" of Ukrainian immigrants by answering these research questions:

1. How does social media discourse shape public perception of Ukrainian immigrants in American and Ukrainian contexts?
2. What are the key similarities and differences in epistemic stance markers choices American and Ukrainian users make?
3. How are epistemic stance strategies of American and Ukrainian users influenced by ideological, cultural, and political discourses?

As mentioned earlier, this research enriches the stance research by presenting the authentic language of ordinary American and Ukrainian people from social media. Moreover, by comparing American and Ukrainian users' perspectives, this study discovers similarities and differences in their epistemic stance strategies within social media discourse. Ukrainian data restores agency to Ukrainian people in migration discourse, talking about Ukrainian refugees, which is known to be taken from them in Western media. The next chapters of this paper will present the literature review on epistemic stance. Next, the methods used in the study will be represented. Finally, the results of the study will be stated and discussed.

2. Literature Review

The authors' stance is commonly researched among different online discourses as they present a decent source of writers' stance markers, which crucially affect how the public perceives the information. According to Marín-Arrese (2011: 194-195), "stance refers to particular viewpoint of the speaker/writer, which reflects their attitudes, assessments, and knowledge concerning the designated event and/or the communicated proposition". The scholar adds to Biber et al. (1999) division of writers' stances into three major categories: epistemic stance, attitudinal stance, and style.

Epistemic stance is central to shaping migration discourse. The study of how individuals express their certainty, justification, and commitment to knowledge claims comes under the epistemic stance, which applies to how people present their views on subjects such as immigration and immigrants. Writers often justify their claims with linguistic expressions of the validity of information (Marín-Arrese, 2009, 2011, 2015). Marín-Arrese (2011) discusses the cognitive as well as pragmatic functions of the epistemic stance, which indicates the strength of belief rather than intentions to act. Epistemic stance is formed of epistemic modality (probability, factual, or speculative) and evidentiality (source of knowledge) (Englebretson, 2007; Marín-Arrese, 2015). Such devices as hedging (*I think, it seems*, etc.) and certainty markers (*I know, it is clear*, etc.) are used by speakers to regulate credibility (Carretero, 2023b; Hendl et al., 2024). Media often adjust these markers to strengthen authority or bring up doubt (Hendl et al., 2024). These elements give the epistemic stance a possibility to influence public perception by constructing specific public narratives in migration or other discourses.

2.1 Epistemic Stance in Migration Discourse

Validating or doubting migration policies is central to the role of epistemic stance. Linguistic markers proposed by political and media discourse reinforce claims that shape public opinion (Carretero, 2023b; Marín-Arrese, 2015; Ruskan & Šolienė, 2023). Carretero (2023b) demonstrates how policymakers express uncertainty in implementing their policies, whereas Marín-Arrese (2015) argues that policymakers use epistemic certainty markers to justify restrictive migration policies.

The necessity markers are favored by right-wing rhetoric, and evaluative markers are used in left-wing rhetoric. Degani & Belladelli (2009) and Ruskan & Šolienė (2023) conclude that based on certainty (*must be controlled, should be reduced*), conservatives mark the issue through security and economic burden markers, while liberals use hedging (*could be beneficial, might help*) concentrating on humanitarian contribution markers. Moreover, Ruskan and Šolienė (2023: 114) add that “the Conservatives employ more devices expressing the lower degree of the speaker’s commitment than the Democrats”. Thus, political ideologies of the different ideological groups influence their certainty markers, justifications, and framing of migration discussions. This encourages these divides, which are reinforced by media on the right with an emphasis on security risks and media on the left, supporting inclusion through more flexible epistemic markers (Ajana, 2024; Marín Arrese, 2021b). The variety of these ideological contrasts indicates how epistemic stance can be a tool to justify one’s stance towards migration policies and the public’s attitudes.

Social media further amplifies competing users’ epistemic stances due to ideological and cultural differences (Brems et al., 2012; Ajana, 2024). Even though Brems et al. (2012) propose that media discourse contributes to developing different perceptions and opinions, Ajana (2024: 2) points out “the alleged bias of contemporary media in reporting on the different refugee crises”, which shapes the public perception of news as positive, neutral, or negative. In addition, the way information on immigrants is conveyed through neutral statistics or subjective personal stories depends on the epistemic stance (Degani & Belladelli, 2009; Fóti, 2024). They emphasize that epistemic stance is a part of language use, which serves as a linguistic feature and strategic tool.

Legal, cultural, and psychological factors contribute to epistemic stance in integration processes, which determine the refugees’ perception of host countries and those countries’ responses to refugees. Influenced by humanitarian discourse, policies of integration gather more epistemic legitimacy and are easily supported by the public and the government (Marín-Arrese, 2015; Fóti, 2024). On the other hand, policies focusing on security risks create epistemic skepticism, denying

people the need for acceptance. The epistemic stance of refugees towards host governments depends largely on the social support level in those countries (Carretero & Domínguez Romero 2024; Kovács et al. 2023). Kovács et al. (2023: 7) argue that “providing mental health support, social support, and communicative language competencies undertaken by policymakers in European countries accepting war refugees from Ukraine can change the integrative attitudes of the refugees”. In fact, “perceived social support proved to be the strongest correlate of integrative attitudes” (Kovács et al., 2023: 6). In addition, the epistemic stance in migration discourse is influenced by post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), when refugees are more likely to doubt the sincerity of the government regarding the integration policy (Kovács et al., 2023). People with high levels of PTSD are less willing to trust host governments and other people. The studies suggest that humanitarian discourse, social support, and well-being affect epistemic stance toward integration, determining refugees’ perception of their host countries as welcoming or not.

2. 2 Legal and Policy-Based Framing

Epistemic stance is strategically mobilized by migration policies to justify inclusion, restriction, or responsibility shifts. In legal discourse, migration is framed in the domain of deontic modality as either a necessity or a security risk (Thegel & Lindgren, 2020; Marín-Arrese, 2015). Thus, public perception of migration is based on the use of certainty markers (*must be controlled*) used by restrictive policies and hedged responsibility (*should be addressed*) used by politicians. Institutional narratives in EU policies also frame epistemic stance in support of how the government should be in charge of the debate on migration (Carretero, 2023b; Fóti, 2024). In addition, legal frameworks establish epistemic positioning with different levels of legitimacy granted to various refugee groups. These policies determine who has privileged epistemic legitimacy (Fóti, 2024).

In global migration discourse, Western epistemic frameworks reinforce power hierarchies that privilege Western narratives above all other possible perspectives. Western media and academic institutions, which claim that their narratives are authoritative and which tend to fail to take refugee perspectives seriously, keep epistemic dominance (Cuyckens et al. 2010, Marín Arrese 2021b). As a result, there is epistemic injustice, and Western scholars define what knowledge about Ukrainian migration is produced while the voices of ordinary Ukrainian people are marginalized (Brems et al., 2012; Hendl et al., 2024). Westspaining, which is characterized as “the treatment of Europe’s East and its people as objects rather than subjects of history” (Hendl et al., 2024: 176), produces an impact

on the marginalization of diverse narratives in the global migration discourse by demonstrating the phenomenon of epistemic exclusion (Hendl et al., 2024). This creates an unbalanced epistemic hierarchy, verifying what it means to be a legitimate migrant, while those marginalized struggle to establish their epistemic authority. This means that the epistemic position is created linguistically and maintained institutionally, which maintains a power imbalance in migration discourse.

2.3 Public Attitudes Toward Ukrainian Immigrants

Factors such as media framing, cultural hegemony, national ideology, and epistemic stancetaking influence the public perception of Ukrainian immigrants. Marín-Arrese (2021a) found that specific markers of evidence that Ukrainians need protection legitimize pro-refugee policies. Conversely, Ajana (2024) argues that the Western media goes as far as developing Ukrainian refugees into a group that deserves more than other refugees do. Social media further enhances the difference in epistemic stance strategies used by people from different cultures, reinforcing the ideological position that already exists in their cultural background (Brems et al., 2012; Hendl et al., 2024). Mystification of responsibility in the political discourse is a convenient tool that is used to transfer blame for the migration crisis to the shoulders of governments while shaping the public's opinion: "Mystification of responsibility for the realization of events involves dimensions of defocusing of agency, realized by means of expressions in the middle- spontaneous passive systems" (Marín-Arrese, 2011; p. 194). Attitudes towards refugees are shaped by these strategies to navigate societies to view migration as a collective responsibility or as an issue imposed from outside.

Epistemic alignment, political ideology, and perceived similarity to the host population predict the public's willingness to help Ukrainian refugees. For instance, shaping the public's opinion regarding whether or not refugees should receive help based on political ideology affect epistemic stancetaking in migration discourse. The focus on migration in terms of national security underlies conservative trends that emphasize certainty and obligation, while liberal trends are more concerned with humanitarian concerns, probabilities, and opportunities (Marín-Arrese, 2011; Ruskan & Šolienė, 2023). As a result, political biases influence changes in epistemic stance, which is manifested in conservative rhetoric, emphasizing security risk, and in liberal rhetoric, emphasizing moral responsibility. Moreover, surveys proved that when individuals perceive cultural similarity, their epistemic alignment and their willingness to help increase (Carretero, 2023b; Sinclair et al., 2024).

Media constructs epistemic authority by building on selective framing and evidentiality

markers to inform public opinion on Ukrainian refugees. News media uses epistemic modality strategically to construct legitimacy, that is, certainty markers in favorable narratives and hedging in disapproving narratives (Carretero, 2023b; Ajana, 2024). During crises, epistemic stance shifts dynamically as media adjust certainty and evidentiality markers to maintain credibility and manage public response (Carretero, 2023a). Ukrainian refugees are often framed as “successful integrators” as other refugee groups are treated to more hedged descriptions, thereby creating uncertainty. Furthermore, the media selectively receives epistemic legitimization, which categorizes refugees as deserving or undeserving refugees depending on their race, religion, and national identity (Marín Arrese, 2021a; Ajana, 2024). Ajana (2024) underscores that media is crucial for constructing epistemic legitimacy, the favorable portrayal of Ukrainian refugees, and influencing policy decisions. This shows that epistemic stance is a linguistic phenomenon and political tool often involved in migration discourse. The epistemic bias is typically reflected in Western media discourse, which reinstates a selective epistemic legitimacy, as Ukrainians are made to seem like rightful refugees while non-European refugees are conversely framed right out of the gate as a threat (Ajana 2024). Ukrainian refugees are described with high certainty markers (*They will integrate successfully*), while Middle Eastern refugees are represented with more hedging (*they may integrate*) (Ajana, 2024). In Ukrainian news media, a negative image of other refugees, for instance, from Asia and Africa, was also revealed (Chendei, 2025). In the end, media framing has a significant effect in legitimizing or delegitimizing refugee groups when it concerns public opinion and policy response.

Fear and uncertainty of Ukrainian immigrants’ current and future situations influence the epistemic stance of wondering and questioning, which is also reflected in increased hedging strategies, threat-based justifications, and defensive rhetoric. The fear weakens epistemic commitment to the point that it might be beneficial when one makes claims, including phrases as *it seems* and *someone claims*, but not making valid assertive claims (Carretero, 2023; Englebretson, 2007). Media crisis framing increases certainty markers use and allegedly makes restrictive policies necessary (Marín-Arrese, 2021b; Sinclair et al., 2024). Defensive epistemic positioning also occurs based on perceived economic and cultural threats (Sinclair et al., 2024; Marín-Arrese, 2021). As such, epistemic stancetaking, political ideology, and cultural background determine public attitude towards refugees.

2. 4 Comparison of American and Ukrainian Users’ Perspectives

American and Ukrainian epistemic stances are partially constructed according to history,

national identity, and media framing of the issue. Americans create epistemic authority and make Ukrainian migration a democratic and humanitarian concern (Carretero & Domínguez Romero, 2024; Ajana, 2024). On the contrary, Ukrainians prefer a different epistemic stance strategy and conceptualize migration through historical and cultural contexts (Marín-Arrese, 2009; Hendl et al., 2024). Ukrainians tend to externalize migration to global responsibility but internalize it as a matter of national survival.

Epistemic stance also affects national identity, from which migration discourse is partially framed. Epistemic claims support the national narrative, opposing external views across different socio-cultural ideologies (Brems et al., 2012; Marín Arrese, 2011). Unlike Western humanitarianism, Ukrainian discourse attributes sovereignty and regional security to migration. In Western discourse, migration is seen as an international responsibility, whereas in Eastern European discourses, migration is considered to be related to national security issues (Hendl et al., 2024; Marín Arrese, 2021b). This distinction brings out the cultural and political nature of the migration issue in addition to economic and humanitarian discourses. These show how belief status affects whether migration is referred to as a geopolitical issue or a moral duty depending on where one stands culturally.

Based on this literature review, the epistemic positioning on Ukrainian immigration is influenced by national identity, emotions, political ideology, and media framing. It also addresses cross-cultural epistemic differences, the role of social media in polarization, and space in the current research. Although these factors have been researched, there are gaps in the research on multilingual epistemic positioning, comparative studies, and longitudinal analysis. Closing these gaps will offer closer views of how epistemic stance endures through different cultural, political, and digital contexts.

3. Data and Methods

The study examined the extent to which American and Ukrainian users employ epistemic stances in their posts/replies on social media concerning Ukrainian immigrants and how these markers contribute to shaping public opinion and perceptions of Ukrainian immigrants. Various ways of doing discourse research give insights into different aspects of epistemic stance in migration discourse. Epistemic markers can be efficiently tracked through corpus-based discourse analysis, which has made shifts in migration narratives over time (Marín-Arrese, 2009, 2011, 2015; Carretero & Domínguez Romero, 2024). This method allows researchers to identify and discern certainty, evidentiality, and justification markers in collected corpus/corpora. With the help of the quantitative

method, the relation of epistemic certainty to migration attitudes can be researched. Moreover, researching epistemic shifts in migration discourse also contributes to media discourse analysis by proving how public perception changes based on the diverse crisis narratives (Degani & Belladelli, 2009; Ajana, 2024). A mixed methodology is the most efficient and comprehensive tool for studying epistemic stance, as it considers the phenomenon's qualitative and quantitative aspects. The qualitative method helps identify linguistic and ideological framing, while the quantitative method measures epistemic certainty statistically and proposes a comparison across different national contexts (Marín-Arrese, 2009, 2011, 2015).

The research adopted the deductive approach, applying Marín Arrese's (2011) framework of epistemic stance markers in order to analyze the collected data. A mixed-methods approach was chosen to provide a comprehensive understanding of online attitudes towards Ukrainian immigrants. The quantitative approach measured the frequency of epistemic markers used by American and Ukrainian users and if such were used at all in their writings about Ukrainian immigrants. However, the quantitative approach only would not be enough to understand the epistemic stance of online users. The qualitative approach explored the underlying reasons for epistemic stance usage choices in different contexts.

Using a mixed-method approach, this study aimed to consider not only how frequently American and Ukrainian users employ the epistemic stance but also the discourses in which it is used. The quantitative analysis provided statistical insights into how frequently epistemic stance markers appear and whether they are a significant feature in discussions and opinion formation about Ukrainian immigrants. On the contrary, the qualitative analysis explored the context and functions of such markers, revealing how online users construct their stance and engage in epistemic positioning in social media discourse.

3.1 Data Collection

The primary method used in this study is the corpus-based discourse analysis, which allowed for the examination of linguistic patterns in naturally occurring social media discourse. A corpus-based methodology enabled both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The mixed-methods approach was extremely useful in analyzing epistemic stance markers, as it allowed me to identify repetitive linguistic patterns and social factors influencing their use. A corpus of 60 publicly available posts from platforms such as Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) was compiled. The corpus included

30 posts written by American users and 30 posts written by Ukrainian users, related to Ukrainian immigrants, refugees, asylum, and migration. The social media discourse was chosen due to its increasing effect in shaping public perception and opinions. Social media serves as a fruitful source of authentic language use by different people as they share their personal opinions online and have access to a variety of other users' views, which are much less filtered and moderated than in traditional media. Social media posts and replies often reflect spontaneous, personal, and emotionally charged opinions of online users, which plays a significant role in understanding how epistemic stance choices affect the public perceptions of Ukrainian immigrants.

The table below represents word count of each post from both American and Ukrainian corpora and their totals.

Table 1. Word count of each post from American and Ukrainian corpora

№	US corpora	UA corpora
Post 1	112	228
Post 2	45	25
Post 3	57	80
Post 4	74	299
Post 5	113	261
Post 6	112	137
Post 7	72	182
Post 8	31	182
Post 9	41	48
Post 10	46	327
Post 11	43	136
Post 12	105	572
Post 13	58	16
Post 14	48	53
Post 15	42	339
Post 16	37	367
Post 17	34	76
Post 18	25	120
Post 19	37	26
Post 20	42	45
Post 21	47	32
Post 22	49	317
Post 23	51	171
Post 24	1008	117
Post 25	366	125
Post 26	317	174

Post 27	85	224
Post 28	227	62
Post 29	65	243
Post 30	2747	65
Total	6136	5049

I have compiled the corpus by searching for posts and replies that include relevant keywords such as Ukrainian immigrants, Ukrainian migrants, Ukrainian refugees, Ukrainian asylum, etc. Only posts and replies starting from 2022 until nowadays were considered as they reflect relevant opinions about Ukrainian immigrants, influenced by different social contexts. Besides, only content written in English for American users and in Ukrainian for Ukrainian users was included in the corpus as these are the languages that I can fluently understand. To ensure the nationality of the users, whose posts and replies were included in the corpus, users' origin was verified in their profile descriptions. Posts that lacked clear information about the nationality or location of the users were excluded from the sample. Additionally, advertisements and repetitive content that were shared from multiple accounts were also removed from the corpus, as such posts are more likely to represent institutional opinions and views rather than individual epistemic stances. Some posts and replies were inaccessible as they were written from private or restricted accounts.

3.2 Analytical Framework

As it was mentioned before, the research employed Marín Arrese' (2011) framework of epistemic stance markers, which classified stance expressions into five key sub-categories: epistemic modality (expressions of certainty, probability, or possibility), truth-factual validity (statements asserting truthfulness and factuality), experiential evidentials (references to personal experience or perception), cognitive evidentials (references to mental states or knowledge sources) and communicative evidentials (references to external sources or reported speech). Furthermore, a list of epistemic stance-related words and phrases was created, based on Marín Arrese's (2011) framework of epistemic stance markers. These markers were manually annotated within the dataset, allowing both quantitative frequency analysis and qualitative discourse examination.

The table below represents epistemic stance markers Marín Arrese (2011) propose for epistemic stance analysis.

Table 2. Marín Arrese's (2011) framework of epistemic stance markers (p. 206)

Subcategory	Explanation	Examples
Epistemic modality	Epistemic modals; Adverbs, predicative adjs. and nominals	high certainty or necessity (<i>must, cannot, certainly, ...</i>) medium certainty or probability (<i>will, would, should, probably, ...</i>) low certainty or possibility (<i>may, could, perhaps, ...</i>)
Truth-Factual Validity	Personal and Impersonal predicates expressing factive or affective meanings; Adverbs, predicative adjs. and nominals	<i>I am confident that ...</i> <i>The truth is..., The fact is...</i> <i>In my judgement...</i> <i>Frankly....</i>
Experiential Evidentiality	Personal predicates of perceptual or mental observation; Adverbs, predicative adjs. and nominals	<i>We have seen..., We have experienced...What is perfectly clear....</i> <i>It is evident..., It was obvious...</i> <i>Obviously..., Clearly....</i>
Cognitive Evidentiality	Personal predicates of mental state; Adverbs, predicative adjs. and nominals	<i>I think..., I have concluded...</i> <i>We all know..., We have learned...</i> <i>That means..., Presumably....</i>
Communicative Evidentiality	Personal predicates of communication and verbal interaction	<i>I say to you ..., I said...</i> <i>That suggests..., That implies....</i>

Ukrainian users tended to write longer posts on this subject due to the direct personal and national importance of the topic. A normalization process of the data was implemented to ensure a valid comparison between American and Ukrainian users. Raw frequency counts were converted into normalized frequencies per 1,000 words to account for variations in text lengths. This step was essential in order to avoid potential biases in statistical representation and to ensure a balanced analysis of epistemic stance marker usage.

The data was coded as Epistemic modality: certainty (EP: CERT), probability (EP: PROB), possibility (EP: POSS), impossibility (EP: IMPOSS) and necessity (EP: NEC), Truth-Factual Validity (TF), Experiential Evidentiality (EE), Cognitive Evidentiality (CE), and Communicative Evidentiality (ComE).

4. Results and Discussion

Two datasets with 30 posts each, the American (US) corpus and Ukrainian (UA) corpus were compiled and analyzed for epistemic stance strategies that American and Ukrainian users apply in their social media writings. The data was coded as *Epistemic modality: Certainty, Probability, Possibility, Impossibility, and Necessity (EP: CERT, PROB, POSS, IMPOSS, and NEC), Truth-*

Factual Validity (TF), *Experiential Evidentiality (EE)*, *Cognitive Evidentiality (CE)*, and *Communicative Evidentiality (ComE)*. The findings were grouped into three themes: American users' stance strategies, Ukrainian users' stance strategies, and a comparison of American and Ukrainian perspectives.

4.1 Distribution of American users' stance strategies

The table below represents the frequency of use of epistemic stance markers by American users. Frequency is normalized to 1,000 words. It is crucial to highlight that there were no instances of truth-factual validity markers identified in the US corpus.

Table 3. The frequencies of epistemic stance markers of American users in social media posts

Codes	Raw frequency	NF (1000)
TF	0	0
EP-CERT	25	4.1
EP-PROB	19	3.1
EP-POSS	16	2.6
EP-IMPOSS	0	0
EP-NEC	0	0
EE	9	1.5
CE	16	2.6
ComE	93	15.2
Total	178	29

The analysis showed the tendencies in Americans' epistemic stance usage choices and perceptions. To begin with, Americans used epistemic modality markers in their posts often, 9.8 occurrences per 1,000 words; the posts included epistemic modality markers, expressing certainty, probability, and possibility. It is important to highlight that there were no instances of impossibility and necessity markers identified in the US corpus. Americans showed the most frequent display of

certainty, 4.1 occurrences per 1,000 words. American users proved to choose high certainty markers to show their assurance of Ukrainian immigrants' background, Russian-Ukrainian war events, and future predictions of their destiny:

- (1) ***Sure**, Ukrainian refugees grew up in a semi-western environment* (US Post 6).
- (2) *Ukrainians **will** become 'illegal immigrants overnight'* (US Post 24).
- (3) *Russian artillery rate of fire **will** increase and they **will** start counterattacking* (US Post 30).
- (4) *One thing is **clear**, Russian commanders were taken completely off-guard by the size and success of Ukraine's offensive* (US Post 30).

Americans also included probability markers in their posts, 3.1 occurrences per 1,000 words, to discuss Ukrainian immigrants' hypothetical current state of affairs in the host countries:

- (5) *You **would** think that Ukrainians, due to the war, **would** have a very good basis to claim asylum* (US Post 3).

Besides, they acknowledged probable ways the legislation in the USA could be developed by including probability markers that expressed that there were different potential scenarios:

- (6) *Even in light of **the likelihood of losing** their immigration status, they are still so kind and generous to the girls* (US Post 16).
- (7) *Migrants stripped of their parole status **would** then likely face fast-track deportation proceedings* (US Post 24).
- (8) *The Trump administration said last month it was carrying out the "largest deportation operation" in U.S. history, as Trump repeatedly said he **would** push for all migrants accused of crimes to be deported* (US Post 28).

Given the current political state in the country and the views expressed by the current administration on issues related to immigration, even though American people, in general, keep supporting Ukraine, they start wondering about Ukrainian immigrants' rights in the US. In the same manner, American users share their concerns and fears about the upcoming changes in their country for their non-American fellows and themselves.

In addition to probability markers, Americans illustrated quite frequent use of possibility markers, 2.6 occurrences per 1,000 words. Some users utilized possibility markers while speculating about the one responsible for an excessive number of Ukrainian immigrants in the US:

- (9) *The Office of Refugee Resettlement confirms humanitarian parolees **may** also be eligible for assistance through existing programs* (US Post 1).

Americans also used the possibility markers in their propositions to foreign governments as well as reflections on potential changes in migration discourse, depending on their current actions:

- (10) *Maybe they **could** consider just opening the border and letting refugees through without checking passports* (US Post 15).
- (11) *Important piece from @nicohaeringer arguing that our solidarity with Ukrainian refugees **might be** setting a new template for thinking about refugees in general* (US Post 20).
- (12) *The move, which **could** be rolled out as soon as April, **would** reverse the welcome Ukrainians received under President Joe Biden's administration during Russia's 2022 invasion of the country* (US Post 24).

American users highlighted positive and negative outcomes in the migration crisis for themselves and immigrants based on their current actions performed by the governments, political parties, and the public.

Besides epistemic modality markers, Americans predominantly applied different evidential markers in order to support their claims. The most frequently used ones were communicative evidential markers, 15.2 occurrences per 1,000 words, which Americans included in their posts by referring to external credible sources to support their statements. For example, Americans referred to the rules of different countries or political entities and official statistics:

- (13) *Moldovan border guards plan to cooperate with Ukrainian authorities to catch evaders who are trying to escape Ukraine through the Transnistrian region, **said** Moldovan Interior Minister Adrian Efros* (US Post 4).
- (14) *The planned rollback of protections for Ukrainians was underway before Trump's public row with Volodymyr Zelensky last week, Reuters **reported, citing** a senior Trump official and three sources familiar with the matter* (US Post 24).

Unlike these examples, some online claims regarding the new laws concerning Ukrainian immigrants were based on individuals' experiences:

- (15) *Ukrainian men do not want to defend the corrupt Kiev government and are fleeing the country, seeing it as a "prison", German television channel NTV **reported, citing** illegal Ukrainian immigrants* (US Post 12).
- (16) *"The closure of the border has turned Ukraine into a prison for men," **said** one of those interviewed by the channel, 23-year-old Bogdan Khorolsky* (US Post 12).
- (17) *Some Ukrainians escaped to Estonia. They **told** us their stories* (US Post 17).

The following examples represented communicational markers that Americans used to refer to ordinary people's words/experiences rather than news sources or official institutions.

Moreover, American users' posts contained cognitive evidential markers, 2.6 occurrences per 1,000 words. Some of the American users resorted to cognitive evidential markers, expressing their opinions, mental processing, or their inability to comprehend information shared online:

(18) *I **say** deport them ALL!* (US Post 8)

(19) *I really **don't understand** this* (US Post 13).

(20) *I **know** - not how it is done, but these are EXTRAORDINARY times* (US Post 15).

Additionally, American users also included cognitive evidential markers in their posts when referring to common knowledge and beliefs most people share about Ukrainian refugees in contrast to refugees from other countries:

(21) *You would **think** that Ukrainians, due to the war, would have a very good basis to claim asylum* (US Post 3)

(22) *Once again we **are reminded** of the double standards and the hypocrisy of the West in welcoming Ukrainian refugees safely while assaulting, deporting and turning away those escaping conflict, violence and starvation from Central America and Africa* (US Post 7).

By using cognitive evidential markers, Americans expressed their opinions and awareness of the situation regarding Ukrainian immigrants in the US.

American users also consistently employed experiential evidential markers to share the information and knowledge that came from their daily lives, 1.5 occurrences per 1,000 words. Both supportive statements, as well as attacking ones, included these markers based on users' positive and negative experiences or lack of experience with Ukrainian immigrants. Some usages of experiential evidential markers were rather generalized instead of referring to specific episodes from their life:

(23) *When I **saw** Ukrainian refugees, my heart broke* (US Post 2).

(24) *I **hear** many stories about Ukrainian refugees acting very entitled and aggressive in their host countries* (US Post 8).

(25) *I **have come to know** many beautiful Ukrainian immigrants to USA recently* (US Post 14).

While some American users shared their opinions based on the concrete experiences of their interaction with Ukrainian immigrants, others kept experiential markers other users included, referring to their conclusions:

(26) *'**Obviously**, everyone is trying to save their lives, and for the most part people who cross state borders illegally are men between the ages of 18 and 60,' he said* (US Post 4)

(27) *Tomi wrote, 'There are reports and visually confirmed footage of Ukrainian troops in Belgorod region. Town of Poroz is under Ukrainian control. Russian forces still **seem to be** in*

total chaos’ (US Post 30).

Based on the corpora data, users who used less specific experiential evidential markers seemed to have a negative experience or none at all, while users who employed more specific experiential markers seemed to have neutral or positive experiences with Ukrainian immigrants in the USA.

4.2 Distribution of Ukrainian users’ stance strategies

The table below represents the frequency of Ukrainian users’ use of epistemic stance markers. Frequency is normalized to 1,000 words. Unlike American users, Ukrainian users demonstrated a few instances of truth-factual validity, impossibility, and necessity in their posts.

Table 4. The frequencies of epistemic stance markers of Ukrainian users in social media posts

Codes	Raw frequency	NF (1000)
TF	1	0.2
EP-CERT	16	3.2
EP-PROB	7	1.4
EP-POSS	21	4.2
EP-IMPOSS	4	0.8
EP-NEC	1	0.2
EE	7	1.4
CE	23	4.6
ComE	46	9.1
Total	126	25

While American users included communicative evidential markers the most frequently in their posts, Ukrainian users most frequently resorted to epistemic modality markers, 9.8 occurrences per 1,000 words, expressing certainty, probability, possibility, necessity, and impossibility. Ukrainians most frequently displayed possibility markers, 4.2 occurrences per 1,000 words. They included possibility markers in their posts regarding the official procedures of law-making in host countries,

such as the US and Spain, questioning their legal status as immigrants and thinking of potential consequences for some Ukrainian immigrants:

- (28) *Найбільше ж за своє майбутнє в США, українці переймаються у випадку перемоги Трампа, тому що тоді **можлива** більш жорстка міграційна політика, яка може поставити під загрозу тимчасовий статус українців* [Most of all, Ukrainians are worried about their future in the USA if Trump wins because then a stricter migration policy **might** be introduced, which could jeopardize the temporary status of Ukrainians] (UA Post 7)¹.
- (29) ***Може** тоді дехто буде цінувати те що роблять для нас мирні країни, **може** тоді дехто прозріє* [**Perhaps** then some people will appreciate what peaceful countries are doing for us, **perhaps** then some people will see the light] (UA Post 27).

Ukrainian users also used possibility markers in their posts to explain their thoughts on potential scenarios for Ukrainians abroad and in Ukraine:

- (30) *Основною метою заходу було обговорити, як українці **можуть** використати свій досвід життя і роботи у Європі у майбутній післявоєнній відбудові України* [The main goal of the event was to discuss how Ukrainians **could** use their experience of living and working in Europe in the future post-war reconstruction of Ukraine] (UA Post 15).
- (31) *Примітно, що українські мігранти **можуть** стати рупором України на міжнародній арені* [It is notable that Ukrainian migrants **might** become Ukraine's voice in the international arena] (UA Post 23).

It follows that Ukrainian users mostly used possibility markers to express their opinions on potential outcomes of current and future situations for Ukrainian immigrants.

Correspondingly, Ukrainian users demonstrated confidence in their statements regarding the Ukrainian people, their present, and future by including high certainty markers in their writings, 3.2 occurrences per 1,000 words:

- (32) *Українські біженці повинні **будуть** підтвердити своє перебування в Польщі* [Ukrainian refugees will have to confirm their stay in Poland] (UA Post 4).
- (33) *Знання та досвід, здобуті ними за кордоном, **будуть** корисними для відновлення України* [The knowledge and experience they have gained abroad **will** be useful for Ukraine's recovery] (UA Post 23)

Simultaneously, the Ukrainian data highlighted that Ukrainian users shared their fears as immigrants

¹ All translations from Ukrainian into English here and further in the paper are made by the author.

in the US based on the outcome of the presidential election and Trump's negative attitudes towards immigrants with the help of certainty markers just as with possibility markers:

- (34) *5 листопада США обирають нового президента, що викликає неабиякі очікування серед українських біженців, тому що майбутній лідер країни безпосередньо **вплине** на програми, через які українці приїхали в США [On November 5, the United States elects a new president, which raises high expectations among Ukrainian refugees, as the country's future leader **will** directly affect the programs that brought Ukrainians to the United States]* (UA Post 7)

Ukrainians use certainty markers in order to discuss the issues Ukrainian immigrants encounter abroad and reflect Ukrainian immigrants' future in host countries, highlighting the significance of social media in shaping public perceptions as most people get their updates on Ukrainian immigrants as well as other topics online.

Apart from certainty markers, Ukrainians resorted to using probability markers in their writings regarding Ukrainian immigrants: 1.4 occurrences per 1,000 words. They used probability markers to discuss the potential scenarios for Ukrainian refugees in host countries, influence of Ukrainian immigrants in the developments of their host countries, and predict the ensuing outcomes:

- (35) *В той же час, експерти вважають, що у випадку перемоги Гарріс, **буде** продовжена чинна політика щодо мігрантів [At the same time, experts believe that if Harris wins, the current policy towards migrants **will** be extended]* (UA Post 7)
- (36) *Окрім того, українські мігранти мають високий рівень освіти та кваліфікації, що **може** стимулювати економічне зростання в приймаючих країнах [In addition, Ukrainian immigrants have a high level of education and qualifications, which **might** stimulate economic growth in host countries]* (UA Post 23).

By using probability markers, Ukrainians expressed their thoughts on matters that they were uncertain about.

The least employed epistemic modality markers by Ukrainian users in the corpora were necessity, 0.8 occurrences per 1,000 words, and impossibility markers, 0.2 occurrences per 1,000 words. Ukrainians included impossibility markers in their posts to state what should not be done in relation to Ukrainian immigrants:

- (37) *Звичайно, біженців з України **не можна** розглядати лише з точки зору того внеску, який вони роблять в чеську економіку [Of course, refugees from Ukraine **cannot** be viewed*

only in terms of the contribution they make to the Czech economy] (UA Post 16).

By using necessity markers, Ukrainian users not only underlined the importance of actions in the present moment but also their relation to consequences in the future:

- (38) ***Варто** зазначити, що з кожним кварталом витрати на державну підтримку українців падають, а доходи від їхньої діяльності зростають [It is important to note that every quarter the costs of state support for Ukrainians are falling, while revenues from their activities are growing]* (UA Post 16)

As is evident, Ukrainians use necessity and impossibility markers to charge their statements with the urgency of relevant matters.

Furthermore, Ukrainian users resorted to different evidential markers to support their statements. The most frequently used ones were communicative evidential markers, 9.1 occurrences per 1,000 words. Some Ukrainian users shared official statistics of different institutions of host countries related to Ukrainian immigrants and their life abroad:

- (39) ***За даними** дослідницької компанії, середня вартість оренди житла в Канаді за рік зросла на 11% до рекордних 2149 канадських доларів [According to a research company, the average cost of renting a home in Canada increased by 11% over the year to a record 2149 Canadian dollars]* (UA Post 3).
- (40) *Аналітики СепЕА **опублікували звіт**, згідно з яким українців у Польщі менше, ніж **свідчать** офіційні дані [СепЕА analysts published a report showing that there are fewer Ukrainians in Poland than official data indicate]* (UA Post 4).
- (41) *Дослідницький інститут STEM **з'ясував**, що 55% чехів виступають за продовження дозволу на перебування в країні українських біженців (проти – 16%) [The STEM Research Institute **has found** that 55% of Czechs are in favor of extending the residence permit for Ukrainian refugees (16% are against)]* (UA Post 16)

Such information could be extremely helpful and relevant for those Ukrainians who live abroad, which is why Ukrainians share the message, referring to credible sources. Moreover, Ukrainians referred to different political figures, and researchers, and discussed the effect of their statements on Ukrainian immigrants:

- (42) *Порівняно з колишніми притоками біженців до Німеччини українці мають суттєві відмінності, **зазначила** Сабіне Цинн із Німецького інституту економічних досліджень (DIW) у Берліні [Compared to previous refugee inflows to Germany, Ukrainians have*

significant differences, said Sabine Zinn of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin] (UA Post 12)

- (43) *Нещодавно, Зеленський заявив, що заходу «політично вигідно» не працюючих біженців відправляти додому, а не витратити на них гроші [Recently, Zelenskyu **stated** that it is “politically advantageous” for the West to send unemployed refugees home rather than spend money on them]* (UA Post 22).

This example illustrates that by using communicative evidential markers in their posts on social media, Ukrainian users demonstrated their will to present reliable information from credible sources.

Ukrainian users also frequently used cognitive evidential markers, with 4.6 occurrences per 1,000 words. Some of the Ukrainian users resorted to cognitive evidential markers, referring to their and others' observations, reasoning, and expectations:

- (44) *На думку авторів звіту, це суперечить даним звіту НБП, згідно з яким станом на липень 2024 року 70% офіційно працювали, а 19% шукали роботу [The authors of the report **believe** that this contradicts the NBP report, according to which 70% were officially employed and 19% were looking for work as of July 2024]* (UA Post 4).
- (45) *В той же час, експерти вважають, що у випадку перемоги Гарріс, буде продовжена чинна політика щодо мігрантів [At the same time, experts **believe** that if Harris wins, the current policy towards migrants will continue]* (UA Post 7).

Besides sharing their reasoning and expectations with their audiences, Ukrainian users also expressed their opinions based on internal certainty, using cognitive evidential markers that presented something as known:

- (46) *Я точно **знаю** руки русоговорящих в крови в Ерефії или України... [I **know** for sure the hands of Russian-speaking people in blood in Erefia or Ukraine...]* (UA post 11).
- (47) *Зрозуміло, що кийська кліка не може нічого запропонувати біженцям, окрім як вмерти за розкіш олігархів [It is **clear** that the Kyiv clique has nothing to offer refugees except to die for the oligarchs' luxury]* (UA post 22).

Such cognitive evidential markers of knowledge helped Ukrainian users to raise attention to their statements on social media.

Furthermore, Ukrainian users also employed experiential evidential markers to share the knowledge that came from their experience, 1.4 occurrences per 1,000 words. Ukrainians used experiential evidential markers while referring to their impressions of Ukrainian people/immigrants that they discovered:

(48) *Раптом з'ясувалось, що деякі вважають, що всі українські мігранти в Німеччині отримували чи отримують соціальну допомогу [It **turned out** that some people believe that all Ukrainian migrants in Germany have received or are receiving social assistance] (UA Post 19).*

Examples from life helped Ukrainian users to show an accurate and nuanced representation of the experiences of Ukrainian people/immigrants. In addition, Ukrainians implied their subjective perceptions based on personal or group experience:

(49) *Я, звичайно, можу помилятися, але мені здається, що справа не в борщах.” [Obviously, I could be wrong, but it seems to me that it's not about borscht] (UA Post 29).*

Using such markers, Ukrainians conveyed narratives of individuals directly experiencing the recent events caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war, presenting them to online audiences through a lens of subjective perspectives

Thus, in contrast to American users, who did not exhibit truth-factual validity markers in their posts on Ukrainian immigrants, the analysis identified a truth-factual validity marker used by Ukrainians, 0.2 occurrences per 1,000 words. For instance, Ukrainians resorted to truth-factual validity markers when discussing the relevant issues Ukrainian immigrants face and will face due to the war:

(50) *Їм **справді** внаслідок війни НЕМА КУДИ ВЕРТАТИСЬ [They **truly** have nowhere to go back to as a result of the war] (UA Post 26).*

As we can see, Ukrainians use social media to share their awareness of Ukrainian immigrants' realities.

4.3 Comparison of American and Ukrainian perspectives

The table below represents the normalized frequencies of American and Ukrainian users' epistemic stance markers' use to 1,000 words.

Table 5. The frequencies of epistemic stance markers of American and Ukrainian users

Codes	US NF (1,000)	UA NF (1000)
TF (Truth-factual validity)	0	0.2
EP-CERT (Epistemic certainty)	4.1	3.2
EP-PROB (Epistemic probability)	3.1	1.4
EP-POSS (Epistemic possibility)	2.6	4.2
EP-IMPOSS (Epistemic impossibility)	0	0.8
EP-NEC (Epistemic necessity)	0	0.2
EE (Experiential evidential)	1.5	1.4
CE (Cognitive evidential)	2.6	4.6
ComE (Communicative evidential)	15.2	9.1
Total	29	25

To ensure a valid comparison between American and Ukrainian users, raw frequency counts were converted into normalized frequencies per 1,000 words. The normalization process helped to identify the similarities and differences in Americans and Ukrainians' epistemic stance markers choices in their social media posts. In addition, based on the existing literature and the research results of epistemic stance strategies in migration discourse found in social media posts written by American and Ukrainian users, this chapter discusses the influence of stancetaking on public perception, cultural narratives, and societal identities reflected in the stance.

The literature review showed that public perception of refugees is shaped by stancetaking strategies to influence societies to view migration as a collective responsibility or an external issue (Marín-Arrese, 2011). It also proved that the emotion of fear minimizes epistemic commitment to the point that it is beneficial when making claims, using wording like *it seems* and *some claim*, but not making valid assertive claims (Carretero, 2023; Englebreton, 2007). As depicted in Table 5, American users tended to include epistemic stance markers slightly more often than Ukrainian users, 29 and 25 occurrences per 1,000 words. While American users employed communicative evidential markers the most frequently, 15.2 occurrences per 1,000 words, Ukrainian users used the epistemic modality markers the most, resulting in a normalized frequency of 9.8 instances per 1,000 words. American users included communicative evidential markers the most in their posts, which helped them to deliver the information credibly as outsiders by referring to external sources. Based on the gathered data from social media posts, US and UA corpora, it is evident that American users most frequently resort to communicative evidential markers to support their claims, build the trust of the audience, and influence other people's opinions. Some of the communicative evidential markers that

were found in the US corpus are the following: *our sources are* (US Post 1), *Moldova has announced that* (US Post 4), *NTV reported* (US Post 12), *an important piece from* (US Post 20), *citing a senior Trump official* (US Post 24), etc. At the same time, Ukrainian users most constantly resorted to epistemic modality markers due to the direct relevance and importance of the matters discussed online, which influenced them to express their subjective, uncertain, and evaluative opinions more than referring to sources of knowledge. Ukrainian users have been proven to resort to epistemic modality markers more often, displaying their fear, doubt, hope, and confidence in order to influence their audience to relate to their statements. Ukrainians more often relied on epistemic possibility markers such as *може* [*might*] (UA Post 4, 7, 25, 27), *можлива(-о)* [*is possible*] (UA Post 7, 29); high certainty markers: *будуть* [*will*] (UA Post 4, 8, 24), *точно* [*for sure*] (UA Post 4, 11, 12); and probability markers: *може* [*can*] (UA Post 7, 15), *напевно* [*perhaps*] (UA Post 30).

Slightly less commonly American users integrated epistemic modality markers in their social media writings to discuss more and less likely potential scenarios for Ukrainian refugees and themselves, leading to a normalized frequency of 9.8 instances per 1,000 words. Some of the epistemic modality markers that were found in the US corpus are the following: certainty markers: *will* (US Post 4, 6, 18, 24), *sure* (US Post 6); probability markers: *would* (US Post 3, 24, 27), *maybe* (US Post 15); and possibility markers: *may* (US Post 1), *could* (US Post 15), *might* (US Post 20). At the same time, Ukrainians used the communicative evidential markers slightly less frequently than they used epistemic modality markers to support their propositions, generating 9.1 instances per 1,000 words: *пишуть світові ЗМІ* [*global media states*] (UA Post 3), *підтверджують* [*confirm*] (UA Post 4), *повідомляє* [*announces*] (UA Post 9). The results did not show any significant difference in American and Ukrainians' epistemic modality and communicative evidential markers usage. This proved that both American and Ukrainian users delivered information about some situations and news among their followers and other online users by referring to external sources and supporting their claims with their subjective, uncertain, and evaluative opinions due to different experiences, knowledge, and beliefs.

In addition, the results showed a notable difference in frequencies of epistemic modality markers usage by American and Ukrainian users. While American users included high certainty markers the most, 4.1 occurrences per 1,000 words, followed by probability markers, 3.1 occurrences per 1,000 words, Ukrainian users' posts presented possibility markers the most often, 4.2 occurrences per 1,000 words, followed by high certainty markers, 3.2 occurrences per 1,000 words. American

users included certainty markers to demonstrate their confidence about Ukrainian immigrants' future and their awareness of potential scenarios. Ukrainian users confirmed to be less confident in their claims on their current and future lives by mostly using possibility markers in their predictions. They covered various possible ways in which Ukrainian, as well as American people's lives, could be changed/affected nowadays or in the near future. Results showed that only Ukrainian users included impossibility and necessity markers in their posts. American users' posts included no instances of necessity or impossibility markers' use. Such results supported the claim that Ukrainian users expressed their ideas and propositions more dramatically and radically than American users, as the matters discussed in the posts are less relevant/connected to American users.

Moreover, the results highlighted diverse evidential markers usage tendencies in social media posts, written by American and Ukrainian users. As mentioned earlier, both American and Ukrainian users most regularly included communicative evidential markers in their posts, 15.2 and 9.1 occurrences per 1,000 words, followed by cognitive evidential markers, 2.6 and 4.6 occurrences per 1,000 words. Marín-Arrese (2011) highlighted the cognitive as well as pragmatic functions of the epistemic stance, which indicates the strength of belief rather than intentions to act. Both American and Ukrainian users have been proven to include cognitive evidential markers in their posts to express their thoughts, beliefs, and opinions. American users included such cognitive evidential markers in their social media posts as *think/don't think* (US Post 3, 21, 22), *say* (US Post 8), *don't understand* (US Post 13), *know* (US Post 15). Meanwhile, Ukrainian users chose the following: *задаю, що/ вважають, що* [*think that*] (UA Post 6, 7, 19, 21), *на думку* [*according to one's opinion*] (UA Post 4), *знаю* [*know*] (UA Post 11), *усвідомлюють* [*realize*] (UA Post 16), *не знаю* [*don't know*] (UA Post 25). Both American and Ukrainian representatives resorted to cognitive evidential markers to add their opinions/perspectives based on their social and cultural backgrounds to the factual information they presented.

Less often Americans and Ukrainians used experiential evidential markers, 1.5 and 1.4 occurrences per 1,000 words. As Ajana (2024) noted, Western media tends to differentiate between Ukrainian and Middle Eastern refugees, reinstating a selective epistemic legitimacy and seeing migration as an international responsibility. Unlike Western humanitarianism, Ukrainian discourse, like most Eastern European discourses, views migration as a significant matter of national independence and regional security and conceptualizes it through historical and cultural contexts (Hendl et al., 2024; Marín Arrese, 2021b). The research of American and Ukrainian posts in social

media showed that both groups tend to include experiential evidential markers in their posts to share their first-hand experience on the ongoing matters that involve Ukrainian immigrants and establish their national identities. The US corpus showed that American users included such experiential evidential markers as *saw/ have seen* (US Post 2, 30), *obviously* (US Post 7, 26), *hear* (US Post 8), while the UA corpus demonstrated that Ukrainian users resort to the following experiential evidential markers: *виявилось/ з'ясувалось* [*turned out*] (UA Post 2, 3, 19), *звичайно* [*obviously/of course*] (UA Post 16, 29), *нобачив* [*saw*] (UA Post 29). Both groups convey the characteristics of their national identities to join the discussion of Ukrainian immigrants on social media.

Both American and Ukrainian users tended to refer to external sources rather than their internal mental processes and beliefs, and even less to their own experiences, which shows the common tendencies among online users to refer to external credible sources rather than to cognitive individuals' processes or personal experiences. Both American and Ukrainian users' posts included different types of evidential markers to support their claims and agendas: presenting information from credible sources, appealing to the emotions of their audiences, sharing stories from their personal lives, etc. It is also important to mention that both the US and the UA corpora did not display a high number of instances of truth-factual validity markers. This could be explained by the fact that for both American and Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian migrant crisis became a personally significant matter, which prevented them from presenting their claims neutrally without applying their epistemic positioning.

5. Conclusion

To conclude, both American and Ukrainian groups proved to include a high number of epistemic stance markers in their social media posts on the ongoing discussion on Ukrainian immigrants. Overall frequencies of American and Ukrainian users' epistemic stance markers did not differ, 25 and 29 occurrences per 1,000 words, however, there were differences in the subcategories. Furthermore, the US and UA corpora demonstrated the highest frequency of epistemic modality markers and communicative evidential markers, followed by cognitive and experiential evidential markers in social media posts on Ukrainian immigrants. The study showed that while Americans resorted to certainty markers the most in their posts, Ukrainians more often included possibility markers. This highlights the differences in American and Ukrainian users' epistemic commitment to their claims regarding Ukrainian immigrants on social media. Such epistemic stancetaking of both groups added American and Ukrainian online users' perspectives to the global migration discourse

and proved that social media users, as well as traditional media, frequently use epistemic positioning and evidential markers in their narratives in an attempt to shape public perception of Ukrainian immigrants.

Americans and Ukrainians' stancetaking in their posts on Ukrainian immigrants was mostly influenced by their cultural backgrounds and national identities. Ideological, cultural, and political discourses proved to play a significant role in the users' epistemic positioning choices, influencing the various tendencies in epistemic stancetaking of the representatives of different cultures and beliefs. Due to social media's growing influence in shaping public opinions and beliefs, it is more accessible for people to read and find news on social media rather than on traditional media. Besides its accessibility, social media serves as a safe/open space for diverse discussions within various discourses, as social media users are less limited in their freedom of expression and less censored compared to traditional media authors. In addition to a proposition of how this study contributes to stancetaking research within migration discourse, this chapter indicates the limitations of research as well as further research recommendations.

Several limitations have been identified throughout the research process while collecting and analyzing the data. The lack of access to posts and replies written from private or restricted accounts was one of the limitations, which narrowed the study to only publicly available posts and replies. Another limitation was the social media algorithm that affects what type of content is visible to the users. The content varies for each user based on their online activity. Social media algorithms could potentially influence the representativeness of the corpus, as users have to register and log in to search for posts on both Facebook and X, which makes their search personalized. The next limitation appeared while manually verifying users' nationalities as some users restricted or provided incomplete information about their origin, which could also affect the accuracy of the results. Social media discourse often involves informal language such as slang, emojis, abbreviations, and hashtags, complicating the interpretation of the epistemic stance markers. While some stance expressions were marked explicitly by lexical choices, there were also implicitly marked expressions found in the corpus that were harder to identify. Thus, some instances of epistemic modality markers researched and presented in the study were difficult to categorize.

Just a few longitudinal studies follow the evolution of epistemic stance to evaluate the long-term changes in migration narratives (Sinclair et al. 2024). Different cultural groups' evolution of epistemic stancetaking in migration discourse should be reflected in future research that considers

how epistemic positioning shifts across languages, platforms, and historical contexts and composes migration discourse analysis. Besides, Ukrainian users often present their thoughts and information on social media in Russian and English in addition to Ukrainian. This might be because some Ukrainians come from the Russian-speaking regions and find it challenging to express their thoughts in Ukrainian. Other Ukrainians write their posts in English as a universal language to share valuable information, which might be unfamiliar to global communities outside of Ukraine. American users, who speak languages other than English might also write their posts, which include epistemic positioning, in other languages. A bigger comparison study of American and Ukrainian epistemic stancetaking on social media that includes not only English and Ukrainian languages could be implemented in the future to provide a broader understanding of their stance positioning.

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Summary in Lithuanian

Dėl Rusijos ir Ukrainos karo daugelis ukrainiečių persikėlė į priimančiąsias šalis, daugiausia į Europą ir JAV. Dėl to internete ėmė gausėti socialinių tinklų įrašų apie Ukrainos imigrantus. Šiame tyrime lyginamas amerikiečių ir ukrainiečių episteminis pozicionavimas jų įrašuose apie Ukrainos imigrantus, sudarant JAV ir UA tekstynus iš amerikiečių ir ukrainiečių socialinių tinklų „X“ (buvęs „Twitter“) ir „Facebook“ įrašų. Darbo tikslas – ištirti, kokius epistemiškumo žymiklius dažniausiai vartojama amerikiečiai ir ukrainiečiai internete vykstančiose diskusijose apie Ukrainos imigrantus, nustatyti tarpkalbines vartosenos tendencijas ir jas nulemenčius faktorius ir taip prisidėti prie stancetaking autoriauspožiūrio raiškos (angl. *stancetaking*) tyrimų migracijos diskurse.

Tyrime taikomi kiekybiniai ir kokybiniai metodai, siekiant atskleisti, kaip šios dvi nacionalinės ir kultūrinės grupės reiškia savo episteminį pozicionavimą kalbėdamos apie Ukrainos imigrantus internete. Analizei taip pat taikomas Marín Arrese (2011) episteminio pozicionavimo žymiklių modelis, pagal kurį duomenyse rasti raiškos būdai klasifikuojami į penkias pagrindines kategorijas: episteminis modalumas (tikrumo, tikimybės ar galimybės raiška), tiesos/faktų pagrįstumas, eksperiencinis evidencialumas, kognityvinis ir komunikacinis evidencialumas.

Rezultatai parodė, kad nors abi grupės dažnai naudoja episteminio modalumo bei komunikacinius evidencialumo žymiklius savo internetiniuose įrašuose, amerikiečiai dažniau linkę įtraukti komunikacinius evidencialus tam, kad pagrįstų savo teiginius. Toks episteminių žymiklių vartojimas socialiniuose tinkluose abiejų grupių atstovų įrašuose atskleidžia visuomenės požiūrį į Ukrainos imigrantus. Tyrimo duomenys neatskleidė reikšmingų skirtumų tarp amerikiečių ir ukrainiečių kognityvinių ir eksperiencinių evidencialumo žymiklių vartosenos dažnio – abi grupės įtraukia šiuos žymiklius išreikšdamos savo įsitikinimus apie Ukrainos pabėgėlius ir su jais susijusius klausimus. Reikia pastebėti, kad abiejuose tekstynuose buvo nustatytas nedidelis tiesos/faktų pagrįstumo žymiklių skaičius, o tai rodo, kad abiem grupėms sunku pateikti informaciją apie Ukrainos imigrantus neutraliai, nepridedant savo episteminio vertinimo.

Raktiniai žodžiai: *episteminis autoriaus požiūris, episteminio autoriaus požiūrio raiškos strategijos, migracijos diskursas, socialinių tinklų diskursas, anglų kalba, ukrainiečių kalba*

Appendix 1 (US Corpus)

1. Send this to everyone before they vote

Hundreds Of Thousands of Ukraine ‘Refugees’ Claiming American Social Security Benefits

“Our viewers asked us to verify — we can verify it's true.”

Kamala Harris Admin “Has made it legal for Ukrainian immigrants to get SSI checks”

DHS Estimates (Communicative evidentials) 537,000 Ukraine ‘Refugees’ Have Entered America

“**Our sources are** (Communicative evidentials) the Social Security Administration, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, the Uniting for Ukraine program, and immigration lawyer Charles Cook”

“The Office of Refugee Resettlement **confirms** (Communicative evidentials) humanitarian parolees **may** (Epistemic modality: possibility) also be eligible for assistance through existing programs”

They’re getting social security, health care, food stamps and more. All paid for by US Tax payers and draining out Social Security.

2. Agreed. Anyone looking at this **sees** (Cognitive evidentials) the ongoing torture of families in Gaza by Israel. When **I saw** (Experiential evidential) Ukrainian refugees, my heart broke. Like many, I begged the world to intervene. And it did. But we can't care about Palestinians? Instead, we support their torture?

3. Ukrainians are literally dying in the streets.

The war with Russia has transformed their country. Yet, we are not importing millions of Ukrainian migrants. Why not? You **would think** (Epistemic modality: probability +Cognitive evidentials) that Ukrainians, due to the war, **would have** (Epistemic modality: probability) a very good basis to claim asylum. But instead, we are importing South Americans, Central Americans, and Africans. That’s weird.

4. Moldova **has announced that** (Communicative evidentials) it **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) catch and return ‘illegal Ukrainian migrants’ who are fleeing mobilization.

Moldovan border guards plan to cooperate with Ukrainian authorities to catch evaders who are trying to escape Ukraine through the Transnistrian region, **said** (Communicative evidentials) Moldovan Interior Minister Adrian Efros.

‘**Obviously**, (Experiential evidential) everyone is trying to save their lives, and for the most part people who cross state borders illegally are men between the ages of 18 and 60,’ **he said** (Communicative evidentials).

5. The group that helped us feed nearly 2,000,000 hungry Ukrainian refugees is now feeding our

hungry neighbors!

Please give \$50 or more if you can and email matthew@outreachprogram.org the date you think we'll **pack** (Epistemic modality: probability) our 50 millionth meal. The winner gets an item of their choice from each of our Gallery artists. The next 50 donors of \$50+ get a free Celtics green T-shirt! You can donate, sign up to volunteer, connect with us to get free meals for your pantry, and/or watch and share our Ending Domestic Hunger video (<https://youtu.be/oj5e0nkHEqQ>) at EndHungerNE.org!

The more funds we have, the more volunteers we can have, the more hungry New Englanders we can feed. @theoutreachprogram

6. **Sure**, (Epistemic modality: certainty) Ukrainian refugees grew up in a semi western environment. Decent moral compass, applicable work ethic, low cultural abrasion. Assimilation is not difficult and it doesn't destroy the ethnic makeup.

Palestinian refugees like their Arab counterparts grew up in a Muslim environment, an environment that's anti western, they don't have a work ethic and the little work ethic they do have is not applicable and they induce high cultural abrasion through demands of sharia, rape, gang rape, intimidation, religious overtaking and arson of churches. They also decimate the ethnic makeup of a European country.

A very stark difference in the quality of refugees and the outcomes they **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) produce. Hope this helps

7. African migrants were brutally assaulted and killed in Spain this week. Central American migrants were trapped and suffocated to death in a truck in Texas this week as well.

Once again **we are reminded** (Cognitive evidentials) of the double standards and the hypocrisy of the West in welcoming Ukrainian refugees safely while assaulting, deporting and turning away those escaping conflict, violence and starvation from Central America and Africa. #melila #sanantonio #spain #texas #refugees #migrants

8. **I hear** (Experiential evidentials) many stories about Ukrainian refugees acting very entitled and aggressive in their host countries. **I say** (Cognitive evidentials) deport them ALL!!!!

Why should #Ireland and #Irish People feed ANY PARASITES???? ☹️

9. Over 835,000 refugees have fled Ukraine due to Russia's deadly invasion, **says the UN**. (Communicative evidentials)

Nigeria **will airlift** (Epistemic modality: probability) 1,000+ citizens from neighboring countries.

Many say (Communicative evidentials) they faced racism while evacuating: "Ukrainians have been prioritized over Africans — men and women — at every point."

10. Trump has ended the refugee program that allowed Ukrainians to come to the United States Thankfully my Ukrainian friends made it in time, however their family members cannot come to the United States now. My friends are very stressed they **will be sent back** (Epistemic modality: probability- attributed) to Ukraine.

11. Mayor Johnson defending Hispanic immigrants **says** (Communicative evidentials) when 30,000 UKRAINIAN immigrants came to Chicago Trump was Silent! Ukrainians who made it hard for African students to flee Russia's war and a look at their relatives precincts in Chicago **reveals** (Communicative evidentials) they voted Trump!) Stand up Mayor!

12. Ukrainian men do not want to defend the corrupt Kiev government and are fleeing the country, seeing it as a "prison", German television channel **NTV reported**, (Communicative evidentials) **citing illegal Ukrainian immigrants** (Communicative evidentials).

"The closure of the border has turned Ukraine into a prison for men," **said** (Communicative evidentials) one of those interviewed by the channel, 23-year-old Bogdan Khorolsky.

The young man **said** (Communicative evidentials) he saw no point in defending a corrupt system.

"They take people and send them to war. It's slavery," **said** (Communicative evidentials) another interviewee, 32-year-old Sergei Zhgorolsky.

He also did not want to defend a country "where the government and the oligarchs own everything and the people have nothing".

13. I really **don't understand** (Cognitive evidentials) this.

Ukrainian refugees for the most part are good and law abiding citizens/residents. Whatever beef you have with their government shouldn't have anything to do with them.

Revoking the legal status and naturalizations of the millions of Islamists who have infiltrated our country over the past two decades should be a much higher priority.

14. If you are a praying person, take a few minutes to set aside your political opinions about the war in Ukraine and pray for its suffering citizens. **I have come to know** (Experiential evidentials) many beautiful Ukrainian immigrants to USA recently. They are beautiful and their stories are heart wrenching.

15. Immensely grateful to Poland, Hungary and Romania for letting in Ukrainian Refugees.

Maybe (Epistemic modality: probability), they **could** consider (Epistemic modality: possibility) just

opening the border and letting refugees through without checking passports?

I know (Cognitive evidential) - not how it is done, but these are EXTRAORDINARY times.

#StandWithUkraine UA

16. Baby and her BFF tutor 2 little boys who are refugees from Ukraine each Saturday. Even in light of the **likelihood of losing** (Epistemic modality: probability) their immigration status, they are still so kind and generous to the girls. #SlavaUkraini

17. Thousands of refugees from Ukraine have been sent to so-called filtration camps, where they have been interrogated and then forced to resettle in Russia. Some Ukrainians escaped to Estonia.

They told us (Communicative evidentials) their stories.

18. Trump is planning on revoking 240,000 Ukrainian legal asylum status. May God have mercy on his soul. **Blood will spill** (Epistemic modality: high) at Trump and Putins feet.

19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Maria Zakharova sharply criticized the Danish Foreign Minister's statement about sending troops to Ukraine, sarcastically questioning who **would** (Epistemic modality: possibility) guard Greenland and **suggesting** (Communicative evidentials) Ukrainian refugees might take on the role.

20. **Important piece from** (Communicative evidentials) @nicohaeringer **arguing** (Communicative evidentials) that our solidarity with Ukrainian refugees **might be** (Epistemic modality: possibility) setting a new template for thinking about refugees in general. Which, given the climate crisis, can't happen soon enough

21. Actually the liberal party has become the neocons from 2000s, goading war at any cost.

That said **I don't think** (Cognitive evidentials) Ukrainian refugees should be sent back right now.

It's not their fault this is happening. A Ukrainian guy who speaks no English is building my friend's deck.

22. **I don't think** (Cognitive evidentials) Ukrainian refugees should be allowed in now.

Wtf are we bankrupting ourselves for a country that has done zero things for us, and was deemed too corrupt to be let in the UN. They're dragging us into WWII. There are countries plenty closer they can refuge

23. Those Ukrainians were generally hard working, a lot of grain came from Ukraine, it takes a lot to get to Canada, a work ethic if you will...

I get it limit refugees... blah blah blah... but also **I don't think** (Cognitive evidentials) UKRAINIAN refugees are the problem...

...a lot of **stats backing** (Communicative evidentials) that!

24. Trump 'plans to revoke immigration status for Ukrainians who fled to US'

The move **would reverse** (Epistemic modality: possibility) the welcome they received under Joe Biden and potentially fast-track them for deportation

Donald Trump is seeking to revoke the temporary legal status for some 240,000 Ukrainians who fled the conflict to find refuge in the United States, **according to reports** (Communicative evidentials).

The move, which **could be** (Epistemic modality: possibility) rolled out as soon as April, **would reverse** (Epistemic modality: possibility) the welcome Ukrainians received under President Joe Biden's administration during Russia's 2022 invasion of the country. This potentially leaves Ukrainians in the US under the "temporary protected status" scheme facing deportation.

The planned rollback of protections for Ukrainians was underway before Trump's public row with Volodymyr Zelensky last week, **Reuters reported** (Communicative evidentials), **citing a senior Trump official** (Communicative evidentials) and three sources familiar with the matter.

Trump's administration is seeking to strip legal status from more than 1.8 million migrants allowed to enter the country under the temporary humanitarian parole programs launched under the Biden administration, **the sources said** (Communicative evidentials).

The US Department of Homeland Security **said** (Communicative evidentials) it did not have any announcements at this time.

The White House and Ukrainian embassy in Washington were also approached for comment.

Trump 'pausing' temporary settlement status

It comes after Department of Homeland Security officials **were told** (Communicative evidentials) to pause programs that allowed new Ukrainian immigrants to temporarily settle in the US, the New York Times **reported** (Communicative evidentials), days after Trump's inauguration.

Trump – on his first day back in office – also signed an executive order calling for the Department of Homeland Security to "terminate all categorical parole programs". This involves some 530,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans, and 70,000 Afghans escaping the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Migrants stripped of their parole status **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) then likely face fast-track deportation proceedings.

Ukrainian refugees in the US share a similar status to those from Haiti, Venezuela, known as

“temporary protected status”.

Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem last month ended the previous administration’s extension of the programme for both Venezuelans and Haitians, **arguing** (Communicative evidentials) it had been “abused and exploited by illegal aliens”.

Immigrant rights groups subsequently filed a lawsuit on Monday challenging the decision to end temporary protections against deportation for thousands of Haitians and Venezuelans in the US. An end to the status for Ukrainians **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) likely face a similar legal challenge.

Under US law, migrants who cross the border illegally can be put into the fast-track deportation process known as expedited removal, for two years after they enter.

Those who entered through legal ports of entry without being officially “admitted” to the US – such as those who are on parole – face no time limit on their rapid removal, an internal ICE email seen by Reuters **said** (Communicative evidentials).

Throughout his campaign, Trump **pledged** (Communicative evidentials) to end Biden’s program which created a temporary legal pathways to deter illegal immigration and provide humanitarian relief.

He **said** (Communicative evidentials) the refugees’ legal status in the country went beyond the bounds of US law.

‘Speaking out for victims of war should not be a partisan issue’

Both Republican and Democrat lawmakers in the past weeks made efforts to grant Ukrainians with temporary guest status until the war in Ukraine had ended.

The legislation, Protecting our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act, aimed to allow Ukrainians to stay in the US with their immediate family members until the Secretary of State determined that it was safe for them to return.

Senator Dick Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois, introduced the law last month on the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In a plea to Republicans to co-sponsor the bill, he called on colleagues to “join us to ensure Ukrainians legally present in the US have temporary guest status until conditions in Ukraine are safe for return.

Standing up to dictators and speaking out for victims of war should not be a partisan issue.”

Fearing that the legislation **may not** (Epistemic modality: possibility) be passed, he **urged** (Communicative evidentials) Ukrainians in the US to “think about what they **would** (Epistemic

modality: possibility) do if U4U or TPS for Ukrainians ends, and they no longer have legal status to remain in the US.”

President George HW Bush introduced temporary protected status in 1990 to allow immigrants in the US the ability to live and work legally if their home countries are not deemed safe either due to armed conflict, natural disasters, or other “extraordinary and temporary conditions.”

The status is granted to a specific country for between 18 and 24 months at a time and can be extended.

Ukrainians **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) become ‘illegal immigrants overnight’

Yuriy Boyechko, the CEO of Hope for Ukraine – a US charity assisting refugees coming into the country – **said** (Communicative evidentials) “we were expecting this **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) probably be coming down the pipeline”.

He **said** (Communicative evidentials) many Ukrainians who arrived in the US as part of United for Ukraine – a repatriation programme for those affected during the initial outbreak of the war – had not been able to renew their paperwork to extend their stay in recent months.

“People are going to become illegal immigrants overnight,” **he told** (Communicative evidentials)

The i Paper. “People have no home to go to... It’s inhumane.

“We are hoping this administration will reconsider this decision, and that it won’t go into effect. But if it does it will be devastating.”

Boyechko **said** (Communicative evidentials) he **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) wait to see what the official ruling was from the White House before deciding whether to join Haitian and Venezuelan charities in taking the issue to court.

Once the action is taken by the administration, then we **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) figure out what we can do right now, how we can protect these families.”

Krish O’Mara Vignarajah, CEO of Global Refuge, a national refugee resettlement charity in the US, **said** (Communicative evidentials): “We pray there is no decision to strip temporary legal protections from 240,000 Ukrainians who fled war and devastation in their homeland.

“These families followed a legal process to seek safe haven here, one that requires sponsorship by US-based supporters. We are heartened to **hear from** (Communicative evidentials) the White House that no decision has been made, because reversing protections now **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) send a troubling message about America’s commitment to those seeking safety from conflict.”

25. Art imitates life. Or really, art mirrors life. **I believe** (Cognitive evidentials) that artists have both the ability and the responsibility to reflect what is happening in the world. The amazing, the dreadful, and the grey area between.

@batterydance, the brilliantly talented dance company based in NYC, just performed this incredibly powerful piece at @BatteryDance Festival. Its visual narrative traverses the journey of people through the horrors of deadly conflict - and through nuances of necessary strength, resistance, and hope. Romanian choreographer @Arcadie.Rusu presented his piece Cain in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. And it struck many chords - with me and so many others.

As with nearly all such wars - unless they are literally on our doorstep, we as a world tend to forget. We put the difficult images and realities to the side. We **think** (Cognitive evidentials) that those who survive and escape are 'lucky' or 'doing fine'. But for those enduring and suffering through these conflicts, there is no such break. And they are **most certainly** (Epistemic modality: certainty) not 'fine', whether they are physically safe or not.

I offer this post's images and thoughts on their own - but also as pretext for my next series, which I **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) present periodically over the coming weeks. This series toes the line between darkness and light - again, reflecting the realities of life.

I had the opportunity to travel to Poland recently, to celebrate the marriage of 2 dear friends.

Planning for this trip, and **knowing** (Cognitive evidentials) that Krakow is one of the main cities to which Ukrainian refugees are fleeing, I also felt compelled to try to help in the crisis in some small way. After fracturing my knee, I **knew** (Cognitive evidentials) I could not be a traditional volunteer given physical restrictions. But I could photograph. And so I cold-called orgs that seemed credible and authentic in their support and actions. I **shared** (Communicative evidentials) my portfolio and intent to amplify the stories and experiences of willing refugees and volunteers - through photography and written word. All except one replied with an enthusiastic yes..and off I went. And I returned home a different and very changed person.

Let us not forget. Portraits and very human stories to come..

#BatteryDanceFestival #StandWithUkraine

26. 0% of profits on any purchase of my art & music (CDs) **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) be donated to help Ukrainian refugees and whatever is in dire need for those still in the Ukraine, defending their freedom and their land. Too bad I don't build fighter jets...

My grandmother was Ukrainian (when it was under Russian rule) and the anti-semitic pogroms led

by the Cossacks violently pushed them out of their home (and homeLAND, **obviously** (Experiential evidential) in the early 20th century, and my family had to leave everything behind, and then they moved from country to country before they came to NY. My grandmother saw her uncle brutally murdered when she was just a young girl. I won't share the gory details.

Some **don't realize** (Cognitive evidentials) that a gallery takes 50% of sales. So instead, it **would** (Epistemic modality: possibility) be an honor to give that much to the Ukrainian efforts to save their people and land.

I'm too overwhelmed now to list charities but I **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty).

@worldfoodprogramme and @rescueorg are top of my list.

I'll post more art later... just hard to do a slider with vertical and horizontal images. (#Whitgram doesn't always make it easy even though it's supposed to)

If you could contact me through my website instead of here (the link is in the bio, www.randirusso.com), I'd appreciate it. I really don't check in on Instagram much because it's such a time-suck filled with advertisement and I actually feel ill when I spend too much time on here. If I don't return your email/msg right away, please know that I **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) be in touch with you within a week.

(Please note that shipping or delivery costs are not included. And this does not apply to commissions, which I am currently on hiatus from).

.#saveukraine #slavaukraini #empathy #empathymatters #love #humanity #freedom #care #nowar #food #shelter #children #donations from sale of #art #abstractart #artist #randirusso #contemporaryart #painting #modernart #checkitout : randirusso.com

27. **U.S. government** email that **told** (Communicative evidentials) Ukrainian refugees that their status had been revoked was sent by mistake.

Ukrainians who had fled to the U.S. from Vladimir Putin's full-scale invasion under a program created by the previous Joe Biden administration, had been informed this week that they **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) have to leave the country within seven days, **according to Reuters** (Communicative evidentials).

But the Department of Homeland Security later **said** (Communicative evidentials) that the message had been sent in error.

Newsweek has contacted the Department of Homeland Security for further comment.

28. President Donald Trump is planning to revoke temporary legal status for Ukrainians who fled to the US, sources **said** (Communicative evidentials), potentially putting them on a fast-track to deportation. The move, expected as soon as April, would be a stunning reversal of the welcome Ukrainians received under Joe Biden's administration.

“Revoking temporary legal status for thousands of Ukrainians would mark a reversal of Biden’s efforts to welcome Ukrainian refugees and the “Uniting for Ukraine” initiative. Homeland Security **said** (Communicative evidentials) the program would allow Ukrainians suffering “immense tragedy and loss as a result of Putin’s unprovoked and unjustified attack on their country” to enter and temporarily reside in the U.S., while also requesting Americans to sponsor refugees. The Trump administration **said** (Communicative evidentials) last month it was carrying out the “largest deportation operation” in U.S. history, as Trump repeatedly **said** (Communicative evidentials) he **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) push for all migrants accused of crimes to be deported. Trump signed an executive order on Jan. 20 requesting the Department of Homeland Security to “terminate all categorical parole programs.” The Trump administration is expected to revoke temporary legal status for migrants from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela who flew to the U.S. with American sponsors, **CBS News reported** (Communicative evidentials), citing internal government documents. The move **would affect** (Epistemic modality: possibility) over 530,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans. Some 77,000 Afghans who escaped the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan are also covered under the parole programs.”

29. It is unthinkable that the Trump **administration would** (Epistemic modality: possibility) revoke the status of Ukrainian refugees in the U.S.

This **would be** (Epistemic modality: possibility) not only wrong, but also short-sighted. These are families—parents and children—who fled war and were invited to America for safe haven.

Trump must reopen dialogue with Zelensky so this war, started by Putin and Russia, can end, allowing Ukrainians to return home safely.

30. Daily Ukraine Update: August 10, 2024

I do daily posts on the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Visit my profile to see previous posts.

Kursk Offensive:

Ukrainian forces continued to expand their area of control in Russia's Kursk Oblast. While forward elements continue to advance deeper into #Kursk, other units have been fanning out and widening the breach. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) **seem to** (Experiential evidentials) have learned

from Russia's failed 2022 invasion that so-called, "thunder runs," without adequate follow-on forces **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) turn success into failure. PStyleOne1 wrote, "Having control on the main roads, Ukrainians are slowly making the junction between the various axis of advance. The Russians in between have the choice between surrendering or death."

Tendar reported (Communicative evidentials) that, "Ukrainian forces have consolidated gains north of Sudzha and have taken several towns up to the town of Cherkasskoe Porochnoe. The area **is likely** (Epistemic modality: probability) since days under AFU control, but Russian drone footage only now **confirms** (Communicative evidentials) it. This make around 470 square kilometers (185 square miles) under Ukrainian control in less than 5 days." Some Russian military bloggers **suggest** (Communicative evidentials) the actual area is even larger. Maks 24 wrote, "The area of hostilities in Kursk region today is 650 sq. km, **according to** (Communicative evidentials) Russians." Russia's ally in Belarus **echoed** (Communicative evidentials) these alarming reports. War Translated (Dmitri) wrote, "Concerned Lukashenko **says** (Communicative evidentials) Ukraine advanced 30-35 km into the Russian territory as of today."

This is a stunning advance, unlike anything we **have seen** (Experiential evidentials) in over a year. Tendar **explained** (Communicative evidentials), "Just to put things into perspective: It took Russians almost a year and between 70,000 and 100,000 WIA / KIA in casualties to take 390 square kilometers (150 square miles) in the Avdiivka sector. They hailed this as a "genius" move. Ukrainians took in 5 days more than 470 square kilometers (180 square miles) in Kursk, with no significant losses, according Russian claims even up to 700 square kilometers, and there is no sign of them stopping."

As the day went on, Russian and Ukrainian sources **shared reports** (Communicative evidentials) of Ukrainian soldiers in more and more Kursk villages. NOEL Reports wrote, "**According to** (Communicative evidentials) Russian sources. Ukrainian forward units, **likely** (Epistemic modality: probability) DRG, were spotted in the direction of Belitsa, Kursk region. This is several kilometers deep and away from the current frontline." OSINT Technical wrote, "Ukrainian T-64BV main battle tank moving northeast through the Russian town of Rubanshchina, Kursk Oblast." Another wrote, "Russian sources report that Ukrainian forces were spotted in the vicinity of Belitsa, Kursk Oblast. Explosions were also **reported** (Communicative evidentials) in the area."

Widening Offensive:

Reports from Russia and Ukraine also **suggest** (Communicative evidentials) that the AFU are

adding additional axes of advance to their already successful offensive. In Kursk, Russians **report** (Communicative evidentials) that Ukrainians are bombarding the border crossing at Tetkino. OSINT Technical wrote, "Russian sources report heavy Ukrainian shelling and fire in the town of Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, 40km to the west of the current Ukrainian push." Michael MacKay wrote, "Ukrainian artillery is bombarding the town of Titkine in Kursk region. The Russian border guard detachment there is cut off from outside communication. Titkine is 68 km west of Sudzha, Kursk region, Russian Federation."

To the south and east, Bandera Fella wrote, "**According to** (Communicative evidentials) [Russian] reports, a new Ukrainian brigade has entered the Belovsky district. Tanks and a substantial amount of military equipment are pushing forward, moving in various directions. Russia's grip is slipping. The momentum is with Ukraine."

Outside of Kursk, **there are reports** (Communicative evidentials) that Ukrainian allied forces crossed into Russia's #Belgorod Oblast. Tomi **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "There are reports and visually confirmed footage of Ukrainian troops in Belgorod region. Town of Poroz is under Ukrainian control. Russian forces still **seem to** (Experiential evidentials) be in total chaos." Maks 24 **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Threats of breakthroughs in the Belgorod region, according to Russians." Euan MacDonald **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "I admit I didn't think the war **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) expand geographically and increase in intensity quite so quickly! Georgians **reported** (Communicative evidentials) to have broken into Russia's Belgorod Oblast now!" It's **unclear** (Epistemic modality: possibility) if this incursion is truly a new element of the offensive or a demonstration meant to tie down Russian reinforcements. The effort has stoked Russian fears and NOEL Reports **shared** (Communicative evidentials) that, "In addition to Kursk and Bryansk, a counter-terrorism operation (KTO) regime has been introduced in the Bilhorod region."

Russian Reinforcements:

One **possible** (Epistemic modality: possibility) rationale for Ukraine's Kursk Offensive is to lure Russian men and materiel away from fortifications of the east and destroy them in the open. The AFU has proven especially adept at targeting the relief columns the Kremlin is sending toward the frontline in Kursk. Bandera Fella **noted that** (Communicative evidentials), "UAF sabotage groups are using FPV drones to target Russian equipment on the Kursk-Rylsk highway, according to a Z-war correspondent." In one incident, two days ago, Ukrainian forces destroyed an entire column

with ATACMS missiles. Maks 24 **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "In the Russian destroyed column near #Rylsk, 490 dead Russians, - soldiers of the 116th OMBR."

It **appears** (Cognitive evidentials) the Ukrainians hacked into Russian traffic cameras to track the movement of military vehicles. War Monitor **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Russian forces have finally worked out that Ukrainian intelligence have been watching their troops the whole time through hacked roadside cameras." In other cases, Russia's own propaganda efforts have led to disaster. Azov South **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "The Armed Forces destroyed a tank ambush of the russians in Kursk in the morning." **Apparently** (Cognitive evidentials), the Russians shared a propaganda video of their preparations to boost morale, inadvertently alerting the Ukrainians to their presence.

The AFU have also set up air ambushes. They **seem to** (Experiential evidentials) have brought adequate air defense systems to or across the border and have regularly destroyed Russian fighter-bombers and helicopters. Today, War Monitor **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Reports of Ukrainian forces shooting down an SU-34 bomber of Russian forces in Kursk region." War Translated (Dmitri) added, "Another Russian Ka-52 helicopter defeated. "Point blank shot from MANPADS."

Ukrainian Strikes:

In addition to targeting Russian reinforcements, the Ukrainians have launched drone and missile attacks on facilities behind the rapidly moving front line. Intelschizo **reported** (Communicative evidentials), "Ukrainian OWA-UAV attack on the Yuzhnaya 330/110kV Transformer Substation at 51.639567,35.952667 is connected to the Kursk #Nuclear Power Plant this may cause connectivity issues for the plants and could take it offline or reduced power production." Jason Jay Smart **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Substation attacked in Kursk region of Russia. Five areas are now without energy. Well, Russians, do you enjoy sitting in the dark like the people in Ukraine do because of you?"

In addition to the power grid, Maks 24 **reported** (Communicative evidentials), "At night, a drone attack was also carried out on the repair base of the Russians in Novyi Oskol, Belgorod region. 7 UAVs hit directly at the base, 2 hangars and 3 combat vehicles were damaged." And, MilitaryNewsUA **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Something is burning in Shebekino, Belgorod Region, and Rostov."

Russian Reaction:

One thing is clear (Epistemic modality: certainty), Russian commanders were taken completely off-guard by the size and success of Ukraine's offensive. Some units have collapsed and the Ukrainians report capturing over 1,000 prisoners. Jan Kallberg **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "The Russian's massive officer losses in Bachmut and along the front of junior officers are now playing out in Kursk. With no experienced junior officers that can lead, the Russian units become just a mass of individuals, and they **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) take massive losses. I wrote this 1½ years ago before the UKR offensive that stalled, it is valid today."

Russia's dictator, Vladimir #Putin, appears displeased with his military leadership and intends to hand responsibility for turning the tide in Kursk to his trusted state security apparatus. Aki Heikkinen **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "FSB took over of the Kursk situation, army sidelined. **Will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) go splendid, goons ordering army what to do with very little understanding of mechanized warfare and lessons learned during the war."

Civilian authorities are working to complete a mass evacuation of Russian civilians from the area. Maks 24 **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "More than 76,000 Russians were evacuated from the border areas of the Kursk region, - Ministry of Emergency Situations." They are also helping to construct new defenses, especially around the Kursk Nuclear Power Station -- rumored to be a key Ukrainian objective. Maks 24 **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "The Russians, fearing the further advance of Ukrainian troops, began the construction of an additional line of defense in the Kursk region." Michael Weiss **added** (Communicative evidentials), "Russians are digging trenches around the Kursk NPP."

The Kremlin faces the vital task of bringing reinforcements to Kursk to stem Ukraine's advance. The Kyiv Independent **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Kursk region incursion may force Russia to redeploy troops, Estonian intelligence says. Ukraine's incursion into Russia's Kursk region may force Moscow to redeploy troops from other sectors, **said** (Communicative evidentials) Janek Kesselmann, the deputy commander of the Estonian Military Intelligence Center, in comments reported by ERR on Aug. 9." Some open source intelligence figures suggested such a transfer is already underway.

Jason Jay Smart **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Russia transfers the operational reserve from Ukraine's Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Kupyan, Kharkiv, Belgorod, Pokrovsky & Luhansk directions to the Kursk region." I bet this is about to work out very badly for Russia." War Monitor **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Russian forces are now transferring forces from Bakhmut and

Adiivka areas of the frontline. Ukrainian command has worked a genius move." Ukraine's ability to draw forces from the campaign in the Donbas **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) be one vital marker of success for this campaign in Kursk.

Donbas:

So far, the Kursk campaign has done nothing to halt Russia's steady advance in the #Donbas. Rob Lee **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Updated map showing Russian advances on the Kupiansk and #Pokrovsk fronts and in Krasnohorivka," and, "Updated map showing further Russian advances west of New York and on the Pokrovsk front." These advances bring Russian forces closer to cutting a vital highway supplying Ukrainian units on this sector of the front. Julian Ropcke **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "The Russian invasion army captured Tymofiivka in Donetsk oblast. No visual conformation, but now confirmed by both, Ukrainian and Russian sources (DeepState + RuMoD). Distance to strategic logistic route T0504 between Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka is now merely 5 km." A collapse in the Donbas **would** (Epistemic modality: probability) negate the value of much of Ukraine's success in Kursk.

Concerns:

While Ukraine's Kursk Offensive is so far an unqualified tactical success, Western military analysts remain cautious about its broader strategic value. It is still an open question whether this campaign **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) shorten the war and/or put Ukraine in a better bargaining position at future negotiations. Michael Lokesson offered a thorough assessment of the risks of this Ukrainian gamble and the strategic position that made them decide it was necessary.

Lokesson **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "For the past month Zelensky and others in his administration have been hinting about a willingness to open negotiations. I believe the reason for this is two-fold. First, they have finally come to recognize that their strategic position is unlikely to improve over the medium to long term....The chance of another huge arms package getting through hardening Republican opposition in Congress is anything but a sure thing. Second, Zelensky and company have come to the realization that Ukraine's ability to mobilize and adequately train a sufficient amount of men to restore offensive combat power is permanently impaired. [While the current figures are promising, its unclear if that] pace can be sustained which is the most important factor. Zelensky, Umerov, and Syrsky know where those numbers are trending. And they may have concluded that the trend is moving against them. If the strategic picture is moving against you, with potential existential downside risks on the horizon, it makes sense to gamble on an operation that

could improve your short-term leverage before entering into negotiations."

He explained the possible outcomes of this gamble **saying** (Communicative evidentials): "The potential upside of a successful gamble is substantial if, and only if, you plan to use the newfound leverage in the near term. Before the long-term costs of occupation stretch your already depleted forces even further. But the downside risk if the gamble fails is you use up strategic reserves that **would've** (Epistemic modality: probability) been better spent holding back Russia in the Donbass. Zelensky may have decided the gamble was worth it, because the upside was better than the gradually eroding strategic position they already find themselves in...Of course, this calculus is predicated on Putin being willing to enter in to negotiations, which I have consistently doubted. He may well be perfectly happy to have Ukraine occupy a portion of Kursk, knowing it **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) be costly for them, while he chips away at the Donbass. He knows his political position is extremely unlikely to be harmed by the incursion and occupation. If anything, it might bolster support for the war, as J. Helin has pointed out. Ukraine is in a very unenviable position. The levers they have at hand to bolster their strategic position are extremely limited. And external political factors are not working in their favor. Gambling on a high-risk/high-reward operation makes sense in that context. But ultimately they may be at the whim of forces outside of their control. Their success so far is welcome. Whether the operation was the right strategic decision... I still have my doubts. The next few weeks **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) tell."

Lokesson raises an important point about Russian internal politics. Western journalists have **said** (Communicative evidentials) Vladimir Putin is humiliated or losing face with his people. They **suggest** (Communicative evidentials) he **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) be under tremendous pressure to respond. In a Russian police state, that might not be the case. Dr. Ian Garner **tweeted** (Communicative evidentials), "Kursk is on fire but so far I haven't seen any evidence that the mass of the Russian population is in any way moved. Don't count on even a long occupation changing many minds about Putin, Ukraine, and the broader war."

Other analysts agreed that the clock is ticking for Ukraine in Kursk. Def Mon **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "More and more Russian reinforcements **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) likely start arriving in the Kursk direction in the coming few days. Russian artillery rate of fire **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) increase and they **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) start counter attacking. This is when we **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty) see if Ukraine had a solid plan or not." At the same time, this operation puts Russia, and in particular Vladimir Putin, in

an unenviable position as well. Dr. Ian Garner **wrote** (Communicative evidentials), "Until 3 days ago, Russia could have pulled its troops out of Ukraine and ended the war. For as long as Ukrainian troops are in Kursk, Putin has a big problem: ending the war is no longer his decision alone." Now, the situation is more complicated.

Get Involved

To make it through the war, the Ukrainian people **will** (Epistemic modality: certainty), need all the help they **can** (Epistemic modality: possibility) get. If you want to help Ukraine, there are a lot of ways to get involved. As always, I recommend calling your congressional representatives to make sure they know you support aid for Ukraine and sanctions against #russia.

Donate where you feel comfortable doing so. Here are some options:

Aid Ukrainian refugees at Razom for Ukraine: <https://www.razomforukraine.org>

Donate to buy medical supplies and drones with Ukraine Aid Ops (<https://ukraineaidops.org>)

Donate toward drones, demining equipment, and medical supplies at United24 (<https://u24.gov.ua>)

Support humanitarian relief with Ukraine's Chief Rabbi Moshe Azman

(<https://www.charidy.com/Sos2023>)

Support humanitarian relief with Nova Ukraine (<https://novaukraine.org>)

Above all, pray for Ukraine. Pray for peace with justice. Pray for an end to this war.

Appendix 2 (UA Corpus)

1. УКРАЇНСЬКІ БІЖЕНЦІ. МАЙБУТНЄ ЗА КОРДОНОМ ТА ПЛАНИ НА ПОВЕРНЕННЯ.

1. За кордоном залишається близько 3,3 млн українців (це тільки ті, хто перетнув кордон з країнами Європи)
2. Станом на кінець січня 2023 року, близько 4,3 млн. українців мають статус тимчасового захисту в країнах ЄС
3. Найбільша кількість біженців знаходиться в Німеччині 1,3 млн осіб), Польщі 951,6 тис) та Чехії 381,2 тис)
4. Більшість біженців - жінки 65%
5. Більшість біженців виїхали з південних та східних областей України
6. Біженці оцінюють свій економічний стан до повномасштабного вторгнення значно краще, ніж загальноукраїнські показники 2021 року.
7. З травня 2023 частка залучених до ринку праці зросла з 39 до 45%. Також зменшується частка тих, хто не шукає роботи
8. Понад 60% тепер мають вищі доходи, ніж до 24. 02. 2022. У листопаді 2022 цей показник складав 43%
9. Порівняно з травнем 2023, у січні 2024 більша частка біженців **повідомляє** (Communicative evidentials), що їм більше подобається за кордоном, аніж в Україні.
10. Більшість українців все ще планують повернутися до України (26% точно та 26% скоріше), 61% планує це зробити після війни
11. Біженці, що не отримують допомогу від країни перебування, самостійно знімають житло, працюють як дистанційно на українську компанію, так і повний робочий день на роботі в країні перебування - найбільше готові повернутись до України.

Із дослідження (Communicative evidentials) Центру економічної стратегії (занотувала для вас прямо по ходу вебінару), презентація теж є.

Як вам із цією інформацією?

2. Українські біженці швидко адаптуються в країнах ЄС і тепер уже стимулюють європейські економіки. Однак те, що стало надбанням для ЄС, **виявилось** (Experiential evidentials) втратою для економіки України.

3. Українські біженці почали виїжджати з Канадиса

Життя у країні **виявилось** (Experiential evidentials) занадто дорогим. Про це **пишуть** світові

ЗМІ (Communicative evidentials). **За даними** (Communicative evidentials) дослідницької компанії, середня вартість оренди житла в Канаді за рік зросла на 11% до рекордних 2149 канадських доларів (56,6 тис. грн). Середня ціна оренди житла в Торонто – 2614 канадських доларів (68,8 тис. грн). Ця сума майже дорівнює мінімальній зарплаті до вирахування податків. Інші витрати також зростають. У вересні ціни на продукти зросли на 5,8% за рік, а ціна газу – на 7,5%.

4. Українські біженці повинні **будуть** (Epistemic modality: certainty) підтвердити своє перебування в Польщі

◆□ Аналітики CenEA **опублікували звіт** (Communicative evidentials), **згідно** (Communicative evidentials) з яким українців у Польщі менше, ніж **свідчать** (Communicative evidentials) офіційні дані. Міністерство внутрішніх справ та адміністрації **повідомляє** (Communicative evidentials) про заходи з цього приводу.

◆□ **За офіційними даними** (Communicative evidentials) (станом на січень 2025 року), у Польщі проживає 992 тисячі біженців з України. Однак звіт економістів аналітичного центру CenEA **показує** (Communicative evidentials), що ця цифра **може** (Epistemic modality: possibility) бути завищена на 30-40%.

◆□ **Дані показують** (Communicative evidentials), що на кінець 2024 року у польських школах навчалося приблизно 150 тисяч учнів, однак PESEL UKR мають 270 тисяч дітей з України. Водночас, **за статистикою** (Communicative evidentials) ZUS, станом на грудень 2023 року на ринку праці було 759 тисяч працівників з України (396 тисяч чоловіків і 363 тисяч жінок). З 2021 по 2023 рік ця кількість зросла на 132 тисячі людей, і, за даними дослідників CenEA, збільшення відбулося за рахунок жінок.

◆□ **У базі даних** (Communicative evidentials) ZUS у грудні 2023 року було зареєстровано 335 тисяч українок віком 18-59 років (без урахування студентів). Такий показник свідчить про те, що лише близько 40% українських жінок-біженок офіційно працевлаштовані в Польщі. **На думку** (Cognitive evidentials) авторів звіту, це суперечить даним звіту НБП, **згідно** (Communicative evidentials) з яким станом на липень 2024 року 70% офіційно працювали, а 19% шукали роботу.

◆□ З кінця 2022 року кількість зареєстрованих українських біженців у Польщі тримається на рівні трохи менше 1 мільйона осіб. Однак аналітики **наголошують** (Communicative evidentials), для того щоб виключити громадянина України з бази даних, потрібна офіційна

реєстрація виїзду українців з території Польщі на кордоні або реєстрація в іншій країні Європейського Союзу, або реєстрація виїзду з Шенгенської зони іншою країною.

◆□ У Міністерстві внутрішніх справ та адміністрації також **підтверджують** (Communicative evidentials), що українців у Польщі **точно** (Epistemic modality: certainty) менше, ніж у базі PESEL UKR. У відомстві підготували систему підтвердження перебування українців, в якій статус тимчасового захисту на зміниться на тимчасове перебування. Потім ці люди повинні **будуть** (Epistemic modality: certainty) з'явитися в офіси гміни, щоб підтвердити своє перебування.

5. Українські мігранти, які повертаються з-за кордону, **можуть отримувати** (Epistemic modality: Possibility) допомогу малозабезпеченим родинам

Нагадуємо (Communicative evidentials), що з січня поточного року діє постанова, яка розширює можливості призначення допомоги малозабезпеченим, щоб ті родини, які опинились у ризику бідності, могли активніше нею користуватися.

ВПО та українцям, які повертаються із-за кордону та ще не встигли працевлаштуватись в Україні і не мають власних джерел доходів, допомога призначається на 6 місяців:

для родин, що повернулись в Україну після тривалого (понад 90 днів поспіль) перебування за кордоном, навіть якщо в таких родинах є працездатні непрацюючі особи, які не сплачували ЄСВ.

для родин внутрішньо переміщених осіб, які, внаслідок переміщення, не працювали або не сплачували ЄСВ.

Водночас, аби сприяти поверненню українців до економічно незалежного і самостійного життя, виплата допомоги для малозабезпечених поєднується з інструментами стимулювання до працевлаштування.

Так, якщо в родині ВПО чи мігрантів, які повертаються, є працездатні особи, які не працюють, після призначення допомоги малозабезпеченим вони мають протягом двох місяців після призначення допомоги сприяти своїй економічній самостійності - тобто або працевлаштуватись, або стати на облік в Державному центрі зайнятості, аби фахівці Центру допомогли таким особам знайти роботу, чи, за потреби, пройти перенавчання та перекваліфікацію.

Нагадаємо, допомога малозабезпеченим призначається тим родинам, у яких сукупний розмір доходів не перевищує рівень забезпечення прожиткового мінімуму для сім'ї, так наразі (для

працевдатних осіб це - 55% прожиткового мінімуму (1665.4 грн), для дітей - 140 % (віком до 6 років - 3 588,2 грн, від 6-18 років - 4 474.40 грн), для осіб, які втратили працевдатність - 100% (2 361 грн). Таким чином допомога розраховується як різниця рівнем забезпечення прожиткового мінімуму для

сім'ї та її середньомісячним сукупним доходом.

6. Українські біженці, які перебувають за кордоном, не зможуть отримати обіцяну тисячу від Зеленського, — **ЗМІ...** (Communicative evidentials)

Цікава така тема для обговорення.. якраз для подальшого розколу в суспільстві...

Тобто, українці, які за кордоном автоматично вже не українці..

Гадаю, що (Cognitive evidentials) Зеленський в курсі, що «проїдає» (проваливши)

допомогу переселенцям, багато хто змушений повернутися в окупацію..уявіть собі, людина кидала все, що мала, аби залишитися в Україні, але через похлістичне ставлення влади зараз змушена повернутися.. піти жити в тепер вже лігво ворога..під страхом невідомості...

Багато українців почувши про цю смішну тисячу Зеленського одразу вирішили, що їй бути донатом на ЗСУ, в тому числі і українці за кордоном..Але тепер ще один мінус в об'єднанні.. людей знову поділено...

Це буде великим стимулом для повернення багатьох 😊

Від себе особисто: хай скрутить ту тисячу і засуне собі в одне місце..Просто моя допомогу буде на тисячу менше, дякуючи корумповано-офшорним шурам.

7. Чого очікують українські біженці в США від нового президента.

5 листопада США обирають нового президента, що викликає неабиякі очікування серед українських біженців, тому що майбутній лідер країни **безпосередньо вплине** (Epistemic modality: certainty) на програми, через які українці приїхали в США. Загалом з початку війни тут знайшли прихисток близько пів мільйона громадян України.

Українців турбує, чи продовжать програми, які дозволяють їм залишатися в США. Більшість програм, таких як Temporary Protected Status та U4U, є тимчасовими і залежатимуть від політичної волі нового президента.

Найбільше ж за своє майбутнє в США, українці переймаються у випадку перемоги Трампа, тому що тоді **можлива** (Epistemic modality: possibility) більш жорстка міграційна політика, яка **може** (Epistemic modality: probability) поставити під загрозу тимчасовий статус українців. В той же час, **експерти вважають** (Cognitive evidentials), що у випадку перемоги Гарріса, **буде**

продовжена (Epistemic modality: probability) чинна політика щодо мігрантів

Експерти зазначають, що українським біженцям у США не варто хвилюватися через можливі зміни в законодавстві:

Якщо виникне загроза закриття програм, українська громада готова лобіювати підтримку в Конгресі, як це вже було раніше

Також **деякі біженці вважають, що** (Cognitive evidentials) політика США дуже проста – якщо ти працюєш, заробляєш гроші, платиш податки – тобі нема за що переживати

8. Наша влада в черговий раз пробилла дно: Президент Зеленський дає інтерв'ю закордонним ЗМІ, де плаче, що українські біженці мають повертатися з Європи і платити тут податки, а в цей час тут в Україні у вимушених переселенців, які втратили в житті все, віднімають останнє - ті нещасні 2 тис грн в місяць. Так нащо нашим повертатися, коли в європейських країнах допомога нашим біженцям дуже суттєва, а тут її не буде взагалі!

Все зовсім буде інакше - все більше і більше українців **будуть** (Epistemic modality: certainty) навпаки покидати країну, бо ми тут не потрібні... — **с** (Communicative evidentials)

Александром Товкачем.

Те що ми отримали за ці два роки - для якогось чиновника один раз сходити до ресторану... І так, дійсно, чиновникам компенсують житло, виписують премії при їх зарплатах більше ста тисяч в місяць... Скільки ще ми будемо терпіти? Ми ті, хто втратили все в цій війни - зовсім незахищені і кинуті державою... А тепер у нас віднімають останнє...

Докоряти нам, які втратили все, що ми вже встали на ноги - просто цинічно! У нас вже **ніколи не буде** (Epistemic modality: certainty) житла, тобто стати бомжами - це по-вашому "встати на ноги"? #ОфісПрезидента #ПрезидентЗеленський

9. Поляки почали гірше ставитись до українців, бо **вважають, що** (Cognitive evidentials) Польща забагато вкладається в Україну і нічого не отримує на заміну, а українські біженці разом з іншими мігрантами створюють загрозу для безпеки країни

Таку думку висловила (Communicative evidentials) українська журналістка Олена Бабакова, що живе у Варшаві у коментарі для статті NV

10. Нові соціопитування **показують, що** (Communicative evidentials) українські біженці здебільшого вже успішно інтегрувалися за кордоном і вже менша частина бачить майбутнього своїх дітей в Україні. Багато дітей продовжують навчання в двох системах освіти – українській та місцевій. Але більшість планує залишатися.

Плани українських біженців у Німеччині та Нідерландах **показує дослідження** міграційної платформи **EWL**. (Communicative evidentials)

Німеччина надала тимчасовий захист понад 1,2 млн втікачів від війни в Україні, Нідерланди – понад 118 тис. людей.

З'ясувалося, що (Cognitive evidentials) більше половини українських громадян у Німеччині (57%) бачать майбутнє своїх дітей у цій країні, тоді як 39% – в Україні. У Нідерландах ситуація протилежна – більше половини (60%) бачать майбутнє своїх дітей в Україні та лише 29% – у поточній країні проживання. Але кількість українців у Німеччині незрівнянно більша, ніж у Нідерландах.

Половина опитаних українців у Німеччині (51%) та Нідерландах (50%) **повідомили** (Communicative evidentials), що приїхали з дітьми до 18 років. В обох країнах з однією дитиною перебувають третина респондентів (33%). Середній вік наймолодшої дитини в Німеччині – 8 років, у Нідерландах – 9 років.



У Німеччині вже знайшли роботу або проходять підготовчі курси для працевлаштування 67% громадян України, **свідчать дані EWL**. (Communicative evidentials) Водночас **за офіційною німецькою статистикою**, (Communicative evidentials) минулого року рівень зайнятості серед українських біженців складав близько 20%. У Нідерландах 61% громадян України декларують, що мають роботу.

У середньому в Німеччині українці заробляють 1334 євро на місяць ("чистими"), у Нідерландах середня зарплата українців становить 1104 євро на місяць.

40% респондентів у Німеччині **повідомили, що** (Communicative evidentials) їхні родичі не планують до них переїжджати. Ствердно відповіли лише 27% опитаних. У Нідерландах 62% українців відповіли, що їхні родичі до них не переїдуть. Про готовність родичів переїхати до цієї країни розповіли 26% респондентів.

Я залишу цю інформацію без висновків. Але **можу впевнено сказати** (Epistemic modality: certainty), що коли в ОП на початку 2022 року проігнорували наші, разом Євгеном Магдою, поради у питанні виписування програми мотивації повернення біженців під час війни та після війни, то додали зусиль, щоб був такий результат. Довбойоби на Банковій просрали шанс повернути більшу кількість українців через своє невігластво та тупість. А коли Зеленський толерує корупцію, збільшує авторитаризм та бреше, то бажаючи повернутися зменшується.

11. На оккупированных Парашкой территориях Украины, военные российские преступники

убивают Украинцев за язык, за символы Украины.  

В убийстве Ирины Фарион **точно** (Epistemic modality: certainty) рука русоговорящих, они за ней следили и доказательство этому то, как быстро нашли парня из Крыма, письмо которого она выложила на радостях, не подумав о его безопасности. Как и любому Человеку ей нужны были слова поддержки и Любви и это письмо сгорело ей сердце. Я **точно знаю** (Epistemic modality: certainty + Cognitive evidentials) руки русоговорящих в крови в Эрефии или Украины, если граждане Украины не знают свой родной язык, они не полноценные граждане Украины. Она права на **1000%**. (Epistemic modality: certainty) русоговорящие Украинцы не хотят учить Украинский, но приезжай в Европу как беженцы учат язык страны кто их приютил. Украинский язык это способ борьбы с террористическим государством под названием Эрефия. Его нужно учить, это обязанность гражданина Украины, чтобы в языковой сферы Украины Парашка была уничтожена.

12. Українські біженці у Німеччині. Які вони?

Після початку масованої війни Росії проти України 24 лютого в одну лише Німеччину прибуло понад мільйон українців та українок, які рятуються від бойових дій у себе на батьківщині. Що то за люди? Чому приїхали саме до Німеччини? **Чи надовго** (Epistemic modality: Possibility)?

На ці та багато інших питань відповідає перше репрезентативне дослідження, яке провели три німецькі соціологічні інститути спільно з Федеральним відомством у справах міграції та біженців (BAMF).

Порівняно з колишніми притоками біженців до Німеччини українці мають суттєві відмінності, **зазначила** (Communicative evidentials) Сабіне Цинн (Sabine Zinn) із Німецького інституту економічних досліджень (DIW) у Берліні, представляючи 15 грудня результати опитування на прес-конференції у Берліні.

По-перше, українцям не потрібна віза для в'їзду до країн ЄС. По-друге, **згідно** (Communicative evidentials) з директивою Євросоюзу, вони одразу отримують тимчасовий захист без затяжної процедури розгляду клопотання про надання притулку (Asyl). І, нарешті, по-третє, українським чоловікам призовного віку через загальну мобілізацію заборонено в'їзд з України.

Тому **не дивно** (Epistemic modality: certainty), що переважна більшість втікачів з України – жінки (80%), майже половина з яких (48%) мають малолітніх дітей. А що є 20% біженців з

України чоловічої статі? Чи багато серед них тих, хто ухилився від мобілізації?

Точно відповісти на таке питання автори дослідження **не змогли** (Epistemic modality: certainty and impossibility). Але Катаріна Шпіс (Katharina Spieß) із Федерального інституту вивчення народонаселення (BiB) **підкреслила** (Communicative evidentials), що 71% українців прибули до Німеччини разом із членами сімей – дружинами, дорослими доньками та онуками. 6% приїхали до дружин, які вже перебували в Німеччині. 16% - неodrжені чоловіки та без дітей. Це, однак, не означає, що ці 16% - ті, хто втік від мобілізації. Серед них багато людей похилого віку та інвалідів, яких в армію не закликають, **підкреслила** (Communicative evidentials) Катаріна Шпіс. А Герберт Брюкер (Herbert Brücker) з Інституту вивчення ринку праці та професій (IAB) **додав** (Communicative evidentials), що й деяким чоловікам призовного віку дозволяється виїзд із України за сімейними обставинами.

Практично всі опитані в Німеччині українці та українки (96%) **заявляють** (Communicative evidentials), що тікають від війни. Дехто **додає** (Communicative evidentials), що і від економічних негараздів.

Дві третини – з регіонів, охоплених бойовими діями. А Німеччину, **за її словами** (Communicative evidentials), обирають тому, що у багатьох тут уже є родичі, друзі та знайомі. Так, лише 9% із них продовжують досі жити у гуртожитках, 17% – у готелях та пансіонах. Решта вже знайшли собі дах над головою - або у родичів, друзів і знайомих, або мають окрему квартиру (60%).

Середній вік українських біженців у Німеччині – 28 років. Це молодше, ніж загалом населення і України, і Німеччини. Рівень освіти у них - значно вищий за середній. Вищі мають 72% опитаних за 50% у середньому по Україні та 33% - у Німеччині.

У середньому 18% українських біженців (серед чоловіків 24%) після півроку вже знайшли собі роботу в Німеччині, і з кожним місяцем їх стає дедалі більше. Ця частка значно вища, ніж серед біженців з інших країн. Суперництва з місцевими кадрами на німецькому ринку праці експерти не очікують. Навпаки, **за їхніми словами** (Communicative evidentials), українські біженці допомагають пом'якшити дефіцит робочих рук, що зростає в Німеччині. При цьому добре німецьку мову знають лише 4% опитаних, 80% – погано чи зовсім ніяк. Але половина всіх біженців справно відвідує мовні курси, третина ще й інтеграційні. 34% українських біженців, **згідно** (Communicative evidentials) з дослідженням, хочуть залишатися в Німеччині до закінчення бойових дій на батьківщині, 26% планують

залишитися тут назавжди, 11% – ще на кілька років, 2% – максимум на рік.

91% українських сімей у Німеччині кажуть (Communicative evidentials), що їхні діти шкільного віку ходять до німецької школи. А майже чверть зазначає, що діти навчаються паралельно ще й онлайн в одній із українських шкіл.

У січні планує провести ще одне, більш докладне опитування.

За матеріалами (Communicative evidentials) Deutsche Welle

13. Міністр оборони Словаччини (Communicative evidentials): Українські біженці призовного віку мають їхати воювати в Україну

А Ви як вважаєте?

14. У Центрі досліджень міграції Варшавського університету повідомили, що (Communicative evidentials) українські біженці сплатили у Польщі податків на 2 мільярди євро від початку російського вторгнення.

!!□Ця цифра утричі перевищує допомогу польського уряду українцям.

Таких працьовитих біженців ще Європа не бачила □ ©□ Останній Капіталіст

ПС. Фото моє зі Стрийський парк - про гарне тра пам'ятати 🍁

15. ДОСВІД УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ГРОМАДЯН У ПОЛЬЩІ - ШЛЯХ ДО ВІДБУДОВИ
УКРАЇНИUA🇺🇦 PL

Міграційна платформа EWL 16 квітня провела масштабний БІЗНЕС ФОРУМ у 📍Львові в конференц-залі GRAND HOTEL.

★Основною метою заходу було обговорити, як українці **можуть використати** (Epistemic modality: possibility) свій досвід життя і роботи у Європі у майбутній післявоєнній відбудові України.

Також окремо проговорили тему міграції та її впливу на економіку України та країн, де зараз найбільше проживає українців.

🗣️Спікерами заходу стали експерти Міграційної платформи EWL, знавці своєї справи:

- Мар'яна Семенюк — директорка рекрутації Міграційної платформи EWL, генеральна менеджерка відділу рекрутації ринку Центрально-Східної Європи;

- Alex Kartsel - віцепрезидент EWL Group;

- Marcin Kołodziejczyk - директор з підбору персоналу.

? ПІД ЧАС БІЗНЕС ФОРУМУ ОБГОВОРЮВАЛИ ПИТАННЯ:

- ВЗАЄМОЗВ'ЯЗОК МІЖ ТРУДОВОЮ МІГРАЦІЄЮ УКРАЇНЦІВ ДО ПОЛЬЩІ ТА ЕКОНОМІЧНИМ ЗРОСТАННЯМ ОБОХ КРАЇН.




💬 "Українські мігранти можуть використати свій досвід праці в Польщі для стимулювання розвитку економіки в Україні. Адже протягом 2020-2023 років понад 44,5 тисяч українців зареєстрували в Польщі одноособову господарську діяльність — аналог українського ФОП. Станом на 31 грудня 2023 року в Польщі зареєстровано 100 тисяч іноземних компаній, з них 27 тисяч — українські", - Marcin Kołodziejczyk.

- ВПЛИВ УКРАЇНЦІВ НА ЕКОНОМІКУ ПОЛЬЩІ.  PL

💬 "Українські мігранти сприяють економічному зростанню у Польщі, тому що рівень працевлаштування українських біженців є найвищим з-поміж країн Євросоюзу, завдяки цьому зростання ВВП впродовж п'яти років, за прогнозом, **може становити** (Epistemic modality: probability) на рівні 1,2-2%. В перерахунок на кошти — це близько 20 мільярдів злотих", - Alex Kartsel.

- ПОРТРЕТ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО МІГРАНТА НА ПОЛЬСЬКОМУ РИНКУ ПРАЦІ.  UA

💬 "До початку повномасштабної війни, в Польщу їхали українці, які не могли знайти роботу в Україні, або гідної оплати за неї. Тенденція змінилась, біженці від війни з України – це люди добре освічені. **Згідно з дослідженнями** (Communicative evidentials), 56% з них має вищу освіту", - Мар'яна Семенюк.

- ЖІНОЧЕ ЛІДЕРСТВО: ВНЕСОК УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ЖІНОК МІГРАНТІВ У РОЗВИТОК ГРОМАДСЬКОГО СУСПІЛЬСТВА   

💬 "З початком повномасштабної війни, українські жінки перевернули думку європейців на 180% хто така УКРАЇНСЬКА ЖІНКА. Вони бачать високоосвічених, працьовитих, заможних жінок, які знають чого хочуть і досягають цього. А саме: відкривають свій бізнес, підвищують дохід, вчать швидко іноземну мову, встигають і працювати, і доглядати за дітьми", - Мар'яна Семенюк.

16. УКРАЇНСЬКІ БІЖЕНЦІ – ЕКОНОМІЧНЕ ЧУДО ЄВРОПИ!

CZUA Коли навесні 2023-го року у Чехії почали стрімко поширюватися антиукраїнські настрої, **можна було** нерідко **почути** (Experiencial evidentials) наратив про те, що чеський уряд приділяє більше уваги тим українцям, які рятувався від війни, аніж самим чехам. Дійшло до того, що в березні минулого року протестувальники зробили спробу прорватися до

Національного музею у самісінькому серці Праги, щоб зняти з його будівлі український прапор. Поліції вдалося затримати найбільш агресивних учасників акції, серед яких були люди з нашивками ПВК «вагнер» та літерою «Z».

👁️♂️ «ВОНИ КРАДУТЬ НАШІ РОБОЧІ МІСЦЯ», - заявляють деякі громадяни Чехії. Хоча насправді це маніпуляція чистої води. Філіп Пертольд, який входить до консультативної групи Міністерства праці Чеської Республіки, **говорить** (Communicative evidentials) про те, що у Чехії вже давно відчувається суттєвий брак працівників – на ринку праці не вистачає щонайменше 3 000 тисяч людей. Українці просто заповнюють ринкові прогалини, чим напрочуд задоволений чеський бізнес.

💰 «МИ ВИТРАЧАЄМО НА НИХ (українців) НАДТО БАГАТО ГРОШЕЙ». Це також доволі популярний маніпулятивний наратив, який спростовує заява того ж Міністерства праці. Протягом першого півріччя 2024 року на підтримку українських біженців було витрачено 7,3 млрд крон. За цей же період українці сплатили податків у держбюджет на суму 11,7 млрд крон. Тобто Чехія чистими заробила на українцях 4,4 млрд крон (за поточним курсом це майже \$185 млн). **Варто зазначити** (Epistemic modality: necessity), що з кожним кварталом витрати на державну підтримку українців падають, а доходи від їхньої діяльності зростають. І це враховуються лише українці, які працюють офіційно та сплачують податки.

♥️♥️ Кого-кого, а чехів **точно не можна** (Epistemic modality: certainty and impossibility) назвати ксенофобами. Тим паче, ця країна має власний історичний досвід російської імперіалістичної агресії. Тому чехи чітко **усвідомлюють** (Cognitive evidentials), з ким ми маємо справу. І продовжують активно підтримувати українців. Дослідницький інститут STEM **з'ясував** (Communicative evidentials), що 55% чехів виступають за продовження дозволу на перебування в країні українських біженців (проти – 16%). Ще 56% громадян Чехії підтримують і продовження прийому біженців з України (проти – 17%). А українці продовжують адаптуватися, асимілюватися, вчити мову та поповнювати чеський бюджет. **Звичайно** (Experiential evidentials), біженців з України **не можна** (Epistemic modality: impossibility) розглядати лише з точки зору того внеску, який вони роблять в чеську економіку. Краще дивитися на них як на учасників взаємовигідних стосунків. А ще краще, як на людей, котрі вмюють відповідати критеріям, які встановлює культурне середовище, і дотримуватися тих правил, які диктує саме життя.

СвоєРІДНІ #своєрідні #перемогапісляперемоги

17. Побував сьогодні на жд вокзалі, відправляв малу, більшість пасажирів ті, які, **мабуть** (Epistemic modality: probability), від міграційної служби ховалися, а зараз повилазили та намагаються до Європи проскочити як українські біженці. З величезними валізами, переважно чоловіки. Поперед жінок з малими дітьми, зайняли кілька вагонів потягу Київ Львів. Звісно, повикидали. Але все одно поїхати змогли не всі. Забитий наче трамвай в годину пік. Малу вдалося запхати в наступний потяг. Тішить, що більшість чоловіків на вокзалі саджають своїх на поїзд і залишаються...

18. Люди добрі! Це українські біженки в Данії! **Кажуть** (Communicative evidentials), **ніби** (Epistemic modality: possibility) з Харкова.

Місцеві мешканці прозрівають: такого цинізму вони не уявляли. В той час, коли вся Україна здригається від ворожих ракет, гинуть наші захисники, вороги гвалтують і вбивають жінок і дітей, ворог бомбардує і стирає з лиця землі цілі міста, українські біженці дозволяють собі алкогольні розваги під ворожу попсу!

Мабуть (Epistemic modality: probability), це якраз ті, що за 8 років "усталі от вашей вайни".

Шановні наші закордонні друзі, ті, хто не задумуючись простягнув руку допомоги усім українцям, не шкодуйте таких тварюк, негайно депортуйте назад в Україну з заборонаю подальшого виїзду за кордон до закінчення бойових дій. Або... залишіть їх собі назавсім. Бо ми дуже швидко їх навчимо поважати наші почуття. За умовами військового часу...

19. **Раптом з'ясувалось, що** (Experiential evidentials) **деякі вважають** (Cognitive evidentials), що всі українські мігранти в Німеччині отримували чи отримують соціальну допомогу.

Звичайно ж, ні (Experiential evidentials). Ніколи не отримувала. І права не мала.

20. Закінчення війни в Україні = економічна криза в Європі, – **Reuters пише, що** (Communicative evidentials) такий сценарій **стане реальністю**, (Epistemic modality: probability) якщо звідси поїдуть українські біженці.

Економіка багатьох країн за останні 2 роки значно зросла завдяки українським біженцям, **вважає Крістіан Петтер** (Cognitive evidentials), голова відділу Австрії та ЦСЄ компанії J. Safra Sarasin.

21. Чотири роки тому я дивилася кіно, в якому росія окупувала Україну. Українські біженці знаходять притулок у Європі.

І **вважала** (Cognitive evidentials), що це просто кіно ☺□, вигадка сценарістів.

Тепер ми у цій реальності.

22. «Рівність» в Європі та українські біженці

Нещодавно, **Зеленський заявив, що** (Communicative evidentials) заходу «політично вигідно» не працюючих біженців відправляти додому, а не витратити на них гроші. **Зрозуміло** (Cognitive evidentials), що київська кліка **не може** (Epistemic modality: impossibility) нічого запропонувати біженцям, окрім як вмерти за розкіш олігархів. В випадку повернення цих біженців назад в Україну, ТЦК «добровільно» запхає їх в машину і відправить на передок, поки Зеленський буде захищати своїх корумпованих чинуш в його офісі президента, наприклад, Татарова.

Однак, тут одразу встає питання, навіщо захід тримає біженців та чому він одразу їх не відправить в Україну?

Невже (Epistemic modality: possibility), тому що на західна політична **еліта** дуже любить мігрантів та **вважає** (Cognitive evidentials), що «всі рівні», та вони є дуже «толератні» до інших націй?

Достатньо просто подивитися на те, як відносяться до мігрантів, щоб зрозуміти, наскільки дешеві такі заяви про «підтримку українців» зі сторони західного істеблішменту.

Більшість біженців з України або зовсім нічого не мають та втікають з гарячих точок під загрозою мобілізації, або опинилися в зовсім катастрофічному економічному стані, в якому в них вже не вистачало грошей на житло, світло та їжу, тому вони тікають на захід в надії на те, що вони зможуть встати на ноги, дати дітям хорошу освіту та інтегруватись в нове суспільство.

Західні багаті, в той же момент, використовують таку ситуацію в своїх інтересах, щоби на їх фабриках та заводах було більше дешевої робочої сили, яку ще в додаток забезпечує держава.

Звісно (Epistemic modality: certainty), що є певний відсоток) безробітних та незахищених біженців, однак, держава кожен день зменшує їм допомогу чи зовсім викидає на вулицю.

Мало того, що більшість біженців та мігрантів для західних капіталістів є дешевими робітниками, так ще їх дуже часто принижують в правах в сферах медицини, освіти чи житла, віддаючи перевагу корінним людям чи просто багатим. Тим самим, на заході це розколює робітничий клас по національному признаку.

Щоби покращити свій соціально-економічний стан всі робітники-мігранти повинні разом боротися проти крупних капіталістів, що їх експлуатують, незважаючи на расу, стать чи національність.

Геть розбрат! За робітничу солідарність!

23. Українські мігранти та біженці збагачують культурне життя країн, які їх приймають після початку у лютому 2022 агресивної кривавої війни імперської Росії. Їхні знання та досвід **можуть допомогти** (Epistemic modality: possibility) подолати стереотипи та розширити світогляд приймаючих світових спільнот. Окрім того, українські мігранти мають високий рівень освіти та кваліфікації, що **може** (Epistemic modality: possibility) стимулювати економічне зростання в приймаючих країнах, допомогти заповнити нестачу робочої сили в деяких секторах економіки.

Примітно, що українські мігранти **можуть стати** (Epistemic modality: possibility) рупором України на міжнародній арені. Їхні голоси можуть допомогти привернути увагу до проблем українства та зберегти міжнародну підтримку. Важливість українських біженців зростатиме з часом і їх інтеграція в приймаючі суспільства буде мати довгостроковий позитивний вплив на всі аспекти життя – економіку, культуру, демографію, політику та гуманітарну сферу.

Українські мігранти та біженці – це не тягар для приймаючих суспільств, а цінний ресурс. Особливо важливо зазначити, що не всі українські мігранти та біженці планують залишатися в країнах, де вони знайшли притулок. Значна частина з них згодом повернуться до України, коли закінчиться спровокована терористичною Росією війна. Знання та досвід, здобуті ними за кордоном, **будуть** (Epistemic modality: certainty) корисними для відновлення України.

24. В українському ФБ кожного тижня свої хайпи, останній вже про поліграф.

Хотілося б що ми все ж таки трохи задумалися над тим, що таке довіра, і як її розвивати.

Є певні фундаментальні речі, на яких можна побудувати довіру.

Ключове, це компетенції та експертиза, прозорість та чесність, небайдужість та взаємопідтримка.

Саме тому, давно пора поставити меритократію (а не особисту лояльність) в центрі прийняття всіх кадрових рішень на державному рівні.

Й розвивати інтелектуальний капітал нації через довіру, репутацію та відповідальність.

Тоді **будуть** (Epistemic modality: certainty) інші правила гри, інша якість життя, інший імідж у світі, тощо.

Це можливо, (Epistemic modality: possibility) українські експати та трудові мігранти живуть по таких правилах в інших країнах.

Настав вже час будувати такі правила в Україні.

#SmartNation

#GlobalUkraine

#GlobalSmartNation

#ВсеБудеГлобал

25. **Я не знаю** (Cognitive evidentials), що показує німецьке телебачення. **Я не знаю** (Cognitive evidentials) чи дивляться етнічні німці нашу війну на rt чи **може** (Epistemic modality: possibility) там є "телемарафон". **Не знаю** (Cognitive evidentials), що пишуть в газетах. Що розповідають українські біженці. Навіть, **не знаю** (Cognitive evidentials) що думають пересічні німецькі громадяни.

Але сьогодні моя донька повернулась додому з табору, де вони були разом з німецькими однолітками..

І саме темою війни, саме "славарАсії" німці намагались провокувати наших дітей на конфлікт.

Напевно (Epistemic modality: possibility), десь ми всі недопрацюємо...

Але коли на парних заняттях в українських дітей в телефонах заволав додаток "Тривога", то найбільше розгубились і налякались саме німці і їм довелося пояснювати що це.

П.с.Як багато залежить від висвітлення.

От саме цю картину вчора підсвітив нам електрик. І тепер я звертаю на неї більше уваги, ніж раніше

26. Біженці. Можете закидати тапками, але Європі справді вже давно потрібно розділити українських біженців на категорії.

Тому що біженці з окупованих (як приклад - Маріупіль), біженці з зони бойових дій (той же Бахмут), з прифронтових територій (Харків, Нікополь), біженці хоч і з тилу, але з розбомбленим від обстрілів житлом, не придатним для проживання - це одна категорія біженців.

Їм **справді** (Truth-factual validity) внаслідок війни НЕМА КУДИ ВЕРТАТИСЬ. Вони втратили все. І виплати в них в приймаючих країнах справді повинні бути максимальні.

А от біженці з глибокого тилу, особливо з областей, які з початку війни обстрілювались максимум один - два рази (Чернівецька, Закарпатська, наприклад, повинна ж бути територіальна статистика інтенсивності обстрілів), з цілим житлом, яке вони здають втридорого іншим громадянам, а самі живуть в Європі на соціалку...

Так, цю категорію біженців варто позбавити статусу біженець, пільг та виплат. Це не біженці, це не заробітчани. Це наглі пристосуванці.

І тут я справді широко **не розумію** (Cognitive evidentials) - для чого Європі утримувати таку категорію громадян України. Або додому, або живи в Європі як заробітчанин. Самостійно заробляй та проживай.

#біженці #війна #Україна

27. Дорогі друзі, після розмови зі своєю подругою дитинства з Іспанії, яка проживає там, вже понад 20 років, мені було дуже соромно, прикро і неприємно почути про наших українських втікачів саме втікачів, а не біженців. Тому хочу з вами поділитись своїми почуттями і відношенням до тих людей, які повтікали з пекельної небезпеки з України за кордон і не тільки за кордон. Саме повтікали, бо про них по другому не скажеш. Таке **враження** (Cognitive evidentials), що вони люди блакитної крові, для яких все дозволено і яким всі щось винні. Ведуть себе наче свині в чужому городі, "не туди поселили. не те дали не так подали і їжа їм не така", та в кінці кінців вам шановне хамство ніхто нічого не винен. Ви в чужій країні вас прихистили дали мирний дах над головою, нагодували. Ви насамперед повинні бути дуже вдячні за хлібосольний прийом, а не гризти ту руку, яка надала вам допомогу в скрутну годину. Та в кінці-кінців наші сини, чоловіки, батьки віддають свої життя за вас, а ви ганьбите нашу націю, нашу Україну! Моя пропозиція депортувати таких осіб і відправляти в гарячі точки України нехай захищають свої життя і життя своїх рідних тут на Батьківщині, яка зараз палає в огні. **Може** (Epistemic modality: possibility) тоді дехто буде цінувати те що роблять для нас мирні країни, **може** (Epistemic modality: possibility) тоді дехто прозріє. Ганьба вам вельможне свинство-втікачі!!!

Бо справжні біженці, які побували у пеклі радіють будь-якій допомозі.

СЛАВА УКРАЇНІ!!! ГЕРОЯМ СЛАВА !!!— с разбитим серцем.

28. кожен раз коли бачу такі світлини - плачу ...

Здається (Cognitive evidentials), що психіка ось ось прийме ситуацію, але людське горе неможливо прийняти, воно пронизує ножем в саме серце, обливає його кров'ю, гнівом, страхом, ненавистю і безмежним сумом

скалічені душі, сім'ї, будинки, вулиці, міста ...

кати - горіть в пеклі довго і страшно, і хай ніяке прощення не змиє цю кров з ваших рук

29. **Побачив** (Experiential evidentials) у стрічці, що є якийсь срач про те, що європейці вважають, що українські біженці забагато готують і після них смердить кухня. Наші коментатори захищають співвітчизників, мовляв, ті європейці звикли до снєків і бояться борщу хахахахах.

Я, **звичайно** (Experiential evidentials), **можу** (Epistemic modality: possibility) помилятися, але мені здається, що справа не в борщах. А в олії. Ні, не в олії, а в Її Величності Олії.

Коли моя сусідка знизу, щось готує, тобто майже кожного дня, у мене відчуття, що мене трують газами. Бо вона обов'язково смажить овочі, рибу чи м'ясо в тоннах олії, і воно дійсно смердить неймовірно. Я називаю своїх сусідів Родиною Дамерів, тому що **враження** (Cognitive evidentials) таке, ніби вони смажать свіжий труп.

Правда в тому, я боюся, що в багатьох українських родинах немає ідеалізованої картинки с борщами і пиріжками. Але є культ смаження усього на світі, щоб воно прям плавало в олії.

Помножене на впевненість, що олія має бути саме "з ринку", оця смердюча темна.

Навіть той самий борщ. Я, наприклад, його роблю майже без засмажки. Бо якщо є м'ясо достатньо жирне, то та засмажка і нафіг не потрібна. А якщо навіть і потрібна, то є пульверизатор для олії, який допомагає мінімізувати її кількість. Але **знаю** (Cognitive evidentials) багато людей, у яких та нещасна морква пів години плаває в океані олії.

І добре пам'ятаю, як складно мені в дитинстві було їсти деякі страви моєї бабусі. Бо олія, блін, тонни олії, все в олії, немає вже ніякого іншого смаку, крім олії.

Тому, **можливо** (Epistemic modality: possibility), європейці ті не такі вже й неправі.

30. Нічого особистого. Для моїх друзів з Польщі.

Я **розумію** (Cognitive evidentials), що **напевно** (Epistemic modality: probability) дістали наші деякі біженці своєю поведінкою...

То можна з ними розібратись, або спровадити з країни...

Але нащо ж так ображати людей, які живуть і працюють в Україні, під обстрілами, ризикуючи кожного разу власним життям??

Землі, де найбільше землеробства зараз близько до лінії фронту й найбільш страждають від ворожих обстрілів...

Невже гроші дорожче за життя...