| Abstract [eng] |
The friendshoring strategy is based on the belief that relocating supply chains to trusted countries with shared values and principles can minimise trade disruptions in times of unexpected crises or geopolitical tensions. The rise of friendshoring has led to the expectation that economic ties with countries close in terms of values would increase, while trade with unfriendly countries were to decrease. However, preliminary data and calculations did not reveal substantial changes in trade with allies. Friendshoring was also threatened in 2025 when US president Donald Trump announced additional tariffs on both allies and competitors. This led to the central question of this paper: has friendshoring from 2022 onwards actually been implemented? The thesis argues that friendshoring has not intensified since 2022, despite the EU and US political ambitions to reduce dependence on countries considered unfriendly. The aim of this study is to analyse strategic documents and statistics from the European Union and the United States of America in order to assess the practical implementation of friendshoring. To achieve this goal, four tasks are formulated. First, to analyse the theoretical literature of friendshoring in academic debates. Second, to examine EU and US policy statements and strategy papers as a way to identify how strategy is framed in political discourse. Thirdly, to analyse empirical data on the import and export flows of the EU and the US with both blocs of friendly and unfriendly countries, as well as their bilateral trade relations with selected individual partner states. Fourthly, to assess whether the friendshoring strategy has changed the structure of international supply chains. For deeper analysis, the practical factors limiting the implementation of the friendshoring strategy are discussed. The analysis of political discourse revealed that in the EU, friendshoring is viewed as a risk management tool in strategically important areas. Meanwhile, the administration of then-US president Joe Biden sought to combine reshoring with a targeted engagement in global supply chains, recognising that certain sectors require international cooperation. In addition, both EU and US seek to work not only with traditional and trusted partners but also with countries whose political or economic systems differ from democratic norms, as long as they do not pose a threat to the international order or supply chain security. Empirical findings support the central argument of this thesis: despite political ambitions to reduce dependency on adversarial states, trade with allies has not significantly intensified since 2022. While trade with the friend bloc increased, a stronger orientation toward allies was already observable before 2022. This trend is further confirmed by bilateral trade flows – although trade with Russia and Belarus declined sharply, increased trade with India and Vietnam, and sustained high levels of trade with China, suggest that economic ties are often guided by pragmatism rather than shared values. Reorganizing supply chains in sectors like critical raw materials, semiconductors, automobiles or agriculture involves high financial and time costs businesses are reluctant to take. Trump’s protectionist trade policy, including tariffs on both rivals and allies, undermines trust and contradicts friendshoring principles. This thesis contributes to friendshoring research by expanding the focus beyond the US to include EU. In addition, it combines discourse analysis of political speeches and strategy papers with trade data to evaluate the gap between policy goals and trade realities. Further research could examine specific sectors, look at how friendshoring plays out from the perspective of other countries or use alternative methodology for dividing countries into allies and adversaries blocs. Finally, Trump’s current tariff policy opens up new avenues for research on the future of friendshoring. |
