| Abstract [eng] |
This thesis explores the absence of large-scale collective action in the West Bank following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. Despite deep historical grievances, widespread frustration, and strong collective identity among Palestinians, no mass mobilization emerged. The study seeks to understand why mobilization for violent resistance did not occur, even in a context shaped by intensified repression, socio-political inequality, and long-standing occupation. The research is grounded in Ted Robert Gurr’s theory of collective action, which explains political violence and rebellion as outcomes of relative deprivation. Gurr’s model identifies four key components that shape a group’s likelihood to mobilize: (1) ethnocultural identity; (2) collective incentives to act, shaped by deprivation, repression, and perceived injustice; (3) organizational capacity and cohesion; and (4) the availability of peaceful avenues for achieving political goals. These four dimensions structure the empirical analysis of the West Bank after October 2023. Based on this framework, the thesis formulates two theoretical propositions: (1) that intense political, economic, and cultural deprivation in the West Bank after October 2023 reinforces collective incentives for action; (2) that weak organizational capacities, intra-group fragmentation, and a lack of legitimate leadership significantly constrain the ability to translate grievances into collective action, even when the motivation to act is strong. To test these propositions, the study employs a qualitative case study methodology. The analysis draws on a broad range of secondary sources: academic literature, reports by international organizations and human rights NGOs, news media, public documents, and one expert interview. This data is used to assess the extent to which each of Gurr’s four elements is present or absent in the current West Bank context. The analysis confirms that both theoretical propositions hold. The first proposition is supported by evidence of widespread and intensifying relative deprivation, growing frustration with Palestinian leadership, and strong collective identity and narrative framing. Together, these factors create strong incentives for resistance. However, the second proposition is also confirmed: structural conditions severely limit the ability to mobilize. Organizational capacity remains highly fragmented; the territory is geographically divided by physical barriers and settlements; and leadership is either repressed, delegitimized, or absent. Political opportunities for either peaceful or violent mobilization are extremely limited. Despite brief moments of local protest or solidarity, no sustained or large-scale collective action has emerged. In addition, the thesis offers an original contribution by drawing attention to how digital communication and social media are increasingly central to modern mobilization strategies, particularly in contexts where physical movement and organization are constrained. While Gurr’s theory addresses organizational capability, it does not account for contemporary technological developments that shape resistance in new ways. In this sense, the West Bank case highlights both the enduring relevance of Gurr’s framework and the need to adapt it to the realities of digital-era resistance. Ultimately, this thesis contributes to the broader literature on collective action and Palestinian resistance by analyzing a moment of inaction rather than revolt. It shows that the absence of uprising can be theoretically rich and empirically revealing. The findings underscore that structural conditions—not just motivation—determine whether societies revolt. The West Bank case affirms Gurr’s view that grievances alone are insufficient: without the capacity and opportunity to act, collective frustration remains politically inert. This reinforces the importance of studying not only the causes of rebellion, but also the causes of restraint. |
