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VILNIUS UNIVERSITY

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# The Role of Emotions in Advocacy for the Climate Justice Norm: the Case of Civil Society NGOs in the UNFCCC

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VILNIAUS UNIVERSITETAS

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# Emocijų vaidmuo klimato teisingumo normos advokacijoje: pilietinės visuomenės NVO atvejis Jungtinių Tautų bendrojoje klimato kaitos konvencijoje

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

**APA –** Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement

**CAN** – Climate Action Network

**Civil Society NGOs** – Non-governmental organisations emerging from grassroots movements representing civil society interests in climate governance

**COP** – Conference of the Parties

**EDA** – Emotion Discourse Analysis

**ENGO** – Environmental NGOs

**ICJ** – International Court of Justice

**ICJAO** – International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion

**IPCC** – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

**IR** – International Relations

**LAC** – Latin America and the Caribbean

**MDBs** – Multilateral Development Banks

**NAPs** – National Adaptation Plans

**NDCs** – Nationally Determined Contributions

**NGOs** – Non-Governmental Organisations

**REDD+** – Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries

**UNFCCC** – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

**UNGA** – United Nations General Assembly

**WIM** – Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

# 1. INTRODUCTION

"Tackling climate change is a question of justice",[1] say civil society NGOs engaged in international climate change negotiations. This quote echoes the idea of climate justice – the emerging understanding of the climate change crisis as a justice issue. However, justice is an emotional belief, and it involves a perspective that depends on emotion, as Jonathan Mercer argues.[2] Climate justice means that agreements and negotiations are approached by employing a specific understanding that solutions for climate change must rely on justice, that is, on equal distribution of the burden, transparent and equal participation, human rights and interests of vulnerable groups.[3] The demands for climate justice address the historical responsibilities of wealthier industrialized nations while acknowledging the disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable groups, thus challenging the domination of developed countries. In fact, this conceptual shift represents an emerging norm in climate cooperation, as evidenced by research showing that international climate cooperation agreements are becoming reliant on the principles of climate justice.[4] The emergence of new norms in the international community is closely linked to emotions, especially their role in advocacy employed by norm entrepreneurs such as NGOs.[5] NGOs rely on emotion-based approaches when promoting new norms (e.g., naming and shaming), employing emotional expressions to persuade the international community to accept certain behaviours as *morally right*.[6] However, scholars researching international norms emphasise the remaining need to investigate the origins of norms by

[1] 'Climate Justice and Social Justice'.

[2] Mercer, 'Emotional Beliefs'.

[3] Alves and Mariano, 'Climate Justice and Human Development: A Systematic Literature Review'; Caney, 'Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens'; Gajevic Sayegh, 'Climate Justice after Paris: A Normative Framework'; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014; Schlosberg, 'Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse', 1 February 2013; Schlosberg, 'Climate Justice and Capabilities: A Framework for Adaptation Policy'; Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'; Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', n.d.

[4] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

[5] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

[6] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'; Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'.

engaging more with psychological factors, including emotions.[7] The significance of emotions is emphasised beyond international norm emergence processes. An increasing number of studies in the field of the 'emotional turn' in *International Relations* (IR) highlight that emotions are inseparable from international politics, thus requiring in-depth analysis of their role in different contexts.[8] The emergence of the climate justice norm, strongly advocated by civil society NGOs within international climate cooperation institutions,[9] thus, implies the role of emotions in persuading actors to comply with the ideas of climate justice. However, the role of emotions in the emergence of the climate justice norm still remains overlooked. In the context of climate justice, emotional lenses become especially important. The concept of justice intersects with emotions that influence perceptions and reactions to fairness or unfairness in social interactions. In fact, justice can be understood as an emotional belief because it involves a perspective that depends on emotion (i.e., a way of seeing something as unjust where emotion constitutes and strengthens this belief. As Mercer emphasised, emotion is not an addition to a belief about injustice, but it is essential to that belief.[10] Thus, it is crucial to turn to the emotional underpinnings of the construction of the climate justice norm, with a focus on the discourse employed by norm entrepreneurs seeking to persuade the international community to accept this norm.

Civil society NGOs play a crucial role in promoting climate justice within the UNFCCC, i.e., the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*.[11] The principles and ideas of this norm are historically linked to the discourse of grassroots movements and civil society NGOs, focusing their participation and engagement in international climate cooperation institutions

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7 Price and Sikkink, 'International Norms, Moral Psychology, and Neuroscience'.

8 Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2017; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Fear no More: Emotions and World Politics'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Emotions, Agency, and Power in World Politics'.

9 Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

10 Mercer, 'Emotional Beliefs'.

11 Alves and Mariano, 'Climate Justice and Human Development: A Systematic Literature Review'; Schlosberg, 'Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political Theories'; Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', n.d.; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014; Kluttz and Walter, 'Conceptualizing Learning in the Climate Justice Movement'; Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

on advocacy for climate justice.[12] The UNFCCC is the foundational treaty functioning as a basis for international climate negotiations since it was established in 1992. It is a complex mechanism of global climate cooperation, including a wide variety of different actors and institutional agreements.[13] UNFCCC conferences have grown exponentially in size over the past two decades and have evolved into one of the largest international meetings in the world. Negotiation talks such as the *Conference of the Parties* (COP) are characterised by exceptionally high participation and a large variety of different non-state actors.[14] The increasing number of governmental officials and vast numbers of representatives from civil society and media have thus led to a complex institutional environment. For example, there were 3,804 observer organisations at COP 28 in 2023, of which, the majority (3,631) were NGOs. The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the climate change process, bringing together all the 'Parties' of the UNFCCC (the governments that have formally joined the treaty). NGOs are crucial players in international climate cooperation because of their contribution to monitoring the implementation of international agreements, lobbying for various solutions, and providing knowledge and expertise.[15]

The *Climate Action Network* (CAN), acting as the umbrella organisation for civil society NGOs within the UNFCCC, highlights its strategy to "build power by empowering grassroots movements and local communities fighting for a better world".[16] To ensure this, CAN aligns with other movements and stakeholders, such as the youth, gender constituency, faith groups, and Indigenous peoples' networks, striving to become a grassroots- and movement-driven network. Their advocacy often relies on appeals to the principles of climate justice, which are also reflected as the main interests and goals of CAN, connecting a large network of civil society NGOs.[17] NGOs seek to advocate for more ambitious goals in relation to protecting the

[12] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014.

[13] Benito Müller et al., 'Quo Vadis COP?'; 'A Brief Introduction to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and Kyoto Protocol'.

[14] Bäckstrand et al., 'Non-State Actors in Global Climate Governance: From Copenhagen to Paris and Beyond'; Pandey, 'Managing Climate Change: Shifting Roles for NGOs in the Climate Negotiations'; Betsill and Corell, 'NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations'.

[15] Betsill and Corell, 'NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations'.

[16] 'About CAN'; 'Building Power through Movements'.

[17] 'About CAN'; 'Building Power through Movements'.

environment while advocating for the inclusion of youth and Indigenous peoples' interests in the agenda. Youth organisations often appeal to the responsibility of older generations and the importance of guaranteeing a safe future for their children, as well as advocate for general ideas of climate justice and the inclusion of marginalised groups within COP negotiations.

Existing theories may explain NGOs' advocacy for climate justice from different perspectives. While there is a significant amount of research on the link between emotions and social movements[18], including those linked to climate change, this thesis focuses on the emotional underpinnings of climate justice norm emergence within climate cooperation frameworks such as the UNFCCC. This requires investigating the research linked to international norms and the role of NGOs, climate justice, and emotions. Existing theories explain NGOs' advocacy by focusing on lobbying efforts, agenda-setting, and other rational mechanisms that are explained by theories measuring the influence of NGOs in environmental diplomacy.[19] Another way is to rely on emotional rhetoric. NGOs advocate for normative ideas (i.e., norms) by various means, one of which is emotional rhetoric (e.g., references to compassion and empathy) and emotional strategies (e.g., naming and shaming).[20] Although some theories emphasise that rational actors can be persuaded depending on argument, debate, evidence, logic, and deliberation, we cannot overlook that it also depends on emotion. Actors can persuade others by using emotions (i.e., one can, and one should use emotion).[21] Thus, research would also allow arguing that NGOs employ emotional strategies, such as naming and shaming, to encourage the international community to

[18] Goodwin and Jasper, 'Emotions and Social Movements'; Jasper, 'Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research, 2011; Flam and King, *Emotions and Social Movements*; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 'The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory'.

[19] Betsill and Corell, 'NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations'.

[20] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'; Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'.

[21] Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework'; Jensen and Johnston, 'Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse'; Risse, '"Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics'.

comply with moral principles and promote new norms (especially emphasised in research on human rights).[22] As mentioned above, the concept of justice, as such, refers to emotional foundations,[23] and is strongly related to emotions. Although climate justice has its own specifics, its link to emotions persists as it seeks to promote certain values and principles: it advocates for human rights, dignity, fair distribution of sharing the burden of climate change-caused damage, and equal inclusion in participation.[24] As Mercer argues, "emotion is more than a trick; it is fundamental to how people think and what they believe'. That is, they constitutively shape our beliefs and understanding, and thus cannot be overlooked in processes such as the emergence of climate justice norm. Thus, I assume that certain emotions enable the persuasion for climate justice as a norm in international climate cooperation frameworks: they function to construct the belief that climate justice is a *morally* right approach to climate cooperation. This functioning can be uncovered by looking into how they are invoked through the discourse of norm entrepreneurs – such as civil society NGOs acting within the UNFCCC.

The emotional turn in IR marked a fundamental shift in understanding how emotions shape world politics by emphasising that they are inseparable from international relations[25]; for example, war,[26] conflict resolution,[27] foreign policy decision-making,[28] and other aspects. Although emotions were once

[22] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Murdie and Peksen, 'Women's Rights INGO Shaming and the Government Respect for Women's Rights'.

[23] Mercer, 'Emotional Beliefs'.

[24] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014.

[25] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2017; Koschut et al., 'Discourse and Emotions in International Relations', 1 September 2017; Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Emotions, Agency, and Power in World Politics'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'.

[26] Åhäll and Gregory, 'Emotions, Politics and War'.

[27] Halperin and Schwartz, 'Emotions in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconciliation'.

[28] Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'; Mercer, 'Emotional Beliefs'; Renshon and Lerner, 'Decision-Making, the Role of Emotions in Foreign Policy'.

ignored because of the methodological challenges involved in analysing them, researchers in the field of the emotional turn in IR argued that ignoring emotions means overlooking significant explanations that drive the behaviour of international actors.[29] Thus, scholars started to explore methodological ways to analyse emotions, and uncover their meaning in explaining international politics.[30] The emotional turn in IR reconceptualised emotions as social and collective phenomena rather than merely individual psychological states.[31] This approach defines emotions as social constructs and emphasises their collective nature and institutional embeddedness.[32] It views emotions as emergent properties of groups, including states and non-state actors, rather than merely individual psychological states.[33]

Researchers introduced concepts such as *emotional diplomacy*, and conceptualised actors as *emotional agents*, acting within the international system.[34] For example, Todd Hall explained that actors act as emotional agents in diplomatic relations, performing the diplomacy of anger, guilt, and sympathy.[35] Although the concept was primarily introduced based on state actors, Ilgit and Prakash extended the use of this concept by focusing on non-state actors such as NGOs. They conceptualised NGOs as *emotional actors*,

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[29] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Emotions, Agency, and Power in World Politics'; Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

[30] Martin Petlach, 'Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (Eds): Researching Emotions in International Relations'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2017; Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'.

[31] Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut et al., 'Discourse and Emotions in International Relations', September 1, 2017; Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11'; Hall, 'Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage'.

[32] Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

[33] Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'; Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'.

[34] Hall, 'Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage'; Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

[35] Hall, 'Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage'.

and explained how these actors perform *emotional diplomacy* to promote new norms through naming and shaming.[36] Scholars in this field have also established crucial links between emotions, discourse, and power in international politics.[37] They highlighted that emotions have to be analysed as crucial forces shaping international politics, underpinning actors' discourse and power relations.[38] In other words, emotions function as structural forces that, by being embedded in a discourse, can reproduce or challenge existing power relations.[39] Research has shown that emotions can both reinforce and challenge dominant positions, reflect power hierarchies, and serve as forces for resistance and transformation.[40] "The insights in the field of emotional turn in IR can contribute to explanations of norm emergence, especially in the context of an emerging significance to investigate norm emergence by focusing on emotional aspects.

The emergence of climate justice norm in international climate cooperation frameworks such as the UNFCCC is a suitable context to explore the role of emotions. In fact, by overlooking the role of emotions within climate justice norm advocacy, we get a less precise picture of how this normative shift emerges in global climate cooperation. While scholars have examined the emotional rhetoric of NGOs advocating for norms such as human rights,[41] the context of climate cooperation still remains overlooked. Prevailing research implies the significant role that emotions may play in this process,[42] especially

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[36] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

[37] Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Hall, '"An Extremely Obnoxious and Illegal Case" – Three Approaches to Affect, Emotion, and Discourse in the Aftermath of the Zhuhai Incident'.

[38] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

[39] Koschut; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'.

[40] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

[41] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'.

[42] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'.

through NGOs' discourse increasingly engaging in the UNFCCC framework. Ignoring the role of emotions in this emerging norm would lead to a less comprehensive understanding of how climate justice is shaped as a norm because emotions are crucial elements in constructing beliefs and perceptions of certain issues in international politics.[43] Ignoring emotions in this issue would also result in a limited understanding of the ways through which advocates of this norm seek to swing international climate cooperation frameworks such as the UNFCCC towards a more just approach.

**Problem Statement:** Climate change cooperation is shifting towards climate justice, and scholars agree that it is becoming a new norm in international climate cooperation institutions. Civil society NGOs (as representatives of grassroots movements) seek to promote climate justice within crucial climate cooperation frameworks – such as the UNFCCC – and employ emotional rhetoric as one of their tools of persuasion. While current studies admit the significant role of emotional appeals in advocacy for norms (e.g., naming and shaming in the context of human rights), little is discussed about the emotional underpinnings of the climate justice norm.

The thesis raises **the question** of *how and which emotions NGOs employ to persuade actors to accept climate justice as a norm within the UNFCCC*.

**Thesis Aim and Objectives:** The thesis aims to better understand how and which emotions civil society NGOs invoke to promote climate justice within the UNFCCC, thereby shifting climate cooperation framework towards a climate justice norm. In other words, the thesis seeks to show how certain emotions invoked by civil society NGOs help them to promote climate justice as a norm that the international community should comply with.

The **objectives** of the thesis are as follows:

1. To develop a framework conceptualising emotions as forces driving a normative shift towards climate justice through the discourse of civil society NGOs within the UNFCCC.
2. To identify the dominant emotions in the discourse of civil society NGOs within the UNFCCC.

[43] Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'; Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'.

3. To explicate how these dominant emotions contribute to constructing climate justice as a norm.

**This thesis addresses the gap by arguing for a need to analyse how specific emotions play the role in the emergence of the climate justice norm, with a focus on civil society NGOs' advocacy for this norm within the UNFCCC. It conceptualises this role by introducing the framework of *emotive transformative persuasion*, and, by applying it in the context of NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC, the thesis uncovers indignation and hope emotions as significant forces underpinning NGOs' persuasion for climate justice in this institutional framework.**

## Theoretical Approach & Key Concepts

To achieve its aim, the thesis generally relies on social constructivism, allowing for the integration of emotions in understanding the construction of the climate justice norm. Research explaining norm emergence processes and that explaining the role of emotions in international relations relies on a social constructivist approach.[44] Norms in international politics, as shared understandings of behavioural rules, emerge because certain actors employ a discourse which constructs these norms as appropriate rules of behaviour.[45] Research in the field of the emotional turn in IR uncovered that actors' discourse is embedded with emotions, which play a crucial role in constructing shared understandings, identities, beliefs, and thus power dynamics in world politics.[46] In other words, when analysing discourse, scholars should assume that it is embedded with certain emotions, which can significantly shape the actors' attitudes and behaviour related to international politics. Thus, theories explaining norm emergence emphasize that norms in international politics are constructed through discourse. However, research analysing the role of

[44] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'.

[45] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[46] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Hall, '"An Extremely Obnoxious and Illegal Case" – Three Approaches to Affect, Emotion, and Discourse in the Aftermath of the Zhuhai Incident'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

emotions in world politics highlights that, within this discourse, there are emotions at play that cannot be overlooked. Based on the social constructivist approach, this thesis assumes that the climate justice norm is constructed through the civil society NGOs' discourse, which is embedded with certain emotions. Those emotions help to construct a shared understanding of climate justice as a norm that the international community should comply with. To integrate emotions in the explanation of the climate justice norm construction process by focusing on civil society NGOs as norm entrepreneurs, the following concepts need to be explained first: emotions, the climate justice norm, and civil society NGOs.

*Emotions*

Although emotions are generally viewed as psychological experiences (reaction patterns) that individuals undergo, I focus in my thesis on their collective and social dimension, and expression through language. This conceptualisation of emotion builds upon the assumptions in the research related to the emotional turn in IR, especially Simon Koschut's framework linking emotions and discourse, and Yohan Ariffin's focus on emotions through the framework of emotives.[47] Rather than analysing emotions as psychological individual states related to the physical body, this thesis thus examines emotions as expressed through language: emotions are analysed here by referring to linguistic expressions that convey emotions.

Scholars in the field of the emotional turn in IR emphasise the challenge in conceptualising emotions, which thus means that there is no single and universally established definition. However, it is important to mention a few patterns that have emerged in this research field. First, emotions are seen as both mental and physical phenomena, influencing political perceptions and behaviours, and are often studied through the lens of social constructivism, which views emotions as cognitive beliefs rather than mere bodily states. Emotions in international relations are understood within the broader perspective, meaning that the analysis may not rely on an exhaustive list of emotions developed within psychological studies,[48] distinguishing a few main emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, surprise, and anger).[49] Studies of emotions in IR also analyse empathy, trust, justice, or other feelings that may

[47] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.
[48] Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations', 11.
[49] Ekman, 'Basic Emotions'.

be understood as somehow related to emotions but not emotions *per se*. IR scholars analyse emotions by focusing on a wide variety of feelings that may underpin international politics. For example, Neta Crawford argued that emotions can function as institutionalised forces in structures of international politics, and illustrated her point by showing the institutionalisation of empathy in diplomatic institutions.[50] Mercer brought focus on emotions in IR by arguing that trust or credibility are emotional beliefs, thereby also emphasising the significance of emotional lenses in the analysis of relations between adversaries or allies. Thus, emotions in IR are studied by going beyond the narrow list of the chief emotions, to examine a wider variety of feelings.

Furthermore, *emotions* in IR are also conceptualised by differentiating them from *feeling* and *affect*. Emotions in the context of international relations are defined as "the inner states that individuals describe to others as feelings".[51] They are subjective experiences that also have physiological, inter-subjective, and cultural components. As Crawford explained, "Feelings are 'internally experienced' while the meaning attached to those feelings, the behaviours associated with them, and the recognition of emotions in others are cognitively and culturally construed and constructed".[52] Individual and subjective as they might be, emotions are also always intertwined with pre-existing social, cultural, and political contexts. Feelings are viewed as the physiological, or somatic, expression of emotional change. For example, when someone is afraid, their heart races and muscles get tense instinctively. Affective dynamics lie beyond representation and are broader phenomena that exist both before and beyond consciousness. They are a wide range of non-reflective and subconscious bodily sensations, such as mood, intuition, temperament, attachment, disposition, and even memory. Whereas some studies focus specifically on any of these concepts, several of them belong to the field of the emotional turn in IR without focusing on the difference between these concepts. As Hutchison and Bleiker state, most international relations scholars use the term "emotion loosely, as a broad umbrella term to denote a range of different phenomena".[53]

[50] Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'.
[51] Crawford, 537.
[52] Crawford, 537.
[53] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', 501.

A significant number of studies show that emotions in international relations can be studied by analysing language and discourse.[54] Simon Koschut proposed the *Emotion Discourse Analysis* (EDA) method to grasp the meaning of emotions embedded in discourse.[55] Yohan Ariffin also explained that emotions in world politics may be "assessed insofar as the inquiry is confined to their discursive expressions by significant subjects".[56] In this way, emotions function as *emotives*, which means that emotions expressed in language not only describe an actor's emotional state, but also produce certain political effects.[57] That is, emotions expressed through language perform certain functions because they inevitably shape beliefs and understanding which have effects on political events and processes. As explained by Ariffin, scholars may study the role of *emotives* rather than emotions *per se*: certain evaluations are expressed through language, and once thus conveyed, they produce certain political effects.

This thesis relies on the conceptualisation of emotions as having a social dimension developed within the field of the emotional turn in IR, but it specifically focuses on their representations in discourse elaborated by Koschut and Ariffin. Their approaches offer useful lenses for the conceptualisation of emotions in this thesis. Both scholars introduced these frameworks to address the methodological challenges faced in trying to assess the role of emotions in international relations. They suggest that emotions can be assessed by focusing on their discursive expressions, and assuming that, in this way, they shape attitudes, beliefs, and understandings in international relations. Additionally, these approaches allow us to avoid the explicit distinction between the instrumental and genuine expressions of emotions. Most research analysing emotional rhetoric in political contexts implies their instrumental role: emotions are understood as strategic tools used to manipulate and convince the audience. However, as Ariffin explained, "Although emotions are used to frame issues and are instrumental to particular ends, they are nevertheless sentiments that influence the behaviour of those that mobilise them". For example, if NGOs use emotional expressions to promote certain values and principles in international institutions, it does not

[54] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2018; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.

[55] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

[56] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.

[57] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.

mean that the representatives of the NGOs do not experience these emotions genuinely.

Conceptualising emotions through the lens of *emotives,* thus, means the following: emotions can be conveyed in linguistic expressions; these expressions issue evaluations of certain ideas and principles, thereby producing political effects; and emotions expressed in actors' language do not imply their rational and instrumental use. Emotions become inseparable from political effects because actors pursuing certain goals engage in a discourse which expresses certain evaluations through emotional expressions. In this way, they mobilise *emotives,* which play a significant role in shaping beliefs and understandings in international politics.

Additionally, the research does not rely on a strict list of basic emotions[58] but rather examines a variety of different feelings that can be interpreted as emotions in a broader sense (i.e., a wide variety of feelings such as anxiety or indignation can be understood as emotions despite not being strictly defined as emotions).[59] This thesis assumes that emotions are meaningful as they construct understandings and perceptions of climate justice by embedding within the discourse of actors that seek to promote this framing of the climate change crisis. Emotions are attached to the meanings of behaviours related to climate justice, thereby shaping the understanding of right and just behaviour. Based on the presently explained conceptualisation of emotions, and theoretical approaches informing them, this thesis relies on the following definition of emotions:

- **Emotions** are viewed as integral components of discursive practices, influencing actors' beliefs and perceptions.[60] Emotions are analyzed here by referring to linguistic expressions that convey emotions. Scholarly debate usually focused on two approaches to emotions: the naturalist conception or the social conception.[61] Naturalists focus on evolutionary

[58] Ekman, 'Basic Emotions'.

[59] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'.

[60] Graham, 'Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion'; J. M. Skorick, 'Pathos and Policy: The Power of Emotions in Shaping Perceptions of International Relations'; Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'; Gustafsson and Hall, 'The Politics of Emotions in International Relations: Who Gets to Feel What, Whose Emotions Matter, and the "History Problem" in Sino-Japanese Relations'.

[61] Ekman, 'Basic Emotions'; Nesse and Ellsworth, 'Evolution, Emotions, and Emotional Disorders'; Barrett, 'How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain'; Barrett, 'The Theory of Constructed Emotion: An Active Inference

and phenomenological theories of emotions, conceptualising them as embodied experiences, and argue in favour of innate universals as opposed to cultural relativism (emotions are 'natural kinds', they exist in nature, and are indifferent to social labelling). Meanwhile, the social constructivist approach views emotions as socially constructed: "what people feel is conditioned by socialisation into culture and by participation in social structures".[62] This study aligns with the methodological perspectives that emerged in the emotional turn in IR and relies on the social constructivist approach to emotions. It focuses on emotions that are experienced collectively rather than individually: that is, the study relies on the social nature of emotions and assumes that emotions cannot be reduced to individual bodies, and that they are emergent properties of groups, which structure relations within and between groups.[63] The thesis also assumes that actors' discourse can be *emotive*: emotions embedded in a discourse perform certain functions, and produce political effects as they contribute to constructing meanings and beliefs that emerge in international institutions. Thus, emotions can be analysed by focusing on their expressions in language and discourse.

*Norms*

Generally, international norms are defined as the "standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity".[64] According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms embody a quality of 'oughtness' and shared moral assessment.[65] They are shaped by social interactions and shared understandings among states and other international actors. Climate justice is observed as an international norm, which means that a shared understanding of climate change as a justice issue is increasingly accepted by international actors.[66] Therefore, this thesis relies on the following definition of the climate justice norm:

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Account of Interoception and Categorization'; Fridman et al., 'Applying the Theory of Constructed Emotion to Police Decision Making'; Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'.

62 Turner and Stets, 'The Sociology of Emotions'.

63 Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'.

64 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

65 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

66 Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'; Wiener, 'Norm(Ative) Change in International Relations: A Conceptual Framework'.

- **A normative shift towards climate justice** is understood as an evolving expectation that all parties involved in addressing climate change should respect, promote, and consider various obligations related to human rights and vulnerable communities.[67] The study relies on the observation that the global conception of climate change is evolving towards a norm of climate justice, which can be seen in the discourse of states, civil society organisations, and the text of the preeminent international climate change treaty, the Paris Agreement.[68]

Sultana explains climate justice as being "foundationally about paying attention to how climate change impacts people differently, unevenly, and disproportionately, as well as redressing the resultant injustices in fair and equitable ways".[69] By relying on existing studies, this research assumes that this normative shift is observed within the UNFCCC, with signs of its institutionalisation in crucial agreements (the Paris Agreement).[70] The thesis analyses the UNFCCC framework as the institutional setting, which significantly structures the emergence of the climate justice norm in international climate cooperation. The UNFCCC is the most important framework of global climate negotiations, where climate justice is strongly advocated by actors such as civil society NGOs. Based on their focus on advocacy for climate justice, it can be assumed that their presence contributes to strengthening the discourse on climate justice within the crucial global climate cooperation frameworks such as the UNFCCC.

Norms are constructed through discourse, which plays a crucial role in the emergence, diffusion, and internalisation of these norms.[71] The first stage of norm emergence is fundamentally dependent on the activities of norm entrepreneurs such as NGOs who utilise persuasive argumentation to advocate for new norms.[72] This process highlights how the discourse shapes the understanding and acceptance of norms within international relations.

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[67] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'; Sultana, 'Critical Climate Justice', 2 November 2021; Wiener, 'Norm(Ative) Change in International Relations: A Conceptual Framework'.

[68] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

[69] Sultana, 'Critical Climate Justice', 1 March 2022.

[70] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

[71] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[72] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

*Civil Society NGOs*

As explained before, climate justice is an emerging international norm, implying that certain norm entrepreneurs seek to persuade other actors into accepting behavioural rules that comply with climate justice principles. Based on the research showing that climate justice ideas emerged from grassroots movements and civil society NGOs,[73] this thesis assumes that they act as the norm entrepreneurs of climate justice:

- Civil society **NGOs, through their discourse representing ideas of grassroots movements, act as the norm entrepreneurs of climate justice.** They are considered crucial actors in the emergence of the climate justice norm.[74] The analysis focuses on civil society NGOs participating in the UNFCCC framework: Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), Children and youth NGOs, and Indigenous peoples' organisations. Civil society organisations are distinguished from others as those having a public purpose, that is, "CSOs stand out for their normative dimension since they support values such as equality, justice, and solidarity".[75] In the context of this study, civil society NGOs within the UNFCCC rely on climate justice as their crucial goal and their vision is to empower marginalised groups, such as Indigenous peoples or youth, within climate negotiations. While NGOs vary in forms and priorities in COP negotiations, they share common values and interests, especially linked to advocacy for climate justice, as representatives of civil society.[76]

Within the UNFCCC, the Climate Action Network or CAN has operated from the very beginning, serving as the largest and most influential network representing the attitudes of civil society NGOs, including stakeholders such as ENGOs, youth, and Indigenous peoples.[77] It comprises more than 1,500 civil society organisations in 130 countries, together fighting the climate crisis. CAN emerged in 1989 as an official group of civil society NGOs in

[73] Schlosberg, 'Climate Justice and Capabilities: A Framework for Adaptation Policy'; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014; Schlosberg, 'Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse', 1 February 2013.

[74] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014.

[75] Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'.

[76] Brühl, 'Representing the People? NGOs in International Negotiations'; Kumar, 'Global Civil Society'; Leander, 'Global Civil Society: An Answer to War'.

[77] 'About CAN'; 'Climate Action Network – Home'.

COP negotiations and became the world's largest climate network, officially representing the voice of civil society NGOs. In 1989, organisations primarily from Europe and the US agreed to establish amongst themselves a loose but official network for the coordination of their activities around climate change negotiations and domestic climate action. This was done between the 1988 World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere and the creation of the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC), and the 1990 decision by the United Nations General Assembly to develop a negotiating committee to draft a climate change convention. Currently, it remains the main network, gathering the positions of civil society NGOs and representing their interests during COP negotiations. "Therefore, this thesis focuses on CAN, which represents the discourse of civil society NGOs within the UNFCCC.

In summary, climate justice can be understood as an emerging international norm that is constructed within the framework of global climate governance, characterised by behavioural rules that emphasise equitable resource distribution, inclusive decision-making processes, and recognition of diverse identities and rights among the affected communities. The shift reflects a growing consensus among states and civil society that climate policies must address human rights, vulnerability, and social inequalities, and that climate policies are incorporated in international agreements like the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, civil society NGOs function as norm entrepreneurs of climate justice within the UNFCCC context. Here, emotions are constitutive of norm emergence processes, manifesting in persuasion mechanisms employed by norm entrepreneurs such as NGOs. Thus, emotions should be analysed as collective, socially constructed forces embedded in NGOs' discourse that can either reinforce or challenge existing power dynamics within the UNFCCC.

## Research Design

The thesis implements its objectives by initially developing the framework that conceptualises the way in which emotions can contribute to the construction of the climate justice norm. It then proceeds by applying this framework in the context of NGOs' climate justice advocacy within the UNFCCC to uncover the role of specific emotions in this process. The thesis introduces the conceptual framework of *emotive transformative persuasion*, which combines two approaches that specify the ways in which emotions can contribute to the construction of the climate justice norm. One approach explains how actors such as NGOs encourage new international norms, whereas the second approach allows us to integrate emotions into the analysis. The thesis then proceeds by employing emotion discourse analysis and

interviews to analyze the role of emotions conceptualized in the framework of *emotive transformative persuasion.*

Actors such as NGOs seek to persuade other actors to comply with new rules of behaviour by employing expressions that resonate with the international community; for example, emphasising moral principles and 'universal values'.[78] Melissa Labonte in her study on humanitarian norms and responsibility to protect norms advocacy emphasised that norm entrepreneurs such as NGOs use the logic of argumentation to persuade policymakers to adopt new ideas and norms in international politics.[79] This logic relies on argumentation and deliberation as key factors in persuading actors to adopt new ideas, norms, and interests, and to generate shared understandings that further constitute their identities as policy actors. It is a persuasion mechanism, as it involves appeals made to norms of truth, justice, right, and sincerity to generate intersubjective meanings between actors and compel certain forms of political behaviour. Effective persuasion utilises the logic of argumentation, which aids in generating resonance, which, in turn, is necessary for persuasion as it connects existing ideas and norms to new ones. Resonance thus helps to construct persuasive messages. NGOs seek to make their claims resonate by adhering to certain resonance conditions: they seek to expose evidence of caused harm; they link promoted principles with already prevailing standards and universal values such as human rights; they draw the link between perpetrators and victims; and they also encourage intervention or solutions to address the violation of moral standards. Therefore, for effective norm persuasion, NGOs engage in communication (i.e., logic of argumentation) that allows them to resonate with the international community by focusing on the above-mentioned aspects.

Simon Koschut's theoretical framework links emotions, discourse, and power in world politics with the assumption that NGOs' discourse urging for climate justice is embedded with certain emotions.[80] These emotions serve significant functions that enable NGOs to challenge the status quo in the UNFCCC, and promote principles that challenge the domination of developed

[78] Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Clark, 'Diplomacy of Conscience'; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

[79] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[80] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

countries while shifting more power in favour of vulnerable communities in this institutional setting. Koschut's framework is relevant to this thesis for several reasons. First, it allows us to presume that emotions play a significant role in constructing the climate justice norm: they become inseparable from features of the discourse of actors seeking to promote the principles of climate justice (i.e., their discourse should be studied as *emotion discourse*), thereby shifting more power to vulnerable communities. In this way, emotions contribute to transforming the prevailing dynamic among actors within the UNFCCC. Second, Koschut's approach emerges from the emotional turn in IR, thus providing a conceptualisation of emotions that aligns with the definition of emotions given before.[81] Last, the framework provides concrete methodological tools to analyse emotions empirically, by focusing on language as representing certain emotions and their functions.[82]

The thesis combines Labonte's and Koschut's frameworks as follows:

- It employs Labonte's framework to assume that successful persuasion for new norms depends on the discourse that norm entrepreneurs, for example, NGOs, employ when making other actors accept new rules of behaviour (i.e., logic of argumentation). The thesis also relies on Labonte's framework to identify the specific aspects (i.e., resonance conditions) on which norm entrepreneurs such as NGOs focus to make their persuasion more resonant.
- It employs Koschut's framework to analyse emotions within this discourse, by approaching it as an *emotion discourse*, that is, a discourse which is embedded with certain emotions that function to shape the understanding of climate justice as a norm, thus challenging the domination of developed countries in international climate cooperation frameworks such as the UNFCCC.

Based on the previously explained theoretical assumptions and the above-outlined two frameworks, I introduce the conceptual framework of **emotive transformative persuasion**. This framework conceptualises how norm entrepreneurs persuade actors to accept new international norms by invoking certain emotions, especially when appealing for justice. Those emotions function through their discourse, and help NGOs challenge the domination of certain actors by promoting new norms, such as that of climate justice. In this way, emotions function to transform the prevailing power dynamics by shifting it more towards vulnerable groups. I use this conceptual framework

[81] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

[82] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

to analyse civil society NGOs' advocacy for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC and employ emotion discourse analysis and interviews to uncover specific emotions that play a crucial role in this context.

*Data Collection and Analysis*

With the objective to identify the relevant emotions and their meaning, I employed methodological tools offered by EDA, or emotion discourse analysis, and conducted interviews. As mentioned before, EDA provides specific strategies and methodological tools to analyse emotions empirically in texts.[83] Additionally, interviews with representatives from civil society NGOs provide a more internal perspective of their emotional experiences while advocating for climate justice within international cooperation frameworks.

EDA allows us to analyse the presence of emotions in the analysed texts, and interpret their meaning within the wider context by providing specific strategies of analysis.[84] However, the presence of certain emotions and their significance can also be grasped by using additional methods such as interviews. In fact, scholars in the field of the emotional turn in IR emphasise that interviews can significantly contribute to gaining an internal perspective of the actors' emotional experiences, and employ them in combination with other methods.[85] This analysis relies on documents (summaries of the transcripts of COP negotiations, and ECO newsletters, that is, newsletters released by civil society NGOs during COP negotiations to present their position on the relevant issues) and 10 interviews conducted with representatives from civil society NGOs participating in international climate negotiations. This analysis focuses on the textual dimension of discourse, that is, it does not seek to cover the non-verbal and visual dimensions of discourse.

Emotion discourse analysis was introduced by Koschut to address the methodological challenges in analysing emotions empirically in IR.[86] It relies on the previously given definition of emotions, and aligns with the conceptual framework of this thesis. *Emotion discourse* is understood as words, phrases,

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[83] Koschut.

[84] Koschut.

[85] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2017; Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'; Martin Petlach, Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (Eds): 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'.

[86] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

narratives, expressions, and representations that in some way refer to emotion.[87] For example, emotionally charged language, such as the terms *innocent victims* and *human suffering*, may invoke emotional responses that are crucial in shaping certain beliefs.[88] Rather than stemming from fixed cognitive scenarios that define what each emotion word means, emotion discourse deploys a flexible range of oppositions and contrasts.[89] The point is that this is a *way of* talking, and this includes emotion categories that provide a flexible resource for situated discourse rather than a set of semantic templates or fixed scenarios that will mean or imply the same things about actors and events whenever used. *Emotion categories* are not graspable merely as individual feelings or expressions, nor is their discursive deployment reducible to detached, cognitive sense-making. The focus here is on how emotion categories function as rhetorical elements within a larger text. They are discursive phenomena, and they can be studied as such as part of how talk performs social actions. Thus, emotions embedded in discourse become powerful forces that can significantly shape understandings and relations among actors: by embedding themselves in the discourse, they become structural forces (i.e., structured patterns) that construct and reinforce beliefs such as humanity and the moral obligation to support refugees, resisting exclusionary narratives, and advocating for more inclusive approaches. The study of emotions as structural forces embedded in discourse allows us to interpret and contextualise emotions, therefore suggesting a more comprehensive understanding of their role.[90] This approach seeks to reveal emotionalising effects (i.e., to extract the emotion potential) that are hidden in these texts by interpreting and contextualising emotions.

EDA is one of the approaches that provides scholars with tools to explore the hidden meaning of emotions by examining them through discourse. By arguing that emotions are ephemeral phenomena, scholars conceptualised the influence of emotions even "when and where it [the influence] is not immediately apparent".[91] EDA is used as a methodological tool which focuses on emotions as powerful forces embedded in discourse, allowing actors to

[87] Edwards, 'Emotion Discourse'; Koschut et al., 'Discourse and Emotions in International Relations', 1 September 2017; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2018.

[88] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Sasley, 'Victimhood as Power in International Conflict', 2020.

[89] Edwards, 'Emotion Discourse'.

[90] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

[91] Koschut; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'.

shape beliefs and understandings. It reorients from the explanations in studies on psychology towards assumptions that allow for a more comprehensive inquiry into emotions in world politics.[92] Such an approach relies on a broader theoretical background that defines emotions and their meaning (i.e., "what emotions do") by focusing on the following aspects: their social and collective nature; explaining the 'effects' of emotions not through direct causal links, but rather by uncovering certain aspects through which emotions become meaningful (e.g., shaping beliefs and perceptions through discourse).[93]

Rather than being innate or universal, emotions are products of socialisation processes and interactions within specific cultural frameworks.[94] In other words, the experience of emotions is not simply an internal, biological reaction. Instead, the way we understand and express emotions is shaped by the social and cultural context. They are considered discursive representations that are communicated and interpreted through language, symbols, and narratives.[95] The given methodology allows us to reveal the role that emotions play through certain representations. EDA aims to uncover the emotional meanings embedded in texts, speeches, and interactions and understand how these emotional expressions shape power dynamics, social relationships, and political outcomes.[96] Thus, instead of focusing on measuring the direct influence of emotions, this methodological turn sought to conceptualise how emotions function in hidden ways, such as, for example, by becoming constitutive features of political structures or by shaping understandings and perceptions by embedding in the discourse.[97] This approach focuses on how actors talk about emotions and how they employ emotion categories when talking about subjects, events, or social relations; for instance, how emotions experienced during trauma shape certain communities or how emotions embedded in discourse create feeling rules that structure the actors' emotional responses (e.g., fear towards immigrants). Thus, emotions here are understood

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92 Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

93 Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

94 Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Hutchison, 'Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Ahmed, 'The Cultural Politics of Emotion'.

95 Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

96 Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

97 Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

as an integral part of discourse, and emotion discourse is the words, phrases, narratives, expressions, and representations that in some way symbolically refer to emotion.

Emotion discourse analysis is implemented in the following steps: 1) Making text selections (identifying texts in which emotions are either explicitly expressed or tactically implied over a range of sources); 2) Mapping the emotional potential of the text (mapping emotions within the text in a way that separates the descriptive meaning of written words from their connotative emotional meaning); 3) Interpreting and contextualising the emotionalisation effects of the text (situating emotional expressions within the socio-cultural context, that is, looking at how these expressions are directed at, and how they resonate with particular audiences). For this analysis, appropriate texts were selected by looking for a discourse that would represent emotions invoked by grassroots movements within the UNFCCC. The CAN principles and actions strongly align with those of grassroots movements, whose discourse was identified as a significant factor in shaping climate justice.[98] Therefore, texts produced by CAN and its members were selected as appropriate for this analysis.

EDA uses linguistic tools to identify and understand emotions in language. These tools include examination of emotion terms (e.g., 'angry', 'hope'), emotional connotations (e.g., 'genocide', 'betrayal'), and metaphors or comparisons that symbolically represent emotions. By analysing these features, researchers can uncover the emotional content and impact of communication. These tools are the ways through which actors communicate emotions in discourse. Thus, with the oibjective to identify these emotions and interpret their meaning, the analysis looked at texts for emotion terms, emotional connotations, metaphors, comparisons, and analogies that refer to certain feelings.

Data for this analysis were obtained from documents and interviews. More specifically, three sources provided data for this study:

1) *Summaries of transcripts of COP negotiations:* Earth Negotiations Bulletin: independent reporting service on the United Nations environment and development negotiations: From this source, data that represent civil

[98] 'About CAN'; 'Building Power through Movements'; Martens, 'COP 28'; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 1 May 2014.

society NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC framework were collected.[99]

2) *ECO Newsletters (ECO):* An insider's perspective on the UNFCCC negotiations and the climate change movement. It concentrates on the positions of civil society NGOs concerning the COP framework and the involved actors, producing the textual representation of their common rhetoric within this institutional structure.[100]
3) *Interviews with representatives of civil society NGOs:* Interviews provided an inside perspective on the emotional aspects of the climate activists' engagement in climate negotiations with governmental officials and allowed for a more nuanced understanding of the emotional dynamic within this context. The analysis included 10 (9 remote, 1 face-to-face) interviews with representatives from NGOs participating in international climate negotiations: Environmental NGOs, youth, and Indigenous peoples' organisations (from France, Thailand, Lithuania, Honduras, South Africa, Poland, Argentina, and Greece). The list of CAN members was employed to choose organisations relevant to this study. The interviews proceeded with a *snowball* sampling technique to recruit new interviewees, where the initial research participants were invited to suggest and provide contacts for additional potential participants.

Therefore, the thesis assumes that advocacy for climate justice is driven by civil society NGOs, represented by the *Climate Action Network*, which explicitly emphasises it as their goal. Their discourse, thus, becomes crucial in a normative shift towards climate justice within the UNFCCC. Emotion discourse analysis was employed to identify the distinct emotions in civil society NGOs' discourse which shape understandings related to climate justice and interpret their meaning for the construction of this norm within the UNFCCC environment. Interviews, on the grounds of assuming them to be an important source of data across studies of emotions such as those of human rights advocacy,[101] allowed for a more in-depth look into NGO representatives' emotional experiences related to their advocacy efforts within the international climate negotiations.

It is important to draw attention to a few aspects relevant to this thesis. First, as explained above, climate justice is understood as a set of principles

[99] A more precise explanation on the collection of data is provided in the 'Methods' chapter.

[100] 'ECO Newsletter Archives'.

[101] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

that are observed in the research as the emerging new international norm.[102] The conceptual framework builds upon the assumption that there is an emerging shared understanding among actors in the international community that climate justice is already a prevailing set of normative principles to which the actors are expected to comply. The thesis thus explores the role that emotions play in the emergence process of this norm. It is also important to clarify that the role of emotions is investigated based on the conceptualisation of emotions developed within the research field of the emotional turn in IR: the approach argues that scholars should not look for the direct causal links between emotions and certain outcomes (in this case, the role in the construction of the climate justice norm), but rather uncover the specific aspects through which emotions become meaningful in affecting international politics. In the context of this study, thus, I do not seek to demonstrate a causal relationship between emotions and the emergence of the climate justice norm in any strict sense. I rather seek to uncover how emotions become a force underpinning the construction of the climate justice norm, thus providing an understanding of *how* and *which emotions* function within this process.

## Thesis Statements

The thesis sought to address the gap of the overlooked role of emotions in the emergence of the climate justice norm, and thus conceptualised how norm entrepreneurs rely on emotions to persuade the international community to accept the climate justice principles as a new norm. The thesis raised the question of *how and which emotions NGOs employ to persuade actors to accept climate justice as a norm within the UNFCCC.* The thesis presents the following statements:

1) Emotions underpin the construction of the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC through civil society NGOs' discourse: emotions, invoked through the discourse of norm entrepreneurs, shape a shared understanding of climate justice as a *morally right* approach to climate cooperation. This process can be conceptualised as *emotive transformative persuasion*, on which civil society NGOs rely to advocate for climate justice. This advocacy approach refers to the discourse of norm entrepreneurs that invokes certain emotions to resonate with the international community, and to challenge the domination of certain actors.
2) Within *emotive transformative persuasion*, indignation and hope are two dominant emotions in the context of NGOs' advocacy for the climate

[102] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

justice norm within the UNFCCC. The *Indignation–Hope* nexus highlights what needs to change (exposing injustices through indignation) while maintaining a belief that change is possible (encouraging progress through hope), and mobilising the community that is able to bring this change (actors complying with the climate justice principles and advocating for them). Thus, indignation functions as a boundary-drawing force (pushing actors violating climate justice principles outside the boundaries of the moral community). Hope functions as a community-building force (aligning actors that comply with the climate justice principles or promote them into a *hopeful community*).

3) The norm entrepreneurs of climate justice (civil society NGOs), acting within the UNFCCC framework, perceive the framework as inherently unjust, reproducing the prevailing inequalities in international climate cooperation. In this context, the invocation of indignation and hope emerges as an emotional approach by civil society NGOs seeking to promote the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC. This emotional approach can be employed in two ways based on different types of hope: indignation and passive hope; and indignation and active hope. The former reproduces the image of civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities as powerless actors, whereas the latter focuses on the improved agency of these actors by encouraging the belief in their capabilities to produce change and challenge the prevailing inequalities within the UNFCCC.

## Contribution of the Thesis

The thesis aims to make a few contributions. First, it brings an emotional perspective to explanations of climate justice, particularly by focusing on its emergence within the international climate cooperation framework. Second, it expands the research of emotions in IR by including the emergence of climate justice in the emotionally driven processes of international politics. Third, the thesis introduces the framework of *emotive transformative persuasion*, which contributes to the research field of international norms by directly addressing the call for a deeper investigation into the emotional underpinnings of norm construction within the International Relations theory. The framework conceptualises emotions as significant forces in shaping the climate justice norm, and illustrates its application by focusing on civil society NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. This analysis also provides insight into how non-state actors, particularly civil society NGOs, participate within the complex UNFCCC environment and address challenges, as evidenced by their growing numbers and influence in climate negotiations. It

deepens the understanding of specific emotions and their interplay in legitimising vulnerable groups' claims within climate cooperation institutions.

For the first contribution, it is important to consider emotional factors as underpinning a shift to the climate justice norm (a shared understanding or expectation how the things *should be*) because the discourse that promotes this understanding within the UNFCCC is inevitably embedded with emotions. NGOs, as representatives of civil society, play an important role in promoting the climate justice discourse,[103] and participation in the UNFCCC not only brings this discourse into this framework but does so by invoking certain emotions. NGOs are known to employ emotional appeals to promote their goals and values in international institutions, and, within the context of climate change, the emotional dimension of such organisations is highly emphasised. The thesis emphasises the NGOs' perspective on climate cooperation, which may expose complexities and challenges that these actors have to navigate when participating in these frameworks. This means that emotional factors cannot be ignored while explaining the emergence of climate justice within climate cooperation institutions, and these factors should be analysed to comprehensively understand this shifting discourse.

The thesis also expands the research in the field of emotions in international relations by analysing the emotional foundations of the emergence of climate justice within international climate cooperation framework and uncovers the role of certain emotions that play in this process. Although research on emotions in IR has advanced during the previous few decades, issues related to international climate cooperation, especially in the climate justice context, remain underexplored. Initially, scholars started the debate by showing that emotions *matter* in world politics. They criticised rational theories and limited explanations based on psychological perspectives that distinguish emotions from rationality or understand them as obstacles to rational thinking. Scholars argued that, on the contrary, emotions cannot be separated from rational thinking because they constitute individuals' cognitive mechanisms and thus become an inseparable element of political thinking and behaviour.[104] A significant amount of research argued for this approach and brought emotions into the field of IR, which encouraged scholars to move beyond the *emotions matter* approach and to focus on explanations of *how* emotions can be analysed (i.e., by looking for methodological approaches) and

[103] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014; Schlosberg, 'Theorizing Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse', 1 February 2013.

[104] Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'

*why* they are important in explaining world politics. This led to several studies analysing the role of emotions in various contexts, ranging from emotional diplomacy, security politics and securitisation processes, relations among allies, and security communities, to those focusing on emotions in war or resistance movements.[105] A link between emotions and climate change is studied from different perspectives, for example, by focusing on psychological explanations, political communication, or the role of emotions in environmental social movements.[106] However, the emotional dimension of international climate cooperation, and, especially, the observed emergence of climate justice within such frameworks are still under-researched.

The thesis introduces the framework of *emotive transformative persuasion*, which explicitly links emotions and norm persuasion in the context of justice claims in international politics. It thus aligns with the emphasis made by a number of scholars on the increasing need to understand the mechanisms through which norm emergence is underpinned.[107] The framework conceptualises emotions as an underpinining norm persuasion mechanism, that is, they are invoked through norm advocates' discourse, and are enabled to resonate with the international community. The framework serves as a tool for analysing how emotions function as transformative forces in norm construction through discourse, leading to normative shifts in the context of justice claims in international politics. The thesis illustrates this theoretical contribution through an in-depth analysis of the civil society NGOs' advocacy

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[105] Hutchison, 'Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma'; Jeffery, 'Emotions and Reconciliation Rhetoric – Banishing the Dark Emotions in Timor-Leste', 2020; Åhäll and Gregory, 'Emotions, Politics and War'; Koschut, 'Emotional (Security) Communities: The Significance of Emotion Norms in Inter-Allied Conflict Management'; Hutchison, 'Affective Communities as Security Communities'; Mrovlje, 'Disappointment's Magic: Negative Emotions, Transitional Justice and Resistance'; Pearlman, 'Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings'.

[106] Brosch, 'Affect and Emotions as Drivers of Climate Change Perception and Action: A Review'; Harth, 'Affect, (Group-Based) Emotions and Climate Change Action'; Sangervo, Jylhä, and Pihkala, 'Climate Anxiety: Conceptual Considerations, and Connections with Climate Hope and Action'; Iniguez-Gallardo, Lenti Boero, and Tzanopoulos, 'Climate Change and Emotions: Analysis of People's Emotional States in Southern Ecuador'; Davidson and Kecinski, 'Emotional Pathways to Climate Change Responses'; Wang et al., 'Emotions Predict Policy Support: Why it Matters how People Feel about Climate Change'; Ojala, 'Hope and Climate-Change Engagement from a Psychological Perspective', February 2023; Head and Harada, 'Keeping the Heart a Long Way from the Brain: The Emotional Labour of Climate Scientists'; Roeser, 'Risk Communication, Public Engagement, and Climate Change: A Role for Emotions'.

[107] Price and Sikkink, 'International Norms, Moral Psychology, and Neuroscience'.

for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC, and demonstrates how specific emotions underpin norm persuasion in an international institutional setting.

Thus, the thesis offers an integrated view of the emotional dimension of the NGOs' advocacy for climate justice. The thesis is structured into five parts. The Introduction is followed by the second chapter, presenting the literature review that inform the conceptual framework and its assumptions. The second chapter elaborates on climate justice and its understanding as a norm in the international community, the role of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs and their contribution to climate justice advocacy, and the emotional dimension of norm advocacy. The chapter concludes by introducing the conceptual framework of *emotive transformative persuasion*, which is informed by theoretical approaches explaining norm persuasion and resonance, and the conceptualisation of emotions as transformative forces functioning through the discourse. The following chapter explains the methodology employed to analyse emotions in NGOs' persuasion aimed at climate justice within the UNFCCC by elaborating on emotion discourse and interview analysis. The fourth chapter presents the analysis, structured in two steps: the first step focuses on the identification of the dominant emotions; the second step contextualises the identified emotions (indignation and hope) within the climate justice advocacy by uncovering how these emotions function to shape this norm. The second section of the analysis chapter outlines how these emotions function within the framework of *emotive transformative persuasion*, while focusing on how the discourse of NGOs adheres to the resonance conditions for successful persuasion. The chapter concludes by presenting specific emotional approaches of civil society NGOs in the climate justice advocacy, which emerged in the analysis. Finally, the last chapter presents the conclusions and implications of the findings.

# 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents the process of the development of the conceptual framework and its assumptions for the study, based on a literature review conducted and organised around the themes of **climate justice**, **NGOs' norm advocacy**, and **emotions**. These theoretical assumptions inform the conceptual framework developed at the end of this chapter, thereby establishing the background to conceptualise the role of emotions in advocacy for the climate justice norm.

To explain the role of emotions in such a context, it is crucial to address a few aspects. First, we need to understand what the climate justice is, and why it is referred to as the norm in the international community. It is also important to elaborate on the actors who advocate for this norm (i.e., the norm entrepreneurs promoting climate justice), which, in this case, are civil society NGOs. Furthermore, norm persuasion and the role of emotions within its mechanisms also merit investigation. Based on these aspects, the chapter seeks to address the following questions:

- What is climate justice and why is it considered as a new norm in the international community? (i.e., What behavioural rules does it refer to?)
- Why can civil society NGOs be considered as norm entrepreneurs in the climate justice advocacy?
- How do norm entrepreneurs persuade the international community to accept new norms, and why are emotions important in this process?

As the questions imply, the developed assumptions need to establish the link between climate justice, NGOs' norm advocacy, and emotions. In other words, they must provide a theoretical background allowing for the understanding of how emotions can underpin the emergence of the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC, represented through the NGOs' involvement in this process. The chapter is structured based on the three questions above, that is, each section seeks to answer the questions respectively by discussing the relevant literature. First, it elaborates on the definition of climate justice and a normative shift towards this conception, followed by a discussion of the role of civil society NGOs in the emergence of this norm. Next, the chapter discusses the research that explains norm persuasion, with a focus on emotions as a crucial aspect of persuasion mechanisms. The last section summarises the theoretical assumptions that address the above questions and inform the methodological tool presented in the next chapter.

## 2.1. Climate Justice as a Norm

Among the large number of studies analysing climate justice, the following types are relevant for this thesis: research explaining what is climate justice and defining this concept; and research observing it as a new norm in the international community. Focusing on these studies will allow us to answer the first question: **What is climate justice and why is it considered as a new norm in the international community** (i.e., what behavioural rules does it refer to)? Without presenting a single definition of climate justice, a variety of studies seek to conceptualise it and define this term from different perspectives. This section reviews the studies seeking to define climate justice, and presents the conceptualisation employed in this thesis based on Gach's study on the emergence of the climate justice norm.

### *Defining Climate Justice*

Although several studies focus on the conceptualisation of climate justice and emphasise its unique role in the international climate regime,[108] they do not provide a single definition of climate justice, as its meaning depends on the actor using it and the setting in which it is being applied.[109] The general understanding of climate change has significantly shifted towards a justice frame focused on human rights, vulnerability to climate change, and social inequalities.[110] In other words, climate justice structures the understanding of

[108] Taylor, 'The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm: Injustice Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental Discourses'; Schlosberg, 'Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political Theories'; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 1 May 2014; Schlosberg, 'Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse', 1 February 2013; Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans, 'Exploring the Nexus: Bringing together Sustainability, Environmental Justice and Equity'; Adger, 'Scales of Governance and Environmental Justice for Adaptation and Mitigation of Climate Change'; Adger et al., 'Advancing a Political Ecology of Global Environmental Discourses'; Okereke, 'Global Environmental Sustainability: Intragenerational Equity and Conceptions of Justice in Multilateral Environmental Regimes'; Newell, 'Race, Class and the Global Politics of Environmental Inequality'; Roberts and Parks, 'Fueling Injustice: Globalization, Ecologically Unequal Exchange and Climate Change'.

[109] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

[110] Sultana, 'Critical Climate Justice', 2 November 2021; Porter et al., 'Climate Justice in a Climate Changed World'.

'what is right' in shaping climate policies and international agreements.[111] In general, climate justice is "*fundamentally about paying attention to how climate change impacts people differently, unevenly, and disproportionately, as well as redressing the resultant injustices in fair and equitable ways*".[112] However, climate justice is a complex term as, in this case, the activity that constitutes the wrong (e.g., emission of greenhouse gases) is not wrong *per se*, such as genocide or slavery, but is only wrong in excess.[113] It results in different meanings that the actors place on 'climate justice' and their capacity to influence the outcomes.[114]

Among the significant number of studies seeking to define climate justice, some focus on its conceptualisation and historic development while others seek to identify different types or dimensions of climate justice.[115] David Schlosberg and Lisette B. Collins in their study on the conceptualisation of climate justice and its roots in environmental justice explain that climate justice can have various definitions because of the wide range of approaches to justice itself and the complexity of climate change.[116] The authors synthesised them and provided three broad conceptualisations of climate justice, grouped as follows:

1) Academic theories of climate justice, that is, the use of more or less ideal notions of justice to provide a normative justification for a global climate change policy (e.g., the historic responsibility approach/'polluter pays' principle; rights-based approaches such as a right to develop out of poverty before gaining any responsibility to mitigate climate change).
2) Climate justice and elite organisations, mostly seeking to influence policymaking by focusing on principles such as the development rights approach, a related right or need to industrialise, a negotiated North/South approach, a human rights approach, and a commitment to carbon markets.

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[111] Bailey, 'Spatializing Climate Justice: Justice Claim Making and Carbon Pricing Controversies in Australia'.

[112] Sultana, 'Critical Climate Justice', March 2022.

[113] Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', 18 July 2023.

[114] Lefstad and Paavola.

[115] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 1 May 2014; Wagle and Philip, 'Climate Justice Is Social Justice'; Diezmartínez and Short Gianotti, 'US Cities Increasingly Integrate Justice into Climate Planning and Create Policy Tools for Climate Justice'; Gibson and Duram, 'Shifting Discourse on Climate and Sustainability'.

[116] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 1 May 2014.

3) Grassroots movements, developing simultaneously and engaging more actively in social activism.

Other studies seek to develop frameworks that would help to study the relationship between the effects of climate change and its relation to justice and fairness:[117]

- 'Polluter pays' models: based on historical responsibility; those with more responsibility for causing climate change should provide a larger contribution to the prevention or mitigation of impacts.
- Fair share models: based on the equal allocation of emissions; encourages giving everyone an equal share of the capacity of the atmospheric sink, that is, equal emissions allowance for each country.
- Rights-based models, focusing on development rights, human rights, environmental rights, and differentiated duties and responsibilities that flow from them.

Schlosberg argued for an additional *capabilities approach*, which would better reflect the issues of vulnerability, basic needs and rights, and human functioning.[118] According to him, the currently existing approaches do not reflect the problem of recognition as a key condition of the maldistribution of goods and risks, and ignore the capabilities approach, which emphasises the specific range of the basic needs and capabilities (including recognition) that human beings require to function:

- Recognition: emphasising a lack of recognition of communities, institutionalised domination, and oppression as determinants of poor distribution and injustice. Recognition is about the relationship between the processes of the natural and social worlds, that is, climate change affects not only the natural world but also the very basis of cultural practices and identity among different communities, for example, Indigenous peoples.
- Capabilities approach: focusing on the functioning of communities and individuals and their needs of particular aspects of the environment to help them function (encompassing needs to survive, function, and develop in a climate-changing world). This approach to justice can help a range of concerns caused by climate change, such as distributions of vulnerability, recognition of peoples, places, and their relationships, and threatened basic rights.

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[117] Schlosberg, 'Climate Justice and Capabilities: A Framework for Adaptation Policy'.

[118] Schlosberg.

Therefore, additional approaches, covering aspects of recognition and capabilities, expanded the understanding of vulnerability conditions by focusing not only on the physical conditions (as in previous approaches) but also on political, social, and cultural conditions causing and sustaining vulnerability.[119]

Other research seeks to categorise and describe different types of climate justice. For example, Newell et al. identified four dimensions of climate justice: procedural, distributive, recognition, and intergenerational.[120] Procedural justice focuses on the processes for decision-making (i.e., fair and inclusive); distributive justice refers to fairness in sharing the burden of climate change and deciding who gets to use what resources; recognition is related to both procedural and distributional aspects but focuses on recognising the differences between groups and protecting equal rights for all; intergenerational justice is about protecting future generations from harm while holding the responsible ones accountable. Biermann and Kalfagianni group climate justice around three main concerns: 1) who the subjects of justice are, 2) the principles of justice, as in what is just, and 3) the mechanisms proposed to advance justice.[121] This organisation of justice issues relies on different ethical traditions of what justice is: liberal egalitarian, cosmopolitan, and libertarian. Furthermore, Simon Caney distinguishes between two types of climate justice: avoiding harm, and sharing burdens.[122] The latter focuses on how the burden of combating the problem should be shared fairly (*burden-sharing justice*), while the former emphasises the imperative to prevent climate change and concerns potential victims by ascribing responsibilities to others (*harm avoidance justice*). Therefore, there is a wide variety of approaches to studying climate justice and it can be categorised depending on different aspects in which justice is required, namely, decision-making, burden sharing, or recognition. Despite varying definitions and approaches, climate justice essentially relates to an understanding that climate change impacts people differently and disproportionately and the goal is to address these injustices in fair and equitable ways.

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[119] Schlosberg.

[120] Newell et al., 'Toward Transformative Climate Justice: An Emerging Research Agenda', 1 November 2021.

[121] Biermann and Kalfagianni, 'Planetary Justice: A Research Framework'.

[122] Caney, 'Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens'.

*Climate Justice Norm*

Along with studies seeking to conceptualise climate justice and analyse it from different approaches, scholars also identified that climate justice is emerging as a new norm, profoundly affecting a general understanding of climate change as a justice issue. The conception of climate change has evolved to increasingly frame it as an issue of justice and human rights, indicating a shift towards a norm of climate justice.[123] In other words, global climate change is being framed as a climate justice issue, with various actors and NGOs advocating for just and fair approaches to climate change decisions and governance. Evan Gach's study paved the way for these discussions by showing that climate justice is a new norm in the international community, entering the *cascade phase* based on Finnemore and Sikkink's explanation of the norm emergence process.[124] The study further helped construct a shared understanding that international climate agreements should adhere to the principles of climate justice. This thesis relies on Gach's study, and employs its synthesised definition of climate justice and its explanation as a new norm in the international community.

Gach shows how climate justice principles are incorporated in international agreements, suggesting a move towards institutionalising the norm within global climate governance. Gach's study focused on how the growing international norm of climate justice had entered the second stage (norm cascade) as per Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle.[125] The framework of Finnemore and Sikkink's 'norm life cycle' is utilised to explain the emergence of the climate justice norm by analysing the discourse of states and civil society NGOs prevailing within the UNFCCC negotiations. The study highlighted the significance of this normative shift, showing that the global conception of climate change is evolving towards a norm of climate justice, which can be observed in the discourse of states, civil society organisations, and the texts of international climate change treaties such as the Paris Agreement. It is important to draw attention to the concept of climate justice employed in this study, which is developed based on common issues and positions adopted in various climate justice statements, declarations, and agreements by both states and civil society organisations. The analysis of this concept has identified nine principles (Table 1):

[123] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.
[124] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.
[125] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

**Table 1.** *Climate justice principles*

| Climate justice principle | Explanation |
|---|---|
| A conception of justice in line with Rawls' two Principles of Justice or the three dimensions of distributional, procedural, and recognition justice outlined by Schlosberg (2004); | Fair allocation of environmental benefits and burdens.<br>E.g., Equitable distribution of resources, risks, and opportunities related to climate change. Focus on ensuring that developing countries are not disproportionately burdened by the mitigation efforts while the developed countries bear more responsibility (distributional justice). |
| | Fairness and inclusivity in decision-making processes.<br>E.g., Ensuring that all stakeholders, including vulnerable communities and Indigenous peoples, have a voice in environmental governance and that decision-making is transparent and participatory (procedural justice). |
| | Acknowledging and respecting the identities, cultures, and rights of different social groups.<br>E.g., Valuing diverse perspectives on climate change, addressing historical injustices related to environmental degradation, and promoting social inclusion and empowerment through climate policies and practices (recognition justice). |
| Emphasising the differing vulnerabilities of countries to the effects of climate change and adaptation capacities; | Recognising that countries have varying capacities to adapt to climate change impacts. |
| Tying greenhouse gas emission reduction responsibilities to historical emissions, often referred to as 'climate debt'; | Responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions based on historical contributions. Consideration of a country's historical emissions, economic development level, and existing infrastructure when discussing mitigation and adaptation strategies. |
| Provision of compensation for loss and damage incurred from climate change impact; | Compensation for losses incurred from climate change impact; provision of financial assistance to countries experiencing extreme weather events, sea-level rise, and other climate-related damages.<br>Developed countries, with higher historical emissions, have a greater responsibility to provide financial and technological resources |

| Climate justice principle | Explanation |
|---|---|
| | to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. |
| Connecting climate change to issues of human rights; | Climate change as a threat to human rights; Highlighting how climate change can exacerbate the currently manifested human rights issues such as access to food, water, and sanitation. |
| The impact of climate change on cultural heritage and the rights of Indigenous communities; | Recognition of the unique vulnerabilities of Indigenous communities and the potential loss of cultural heritage due to climate change. |
| The role of climate change and its policy responses in intensifying existing social inequalities, including those related to gender, race/ethnicity, and social class; | Climate change and its policy responses can worsen existing social inequalities. Climate change policies should consider and mitigate the potential for increased inequality, particularly regarding gender, race/ethnicity, and social class. |
| Criticism of 'false solutions': market- and technology-based responses to climate change that do not address its underlying causes; | Questioning the effectiveness of solely relying on carbon trading or unproven technologies to address climate change without tackling the underlying issues like overconsumption. |
| Connecting the problems associated with climate change to global systems and practices such as globalisation, trade liberalisation, international debt, militarism, and global capitalism. | Connection of climate change to issues like globalisation, trade, international debt, and global capitalism, while arguing that these systems contribute to unsustainable practices and hinder climate action. |

*Note.* The list of climate justice principles is taken from Gach's study;[126] the explanations are given by the author of this thesis based on a literature review.

The research has found evidence to prove that the conception of climate change among both states and NGOs has shifted from a problem viewed as largely scientific, environmental, and global to an understanding based on the principles of climate justice.[127] This shift is found in concrete policy outcomes by showing that the text of the Paris Agreements pays markedly more attention

[126] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change: The Growth of Climate Justice'.

[127] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change', 19.

to issues of climate justice compared to previous treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol: there is an increased focus on various circumstances of vulnerable countries and populations (e.g., gender equality, Indigenous rights), and the first explicit mentions of climate justice and human rights in a multilateral environmental treaty. Therefore, we can observe signs of the institutionalisation of the norm of climate justice, which has entered the second stage (norm cascade) of Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle.[128] The institutionalisation of this norm is also proven by the cooperation of major greenhouse gas emitters, which is necessary to give the agreement legitimacy. Further, it meets the three criteria for the second stage of the norm life cycle: 1) states are advancing climate justice framing in international negotiations; 2) climate justice is being adopted by both developing and developed countries, thus showing that different actors agree on such framing; and 3) the dominant mechanism has moved beyond persuasion to socialisation, increasingly covering all countries involved in UNFCCC negotiations.

The reviewed literature recognises climate justice as a significant set of principles shaping the international climate governance and approaches to solving the climate change crisis. Initial studies addressed the issue of defining climate justice and explaining its meaning by conceptualising it as a set of principles required to solve the climate change crisis in a fair and just manner, taking into consideration the interests of vulnerable communities. Further research observed that this set of principles was emerging as a new international norm, institutionalised in international agreements, and structuring approaches to solving climate change. Therefore, the presently discussed studies allow us to draw the following assumption, which addresses the question of how to explain the normative shift towards climate justice (i.e., to what/which behavioural rules it refers):

- *Climate justice can be understood as a new international norm that has emerged within the framework of global climate governance, characterised by behavioural rules that emphasise equitable resource distribution, inclusive decision-making processes, and the recognition of diverse identities and rights among affected communities. The shift reflects a growing consensus among states and civil society that climate policies must address human rights, vulnerability, and social inequalities, and is incorporated in international agreements like the Paris Agreement*.

The reviewed literature, i.e., not only literature conceptualising climate justice in general, but also studies observing it as a norm in the international

[128] Gach, 6.

community, refer to civil society NGOs and grassroots movements as the main advocates of this norm.[129] This normative shift is significantly shaped by grassroots movements, as evidenced by the research explaining the emergence of the climate justice discourse.[130] Grassroots movements refer to collective actions or initiatives that emerge from the local level (i.e., the bottom-up approach), driven by community members who seek to address specific social, environmental, and political issues. It implies that, as advocates for climate justice, they play a crucial role in shifting the discourse on climate and sustainability and the emergence of climate justice. Therefore, the following section elaborates on civil society NGOs as advocates for climate justice in more depth, by linking their role to the explanations of the actions of norm entrepreneurs.

### 2.2. NGOs as Norm Entrepreneurs

The role of NGOs in norm-shaping processes was already emphasised in the earliest studies explaining norm emergence, and it still continues in the current research that looks into specific contexts of NGOs' norm advocacy.[131] Within the context of climate justice, civil society NGOs can be considered as entrepreneurs of this norm because their participation in international climate cooperation frameworks, especially the UNFCCC, relies on the promotion of climate justice ideas.[132] The previous section established that climate justice can be understood as a new norm, while this section seeks to address the second question: **Why can civil society NGOs be considered as norm entrepreneurs in climate justice advocacy?** Although a combination of different factors could have influenced the emergence of this norm, civil

[129] Schlosberg, 'Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements And Political Theories'; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014; Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

[130] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 1 May 2014; Martiskainen et al., 'Contextualising Climate Justice Activism: Knowledge, Emotions, Motivations, and Actions among Climate Strikers in Six Cities'; Gibson and Duram, 'Shifting Discourse on Climate and Sustainability'; Chatterton, Featherstone, and Routledge, 'Articulating Climate Justice in Copenhagen'; Grosse, 'Climate Justice Movement Building'.

[131] Carey and Richmond, 'Mitigating Conflict'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics'.

[132] 'About CAN'; Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

society NGOs played a crucial part in this process, as explained by scholars.[133] Thus, the following section seeks to elaborate on their role as norm entrepreneurs of climate justice by reviewing research explaining the general aspects of the norm emergence process, and studies connecting NGOs and climate justice, shedding light on their role as norm entrepreneurs in this context.

*Norm Emergence Processes and NGOs*

International norms assume the idea of a shared world culture and can manifest as standard behaviours, legitimate behavioural claims, or shared understandings and meanings.[134] They are defined as the rules and principles that shape state behaviour and are closely linked to power, identity, values, and national interests.[135] Norms about the appropriate behaviour are what gives the world structure, order, and stability.[136] They can also shift and encourage change, with new norms emerging and being accepted by the international community. Norms can be articulated through states' discourse and deliberation behaviour.[137]

As foundational theories on norm emergence explain, norms in the international community are shaped in three stages:[138] 1) Norm emergence, in which the characteristic mechanism is the persuasion by norm entrepreneurs; 2) Norm 'cascade', characterised by norm entrepreneurs seeking to socialise other actors to become norm followers; 3) Norm internalisations, in which norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer questioned. Studies on norm emergence rely on the constructivism perspective,[139] with

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133 Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014; Tokar, 'On the Evolution and Continuing Development of the Climate Justice Movement'; Gunningham, 'Building Norms from the Grassroots Up: Divestment, Expressive Politics, and Climate Change'; Allan and Hadden, 'Exploring the Framing Power of NGOs in Global Climate Politics', 25 April 2017.

134 Finnemore, 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism'.

135 Zhang, 'Multipolarity and Multilateralism as International Norms: The Chinese and European Perspectives'.

136 Epstein, 'The Postcolonial Perspective'.

137 Miyaoka, 'The Legitimacy of International Norms'.

138 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

139 Finnemore, 'National Interests in International Society'; Ruggie, 'Constructing the World Polity'; Florini, 'The Evolution of International Norms'; Elgström, 'Norm Negotiations. The Construction of New Norms Regarding Gender and

Finnemore and Sikkink's research providing a foundational framework to study normative change in the international community.[140] Norms embody a quality of 'oughtness' and shared moral assessment, therefore prompting justification for action and leaving an extensive trail of communication among actors that can be studied.[141] Furthermore, norm entrepreneurs must be able to frame their concerns in ways that resonate with their target audience, engaging in 'strategic social construction'.[142]

NGOs are referred to as **norm entrepreneurs**, that is, actors that play a major role in promoting norms among the international community based on universal values, human dignity, and normative standards.[143] NGOs play a crucial role in norm emergence as they promote and institutionalise new norms by engaging in persuasive efforts to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms.[144] A significant amount of research focuses on the important role played by NGOs as norm entrepreneurs in this process, to explain different ways to influence negotiations (e.g., by lobbying, agenda-setting), and to elaborate on certain mechanisms that help to make their persuasion tactics more successful.[145] They serve as organisational platforms for promoting norms such as human rights, environmental protection, or disarmament.[146] NGOs act as norm entrepreneurs, that is, agents with strong notions about the appropriate or desirable behaviour who play a crucial role

Development in EU Foreign Aid Policy'; Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge'.

140 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

141 Finnemore and Sikkink.

142 Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, 'From Santiago to Seattle'

143 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Reimann, 'A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs'; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

144 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

145 Betsill and Corell, 'NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations'; Pandey, 'Managing Climate Change: Shifting Roles for NGOs in the Climate Negotiations'; Mamudu and Glantz, 'Civil Society and the Negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control'; Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines'; Blasiak et al., 'The Role of NGOs in Negotiating the Use of Biodiversity in Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction'; Humphreys, 'Redefining the Issues: NGO Influence on International Forest Negotiations'.

146 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

in the norm emergence by calling attention to issues or even 'creating' them by using language that names, interprets, and dramatises them.[147]

Other studies emphasise that a key aspect of these NGOs' role is their use of moral arguments to persuade others about what is 'the right thing to do', with scholars referring to their role as 'moral entrepreneurs' or 'moral advocates' for this reason.[148] NGOs have a reputation for pursuing the 'greater good', which allows them to leverage moral authority in their advocacy. This moral aspect of their role as norm entrepreneurs is reflected in additional concepts such as *moral entrepreneurs* or *moral advocates* which were developed by scholars seeking to define this role more precisely. For example, Kjersti Lohne discussed the conceptualisation of NGOs as *moral entrepreneurs* or *moral advocates* who employ humanist discourses to promote global justice and claim moral authority.[149] David E. Pozen explained that moral entrepreneurs presumably constitute a subset of norm entrepreneurs, and the two ideas plainly have significant conceptual and functional overlap.[150] Ann-Charlotte Buntinx and Francesca Colli also emphasised that there is no clear distinction in the literature between the concepts of *norm entrepreneurs* and *moral entrepreneurs.*[151]

However, authors draw attention to the fact that *norm entrepreneurs* usually try to influence how society thinks about an issue by making it a particular norm (e.g., by shaping some issues as human rights issues), while *moral entrepreneurs* rely on altruistic arguments and use emotional appeals by framing actions as 'the right thing to do'.[152] Altruism (i.e., a shared perception of common humanity), along with empathy and ideational concerns, is also mentioned by Finnemore and Sikkink as one of the main

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[147] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

[148] Buntinx and Colli, 'Moral Policy Entrepreneurship: The Role of NGOs in the EU's External Human Rights Policy towards China', 3 July 2022; Lohne, 'From Moral Entrepreneurs to Moral Advocates'; Colonomos, 'Non-State Actors as Moral Entrepreneurs: A Transnational Perspective on Ethics Networks'; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Allan and Hadden, 'Exploring the Framing Power of NGOs in Global Climate Politics', 25 April 2017.

[149] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[150] Pozen, 'We Are all Entrepreneurs now'.

[151] Buntinx and Colli, 'Moral Policy Entrepreneurship: The Role of NGOs in the EU's External Human Rights Policy towards China'.

[152] Pozen, 'We Are all Entrepreneurs now'; Buntinx and Colli, 'Moral Policy Entrepreneurship: The Role of NGOs in the EU's External Human Rights Policy towards China'.

potential motives encouraging norm entrepreneurs to seek norm emergence.[153] NGOs are usually in an advantageous position in this case, as they have a reputation as independent moral actors that are supposed to abandon national or economic interests to pursue a 'greater good'.[154] Buntinx and Colli also argued that NGOs act as *moral policy entrepreneurs*, setting the agenda and providing policy advice to policymakers, while also relying on their moral authority and using moral arguments to persuade decision-makers.[155] The authors analysed the role of NGOs in the EU's external human rights policy towards China regarding the Xinjiang crisis and showed that representatives of NGOs combine expertise with moral arguments about the EU's role as a human rights leader to put the Xinjiang crisis higher on the agenda.[156] Their role as *moral policy entrepreneurs* is emphasised, as NGOs employ moral arguments and persuasion about what is the 'right thing to do' to provide policy solutions for human rights issues. Therefore, the moral aspect of NGOs' role as norm entrepreneurs is emphasised in research, with scholars showing that NGOs shape norms by persuading other actors about what is the right thing to do.

Their role is further explored with a focus on the functioning of the mechanisms through which NGOs shape norms.[157] For example, NGOs often rely on moral arguments in persuasion strategies employed to advocate for international norms.[158] Persuasion is a crucial mechanism in constructing norms, referring to the process of using various rhetorical and communicative

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153 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

154 Lohne, 'From Moral Entrepreneurs to Moral Advocates'.

155 Buntinx and Colli, 'Moral Policy Entrepreneurship: The Role of NGOs in the EU's External Human Rights Policy towards China'.

156 Buntinx and Colli.

157 Tallberg et al., 'NGO Influence in International Organizations'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 'Advocacy Strategies in Global Governance: Inside versus Outside Lobbying'; Pallas and Urpelainen, 'Mission and Interests'; Hill, Moore, and Mukherjee, 'Information Politics Versus Organizational Incentives: When Are Amnesty International's "Naming and Shaming" Reports Biased?'; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers, 'Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000'.

158 Schneiker, 'NGOs as Norm Takers: Insider–Outsider Networks as Translators of Norms', 9 January 2017; Amandine Hostein, 'The Echo Which Set off the Avalanche: Shaping the Landscape', 'The Role of INGOs in Diffusing Norms to Shape World Politics: Amnesty International and the Death Penalty Campaign'; Herro, 'Norm Entrepreneurs Advocating the Responsibility to Protect, and Peacekeeping Reform Proposals'; Wunderlich, 'Dedicated to the Good: Norm Entrepreneurs in International Relations'.

strategies to influence the target audience to accept the advocated norm.[159] **Persuasion** is 'the process by which agent action becomes a social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes intersubjective'.[160] Persuasive argumentation is "used to raise moral consciousness about what constitutes 'the right thing to do' ".[161] As explained by Rodger A. Payne, persuasion has occurred once significant behavioural (or even rhetorical) change is identified.[162]

Persuasion is linked to resonance, that is, the ability of a norm or an advocacy message to resonate with and be accepted by the target audience.[163] To ensure that persuasion is effective, actors seek to achieve resonance with already prevailing ideas and values, that is, new ideas are said to 'resonate' because of their ideational affinity to other already accepted normative frameworks.[164] The **resonance** relates to the 'intensity of interest': for a norm to resonate with other actors, it must be framed in a way that elicits some threshold of 'interest' to persuade the actors to modify their preferences or interests (either material, ideational, or a combination of both).[165] Additionally, resonance is also understood as an emergent process arising from the interaction between objects rather than static messages.[166] It emerges based on complex interactions among those who shape the message, the audience that receives the message, and the context within which this message is shaped. Thus, persuasion and resonance are crucial elements of norm emergence processes.

While state actors can employ coercive measures, NGOs usually rely on persuasion ('better arguments') with an emphasis on resonant claims to construct legitimate norms. NGOs employ persuasion to encourage policymakers to "redefine their preferences and interests, as well as affect

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[159] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[160] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Klotz, 'Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid'.

[161] Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework'.

[162] Payne, 'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction'.

[163] Payne; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory, 'A Theory of Resonance'.

[164] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

[165] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[166] McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory, 'A Theory of Resonance'.

policy decisions and political behaviour".[167] NGOs' ability to influence decision-making in international politics largely depends on their persuasion effectiveness. They utilise various strategies – such as networks – to mobilise political, economic, and diplomatic pressure, and affective mechanisms of liking, affect, empathy, and social influence. Thus, for norm emergence to be successful, NGOs seek to communicate their messages in a way that would resonate with the international community as strongly as possible.

Melissa Labonte's *Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect* looks in depth at the persuasion mechanisms that NGOs rely on when advocating for norms such as human rights.[168] The author states that "because international humanitarian NGOs do not possess material power as states do, they rely mainly on effectively communicating norms and ideas to influence policymakers (e.g. persuasion) to support or oppose policy decisions". She explains that NGOs play a significant role in shaping international norms by using persuasion through strategic framing, which helps to connect new and existing ideas and norms and contributes to the construction of persuasive messages. Through strategic framing, NGOs consciously shape shared understandings of the world that motivate collective action by suggesting the appropriate behaviour. The study explains the mechanisms that allow NGOs to effectively persuade other actors by providing arguments that are most likely to resonate with policymakers.[169] To effectively influence policymakers, arguments should be presented in a way that leverages the interactive effects of the three logics of decision-making behaviour:

- Logic of *consequences*: It centres on rational calculations of costs and benefits. Policymakers will be persuaded by arguments that demonstrate the material advantage of a particular course of action.
- Logic of *appropriateness*: It centres on beliefs of what is considered morally right or wrong. Appeals to morality and universal values are employed to persuade policymakers.
- Logic of *argumentation*: It centres on the power of persuasive communication, argumentation, and deliberation.

When persuading, NGOs usually rely on a combination of these logics and may appeal to rational calculations relevant to other actors, as well as to moral

[167] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect', 56.
[168] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.
[169] Labonte, 57.

values. However, the framework strongly emphasises the logic of argumentation as a crucial element of effective persuasion because "the structure of political discourse and language shapes how policy ideas are communicated and translated into practice".[170] As explained by Labonte, under the logic of argumentation, arguments appeal to universal principles like truth, justice, and sincerity, and create a shared understanding of a certain issue.[171] Therefore, NGOs may persuade by appealing to other actors' rational interests and calculations of costs and benefits; however, "it is a structure of political discourse and language (the logic of argumentation), that are key in persuading actors to reconstitute and adopt new norms and generate shared understandings".[172]

*NGOs' advocacy for international norms*

Most of the research studying NGOs' contribution to shaping norms focuses on human rights issues,[173] with some studies also focusing on environmental norms.[174] For example, Ann Marie Clark provided a comprehensive explanation of how NGOs, such as Amnesty International, employ the *diplomacy of consciousness* and have an autonomous role in the emergence of norms based on moral imperatives against state sovereignty.[175]

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[170] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[171] Labonte, 52.

[172] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[173] Clark, 'Diplomacy of Conscience'; Martens, 'An Appraisal of Amnesty International's Work at the United Nations: Established Areas of Activities and Shifting Priorities since the 1990s'; Buntinx and Colli, 'Moral Policy Entrepreneurship: The Role of NGOs in the EU's External Human Rights Policy towards China'; Krook and True, 'Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality'; Joachim, 'Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights', 1 June 2003; Tsetsura, 'Challenges in Framing Women's Rights as Human Rights at the Domestic Level: A Case Study of NGOs in the Post-Soviet Countries', 1 November 2013; Lohne, 'From Moral Entrepreneurs to Moral Advocates'.

[174] Bailey, 'Arrested Development: The Fight to End Commercial Whaling as a Case of Failed Norm Change'; Latif et al., 'Coercive, Normative and Mimetic Pressures as Drivers of Environmental Management Accounting Adoption'; Grant and Vasi, 'Civil Society in an Age of Environmental Accountability: How Local Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations Reduce U.S. Power Plants' Carbon Dioxide Emissions'.

[175] Clark, 'Diplomacy of Conscience'.

The study explained thoroughly the principles of the diplomacy of consciousness (fact-finding, consensus building, principled norm construction, norm application) and showed how they were implemented in the case of Amnesty International and human rights issues. The author argues for a less state-centric conception of international relations because the presence of NGOs in international frameworks changes the environment in which states must act: they mould expectations of international behaviour and demand that states conform. Labonte's book *Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect* focuses on the context of responsibility to protect norms and mass atrocities and analyses how NGOs utilise strategic framing as the means to influence policy decisions.[176] Within the context of environmental norms, Jennifer L. Bailey studied how anti-whaling NGOs intended to change the norm regarding whaling.[177] Bailey employs the framework developed by Finnemore and Sikkink to explain why this norm has failed to set: whereas some critical states launched the new norm, other key actors failed to endorse it.

Therefore, the literature on norm emergence in international relations emphasises the crucial role of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs in shaping international behavioural rules. These actors serve as advocates who employ various strategies, particularly persuasion based on moral arguments, to influence state behaviour and promote new international norms. Their reputation as independent actors pursuing the greater good helps them to establish their image as moral entrepreneurs. Although much of the existing research has focused on NGOs' norm-shaping role in human rights advocacy, with notable examples like Amnesty International, their influence extends into environmental issues as well. Building on this understanding of NGOs' general role as norm entrepreneurs, the following sub-section examines how civil society NGOs have specifically contributed to advancing climate justice as an emerging international norm.

*NGOs and Climate Justice within the UNFCCC*

Civil society organisations, including environmental activists and Indigenous peoples, are some of the main actors advocating for the normative

[176] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[177] Bailey, 'Arrested Development: The Fight to End Commercial Whaling as a Case of Failed Norm Change'.

shift of climate justice.[178] They engage with communities to address local issues, represent the voices of marginalised populations, and seek to promote a bottom-up approach to advocacy and climate action. They are also referred to as grassroots movements – locally based, community-driven initiatives advocating for social and environmental justice issues from the bottom-up local communities and NGOs – that play a crucial role in the emergence and advancement of climate justice principles and initiatives.[179] A significant amount of studies showing that climate justice emerged from these movements implies their important role in promoting this normative shift within international frameworks such as the UNFCCC.[180]

The UNFCCC functions as the main framework for most parties to cooperate on climate change, and also provides a platform for civil society NGOs to be included in decision-making. The increasing number of civil society participants[181] implies their growing role in climate negotiations, which also reflects climate justice principles related to the increased inclusion of grassroots movements and representation of vulnerable communities' interests.[182] However, research also points out that the UNFCCC is an inherently unjust framework, and criticises it.[183] One of the points is that, rather than ensuring climate justice, due to power imbalances in negotiations,

[178] Kluttz and Walter, 'Conceptualising Learning in the Climate Justice Movement'.

[179] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 1 May 2014; Derman, 'Climate Governance, Justice, and Transnational Civil Society', 29 October 2013; Allan and Hadden, 'Exploring the Framing Power of NGOs in Global Climate Politics', 4 July 2017; Bernauer et al., 'Could More Civil Society Involvement Increase Public Support for Climate Policy-Making? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China'.

[180] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'; Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', n.d.; Schlosberg, 'Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political Theories'; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014.

[181] Benito Müller et al., 'Quo Vadis COP?'

[182] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014; Schlosberg, 'Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political Theories'; Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

[183] Derman, 'Climate Governance, Justice, and Transnational Civil Society', 2 January 2014; Gulliver, Vachette, and Boddington, 'How Australian Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations Frame and Enact Climate Justice'.

in fact, structures of climate injustice are merely reproduced.[184] For example, the consensus decision-making process is seen as ineffective and unfair because of obscuring differences between countries.[185] Additionally, the climate finance system lacks justice and equity principles and thus fails to adequately protect the most vulnerable stakeholders.[186] By promoting market-based mechanisms like carbon trading and offsetting, the UNFCCC perpetuates existing inequalities and fosters a form of 'carbon colonialism', which further marginalises vulnerable communities.[187] The current burden-sharing and financial transfer criteria are also considered unfair and ineffective, particularly for adaptation financing,[188] and adaptation finance reflects the developed countries' interests more than justice principles.[189] However, a growing number of civil society NGOs participating in the UNFCCC highlight their efforts to continue the advocacy for climate justice within this framework, even despite its flaws.

Jenalle Kluttz and Pierre Walter refer to the contribution of NGOs by emphasising that the foundation of the climate justice movement can be traced back to *Climate Justice Now!*, an international network of NGOs and activists, which relied on a few main principles: (a) those who have benefited most from economic growth should be responsible for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and funding renewable energy, (b) natural resources should be distributed fairly, (c) there should be equal participation in decision-making, and (d) those who are suffering the worst effects of climate change should be compensated.[190] Lina Lefstad and Jouni Paavola analysed climate justice claims with a specific focus on UNFCCC negotiations and sought to expand the analysis beyond nation-states to also include how CSOs define climate justice.[191] The authors explained that understanding how these groups frame climate justice is central because, although CSOs are 'only' observers at negotiations, they represent the majority of the people at the frontlines of the

[184] Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', n.d.
[185] Vogel, 'The Problem with Consensus in the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change'.
[186] Sheridan and Jafry, 'The Inter-Relationship between Climate Finance and Climate Justice in the UNFCCC'.
[187] Dehm, 'Carbon Colonialism or Climate Justice?'
[188] Sustainability (IDOS), 'Burden-sharing and Allocation Criteria under the UN Climate Regime'.
[189] Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan, 'The Politics of International Climate Adaptation Funding: Justice and Divisions in the Greenhouse'.
[190] Kluttz and Walter, 'Conceptualising Learning in the Climate Justice Movement'.
[191] Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', n.d.

climate crisis who are often underrepresented by their states. The study identified four new groupings with different climate justice frames (radicals, opportunists, hypocrites, and evaders), in which CSOs come under the radical group. This group advocates for a low-temperature increase limit, proposes novel mechanisms, and focuses on the real danger to subjects of justice. [192]

Schlosberg and Collins (2014) highlight that the discourse of climate justice has emerged from grassroots movements and emphasise the need for justice in climate action that aligns with broader environmental justice principles.[193] This grassroots perspective is crucial, as it informs CAN's advocacy strategies and helps shape the narrative around climate justice in international negotiations.[194] Furthermore, the Paris Agreement has highlighted a shift towards recognising the importance of non-state actors, including NGOs like CAN, in driving climate action.[195] This refers to the role of CAN as a norm entrepreneur, as it mobilises diverse stakeholders to engage in climate governance and promote justice-oriented frameworks. In this context, CAN's efforts to advocate for climate justice norms contribute to the discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC and influence the broader climate governance context by seeking to shift it towards a more climate justice-based approach. As a coalition of over 1,300 organisations, CAN actively promotes the principles of climate justice and advocates for equitable climate policies that address the disproportionate impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations.[196]

While analysing the conceptualisation of climate justice and related claims within the context of carbon pricing controversies, Ian Bailey also includes representatives of NGOs as important actors seeking to influence policies related to climate justice.[197] Gach's study on the emergence of the climate justice norm also includes civil society NGOs as actors bringing a specific discourse to the UNFCCC: it represents a conceptualisation of climate justice outside the strategic framing and interests of national governments.[198] The study focuses on CAN as the largest and most prominent civil society NGO

[192] Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', 18 July 2023.
[193] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014.
[194] 'About CAN'.
[195] Hale, '"All Hands on Deck": The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action'.
[196] Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 22 February 2014.
[197] Bailey, 'Spatializing Climate Justice: Justice Claim Making and Carbon Pricing Controversies in Australia'.
[198] Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

network involved in the UNFCCC negotiations, and includes ECO newsletters as the network's most consistent and representative outlet for communication. The findings showed an increased presence of climate justice frameworks in the rhetoric of NGOs.

Therefore, the focus of civil society NGOs on advocacy for climate justice makes their discourse crucial in this normative shift: it constructs an understanding that compliance with climate justice principles is 'a morally right thing to do'. They promote key principles – fair resource distribution, equal participation in decision-making, and compensation for those most affected by climate change – which represents the norm entrepreneurship identified in the literature. Climate justice emerged largely from grassroots movements and NGO networks, combined with their strong advocacy in shaping the climate justice discourse within international frameworks such as the UNFCCC. The reviewed literature thus allows us to draw the following assumption:

- *Civil society NGOs act as norm entrepreneurs of climate justice, represented by the Climate Action Network within the UNFCCC context.*

The reviewed literature has also highlighted that NGOs advocate for new norms through persuasion, by relying on emotional appeals as a way to promote 'universal values' and moral principles. It thus implies the significant role that emotions may play in NGOs' advocacy for climate justice. The following sub-section looks into the studies explaining the role of emotions by first commenting on the general focus brought by scholars on emotions in international politics, and then elaborating on specific studies analysing emotions in norm advocacy.

### 2.3. The Role of Emotions in NGOs' Norm Advocacy

The role of emotions is being increasingly acknowledged within the field of international relations in general,[199] and it is also studied by scholars focusing on the processes of norm advocacy.[200] Emotions can serve as

[199] Houde, 'Emotions, International Relations, and the Everyday: Individuals' Emotional Attachments to International Organisations'; Gürkan and Terzi, 'Emotions in EU Foreign Policy – when and how Do They Matter?'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'.

[200] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion

powerful tools in mobilising support for certain behavioural rules promoted by norm advocates. They often employ emotional appeals, such as referring to empathy, compassion, or shame, to persuade other actors to accept new norms. This section seeks to review the research analysing the role of emotions in the norm advocacy of NGOs and present a more structured understanding of how this role can be analysed. It thus seeks to address the third research question: **What is the role of emotions in NGOs' norm advocacy?** The large number of studies that refer to the significance of emotions in norm advocacy necessitate a more structured understanding of how emotions can be studied when explaining advocacy for climate justice.

Within the broad field of such research, a few approaches can be distinguished as significant for this thesis: one is the emotional turn in IR, which has brought a general and broad focus on emotions as crucial forces shaping international politics, and provided a more comprehensive methodology on how emotions can be studied in international politics; additionally, there are studies specifically focusing on the role of emotions in international norm advocacy and persuasion. Both approaches provide significant insights for developing theoretical assumptions and informing the conceptual framework in this thesis. Therefore, this section reviews the literature in both fields: first, I elaborate on the emotional turn in IR and explain its main approaches and assumptions. I then discuss the research that refers to the significant role of emotions implied in the foundational explanations of norm emergence, and specifically focuses on emotional approaches in norm advocacy.

*The emotional turn in International Relations*

The emotional turn in IR a few decades ago introduced a fundamental shift with a strong focus on how scholars understand emotions in world politics. Scholars in this research field criticised the overlooked role of emotions in world politics, which was mostly determined by rational approaches to emotions as obstacles to the rational thinking of decision-makers,[201] or the

Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'; Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'.

[201] Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Emotions, Agency, and Power in World Politics'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2017; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing

lack of methodological ways to grasp emotions empirically in the field of international relations.[202] It was argued that emotions are inseparable from diplomacy, war, or peace processes; for example, fear is significant in explanations of the security dilemma, and anger or empathy can be crucial in diplomacy institutions. According to the studies in this field, emotions are transformative forces that can influence international politics by shaping beliefs, understandings, and perceptions.[203] In other words, not only should emotions be included when analysing processes of international politics but they can also be understood as transformative forces underpinning the behaviour of international actors, such as forming security communities, affecting allies' relationships, shaping images of adversaries or solving conflicts, and influencing the power dynamics among the actors.[204] This research field introduces a general and fundamental focus on emotions in international relations, therefore calling for a more in-depth investigation of their role, including the advocacy for international norms.

Scholars in the field of the emotional turn in IR define emotions as having a social and collective nature.[205] They are politically consequential elements that operate not only at the individual level but also at the group, state, and institutional levels.[206] Emotions are socially constructed and shared experiences that influence individual and group behaviours,[207] that is, they are not only individually experienced but also socially shared and recognised,

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Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'.

202 Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2018.

203 Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'.

204 Hutchison, 'Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma'; Hutchison, 'Affective Communities as Security Communities'; Koschut, 'Emotional (Security) Communities: The Significance of Emotion Norms in Inter-Allied Conflict Management'; Palm, 'An Emotional Security Community under Pressure? Emotional Discursive (de)Legitimation in EU External Border Control'; Eznack, 'Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Halperin and Schwartz, 'Emotions in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconciliation'.

205 Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'; Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

206 Reus-Smit, 'Emotions and the Social'.

207 Rimé, 'Emotions at the Service of Cultural Construction'.

influencing beliefs and responses at different levels in international relations. Instead of measuring direct causal links explaining the influence of emotions on decision-making (as studied in psychology), the emotional turn in IR argues that emotions play a more complex role in international relations.[208] This approach has emerged through the following propositions: 1) The need to accept that research can be insightful and valid even if it engages unobservable phenomena and the results of such inquiries can neither be measured nor validated empirically; 2) The importance of examining processes of representation and communication and the manner in which they shape political perceptions and dynamics; 3) A willingness to consider alternative forms of insight. Therefore, emotions influence international politics not necessarily through direct causal links, but rather by uncovering hidden aspects through which emotions shape global interactions. They operate as driving forces that underpin decision-making, perceptions, and power dynamics in international relations.[209] These propositions argue that, instead of seeking to measure emotions objectively, scholars should embrace emotions as ephemeral phenomena and seek insights into or derived from them. By examining certain contexts and the emotions functioning within them, the meaning of these emotions can be interpreted through methodologies based on the propositions outlined above.

The initial studies in this field focused on the general emphasis that 'emotions matter' in world politics, while later studies investigated what emotions actually 'do' in international relations.[210] This theoretical shift emerged in the early 2000s and addressed the challenges to include the role of emotions by seeking to theorise the link between emotions and international politics, and developing the methodological ways to analyse their role. First, scholars focused on the need to analyse the influence of emotions on international politics in general, therefore highlighting that 'emotions matter' in world politics. Later, scholars sought to uncover more specific ways through which emotions influence international politics, that is, 'what emotions do'. Within this field, theories emerged of the link between emotions, discourse, and power, which argued that, by embedding in the discourse, emotions help to construct shared beliefs and understandings. In this way, emotions function as transformative forces able to reproduce or challenge the prevailing power dynamics among actors.[211]

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[208] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'.
[209] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.
[210] Koschut.
[211] Koschut, 3, 4, 23.

The methodological challenge of studying emotions in international politics has been a central concern in this field. In the initial studies, Crawford and Mercer recognised the difficulty in empirically observing and measuring collective emotions and their effects, and explained the causation.[212] Scholars developed various methodological solutions to address this challenge by combining multiple analytical tools and providing systemic ways to study emotions in actors at different levels of analysis.[213] Emotion discourse analysis was developed by Koschut, and it provided a comprehensive framework for analysing emotions through discourse.[214] For example, in studying diplomatic communication during crises, scholars have used emotion discourse analysis to examine how emotions like fear and anger shape crisis dynamics.[215] Arrifin addresses the methodological challenge to analyse emotions in international relations by suggesting that we should focus on emotives, and analyse how actors such as states and NGOs mobilise them through their speech acts to frame issues in ways that allow them to achieve their political goals.[216] Other approaches have also been proposed: for example, analysing emotions through visual material, ethnographic studies, content analysis, interviews, and multi-method approaches combining different analytical tools.[217]

By relying on the social constructivist perspective, emotional turn research criticised rational and reductionist views on emotions as individual instinctive states and provided an expanded explanation of emotions by focusing on their collective and social nature. In other words, emotions are not just individual but also socially constructed and shared experiences influencing group

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[212] Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'.

[213] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2018; Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'.

[214] Koschut, 'The Power of (Emotion) Words: On the Importance of Emotions for Social Constructivist Discourse Analysis in IR'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Koschut et al., 'Discourse and Emotions in International Relations', 1 September 2017; Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'.

[215] Hall, 'Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage'.

[216] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.

[217] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2017; Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'; Martin Petlach, 'Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (Eds.): Researching Emotions in International Relations'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

behaviours.[218] The emotional turn in IR developed several fundamental arguments, challenging the traditional understanding of emotions that prevailed in rational theories-based explanations and psychology: it criticised rationalist traditions that treat emotions as impediments to rational decision-making or as irrelevant to the study of international politics, introduced theoretical innovations based on the social construction of emotions, and emphasised the collective and social nature of emotions; and brought attention to the relationship between emotions and power in international politics.[219]

*Challenging the Rationality-Emotion Dichotomy in International Relations*

The traditional IR theory has long been dominated by rationalist approaches that treat emotions as either irrelevant or disruptive of rational political decision-making.[220] They predominantly focused on rational choice models which assume that actors make decisions based on cost-benefit calculations rather than on emotional factors.[221]

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[218] Rimé, 'The Social Sharing of Emotion as an Interface Between Individual and Collective Processes in the Construction of Emotional Climates'; Smith and Mackie, 'Group-Level Emotions'; van Kleef et al., 'Editorial: The Social Nature of Emotions'; T. Kuppens, 'Feeling like a Group Member : Social Identity, Group-Based Appraisals and Group-Based Emotions'.

[219] Koschut et al., 'Discourse and Emotions in International Relations', 1 September 2017; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Graham, 'Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion'; Beattie, Eroukhmanoff, and Head, 'Introduction: Interrogating the "Everyday" Politics of Emotions in International Relations'; Hall, '"An Extremely Obnoxious and Illegal Case" – Three Approaches to Affect, Emotion, and Discourse in the Aftermath of the Zhuhai Incident'; Sasley, 'Victimhood as Power in International Conflict', 2020; Wolf, '"On Monday, Our National Humiliation Will Be over. We will Finish with Orders from Abroad" – Status, Emotions, and the SYRIZA Government's Rhetoric in the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis'; Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework'; Subotić and Zarakol, 'Hierarchies, Emotions, and Memory in International Relations'; Head, 'Contesting Emotional Governance – Empathy under Fire in the Israeli Public Sphere during Operation Protective Edge'; Solomon, 'Status, Emotions, and US–Iran Nuclear Politics'; Fierke, 'Emotional Intentions – Self-Immolation and Ontological Choice in Tibet'; Ross, 'The Power of Viral Expression in World Politics', 2020.

[220] Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'.

[221] Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'.

Neta Crawford's article 'The Passion of World Politics' marked a crucial intervention by arguing that emotions are integral to both individual and collective political behaviour.[222] Crawford demonstrated that seemingly 'rational' political decisions often have crucial emotional underpinnings which the traditional IR theory overlooked. Jonathan Mercer challenged the separation between rationality and emotion in the article 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'.[223] He argued that emotions are essential to rational decision-making (not the opposite of it), that the absence of emotion actually hinders rational judgment, that emotional and cognitive processes are inextricably linked, and that rationality itself depends on emotional processes. In his other work, 'Emotional Beliefs',[224] Mercer makes a further contribution by demonstrating that emotions are not merely attached to beliefs, but are actually constitutive of them. He argued that emotional beliefs, defined as beliefs that exist because of their emotional value rather than evidence, play a fundamental role in international politics. The analysis shows that the central concepts in IR, such as reputation, credibility, and trust, are inherently emotional beliefs that cannot be reduced to rational calculation.[225] It shows that even seemingly 'rational' aspects of international relations, such as assessments of state credibility or calculations of deterrence, are fundamentally grounded in emotional beliefs.

Thus, initial studies draw on research in neuroscience and psychology to reconceptualise the relationship between emotion and rationality and conclude that emotions are necessary for making rational choices, that they inform rational deliberation, and that the traditional separation between emotion and reason is empirically unsuitable. Crucially, this approach relied on the social constructivist perspective, allowing for the further conceptualisation of emotions as social phenomena.

*Social construction of emotions and their collective nature*

Scholars in the field of the emotional turn also reconceptualised emotions by defining them as social constructs.[226] These developments move beyond

[222] Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'.
[223] Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'.
[224] Mercer, 'Emotional Beliefs'.
[225] Mercer; Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'; Mercer, 'Reputation and International Politics'.
[226] Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017;

treating emotions as individual psychological states toward understanding them as collective phenomena that shape international politics. Emotions are studied as emergent rather than intrinsic properties representing beliefs, values, and moral judgments about the world, which coincide with social hierarchies, inequalities, and status differences.[227] Grounded in a social constructivist perspective, such theorisation relies on three crucial assumptions about emotions:[228]

*1) Culturally appraised:*

- Emotions are not solely physiological states or natural objects; they are linked to sociocultural structures.
- Emotions are characterised by cultural appraisals and moral attitudes about how the world should be.
- Emotions are understood as coming from without and moving inward rather than coming from within the body and moving outwards.

*2) Learnt, not innate:*

- Emotions are learnt through socialisation, which means that people come to some feelings because of their environment and relations to other actors, that is, people come to feel as they do as a result of their social environment (e.g., human rights activists have been emotionally moved by human stories of suffering, thereby using the same logic to move other actors to action).
- Socialisation of emotion refers to shared memories and emotional knowledge that relates to the collective identities of agents.

*3) Socially prescriptive and purposive:*

- Emotions serve social functions that emphasise their prescriptive and purposive character. In other words, emotions can regulate social behaviour by underpinning the moral hierarchy of values and beliefs by assigning emotional meaning to rules and norms and by restraining undesirable attitudes and behaviours.

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Crawford, 'Institutionalising Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Emotions, Agency, and Power in World Politics'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions'.

227 Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 4.

228 Koschut, 7, 8; Armon-Jones, 'Prescription, Explication and the Social Construction of Emotion'.

- Emotions also serve constitutive functions and purposes that sustain the political order; for example, by producing solidarity, restraining non-compliance, and affirming moral order. Meanwhile, resistance to comply with established emotional rules challenges the basis of the prevailing political order and encourage its transformation.

Several studies in this field focused on the theorisation of collective emotions,[229] ways through which emotions can move from the individual to the collective level,[230] and the attribution of emotions to groups.[231] Scholars agree that emotions can be collective and relate to social and cultural contexts in international politics.[232] They emphasised that group-level emotion is powerful, pervasive, and irreducible to individuals, and that it can be stronger than an emotion experienced as an individual.[233] Emotions are collective features of units such as groups, states, or non-state actors. Crawford's 'Institutionalizing Passion' marks a crucial theoretical development by establishing how emotions function as collective forces.[234] Crawford rgues for an approach to emotions as embedded in institutional structures, capable of shaping collective interpretations of events, influencing the patterns of international behaviour, and constituting social and political relationships. In this way, emotions, for example, empathy or fear, become institutionalised within international political structures and practices. Koschut's work 'The Power of (Emotion) Words' also provides a theoretical framework for understanding how emotions operate through collective meaning systems: it presents emotion-based building blocks for discourse analysis and shows how particular emotion categories can strengthen relational structures of

[229] Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Crawford, 'Institutionalising Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Emotions, Agency, and Power in World Politics'.

[230] Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11'.

[231] Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'.

[232] Mercer; Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11'; Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions'; Ross, 'Mixed Emotions'; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships'; Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

[233] Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'.

[234] Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy'.

domination and resistance, and lead to the transformation of social hierarchies in world politics.[235]

Mercer emphasised a social dimension of emotion and argued that emotions, for example, shaming, depend on a social dimension because "one must be responsive to opinions of others".[236] Groups acting within the network that have the same or similar interests identify themselves with their larger group and, therefore, experience emotions in a collective manner.[237] This approach also assumes that emotion is contagious, that is, one's emotion influences others to feel in a similar way. Contagion often happens due to a pursuit of common goals, a close relationship, a common social identity, or synchrony of physical actions (e.g., marching, singing, protesting, working closely on a task).[238] Acknowledging the social nature of emotions means that emotions cannot be reduced to bodies, and that they rather are emergent properties of groups, including states and non-state actors.

Other scholars have also demonstrated the social and collective nature of emotions, by analysing the specifics of how emotions function as collective phenomena shaping international political behaviour and how they operate at multiple levels.[239] In his influential work 'Coming from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions', Ross provides a foundational framework for understanding emotions as collective phenomena.[240] Ross demonstrated that emotions could not be reduced to individual psychological states, but they rather must be understood as social constructs that emerge through collective experience and interpretation: emotions are shaped by culture and social contexts; they emerge through the collective interpretation of events; they function as shared meanings in international politics; they help constitute group identities and interests.[241] Hutchison and Bleiker advanced studies in this field by showing how emotions operate at multiple levels simultaneously: at the individual level, they shape personal interpretations of political events, influence individual decision-making processes, and mediate personal responses to collective experiences; at the group level, they create and maintain collective identities, structure group responses to political events,

[235] Koschut, 'The Power of (Emotion) Words: On the Importance of Emotions for Social Constructivist Discourse Analysis in IR'.
[236] Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity', 2.
[237] Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity'.
[238] Mercer, 26; Wiltermuth and Heath, 'Synchrony and Cooperation'.
[239] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions'.
[240] Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions'.
[241] Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions'.

and shape inter-group relations and dynamics; at the institutional level, they influence institutional practices and norms, shape organisational cultures and behaviours, and mediate institutional responses to political challenges.[242] Therefore, social constructivism is a crucial approach that allows scholars to criticise rational explanations-based perspectives on emotions and expand the understanding of emotions based on their social and collective nature.

The emotional turn in IR primarily focused on state actors. For example, scholars argued that emotions are significant factors uniting member states of a security community such as NATO.[243] The concept of emotional diplomacy was also introduced to emphasise that emotions can be employed by collective units such as national states to signal specific emotional states for other countries in achieving their political goals. Emotional diplomacy refers to a type of diplomacy in which actors purposively seek to demonstrate and evoke specific emotions to achieve diplomatic goals: it is a coordinated state-level behaviour that explicitly and officially projects the image of a particular emotional response toward other states.[244] The study mostly focused on state actors as those who seek to signal specific emotions such as anger, sympathy, and guilt to achieve their political goal. Emotional diplomacy was later studied in other research,[245] with some scholars noting the need to analyse emotional diplomacy in relation to non-state actors such as NGOs, and the use of this term was extended in this context.[246]

Ilgit and Prakash addressed the limited research on emotions and non-state actors in international relations by focusing on human rights NGOs and the *naming and shaming* approach.[247] Besides explaining in depth the emotions of shame and guilt, the research also conceptualises NGOs as emotional actors that experience and, at the same time, seek to evoke specific emotions in international cooperation. Shame is not merely a tool for NGOs to seek their political goals, but also an internal and social emotion experienced by these actors.[248] Additionally, Ariffin explains how NGOs mobilise emotions (i.e.,

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[242] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'.

[243] Koschut, 'Emotional (Security) Communities: The Significance of Emotion Norms in Inter-Allied Conflict Management'.

[244] Hall, 'Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage'.

[245] Lemée, 'Harnessing Anger and Shame'; Burke, 'Emotional Diplomacy and Human Rights at the United Nations'; Lacatus and Blanc, 'Diplomacy of Hope: Transatlantic Relations in the Transition from Trump to Biden'; Hall, 'We will not Swallow this Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger'.

[246] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

[247] Ilgit and Prakash.

[248] Ilgit and Prakash.

*emotives*) in their communication strategies to achieve political goals, which usually focus on the promotion of moral principles and 'universal values' in the international community.[249]

Along with the studies establishing the general importance of emotions in international politics, and their conceptualisation as social and collective phenomena of state and non-state actors, scholars also sought to explain in depth how emotions influence international politics, that is, what emotions actually 'do'. Within this focus, theories linking emotions, discourse, and power emerged, which also provided methodological ways to study emotions in international politics by focusing on their representation in the actors' discourse.

*Relationship between emotions, discourse, and power in international politics*

One of the approaches to analyse the role of emotions in international relations is to focus on the link between emotions, discourse, and power. As Koschut explains, emotions are understood as transformative forces which are able to transform prevailing inequalities and bring political change.[250] The articulation of emotions can be a key force in challenging the *status quo* in international relations because emotions embedded in the actors' discourse can construct understandings that either sustain the prevailing power dynamics or challenge it. This approach argues that the link between emotions, discourse, and power allows us to translate commonsensical positions about emotions into a more thorough understanding of what emotions actually 'do' at the level of world politics.[251]

Scholars focusing on the link between emotions, discourse, and power argued that emotions are effects of power relations and are constitutive forces in shaping, maintaining, or transforming power dynamics in international politics.[252] This lane of research employs a social constructivist perspective

[249] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.
[250] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.
[251] Koschut; Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'.
[252] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Hall, '"An Extremely Obnoxious and Illegal Case" – Three Approaches to Affect, Emotion, and Discourse in the Aftermath of the Zhuhai Incident'; Sasley, 'Victimhood as Power in International Conflict', 2020; Wolf, '"On Monday, our National Humiliation will be over. We will Finish with Orders from Abroad" – Status, Emotions, and the SYRIZA Government's Rhetoric in the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis'; Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework'; Subotić and Zarakol, 'Hierarchies, Emotions, and Memory in

that views emotion as socially constructed in the sense that "what people feel is conditioned by socialization into culture and by participation in social structures".[253] The theorisation of emotions here relies on the social and constructive nature of emotions, which are embedded in the discourse, and which thereby construct meanings and understandings of social interactions. The focus is on the social nature of emotions rather than the naturalist one. This perspective shifts the analytical focus on emotions from their internal phenomenological perception and cognitive appraisal by individuals (prevailing within the cognitivist approach) to their intersubjective expression within social spheres. Here, the social ontology of emotions is concerned with investigating the intersubjectivity of emotions. The social epistemology of emotion then states that emotions, and the discourses as well as power relationships they disclose, can only be grasped within the cultural meaning systems and knowledge structures in which they are represented and known.[254] It states that emotions become what they are and contribute to the construction of collective meanings in world politics through these epistemic landscapes in which they embed. In contrast, the previous approaches of naturalist and cognitivist theories used to focus on the internal phenomenological perception of emotions rather than their social dimension. In other words, the focus has shifted from individuals and their subjective perceptions of emotions to the social and cultural environment where different effects of emotions can be revealed.

Koschut demonstrated that emotions can reinforce dominant positions or challenge them, that they can reflect power hierarchies, and that certain emotions become legitimate while others are delegitimised.[255] Emotions can also become forces for resistance and transformation by uniting marginalised groups, driving institutional change, or expressing emotions in a way that contests dominance.[256] Scholars employed this approach and explored the link

International Relations'; Head, 'Contesting Emotional Governance – Empathy under Fire in the Israeli Public Sphere during Operation Protective Edge'; Solomon, 'Status, Emotions, and US–Iran Nuclear Politics'; Fierke, 'Emotional Intentions – Self-Immolation and Ontological Choice in Tibet'; Ross, 'The Power of Viral Expression in World Politics', 2020.

253 Stets and Turner, 'Conceptualizing Emotions Sociologically'.

254 Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 9.

255 Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'The Power of (Emotion) Words: On the Importance of Emotions for Social Constructivist Discourse Analysis in IR'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Koschut et al., 'Discourse and Emotions in International Relations', 1 September 2017.

256 Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Fear no More: Emotions and World Politics'; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International

between emotions, discourse, and power, for example, in studying the victimisation of social groups and how victims deal with their conditions as victims,[257] the use of emotions in the rhetoric of reconciliation,[258] and the impact of viral expression on the constitution of political community in an age of populism.[259]

Therefore, the emotional turn in IR approaches emotions as social and contextual rather than instinctive psychological reactions emerging within the body. The emphasis on the social and collective nature allows researchers to study states or non-state actors as emotional agents acting within the international arena. Thus, emotions operate as a transformative force (i.e., they are shaping understandings and underpinning power dynamics among actors in international politics) that is integral to the social construction of reality and the formation of norms within society, thereby influencing decision-making, perceptions, and power dynamics in international politics.

These insights imply that emotions are also inseparable from the construction of international norms such as human rights or environmental norms. They also reflect the significant amount of research specifically emphasising the role of emotions in norm advocacy, and analysing their manifestation in norm entrepreneurs' rhetoric and advocacy strategies (e.g., Ilgit and Prakash's study on NGOs functioning as *emotional actors* while advocating for human rights norms). While this sub-section discussed the emotional turn in IR that brought a general and fundamental shift on emotions in international politics, the following sub-section elaborates on the research specifically explaining the role of emotions in norm advocacy.

*Emotions in NGOs' Norm Advocacy*

Traditional theories about norm emergence imply that emotions play a significant role in persuasion mechanisms. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink explain that norm entrepreneurs often utilise emotional appeals as a strategic method to persuade other actors to accept new norms, which emphasises the importance of emotional resonance in the process of norm

Relations', 2017; Koschut et al., 'Discourse and Emotions in International Relations', 1 September 2017; Koschut, The Power of Emotions in World Politics.

257 Sasley, 'Victimhood as Power in International Conflict'.

258 Jeffery, 'Emotions and Reconciliation Rhetoric – Banishing the Dark Emotions in Timor-Leste'.

259 Ross, 'The Power of Viral Expression in World Politics'.

emergence and advocacy.[260] Later, Sikkink argued that International Relations theorists should engage more with research in moral psychology and neuroscience to advance theories of norm emergence and resonance, specifically to correct the existing imbalance in the IR norms literature that continues to place more emphasis on the rational processes of persuasion, argument, and deliberation.[261] There is also research that elaborated on the role of emotions more explicitly by analysing emotional strategies that help norm advocates promote new international norms.[262] Additionally, the role of emotions should not be overlooked when understanding the motivation of norm advocates, especially of NGOs that rely on moral arguments in advocacy for norms such as human rights.[263]

Theories explaining norm emergence referred to emotions as a significant element of norm emergence processes,[264] yet their role was implied rather than explicitly explained. Further research focused on emotions more explicitly by explaining how and which emotional appeals allow for more successful persuasion[265] and defining certain emotional strategies that norm entrepreneurs employ.[266] NGOs, acting as norm entrepreneurs or moral entrepreneurs, seek to persuade and socialise state actors and international organisations to accept these norms by employing various strategies of

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[260] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

[261] Price and Sikkink, 'International Norms, Moral Psychology, and Neuroscience'.

[262] Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'; Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'; Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Asal, Murdie, and Peterson, 'Human Rights, NGO Shaming and the Exports of Abusive States'; Murdie and Peksen, 'Women's Rights INGO Shaming and the Government Respect for Women's Rights'.

[263] Doidge and Sandri, '"Friends That Last a Lifetime": The Importance of Emotions amongst Volunteers Working with Refugees in Calais'; Rodgers, '"Anger is why we're all Here": Mobilising and Managing Emotions in a Professional Activist Organization'; Beres and Wilson, 'Essential Emotions: The Place of Passion in a Feminist Network'; Bosco, 'Emotions that Build Networks: Geographies of Human Rights Movements in Argentina and beyond'.

[264] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics'.

[265] Risse, '"Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics'; Posner, 'The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory'.

[266] Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'; Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'; Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

communication and persuasion.[267] Several studies analyse how NGOs frame issues in general,[268] and emotions emerge as an important tool of persuasion. Thomas Risse explained that norm entrepreneurs have to persuade their target audience of their normative claims by engaging in speech acts using effective techniques of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion.[269] NGOs frame their issues in ways that make persuasive connections between existing and emerging norms and promote their normative claims, which would resonate with broader audiences, namely, decision-makers and the media.[270] Richard Posner explained that *moral entrepreneurs* are people with the power to change our moral intuitions, and they do not do this by rational argument, but they rather mix appeals to self-interest with emotional appeals.[271] Therefore, actors seeking to promote various norms have to frame the issues in the most convincing way to their targets and employ the most effective rhetorical skills, in which emotions also play a significant role.

Research on framing processes emphasises the importance of emotional appeals: frames lead individuals to experience different emotions, and these emotional reactions mediate framing effects on attitudes and political behaviour.[272] Kimberly Gross draws attention to emotions in framing persuasive appeals and seeks to address the prevailing focus on cognitive factors in framing studies.[273] The study implements two experiments designed to explore the effect of two types of framing (episodic and thematic) on emotional response and policy opinion. The study finds that emotional appeals are an important element of any persuasive message and that the choice of how to frame a story significantly affects how citizens feel and think about the

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[267] Joachim, 'Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights', 2003; Tsetsura, 'Challenges in Framing Women's Rights as Human Rights at the Domestic Level: A Case Study of NGOs in the Post-Soviet Countries', 1 November 2013.

[268] Tsetsura, 'Challenges in Framing Women's Rights as Human Rights at the Domestic Level: A Case Study of NGOs in the Post-Soviet Countries', 1 November 2013; Joachim, 'Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights', 2003.

[269] Risse, '"Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics'.

[270] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

[271] Posner, 'The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory'.

[272] Gross, 'Framing Persuasive Appeals: Episodic and Thematic Framing, Emotional Response, and Policy Opinion'; Lecheler, Schuck, and Claes, 'Dealing with Feelings: Positive and Negative Discrete Emotions as Mediators of News Framing Effects'; Lecheler, Bos, and Vliegenthart, 'The Mediating Role of Emotions: News Framing Effects on Opinions about Immigration'.

[273] Gross, 'Framing Persuasive Appeals: Episodic and Thematic Framing, Emotional Response, and Policy Opinion'.

policies implicated by that story. Rosa M. Sanchez Salgado focuses on issue-framing during crises, such as the refugee crisis, and argues that, in order to better understand framing processes and which narratives prevail in the crisis contest, it is of utmost importance to take into account the role of emotions.[274] Nicolas M. Anspach and Gorana Draguljić have assessed the effectiveness of different frames (motivational, economic, personal) employed in the advocacy by environmental NGOs, including emotions as important factors to improve the effectiveness of framing strategies.[275] The study found economic and personal frames to be more effective in gathering public support, as these frames align the audience's attitudes with the message and operate through psychological proximity, sadness, and anger to encourage behavioural support for the environmental campaign.

A similar study conducted by Kyla Jo McEntire, Michelle Leiby, and Matthew Krain identified the three most common messaging techniques employed by human rights NGOs: informational frames, personal frames, and motivational frames.[276] The authors tested the effectiveness of these frames by using an experimental research design and found that personal narratives are the most successful, increasing individuals' sense of knowledge on the issue and their emotional reaction, leading them to reject the practice and participate in a campaign to demand its cessation. Emily Matthews Luxon draws attention to environmental NGOs' emotional framing while seeking to attract media coverage. The study provides suggestions for communication strategies of ENGOs by showing that balanced emotional framing, which combines negative statements about an environmental problem with more positive statements about concrete actions and their potential outcomes, may be effective for both mobilising the public and attracting media coverage.[277]

Scholars have further explored specific strategies employed by civil society organisations, such as *naming and shaming*, *fear-mongering*, *dehumanisation*, and *boosting*.[278] Studies have explained how such strategies help to advocate for human rights issues internationally; they have also investigated the effectiveness of such strategies in more depth, for example, by explaining which emotions and how should be employed to mobilise a

[274] Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotions in the European Union's Decision-Making: The Reform of the Dublin System in the Context of the Refugee Crisis'.
[275] Anspach and Draguljić, 'Effective Advocacy: The Psychological Mechanisms of Environmental Issue Framing', 2019.
[276] McEntire, Leiby, and Krain, 'Human Rights Organizations as Agents of Change: An Experimental Examination of Framing and Micromobilization'.
[277] Luxon, 'Mobilizing Environmental Sentiment through the Media'.
[278] Sanchez Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'.

bigger audience.[279] One of the most studied emotional strategies employed by NGOs is that of 'naming and shaming', which is usually analysed in the context of human rights advocacy. James C. Franklin notes that human rights violations monitoring implemented by international organisations and NGOs became the basis for the emergence of *naming and shaming.*[280] Justin Esarey and Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt explored whether being named and shamed for human rights abuse influences the amount of foreign aid received by the shamed state.[281] The study found that shaming for human rights abuse by the United Nations is associated with lower bilateral aid levels among states that already receive small amounts of aid, whereas states that receive greater aid continue to have equal or higher bilateral aid despite condemnation for human rights. The authors also note that public shaming by human rights NGOs is not associated with decreased aggregate bilateral aid.[282]

Other studies investigate the effectiveness of the naming and shaming strategy and its contribution to reducing the violation of human rights. For example, DeMeritt's study analyses whether international organisations, including NGOs, affect state-sponsored killing by using the naming and shaming technique.[283] The findings show that, by shaming abusive states, human rights NGOs and international organisations such as the United Nations can reduce the likelihood and severity of government killing. Meanwhile, Jack Snyder argues that, although shame may serve as a motivating feeling, the effectiveness of the naming and shaming technique has been declining, and that its utilisation is even counterproductive.[284] The author explains that shaming can produce anger, resistance, denial, and deviance from outgroup norms, especially when imposed by cultural outsiders, instead of serving its purpose to promote human rights.[285]

Besides naming and shaming, other emotional strategies have also been academically studied. For example, Sanchez Salgado analysed how civil society organisations use strategies such as *fear-mongering* (i.e., the action of deliberately arousing public fear or alarm about a particular issue), *boosting*

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[279] Luxon, 'Mobilizing Environmental Sentiment through the Media'; Anspach and Draguljić, 'Effective Advocacy: The Psychological Mechanisms of Environmental Issue Framing', 2019.

[280] Franklin, 'Human Rights Naming and Shaming'.

[281] Esarey and DeMeritt, 'Political Context and the Consequences of Naming and Shaming for Human Rights Abuse'.

[282] Esarey and DeMeritt.

[283] DeMeritt, 'International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?'

[284] Snyder, 'Backlash against Human Rights Shaming: Emotions in Groups'.

[285] Snyder, 'Backlash against Human Rights Shaming: Emotions in Groups'.

(i.e., praising good behaviour or policies), *vilification* (i.e., implying the action of making something seem evil, and cultivating emotions such as hate or contempt), and *compassion*.[286] Studies have explored how civil society organisations employ these strategies to promote their goals in the face of the refugee crisis,[287] or in the face of rising populism.[288] Fear-mongering is used by civil society organisations not with the objective to spread fear, but rather to refer to this emotion based on facts. At the same time, they refer to hope to downplay fear, especially in the case of climate change issues. *Boosting* is used more to praise public society in general rather than specific policymakers or institutions. Sanchez Salgado explained that the rising narratives of populist groups, countering the need to help others and engage in humanitarian actions (e.g., refugee crisis), challenge the goals of human rights CSOs and narratives of compassion, thus creating the need to adapt their strategies and approaches. However, compassion continues to play the most important thought-directing role in the values and goals of CSOs. They also tend to use an optimistic discourse based on hope, which contrasts with the fear-mongering visible in the discourse used by populist groups. Additionally, the study shows that CSOs combine the use of appeals to emotion and reason (cognition) in their communication, and that these organisations are confronted with the contradictory pressures rising from the importance of using emotions and, at the same time, suppressing them.

Therefore, the research shows that emotions are crucial in the advocacy of civil society organisations and NGOs, which employ a wide variety of emotional strategies to make their persuasion more effective. One of their most important roles is to promote behaviour that aligns with the moral values in the international community,[289] where emotional appeals are mostly employed. Emotions can be understood as instrumental and strategic, which implies the intentional, calculated use of emotions as tools to achieve specific goals (in this case, more effective persuasion in favour of new norms).

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[286] Sanchez Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'; Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'.

[287] Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotions in the European Union's Decision-Making: The Reform of the Dublin System in the Context of the Refugee Crisis'.

[288] Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'.

[289] Buntinx and Colli, 'Moral Policy Entrepreneurship: The Role of NGOs in the EU's External Human Rights Policy towards China'; Schneiker, 'NGOs as Norm Takers: Insider–Outsider Networks as Translators of Norms', 9 January 2017; Colonomos, 'Non-State Actors as Moral Entrepreneurs: A Transnational Perspective on Ethics Networks'.

However, emotions can also function as forces mobilising the action of norm entrepreneurs, that is, moral emotions such as empathy, compassion, and care often drive advocates to promote norms such as human rights.[290] Scholars draw attention to emotions as forces that function to motivate and mobilise individuals to engage in organisations advocating for human rights and other moral values. Some studies implicitly refer to the complexities that members of NGOs have to face because of the need to express and, at the same time, manage emotions, whereas others analyse such phenomena explicitly by employing concepts such as emotional labour, referring to the management of emotions because of prevailing organisational structures and rules.[291]

Rosa Sanchez Salgado, in her study on emotional strategies, notes the complexities that members of NGOs must face in relation to balancing the use of emotions and their authentic feelings.[292] In other words, they seek to balance the use of emotions as part of their rhetoric, and the genuine feelings that they experience due to moral issues such as human rights violations that they seek to attract attention to.[293] Ilgit and Prakash also refer to a similar insight in the study where they conceptualise NGOs as *emotional actors*, engaging in emotional diplomacy to advocate for human rights issues.[294] The author also points out the complex nature of NGOs as those who not only employ emotional diplomacy as a tool to achieve their political goals but also as actors whose actions are emotional entities as well: their choices and actions, such as choosing which issues to focus on, may be influenced by genuine feelings. The existing literature on NGOs and human rights often treats emotions as an external tool or tactic, overlooking the intrinsic emotional aspects of NGOs' actions.

Furthermore, some scholars explicitly refer to the phenomena of emotional labour, which highlights that representatives of NGOs manage their personal

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290 Rodgers, '"Anger is why we're all Here": Mobilizing and Managing Emotions in a Professional Activist Organization'; Doidge and Sandri, '"Friends That Last a Lifetime"': The Importance of Emotions amongst Volunteers Working with Refugees in Calais'; Beres and Wilson, 'Essential Emotions: The Place of Passion in a Feminist Network'; Bosco, 'Emotions that Build Networks: Geographies of Human Rights Movements in Argentina and beyond'.

291 Wharton, 'The Sociology of Emotional Labor'.

292 Sanchez Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'.

293 Sanchez Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'.

294 Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

emotions in the context of organisational and institutional constraints.[295] Emotional labour refers to the process by which workers are expected to manage their feelings in accordance with organisationally defined rules and guidelines.[296] For example, Kathleen D. Rodgers examines emotional labour implemented by activists in a professional activist organisation,[297] and Dilara Ozel's study emphasises the significance of emotional reflexivity for the NGO staff working with refugees.[298]

Although a strategic use of emotions as instruments in persuasive rhetoric plays a significant role in norm emergence, emotions also function as forces underpinning the engagement of those who promote these norms. Research shows that NGOs may express emotions in their persuasion discourse, but that does not mean that representatives of NGOs do not experience these feelings genuinely. On the contrary, NGOs, considered driven by moral values, even engage in emotional labour to manage the expression of emotions so they can fit the prevailing organisational and structural constraints that they face when speaking to decision-makers. Here, the link between emotions and NGOs' norm advocacy is multifaceted: emotions function in various ways simultaneously across different dimensions and levels, including individual psychological experiences, collective shared meanings, or strategic resources that can be mobilised for political purposes.

Therefore, the studies discussed in this sub-section have revealed that emotions play a crucial role in norm advocacy, either manifesting as features of norm entrepreneurs' strategies and persuasion, or motivating their genuine engagement in advocacy. Foundational theories explaining norm emergence implied that emotions play a significant role in persuasion mechanisms, which is an idea that was later developed in further studies focusing on NGOs' emotional strategies. In addition, they also refer to tensions that members of NGOs face due to strategic use of emotions and their genuine feelings. Either way, emotions are an inseparable element of norm emergence processes. This allows us to draw the following assumption:

- *Emotions are constitutive elements of norm emergence processes, manifesting through norm entrepreneurs' advocacy approaches*.

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[295] Rodgers, '"Anger is why we're all here": Mobilizing and Managing Emotions in a Professional Activist Organization'; Özel, 'Emotional Reflexivity in Social Work with Refugees'.

[296] Wharton, 'The Sociology of Emotional Labor'.

[297] Rodgers, '"Anger Is Why We're All Here": Mobilizing and Managing Emotions in a Professional Activist Organization'."

[298] Özel, 'Emotional Reflexivity in Social Work with Refugees'.

## Summary of the Assumptions

The previous sections have presented a review of the literature connecting themes of climate justice, NGOs' norm advocacy, and emotions, and addressed the following questions: What is climate justice and why is it considered as a new norm in the international community? (i.e., What behavioural rules does it refer to?) Why can civil society NGOs be considered as norm entrepreneurs in climate justice advocacy? How do norm entrepreneurs persuade the international community to accept new norms, and why are emotions important in this process?

The discussion on existing research can be concluded by highlighting a few insights that are important for this thesis. First, climate justice initially emerged as a set of principles, bringing focus to the rights of vulnerable communities, the responsibility of the developed countries to compensate for loss and damage, and a more inclusive approach to climate cooperation in general. Further studies recognised that climate justice had become a new norm shaping international climate cooperation, which emerged mainly from the discourse of grassroots movements and civil society NGOs. Their strong focus on climate justice promotion is also evidenced by their discourse within the UNFCCC, mainly focusing on advocacy for the climate justice principles.

While research acknowledges the significant role of emotions in international norm advocacy, often manifesting through strategies such as naming and shaming, the specific mechanisms through which emotions function in these processes remain underexplored or implicitly referred to. Emerging norms, such as climate justice, understood as addressing climate change as a justice issue, provide a crucial context for investigating such mechanisms. Scholars observe climate justice as a new norm, but there is a need to understand in depth the processes through which this norm is constructed. The shifting understanding of climate change as a justice issue reveals that the international community accepts the new approach to shaping international climate policies. Traditional theories of norm emergence indicate that new norms are constructed through persuasion employed by norm entrepreneurs, especially NGOs, who promote new behavioural rules by employing the discourse that resonates with the international community. For example, they link new behavioural rules with the already existing moral principles and 'universal values', such as human rights. Civil society NGOs act as norm entrepreneurs for climate justice, actively employing emotional approaches in their advocacy within frameworks such as the UNFCCC.

Thus, persuasion mechanisms are inevitably underpinned by emotions. This is evidenced by both traditional theories explaining norm emergence, and by further research specifically focusing on emotion either in norm advocacy, or international relations in general. The initial theories of norm emergence implicitly referred to emotions as significant tools of persuasion employed by norm entrepreneurs, which was later elaborated in studies that analysed the emotional advocacy strategies of NGOs in more depth. A fundamental focus on emotions was brought by the emotional turn in IR, where scholars argued that emotions are inseparable from international politics, and provided methodological ways to analyse them in various processes. Therefore, theoretical frameworks proposed in the field of emotional turn in International Relations, which highlight the link between emotions, discourse, and power, combined with explanations of norm emergence and persuasion processes, can offer potential ways of conceptualising emotions as significant forces contributing to the emergence of norms such as climate justice.

The next section introduces the conceptual framework based on the theoretical assumptions developed in the previous sections after reviewing the relevant research:

- Climate justice can be understood as a new international norm that has emerged within the framework of global climate governance, characterised by behavioural rules that emphasise equitable resource distribution, inclusive decision-making processes, and the recognition of diverse identities and rights among the affected communities. The shift reflects a growing consensus among states and civil society that climate policies must address human rights, vulnerability, and social inequalities, and is incorporated in international agreements like the Paris Agreement.
- Civil society NGOs act as norm entrepreneurs of climate justice, represented by the Climate Action Network within the UNFCCC context.
- Emotions are constitutive elements of the norm emergence processes, manifesting through norm entrepreneurs' advocacy approaches.

The presented theoretical assumptions imply that civil society NGOs contribute to climate justice norm construction as norm entrepreneurs within the UNFCCC, whose advocacy is underpinned by certain emotions. These assumptions provide the foundation for the conceptual framework developed in the next section, which will guide the empirical investigation of how emotions function in NGOs' climate justice advocacy.

## 2.4. Conceptual Framework: Emotive Transformative Persuasion

This section explains the conceptual framework introduced in this thesis, seeking to uncover the role that emotions invoked through NGOs' advocacy play in shaping the climate justice norms within the UNFCCC. It presents the concept explaining the emotion-driven mechanism through which NGOs advocate for climate justice. By relying on the previously established theoretical assumptions, this section introduces the conceptual framework of *emotive transformative persuasion* as a framework explaining how emotions underpin advocacy for climate justice;

The conceptual tool explaining the role of emotions in constructing the climate justice norm needs to focus on the emotional foundations of this advocacy. The framework has to approach emotions as functioning within the mechanism that NGOs employ to persuade for climate justice within the UNFCCC. For this reason, the conceptual framework consists of two parts:

a) The emotional dimension, that is, the advocacy mechanism should include emotions as a significant element in NGOs' argumentation for climate justice.
b) Persuasion as the mechanism through which NGOs advocate for norms, that is, a discourse that resonates with the international community through references to common values and ideas.

The first aspect can be addressed by referring to the research explaining the role of emotions in the advocacy for norms and international politics in general. The second aspect can be addressed through the research explaining the specifics of persuasion approaches employed by norm entrepreneurs. Thus, the concept includes both the general principles explaining norm persuasion, and the emotional dimension underpinning this persuasion. The concept relies on the following insights emerging from the research and the theoretical background explained in the previous chapter:

- Emotions are inseparable from processes of international politics, and they **perform** certain **functions** that influence actors' beliefs, understandings, and behaviour. Emotions expressed in speech acts, defined as *emotives*, function to "get addressee to do something or to refrain from doing something in a context in which the latter is not obligated to comply." [299]
- Emotions function as **transformative forces**, underpinning social interactions among international actors. Emotions can challenge prevailing domination of certain actors and enhance agency of those feeling opressed

[299] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations', 213.

as they "can utilize discourse and emotions to enhance their agency regarding their demands" in international politics.[300]

- NGOs advocate for international norms through **persuasion**, which relies on emotional appeals promoting moral principles and 'universal values', and ensuring enhanced resonance with international community.

*Emotive*

Characterising the persuasion mechanism as *emotive* means that it is underpinned by emotions, which are expressed through the discourse of certain actors (in this case, civil society NGOs), and which have performative functions: they intend to construct meanings, express attitudes, and produce certain effects.[301]

As explained in the second chapter presenting the theoretical background, Yohan Ariffin emphasised the significance of studying emotives in world politics. *Emotives* refer to emotionally driven evaluations, and the performative function of emotions, meaning that emotions are particular performatives that perform all at once "a locutionary act (issue a specific meaning), an illocutionary act (express an attitude) and a perlocutionary act (produce certain consequential effects)".[302] Emotions are not merely impulsive reactions or irrational expressions but rather significant forces that can shape beliefs and understandings. In other words, "emotions intend to do things". The author of this thesis addressed the challenge to study the role of emotions in international relations by arguing that emotions can be assessed "insofar as the inquiry is confined to their discursive expressions by significant subjects".[303] Thus, scholars should study *emotives*: cognitions whose distinctive nature is to excite an emotion for political purposes. This approach helps to show that emotions affect behaviour, policies, and institutions. Material interests and rational assessments may influence actors' behaviour, but they stem from evaluations that are inseparable from emotions (i.e., they involve judgments and ideas that are emotionally toned).[304]

The concept 'emotives' was originally introduced by William Reddy.[305] It was explained as emotional expressions that are equal to performatives

[300] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 60.
[301] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.
[302] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.
[303] Ariffin, 207.
[304] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.
[305] Reddy, 'Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions'.

because they "alter the states of the speakers from whom they derive".[306] For example, the emotional statement 'I am angry' presents a certain feeling but, at the same time, it can "alter what they 'refer' to": it changes the feeling by intensifying, contradicting, or transforming it to another feeling. However, Reddy's focus is on the *speaker*, whereas Ariffin's approach emphasises the addressee (i.e., the speaker's attempts to get other actors to do something or to refrain from doing something). In this case, state or non-state actors can issue emotives to encourage other actors to do or not to do certain things, therefore seeking to achieve their political goals.[307] This approach emphasises that the use of words with emotive meanings is "a tendency of a word, arising through the history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective responses in people".[308] In other words, the use of emotional expressions in language not only represents speakers' attitudes but also produces effects because it seeks to alter other actors' (*addressees*') behaviour.

The concept of the *emotive* particularly suits the goal of this thesis to explain the role of emotions in advocacy for climate justice. First, it implies that emotions expressed in actors' language can both represent their emotional states and produce certain political effects. In the context of this thesis, it means that civil society NGOs' emotional expressions in their statements within the UNFCCC can reflect their representatives' genuine emotions, and, at the same time, produce political effects – they promote a normative shift towards climate justice. In other words, the thesis assumes that if emotions are displayed in the NGOs' discourse, it does not imply that emotions are employed merely as a strategic tool. Instead, they are approached as *both* representing emotional states and producing political effects. Second, the concept *emotive* implies the performative function of emotions, that is, emotions serve significant functions in world politics, which can be analysed through speech acts. In the context of this thesis, this would mean that emotions have a performative function in NGOs' persuasion for climate justice: they issue specific meanings and express attitudes that help to promote the climate justice norm. Thus, the role of emotions in climate justice advocacy can be analysed by looking into how NGOs mobilise *emotives* through their speech acts. Thus, the analysis would reveal how certain emotions function to enable NGOs' persuasion for climate justice.

[306] Reddy.
[307] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations', 213.
[308] Stevenson, 'II—The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms'.

Therefore, the concept of the *emotive* is employed to refer to the mechanism through which civil society NGOs advocate for climate justice within the UNFCCC. This highlights that the mechanism is underpinned by emotions, which serve significant functions in enabling NGOs' persuasion for climate justice. The concept includes the emotional foundation of the way to explain NGOs' advocacy for climate justice, and also aligns with assumptions developed in the emotional turn of IR, where scholars argued that emotions are not merely irrational reactions, but they rather perform certain functions in international politics. Emotions were highlighted as transformative forces, which are able to affect power dynamics among actors and challenge the current *status quo* in international politics.[309]

*Transformative*

Emotions also function as **transformative forces**, which means that they have the power to cause major changes, referring to the potential of emotions to transform beliefs and interactions among international actors.[310] In the context of this thesis, understanding emotions as transformative implies their significant role in shaping the understanding that international climate cooperation should align with the principles of climate justice, thus challenging prevailing domination of developed countries. Emotions can enhance actors' agency regarding their demands in international politics. In other words, it is assumed that emotions underlie the mechanism through which the climate justice norm is promoted.

As explained before, the emotional turn in IR brought this focus on emotions, by arguing that emotions cannot be ignored in international politics, and that they should be studied as crucial forces shaping the actors' perceptions, understandings, and interactions (i.e., emotions are not merely personal experiences; they are pivotal in the construction of political realities, and they can drive social change).[311] The research in this field has brought a general focus on emotions by emphasising that emotions should be taken into account when explaining peace negotiations and conflict resolution, diplomatic institutions and actors' relations, including cooperation in terms of shaping security communities, or adversary relations and decisions to go to

[309] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'.

[310] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 22, 196.

[311] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics'; Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

war.[312] Understanding emotions as transformative in international politics involves recognising their significant role in shaping political behaviour and the collective actions of international actors, especially because emotions can help to challenge the *status quo* and resist domination or, conversely, reproduce the prevailing power dynamics.[313]

Koschut emphasised that emotions can transform the social order by embedding in discourse. They can challenge existing power structures, for example, through naming inequalities and shaming those responsible, thus disrupting the *status quo*. Emotions are constitutive elements of actors' discourse, and are "thus able to enact and transgress, political agency and power. Feelings can unsettle, subvert, and ultimately transform prevailing power and bring about political change".[314] As explained by Hutchison and Bleiker, "an attentiveness to the intersection between emotions, power, and world politics enables a more complete appreciation of how political viewpoints are constituted and can, in particular situations, be resisted and even transformed".[315] Emotions are understood as transformative because they contribute to maintaining or shifting certain dynamics in international politics, and this role can be explored by focusing on how emotions are represented in discourse. Scholars should look for emotions in textual or visual discourse, and analyse how these emotions construct understandings of *us* and *them* (e.g., through fear or love), and shape communities and other beliefs, which can challenge or sustain the *status quo*. Therefore, emotions are transformative in that they produce political change, especially through their link to discourse and power.

The approach to emotions as transformative can be included in the analysis of the emerging norm of climate justice. As explained above, the norm represents the discourse which challenges the prevailing domination of developed countries, and emphasises the need to take into account the interests of vulnerable communities. The principles of climate justice emphasise the historic responsibility of developed countries and their obligation to pay compensation, the rights of vulnerable communities, and the need for a more

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[312] Mercer, 'Emotional Beliefs'; Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics'; Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'; Eznack, 'Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships'; Palm, 'An Emotional Security Community under Pressure? Emotional Discursive (de)Legitimation in EU External Border Control'; Koschut, 'Emotional (Security) Communities: The Significance of Emotion Norms in Inter-Allied Conflict Management'.

[313] Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics'.

[314] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 22.

[315] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', 508.

inclusive and just approach to climate cooperation.[316] This set of ideas represents the resistance to the perceived injustice performed by developed countries in international climate cooperation, and challenges the *status quo* by seeking to counter the domination of the developed countries and shift their power towards vulnerable communities. The research in the field of the emotional turn in IR implies that this shift is inevitably underpinned by emotions, as emotions are inseparable from the actors' discourse, which seeks to resist domination and change the *status quo*. In this way, emotions contribute to transforming the understanding of addressing the climate change crisis: they shape the understanding that the climate change crisis should be solved in ways that take into account the interests of vulnerable communities rather than reproducing the domination of the developed countries. In the context of this thesis, it implies that the civil society NGOs' discourse, profoundly focusing on advocacy for climate justice, represents certain emotions that transform the prevailing understanding of the *morally right* approach to international climate policies.

Such an understanding of emotions emphasises that emotions perform certain functions in international politics: they can transform the prevailing beliefs, and hierarchies. The link between emotions, discourse, and power connects with the previously explained approach to analyse emotions as performatives, that is, *emotives*, represented in speech acts. It implies that emotions expressed through civil society NGOs' statements not only reflect their emotional states but also produce political effects: emotives mobilised through their speech acts promote climate justice as a norm in the international community, thereby challenging the prevailing domination of the developed countries. In the context of this thesis, this would mean that the *Climate Action Network*, uniting civil society NGOs and acting within the UNFCCC, represents certain emotions that help them to resist and transform the prevailing injustices.

Thus, the mechanism explaining how emotions underpin the construction of the climate justice norm should refer to the transformative power of emotions linked to enhancing the agency of certain actors. To understand how emotions function in the processes of norm construction, the mechanism should also include the explanation of how actors are persuaded to accept new norms, as elaborated in the following part.

[316] Sultana, 'Critical Climate Justice', 2 November 2021; Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'; Schlosberg, 'Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse', 1 February 2013.

*Persuasion*

**Persuasion** refers to the mechanism on which NGOs rely in their advocacy for norms.[317] NGOs seek to make their arguments persuasive so that the particular norm is accepted by the international community.[318] This requires resonance – the ability of a message to connect and be accepted by a target audience and their beliefs, values, and context.[319] In the context of this thesis, this means that civil society NGOs rely on persuasion as an advocacy strategy and seek to make their messages on climate justice resonate with the international community. Persuasion, thus, is a mechanism through which NGOs promote the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC.

A variety of studies explain NGOs' persuasion strategies and influence in affecting policymaking.[320] The thesis relies on Melissa Labonte's framework and her study on advocacy for the responsibility to protect norm for several reasons. First, it emphasizes the logic of argumentation and highlights the significance of the discourse. It allows for the integration of the theoretical framework linking emotions, discourse, and power that was proposed by scholars of the emotional turn in IR. Furthermore, Labonte elaborates on the specifics of persuasion and resonance, thus proposing a more precise understanding of how NGOs seek to resonate with decision-makers. I thus rely

[317] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'; Payne, 'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction'.

[318] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect', 47.

[319] McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory, 'A Theory of Resonance'; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics'; Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

[320] Betsill and Corell, 'NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations'; Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'; Sanchez Salgado, 'Emotion Strategies of EU-Based Human Rights and Humanitarian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Times of Populism'; Sanchez Salgado, 'The Advocacy of Feelings'; Clark, 'Diplomacy of Conscience'; Tallberg et al., 'NGO Influence in International Organizations'; Fitzduff and Church, 'NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict'.

on the framework of this study and adapt it in the analysis of NGOs' advocacy for climate justice norm.[321]

As explained in the second chapter (p. 52), Labonte argues for a focus on the logic of argumentation as the persuasion mechanism that norm entrepreneurs' employ for the effective persuasion of other actors into complying with new norms.[322] Argumentation and deliberation play key roles in persuading actors to adopt new ideas, norms, and interests, as well as to generate shared understandings. Scholars should look into norm entrepreneurs' discursive structures (e.g., concepts, metaphors, etc.) and how they affect the likelihood that alternative policy options will be perceived, understood, and possibly supported or opposed by policymakers. In other words, it emphasises the significance of the discourse that norm entrepreneurs employ to persuade for new norms. Although Labonte's study focuses on humanitarian norms and advocacy for the responsibility to protect them, it establishes a strong theoretical foundation to understand how norm entrepreneurs, such as NGOs, seek to effectively persuade international actors to accept new norms. Thus, I rely on this framework, specifically on the conceptualisation of persuasion and resonance, in an attempt to identify the elements of persuasion by NGOs.

As explained by Labonte, when persuading, NGOs employ arguments that appeal to universal principles like truth, justice, and sincerity, and create a shared understanding of a certain issue.[323] In the context of human rights and the responsibility to protect norms, Labonte explains that these norms, embedded within strategic frames, have a higher potential to resonate with policymakers when the following conditions have been met:[324]

a) providing credible and compelling evidence of mass atrocity crimes;
b) explicitly linking the prevailing norms with other 'universal' values concerning human rights and human dignity;
c) making direct linkages between perpetrators and victims in mass atrocity cases;
d) making the case (or its opposite) that because force is being used inappropriately by a sovereign authority (e.g., torture, rape, forced displacement, massive human rights abuses, genocide), responsible use of

[321] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.
[322] Labonte.
[323] Labonte, 51.
[324] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

force should be used to restore peace and stability as well as protect the rights of civilians.

As defined in this framework, these conditions explain when the resonance will be effective in influencing policymakers.[325] In other words, they indicate which aspects the NGOs' discourse should focus on when seeking to effectively persuade other actors to accept the promoted norm (i.e., logic of argumentation). The framework explaining the NGOs' strategies of norm advocacy thus provides a more structured approach to understanding how NGOs persuade other actors to accept new norms by explaining the specific logics of persuasion and listing conditions that increase the *resonance* with policymakers.[326] This framework may be adapted by modifying conditions in a way that would fit the context of other norms, such as that of climate justice. Crucially, it emphasises the significance of discourse and language (the logic of argumentation) as key in persuading actors to adopt new norms. This allows for the inclusion of the previously explained theories about the link between emotions, discourse, and power in international relations: the discourse that international actors employ is embedded with emotions, which function to shape understandings and transform dynamics among the actors in international politics.[327]

In the context of NGOs' advocacy for the climate justice norm, the resonance conditions (i.e., the aspects on which the NGOs' discourse is focused to successfully persuade other actors to accept the new norm), should be modified in a way that they would reflect the principles of climate justice (see Table 1) and the specifics of the UNFCCC cooperation framework:

- The first condition states that NGOs should provide credible and compelling evidence that the problem causes harm, which, based on climate justice, relates to harm caused by the ignorance of the rights of vulnerable communities (disproportionate effects of climate change, exclusion from decision-making, etc.). Thus, the NGOs' discourse should be focused on the exposure to this evidence.
- Another condition states that persuasive argumentation should also be focused on explicitly linking the prevailing norms with other 'universal'

[325] Labonte, 162.

[326] This thesis relies on part of Labonte's framework, specifically on the explanation of resonance and its conditions, to understand the specifics of the discourse employed for persuasion. The conceptual framework of this thesis does not focus on other aspects of this framework, such as the measurement of the influence on policymaking.

[327] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

values concerning human rights and human dignity. This condition directly refers to crucial principles of climate justice, which implies that the NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC should be strongly focused on drawing the link between climate injustice and the violation of human rights.

- The third resonance condition states that the NGOs' discourse should make direct linkages between perpetrators and victims. In the context of climate justice advocacy, civil society NGOs' discourse should establish the dichotomy between those who are suffering and those who should be blamed for the suffering of vulnerable communities.
- The final condition refers to the specific solutions (actions) that are required to address the violation of moral principles and values. In the context of climate justice, this would refer to the implementation of climate policies that take into account the interests of the developing countries and vulnerable communities. In other words, NGOs should highlight solutions to the climate change crisis that are inclusive and fair towards those who suffer from climate injustice and who are excluded from the decision-making processes.

The above-outlined conditions, which have been developed based on Labonte's framework, indicate which aspects the NGOs' discourse should focus on in their undertaking to achieve a higher resonance when advocating for climate justice within the UNFCCC. Therefore, the resonance conditions to which NGOs seek to adhere for effective persuasion can be summarised in the figure below (Figure 1):[328]

[328] The sequence of the resonance conditions was modified to align with the conceptual framework and the empirical data presented in this study.

| **Original Resonance Conditions** (Humanitarian and human rights norms, Labonte's framework) | ***Adaptation for the Climate Justice Norm*** | **Adapted Resonance Conditions in the Climate Justice Norm** |
|---|---|---|
| 1) Providing credible and compelling evidence of mass atrocity crimes | *Maintaining focus on emphasising harm while shifting from atrocities to the effects of violation of climate justice principles* | 1) Providing credible and compelling evidence of negative effects caused by the ignorance of the rights of vulnerable communities |
| 2) Explicitly linking prevailing norms with 'universal' values concerning human rights and human dignity | *Highlighting connection to universal values while focusing specifically on climate-justice-related rights violations* | 2) Drawing explicit links between climate injustice and violation of human rights |
| 3) Making direct linkages between perpetrators and victims | *Adapting a perpetrator-victim dynamic to the violation of the climate justice norm context while maintaining clear attribution of responsibility* | 3) Establishing a dichotomy between those who suffer and those responsible for the suffering of vulnerable communities |
| 4) Making the case for appropriate use of force to restore peace when force is used inappropriately | *Transforming persuasion logic to focus on the promotion of the climate justice norm, requiring more rights for civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities* | 4) Making the case for the implementation of climate policies/solutions to the climate change crisis that are inclusive and fair towards those who suffer from climate injustice and are excluded from decision-making processes |

**Figure 1.** *Resonance conditions adapted in the context of climate justice norm advocacy*

If the logic of argumentation, understood as the discourse helping NGOs to persuade other actors,[329] is crucial in the norm emergence process, this presumably includes emotions, as discussed in the section presenting the theoretical background (see p. 71). Research explaining the role of emotions in international relations theorised that emotions are an inseparable part of the actors' discourse, thereby shaping beliefs and understandings.[330] This means that we have to look into discourse as something that is embedded with certain emotions, which inevitably affect the construction of a shared meaning: NGOs' discourse employed to persuade climate justice norms is also embedded with emotions. Thus, emotions can be understood as an integral part of the persuasion mechanism employed by NGOs to advocate for climate justice within the UNFCCC. This means that emotions function to ensure more resonant discourse. The conditions specified above allow for a more structured investigation of the emotional underpinings of NGOs' persuasion.

*Linking emotions and persuasion*

To conclude, the thesis seeks to explain the role of emotions in the climate justice norm advocacy by primarily relying on two general aspects: the conceptualisation of emotions in world politics, and explaining norm persuasion. The former focuses on the significance of emotions as a fundamental element in NGOs' argumentation for climate justice. Emotions are viewed as integral to the advocacy process, which influences how arguments are expressed. The second aspect refers to the way NGOs utilise emotional appeals to resonate with the international community, leveraging references to the common values and ideas to advocate for climate justice. In this way, the explanation seeks to include the emotional dimension in the persuasion mechanism employed by civil society NGOs to advocate for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC.

Based on the synthesis of these theoretical approaches, I define this conceptual framework as *emotive transformative persuasion*: it links emotions and norm persuasion in the context of justice claims in international politics. The framework describes the way in which *emotions* function as forces enabling the actors' *persuasion* for the climate justice norm, thereby *transforming* the prevailing system of injustices within the UNFCCC. Conceptualising the persuasion as *emotive* means that it is constituted by

[329] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.
[330] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

emotions that have a significant role: they issue a specific meaning, express an attitude, and produce certain consequential effects. In the context of this thesis, emotions function to construct climate justice as a norm, which challenges the *status quo* in the international climate cooperation framework, the UNFCCC, (i.e., domination of the developed countries). This conceptualisation relies on the social constructivist approach, thus theoretically linking assumptions of norm construction processes and emotions as forces contributing to such processes. Here, emotions are treated as forces that help to shape the understanding of 'what is right' (the norm) and its power to resist the prevailing injustices within a certain institutional setting.

This conceptualisation requires a methodological approach to emotions as forces embedded in the discourse employed for persuasion for the climate justice norm. Koschut's framework linking emotions, discourse, and power in IR provides a methodological framework of *Emotion Discourse Analysis* (EDA), emerging from the above-explained theoretical background and aligning with the developed concept.[331] Based on Labonte's framework, it is assumed that persuasion is implemented through the norm entrepreneurs' discourse (i.e., the logic of argumentation)[332] resonating with the international community (i.e., the persuasive discourse has to comply with certain conditions, which increases the possibility for it to resonate with the international community). Thus, the analysis seeks to examine NGOs' **emotion discourse** to understand how a shared understanding of climate justice is framed as morally right behaviour and **which emotions** allow NGOs to increase the *resonance* among the international community. The method of emotion discourse analysis is employed to identify specific emotions prevailing in this discourse and interpret them within the context of climate justice advocacy.

The scheme below (Figure 2) illustrates the conceptual framework explained in this chapter. It depicts how emotions underpin climate justice norm construction: it conceptualises civil society NGOs as norm entrepreneurs, whose discourse, and emotions embedded in it (the emotion discourse), contribute to constructing the climate justice norm; emotion discourse underpins the persuasion, that is, the mechanism through which civil society NGOs seek to encourage the international community into complying with this norm by resonating with the international community and already prevailing values (i.e., adhering to resonance conditions); within this concept,

[331] Koschut.

[332] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

specific emotions are invoked to build resonance with the international community, and to inform the emotional approaches of NGOs in climate justice advocacy. By employing this concept, the analysis seeks to reveal which emotions are invoked by norm entrepreneurs in the context of climate justice advocacy, and what emotional approaches of their advocacy they imply.

*Emotive transformative persuasion employed by NGOs to advocate for climate justice within the UNFCCC*




**Figure 2**. *Conceptual Framework of Emotive Transformative Persuasion in Climate Justice Advocacy by Civil Society NGOs within the UNFCCC*

# 3. METHODOLOGY

The analysis illustrates the application of the conceptual framework by focusing on two general steps, which were organised around the following questions: 1) Which emotions emerge in the NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC when they advocate for climate justice?; 2) How do these emotions in the NGOs' discourse help to promote climate justice as a norm with which other actors have to comply and thus shift the climate cooperation framework toward a just approach? The first question sought to identify the specific emotions that dominate in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC. The second step focused on uncovering the meaning of the identified emotions for climate justice norm emergence, that is, it sought to explain how they are employed to promote the climate justice norm.

The study has conducted emotion discourse analysis of documents combined with interviews with representatives from civil society NGOs. Discourse analysis and interviews are common methods used in research studying the role of emotions in world politics.[333] They especially "come to the fore when we emphasize the intentionality of the sender of emotional exchanges".[334] Emotions are difficult to empirically grasp and identify if analysed at the international level. However, researchers addressed this challenge and developed methodological tools that help to identify emotions and uncover their meaning in international relations.[335] Rather than focusing on their internal phenomenological perception and appraisal by individuals, emotions in world politics are studied through their representational and intersubjective articulation and communication within social spheres.[336] Scholars have developed methodological frameworks, such as emotion discourse analysis, allowing access to emotions through textual and verbal utterances.[337] This study also relies on interviews with representatives of civil

[333] Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'; Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

[334] Ilgit and Prakash, 'Making Human Rights Emotional: A Research Agenda to Recover Shame in "Naming and Shaming"'.

[335] Sangar and Clément, 'Researching Emotions in International Relations'; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 2018.

[336] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Understanding Emotions in World Politics: Reflections on Method'.

[337] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2018; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

society NGOs to gain a more internal perspective on the emotional underpinnings of their advocacy.

### 3.1. Emotion Discourse Analysis

Emotion discourse analysis allows us to interpret the meaning of emotions by revealing the emotionalising effects of texts. In other words, emotions are analysed via speech acts, which allows uncovering their power to transform beliefs and understandings. Emotion discourse analysis conceptualises emotions as embedded in the discourse, and provides methodological tools to analyse the role of emotions in world politics,[338] which includes NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. This section first justifies why this approach is suitable for analysing the role of emotions in the context of this thesis and explains how this method allows us to analyse emotions empirically; then, it elaborates on how the methodological strategies and tools are applied in the analysis in this thesis.

Emotion discourse analysis emphasises the social and collective nature of emotions, which aligns with constructivist explanations of norm emergence processes.[339] In other words, emotions here are not impulsive individual reactions but forces that manifest at a collective level and are shared through social interactions within certain institutional settings.[340] Studying emotions as forces that can construct understandings through the discourse aligns with the definition of norms as shared expectations about the appropriate behaviour.[341] In other words, if norms can be constructed through the discourse, emotions embedded in the discourse become constitutive features of these norms. In this way, emotions are conceptualised as underpinning forces of the norm emergence processes: they are features of a discourse that construct shared understandings of behaviour rules.

This method is suitable for this thesis for several reasons. First, it acknowledges the significant role of emotions in international politics by conceptualizing them as forces that shape the actors' understandings, beliefs,

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338 Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.

339 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998, 8; Keck and Sikkink, 'Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics', 13; Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017, 278.

340 Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 17.

341 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

and behaviour in international relations.[342] That is, it argues that emotions are a crucial element that cannot be ignored when analysing processes of international relations. Second, this position provides an approach to emotions that is helpful in addressing the problem set out in this thesis and that can be integrated within the theoretical approach explaining the NGOs' persuasion of new norms in international politics. The approach argues that the significant role of emotions in international politics can be analysed by focusing on the emotion discourse, defined as words, phrases, narratives, expressions, and representations that symbolically refer to emotion. Emotions here are understood as socially constructed representations of affects and feelings. Emotions are neither purely physiological states nor simple cognitive appraisals, but they are shaped by the societies and cultures in which they are embedded.[343] It also aligns with the previously explained concept of emotives, assuming that actors' language, displaying emotional expressions, produces certain political effects.

Last, emotion discourse analysis gives us methodological tools to identify emotions empirically in discourse and interpret their meaning within the specific context. While studies of emotions in politics are facing the challenge of how to empirically analyse emotions and grasp their meaning, the framework addresses this by providing specific strategies and linguistic tools that help to identify emotions in texts.[344] Emotion discourse analysis suggests two strategies to study emotions in discourse – interpretation and contextualisation. In these strategies, scholars have developed methodological tools to grasp emotions in the analysed discourse and uncover their meaning in a specific context.

Discourse can be 'emotional' in multiple ways, and therefore scholars may choose to analyse such a discourse as indicative, provocative, or invocative of emotions:[345]

1) Discourse as *indicative of emotion*: Offering evidence of and insight into the emotional state of its author and utterer. The assumption here is that discourse can be indicative of (an) affective experience and constitute emotional expression (e.g., direct pronouncements, 'I am happy', 'I am angry'; indirect forms, 'I want to rip his head off', 'I want to be left alone'). Indirect forms of emotion discourse are usually interpreted in relation to a

[342] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 4.
[343] Koschut, 4, 7.
[344] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.
[345] Hall, '"An Extremely Obnoxious and Illegal Case" – Three Approaches to Affect, Emotion, and Discourse in the Aftermath of the Zhuhai Incident'.

specific context, which reflects a broader understanding related to socially constituted patterns of affective experience.

2) Discourse as *provocative of emotion*: Examining discursive formulations for their potential to elicit emotional reactions by looking at the symbols, themes, and narratives they employ. In this case, discourse can, therefore, be read not just as evidence of emotional responses but also as constructed in ways meant to provoke emotion for political goals. For example, some events are narrated in a way that evokes emotions through linkages with already affectively salient nationalist themes, stories, and symbols.

3) Discourse as *invocative of emotion*: Focusing on the explicit deployment of emotional terms and the language of emotions to personal, social, or political effect. Actors invoke emotions when they insert claims about emotional states into discourse, whether by claiming, attributing, pronouncing, or labelling them. Such an approach seeks to explain how a particular emotional response comes to be politicised and treated as representative. For example, Hall explained how media, by purposively deploying specific emotional expressions in their discourse, invoked extreme indignation during the Zhuhai incident, reflecting the conflictual relations between China and Japan.

These types of emotion discourse can, and often do, overlap in practice.[346] For example, if analysis focuses on the discourse as indicative of specific emotions, it does not mean that such a discourse at the same time cannot provoke or invoke those emotions. Further, if analysis shows that the discourse invokes certain emotions for political goals, this means that it can also be indicative of these emotions.

The analysis in this thesis mainly approaches the discourse as indicative of certain emotions, although it does not imply that it denies the explained overlaps with other types of emotion discourse. I assume that this approach aligns well with the main goal of this thesis. First, it does not focus merely on uncovering the emotional states of the NGOs' representatives, which would refer to indicative emotion discourse. The thesis also avoids the assumption that this discourse is merely a strategy to provoke emotions in other actors, which would refer to provocative emotion discourse. It rather seeks to uncover how emotions in the NGOs' discourse become meaningful for the emergence of the climate justice norm, which refers to invocative emotion discourse. I also do not assume that emotions are merely a strategic tool invoked rationally

[346] Hall.

for political goals, as explained above. Here, they are an integral part of the climate justice norm advocacy, represented through the NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC.

Thus, the methodological approach of emotion discourse analysis is apt for analysing the emotional foundations of the NGOs' discourse employed to advocate for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC. It brings focus to emotions as crucial forces shaping understandings and beliefs in international relations through the actors' discourse. This means that the method suits the analysis of the construction of the climate justice norm: grounded in a social constructivist perspective, this method aligns with the foundational theoretical assumptions about norms being constructed through the discourse, but it adds an emotional dimension to this process. In the context of this thesis, this means that the climate justice norm is constructed through the NGOs' discourse, embedded with certain emotions that underpin the emergence of this norm within the UNFCCC.

This analysis focuses on the textual dimension of discourse, that is, this analysis does not seek to cover the non-verbal and visual dimensions of discourse. Appropriate texts were selected by looking for the discourse that would represent emotions invoked by grassroots movements within the UNFCCC, which are mainly represented by Climate Action Network (CAN). Certain actors were identified: observer organisations representing civil society, namely, environmental NGOs, Indigenous peoples' organisations, and youth NGOs. I acknowledge the variety of civil society NGOs operating within the CAN network, and significance of their unique perspectives, however, I assume general focus of this network on advocacy for climate justice remains the main criteria for this study. CAN focuses on "representing grassroot communities" and civil society interests. It centres its goals around the "needs of the most vulnerable, the most marginalised that protects nature".[347] CAN seeks to ensure equity and justice, poverty eradication, sustainable livelihoods and the protection of the rights of nature. CAN principles and actions strongly align with those of grassroots movements, whose discourse was identified as a significant factor in shaping climate justice.[348]

Therefore, texts produced by CAN and its members were selected as appropriate for this analysis (e.g., ECO newsletters, the civil society newsletter published daily at the UNFCCC events that reflect CAN's

[347] 'Building Power through Movements'.

[348] Kauffman, 'Hadden, Jennifer. 2015. Networks in Contention: The Divisive Power of Climate Change. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press'; Schlosberg and Collins, 'From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice', 1 May 2014.

perspective and position on the climate negotiations; and statements by representatives of the civil society NGOs in negotiations within the UNFCCC). The study also conducted interviews to gain an internal perspective of representatives of civil society NGOs.

### 3.2. Interview Analysis

As the thesis focuses on emotions from the perspective of civil society NGOs, semi-structured interviews were employed to ensure a flexible approach. Interviews were organised based on a few guiding questions, which were asked throughout the conversation (not necessarily following a strict sequence but rather by raising them while following up to certain reflections that the interviewees shared). Some questions focused on personal emotional experiences in relation to their engagement in advocacy, covering both their general feelings in relation to climate crisis in general and engagement in international frameworks. Another set of questions focused on feelings in relation to other actors, either fellow activists, governmental officials, or others within the international climate cooperation settings. These questions encouraged the interviewees to reflect on their feelings in relation to various actors, which can represent certain patterns that prevail in relation to their emotional experiences linked with other actors. The final set of questions invited the interviewees to reflect on their expressions of emotions in advocacy for climate justice. Insights on how and why they express certain emotions may uncover the patterns that emerge within the context in which they are advocating for climate justice.

- Civil society NGOs were approached via email after obtaining their contact information from their websites. The list of members of the Climate Action Network was employed to choose organisations relevant to this study. The snowball sampling technique was employed to recruit new interviewees, where the initial research participants were invited to suggest and provide contacts for additional potential participants. Table 2 provides the list of the interviewees' countries and the types of civil society NGOs:

**Table 2.** *List of interviewees' organisations and countries*

| **Organisation** | **Country** |
|---|---|
| *Environmental NGO* | France |
| *Environmental NGO* | Greece |
| *Indigenous peoples' organisation* | Honduras |
| *Environmental NGO* | Greece |

| Organisation | Country |
|---|---|
| *Youth NGO* | Lithuania |
| *Environmental NGO* | Poland |
| *Environmental NGO* | Argentina |
| *Environmental NGO* | Argentina |
| *Indigenous peoples' organisation* | Thailand |
| *Environmental NGO* | South Africa |

- Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of NGOs, which allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of emotional aspects within their climate advocacy. Questions for the interviews were focused on specific thematic areas, which would encourage the participants to share their reflections on the issues relevant to this study:

  1. Personal emotional experiences:
     1.1. Climate crisis in general;
     1.2. Climate activism and advocacy;
     1.3. Participation in international climate negotiations and COP.

  2. Emotions towards other actors within the context of climate advocacy and UNFCCC:
     2.1. Governmental officials;
     2.2. Representatives of civil society NGOs.

  3. Expression of emotions in advocacy for climate justice:
     3.1. How do emotions manifest during your meetings with officials?
     3.2. How do you express your feelings when advocating for your causes?

- The interviews adhered to all applicable academic ethical guidelines. Prior to the interviews, the participants were asked to sign a consent form in order to ensure their understanding and agreement to take part in the research.

The approach of the interviews was flexible, allowing the interviewees to elaborate on their feelings and the reasons behind them. Their reflections were linked with emotional expressions identified in other data, and analysed by maintaining focus on the aim of this thesis and theoretical assumptions, as previously explained.

It is crucial to draw attention to the significance of cultural and linguistic differences in emotions and their expressions through language. It is important to understand the nuances and differences in how people understand and express emotions depending on their different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.[349] For example, the list of emotions and feelings in the psychology literature centres around the English language, whereas there are other emotions and feelings that are unique to certain languages and cultures.[350]

I acknowledge the significance of cultural and linguistic differences in the analysis of emotions and their expressions; however, this thesis focuses on expressions in English as the main language for several reasons. First, in the context of international NGO advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC, English functions as a *lingua franca*. The English language becomes a shared space where norms and shared understandings are constructed. In this context, the specific cultural nuances of individual native languages become less central than the shared discourse within the English-focused institutional setting. Second, this thesis focuses on how emotions function within the climate justice advocacy discourse in the UNFCCC, rather than attempts to capture differences in the emotional experiences of individuals across cultures. The analysis focuses on collective emotional expressions that function within the advocacy discourse employed to persuade the international community. Furthermore, by building upon Ariffin and Koschut's conceptual frameworks, it can be assumed that emotions as constructs in advocacy can resonate independently of linguistic idiosyncrasies. By utilising emotives – emotions embedded in language that serve specific functions – the distinction between the cultural backgrounds of speakers can be less critical. The focus here is on engagement and the resonance elicited by the discourse rather than on the specific expressions of those emotions in a native tongue.

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[349] Barrett, 'Solving the Emotion Paradox: Categorization and the Experience of Emotion'; Barrett, 'The Theory of Constructed Emotion: An Active Inference Account of Interoception and Categorization'; Wierzbicka, 'Language and Metalanguage: Key Issues in Emotion Research'; Cowen et al., 'The Primacy of Categories in the Recognition of 12 Emotions in Speech Prosody across Two Cultures'; Laukka, Neiberg, and Elfenbein, 'Evidence for Cultural Dialects in Vocal Emotion Expression'; Elfenbein and Ambady, 'On the Universality and Cultural Specificity of Emotion Recognition'; Jack et al., 'Facial Expressions of Emotion Are Not Culturally Universal'.

[350] Barrett, 'How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain'.

Therefore, this thesis focuses on English as the main language without denying the significance of different emotional experiences depending on the cultural context. The thesis examines their collective expressions employed to resonate with a wider international community. Before elaborating on the specifics of analysis, the following sub-section explains the data and its collection process.

*Data collection process:*

More specifically, three sources provided data for this study:

1) **Summaries of the transcripts of COP negotiations** (Earth Negotiations Bulletin: independent reporting service on the United Nations environment and development negotiations) **(**Appendix A**)**. From this source, the data that represent the civil society NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC framework were collected:
   - In the search system, the search for relevant documents was implemented by using two criteria: 1) the UNFCCC framework was chosen as a type of negotiation; 2) the presence of civil society organisations was marked as a necessary condition.
   - The initial corpus contained 1340 documents. In each document, specific keywords were applied to identify expressions relevant to the study, that is, expressions by representatives of civil society NGOs. The keywords referred to: 1) civil society NGOs in general (*keywords*: environmental NGOs; ENGOs; youth; Indigenous peoples); or 2) main networks and organisations representing civil society NGOs (*keywords*: Climate Action Network; Climate Justice Now).
   - The collection of relevant expressions covered the time period from 1992 to 2022. It sought to cover all relevant expressions within the time period from the very beginning of civil society NGOs' engagement in COP until the most recent available negotiations.

2) **ECO Newsletters** (ECO) (Appendix A): An insider's perspective on the UNFCCC negotiations and the climate change movement. The newsletter reflects CAN's viewpoints on COP negotiations. As the official description of the ECO newsletter states, these texts represent the viewpoints of civil society on COP proceedings, directed at both their own community and governmental officials. It concentrates on the positions of civil society NGOs concerning the COP framework and the involved actors, producing the textual representation of their common discourse within this

institutional structure. ECO is published on a recurring basis throughout the year, and is issued every morning during the UNFCCC negotiations.

- ECO newsletters were retrieved from the official Climate Action Network archive on the website. They were obtained by applying the name of the newsletter (ECO) as a keyword in the search system.
- An initial corpus of 202 newsletters was obtained.

3) **Interviews with representatives of civil society NGOs**: The interviews aimed to gain a more in-depth view of the participants' emotions surrounding climate change negotiations and the reasons behind their specific feelings. The **interviews** provided an inside perspective on the emotional aspects of climate activists' engagement in climate negotiations with governmental officials and allowed for a more nuanced understanding of the emotional dynamic within this context. The interviews served as a third source of material, thus providing a more in-depth understanding of the context, along with a large set of documents.

In this thesis, emotion discourse analysis was applied to analyse the collected documents, and reflections from the interviews were used to understand the internal perspective of the surveyed representatives of NGOs.

*Emotion discourse analysis strategies: Interpretation and contextualisation*

Emotion discourse analysis suggests two approaches to understand emotions empirically in data analysis.[351] Based on these strategies, the analysis in this thesis consists of two steps that reflect each of the strategies:

**The interpretation strategy of emotion discourse analysis** is used to reveal the affective potential at the micro level of texts. Emotions can be expressed through a large range of linguistic features, and therefore, this strategy helps to study them in a structured way. This strategy identified three ways of how emotions can be communicated in discourse:

- Emotion terms, that is, direct references to emotions and feelings (e.g., I am *angry*, *anxious*, they were *happy*). They convey specific emotional feelings directly.
- Connotations, that is, indirect references to emotions with emotionally loaded terms (e.g., *genocide*, *killing*); or linguistic markers of time and intensity, which strengthen the emotional weight of the expression (e.g.,

[351] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 9.

*utterly, deeply*). Emotional connotations refer to the underlying value judgments or opinions embedded in words or phrases that express the emotional attitude of the speaker.

- Comparisons, metaphors, and analogies, that is, fundamental features of expressive language, often characterised by their figurative nature. They are symbolic linguistic tools used to illustrate an emotional state. Emotional comparisons and analogies create comparative frameworks by drawing on widely known historical references or by constructing mental images (e.g., *our house is on fire*). The point of metaphorical expressions is to enable certain things to be *said* and not just *thought*[352] (i.e., they shape meanings and understandings).

Therefore, by applying this strategy, the analysis should look for these linguistic features, thus showing that certain emotions are being communicated within the analysed discourse.

The analysis in this thesis applied an interpretation strategy to identify the dominating emotions in the NGOs' discourse in advocating for climate justice within the UNFCCC and interpret their meaning within this context. The analysis investigated which emotions are referred to in relation to the climate justice principles in the analysed data. To achieve this, the analysis looked for references to emotions that were expressed when speaking of any of the climate justice principles (see Table 1). Emotional expressions were traced to identify the dominant feelings in the analysed texts. It employed elements of emotion discourse analysis that explain how emotions can be identified in the texts, and looked for the following: 1) emotion terms directly referring to certain feelings; 2) connotations, intensifying linguistic markers that indirectly refer to certain feelings; 3) metaphors, comparisons, and analogies that refer to certain feelings. The way how emotions are expressed in discourse when speaking of climate justice was analysed by relying on specific linguistic features (i.e., ways of communicating emotions in discourse: emotion terms, connotations, metaphors, comparisons, and analogies) provided by the emotion discourse analysis method.[353]

A few definitions employed in the analysis should be clarified. *Emotional expressions* refer to words or combinations of words that convey a certain emotional state.[354] They were identified and mapped in the analysis that

[352] Edwards, 'Emotion Discourse'.

[353] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2018; Koschut, 'Appropriately Upset? A Methodological Framework for Tracing the Emotion Norms of the Transatlantic Security Community'.

[354] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2018.

covers *utterances* of civil society NGOs expressed within the UNFCCC framework, which are understood as expressions of ideas or feelings in spoken or written statements (e.g., utterances by representatives of civil society NGOs, as in summaries of transcripts of negotiations, Appendix A); also, *excerpts* from ECO newsletters, that is, short extracts from texts (Appendix A).

The analysed texts were coded by employing tools of emotion discourse analysis and linking them to persuasion and resonance. The elements of the framework were employed to develop a coding system that would allow for: a) the identification of certain emotions in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC, and b) an understanding of how the identified emotions help to persuade other actors to comply with the climate justice principles. The *MAXQDA* software was used to trace emotional expressions. The identified utterances were coded inductively by introducing codes that refer to various emotions (e.g., anger, hope, compassion, etc.). The emotions were identified based on two criteria for utterances coded as emotion:

1. They needed to refer to a certain emotion, that is, they needed to convey linguistic tools that are considered as a display of emotion in texts: *direct* (emotion terms and their derivates) and *indirect references* (connotations, metaphors, comparisons, analogies).[355]
2. They needed to refer to *climate justice*, that is, principles defined as the climate justice principles (see Table 1, p. 43).

First, the analysis looked for linguistic features of emotion discourse analysis emotion terms, connotations, comparisons, metaphors, and analogies (e.g., *we feel frustrated*; *it's enough!*; *the glimmer of hope*) that communicated various feelings. These linguistic features were traced within the collected data and structured as shown in the table (see Table 3): utterance (column 2) was attributed with either of the linguistic features of EDA (column 1), and a code referring to a feeling conveyed in the utterance is provided in column 4. To reduce the risk of subjective interpretation, the traced emotional expression was scrutinised with relevant definitions and explanations to provide further justification for attributing it to a certain feeling. The primary codes were identified by grouping feelings into categories based on their characteristics. Feelings were grouped into Indignation category when expressed in relation to unjust circumstances and social harm caused by the violation of climate justice principles, aligning with the definition of indignation as an anger-type emotion focused on social injustice. The hope category was introduced due to

[355] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017.

the dominance of hope references and was expanded to include feelings such as optimism, enthusiasm, and excitement, based on existing research linking these positive feelings with characteristics of hope related to future expectations and goals. For example, *frustration* and *outrage* both relate to *anger*; emotion terms referring to the suffering of climate change victims, emphasising the disadvantageous position of vulnerable communities, were categorised as references to *compassion*; *inspiration* and *excitement* both relate to *anticipation of a positive outcome in the future*. Positive emotion terms referring to hope, excitement, and enthusiasm were also identified in the initial analysis, which were expressed mostly when speaking of the future, progress, and capabilities to achieve climate justice. Based on this finding and the research explaining the emotion of hope, explaining its relation to the future, goals, and progress towards a positive outcome, these positive emotion references were grouped into the category of the emotion of hope. After recognising certain categories of feelings, they were examined based on their characterisation given in the literature on the identified feelings, psychology dictionary, and the *emotion typology* tool.[356] The identification of Indignation and Hope as dominant categories was further confirmed by examining their consistent presence across the data, contextual connection to climate justice, and coherence with their conceptual features.

**Table 3.** *Example of emotion discourse analysis*

| EDA Element | Citation | Source | Code |
|---|---|---|---|
| Emotion term | *While some practitioners and NGOs expressed **disappointment** at the lack of a greater level of detail in the agreed compromise text <…>* | Summaries of transcripts | Disappointment |
| Connotation | *<…> the irresponsibility of rich countries leading to '**climate wars**'.* | Summaries of transcripts | Anger |
| Emotion term | *And for us to keep **hope** about climate justice, it needs to send a strong signal that limiting warming to 1.5°C <…>* | ECO newsletters | Hope |

[356] https://emotiontypology.com/colophon/

| EDA Element | Citation | Source | Code |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogy | *ECO loves multilateralism, but sometimes it feels a bit* ***like Parties are spoiled children*** *that never get told off.* | ECO newsletters | Anger |
| Metaphor | ***'Flowers of hope':*** *The Moroccan Network for Environment and Sustainable Development…* <…> | ECO newsletters | Hope |
| Connotation | <…> *immorality for the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when children in the Global South are* ***dying now*** | Summaries of transcripts | Compassion |

The identification of the dominant emotions employed a qualitative approach based on the following criteria:

- Consistent presence across data sources of direct emotion terms, emotional connotations, metaphors/analogies, and linguistic intensifying markers. Or, recurrent terms and phrases: this criterion involves identifying specific utterances and phrases that appear frequently within the discourse, that is, the prevalence of linguistic features of the emotion discourse (emotion terms such as 'anger', 'hopeful', etc.).
- Contextual connection to the climate justice principles and the proposed solutions. It involves examining the regular co-occurrence of emotional patterns with specific actors and actions within the discourse.
- Coherence with conceptual features of certain emotions, that is, the identified emotions should be linked to their conceptual features based on the existing research on emotions.
- Grouping conceptually similar feelings: Identifying and grouping emotional expressions that refer to similar feelings (e.g., frustration and confusion can be grouped together as expressions of anger).

The first step of analysis describes and interprets these emotions in more depth (see pp. 114–146). To provide a more structured approach to this interpretation, two dimensions were employed to describe these emotions: their linguistic features; and their conceptual features. The dimension of linguistic features is included to list the evidence showing

that a certain emotion is expressed in the text (through linguistic components). The dimension of conceptual features is included to link the identified linguistic components to characteristics of indignation and hope with the objective to interpret their meaning.

The analysis does not deny the presence or significance of other emotions and feelings, but rather identifies indignation and hope as the dominant emotion categories based on a variety of emotional expressions in the analysed texts. **Emotion categories** are "elements in situated discourse that provide an analytic purchase both on how discourse works, in detail, and in context, and on the functionally oriented design of verbal categories." They imply that "something more cognitive and analytical is going on".[357] Emotion categories are not graspable merely as individual feelings or expressions, and their discursive deployment is not reducible to a kind of detached, cognitive sense-making. The analysis looked for a **'structure of feeling'** (i.e., a set of emotions that show a regular pattern) built into the analysed texts which constrains and compels the affective experience.[358] The structure of feeling, identified in the discourse, helps to interpret the meaning of these emotions within the broader context, that is, to show how they shape certain understandings or interactions among actors. For example, a sympathy/anger structure of feeling may be invoked in the discourse to depict certain actors as enemies (outsiders), and others as members of *our* group (insiders). In this way, expressions of hope and indignation were analysed in more depth by linking the fundamental features of these emotions to the specific context of the texts.

Therefore, the first step of analysis relied on the interpretation strategy of emotion discourse analysis, which identified indignation and hope as the prevailing emotions in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC (see Figure 3, p. 116). The analysis then proceeded by applying the contextualisation strategy. After identifying indignation and hope as the dominant emotions, the analysis focused on these specific emotions and patterns of their expressions in the context of NGOs' climate justice advocacy (see Figure 5, p. 144). While the interpretation approach inductively looked for different emotional expressions without any pre-determined categories, the contextualisation approach proceeded by specifically focusing on indignation and hope, which were identified as dominant emotions.

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[357] Edwards, 'Emotion Discourse'.

[358] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2018; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'; Koschut, 'Appropriately Upset? A Methodological Framework for Tracing the Emotion Norms of the Transatlantic Security Community'.

The **contextualisation strategy of emotion discourse analysis** shifts attention to a broader sociocultural context within which emotional expressions are situated.[359] Here, the analytical focus moves "from tracing the meaning of single or multiple emotion words to interpreting and contextualising their meaning and effects by looking at how these expressions are directed at and resonate with particular audiences".[360] This strategy is used to show how "emotional expressions are directed at and resonate with particular audiences".[361]

After identifying and interpreting the dominant emotions (indignation and hope), the analysis applied a contextualisation strategy to see how these feelings become important in shaping the understanding of climate justice as a 'morally right' approach to climate cooperation. It looked into how emotional expressions of hope and indignation are directed toward particular actors to uncover the patterns that are significant for the construction of the climate justice norm. The patterns of emotional expressions in the analysed texts were identified by focusing on the following aspects: the target of emotional expressions (whether emotions were directed towards specific actors, e.g., governmental officials, developed countries; institutional structures, e.g., the UNFCCC framework, negotiation processes; or particular principles and issues, e.g., loss and damage, human rights); contextual factors (examining how emotional expressions related to specific events (e.g., COP meetings), issues (e.g., establishment of a Loss and Damage fund), or broader circumstances within climate negotiations. These aspects set the stage for a further contextualisation of emotional expressions, as they focused on how emotional expressions target specific actors, and how they portray these actors or certain events in a way that increases resonance within the international community.

There are a few ways of contextualising emotions:

- *Emotional othering*: How emotions are used to create distinctions between *us* and *them*, and how emotional connotations are associated with different groups.
- *Stigmatisation/Naming and Shaming*: How emotions allow for punishing moral transgressions and creating emotional barriers between the offender and the punisher. It involves naming and shaming as a discursive practice based on the offender's inability to correct their behaviour without external pressure.

[359] Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics', 9.
[360] Koschut, 10.
[361] Koschut, 10.

- *Emotional narratives*: How storytelling is used to convey and shape the emotional lives of people, for example, through culture and dramatic narratives of tragedy and triumph, calling on national communities for collective action as a moral imperative.
- *Intertextuality of emotions*: The ways in which emotional expressions are quoted, appropriated, or criticised across different texts. It emphasises that emotions have a history and focuses on emotions expressed in other culture-specific and/or historical discourses.
- *Performativity and interpellation of emotions*: How emotions are constructed and used to influence identities, with reference to identification with certain ideologies.
- *Non-verbal/Non-linguistic forms of emotion discourse*: How emotions are expressed through non-verbal cues like gestures, sounds, and images. It looks at how non-linguistic forms of emotion discourses help to produce persisting and shifting meanings and ideologies that underpin power structures.

The second step of the analysis, thus, sought to explain how dominant emotions, identified in the first part of the analysis, become important in persuasion for the climate justice norm. The analysis viewed how they function in this context in a way that allow NGOs to make their persuasion resonant within the international community (i.e., that is, resonance conditions that norm entrepreneurs seek to adhere to (p. 91).[362]

Thus, the analysis initially identifies and interprets emotions prevailing in the NGOs' discourse by looking for direct emotion terms, connotations, and metaphors in the discourse, and then contextualising these within broader patterns of emotional expression. The analysis then uncovers how these emotional expressions enable NGOs' persuasion for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC. The analysis first took an inductive approach to identify certain emotions as crucial in the analysed discourse, and uncovered a primary landscape of emotions prevailing in the gathered data. As explained in the first section on emotion discourse (p. 96), the analysis initially focused on identifying references to various emotions, and mapping them into certain categories based on their similarities and differences (as explained in the section discussing the interpretation strategy). The analysis proceeded by identifying certain patterns of indignation-hope expressions in the NGOs' discourse (see Figure 5, p. 144) and understanding their meaning in the advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. The second step of analysis sought to further contextualise the identified indignation-hope expressions

[362] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

within the context of climate justice advocacy. To achieve this objective, this part of the analysis focused on the persuasion and resonance specifics: it analysed how expressions of indignation and hope function to make the NGOs' discourse more resonant (i.e., adhere to resonance conditions, see Figure 1, p. 91). The analysis part includes some utterances exemplifying these arguments, while a more comprehensive list of examples is provided in Appendix B.

### *Reflection on the Researcher's Role*

While conducting this research, I reflected on my role as a researcher to critically evaluate both my prior assumptions and the potential attitudes of the interviewees toward me. I observed a few things that seemed to be important throughout the process of my research.

As for my personal interest in this topic, even before my PhD studies, I started with initial curiosity about the meaning of emotions in international relations. I noticed that emotions are highly discussed in relation to the climate change crisis, by mostly focusing on anxiety and individuals' mental health; or, on the contrary, studying emotions as communication tools can allow one to 'manipulate' by provoking their emotions to increase support for certain policies or political parties. I could not stop but wonder about the role of emotions on a more structural level, which encouraged and prompted me to turn to international climate cooperation frameworks. I quickly noticed that climate justice is becoming increasingly important within this context, inevitably highlighting the role of grassroots movements and vulnerable communities. I also started to read and understand in depth the complexities they have to face while engaging in these institutional frameworks. Although I was familiar with the literature on social movements, including those related to climate change, I felt that their participation in international climate negotiations is a different context to study than that related to social movements in general. While reading more extensively about climate justice and its main principles, I saw connections and links within broader norms, such as the inclusivity norm, studied especially within the field of peace-building and conflict resolution. It increased my curiosity further as I noticed this significant link to the general processes of international politics.

In relation to my personal background and the climate change global challenge, as a PhD student coming from the Eastern part of Europe, I understood that I am unable to directly comprehend the harm and negative effects caused by climate change. The geographical location where I am residing is considered to be safe in comparison to those where citizens are actively advocating for climate justice, including communities from the

Global South or Indigenous peoples. Lithuania is also a member of the EU, which is represented within the UNFCCC under the umbrella of the developed countries, bearing responsibility for the negative effects caused to the developing countries and vulnerable communities. I thus understood that I am in an advantageous position when reflecting on the negative effects of both the climate change crisis in general and the lack of climate justice within international institutions. I constantly tried to empathise with the stories told by my interviewees, although I knew that I would never be able to understand their experiences and inner motivation to get involved in advocacy for climate justice. When some of the interviewees praised the significance of the topic and expressed gratitude for studying it, I felt a huge responsibility to reflect on their stories transparently. Crucially, with every further interview, I found their emotional experience more and more important, which increased this responsibility and interest in the topic. However, I continuously critically reflected on my personal perspective to remain involved only at a level that focuses on the significance of certain emotions and their functioning within persuasion for climate justice within the UNFCCC.

My role in conducting the interviews was less important in relation to other types of data collection, such as from ECO newsletters or summaries of the transcripts of negotiations. I tried to link the observations from different resources, with interviews used for a more in-depth understanding of the context behind the emotional expressions found in NGOs' communication documents such as newsletters or statements in official meetings. It strengthened my determination to approach emotions by focusing on their more complex role than just as manipulative tools employed in the advocates' rhetoric. The interviews allowed me to understand that, behind the emotional appeals expressed in the public communication texts of NGOs, there are significant emotional experiences and stories driving those appeals. I therefore focused on uncovering this complex role of emotions by applying theoretical assumptions and frameworks, moving well beyond the narrow(ed) analysis of emotional communication.

Therefore, continuous reflection on my role as a researcher during this process played an important role when seeking a less subjective interpretation of the data. It encouraged me both to critically evaluate my personal position and to navigate its potential effects on the analysis. The subjectiveness in the interpretative approach of the research remains a challenge, yet the critical reflection of my role as a researcher, and the responsibility understood within this role, helped me to navigate this subjectivity.

# 4. ANALYSIS

This chapter presents an analysis of the emotions that emerge in the discourse of the civil society NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. It seeks to explain how certain emotions found in the NGOs' discourse become important forces underpinning the process of persuasion for climate justice. The analysis is divided into two main parts: the first part focuses on identifying the dominant emotions in the NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC; the second part looks at how these emotions underpin persuasion for climate justice norm (i.e., how emotions are employed in a way that enhances resonance by helping to adhere to resonance conditions).

The analysis relied on interpretation and contextualisation strategies provided by the emotion discourse analysis method. The first strategy of EDA – interpreting the emotions – is employed to reveal the affective potential of the analysed data by looking for specific ways through which certain feelings are communicated: emotion terms, emotional connotations, metaphors, comparisons, and analogies. By relying on these linguistic characteristics, the analysis inductively looked for emotional references that would reflect certain emotions; additionally, it looked for certain patterns in how the dominant emotions are employed in the NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC to persuade the international community to accept climate justice as a norm. The second part, focusing on the contextualisation strategy in EDA, looked into how emotions are employed within the context of climate justice advocacy. Here, the analysis looked into how indignation and hope expressions are employed in a way that helps to resonate with the international community (e.g., by portraying actors as immoral, or, conversely, as promising a positive future outcome). In the second part, the analysis investigates how expressions of indignation and hope are linked to the resonance conditions explained in the previous chapter (Figure 1, p. 91). In this way, the analysis seeks to uncover specific emotions functioning within *emotive transformative persuasion*, (p. 94), and to show how these emotions function as forces underpining NGOs' persuasion for climate justice.

The chapter is organised into two main sections with several subsections each. The first section focuses on explaining the dominant emotions – indignation and hope – identified in the NGOs' discourse, with subsections focusing on each of these emotions. It is summarised by presenting the hope-indignation nexus and patterns of their emotional expressions observed in the analysed texts. The second section elaborates on how these emotions help NGOs to persuade other actors into accepting climate justice norms by looking at how the dominant emotions correspond with resonance conditions. It identified certain functions that hope and indignation perform within the mechanism of the NGOs' persuasion for climate

justice within the UNFCCC, as well as certain advocacy approaches based on the indignation-hope nexus.

### 4.1. Indignation and Hope: Dominant Emotions in NGOs' Climate Justice Discourse

The NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC contains a variety of emotional expressions. Indignation and hope emerge as the dominant emotion categories, containing a complex map of these actors' feelings. The identification of these emotions as dominant ones does not seek to deny the presence of other feelings – but rather implies that these emotions are crucial in their discourse, employed to advocate for climate justice in this institutional setting.

The initial steps of analysis find references to various emotions, such as anger, hope, frustration, disappointment, and confusion (see Figure 3, p. 116). Generally, each of them reflects the emotional tension that the NGOs' discourse represents: it strikes a balance between expressions of positive (e.g., hope, compassion) and negative (e.g., anger, frustration, sadness) emotions.[363] More specifically, NGOs mostly refer to anger or similar feelings (frustration, outrage, confusion, disappointment, shock, surprise, madness), and hope or feelings implying hope (e.g., optimism, excitement, enthusiasm). Based on the identified references, the context and specifics of how they are expressed, and the research explaining emotions, the analysis identifies indignation and hope as the dominant emotion categories in the NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC.

The analysis approached emotions as integral components of discursive practices and shifts away from an exhaustive list of emotions given in psychology studies.[364] Instead, it looked for a complex set of feelings that can be attributed to certain emotions as being the *master*, that is, dominant, emotions in the discourse.[365] Although implicit references reflect the anger in the NGOs' emotion discourse, the context and specifics of how they are expressed convey indignation rather than anger *per se*. The dominant emotion categories were extricated by identifying and grouping recurring linguistic elements that convey emotions in the analysed data, and by relying on the criteria explained in the methodology (see p. 108).

The graph below (Figure 3) presents a visualisation of the dominant emotions identified in the NGOs' climate justice advocacy discourse, analysed based on transcripts of negotiations and newsletters.

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[363] I do not seek to rigidly differentiate between negative and positive emotions in terms of their produced political effects. Rather, this distinction refers to a complex emotional state, representing negative feelings towards the prevailing situation, and positive feelings towards expected change (please also see Ariffin, 2015).

[364] Ekman, 'Basic Emotions'.

[365] Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', 2017; Koschut, 'The Power of Emotions in World Politics'.




**Figure 3.** *References to emotions identified in the analysis of documents*

Indignation is different from anger, as it focuses on social rather than personal harm, and refers to systemic injustices as well as the need to address them.[366] This means that the indignation category includes anger-related feelings, which are expressed by emphasising structural injustices and the necessity to address them. Hope emerges as another dominant emotion category, as evidenced by a reliance on references to this emotion or feelings that indirectly imply hope (e.g., optimism expressed in relation to the future, excitement or enthusiasm about the potential outcomes).[367] These emotional expressions are observed not only in ECO newsletters and transcripts of negotiations. Representatives of civil society NGOs in their interviews also referred to hope or anger (in relation to structural injustices and social harm caused by climate change) as the main feelings, when reflecting upon their engagement in advocacy within the UNFCCC.

Therefore, the analysis identified indignation and hope as the dominant emotion categories, which are explained in depth in the context of NGOs' climate justice advocacy in the following sections. To support this argument, each section initially characterises these emotions based on their main features, and then describes how these features manifest in the context of this analysis based on their linguistic and conceptual characteristics:

- Linguistic features refer to the specific words, phrases, and language elements used to express and represent emotions in the text (e.g., linguistic features of indignation include verbs conveying anger). In this category, the analysis seeks to identify recurring words, phrases, and grammatical structures that express hope and indignation.
- Conceptual features refer to fundamental features of a certain emotion, that is, the core characteristics and components of the emotion defined in the relevant literature (e.g., hope can be characterised by the desire for a positive outcome). For conceptual features, the analysis identified recurring patterns through which indignation and hope are expressed (e.g., social harm caused by climate injustice).

[366] Miceli and Castelfranchi, 'Anger and Its Cousins'; Neblett, 'Indignation'; 'Indignation'; 'Definition of INDIGNATION'; Jasper, 'Constructing Indignation: Anger Dynamics in Protest Movements'.

[367] Alarcon, Bowling, and Khazon, 'Great Expectations: A Meta-Analytic Examination of Optimism and Hope'; Vogelaar and van Dijk, 'The Appraisal Patterns and Response Types of Enthusiasm: A Comparison with Joy and Hope'; 'Hope'.

### 4.1.1. Indignation

*Characterising indignation*

Indignation is often conflated with anger as they have some similar features.[368] However, indignation is a distinct feeling with its own specific characteristics.[369] Indignation is defined as a form of anger triggered by unjust circumstances. It is more than just a reactive emotion of anger, and it can be characterised by a sense of righteous anger and a desire to see the justice served.[370]

The research emphasises that there is a lack of distinction between anger-related emotions – such as indignation and resentment – that differ in terms of their beliefs, goals and action tendencies, and moral claims implied. As explained, "while sharing a common core, they are distinguishable from one another because they comprise non-overlapping belief-goal compounds".[371] Although these feelings belong to the same 'emotion family', they are not identical in their eliciting conditions and action tendencies. Both anger and indignation have a moral dimension (i.e., someone did something bad), but the difference is that, for anger, the action is personal (*you* did something bad *to me*) while indignation reflects bad action in a more general sense, for example, harm to society (Figure 4).

| | Elicitor perceived harm | Elicitor perceived wrong | Elicitor norm violation | Target efficient cause | Goal harm | Goal punish | Goal get even | Goal penalize |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | × suffered by oneself | – | – | × any cause | × | – | – | – |
| R | – | × suffered by oneself | – | × if held responsible | × | × | × | – |
| I | – | × suffered by anybody | × | × if held responsible | × | – | – | × |

*Note*. Minus signs indicate that the elicitor/target/goal is not necessarily implied in the emotion under consideration. Multiplication signs indicate that the elicitor/target/goal is implied in that emotion.

**Figure 4.** *Anger (A), resentment (R), and indignation (I): Elicitors, targets, and triggered goals*

*Source*: Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2019.

[368] Miceli and Castelfranchi, 'Anger and Its Cousins'; 'Indignation'.
[369] Miceli and Castelfranchi, 'Anger and Its Cousins'.
[370] Miceli and Castelfranchi, 18–21.
[371] Miceli and Castelfranchi, 5.

With regard to resentment, indignation is focused on objective justice, while resentment seeks subjective justice or revenge. Indignation is more 'detached' than resentment in the sense that it is more focused on social harm. Resentment calls for subjective justice or revenge, while indignation calls for objective justice. In fact, indignation is often focused on a social rule being violated, or standards being harmed, that is, it is elicited by norm violations. The indignant actor is concerned about justice and norm compliance, which elicits an urge to signal the wrongdoing to protect the community against the violator. An important feature here becomes its relation to moral goodness: to feel indignant is conceived to be a key constituent of moral goodness and moral worth.[372] Thus, indignation can be directed at the situations, contexts, institutions, and systemic features and practices of societies in which moral wrongs and injustices are embedded.

A disposition to indignation is related to other important constituents of moral goodness: feeling (other-regarding) indignation over injustices suffered by others. The indignant actor acknowledges the violations of the rights of others and their suffering.[373] Action motivated by indignation aims at repairing or restoring the social or moral order disrupted by the offense. The offense: a) is conditioned by systemic situational factors, and b) involves not merely individual agents operating independently, but rather a pattern of interconnected systems and practices. The recognised offense then leads to political actions that seek to correct not the wrong directly but the institutions, structures, and systems permissive or constitutive of that wrong. Thus, indignation becomes crucial in studying norm violations,[374] with its focus on social justice and inspired actions to address these injustices.

Based on the above-explained characteristics, indignation is related to anger as a specific form of this emotion. However, it includes a more complex set of feelings related to injustice, social harm (of impersonal nature), and violation of rules. Indignation is, therefore, a negative emotional response triggered by an offense to the sense of justice; it is a reaction to perceived injustices or breaches of moral expectations. It involves the perception of an event or action as unjust and can motivate individuals to act against injustice.[375] Since indignation is defined as a form of anger, it can be expressed through anger-related feelings, for example, through frustration, disappointment, or anger itself. To specifically reflect indignation, these

[372] Neblett, 'Indignation'.
[373] Neblett.
[374] Minner, 'From Indignation to Norms against Violence in Occupy Geneva: A Case Study for the Problem of the Emergence of Norms'.
[375] Mihai, 'Negative Emotions and Transitional Justice'.

feelings need to be expressed in relation to the offense that is conditioned by systemic situational factors.

Therefore, a few features allow us to identify indignation in the analysed texts. First, there must be references to anger or similar feelings when speaking of social harm and structural injustice. Additionally, expressions have to focus on justice, social (rather than personal) harm, blame attribution, and actions seeking systemic change (addressing injustice). The link between the explained characteristics and expressions found in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice suggests that indignation is invoked through this discourse. As shown below, it contains a variety of expressions referring to anger or similar feelings, which are expressed when highlighting social harm caused because of climate injustice. The NGOs' expressions also attribute blame and responsibility to specific actors, especially the developed countries. Last, they promote actions that address unjust behaviour by emphasising the need to comply with the climate justice principles. Thus, the NGOs' discourse is embedded with indignation rather than merely anger, as a different and more complex feeling, reflecting the focus on social harm and addressing systemic injustice.

The next part presents evidence of indignation in the analysed texts. It highlights how certain characteristics of indignation are identified in NGOs' expressions through examples from the analysed texts of the following:

a) References to anger-related feelings;
b) Focus on justice, social rather than personal harm, blame attribution, and actions seeking systemic change (addressing injustice).

*Features of Indignation in the Analysed Texts*

Indignation is inferred from the emotional expressions referring to anger identified in the analysis, characteristics defining indignation, and examining the identified emotional expressions within the characteristics of indignation. After the analysis identified a variety of anger-related emotional expressions, indignation was inferred based on the specific characteristics of this feeling that were recognised in the analysed data.

*a) References to anger-related feelings*

The data show that representatives of NGOs often express anger-related feelings, that is, they refer to a variety of feelings that imply anger or are linked to the emotion of anger. Feelings such as frustration, outrage, or anger seem

to emerge as prevailing emotional states in both activists' reflections on their engagement in international climate negotiations and in the appeals for climate justice employed in their advocacy within the UNFCCC. Additionally, representatives often refer to disappointment, which is expressed when speaking of unachieved expectations to comply with the climate justice principles, highlighting caused harm, or the difficulties in addressing systemic injustice related to international climate cooperation. Table 4 presents some examples from the analysis that refer to anger-related feelings, along with their definitions. The table is followed by a more in-depth explanation of the relevant examples and their meaning within the context of this study.

**Table 4.** *Anger-related feelings identified in the analysis*

| **Emotion** | **Explanation** | **Examples** |
|---|---|---|
| Frustration | The feeling of being upset or annoyed as a result of being unable to change or achieve something. The key in frustration is that it happens when you are trying to achieve something but you run into problems. (Synonyms: annoyance, dissatisfaction, failure, grievance, irritation, resentment) | *'After a frustrating series of negotiations leading to bland compromises <…>'* |
| Outrage | Grossly offensive to the sense of right and decency, that is, if you describe something as outrageous, you are emphasising that it is unacceptable or very shocking (Synonyms: shocking, disgraceful, horrible, inhuman) | *'Even more outrageous is that they are set to spend almost $1 trillion in the next eight years on new gas and oil mining, <…> have severe repercussions on the climate and our lives.'* |
| Madness | Enraged, greatly provoked or irritated. (Synonyms: angry, enraged, furious, indignant) | *'<…> most of the time I feel mad and furious.'* |
| Disappointment | The feeling that something or someone is not what you were hoping they would be, that is, crushing your hope or aim for something you wanted. | *'ECO is disappointed by the push and pull tactics in the negotiation rooms <…>'* |

| Emotion | Explanation | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| | (Synonyms: blow, defeat, disaster, failure, dismay, sorrow) | |
| Anger | A strong feeling of being upset or annoyed because of something wrong or bad: the feeling that makes someone want to hurt other people. (Synonyms: antagonism, displeasure, fury, indignation, rage) | *'Youth representatives expressed outrage and anger at the lack of progress in talks, arguing that if developed countries do not take the lead in combating climate change it would represent the most unconscionable act in the history of humanity.'* |

Expressions of anger-related feelings were identified by finding direct references, such as emotion terms (e.g., *angry*, *frustrated*, *disappointed*), metaphors or comparisons, and indirect references (e.g., *nervous laughter*, *genocide*), which refer to these feelings. For example, the interviewees referred to such feelings in their reflections on climate advocacy:

*'I think it's* ***frustrating****… I mean, they're talking about the European Green Deal <…> It's… it's* ***frustrating****. I mean, yeah… we're searching for oil, but we are 'emission-free'.* ***Like how? Yeah****…'; 'It's the* ***disappointment****…'; 'So yeah, sometimes* ***I feel disappointed*** *<…> most of the time* ***I feel mad and furious.****'* (Interviewee 3)

'*I was a bit* ***disappointed*** *the first time I went to one of those meetings.* ***A bit disappointed? No… a lot! I was really disappointed****…'; 'I understand that's necessary, but I was* ***so frustrated****… nothing really happened after 15 days of the whole world meeting together.'; '<…> but the main emotions for me were hope on the one hand and* ***frustration*** *on the other.'* (Interviewee 7)

*'We felt like, you know,* ***we're not going to take your s*** anymore'***, said one of the representatives of an environmental NGO when reflecting on the governmental officials' unfulfilled promises in relation to the establishment of the loss and damage fund. The concept of loss and damage is closely linked to climate justice because it highlights the disproportionate burden of climate change on vulnerable countries that have contributed the least to greenhouse

gas emissions but are most affected by the consequences.[376] Scientific evidence is often employed by the advocating parties such as the developing countries and NGOs to justify the need for this compensation mechanism. However, the moral obligation of the developed countries remains a crucial pillar in this issue.[377] The successful establishment of a dedicated Loss and Damage Fund at COP 27 represents a significant breakthrough for these NGOs, marking a culmination of their advocacy efforts. While the precise extent of their influence on this specific outcome remains a subject for further research, the institutionalisation of loss and damage within the UNFCCC marks a critical step towards achieving climate justice. The interviewee explained that the representatives of civil society NGOs are used to being disappointed by the governmental officials who were delaying loss and damage issues for a long time and engage in *talk-shops* rather than real actions (e.g., '*their blah blah blah*'). Her insights referred to strong disappointment, intertwined with frustration and anger which she felt as a result of her decade-long experience in COP negotiations.

Strong frustration and disappointment are also expressed by representatives of Indigenous peoples' organisations. For example, an interviewee shared a story about a meeting with a government official, which she found insulting. The governmental official assumed that she, as a representative of the Indigenous peoples' community, did not have reading skills and was not able to read the document on which she was supposed to present her insights:

*'When we were at the table, trying to talk around all these issues, they told me that I need to read. I mean, "you have to read the document. You need to find someone to read that document for you". <…> they tried to tell me that I didn't know how to read and that I didn't know how to really talk about it. That I didn't understand what was written there <…> and I was like,* ***"No! I mean it in every single way! And I know how to read! So you don't have to come to the table to tell me how to read!"*** *'*

Although not explicitly naming specific emotions, such experiences and the way the interviewees elaborate on them refer to anger-related feelings and disappointment, emerging in their reflections on injustice related to climate

[376] Lefstad and Paavola, 'The Evolution of Climate Justice Claims in Global Climate Change Negotiations under the UNFCCC', n.d.; Gach, 'Normative Shifts in the Global Conception of Climate Change'.

[377] Nations, 'Loss and Damage'.

cooperation. In other words, representatives express a variety of anger-related feelings when reflecting on the following:

- general injustices within the climate cooperation setting (e.g., UNFCCC as a state-centric institution which does not leave space for a totally different approach to climate cooperation advocated by the Indigenous communities);
- governmental officials who do not have skills or do not understand the urgency of the climate change crisis;
- their personal experiences in which they felt unfairly treated.

Similar feelings emerge in ECO newsletters and appeals by civil society NGOs in the transcripts of negotiations, especially focused on the climate justice principles. Examples from ECO newsletters and transcripts of negotiations also reveal that anger-related feelings are centred around general injustices within the climate cooperation setting, certain policies and decisions that are perceived as violating the rights of vulnerable communities, and governmental officials or certain parties (states) who/which act unfairly:

'*Even more **enraging**? We now learned there are 600 fossil fuel lobbyists roaming the venue – 25% more than at last year's COP. It is **outrageous** that civic spaces remain severely restricted while those **destroying** the planet are being welcomed and courted in a climate conference.'* (ECO-11.11.2022)

*'This is why today, at the Loss and Damage and Adaptation Day, we are **again shouting**: Stop this **Climate Madness** and Pay up for Loss and Damage!'* (ECO-08.11.2021)

Interjections of *shouting* and expressions such as *enraging* (i.e., to cause someone to become very angry) and *outrageous* (i.e., shocking and morally unacceptable) display anger-related feelings, again emphasising a crucial pillar of climate justice – the loss and damage mechanism.

*'There's a lot to be **disappointed** about when it comes to the climate finance negotiations taking place at COP 27. In particular, the **narrow focus of heads of state** and their preferred corporate partners defining and designing climate finance mechanisms. This means that they **promote false solutions** through carbon market schemes supporting misplaced renewable energy development and misleading net-zero initiatives. These **false solutions** continue to impinge upon the rights of Indigenous Peoples and facilitate **land theft** and displacement of Indigenous Peoples.'* (ECO-12.10.2022)

In such appeals, disappointment is expressed through negative connotations, such as *false solutions* and *land theft*, which refer to a violation of the climate justice principles related to the rights of Indigenous peoples.

Disappointment, anger, and frustration are also referred to indirectly through metaphors, analogies, and comparisons, for example: '*What these **drongos fail to understand** is that there's no economy on a dead planet. Do the right thing; sign up, pledge, and announce plans – for a renewable future. **Strewth!***' (ECO-06.11.2021-1). The slang term 'drongos' is used to refer to "a stupid or slow-witted person",[378] therefore employed as an insult that expresses anger-related feelings.[379] The interjection '*Strewth*' is an expression of surprise and dismay,[380] where dismay refers to being unhappy or disappointed.[381] Indirect references, specifically, negative connotations with negatively loaded affective meanings (e.g., *genocide*, *criminals*, *gaslight us*), are also identified in utterances such as these:

'*Yet, in every negotiation, rich countries **gaslight us**. They've claimed that loss and damage are 'under' adaptation. <…> This reinvention of reality is designed to make us question our own sanity. **L&D is not (the hallucinogenic) LSD**. **We're exposing your refusal to seriously tackle vulnerable countries' needs.***' (ECO-10.12.2018-7)

'*The **obfuscating and delaying tactics** of the US, in particular, are designed to ensure we get nothing. Other rich countries – the EU, Norway, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada – must stand apart from the US. It is **not acceptable to continue to hide behind this climate criminal.***' (ECO-10.12.2018-7)

'*These busybodies are out here **greenwashing and promoting false solutions** geared towards allowing big polluters to continue business as usual – pillaging Indigenous lands and waterways, all while making record-breaking **profits off the genocide of our peoples and lands.***' (ECO-12.11.2022)

The term 'gaslight' also carries a negative connotation, as it is defined as a psychological manipulation of a person, usually over an extended period, that causes the victim to question the validity of their own thoughts and

[378] https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/drongo
[379] Gabriel, 'An Introduction to the Social Psychology of Insults in Organisations'.
[380] https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/strewth
[381] 'Dismay'.

perception of reality.[382] Besides the above-presented negative connotations, metaphors and comparisons can also be identified in these appeals. For example, the references to LSD, a powerful drug, and its hallucinogenic effects, are employed to emotionalise the effects of appeals, emphasising the importance of the Loss and Damage issue (L&D) and tackling the vulnerable countries' needs.

*b) Focus on justice, social rather than personal harm, blame attribution, and actions seeking systemic change (addressing injustice)*

While the identified anger-related expressions, such as frustration, madness, outrage, and disappointment, are related to the emotion of anger, the references to the climate justice aspects imply indignation. As explained above, indignation is an anger-type emotion that responds to injustice, especially social rather than personal.[383] It is defined as the feeling when someone's action goes against your moral values and encourages you to speak out about what this person has done.

One of the interviewees (representing an environmental NGO) reflected on her recent experience in COP 27, which marked a breakthrough agreement on the loss and damage issue, and explained that her advocacy for many years was based on achieving this goal:

'*<…> why I commit and engage in these COPs, it's really deeply rooted with, you know, the values of defending the dignity and repairing the injustice of what climate change is all about. Because it's affecting people who are least responsible for it and have the least capacity to respond. At this COP, there was this sense of renewed energy to fight a major fight. <…> So I think COPs, in general anyway, are very much related to the rights of [the] vulnerable… you know, when it comes to emotions. Because, of course, as NGOs, we come to COPs to really defend, well, to promote the voices of the most vulnerable and defend their rights. So it's really about, you know, fighting for climate justice*.' (Interviewee 4)

Another interviewee shared her emotional experience when she was touched by her fellow Indigenous colleagues' stories, which strengthened her

[382] 'Definition of GASLIGHTING'.
[383] 'Indignation'.

feelings of injustice and encouraged her to reflect on more inclusive participation within the UNFCCC:

'*<…> A lot of my colleagues from Indigenous backgrounds see their house is getting burned now, basically. So you feel a sense of urgency. I mean, there's an intense sorrow in those events because you feel like I can't really do anything. <…> So, you try and find ways to help. We give them more access to things so that they speak in their own words*.' (Interviewee 2)

Such reflections show that representatives of civil society NGOs engage in climate negotiations based on feelings that they experience not only at their personal level but also at a social level, that is, they see unjust behaviour towards specific groups of society, encouraging them to react and speak out about the prevailing injustices. After referring to feeling mad and furious in relation to climate cooperation, a representative of a youth organisation reflected on the perfect scenario of COP negotiations:

'*Climate justice. I think it's a very important thing. We're the Western world, we have to pay the developing countries and the islands of the Pacific and all people. We have to give the billions that we agreed to give them a few years ago. In terms of climate finance, we are far behind our goals. <…> So we need transformations, you know, on many levels… socially, politically, economically, of course. That's my scenario*.' (Interviewee 3)

Similar expressions can be found in the ECO newsletters, emphasising social justice and rules that need to be obeyed:

'*Can you be shocked and not surprised at the same time? It's one thing to hear the term '**climate colonialism**', and it's another to see and feel it up close.*' (ECO-08.11.2021)

'*We demand that Loss and Damage be a priority at COP 26 and a permanent theme in the COPs and intersessionals that follow. We believe that he **who breaks the vase must pay for it**. Today the opposite is true: he who breaks the vase, lets someone else clean up the mess*.' (ECO-05.11.2021)

The latter expression employs figurative elements to emotionalise the appeal, that is, it uses the analogy of the responsibility to pay for a *broken vase*, to which the loss and damage issue is compared, obligating the developed countries to pay for the losses of poor communities. It also emphasises the unjust behaviour by noting that, in the current situation,

developed countries make others *clean their mess* instead of taking responsibility. Emotionalising elements, emphasising negative connotations and references to social harm, such as *climate violence*, can also be illustrated by such appeals:

'*The violent climate of hurricanes, droughts, and flooding is not the root cause of this problem, but the consequence of a* ***climate of violence****. A climate fuelled by* ***greed, exploitation, competition, colonization, inequality, racism, intergenerational injustice, and gender-based violence****. If this is all a bit too abstract, allow us to illustrate what this looks like. Imagine your livelihood depends on the cultivation of land you don't own and can't inherit because of your gender, yet you break your back every day to change it into fertile ground. Your neighbors have the biggest house on the block and generate a lot of waste that pollutes your land. Your ground becomes infertile. You lose your income, livelihood, and eventually your house. You try to* ***claim reparations*** *in the local court,* ***but you are ignored****. You try to get your plea across the ocean, where policymakers are deciding over the fate of the trees, water, and air of your community. But* ***your voice isn't heard****. You end up* ***with nothing but the clothes on your back, unsheltered from all kinds of violence****. You follow in the footsteps of the 30 million people who became climate refugees before you.*' (ECO-05.11.2021)

Furthermore, in the summary report of the Glasgow Climate Change Conference meeting, a representative from the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice called COP 26's outcomes an 'utter betrayal' of the millions of people who are already suffering from climate change and lamented that profits were valued over the lives of black, brown, and Indigenous peoples. He underscored the 'immorality' of the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when children in the Global South are dying now (Summary Report, 31 October – 12 November 2021).

The discussed examples show that anger-related feelings are expressed in reference to the violation of social rules, immoral and unjust behaviour that is maintained through certain climate policies, and the actions of some parties that promote policies violating the climate justice principles. The observation that anger-related expressions are employed in reference to social harm (pp. 91–93) further strengthens the display of the emotion of indignation within the analysed data.

As explained when describing indignation, this feeling may lead individuals to address the injustice they find as an offense and seek to repair it by correcting the institutions, structures, and systems constitutive of that

wrong. While explaining their motivation to engage in climate advocacy, NGOs' representatives refer to a need for more climate justice-based solutions in climate cooperation and a more general systemic change within the UNFCCC:

'*So if we want to change, we need people to change not only on the individual level. We have to make a systemic change in the culture. <…> I engaged in the climate movement when I understood the social effects of the climate crisis. <…> I start looking at the environmental problems like social problems.<…> When I start understanding about climate change, when I start understanding about the effects that are going, that is happening to the society, I start saying, "okay, this is like a really systemic problem, and we have to change the system." <…> I'm going to do my part at least, and I'm going to try to, to make the people around me also do parts. <…> It's not an individual problem. It's a systemic problem. So if we don't change politics, we don't change anything.*' (Interviewee 9)

'*<…> climate change and environmental issues, they are related with poverty, they are related with economy, they are related with politics, they are related with everything.*' (Interviewee 7)

'*NGOs, we come to COPs to really defend, well… to promote the voices of the most vulnerable and defend their rights. So it's really about, you know, fighting for climate justice.*' (Interviewee 4)

These examples show that representatives of NGOs are motivated to address the wrong, that is, unjust, approach to climate cooperation within related institutions and structures. A representative from the Indigenous peoples' organisation expressed frustration that such frameworks are generally built on an unjust approach, making him question the need to engage in them. However, he expected that the participation of his community would help to bring a different normative perspective in this unjust environment and a fair approach to nature (Interviewee 6).

The example of the loss and damage issue serves as a strong illustration of the motivation and efforts of NGOs to address the injustices within the UNFCCC framework. Some of the interviewees explained that a significant amount of their advocacy efforts over the past years were centred on loss and damage:

'*<…> we had this potential, this force, to make it, to make this issue of loss and damage the quintessence of what climate injustice is all about. <…> They would have to face, to be held accountable for it. <…> I felt like this was so*

*dishonest on their side. You know, trying to portray us as like "Stupid folks". Whereas we know that it's not, we have to fight all fronts. It's mitigation, adaptation, loss, and damage. It's not one or the other.*' (Interviewee 4)

However, she felt a renewed sense of inspiration following COP 26:

'*A fight for climate justice, which has been going on for decades now, but for me, that truly has been a before and after COP 26. I think COP 26, especially when it comes to loss and damage, has created a shift. In terms of, we can make things change for real now.*' (Interviewee 4)

The interviewee expressed her strong feelings of motivation after the mechanism of loss and damage was established in COP 27 and reflected that she felt her efforts had paid off.

The analysis of the discourse of NGO representatives advocating for climate justice reveals a clear focus on addressing the systemic factors contributing to the perceived injustice related to climate cooperation institutions. They express the need for a broader transformation beyond individual actions, emphasising the importance of systemic change. The frustration and anger expressed by some interviewees reflect the challenges faced in pushing for this transformation within the UNFCCC, for example, in the loss and damage issue. Concurrently, frustration and anger are also expressed in relation to injustices within the UNFCCC framework (e.g., the state-centric approach). These findings reflect the emotion of indignation in relation to its action tendencies (see pp. 118–120). This feeling may encourage individuals to correct not the wrong directly, but the institutions, structures, and systems permissive or constitutive of that wrong.

To conclude, the data show that a variety of anger-related feelings have been expressed by the representatives of NGOs. However, the context in which these anger-related expressions are employed displays indignation rather than anger itself: a) A variety of anger-related feelings are identified; b) They are expressed in relation to social injustices and harm caused to vulnerable communities rather than personal harm, which, in this context, relates to the unjust behaviour of the developed countries towards vulnerable communities and groups. Additionally, actors seek to address the systemic factors that contribute to these injustices by engaging in advocacy and climate cooperation. Therefore, after identifying a variety of references related to anger, the analysis finds that underneath lies indignation which relates to feelings of injustice, social harm, and a motivation to address the perceived injustices.

### 4.1.2. Hope

*Characterising hope*

Hope is generally defined as "passion for [the] possible",[384] that is, a feeling when you believe that a desire or event has a possibility of happening. Hope is the perceived capability to derive pathways to the desired goals and motivate oneself via agency thinking to use those pathways.[385] While there is a wide variety of research discussing different approaches to hope and ways of measuring it,[386] classic theories explain that hope arises from a strong desire to be in a different situation than at present and from the impression that this is possible, either because of personal efforts or external factors.[387]

There are different approaches to hope: conceptualising it as a cognitive concept or as an emotion or combining both approaches and linking the cognitive and emotional parts of hope.[388] Some approaches focus on hope as a cognitive concept, emphasising its cognitive aspects such as the capability to come up with ways to reach a desired goal or prevent something bad from happening and agency thinking, that is, working to activate these pathways and reach goals.[389] Here, hope can be defined as a two-dimensional construct which involves a person's determination to pursue goal-directed behaviour (i.e., agency) and a person's ability to find ways to meet those goals (i.e., pathways). Hope is here described as motivation to attach oneself to positive outcomes or goals. The emotions that are associated with hope are seen as "resulting from goal-directed thought, with positive emotions reflecting perceived success in the pursuit of goals and negative emotions reflecting perceived failures".[390]

Other approaches conceptualise hope as an emotion: hope is seen as an emotion aroused by appraisals that there is a possibility that a problem could change for the better.[391] For example, hope can also be a coping resource,

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[384] Godfrey, 'Hoping, Possibility, Desirability, and Belief'; Lacatus and Blanc, 'Diplomacy of Hope: Transatlantic Relations in the Transition from Trump to Biden'.
[385] 'Hope as the Antidote'.
[386] Aquinas et al., 'Introducing Hope'.
[387] Lazarus, 'Hope: An Emotion and a Vital Coping Resource Against Despair'.
[388] Ojala, 'Hope and Climate-Change Engagement from a Psychological Perspective'.
[389] Snyder, 'Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind'.
[390] Snyder; Snyder et al., 'The Will and the Ways: Development and Validation of an Individual-Difference Measure of Hope'.
[391] Lazarus, 'Hope: An Emotion and a Vital Coping Resource against Despair'.

especially in the face of despair. In contrast to despair, helplessness, and hopelessness, hope involves believing in positive outcomes. It cannot be regarded as a black-or-white mental state, but it rather is an effective blend that, depending on how an individual understands what is happening, includes both positive and negative judgments. Furthermore, hope is compared to feelings of anxiety, especially because of their shared vagueness (i.e., both emotions are rather abstract than specific like fear or excitement). Uncertainty and anxiety about the present and future are also a significant feature of this emotional state. Thus, hope is a mixed state of the mind that is also related to distress about how the present will affect the future.

Based on the appraisals of future situations, hope is appropriate when: 1) individuals appraise the probability of attainment as realistic (the prudential rule); 2) what is appraised is personally or socially acceptable (the moralistic rule); 3) outcomes or events that are appraised as important are hoped for (the priority rule); 4) those who hope are willing to take appropriate action to achieve their goals if that action is possible (the action rule).[392] Another categorisation of hope distinguishes between hope as an individual experience, and as a comprehensive context-dependent process.[393] While the first approach seeks to precisely define individuals' experience of hope with important characteristics of this experience, the latter approach relies on the assumption that hope is a process without a clear start or end, which is inherently tied to its social context. This approach to hope as context-dependent seems relevant in analysing the discourse within the diplomatic institutions because, in this way, hope can be influenced by social surroundings, that is, institutional, political, cultural, and economic contexts. Some contexts may be crucial sources of hope, where people experience shared hope due to common goals and engaged community.[394]

Snyder's theory of hope is a widely employed framework to analyse hope[395] in different contexts. According to it, three elements are key to understanding how individuals conceptualise and pursue their aspirations:[396]

- Goals: These represent the desired outcomes or objectives that actors aim to achieve. Clear and attainable goals are fundamental to fostering hope because they provide direction and purpose in life. Individuals with higher

[392] Averill and Sundararajan, 'Hope as Rhetoric'.
[393] Pleeging, Exel, and Burger, 'Characterizing Hope: An Interdisciplinary Overview of the Characteristics of Hope'.
[394] Pleeging, Exel, and Burger, 'Characterizing Hope: An Interdisciplinary Overview of the Characteristics of Hope'.
[395] Snyder, 'Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind'.
[396] Snyder.

levels of hope are more likely to set challenging but achievable goals, which, in turn, enhances their motivation and persistence in pursuing these objectives.

- Pathways: These refer to the perceived routes or sequences of events that lead from the current state to the desired goals. Having clear pathways is crucial for maintaining hope. It involves the ability to generate multiple pathways to achieve an individual's objectives, which is crucial for overcoming obstacles.
- Agency: This is the perception that it is possible to follow the identified pathways to reach the desired goals. It involves a sense of control and the capability to take action toward achieving the desired outcomes. It serves as the motivational component that drives individuals to initiate and sustain efforts toward their goals.

Additionally, hope can be categorised in different ways, such as into passive hope and active hope. Passive hope relates to waiting for external agencies to bring the change that is hoped (it brings passivity), while active hope is about becoming active participants in bringing this change.[397] Active hope refers to a perception that, to some degree, events can be controlled by the agents, which motivates them to act on them and bring the change that they crave for. It is important to note that the sense that not everything is under their control remains. However, hope is often referred to as an action-motivating emotion, that is, it is a primary feeling in keeping people engaged with a future outcome. In other words, it motivates behaviour and action. Climate action is a crucial example illustrating the importance of hope in motivating individuals' behaviour.[398]

Hope is considered to be crucial for processes like goal-setting, coping, and motivation for change, impacting individual and collective behaviours.[399] Climate action is a crucial issue where the role of hope is highlighted.[400] Hope

[397] Park, Williams, and Zurba, 'Understanding Hope and what it Means for the Future of Conservation'; Govier, 'Hope and its Opposites'; Miceli and Castelfranchi, 'Hope: The Power of Wish and Possibility'.

[398] Bury, Wenzel, and Woodyatt, 'Against the Odds: Hope as an Antecedent of Support for Climate Change Action'.

[399] van Zomeren, Pauls, and Cohen-Chen, 'Is Hope Good for Motivating Collective Action in the Context of Climate Change? Differentiating Hope's Emotion- and Problem-Focused Coping Functions'; Ojala, 'Hope and Climate-Change Engagement from a Psychological Perspective', February 2023; Aquinas et al., 'Introducing Hope'.

[400] Bury, Wenzel, and Woodyatt, 'Against the Odds: Hope as an Antecedent of Support for Climate Change Action'; Kleres and Wettergren, 'Fear, Hope, Anger, and Guilt in Climate Activism'; Ojala, 'Hope and Climate-Change Engagement from a Psychological Perspective', February 2023; van Zomeren, Pauls, and

is studied as a motivating force for collective action, and its significance is emphasised in encouraging individuals to engage in pro-environmental behaviours.[401] Furthermore, not only hope can lead to action, but action can lead to hope, that is, those engaged in climate action feel more hopeful because they do not feel alone in fighting climate change and feel supported by other climate activists.[402] Within the climate change crisis, hope also becomes intertwined with other feelings, such as anxiety,[403] emphasising the importance of paying attention to an interplay of hope and other feelings.

Therefore, hope is a complex emotion which encourages motivation and goal-oriented behaviour. It is characterised by a strong desire for change and the belief in the possibility of achieving the desired outcomes. Hope relies on goals, positive emotions about progress, and a willingness to take action. It can also be a coping mechanism in the face of despair and motivate actors to continue their actions in achieving their goals, especially when fostered through social contexts. Hope is also associated with other constructs such as *belief*, *positive*, *future*, *desire*, and *possibility*, which emphasises its nuanced understanding.[404] These characteristics are grasped in the framework of hope, which includes *goals*, *pathways*, and *agency*.[405]

Identifying hope and its meaning in discourse thus requires analysing how references to hope are employed in relation to speakers' goals, pathways, and agency, as explained by Snyder.[406] The characterisation of hope shows that this feeling can be expressed in different ways, such as through references to positive outcomes in the future, beliefs, desires, or opportunities. This means that hope can be expressed by also referring to feelings of excitement or optimism, for example, when a positive outcome may be potentially achieved.[407]

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Cohen-Chen, 'Is Hope Good for Motivating Collective Action in the Context of Climate Change? Differentiating Hope's Emotion- and Problem-Focused Coping Functions'.

401 van Zomeren, Pauls, and Cohen-Chen, 'Is Hope Good for Motivating Collective Action in the Context of Climate Change? Differentiating Hope's Emotion- and Problem-Focused Coping Functions'.

402 Kleres and Wettergren, 'Fear, Hope, Anger, and Guilt in Climate Activism'.

403 Sangervo, Jylhä, and Pihkala, 'Climate Anxiety: Conceptual Considerations, and Connections with Climate Hope and Action'.

404 Eliott, 'Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Hope'.

405 Snyder, 'Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind'.

406 Snyder.

407 Hope is linked to other positive feelings such as optimism, excitement, or enthusiasm (Ojala, 'Hope and Climate-Change Engagement from a Psychological Perspective', February 2023; Aquinas et al., 'Introducing Hope'; 'Hope'), but

The following part presents the evidence of hope in the analysed texts. It shows how the distinguishing characteristics of hope are identified in NGOs' expressions. It presents examples from the analysed texts of the following:

a) References to hope or similar feelings, expressed when speaking of positive outcomes;

b) Focus on goals (desired outcomes), pathways (the perceived routes to reach these goals), and agency (motivation to pursue these pathways).

*Features of Hope in the Analysed Texts*

*a) References to hope or similar feelings, expressed when speaking of positive outcomes*

While sharing their personal reflections, representatives of NGOs also refer to hope as a main feeling that they experience when advocating for climate action:

'*At the same time feel responsible and then have the hope that you are doing something that is actually making the difference in the world. <…> So I think there is the hope <…> You start with a very big hope, probably too high expectations.*' (Interviewee 1)

'*I was going with naive hope… I really felt this naive hope.'; 'Maybe what motivates us, activists, is hope. I think that if I had lost hope that we would make a change, I could not handle the reality, and therefore, I would stop doing everything. There is hope that you will find some progressive politicians who will help you to make this change.*' (Interviewee 8)

*I think everybody tries to be hopeful that at least one person in that negotiating room is going to try slightly to… It's not going to follow the agenda by hand, you know… trust a bit in like the human nature in those people or trust…'; 'I think you just hope that there's that [it all] makes sense, that this all has an effect in general.'; '<…> you're gonna be more hopeful because they're not blatantly rejecting the concept of a climate transition.*' (Interviewee 2)

'*I have to maintain that hope, and I try not to lose it myself, to say, "no, no, no, no, this is still useful".*' (Interviewee 4)

scholars also emphasise the differences between these feelings. However, this analysis conceptualises hope as linked to these feelings, thereby assuming that their expressions also refer to the presence of hope.

Although not referring to it directly, there are further examples shared by the interviewees which refer to hope implicitly. For example, an ENGO representative expressed that, after COP 27, she felt '*this renewed energy*' when the fund for loss and damage was established (Interviewee 4). She explained that it inspired her to continue her engagement in this framework, especially when her colleagues and she had been advocating for this decision for many years and were exhausted after negative experiences with governmental officials and their unfulfilled promises. The interviewee also remembered that some civil society NGOs were still having doubts about the actual implementation of this fund, but she sought to encourage and inspire them to celebrate this moment as a hopeful achievement. A representative from another ENGO explained that, despite her strong disappointment in the UNFCCC cooperation, she also feels hope, yet this hope is mostly directed towards the community of civil society NGOs (Interviewee 7). When asked to share one of her most emotional experiences of her participation in these negotiations, the interviewee remembered a side event organised at COP for youth NGOs: '*<...> that made me really, really emotional. I actually cried about it. <…> I do remember like the energy that flowed around within us.*' She also reflected that she feels hopeful about this community and emphasised that if change is going to come to this cooperation framework, it will come from the bottom and from people like her community.

The ECO newsletters also represent the presence of hope with both direct references to this emotion and references to other feelings, such as enthusiasm or excitement, expressed when speaking of potential positive future outcomes. There are appeals for climate justice in which hope is emphasised directly, for example:

'*A few countries gave us some **hope** in these negotiations. We are giving Canada, Colombia, Vanuatu, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, and Switzerland the **Ray of the Day** for insisting on human rights in provisions of Article 6 regulating global carbon markets. There is no ambitious climate action without justice as well as respect for gender and human rights. All these countries need to keep pushing for the inclusion of human rights and gender considerations until rules (that include these considerations) are adopted in Madrid*.' (ECO-06.12.2019)

'*In the **city of lights and with a light of hope**, those 197 parties agreed, among others, to safeguard principles of human rights, including the rights of Indigenous peoples, food security, just transition, ecosystem integrity and*

*protection of biodiversity, intergenerational equity, gender equality and public participation*.' (ECO-07.12.2018)

'*With real opportunities on negotiation items dwindling, for some, the Cover Decision has become* ***a final glimmer of hope****, where civil society may be able to find a home for strong human rights language, commitments to cutting fossil fuel extraction, and other essential demands that have thus far failed to materialize [at] COP 26.*' (ECO-11.11.2021)

'Ray of the Day' is an initiative by the CAN within the UNFCCC to highlight positive actions and solutions for addressing climate action.[408] The idea is to counter the pessimistic view on the climate change crisis by highlighting inspiring examples of climate action and innovation: '*<…> at the end of a rather dismal COP in a rather dreary climate; it is high time we spread a bit of sunshine!*' (ECO-14.12.2018). The initiative itself symbolises hope (*ray*) highlighted in the face of the climate crisis: the imagery of light (*ray*) is compared to progress and moments of success that reinforce the belief that positive change is achievable by implementing climate justice-based policies. The excerpt above illustrates how hope, through its symbolic expression of the Ray of the Day initiative, is attached to actors promoting the climate justice principles ('*We are giving <…> the Ray of the Day for insisting on human rights in provisions of Article 6 regulating global carbon markets*').

*b) Focus on goals (desired outcomes), pathways (the perceived routes to reach these goals), and agency (motivation to pursue these pathways)*

Reflections shared by a representative from an ENGO in South Africa serve as an example illustrating the goal to bring hope in COP negotiations. Besides explicitly naming hope as the main emotion that he experienced while participating in COP 28 negotiations, he also shared the story of how his team presented the artwork in COP, which relies on hope as its main idea:

'*Some of the global power structures that are there give a lot of concern, but there is also a lot of hope. <…> So, looking at some of the changes that have happened in COP this year or in COP 28, you can see there is some level of hope when you see some of the pledges that have been made. <…> They give some level of hope. I hope that they follow through. I hope that the*

[408] 'COP 21'.

*countries that made those pledges, the companies that making those pledges actually follow through.*' (Interviewee 10)

As explained in the description of the artwork, 'The embroidered *Umlibo* tapestry is a testament to one of the most important – yet mostly invisible – issues of our time: climate change. And, of course, the impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable people who live close to the sea, those who will be most affected yet least equipped to adapt to its wicked ways.'[409] The interviewee added that this artwork sought to emphasise the importance of climate change solutions brought by local communities (the small town of Hamburg in South Africa's Eastern Cape province). The project thus highlighted the importance of climate justice-based solutions which rely on the inclusion of small and vulnerable communities that are disproportionally affected by the effects of climate change. The interviewee explained that presenting this artwork at COP was expected to *bring hope* to negotiations and highlight its importance in shaping solutions for the climate change crisis.

Meanwhile, the following excerpt about the International Court of Justice equates compliance with the climate justice principles to hope. It expresses the expectation that the explanation given by the court will emphasise the need for compliance with the climate justice principles, and equates it with hope. Actually, this comparison directly links compliance with the climate justice principles to hope. With the title 'The ICJAO is Hope' (i.e., the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion *is Hope*), it states that countries are lost '*in the desert*' because of violating the climate justice principles. Therefore, NGOs demand an explanation by ICJAO that climate justice is a foundational element of climate cooperation:

'*Remember when you went to* ***the desert and got lost,*** *and then some friendly* ***wise owls*** *advised you on how to go back… you may ask, owls in the desert? Yes!* ***The owls are the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, and you are lost****. Today, we see leadership and* ***hope*** *as a group of champion countries led by the small, vulnerable, and ambitious island nation of Vanuatu, bringing the world's biggest problem to the highest global court! There is no climate justice without human rights. Vanuatu is seeking an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice to clarify the legal obligation of states to protect the rights of present and future generations against the adverse effects of climate change. Encourage your governments to VOTE YES at the UNGA when this resolution is tabled! This* ***will spur***

[409] 'The Bigger Picture of Umlibo'.

***ambition and action*** *for the next COP. This will be our* ***beacon of truth to*** *ensure states live up to the meaning of the Paris Agreement.* ***With hope****, the people united will never be defeated.*' (ECO-18.11.2022)

The metaphor of being 'lost in the desert' underscores the urgency of the climate crisis and positions the *International Court of Justice* (ICJ) Advisory Opinion as a source of guidance and potential solutions. An expression such as the 'beacon of truth' is a connotation further emphasising hope for a future where states are held accountable for not protecting human rights in the face of climate change. The concluding statement, "With hope, the people united will never be defeated", directly exemplifies hope as a driving force of collective action to fight for climate justice.

In addition to direct and indirect references to hope, the analysis finds expressions of other positive feelings, such as excitement or enthusiasm, which, within the analysed data, imply hope. Along with cognitive components, the discourse of hope may be infused with positive affective expressions of excitement and enthusiasm. For example:

'*<…> ECO* ***enthusiastically*** *welcomes the Talanoa Dialogue. Talanoa means inclusive, participatory, and transparent dialogue that builds empathy and leads to decision-making for the collective good. Parties should work in* ***this Talanoa spirit*** *to lay the groundwork* ***for a successful outcome*** *from the Dialogue in 2018*.' (ECO-06.11.2017)

'*ECO was* ***excited*** *to be part of the Presidency's Open Dialogue yesterday. The event was unique because it allowed Parties and Non-Party Stakeholders (NPS) to gather around the same table and participate in a discussion, unlike the usual style of statements or interventions in plenaries, where typically observers get only very short slots at the very end*.' (ECO-09.11.2017)

The Talanoa Dialogue, highlighted in one of the excerpts above, is a facilitative dialogue platform established in 2018 which was built on a specific approach to climate negotiations: it seeks to encourage participants to build trust and discuss solutions through empathy, understanding, and storytelling.[410] The dialogue was initiated by Fiji and is highly welcomed among civil society NGOs as an example of inclusive participation and the right approach to climate cooperation. It explicitly emphasised inclusive and respectful participation as its foundation while blaming critical observations

[410] Sauer, 'The Talanoa Dialogue Explained'.

as inconsistent with building mutual trust and respect that the concept of the Talanoa Dialogue seeks to foster.

The identified emotional expressions reflect a definition of hope as "passion for [the] possible",[411] that is, a feeling when you believe that a desired event has a possibility of happening, and you also believe in its crucial role in motivating action. Examples from the ECO newsletter also refer to "passion for [the] possible" through positive connotations, metaphors, analogies, and comparisons such as *will spur ambition and action*, *a beacon of truth*, and *successful outcome*, or emotional expressions related to other related feelings such as *enthusiasm* or *excitement*. The NGOs' representatives refer to the hope they have experienced within the community of civil society organisations engaging in climate action, or when reflecting on their continued efforts to advocate for issues such as loss and damage. This refers to the pathways through which their goal can be achieved: continued advocacy and engagement of civil society NGOs. The focus on their capabilities to produce change also refers to agency, which is another feature of hope, expressed as a motivation to pursue actions that help to achieve a positive outcome in the future.[412]

Thus, the emotion of hope is expressed either through direct or indirect references to hope, including emotion terms, connotations, metaphors, or analogies referring to hope or closely linked feelings. This emotion is characterised as focusing on goals, pathways, and agency. In the context of this analysis, the main goal remains the implementation of climate justice principles: references to hope are employed when highlighting a possibility to make countries comply with the climate justice principles. However, when speaking of agency, the analysis shows that NGOs' expressions represent both active and passive hope (i.e., the two types of hope, p. 133). In other words, hope is invoked by referring to their own actions and ability to promote the change (the active hope), or more abstract feelings of expectations for a positive future outcome, and focus on external change of other actors' actions (the passive hope). This also has significant implications for their agency (i.e., a belief in their ability to achieve the pursued goal).

[411] Godfrey, 'Hoping, Possibility, Desirability, and Belief'; Lacatus and Blanc, 'Diplomacy of Hope: Transatlantic Relations in the Transition from Trump to Biden'.

[412] Snyder, 'Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind'.

Expressions of hope in the analysed data refer to two types of emotion discussed in the research – active and passive hope.[413] The analysis of the civil society NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC climate negotiations reveals the presence of both the active and passive forms of hope. While passive hope emerges through references to external actors' decisions and general feelings of hope about a possible change, active hope appears through expressions that enhance agency. This observation is important to understand the role of hope in persuasion for climate justice, especially when thinking of its transformative power, that is, the ability to resist the prevailing injustices and produce change.

Active hope is characterised by a sense of agency and is directly linked to actions aimed at achieving the desired outcomes.[414] The NGOs' discourse, invoking active rather than passive hope, represents a belief in their ability to promote change despite being disappointed by the UNFCCC framework because of its unjust treatment of NGOs' representatives and vulnerable communities in general. The active type of hope is evident when NGO representatives link their hope to sustained advocacy despite challenges. For example, in persuasion for climate justice, active hope creates the image of the NGOs' community as a resisting force capable of producing change within the institutional constraints of the framework. As the discussed utterances show, hope motivates NGOs' representatives to continue their advocacy within the UNFCCC despite facing challenges and prevailing feelings of injustice within this institutional framework.

Passive hope is more of a feeling or expectation that positive outcomes will occur, often relying on external factors or the actions of others, with a lesser sense of personal agency. This type of hope also emerges in the NGOs' discourse, especially when referring to the *desperate and helpless* situations of vulnerable communities. Such references intensify the emotionality of argumentation, thereby aiming at more effective persuasion. However, the invocation of passive hope highlights the limited agency of vulnerable communities to produce change: the discourse of passive hope relies on general and more abstract beliefs in potential change, mostly dependable on the actions of other actors and their benevolence. This is evidenced by

[413] Park, Williams, and Zurba, 'Understanding Hope and what it Means for the Future of Conservation'; Govier, 'Hope and its Opposites'; Miceli and Castelfranchi, 'Hope: The Power of Wish and Possibility'.

[414] Snyder, 'Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind'; Lazarus, 'Hope: An Emotion and a Vital Coping Resource against Despair'.

utterances referring to expected benevolence from external actors (e.g., 'Thank you for raising your voices in this time of great need. We can only hope that other countries will listen and take heed.', ECO-14.12.2018).

These two types of hope – passive and active – function differently in relation to agency: while passive hope tends to rely on external actors and may limit belief in one's capabilities to produce change, active hope refers to the enhanced agency through explicit references to NGOs' capabilities to challenge the prevailing injustices and produce change within the UNFCCC. The emergence of these distinct types suggests that hope in the analysed discourse can be cultivated through different approaches, each having distinct implications for NGOs' agency. A more in-depth analysis of these two different approaches to hope is further contextualised in the next part of analysis.

To conclude this part, the analysis finds indignation and hope to be the dominant emotions in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC (Table 5). Although not denying the presence and significance of other emotions in the analysed texts, this analysis identifies hope and indignation as the dominant emotions based on expressions found in NGOs' utterances, and seeks to further interpret their meaning within this context.

**Table 5.** *Characteristics of emotion categories in NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC*

| Emotion category | Characteristics | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Indignation | a) References to anger-related feelings | Expressed through references to anger, and anger-related feelings (frustration, outrage, and disappointment), and their derivatives. |
| | b) Focus on justice, social rather than personal harm, blame attribution, and actions seeking for systemic change (addressing injustice) | Focus on violation of climate justice principles as a violation of moral values (social injustices negatively affecting vulnerable communities), attributed to actions of developed countries; motivation to address systemic factors that perpetuate injustices within the UNFCCC. |

| Emotion category | Characteristics | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Hope | a) References to hope or similar feelings, expressed when speaking of positive future outcomes | Expressed through references to hope and hope-related feelings (enthusiasm, excitement, optimism), and their derivatives. |
| | b) Focus on positive change in future (goals, pathways, and agency) | Focus on the possibility to achieve a positive change, expressed through goals (achieving climate justice), pathways (continued engagement of the civil society NGOs within the UNFCCC), and sense of agency (a belief in the capacity and motivation to initiate and sustain engagement in climate justice advocacy).<br>Two types of hope: passive (general expectation of a positive outcome and reliance on external factors), and active (a belief in capabilities of achieving the desired outcome). |

### 4.1.3. Indignation-Hope Nexus

After identifying which emotions NGOs invoke in their persuasion for climate justice, another part of the analysis focuses on uncovering how the identified emotions function to construct the climate justice norm. In this part, the emotional expressions that have been identified in the initial step of interpretation are analytically structured to contextualise them and gain further insights about their functioning in this context.[415] The analysis next identified patterns of indignation and hope expressions: it looked into not only which emotions are expressed, but also towards which actors and issues the emotions were directed. The following was observed (Appendix B):

[415] Hafner-Burton, 'Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem'; Lebovic and Voeten, 'The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR'.

*Hope is referred to when speaking of:*

a) NGOs' community and their participation in the UNFCCC;

b) Climate-justice based policies and actors promoting them.

*Indignation is referred to when speaking of:*

c) The UNFCCC as a framework promoting an unjust approach to climate cooperation;

d) Policies and actors violating the climate justice principles.

These patterns indicate an overlap between the feelings of indignation and hope, which are expressed toward multiple targets (Figure 5): expressions of hope are directed toward the participation of civil society NGOs' within the UNFCCC framework; at the same time, indignation is expressed by targeting injustices within the same framework; hope is also directed toward those who comply with the climate justice principles or promote them; indignation targets those who violate the climate justice principles.




**Figure 5.** *Patterns of emotional expressions in NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC*

The observed patterns of emotional expressions demonstrate how indignation and hope intersect in the NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. This intersection functions as an Indignation-Hope nexus, that is, intersecting expressions of indignation and hope within the NGOs' discourse linked together through overlapping targets. For instance, NGOs express indignation at the injustices and limitations within the

UNFCCC framework but, at the same time, NGOs express hope for change through the same framework. This emotional nexus in the NGOs' discourse plays an important role in climate justice advocacy: it mobilises emotives, which, on the one hand, highlights that the current *status quo* cannot be accepted because of the violation of moral principles (through indignation), and, on the other hand, it encourages change by attaching positive emotional connotations to the actors promoting that change (through hope).

To sum up, the first section of the analysis identified indignation and hope as dominant in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC, and interpreted their characteristics within the context of climate justice. Patterns of these emotional expressions were identified, which allowed for a more in-depth analysis of the specific functions of identified emotions in persuasion for climate justice.

### 4.2. The Role of Emotions in NGOs' Persuasion for Climate Justice

Having established indignation and hope as the key emotion categories present in the discourse of civil society NGOs advocating for climate justice within the UNFCCC, the analysis now turns to explain how these emotions function to enable persuasion for climate justice. It does so by examining how these emotional expressions help to persuade, that is, build resonance with the international community (pp. 87–92, see also Figure 1, p. 91). The framework of *emotive transformative persuasion* conceptualizes emotions (functioning through NGOs' discourse as emotives) as enabling norm entrepreneurs to persuade other actors to accept climate justice as a norm. While the first part of the analysis identified the dominant emotions and patterns of their expression, the second part sought further analysis of how they function to build resonance (i.e., the resonance conditions outlined in the conceptual framework, including the emphasis on evidence of harm, linking climate injustice to human rights violations, creating a dichotomy between violators and victims, and promoting solutions to climate change based on a just and fair approach).

Thus, the next step of the analysis explains that the indignation-hope nexus is significant for NGOs in their persuasion for climate justice because invocation of these emotions helps to adhere to resonance conditions. Expressions of indignation are employed to highlight evidence of harm caused because of climate injustice, to link them to the prevailing 'universal' values and moral principles, and thus to construct the image of those who violate the climate justice principles as *perpetrators*. Meanwhile, expressions of hope are used to encourage change towards acceptance of the climate justice principles

by portraying actors who comply or advocate for them as a *hopeful community*, that is, they are depicted as hopeful as their dedication to the climate justice principles is presented as a source of optimism and positive change. Thus, the indignation-hope nexus helps to expose the current *status quo* as *morally* unacceptable, and push for change. Based on these insights, analysis distinguishes certain functions of indignation and hope that emerge in the context of NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. This context reveals specific approaches of emotional advocacy based on indignation and hope, in which both emotions serve specific functions in the process of the construction of the climate justice norm.

This section is structured primarily based on the functions of the identified emotions – *indignation as a boundary-drawing force*, and *hope as a community-building force*. Each sub-section focuses on the following: 1) the role of the emotion in resonance building (i.e., explaining how expressions of indignation or hope are employed in the discourse adhering to the resonance conditions); 2) specifying the function which indignation/hope performs in persuasion for climate justice, based on its role in resonance building.

### 4.2.1. Indignation as a Boundary-Drawing Force

Expressions of indignation have become an inseparable part of the discourse that NGOs employ to persuade the international community to accept climate justice principles as a new norm. These expressions are linked to resonance conditions, to which norm entrepreneurs seek to adhere to make their persuasion more effective.[416] To build a new norm, NGOs seek to provide evidence of harm caused by a certain behaviour that needs to be modified; they also seek to link the promoted new norms to the already prevailing 'universal' values and moral principles; and they seek to portray certain actors as perpetrators and others as victims, to attract attention and highlight the need to change the current *status quo*. Thus, the NGOs' discourse seeking to persuade other actors needs to emphasise the above-mentioned aspects, and I argue that expressions of indignation are inseparable from such a discourse in the context of the climate justice norm advocacy.

To make their persuasion for new norms more resonant with the international community, norm entrepreneurs rely on already prevailing moral principles and values.[417] Expressions of indignation inevitably contain references to these principles, as they relate to social harm for certain groups,

[416] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.
[417] Payne, 'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction'.

caused by the unjust behaviour of certain actors. References to anger-related feelings are employed when speaking of injustice, caused harm, and attributing blame.[418] The discourse that seeks to resonate with the international community based on the prevailing moral values (human rights, harm caused to *victims* by those acting as *perpetrators*) is invocative of indignation, characterised by feelings of anger caused due to the social harm and prevailing injustices. Thus, indignation expressions become inseparable from the persuasion of international actors to accept the climate justice principles as *morally right.* Indignation helps to build resonance in the norm entrepreneurs' discourse by exposing the current *status quo* as unjust and in need of change. Additionally, as shown by the observed patterns (p. 144), expressions of indignation are also targeting the UNFCCC as the institutional framework allowing perpetrators to perpetuate their domination, which results in reproduced injustices.

Therefore, expressions of indignation help to build resonance, as they are employed when emphasising the caused harm, linking violations to the prevailing 'universal' values such as human rights, and constructing the image of certain actors as *perpetrators.* Such a discourse helps to portray certain actors as acting outside the boundaries of the *moral community*. This means that **indignation functions as a boundary-drawing force in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC: it pushes actors who violate climate justice principles outside the boundaries of the moral community by constructing their image as *perpetrators.* Additionally, expressions of indignation target the UNFCCC, and construct its image as the framework allowing perpetrators to perpetuate their advantageous position, thus reproducing further injustices**.

### Indignation in Resonance Building

*Exposing harm and injustice*

When promoting a new norm, NGOs seek to gather evidence and highlight them to emphasise that certain behaviour needs to change because it causes significant negative effects. In the context of this thesis, NGOs aim to fulfil the first resonance condition of providing credible and compelling evidence of the negative effects caused by climate injustice. These effects can be exposed by providing statistics in face-to-face meetings or other formats of cooperation with decision-makers, but NGOs also seek to attract attention

[418] Miceli and Castelfranchi, 'Anger and Its Cousins'; 'Neblett', 'Indignation'.

through their general appeals and public communication channels; for example, in climate cooperation, or through ECO newsletters. In this case, civil society NGOs seek to expose and emphasise the negative effects caused by climate injustice to frame it as an issue which requires attention and the modified behaviour of the international community.

To expose the negative effects of the climate injustice, emotional appeals, especially those displaying indignation, play a crucial role. The gathered evidence must be exposed in a manner that would draw the attention of other actors, which requires emotionally appealing expressions. For example, display of anger, attribution of blame to the developed countries, emphasis on social harm caused by such behaviour, and references to moral aspects to highlight such behaviour as immoral – all of these characterise indignation. This means that such a discourse relies on the conceptual features of indignation, which makes it a foundational feeling that is invoked to strengthen attention drawn to the effects of climate injustice. By expressing indignation through anger-displaying language, personal stories, and blame attribution, NGOs relate them to shocking statistics and, in this way, aim to make the evidence of climate injustice more emotionally resonant and thus more likely to encourage a shift in behaviour.

For example, statements emphasising the harm caused by the violation of the climate justice principles are underpinned by indignation because they display feelings of disappointment, emphasis on injustice, and blame attribution: '*…actions in the name of sustainable development by States and transnational companies have led to systematic violation of the human rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. This has led to disappearance, forced displacement and loss of identity*' (COP7, November 1). Other examples also illustrate how references to certain mechanisms that attribute blame to the developed countries and their responsibility to adhere to the climate justice principles (e.g., the loss and damage mechanism) are employed to highlight the negative effects caused by the climate injustice: '*Millions of people have lost their lives and livelihoods due to lethal heat and extreme weather events.*'; '*Devastating losses and damages we are already seeing across the world.*'; '*Five of the world's richest nations are on track to be responsible for 51% of all oil and gas expansion between now and 2050.*'; '*The planet is burning*'; '*Flooding someone's house and then lending them the moolah for damp-proofing ain't gonna fly*.'

These examples show that NGOs not only present evidence to draw attention to climate injustice but they do so through emotional appeals that display indignation. These examples demonstrate how NGOs invoke indignation to amplify the severity of the climate injustice impacts. Through

direct references to devastating losses ('millions of people have lost their lives') and emotionally appealing descriptions ('the planet is burning'), NGOs move beyond a mere statistical presentation to create a sense of moral urgency. Their expressions display features of indignation, which makes it an underpinning emotion of this exposure of the effects of climate injustice. This discourse combines concrete evidence of harm with expressions of moral outrage, especially when attributing blame to wealthy nations and exposing their inappropriate response.

This means that the NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC aligns with the first condition of resonance, that is, it invokes indignation to modify behaviour on climate cooperation by highlighting that the attitude of ignoring the climate justice principles leads to significant negative effects and social harm. This form of persuasion emphasises human suffering by invoking indignation through both explicit references to harm and the moral condemnation of inaction. In this way, NGOs amplify the resonance of their evidence and form a stronger imperative for behavioural change in international climate cooperation.

*Linking the violation of climate justice principles with human rights and other universal values*

NGOs advocating for climate justice within the UNFCCC also adhere to another resonance condition explained in the framework, focusing on the persuasion of a new norm by framing it within the broader framework of human rights and 'universal values'.[419] References to indignation are used not only to highlight the effects caused by climate injustice but also to depict them as incoherent and violating the basic human rights and universal values. References to indignation, displaying anger-related feelings, attribution of blame, and exposing immorality are employed to connect climate injustice to the violation of human rights and universal values. Indignation has the crucial elements for emphasizing the violation of the climate justice principles as immoral and incoherent with the basic human rights.

Utterances in ECO newsletters clearly portray non-compliance with the climate justice principles within the broader framework of universal values and human rights. This framing is underpinned by indignation because it directly or indirectly refers to anger-related feelings, attributes blame to certain actors, and requires social change:

[419] The word 'universal' here is more prescriptive than descriptive.

'*There can be no climate justice without human rights, and we simply can't have COP Presidencies going around violating basic human rights.*'; '*It is immoral therefore that rich nations cannot find adequate funds for addressing climate impacts, yet could instantly find billions of dollars… to support a war.*'; '*Delay is a death sentence.*'; '*THERE CAN BE NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE: THERE CAN BE NO CLIMATE JUSTICE WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS.*' (ECO-28.12.2023)

These examples show how NGOs utilise indignation to connect climate injustice to the broader human rights and universal values. This is evidenced through direct emotional expressions like "There can be no climate justice without human rights" and "It is immoral, therefore, that rich nations cannot find adequate funds", which explicitly connect moral outrage to human rights violations.

Such a depiction is strengthened through blame attribution, seen in statements highlighting the responsibility of "five of the world's richest nations" and the developed countries. The normative element of indignation is particularly evident in expressions that emphasise the broader moral implications, such as connecting climate justice to racial and colonial justice and demanding equal access for all vulnerable groups: "Indigenous Peoples, young and old, people living with disabilities, of all sexual orientations and gender identities". This emotion discourse invokes moral responsibility by presenting climate injustice not merely as a policy failure but as a fundamental breach of universal human rights principles. Through these expressions of indignation, NGOs elevate climate justice from a narrow environmental concern to a broader human rights issue, thereby strengthening its resonance with the values of the international community.

This refers to the second resonance condition: NGOs seek to promote certain norms in the international community, by focusing on exposing evidence showing the negative effects caused by ignoring certain norms and drawing the link with the prevailing universal values and human rights. Thus, by invoking indignation, NGOs amplify the severity of climate injustice, and position it as a breach of the universally accepted principles. This implies that the NGOs' discourse, underpinned by indignation, adheres to the second resonance condition: references to indignation are employed to emphasize climate injustice as a violation of the fundamental human rights and universal values. This discourse invokes indignation as a way to strengthen the resonance and amplify the mobilisation of the international community to adjust their behaviour. Rather than simply stating connections to human rights, the emotional expressions create heightened persuasive effects by combining moral outrage with the human rights principles. References to

features of indignation that express anger, attribute blame, and highlight the violation of certain social rules create a sense of moral obligation and emphasise the need for action in order to protect the rights of vulnerable communities and those who represent them within the UNFCCC framework.

*Establishing the perpetrator-victim dichotomy*

The indignation discourse, adhering to the first two resonance conditions – highlighting the negative effects of caused harm and linking it with a broader frame of human rights and universal values – also emphasises the suffering and injustice faced by vulnerable communities and grassroots movements. The indignation-invoking discourse not only exposes the prevailing unfairness but also draws attention to the groups that suffer from the current *status quo* and highlights their sufferings as unjust. Such a discourse deems certain actors as *victims* and others as *perpetrators*.

The indignation discourse helps to link climate justice with moral responsibility, thereby depicting those who ignore this social rule as violators and *perpetrators* and those who suffer as *victims*. This adheres to another resonance condition, stating that the norm entrepreneurs' discourse focuses on establishing the perpetrator-victim dichotomy. By expressing indignation towards those who contribute to climate injustice, NGOs highlight the perpetrators' responsibility for causing harm and suffering to vulnerable communities. Indignation also refers to disobedience to certain social rules (in this case, to climate injustice) and moral responsibility to comply with this rule (see p. 118).

A particular target of indignation expressions are the developed countries as those who violate and cheat on the climate justice commitments. Emotional expressions of indignation, such as *cheating*, *hypocrisy*, and *betrayals* invoke representations of moral offense rooted in narratives related to *colonialism* and the domination of the developed countries. Their image as *violators* is established through emotional references representing their cheating (*they showed their cards clearly*) and its profound negative consequences (*your delay is killing people*):

'*COP 27 is an African COP, and a climate justice COP. In the third informal negotiation, we saw developed countries show* ***how little they understand*** *climate justice.* ***They showed their cards clearly*** *by offering a united set of procedural outcomes that is detached from the urgency needed. 2024 is too late. Negotiators****, your delay is killing people****. The time is now,*

*and we cannot come out of this COP with nothing but hot air*.' (ECO-12.11.2022)

The example above also illustrates how an image of violators is strengthened through emotional expressions of indignation, with a particular focus on the loss and damage issues:

'*There is demonstrably not enough finance for loss and damage. If developed countries don't agree here in Madrid that we need more finance for loss and damage, that it should come on top of* ***already existing (and inadequate)*** *adaptation aid and humanitarian finance, <…> then they will be* ***violating their human rights obligations*** *to the most vulnerable people. They will be demonstrating that their stated concerns are* ***no more than crocodile tears****. You will be held to account. The world is watching*.' (ECO-10.12.2019)

This excerpt represents indignation expressed through metaphors and negative connotations (*no more than crocodile tears*; *inadequate*) referring to those actors who violate their obligations towards the climate justice principles. It portrays the developed countries as doing little to adhere to the climate justice commitments (*already existing (and inadequate)*), and as seeking to avoid their obligations towards the developing countries. The use of *crocodile tears* (i.e., a false, insincere display of emotions such as a hypocrite crying) creates an image of violators of the climate justice principles as hypocrites.

As shown in the examples above, *hypocrisy*, along with other references to *cheating*, is mentioned by NGOs. *Cheating*, reflected in expressions of indignation and carrying a negative meaning (i.e., acting dishonestly and unfairly to gain an advantage),[420] assigns moral pressure, underpinned by a moral understanding of what is the right thing to do. Indignation becomes a way to express disapproval of policies and actors seen as acting dishonestly or unfairly (*cheating*), thereby putting moral pressure on those actors who/which neglect the climate justice principles. References to *cheating* and *hypocrisy*, expressed towards the actors and policies violating the climate justice principles, therefore, construct an understanding that violating the climate justice principles is the 'wrong thing to do'. By constructing the image of *perpetrators* through references to *cheating,* NGOs push actors towards complying with the climate justice principles in order to avoid moral condemnation.

[420] 'Cheating'.

Expressions of indignation are employed to refer to policies and decisions violating the climate justice principles. For example, the excerpt below represents ECO's indignation about the loan mechanism, which is argued to be unjust by employing the analogy of *flooding a house and lending the moolah for damp-proofing*:

'*To make matters worse, 70% of the public finance is in the form of loans that must be paid back. Even more concerning is the increase in non-concessional loans with higher interest rates. These financial instruments are MDBs' guilty pleasure, representing a "have your cake and eat it too" situation for them. ECO finds it unacceptable that non-concessional loans are counted as part of the $100 bn.* ***Flooding someone's house and then lending them the moolah for damp-proofing ain't gonna fly***.' (ECO-18.11.2022)

Furthermore, the policies that violate the climate justice principles are often referred to as *false solutions*, followed by other expressions reflecting indignation. An example below contains a reference to *false solutions* and strong negative connotations such as *genocide* that are expressed in relation to the rights of Indigenous peoples:

'*These busybodies are out here greenwashing and* ***promoting false solutions*** *geared towards allowing big polluters to continue business as usual – pillaging Indigenous lands and waterways, all while making record-breaking profits off the* ***genocide of our peoples and lands***.' (ECO-12.11.2022)

Another instance illustrates expressions of indignation, such as references to *madness* and *shouting*, employed to advocate for loss and damage, which is considered one of the essential issues of climate justice (see Table 1):

'*This is why today, at the Loss and Damage and Adaptation Day, we are again* ***shouting****: Stop this Climate* ***Madness*** *and Pay up for Loss and Damage! COP 26 needs to provide sufficient and needs-based Loss and <…> on the basis of equity, historical responsibility, human decency, and global solidarity, and in accordance with the polluter pays principle*.' (ECO-08.11.2021)

Expressions of the indignation target those actors that violate and do not comply with the principles of climate justice, for example, by creating unjust climate finance mechanisms (referred to as *false solutions*):

'*There's* ***a lot to be disappointed about*** *when it comes to the climate finance negotiations taking place at COP 27. In particular, the narrow focus of heads of state and their preferred corporate partners defining and designing climate finance mechanisms. This means that they promote* ***false solutions*** *through carbon market schemes supporting misplaced renewable energy development and misleading net-zero initiatives. These* ***false solutions continue to impinge*** *upon the rights of Indigenous Peoples and facilitate* ***land theft*** *and displacement of Indigenous Peoples. These realities are why the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change calls for access, transparency, and accountability on climate finance in COP 27*.' (ECO-10.11.2022)

Here, indignation is represented by expressions of disappointment in the actors (*heads of state and their preferred corporate partners*) promoting unfair climate mechanisms (as *false solutions*), referring to the violation of the climate justice principles (*the rights of Indigenous Peoples*). Comparisons such as *land theft* are employed to refer to the unfair climate mechanisms as a *theft*. Indignation is represented here given that a comparison reference to *land theft* highlights an unjust action, which should provoke anger-related feelings.

Therefore, expressions of indignation are employed to construct the image of certain actors as perpetrators, that is, to expose them for violating the moral values. Invoked indignation towards those actors who violate the climate justice principles shapes their image as *perpetrators*, which refers to the expectation that compliance with these principles should be accepted as *morally right* behaviour in international climate cooperation. The previous sub-sections showed that indignation expressions help to highlight the evidence of the caused harm and relate non-compliance with the climate justice principles to the broader framework of the human rights and universal values (the first two resonance conditions). They highlighted how such emotional expressions emphasise the sufferings of certain groups because of the caused harm. These sub-sections explained how the indignation discourse also leads to establishing the victim-perpetrator dichotomy (the third resonance condition) by emphasising certain actors and policies as violators/violations of the fairness principle.

*UNFCCC as Reproducing Injustices*

Emotional expressions of indignation help to expose the institutional setting as unjust and 'wrong', thus encouraging its transformation based on moral principles and values. They not only help to depict certain actors as *victims* and *perpetrators*, but also emphasise the UNFCCC as the institutional

setting for the continued *perpetration*, which reproduces further injustices by oppressing vulnerable communities and grassroots movements.

Reflections shared by the interviewees refer to their first experiences in COP negotiations as huge disappointments, which further confirms their indignation towards the UNFCCC framework itself. Initially, they had high expectations about COP as the biggest climate negotiation setting, engaging key decision-makers, ranging from the heads of states to famous public figures (e.g., some of them explain that they feel overwhelmed by the possibility of walking in the same corridors with Bill Gates or be in the same room with high-level politicians); the interviewees explained that their expectations were crushed. They feel disappointed for various reasons: experiencing the ineffectiveness of COP negotiations firsthand (i.e., little is achieved in relation to the scale of the event), seeing decision-makers arguing over meaningless details rather than significant commitments when negotiating agreements, and experiencing unjust treatment at the hands of governmental officials. Some of them explicitly mention that growing experience in this framework leads to cynicism and strong disappointment.

It is important to draw attention to Indigenous peoples' experiences and expressions that refer to indignation as a feeling that represents their struggle to participate in this institutional environment. They express frustration because the current UNFCCC framework prioritises nation-states, thus leaving limited space for Indigenous peoples' representation. These communities consider this approach as profoundly unjust and wrong to address the climate change crisis, which requires a '*totally different value system*' and an approach that lies '*in their communities*'. The focus on national governments, therefore, marginalises the Indigenous knowledge and perspectives on climate change solutions while their traditional practices, which are crucial in times of climate change, are overlooked. A more in-depth reflection is given by the representative from an Indigenous peoples' organisation:

'*We start by laying out our solidarity, building our trust, and that's how we start conversation <…> Important elements in building our worldviews, understanding the nature that how we… we live. So I think, for us is that… "can we decolonise the process?*" *<…> The process and the mechanism is extremely complicated.<…> I'm not really sure how we can make understand Indigenous peoples… to make understand what is their role in it. Right? I mean, for the ordinary people like us, we will expect that the process be simple, simple so that people understand what is the negotiation about…* ***and***

***states to be more honest and really focus on the issues that we should care about*** <…>' (Interviewee 6)

The climate change policies and mechanisms, often accepted within the UNFCCC, violate the rights of Indigenous peoples, for example, by failing to consult with Indigenous communities in the development of the climate change adaptation and mitigation measures:

'*<…> then you **get frustrated** because this project didn't work, and didn't work because it was something that people didn't want. It's not going to work if you bring something that people are not needing or not wanting on the ground*.' (Interviewee 1)

'*It is **a very frustrating thing** because it's something that you are not contributing [to] this much <…>, but you are actually paying the worst price [of] all.*'; '*I am **really angry and disappointed and frustrated**.*'; '*So, so if you look at that, <…> it is really **upsetting***.' (Interviewee 6)

For example, the *REDD+* (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries) program caused concern in relation to the lack of free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous communities before implementing the related projects. The loss of traditional lands is another problem that Indigenous communities seek to address by participating in the UNFCCC: large-scale renewable energy projects displace Indigenous communities from their ancestral lands and disrupt their cultural practices which are vital to the Indigenous ways of life.

Indigenous peoples characterise themselves as communities that rely on a more holistic and integral value system in relation to nature than most of the parties participating in the UNFCCC negotiations. Furthermore, they find the complex bureaucracy of the UNFCCC highly frustrating, with its complicated rules and procedures, which not only hinder their participation but also affect the decision-making process. Representatives of these communities explain that they often feel frustrated by the principles of such cooperation in general, and that they often feel misunderstood by governmental officials.

'*I would not want to engage in the climate process because it doesn't have the platform or framework that we can discuss our issues… because that is led by the state and that is the state-centric process. <…> but, well, I think, yes, it's important that we continue to engage in the COP process <…> it's **so intimidating** for Indigenous people. One is that the setting of these meetings, forums, and conferences is not the kind of environment that*

*Indigenous peoples do or discuss, and simply, we don't know how to engage sometimes. That's why it takes a lot of time for us to understand those meeting settings and, you know, like be able to, how to engage with them*.' (Interviewee 6)

The interviewee also explained that he feels frustrated by the state-centric approach within the UNFCCC and their attitude towards the climate change solutions which '*commercialise environment*'. The word *commercialisation*, defined as managed or exploited in a way designed to make a profit,[421] is employed here to refer to a *wrong* approach to addressing the climate change crisis that is currently prevailing within the UNFCCC ('*This commercialising <…> is also* ***insulting***'). The explanation that this approach is driven by the state-centric system of this framework highlights that this *wrong* approach is reproduced by the system itself. The interviewee also mentioned that he feels disappointed because of the totally different value system prevailing in the COP negotiations, and explained that Indigenous peoples often feel misunderstood within this framework. In other words, there is a lack of honesty within the UNFCCC, and there is little space given for the genuine expression of feelings that have arisen among his people. This illustrates an intersection between opposing approaches to addressing the climate change crisis: while Indigenous communities represent a more value-based and integral approach to nature, the UNFCCC environment itself reproduces the *wrong* approach which *commercialises* nature. More importantly, this frustration is expressed by highlighting that this approach depends on the state-centric system, which marginalises crucial voices such as Indigenous communities, and wich further reproduces this *wrong approach* to climate cooperation.

At the same time, the representative admitted that there is no other way of contributing to solving the climate crisis, and therefore, Indigenous communities engage in this framework despite being highly critical of it. This highlights the complicated position of Indigenous peoples where they feel obligated to contribute to addressing the climate change crisis, especially with their *right approach to nature* and *values*. However, their efforts are obstructed because of the unjust institutional framework. As explained by the interviewee, they have no other option but to remain engaged and at least try to promote a '*different value system in this generally unjust environment*'.

Therefore, shared expressions exemplify indignation as they contain expressions of frustration (*intimidating*, *insulting*) when speaking of the unjust institutional framework and conflicting values, limited representation, and

[421] 'Commercialization'.

decisions made by those with the *wrong* value system. Indignation is amplified by the state-centric approach of the UNFCCC, which marginalises the Indigenous knowledge.

The UNFCCC is also portrayed as ineffective in general and as a framework hindering civil society participation (e.g., exclusive practices such as denied access to negotiations). Representatives of civil society NGOs explain that the COP negotiations are associated with highly negative feelings because, as a framework, it does not deliver its results compared to the extent of the event itself:

'*Why do we sit with those people? This is a reason why a lot of NGOs are boycotting COP 28 because meaningful decisions are not being taken, it's being placed in a very, a negative space for everybody <…>*' (Interviewee 2)

Excerpts from ECO newsletters support this with a variety of anger-like feelings expressed when referring to unjust practices within the framework and negotiations:

'*Each year, the COP comes to town and creates a world of its own. Whether you are in Katowice, Bonn, Marrakech, or Paris, the view from the negotiating* ***table is frustratingly generic****. Each year the negotiations are characterized by the same* ***tedious bickering, the same dragging of heels, and the same proactive vandalism of the process by big polluting countries***.' (ECO-13.12.2019)

The excerpt above illustrates how disappointment and frustration are expressed when certain parties seek to perpetuate these injustices with the objective to maintain their advantage. The developed countries (*big polluting countries*) are referred to as those constantly (*tedious*, *the same*) arguing for minor issues (*tedious bickering*), purposively causing delays (*dragging of heels*), and destroying the process of COP (*proactive vandalism*). It is also emphasised that these unjust practices are repeated every year, allowing the developed countries to take advantage of their dominant position within the framework and obstruct a more just approach to climate cooperation.

The excerpts below also illustrate a wide variety of expressions highlighting the indignation invoked towards the UNFCCC, for example, references to anger-related terms (*disappointment*, *fed-up*), negative connotations such as *insulting*, *disgraceful*, *fail,* and intensifying puzzled feelings (*struggling to find right words in the thesaurus*):

'*ECO is **disappointed** by the push and pull tactics in the negotiation rooms on the NAPs agenda item, <…> developing countries*.' (ECO-14.11.2022)

'*In the last article, ECO called the negotiations at this session **insulting, disgraceful, disappointing, and embarrassing**. After Saturday's performance, ECO is even **more puzzled and struggling to find the right words in the thesaurus**. <…> ECO is **fed up** with the **hypocrisy and complacent stance** Parties are showing <…>*' (ECO- 09.12.2019)

'*It's **disappointing** that, on one hand, when countries decide to constructively engage in different activities <…> On the other hand, when it comes to negotiating and agreeing on key elements to make progress on these issues at the UNFCCC, Parties **fail to deliver**. There can't be ambition if there is no justice*.' (ECO-01.12.2019)

'*With consultations on loss and damage nearing half-time here in sunny Sharm el-Sheikh, ECO is **disappointed** to report that — despite the excessive air-conditioning — meeting rooms have been full of little more than hot air. In terms of the process, **things have been difficult**. Loss and Damage are critical issues for this COP, yet room sizes have simply been too small, meaning that observers — and even parties — **got kicked out** of consultations today*.' (ECO-12.11.2022)

Irony and comparisons are also employed to highlight feelings of anger invoked by a lack of inclusivity within the negotiation space and the unjust treatment of representatives from civil society. The excerpt below refers to disappointment as promises about an inclusive COP ('*the most inclusive COP ever*') were not met, and civil society remained excluded ('*no room at the inn*').

'*But the UK presidency insisted that COP 26 was going ahead and was prepared to welcome the global community to "the most inclusive COP ever"… **This spirit of inclusivity has showcased what the Brits do best – the art of queuing for hours in some cases**. People who've invested time and resources to travel to Glasgow have waited patiently only to find there is **"no room at the inn" for civil society** and told to "join events online" – to then find they were offline… We might as well have stayed at home, though we would have missed the weather…*.' (ECO-02.11.2021)

These examples show that the civil society NGOs' discourse contains indignation that is evidenced by expressions of anger that relate to feelings of injustice and the responsibility to address them. This indignation is rooted in

several key aspects of the UNFCCC's functioning. First, there is a widespread sentiment about the UNFCCC's general ineffectiveness in delivering tangible results and meaningful progress in combating climate change. This frustration comes from the perceived lack of concrete actions and outcomes that adequately respond to the urgency of the climate change crisis. Second, the state-centric and inherently unjust approach to climate cooperation within the UNFCCC invokes indignation as it prioritises the interests of nation-states over those of marginalised groups. This is seen as an institutional environment perpetuating systemic inequalities and obstructing the adoption of more inclusive and equitable climate policies and initiatives. Additionally, the technical obstacles that impede the productive participation of civil society organisations in the UNFCCC also contribute to the sense of indignation. Ranging from limited access to decision-making spaces to complex bureaucratic procedures, these obstacles are perceived as unjust and exclude the meaningful participation of non-state actors in shaping the climate policies.

Indignation is invoked through irony, emotional connotations, and emotion terms that highlight the prevailing injustices and structural flaws within this institutional environment. Here, indignation becomes a response to something that is perceived as morally *wrong* in a way that causes social harm and reproduces further injustices. It highlights the ineffectiveness (i.e., the progress is slow and little compared to the extent of COP negotiations) of the UNFCCC and a generally negative approach to climate cooperation that this framework represents. In this way, the UNFCCC is depicted as a *wrong framework* which does not serve its purpose to solve climate change crises but rather reproduces further injustices. This is evidenced by references to *anger feelings* such as *frustration* or *outrage* expressed when speaking of unjust treatment of Indigenous peoples, unjust negotiation practices, and the feeling that decisions are made by those who have little knowledge and in-depth understanding of the climate change policies and their specifics.

This section has shown that emotions such as indignation can function to draw boundaries between what is understood as *morally right* or *wrong* behaviour. During norm emergence, norm entrepreneurs seek to challenge the currently existing boundaries of acceptable behaviour by contesting and negotiating what is considered legitimate or appropriate behaviour.[422] The discourse establishing these boundaries aligns actors based on their behaviour with the emerging norm of climate justice. If NGOs seek to promote climate

[422] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 1998.

justice norm, they need to frame violations of the climate justice principles as being *morally wrong*, thereby pushing actors into compliance with the climate justice principles such as fair burden-sharing, interests of vulnerable communities, and more inclusive decision-making in climate negotiations. Emotions can function as forces reinforcing or constructing boundaries,[423] therefore supporting the argument that indignation can draw boundaries between actors whose behaviour is considered morally *wrong*. This is especially so when indignation includes references to social harm, blame attribution, and goals for adjusting the prevailing violations.

The provided examples illustrate how expressions of indignation are employed to portray actors who violate the climate justice principles as immoral. These examples also imply a moral foundation underneath these emotional expressions. For example, indignation is expressed through frequent references to *cheating* and *betrayal*, which are directed at those that violate the climate justice norm: explicit mentions (e.g., *utter betrayal*) and indirect references (e.g., *land theft*, *they showed their cards clearly* [dishonesty]) are employed. These expressions depict violators of climate justice principles as *unfair* and *cheating*, which contradicts the moral foundation of fairness. In this way, violators of this norm are pushed outside the moral boundaries of the international community: it aims to exert external pressure and ultimately correct their behaviour.

Therefore, this sub-section has shown that indignation expressed through NGOs' discourse helps to adhere to the first three resonance conditions. In the context of the climate justice norm advocacy, the NGOs' discourse invokes indignation by seeking to expose evidence of negative effects caused by climate injustice and linking this behaviour to the violation of human rights. Additionally, indignation is employed to construct the dichotomy between *perpetrators* and *victims*, and depict the current institutional framework – the UNFCCC – as allowing to continue the *perpetrators'* morally unjust actions.

### Perpetrators outside the Boundaries of the Moral Community

The introduced framework of *emotive transformative persuasion* emphasises that NGOs' persuasion for climate justice contains certain emotions that serve specific functions in building resonance. The analysis of the link between indignation expressions and resonance conditions showed that these emotional expressions underpin the statements that are employed to resonate with the international community. Anger-related feelings are

[423] Ahmed, 'The Cultural Politics of Emotion'.

expressed to highlight the caused social harm, non-compliance with the prevailing human rights and universal values, and to attribute blame to certain actors. Such a discourse constructs the image of those who violate the climate justice principles as perpetrators, thereby pushing them outside the boundaries of the moral community.

A moral community refers to a collective unit sharing a set of moral beliefs and values that guide their interactions and responsibilities towards each other.[424] It is a decentralised, inclusive structure that has the authority to introduce new moral norms through individuals working out moral concerns with each other.[425] Crucially, emotions are vital in binding the moral community together, functioning as motivation to act in compliance with moral principles based on empathic and reciprocal understanding.[426] The belief in fairness towards others is considered one of the key attitudes that characterise moral inclusion.[427] Fairness is also one of the key moral foundations, encompassing the notions of justice, inequality, reciprocity, and general unbiased treatment.[428] In other words, members of the moral community have to act based on fairness, equality, and reciprocal treatment of all the other units. Those violating such principles are considered as being outside the moral community: "Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply".[429] The characteristics of indignation refer to the fact that this emotion is invoked because of violations of social rules and justice. It is fundamentally linked to the moral foundations of fairness that underpin the moral community.

Discourse invoking indignation can expose certain issues as violating the moral foundation, thereby pushing those who violate it outside the boundaries of the moral community. Expressions of indignation help to push certain actors outside the boundaries of the moral community by constructing the image of certain actors as *perpetrators* and others as *victims*. Thus, indignation

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[424] Richardson, 'The Idea of the Moral Community'; Richardson, 'Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism', 2018; 'Moral Community'.

[425] Richardson, 'Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism', 2018.

[426] Shoemaker, 'Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of the Moral Community'; Day et al., 'Shifting Liberal and Conservative Attitudes Using Moral Foundations Theory'; Price, 'Moral Norms in World Politics 1'.

[427] Opotow, 'Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction'.

[428] Graham et al., 'Chapter Two - Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism'.

[429] Opotow, 'Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction'.

in this context functions as a boundary-drawing force, pushing certain actors outside the boundaries of the moral community.

To conclude, this section has uncovered that indignation becomes an inseparable element of the discourse which seeks to resonate with the international community. Anger-related feelings are used to highlight evidence of social harm, violations of the prevailing moral principles, and the help of universal values to construct the image of those who violate the climate justice principles as *perpetrators*, causing harm to *victims.* The function of indignation expressions, thus, is to push those who violate the climate justice principles outside the boundaries of the moral community. In their **emotive persuasion**, civil society NGOs invoke indignation to **transform** the current *status quo* by portraying the violators of the climate justice principles as immoral.

### 4.2.2. Hope as a Community-Building Force

Hope is another emotion inseparable from the discourse that NGOs employ to persuade the international community to accept climate justice as a new norm. Expressions of hope also help civil society NGOs to build resonance when persuading for climate justice within the UNFCCC. While indignation is closely linked to the first three resonance conditions, expressions of hope highlight a potentially positive change, thereby reflecting the fourth resonance condition. The last resonance condition refers to the specific behavioural change that is required by norm advocates: giving more rights to those who suffer from climate injustice and who are excluded from the decision-making processes (thus arguing for a power shift towards grassroots movements and vulnerable communities within the UNFCCC framework and related agreements). Thus, the NGOs' discourse should persuade other actors to focus their actions and policies on the climate justice principles, and I argue that expressions of hope are employed to push for this behavioural change.

Expressions of hope help to construct the image of certain actors as *leaders and resisters*, that is, to portray them as the opposite of *perpetrators*, who uphold moral values and transform the climate cooperation framework towards having a more just approach. As shown in the first part of the analysis which identified certain patterns of emotional expressions (pp. 144), the NGOs' discourse refers to hope when speaking of actors who experience the negative effects of the violators' behaviour (including vulnerable communities and NGOs) and those who continue to promote climate justice within the UNFCCC. Hope refers to potential progress and achieved goals, thus depicting those who enable it as *leaders*. Additionally, as hope refers to

the ability to resist challenges and maintain belief in positive change, it constructs the image of those who oppose the prevailing injustices within climate cooperation as *resisters*. The conceptual features of hope refer to a future vision and potential progress, which relates to *leadership*, that is, the understanding of what the future should look like. Hope can also be referred to when actors expect certain changes that, in this case, relate to their *resistance* to the currently prevailing challenges while waiting for potential progress. Therefore, discourse invoking hope can emphasise *leadership* or *resistance*.

The images are important in transforming climate policies towards adopting a justice-based approach: the image of *leaders* shapes the understanding of what the potential change should look like (the feeling of '*oughtness*'), and the image of *resisters* reinforces the understanding of the current climate cooperation framework, the UNFCCC, as unjust (i.e., it highlights the unfair power distribution between the actors in climate cooperation). By portraying those actors who comply with the climate justice principles or advocate for them as *leaders* and *resisters*, expressions of hope align them into a collective unit to which hope, with its positive connotations, is attached. In other words, a group of actors complying with the climate justice principles or advocating for them, is linked to *hope*, as a positive connotation for the desired goal – a normative shift toward climate justice within the UNFCCC framework. Expressions of hope, thus, construct the image of a certain *community* that can bring a positive change in this institutional setting.

Therefore, the invocation of hope helps to build resonance by constructing a positive image of those who represent the principles of climate justice, and by aligning them into the community producing the desired outcome. Thus, in *emotive transformative persuasion*, employed by NGOs to advocate for the climate justice norm, hope functions as a community-building force. **Hope functions as a community-building force in the NGOs' discourse on climate justice within the UNFCCC: it aligns those actors who comply with the climate justice principles or those who advocate for this norm inside the boundaries of the moral community by depicting them as *leaders* or *resisters* who challenge the prevailing injustices in this framework**. This emotion enables adherence to the last resonance condition, encouraging a shift towards a positive outcome (i.e., persuasion of the international community to shift towards a more fair and equitable approach to climate cooperation).

However, as explained before, NGOs' discourse within the UNFCCC refers to different types of hope – active and passive. This has significant

implications when distinguishing between the specific emotional approaches that these actors employ in their persuasion for climate justice. The following section, thus, seeks to uncover how hope functions in NGOs' persuasion for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC by: 1) explaining how the hope discourse helps to resonate in a way that pushes for the change which provides more rights for vulnerable communities and grassroots movements within the climate cooperation framework; and 2) uncovering how expressions of hope create pressure for behavioural change through two different types of hope – active and passive.

## Hope in Resonance Building

The last resonance condition of the persuasion mechanism refers to the specific behavioural shift that is promoted by norm advocates – in this case, solutions to climate change and/or policies that comply with the climate justice principles. Expressions of hope help to depict such change as a future goal towards which the international community should shift.

First, references to hope are employed to highlight compliance with the climate justice principles as a crucial **goal** of the UNFCCC framework and the COP negotiations. Second, references to hope are employed to highlight the actors complying with the climate justice principles and the actors promoting this normative change, such as grassroots movements. As shown in the first section of the analysis (see p. 144), hope expressions have two targets: the actors complying with the climate justice principles and the actors promoting this normative change, such as grassroots movements. A link between hope and ways to achieve the change through certain actors highlights potential **pathways** through which this normative change can be brought within the UNFCCC. Hope expressions, referring to progress and a belief in the expected outcome, establish positive images of those actors. Such images also depict these actors as complying with the moral principles, in contrast to *perpetrators*, thus pushing the shift towards compliance with the climate justice principles. Last, expressions of hope are also employed when speaking of capabilities to bring the climate justice principles into this institutional setting, thus reflecting the **agency** of actors promoting this change (i.e., civil society NGOs). All the presently mentioned aspects refer to the characteristics of hope (pp. 131–135), which shows that hope is invoked to encourage the normative shift promoted by norm entrepreneurs.

Thus, references to hope help to build resonance because they portray compliance with climate justice principles as a positive future goal, led by actors who comply with these principles or advocate for them. Expressions of

hope portray these actors either as ***leaders*** in making the change, or ***resisters*** who challenge the structures of injustice within the UNFCCC. They are depicted as a 'hopeful community', capable of bringing the change within this institutional setting, especially through references to **active** rather than **passive** hope, emphasising their agency in bringing this change.

*Hope creating image of leaders*

First, hope expressions are employed to depict actors and their policies that comply with the climate justice principles as leading examples for climate cooperation, complying with moral principles and values. For instance, the quote below refers to hope when speaking of decisions that comply with the climate justice principles, such as human rights:

'*With real opportunities on negotiation items dwindling, for some, the Cover Decision has* ***become a final glimmer of hope****, where civil society may be able to find a home for strong human rights language, commitments to cutting fossil fuel extraction, and others essential demands that have thus far failed to materialize at COP 26*.' (ECO-11.11.2021)

The usage of *a final glimmer of hope* refers to the hope that is expressed in relation to decisions that comply with the climate justice principles such as the human rights. An example illustrates a direct expression of hope referring to compliance with one of the climate justice principles, which is strengthened by the indignation hidden behind it. Other instances also show how the expression of hope is employed to refer to policies and decisions complying with the climate justice principles, namely, transition, justice-based finance mechanisms, and human rights:

'*There is still* ***hope****. The Santiago Action Plan released by the 51 members of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action on Monday highlights MDBs as priority institutions for Article 2.1(c). <…> with dedicated and robust packages for energy efficiency and just transition.*' (ECO-11.12.2019) '*To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, transparent, adequate, and predictable sources are needed specifically for the most vulnerable countries already facing the impacts of climate change. ECO* ***hopes*** *the 3rd High-Level Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Finance will be used to confirm that.*'; '*In the* ***city of lights and with a light of hope****, those 197 parties agreed, among others, to safeguard principles of human rights, including the rights of Indigenous peoples, food security, just transition, ecosystem integrity and*

*protection of biodiversity, intergenerational equity, gender equality and public participation*.' (ECO-07.12.2018)

The examples above illustrate expressions directly referring to hope. Additionally, this feeling is also identified through other emotional expressions; for example, some excerpts contain a variety of positive expressions referring to hope through positive connotations (e.g., *a vital opportunity*, *spirit of collaboration*):

'*ECO* ***enthusiastically welcomes*** *the Talanoa Dialogue. Talanoa means inclusive, participatory, and transparent dialogue that builds empathy and leads to decision-making for the collective good. Parties should work in this Talanoa* ***spirit*** *to lay the groundwork for a* ***successful outcome*** *from the Dialogue in 2018. This is* ***a vital opportunity*** *to provide the information, create the right conditions, and send the political signals to empower Parties to make their NDCs more ambitious by 2020. Talanoa can thus engender* ***a spirit of collaboration*** *and trust <…>*' (ECO-06.11.2017)

Crucially, hope is expressed toward those actors who cooperate on issues that require adherence to climate justice-based commitments:

'*Today, at the Head of Delegations meeting,* ***ECO felt countries are finally progressing*** *on one of the most basic rules from the artistic world:* ***a good dance requires not only exquisite technique but also a lot of trust in your partner****. Like, for example, when the APA co-chair agreed with Canada: "We are listening to each other and trying to find solutions". ECO* ***hopes this rhythm flows further*** *and would like to propose ideas on how this can lead up to* ***a beautiful tango performance called substantial progress*** *and full operationalization of Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement*.' (ECO-05.12.2018)

This excerpt represents the ECO's position on Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, which reflects the climate justice principle (i.e., requiring the developed country parties to provide financial resources to assist the developing country parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation). This utterance contains a few linguistic features representing hope: positive connotation (*finally progressing*) expressing the long-awaited positive outcomes; also, a direct reference to the emotion of *hope* is employed to express the expectation that sound cooperation between the parties (referred through a comparison to a *good dance* that requires *a lot of trust in your partner*) will continue (*this rhythm flows further*), and that substantial progress (compared with *a beautiful tango performance*) will be achieved. The excerpt,

therefore, illustrates how a variety of linguistic features express hope in actors who would cooperate in good faith on commitments related to climate justice.

Other examples also illustrate how hope is expressed directly towards general agreements of the COP parties to commit to specific principles of climate justice, or to pressure actors to protect vulnerable communities:

'*In the **city of lights and with a light of hope**, those 197 parties agreed, among others, to safeguard principles of human rights, including the rights of Indigenous peoples, food security, just transition, ecosystem integrity and protection of biodiversity, intergenerational equity, gender equality, and public participation*.'; '*We **sincerely hope** that's not the end of the story, though. We hope that they will **listen to the voices** of those fighting on the frontlines as their homes and countries face destruction and quit coal sooner than later*.' (ECO-07.12.2018)

In the previous example, vulnerable communities are referred to as those *fighting on the frontlines*. This reference is regularly employed (also in other utterances) to highlight the struggle to survive the effects of climate change that vulnerable communities must face.[430] Hope is expressed along with the reference to vulnerable communities as *fighters on the frontlines* (i.e., being hopeful that the developed countries will comply with their obligations to assist the developing countries in mitigation and adaptation). Here, expressions of hope are employed to encourage the developed countries to comply with their commitments based on the climate justice.

Furthermore, hope is referred to through indirect references, such as positive connotations (*our dreams*) employed to emphasise the actors (LAC, i.e., Latin America and the Caribbean) as *a new wave of leaders* (promoting a change towards human rights, care, and justice):

'*We have **a new wave of LAC leaders** ready to challenge power and build a decolonial feminist world that divests from harm and extraction and invests in human rights, care, and justice. These leaders remind us of **our dreams** of a global economic transformation that expands beyond the UNFCCC, to tackle the entire economic and financial architecture aiming at sustainability of care and life in the planet, mainstreaming a just framing to degrow the rich and wealthy, to dismantle the logic of profit and to recover environmental integrity. ECO **looks forward to seeing support from the rest of the world** for these **visionary proposals** coming from LAC!*' (ECO-10.11.2022)

[430] 'Climate Frontlines | UNESCO'.

Hope (referred to in the metaphor *our dreams*) is expressed towards the actors (*LAC leaders*) promoting a profound change for the climate justice (e.g., human rights, care, justice), with positive connotations such as *visionary proposals* highlighting feelings of hope. This example, along with others discussed above, represents how hope expressions are employed in reference to the actors complying with or promoting the principles of climate justice. Therefore, expressions of hope, demonstrated with direct and symbolic references (e.g., *Ray of the Day*), invoke representations of a moral example, constructing a positive image as *leaders* of those that comply with or promote the climate justice principles.

The examples illustrate how expressions of hope are directed towards those policies and actors that adhere to the climate justice principles, whereas expressions of indignation are expressed towards those who violate them. Hope is expressed through frequent references to *leadership* as a positive connotation of actors and policies that adhere to the climate justice principles (e.g., *a new wave of LAC leaders*, *visionary proposals*, *looking forward to seeing the support from the rest of the world*). These expressions frame the actors complying with the climate justice principles as a leading example to which/whom the rest of the members of the international community should align. In these utterances, a moral foundation of *care*[431] is referred to: emphasis on the protection from suffering of vulnerable communities, avoiding harm, and caring for human rights. Here, those who comply with the climate justice principles are depicted as *leaders* by emphasising the presence of their moral foundation: it aims to align them with the moral boundaries of the international community.

*Hope creating the image of resisters*

We earlier discussed how expressions of indignation depict the UNFCCC as reproducing injustices (see p. 154). Meanwhile, hope plays a crucial role in aligning the community that seeks to resist these injustices. The emotion of hope is related to motivation: hope explains the mechanisms through which individuals and groups are motivated to continue action despite negative feelings such as disappointment and unfulfilled expectations. Despite being frustrated with the institutional constraints and struggles within this setting, the NGOs in their discourse invoke hope to maintain their resistance. Along with the image of *leaders*, hope expressions also serve to construct the image

[431] Graham et al., 'Chapter Two - Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism'.

of grassroots movements as resisters who challenge the prevailing injustices within the UNFCCC framework. Expressions of hope are also invoked and centred around civil society organisations as a *community promoting the right change* within the unjust institutional environment. This reflects the tension between feeling indignant with the current institutional framework and hope for progress, which represents hope as a tool of resistance against the prevailing injustices. The image of resisters thus helps to establish the legitimacy of civil society NGOs as moral actors within this framework, challenging their marginalisation in the formal negotiation processes.

In spite of feeling disappointed and sometimes hopeless because of injustices prevailing within the climate cooperation framework, and governmental officials' actions in this crisis, representatives of civil society NGOs feel responsible to remain engaged and to provide their contribution. As shown by the examples, individuals, at least to some level, believe that their efforts are effective and may lead to change. They feel responsible to contribute and advocate for climate justice-based solutions that are not considered by the governmental officials that have decision-making powers. In fact, their contribution is deeply attached to hope, as shown by direct and direct references.

'*If you are in the game, you have to play the game*' (i.e., *play according to the rules of the game*), said a few interviewees explaining their continued engagement in the UNFCCC framework despite disappointment in it. Representatives of civil society NGOs admit that the UNFCCC remains the main platform for climate cooperation, within which some change can be achieved.[432] This idea is also reflected in utterances found within the official discourse of civil society NGOs (e.g., ECO newsletters), where they explain that they seek to balance indignation and hope while participating in the UNFCCC framework and experiencing injustices within it (e.g., *colonial systems*). Thus, the UNFCCC becomes a *game* with unjust *rules*, for example, unfair treatment of civil society NGOs or an unjust approach to climate cooperation in general (*colonial system*, *wrong values towards nature*). However, civil society NGOs remain engaged in this framework (*playing the*

[432] The change is achieved not only in the COP negotiations (considered as a final point of exhausting meetings beforehand) but also in related events such as pre-COP or meetings with officials before COP negotiations.

*game according to its rules*) as they have no other option to advocate for their ideas strongly focusing on climate justice. Their participation and continued advocacy for climate justice is therefore reflected by the interplay of indignation and hope, that is, representatives of civil society NGOs remain in constant tension caught between those feelings while engaging in the UNFCCC framework.

Additionally, the interviewees expressed frustration that climate policies are mostly shaped by those (*governmental officials*, *technocrats*) who have little knowledge or genuine care for the climate change crisis and the unjust effects that vulnerable communities are experiencing. Further, the interviewees emphasise that it makes them feel responsible to contribute to and promote climate justice-based policies, which they consider to be the *right* approach to cooperation. The quote from another resource, the ECO newsletter, accurately represents an emotional challenge that the UNFCCC as a framework of climate cooperation creates for those advocating for climate justice:

'*These climate negotiations are* ***spiritually and physically taxing and always fall drastically short, painting a picture of hopelessness****. However, we know* ***hope is rooted in those people and communities*** *outside of this venue who understand that we need (re) connection to our land and our teachings*.' (ECO-17.09.2022)

An in-depth look allows us to extract further emotionalising effects from this utterance, which illustrates how expressions of hope and indignation depict the UNFCCC as an obstructive framework to create a change, while at the same time civil society is depicted as a community that can make this crucial change. COP negotiations (*these climate negotiations*) are shown as difficult and disappointing for civil society (*falls drastically short*) and desperate (*hopelessness*), with an emphasis that the real *hope* lies in *people and community*. *Hope* is referred to via the civil society (*people and community*) acting *outside of this venue*, as opposite to those that are acting within the venue (i.e., governmental officials). Within this context, hope means successful outcomes of negotiations that align with the climate justice principles, as advocated by NGOs. The depiction of the negotiating framework as *physically and spiritually taxing* (and also by employing intensifying linguistic markers such as *always*) exposes this framework as an obstructive environment to create a change. Meanwhile, *hope* is attached to the community of civil society as those who can create a real change, yet the change is created *outside the venue*, which, again, exposes challenges to create

the change within the framework of negotiations. The utterance also refers to indignation through the expression of disappointment, that is, negotiations are depicted as disappointing and desperate (*a picture of hopelessness*).

The excerpt illustrated intertwined indignation and hope, where the former refers to the negotiation framework itself, while hope refers to civil society groups as those capable of making a real change. Other examples also illustrate how indignation and hope are invoked by highlighting the injustices within the UNFCCC and the *hopeful* contribution of civil society NGOs. This tension between the feelings of indignation and hope can be exemplified by additional utterances from ECO newsletters, for example:

'*While progress has been **slow and negotiations have been frustrating**, ECO still has **hope for a positive outcome**. With a flurry of new texts, ECO was **hopeful** that Parties had made good progress. But upon closer examination, ECO is **very worried**. Not content to undermine ambition alone, backsliding continues to broaden its reach to the whole rulebook. With each new APA text, ECO's **worries grow**. Where are the rights? Where are non-party stakeholders? Where are Indigenous peoples? Where is gender? Food security? Just transition? Intergenerational equity? Biodiversity and ecosystem integrity? Just three years after the Paris Agreement was adopted, it seems **Parties are suffering from amnesia**.*'

'*Today, hundreds of civil society delegates marched in sweltering heat in the COP 27 venue demanding climate justice, reminding us all that real lives and livelihoods hang in the balance as rich nations continue to delay and distract from their climate obligations. Meanwhile, US Special Envoy John Kerry was blunt and cold in his statements on the US position here at COP 27 on loss and damage finance*.' (ECO-14.11.2022)

An excerpt from writing by Indigenous peoples in the ECO newsletter contains linguistic features that refer to both the identified emotion categories. For example, it directly refers to hope through the emotion term (*hope*), and the presence of indignation is reflected by referring to *frustration* (i.e., conceptualised as a marker of indignation when used in the context of climate justice). Along with a direct reference to hope, an analogy ('*We are medicine*') is employed to refer to Indigenous peoples as those who can provide solutions for climate change:

'*As we work towards harmony and beauty, we must remember that it is okay to hold **both hope and frustration** in our bodies and spirit. It's okay to*

*make time for both* ***pain and joy*** *with our international relatives! Dance together. Cry together. Sing together. Hold each other.* ***We are hope. We are medicine****. Similarly, the work of our* ***climate justice movement*** *needs balance as well*.' (ECO-17.09.2022)

This refers to Indigenous peoples as those capable of *treating* the climate change crisis with their knowledge and *climate justice movement*. This example not only represents hope and indignation but also refers to its simultaneous functioning (*needs balance as well*), that is, there is a back-and-forth between those feelings when these actors advocate for climate justice.

Another example further illustrates the tension between hope and indignation:

'*We have to sit with the duality that the COPs are often an* ***abysmal failure*** *and* ***a resounding success*** *at the* ***same time.*** *While we would all like to return to our communities with international standards like Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, and our rights throughout 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8, we must also acknowledge* ***the victories*** *that Indigenous folks* ***in this space have long strived and struggled for****. Do we celebrate* ***the bread crumbs****, or do* ***we shout from the roof*** *that it's not enough?* ***We do both****. That's the duality of the COP that we must now take home*.' (ECO-12.11.2021)

The excerpt contains a variety of linguistic features that signal its emotion potential: the utterance *abysmal failure* is emotionally loaded (i.e., it carries a negative connotation, *failure*, and an intensifying marker *abysmal*), and refers to *disappointment* (i.e., something that was expected is not achieved); *a resounding success* is also an emotionally loaded term (i.e., a positive connotation, *success*, and intensifying marker *resounding*), referring to positive outcomes that Indigenous peoples sometimes manage to achieve in COP negotiations; other positive connotations (*the victories*) and intensifying markers (*have long strived and struggled for*) refer to positive outcomes achieved. They are employed to refer to positive outcomes achieved in COP negotiations that are celebrated as small victories (*the bread crumbs*) in relation to the expectations (*shout from the roof that it's not enough*). While the negative connotation referring to disappointment reflects the presence of indignation, expressions such as *success* or *victory* refer to hope. Hope (as active hope) is associated with events that are perceived to be controllable to some degree, and it motivates actors to make these events more likely to happen. As illustrated by the example, Indigenous peoples *long strived and*

*struggled for* those *victories* in COP negotiations, which refers to feeling hopeful about their continued engagement in COP negotiations. Opposing expressions (*abysmal failure/a resounding success*, *victories/the bread crumbs*) represent a tension of feelings prevailing that such groups experience in COP negotiations: they also *celebrate the bread crumbs* (i.e., small victories) and *shout from the roof that it's not enough* (i.e., feeling disappointed) which refers to a duality of feelings.

Other utterances expressed by ECO (as the voice of CAN NGOs), in general, also illustrate a constant fluctuation between feelings that either refer to hope or indignation.

'*But ECO's sixth sense detects some* ***cynicism*** *in the halls –* ***a lingering shadow over the talks****, occasionally expressed in a quiet comment here and there, that indicates* ***a lack of belief that we can achieve all of our most ambitious hopes****. As an antidote of sorts, ECO would like to point out that* ***there is still room for optimism****: hidden deep in the 200-odd pages, we actually have great options in the text which, if kept, will achieve* ***a truly great and historic agreement*** *in Copenhagen. We can choose to keep these options, to protect the most vulnerable and least culpable, to have ambition in our targets, and to ensure that all nations' true best interests are protected.*' (ECO-12.08.2009)

In this utterance, civil society emphasises the importance of believing in their goals, referring to climate justice (i.e., *to protect the most vulnerable*), although their hope (*all of our most ambitious hopes*) is contradicted by disappointment (*cynicism, a lingering shadow over the talks*). Here, NGOs are encouraged to maintain hope (*there is still room for optimism <...> if kept, will achieve a truly great and historic agreement*) despite feeling disappointed.

'*When we sit with our families at the end of December, we will be able to reflect back on an exhausting year, culminating in a daze of frenetic and strained meetings in Copenhagen which pulled a miracle out of the jaws of defeat. We cannot let our cynicism lock that possibility out of reality. Just as failure is unimaginable, success is imaginable, it is possible.*'

'*Clearly, on climate action, and especially on loss and damage, the global situation and the political situation are sadly out of sync. Here at the COP, we started with a great deal of optimism. However, a COP that was perceived*

*as an opportunity to reshape and strengthen the WIM [Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage] looks now to have been a false promise*.' (ECO-13.12.2019)

The above-discussed examples illustrate that the emotion discourse of NGOs represents a tension between indignation and hope. ECO newsletters exemplify this duality by showing how the NGO community seeks to maintain hope in the face of the *failing* UNFCCC framework, which is perceived as deeply flawed and requiring substantial change. The hope discourse emphasises their struggles as challenges that require maintaining hope, experienced within the institutional setting of the UNFCCC. This highlights their determination to maintain opposition to the perceived systemic unfairness while also working toward positive change – in other words, by highlighting their image as *resisters.*

Thus, expressions of hope are invoked when speaking of actors who either comply with climate justice principles or promote them. These expressions attach positive images to these actors by portraying them as *leaders*, capable of bringing the 'morally right' change within the UNFCCC, or by portraying them as *resisters*, continuously challenging the structures of injustice prevailing within the UNFCCC. Hope, expressed through NGOs' language in this institutional setting, depicts such actors as a 'hopeful community', which is closely linked to advocacy and the implementation of the climate justice principles. Crucially, this community, especially through references to active hope, is depicted as agents capable of bringing the needed change within the UNFCCC.

### 'Hopeful community' – Climate Justice Advocates

Representatives of civil society NGOs emphasise the importance of connection and feelings of community with other civil society NGOs which they experience in international climate negotiations. When speaking of their feelings of hope, the interviewees' experiences usually refer to their fellow colleagues from civil society NGOs. They explain that their hope strongly increases when they feel *this collective energy* of their community in COP negotiations and the side events. These events are held along with the formal UNFCCC negotiations and function as an important platform for civil society NGOs to engage in climate action at the international level beyond the official discussions. For example, workshops, seminars, and other events are organised to create the space for NGOs to share their knowledge and build capacity. One interviewee remembered one of the side events as her most

emotional experience, in which she 'almost cried' when she felt this sense of community with other activists. She explained that these experiences and feelings are the most inspiring moments, encouraging them to remain engaged in climate advocacy.

Hope can function to align actors into a community, especially in movements that focus on the advocacy for human rights.[433] The analysis shows that hope is expressed when representatives of civil society NGOs, advocating for climate justice, reflect on common experiences with their colleagues, emphasising that this *motivates* them to remain engaged in climate advocacy. Notably, the UNFCCC framework engages many different civil society NGOs, as mentioned above, ranging from Indigenous peoples' organisations to ENGOs and the youth, with different backgrounds, varying interests, and approaches. However, the previously discussed examples show that they feel as a *community* through hope, that is, this aligns them into a 'single unit' despite their differences. This is also evidenced by expressions in ECO newsletters, where the common position of civil society NGOs is publicly reflected.

Therefore, the hope discourse underpins the persuasive argumentation which civil society NGOs employ to advocate for climate justice. Expressions of hope help to build resonance by portraying compliance with the climate justice principles as a desired future outcome, while attaching positive images to those actors who promote this change. This reflects the last resonance condition, highlighting the behavioural change focused on providing more rights to vulnerable communities and inclusive, justice-based climate cooperation (i.e., adhering to the last resonance condition). This emotion aligns certain actors into *a community* that promotes the *right values* (*climate justice*) while, at the same time, resisting further injustices within the *wrong* institutional framework (*reproducing further injustices*).

To reiterate, hope is expressed by focusing on goals, pathways, and agency. The analysed examples showed how expressions of hope highlight compliance with the climate justice principles as a desired goal, and emphasise the continued engagement and participation of civil society NGOs as the potential pathway to achieve the desired outcome. Regarding agency, the two types of hope – active and passive – become important, together with the observation that civil society NGOs refer to both these types when advocating for climate justice within the UNFCCC. Thus, the NGOs' discourse invokes hope to promote change by constructing positive images of actors who

[433] Bosco, 'Emotions that Build Networks: Geographies of Human Rights Movements in Argentina and beyond'.

promote climate justice - depicting them as both leaders who exemplify moral values and resisters who challenge prevailing injustices within the UNFCCC framework.

### Creating pressure for change through different approaches: active and passive hope

The first step of the analysis revealed that the NGOs' discourse refers to two types of hope, i.e., active hope and passive hope. While some of the expressions refer to the abstract feeling of hope (passive hope as a general expectation that change will happen because of external factors), expressions of hope also refer to deliberate actions toward the desired outcome (active hope).[434] Varying references to hope imply different emotional approaches to promote the climate justice norm. Along with invoking indignation, civil society NGOs invoke either passive or active hope.

As discussed earlier, active hope is characterised by intentional actions aimed at achieving specific goals. It involves a proactive stance where individuals take deliberate steps to influence their future.[435] Passive hope is described as a more general and abstract expectation, where, although individuals maintain a hopeful outlook, it involves an experience of powerlessness and a reliance on external factors or faith. It is more related to a lack of control over the situation (i.e., personal agency is absent or not exercised), whereas active hope is closely linked to a sense of successful agency. [436] This leads to different ways of resistance.

On the one hand, the invocation of passive hope frames vulnerable communities and NGOs, representing them as powerless rather than active agents. Within the features of hope (see p. 131–135), the goal remains focused on achieving climate justice as a norm to which the international community adheres. However, the focus here is on the change in external factors (i.e., actions of other actors, especially the developed countries), and not on the capacity of civil society NGOs to produce the change (i.e., agency). The possibility to achieve this goal in such a discourse is linked to the actions of *others*, that is, it is expected that actors in a position of power will be compassionate towards the sufferings of vulnerable communities, and pay

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434 Govier, 'Hope and Its Opposites'.

435 Park, Williams, and Zurba, 'Understanding Hope and what it Means for the Future of Conservation'.

436 Govier, 'Hope and its Opposites'; Miceli and Castelfranchi, 'Hope: The Power of Wish and Possibility'; Park, Williams, and Zurba, 'Understanding Hope and what it Means for the Future of Conservation'.

attention to the exposed evidence of negative effects caused by their actions – and therefore shift their behaviour to comply with the basic human rights. As for the agency, this discourse then leads to a passive position of those suffering from climate injustice, and reproduces their powerless position by emphasising vulnerability and dependence on external forces: *other actors*' (e.g., developed countries') benevolence and willingness to change their behaviour. This is especially so when references to compassion are also employed, for example: "When disasters hit, we are literally left behind, and it is no surprise that we are the first to die in fires, floods, heat waves, black-outs caused by climatic events and other climate impacts" (ECO-3.12.2019); "You lose your income, livelihood and eventually your house. You try to claim reparations in the local court but you are ignored. You try to get your plea across the ocean, where policymakers are deciding over the fate of the trees, water, and air of your community. But your voice isn't heard. You end up with nothing but the clothes on your back, unsheltered from all kinds of violence" (ECO-5.11.2021); "Waiting for their cries for climate justice to be heard" (ECO-12.11.26). Such a discourse appeals to the violators' moral obligation and responsibility to save those suffering from climate injustice. Thus, appeals for compassion are also often employed along with references to hope and the expectation that the behaviour of external actors will change. This reinforces the vulnerability of those suffering from climate injustice and reproduces their powerless position in this framework.

On the other hand, NGOs also refer to hope in a way that focuses on their active position. It refers to elements of hope that position them as active agents rather than as helpless and dependent on the benevolence of more powerful actors such as the developed states. In terms of the features of hope, the goal also remains focused on achieving climate justice as a norm. The pathways to achieve this goal are linked to the continued engagement of civil society NGOs and their community in general, which is represented specifically by active hope. Rather than relating hope to expectations that decision-makers will be benevolent towards harm caused by climate injustice, hope here is related to representatives of NGOs as agents able to make a change and their responsibility to continue advocacy for this change. In other words, pathways to achieve the desired aim are linked to their own actions and capabilities rather than to officials and decision-makers.

Therefore, references to different types of hope have implications for the agency of those who promote the desired goal: a focus on active rather than passive hope implies an enhanced agency as it emphasises the belief in the civil society NGOs' capability to promote climate justice principles within the UNFCCC, and, at the same time, to resist unjust structures that they find in

this institutional setting. Reliance on references to the responsibility of their own community rather than compassion from decision-makers positions NGOs as legitimate agents who are able to contribute to climate change cooperation meaningfully rather than as powerless actors dependent on external forces such as the benevolence of developed countries to comply with the climate justice principles.

Whereas in both active and passive hope-based approaches, the goal remains the same, that is, to implement the climate justice principles, the approaches to achieve this goal can be framed in different ways: one highlights the *vulnerability* of those who suffer from climate injustice, relying on their position as powerless agents relying on the external actors' benevolence; the other focuses on the image of vulnerable communities and those who advocate for their interests as *leaders*, relying on their position as active agents capable of resisting injustice and encouraging change. Therefore, different approaches to address the injustices within the UNFCCC emerge:

- The *active hope*-based approach focuses on the active role of NGOs through references to their responsibility to continue acting despite facing struggles to resist injustices within the UNFCCC framework. It maintains a positive attitude towards success in shifting the current climate cooperation framework towards a more just approach.
- The *passive hope*-based approach focuses on the powerless position of NGOs through references to their limited capabilities to contribute to the decision-making and shift policies towards a more just approach within the UNFCCC. It maintains the attitude that the success of the goal achievement depends on external actors.

Images of *leaders* and *resisters* play an important role in transforming climate cooperation towards a more just approach because they promote the climate justice principles by attaching them to the image of *leadership*, and highlight the unequal power distribution by depicting grassroots movements as *resisters*. Hope discourse highlights the needed transformation of the UNFCCC towards a fairer and more equitable climate cooperation, with an emphasis on actors complying with or promoting these principles as exemplifying moral values and principles. References to future progress or expectation for a positive outcome are deployed to emphasise the needed change (i.e., a feeling of *oughtness*). Thus, the discourse that seeks to mobilise action and encourage change needs to depict the potential change as a positive future outcome, and expressions of hope are employed to achieve that. In this way, such a discourse helps to adhere to the last resonance condition: the need to transform the current climate cooperation approach in a way that would be more inclusive and give the vulnerable communities more rights.

This section of the analysis uncovered how the emotion of hope functions as a community-building force: hope expressions depict actors complying with the climate justice principles or advocating for them as a 'hopeful community' exemplifying a positive change and the desired outcome. Hope and its connotations enable this discourse (e.g., future vision, expected outcome), thereby attaching a positive image (i.e., *adherence to moral principles*) to actors complying with or promoting the climate justice principles and aligning them into a 'hopeful community'. However, a focus on active hope implies the enhanced agency of this community as it highlights their capabilities to shift the climate policies towards a more just approach. This leads to two approaches to the civil society NGOs' persuasion for climate justice within the UNFCCC: one invoking indignation and passive hope, and another one invoking indignation and active hope, with the latter emphasising the agency of civil society NGOs as agents capable of making a change.

## Summary of Analysis: Indignation-Hope Nexus in *Emotive Transformative Persuasion*

The first part of the analysis has identified the dominant emotions and distinguished certain patterns of their expressions, that is, how and towards what actors and policies they were expressed. The second part of the analysis sought to contextualise these patterns within the persuasion mechanism, while focusing on resonance employed by NGOs in the advocacy for new norms: it looked at how expressions of hope and indignation help to build resonance with international community. The framework introduced in this thesis (*emotive transformative persuasion*) describes the way through which emotions function in the norm persuasion mechanism linked to claims for justice. The analysis sought to apply the framework by relying on emotion discourse analysis and interviews, and to uncover the role of specific emotions by analysing the case of the civil society NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. It has revealed the significance of the indignation-hope emotional nexus, and explained the specific functions that these emotions serve in the context of persuasion for this norm. Based on the identified emotions of indignation and hope (both active and passive), the analysis has also identified certain emotional approaches that civil society NGOs employ in their advocacy for climate justice.

After identifying the dominant emotions, and explaining their characteristics within the context of this case, the analysis sought to uncover how expressions of indignation and hope help to build resonance. Table 6 illustrates how the indignation-invoking discourse helps to adhere to the first

three resonance conditions (exposure of caused harm, link to violations of human rights, and the perpetrator-victim dichotomy), and hope-invoking discourse helps to adhere to the last resonance condition (focusing on giving more rights to those who suffer from climate injustice and who are excluded from decision-making processes):

**Table 6.** *Resonance building through indignation-hope emotion discourse*

| Resonance Conditions | Contribution of Indignation/Hope |
|---|---|
| Providing credible and compelling evidence of negative effects caused by the ignorance of the rights of vulnerable communities. | Indignation: Emphasises harm caused because of non-compliance with the climate justice principles, through emotional appeals that display anger, attribute blame, and highlight the violation of moral values. |
| Drawing explicit links between climate injustice and violation of human rights. | Indignation: Frames climate justice violations within a human rights framework. |
| Establishing a dichotomy between those who suffer and those responsible for the suffering of vulnerable communities. | Indignation: Constructs the image of violators of climate justice as *perpetrators*, and actors suffering from climate injustice as *victims.* |
| Making the case for the implementation of climate policies/solutions to the climate change crisis that are inclusive and fair towards those who suffer from climate injustice and are excluded from decision-making processes. | Hope: Attaches positive images (*leaders* and *resisters*) to actors promoting a shift towards climate justice within the UNFCCC, which portrays them as a '*hopeful community*'. Both passive (external factors) and active (agency of civil society and civil society NGOs) hope is invoked to encourage this normative shift. |

As explained in the conceptual framework of this thesis, emotions perform certain functions in international relations (i.e., *emotive*, referring to the performative function of emotions, which means that emotions are particular performatives that serve certain functions).[437] In the context of this thesis, it was assumed that certain emotions function to shape climate justice as a norm within the international climate cooperation institutions. Thus, the norm advocacy strategy employed by norm entrepreneurs – *persuasion* – was conceptualised as emotive, that is, underpinned by certain emotions. By employing persuasion, norm entrepreneurs seek to employ a discourse that resonates with the international community, that is, their discourse focuses on certain resonance conditions that were applied in the context of this thesis in

[437] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.

the conceptual framework (see p. 94). The approach to emotions developed within the field of the emotional turn in IR allowed for the assumption that emotions, embedded in the actors' discourse, function as *transformative* forces, challenging the *status quo* pushing for change in the international community. Therefore, *emotive transformative persuasion* explains how norm entrepreneurs rely on emotions to advocate for climate justice, thereby challenging the injustices of the UNFCCC within this framework and pushing it towards more fair and inclusive climate cooperation.

Indignation and hope prove to be a crucial emotional nexus in the context of NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. This represents the tension that functions to emphasize prevailing injustices while at the same time fostering a belief in potential change. Table 7 illustrates how the NGOs' discourse combines indignation and hope to enhance the resonance of their advocacy and promote normative transformation within the UNFCCC. Each column demonstrates how these emotional expressions function together to build resonance for climate justice. As shown, both emotions – indignation and hope – serve **functions** that enable persuasion for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC, with indignation functioning as a *boundary-drawing force* and hope serving as a *community-building force*. These functions are uncovered through the discourse employed to persuade for climate justice norms, focusing on **resonance conditions** while seeking persuasive argumentation (see Table 7): the indignation discourse adheres to the resonance conditions focused on emphasising evidence of harm, link to human rights and universal values, and establishing a perpetrator-victim dichotomy; the hope discourse adheres to the last resonance condition, as it is invoked to mobilise the community promoting a shift towards climate justice within the UNFCCC.[438]

NGOs' emotion discourse, embedded with indignation and hope, creates pressure for a normative change in international climate cooperation (see Table 7): indignation expressions help to construct the image of those who violate the climate justice principles as perpetrators and portray the UNFCCC framework as reproducing injustices, and are thus in need of a normative transformation; hope expressions help to portray those who push this transformation as *leaders* or *resisters*. The hope discourse attaches positive images to actors complying with the climate justice principles and promotes them as agents *leading* toward a positive change. Hope expressions also highlight civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities as agents *resisting*

[438] Labonte, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect'.

injustice while at the same time pushing for positive change. This shows that a combination of indignation and hope is crucial in the NGOs' climate justice advocacy as this nexus allows them to highlight violations of the climate justice principles (indignation) while simultaneously offering hope for transformation.

**Table 7.** *Functions of emotions (indignation and hope) in climate justice advocacy within the UNFCCC*

| **Emotion** | **Indignation** | **Hope** |
|---|---|---|
| **Function** | *Boundary-drawing force* | *Community-building force* |
| **Role in resonance building** | - Invoked to **expose evidence of harm** caused by violation of climate justice principles.<br>- Invoked to frame violations of climate justice principles as a **violation of human rights**.<br>- Invoked to frame violators of climate justice principles as **perpetrators**, and those who suffer as **victims**. | - Invoked to mobilise a *community* promoting **a shift towards climate justice** within the UNFCCC. |
| **Creating pressure for normative change in climate justice** | *Image of Perpetrators* (*violators of climate justice principles*): Exposing injustices and violations of moral principles (outside the boundaries of the moral community). | *Image of Leaders:* Portraying climate justice compliance and advocacy as exemplifying leadership and positive future outcomes (inside the boundaries of the moral community). |
| | *UNFCCC as reproducing injustices*: A framework in need of a normative transformation. | *Image of Resisters*: Positive change coming from grassroots movements and vulnerable communities through passive or active hope. |

Two types of hope are invoked in the analysed discourse. Hope can be expressed through *active* or *passive* approaches, which foster different types of agency in those who seek to resist the prevailing injustices and promote change within the UNFCCC. Expressions of **passive hope**, referring to the dependence of vulnerable communities on more powerful actors, are potentially shaped by the prevailing structures inherent in the UNFCCC

environment: the more powerful position of the already dominant actors is highlighted as having the potential for effecting change. Expressions of **active hope**, referring to the grassroots movements' responsibility and their image as *leaders*, foster a belief in their own agency rather than in the dominant actors' power and potential to challenge the prevailing structures. Thus, resistance to injustices within the UNFCCC is performed by invoking hope, either passive or active.

Accordingly, the NGOs' advocacy for climate justice is underpinned by certain emotional approaches (see Table 8). Table 8 delineates two distinct emotional approaches employed by NGOs in the climate justice advocacy within the UNFCCC framework. The first approach combines indignation with passive hope, where indignation exposes the current *status quo* within the UNFCCC as in need of a normative transformation, and hope is invoked as a general feeling that decision-makers will empathise with the sufferings of vulnerable communities. However, this approach focuses on vulnerable communities primarily and civil society NGOs representing them as victims (see Table 8, *Agents of change*), requiring protection and relying on external actors to facilitate change (see Table 8, *Change mechanism*). This approach reinforces the existing power dynamics by highlighting their powerlessness within the UNFCCC framework (see Table 8, *Implications*). On the contrary, the second approach (see Table 8, *Emotional Approach*) shifts from a mere exposure of the current *status quo* within the UNFCCC as in need of a normative transformation and along with indignation, invokes active hope, while emphasising vulnerable communities and civil society NGOs as active agents of change (see Table 8, *Agents of change*). The latter approach, thus, mobilises the advocates of climate justice to resist the prevailing injustices within the UNFCCC by emphasising their internal capability to produce change (see Table 8, *Change mechanism*) rather than reliance on external actors. This approach positions civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities as leading the change while resisting injustice, thereby challenging the existing power dynamics (see Table 8, *Implications*).

**Table 8.** *Emotional approaches of NGOs to promote climate justice as a norm within the UNFCCC*

| **Emotional Approach** | *Invocation of indignation and passive hope* | *Invocation of indignation and active hope* |
|---|---|---|
| **Agents of Change** | Civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities as victims, expecting a change through external actors | Civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities as agents of change |
| **Change mechanism** | External factors and actions of other actors | Internal capability of civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities to produce change |
| **Implications** | - Exposes the current *status quo* within the UNFCCC as in need of a normative transformation (indignation)<br>- Reinforces powerlessness of civil society NGOs and vulnerable communities within the UNFCCC system by emphasising their dependence on external actors (passive hope) | - Exposes the current status quo within the UNFCCC as in need of a normative transformation (indignation)<br>- Enables resistance to prevailing injustices within the UNFCCC by emphasising the internal capability of civil society NGOs and vulnerable community to produce change (active hope) |

Thus, indignation-hope emerges as the NGOs' approach in their advocacy for the climate justice norm within the institutional environment of the UNFCCC, challenging the prevailing injustices within this framework. The difference in ways through which NGOs invoke hope is significant in showing how emotions are employed to promote climate justice as a norm within the institutional environment, which the advocates perceive as inherently unjust. Therefore, the emergence of either passive or active hope, along with indignation, reveals the complexities that these actors must face in these institutional settings. In general, a combination of indignation and hope appeals helps to mobilise feelings of injustice and draw attention to social harm caused by certain actors through indignation and, at the same time, push for a certain change through invoking hope.

# 5. CONCLUSION

The normative shift towards climate justice in international climate cooperation has strong emotional underpinnings, yet the role of emotions in the construction of this norm remains overlooked. The new principles challenge the prevailing domination of the developed countries by exposing their behaviour as morally unjust, and emphasising the harm caused to vulnerable communities. Persuasion for this norm inevitably involves emotions, but this remains understudied in the literature analysing the climate justice norm, as well as in the research on the role of emotions in international politics. This thesis sought to address this gap by focusing on civil society NGOs as norm entrepreneurs, actively participating in crucial climate cooperation frameworks such as the UNFCCC. The thesis raised the question of *how and which emotions NGOs employ to persuade actors to accept climate justice as a norm within the UNFCCC*. To address this question, this thesis developed a framework linking emotions and norm persuasion in the context of justice claims and applied this framework by employing emotion discourse analysis and interviews to uncover the role of specific emotions in NGOs' persuasion for climate justice.

The framework of *emotive transformative persuasion* brought together theories conceptualising emotions in international politics, and theories explaining the norm construction process in international politics. For the first, the thesis relied on Yohan Ariffin's conceptualisation of emotions as *emotives* (emotionally toned evaluations, expressed through language), and Simon Koschut's framework focusing on emotions as forces able to transform understandings, beliefs, and power dynamics among actors in world politics. For the second, the thesis relied on Melissa Labonte's framework explaining how actors, such as NGOs, advocate for new international norms by engaging in persuasion that seeks to resonate with the international community by complying with certain resonance conditions. The developed concept was applied by analysing the case of the civil society NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC. The analysis sought to explore the role of specific emotions in case of civil society NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC, and explain their power to shape the understanding of the climate justice norm. It did so by employing emotion discourse analysis and conducting interviews with representatives of civil society NGOs participating in international climate change negotiations. The thesis defended the following statements:

1) Emotions underpin the construction of the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC through the civil society NGOs' discourse: emotions, invoked through the discourse of norm entrepreneurs, shape a shared understanding of climate justice as a *morally right* approach to climate cooperation. This process can be conceptualised as *emotive transformative persuasion*, on which civil society NGOs rely to advocate for climate justice. This advocacy approach refers to the norm entrepreneurs' discourse that invokes certain emotions to resonate with the international community, and to challenge the prevailing domination of certain actors. The concept assumes that the norm entrepreneurs' persuasion language mobilises certain emotives,[439] which function to transform the prevailing understandings and beliefs.
2) Within *emotive transformative persuasion*, indignation and hope are two dominant emotions in the context of the NGOs' advocacy for the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC. Indignation refers to anger-related feelings, a moral focus on social injustice, and actions aimed at systemic change. Hope, comprising active and passive forms, manifests through direct references to this emotion and references to similar feelings of excitement, enthusiasm, or optimism in relation to the conceptual features of hope: goals, pathways, and agency. The indignation-hope nexus highlights what needs to change (exposing injustices through indignation) while maintaining a belief that change is possible (encouraging progress through hope), and mobilising the community that is able to bring this change (actors complying with climate justice principles and advocating for them). Thus, indignation functions as a boundary-drawing force (pushing actors violating the climate justice principles outside the boundaries of the moral community). Hope functions as a community-building force (aligning those actors that comply with the climate justice principles or promote them into a 'hopeful community').
3) The norm entrepreneurs of climate justice (civil society NGOs), acting within the UNFCCC framework, perceive the UNFCCC framework as inherently unjust, and thus reproducing the prevailing inequalities in international climate cooperation. In this context, invocation of indignation and hope emerges as an emotional approach of civil society NGOs seeking to promote the climate justice norm within the UNFCCC. This emotional approach can be employed in two ways based on two types of hope: indignation and passive hope; and indignation and active hope. In both strategies, mobilised indignation draws attention to the prevailing

[439] Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations'.

injustices and frames the *status quo* as wrong and in need of a normative change. Along with indignation, the invoked passive hope reflects the prevailing restraints for grassroots movements to produce change (depicting representatives of civil society as dependent on the dominating actors). The approach involving the invocation of indignation and passive hope highlights the dependence on external actors and vulnerability of grassroots movements, which reproduces the currently existing power dynamics. Meanwhile, along with indignation, the invoked active hope emphasises the agency and leadership of grassroots movements and focuses on their responsibility to promote progress towards climate justice (thus depicting them as capable of contributing to change).

The thesis offers a theoretical contribution by introducing the framework of *emotive transformative persuasion*, linking emotions, and norm persuasion in the context of justice claims. It explains how the norm entrepreneurs' persuasion discourse invokes certain emotions that function to transform the prevailing understandings and beliefs. The introduced framework addresses the call for a deeper investigation into the emotional underpinnings of norm construction in international politics.[440] By applying the framework in the case of the civil society NGOs' advocacy for climate justice within the UNFCCC, the thesis shows how the role of certain emotions can be uncovered by analysing the construction of a specific norm. The thesis brings the emotional dimension into the explanations of norm emergence from the perspective of the emotional turn in IR, focusing on the context of the climate justice norm advocacy. The concept of *emotive transformative persuasion* can be useful when considering those actors who feel marginalised in diplomatic settings and who advocate for a more inclusive approach, for example, Indigenous peoples, or people with disabilities. The emerging field of literature focusing on the 'agency of the governed' would also benefit from the concept of *emotive transformative persuasion* as it can be employed to analyse how emotions enable those considered as *governed* to seek to shift international norms to improve their agency.[441] Therefore, the concept of *emotive transformative persuasion* provides a theoretical contribution to analyse how emotions enable marginalised actors to both resist injustices and promote normative change.

[440] Price and Sikkink, 'International Norms, Moral Psychology, and Neuroscience'.
[441] 'The Agency of the Governed in the Global South'; Wiener, 'Agency of the Governed in Global International Relations: Access to Norm Validation'.

Furthermore, the thesis uncovers the significant role of indignation and hope, especially their combined functioning. While there are studies exploring the role of distinct emotions, scholars emphasise the significance of studying how certain emotions function together.[442] Although some studies have focused on a combination of pride and shame in international relations,[443] other emotions remain scarcely explored. The thesis contributes to addressing this gap by highlighting the indignation-hope nexus as a significant emotional combination in the processes of international politics. Based on these emotions, the thesis presents the emotional approaches that NGOs rely on in their advocacy for climate justice: indignation-passive hope, and indignation-active hope. Most studies focus on 'naming-and-shaming' as a prevailing approach that non-state actors employ when promoting moral values and norms in international relations. The thesis contributes to the literature on emotions in norm advocacy in international politics by providing a more in-depth analysis of the emotions of indignation and hope, and identifying the additional emotional approaches of this advocacy. Therefore, the theoretical contribution of this thesis reflects the two-fold aim explained in the introduction: it brings an emotional perspective to the literature explaining norm construction by focusing on the climate justice norms; it contributes to the research of the emotional turn in IR by showing the significant role played by emotions in the climate justice emergence.

The thesis also offers a few practical implications. First, it draws attention to the complexities related to the civil society NGOs' participation within the climate cooperation framework of the UNFCCC, uncovered through their emotional experience. Interviews with representatives from Indigenous peoples' organisations, youth, and ENGOs highlight the emotional tensions that these actors are experiencing. It uncovers the contradictions between feelings of indignation emerging due to the disappointment in the general functioning of the UNFCCC, and hope, allowing for their continued engagement in the advocacy for climate justice. Policymakers seeking to create a more inclusive international cooperation environment may find these insights helpful. The thesis has uncovered the complex role of emotions, thus showing that representatives of grassroots movements experience certain emotional tensions when participating in these frameworks. The thesis draws attention to the fact that, when thinking of emotions and norm advocacy, we should not focus on their narrow role as tools of persuasion. Emotions are also forces underpinning the collective experiences of civil society NGOs,

[442] Ross, 'Mixed Emotions'.
[443] Scheff, 'Pride and Shame'.

engaging in advocacy for specific values and principles in international frameworks.

Furthermore, the thesis identifies the specific advocacy approaches based on indignation and hope, providing insights into the NGOs' persuasion discourse. The analysis highlights indignation and active hope as the advocacy approach which focuses on the enhanced agency of norm advocates. These insights may inform advocacy strategies employed by civil society NGOs, promoting more inclusive decision-making and cooperation within international frameworks. The advocacy for inclusive international cooperation frameworks, be it climate change or conflict mediation, may become increasingly important with the changes in the international political system. In other words, considering the interests of marginalised groups and an increasing variety of actors engaging in international cooperation, advocacy for inclusive international cooperation will become crucial. The thesis provided an analysis of climate justice norms, by examining these values and principles through the lens of emotions. This perspective proved to be important within such advocacy, as the analysis has uncovered that emotional tensions and experiences significantly inform the discourse and approaches of those promoting fair and equitable climate cooperation, attributing responsibility to the developed countries and considering the interests and rights of vulnerable communities. It uncovered the tension between indignation and hope as a crucial force informing the civil society NGOs' climate justice advocacy approach. Therefore, understanding the emotional advocacy approaches, such as the invocation of indignation and active hope within the context of the normative shift of climate justice, may be useful in advocacy for other norms.

Although this thesis provides insights into the emotional foundations of the climate justice norm advocacy, it has several limitations that should be acknowledged regarding the scope and methodology of the research. First, the analysis was conducted based on the textual dimension of discourse, although the visual dimension of the discourse may also provide crucial insights in the analysis of emotions in the climate justice advocacy. Civil society NGOs strongly rely on visual tools to promote their ideas not only in their communication campaigns but also in events during COP negotiations. However, I decided to focus on the textual dimension of the discourse with the objective to avoid overextension of the spectrum of data, which would have resulted in a superficial analysis.

Additionally, the thesis sought to capture a more comprehensive understanding of emotional functioning within the climate justice advocacy, thus employing three different sources of data: summaries of transcripts of

negotiations, newsletters produced by NGOs, and interviews with their representatives. However, the scope of data remains limited as the research might have failed to fully capture emotional perspectives within the civil society NGOs' participation in the UNFCCC. I thus sought to focus on the emotional approach (invocation of hope-indignation) identified through established methodological tools, such as discourse analysis, to ensure the in-depth analysis of its functions and contribution to the construction of the climate justice norm.

Furthermore, as the analysis identified indignation and hope as the dominant emotions in the NGOs' discourse, it did not elaborate on other feelings that could also contribute to the construction of the climate justice norm. The emotion discourse analysis method allowed for identifying indignation and hope based on its methodological tools and criteria. Yet, subjective interpretation remains a risk when employing this interpretive approach to the research. I sought to address this potential limitation by critically evaluating the identified utterances in relation to emotion definitions and justifying the interpretation of emotional expressions. Additionally, potential subjectivity was continuously reflected from the perspective of the researcher's role, which is also described in the methodological approach of this thesis.

The thesis sets the ground for future research in a few potential directions. One of the significant ways to apply this framework would be the studies explaining the 'agency of the governed', referring to the capacity of individuals and communities to act independently and make their own choices within the framework of governance.[444] This agency is being increasingly recognised as a critical component in the dynamics of governance, particularly in the context of participatory governance and the role of citizens in shaping policies. For example, an increasing number of studies are researching how these actors shape norms in the international community. The field particularly focuses on norm development from the perspective of the 'governed' and focuses on their agency in shaping the international norms.[445] Agency can manifest through norm validation, where local stakeholders access and contest international norms.[446] The framework developed in this thesis refers to the emotional foundations of such processes because it explores the formation of norms from the perspective of 'dominated' actors –

[444] 'The Agency of the Governed in the Global South'; Wiener, 'Agency of the Governed in Global International Relations: Access to Norm Validation'.
[445] 'The Agency of the Governed in the Global South'.
[446] Wiener, 'Agency of the Governed in Global International Relations: Access to Norm Validation'.

civil society NGOs seeking to resist and challenge the prevailing injustices within climate cooperation institutions. The findings highlight the crucial role of indignation and hope emotions within such processes, by focusing on invoking active hope as the approach to enhance the agency and empowerment of marginalised actors. Further, the framework of this thesis, focusing on *emotive transformative persuasion*, could be applied to analyse the emergence of other norms, promoting inclusive and fair policy formation in international cooperation institutions.

Future research could also focus on the emotional dimension of the climate justice advocacy, but within climate cooperation frameworks other than the UNFCCC, such as regional organisations, national governments, or local community groups. The framework of *emotive transformative persuasion* could be applied to reveal how various emotions enable the promotion of a climate justice approach within different institutional settings where the capabilities of civil society participation are constrained. Further, future research could also focus on different actors' perspectives, for example, by focusing more deeply on the emotional experiences of specific groups such as Indigenous peoples.

Finally, while the thesis identifies indignation and hope as the dominant emotions, it acknowledges the presence of other feelings in this context. It draws attention to a combination of emotions, that is, it emphasises that different emotions function together to serve distinct but crucial functions in processes of international relations such as norm advocacy.

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# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A: The list of documents

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| Report of main proceedings for 5 May 2015 |
| Report of main proceedings for 6 May 2015 |
| Summary report, 1–11 June 2015 |
| Report of main proceedings for 1 June 2015 |
| Summary report, 2–9 June 2015 |
| Summary report, 2–7 November 2015 |
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| Report of main proceedings for 9 November 2015 |
| Summary report, 29 November – 13 December 2015 |
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| Summary report, 11–15 January 2016 |
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| Summary report, 28 March – 8 April 2016 |
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| Summary report, 23–27 May 2016 |
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| Summary report, 11–20 July 2016 |
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| Summary report, 26 August – 9 September 2016 |
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| Summary report, 24–28 October 2016 |
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| Report of main proceedings for 17 July 2017 |
| Summary report, 18–27 July 2017 |
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| Summary report, 27 November – 1 December 2017 |
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| Summary report, 18–22 June 2018 |

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| Summary report, 4–9 September 2018 |
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| Report of main proceedings for 2 December 2019 |
| Report of main proceedings for 11 December 2019 |
| Summary report, 1–10 June 2020 |
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| Summary report, 23 November – 4 December 2020 |
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| Summary report, 9–11 February 2021 |
| Summary report, 17–26 February 2021 |
| Summary report, 8–14 March 2021 |
| Summary report, 5–7 May 2021 |
| Summary report, 16 May – 13 June 2021 |
| Summary report, 31 May – 17 June 2021 |
| Summary report, 21–25 June 2021 |
| Summary report, 6–15 July 2021 |
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| Summary report, 7–10 February 2022 |
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| *Youth NGOs* |
| Daily report for 30 August 1994 |
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| Summary report, 8–19 October 2012 |
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| Summary report, 18–22 February 2013 |
| Summary report, 14–15 March 2013 |
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| Summary report, 26–28 August 2013 |
| Summary report, 16–27 September 2013 |
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| Summary report, 6–10 January 2014 |
| Summary report, 3–7 February 2014 |
| Summary report, 3–5 March 2014 |
| Summary report, 24–28 March 2014 |
| Summary report, 31 March – 4 April 2014 |
| Summary report, 4–15 June 2014 |
| Summary report, 16–28 June 2014 |
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| Summary report, 23–27 June 2014 |
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| Summary report, 1–14 December 2014 |
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| Summary report, 12–15 January 2015 |
| Summary report, 17–20 February 2015 |
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| Summary report, 2–17 December 2016 |
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| Daily report for 12 December 2018 |
| Summary report, 6–10 May 2019 |
| Daily report for 17 June 2019 |
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| Summary report, 19–23 August 2019 |
| Daily report for 24–25 September 2019 |
| Summary report, 2–15 December 2019 |
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| Summary report, 7–16 July 2020 |
| Summary report, 18 September 2020 |
| Summary report, 9–11 February 2021 |
| Summary report, 17–26 February 2021 |
| Summary report, 18–20 February 2021 |
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| Highlights and images for 24 February 2021 |
| Summary report, 8–14 March 2021 |
| Summary report, 3 May – 9 June 2021 |
| Summary report, 31 May – 17 June 2021 |
| Summary report, 21–25 June 2021 |
| Summary report, 6–15 July 2021 |
| Daily report for 7 July 2021 |
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| Daily report for 9 July 2021 |
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| Daily report for 14 July 2021 |
| Summary report, 23 August – 3 September 2021 |
| Summary report, 11–15 October 2021 |
| Summary report, 31 October – 12 November 2021 |
| Daily report for 1 November 2021 |
| Daily report for 6 November 2021 |
| Daily report for 8 November 2021 |
| Summary report, 21 February – 4 March 2022 |
| Daily report for 21 February 2022 |
| Daily report for 2 March 2022 |
| Daily report for 3 March 2022 |
| Summary report, 4 March 2022 |
| Summary report, 14–29 March 2022 |
| Summary report, 9–20 May 2022 |
| Summary report, 9–13 May 2022 |
| Daily report for 9 May 2022 |
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| Daily report for 10 May 2022 |
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| Daily report for 12 May 2022 |
| Daily report for 19 May 2022 |
| Summary report, 29 May – 1 June 2022 |
| Summary report, 2–3 June 2022 |
| Summary report, 6–16 June 2022 |
| Daily report for 10 June 2022 |
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| Summary report, 21–26 June 2022 |
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| Daily report for 7 July 2022 |
| Daily report for 11 July 2022 |
| Daily report for 13 July 2022 |
| Daily report for 14 July 2022 |
| Summary report, 19 September 2022 |
| Summary report, 3–7 October 2022 |
| Daily report for 6 November 2022 |
| *Indigenous peoples' organisations* |
| Summary report, 4–15 September 2000 |
| 13th Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB 13) |
| Daily report for 16 November 2000 |
| UNFCCC COP 6 |
| Daily report for 20 November 2000 |
| UNFCCC COP 6 |
| Daily report for 13 June 2001 |
| 1st Session of the UNFF |
| Summary report, 20 October – 10 November 2001 |
| UNFCCC COP 7 |
| Daily report for 8 November 2001 |
| UNFCCC COP 7 |
| Summary report, 23–1 November 2002 |
| UNFCCC COP 8 |
| Summary report, 20–21 May 2003 |
| 1st Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Negotiation of a Successor Agreement to the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA, 1994) |
| Summary report, 1–12 December 2003 |
| UNFCCC COP 9 |
| Daily report for 4 December 2003 |
| UNFCCC COP 9 |
| Daily report for 5 December 2003 |
| UNFCCC COP 9 |
| Daily report for 10 December 2003 |

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| UNFCCC COP 9 |
| Daily report for 11 December 2003 |
| UNFCCC COP 9 |
| Summary report, 16–25 June 2004 |
| Daily report for 17 June 2004 |
| 20th Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB 20) |
| Daily report for 21 June 2004 |
| 20th Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB 20) |
| Summary report, 6–18 December 2004 |
| UNFCCC COP 10 |
| Daily report for 8 December 2004 |
| UNFCCC COP 10 |
| Summary report, 28 November – 10 December 2005 |
| UNFCCC COP 11 |
| 4th Meeting of the CBD Working Groups on Article 8(j) and on Access and Benefit-sharing |
| Daily report for 7 November 2006 |
| Nairobi Climate Change Conference – November 2006 |
| Daily report for 5 December 2007 |
| Bali Climate Change Conference – December 2007 |
| Summary report, 21–27 August 2008 |
| Accra Climate Change Talks – August 2008 |
| Daily report for 22 August 2008 |
| Accra Climate Change Talks – August 2008 |
| Summary report, 1–12 December 2008 |
| Poznań Climate Change Conference – December 2008 |
| Daily report for 1 December 2008 |
| Poznań Climate Change Conference – December 2008 |
| Daily report for 10 December 2008 |
| Poznań Climate Change Conference – December 2008 |

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| Summary report, 29 March – 8 April 2009 |
| Bonn Climate Change Talks – March/April 2009 |
| Daily report for 4 April 2009 |
| Bonn Climate Change Talks – March/April 2009 |
| Summary report, 1–12 June 2009 |
| Bonn Climate Change Talks – June 2009 |
| Daily report for 1 June 2009 |
| Bonn Climate Change Talks – June 2009 |
| Summary report, 28 September – 9 October 2009 |
| Bangkok Climate Change Talks – September/October 2009 |
| Daily report for 2 October 2009 |
| Bangkok Climate Change Talks – September/October 2009 |
| Daily report for 7 December 2009 |
| Copenhagen Climate Change Conference – December 2009 |
| Summary report, 22–28 March 2010 |
| 9th Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit sharing of the CBD (ABS 9) |
| Summary report, 31 May – 11 June 2010 |
| Bonn Climate Change Talks – May/June 2010 |
| Daily report for 1 June 2010 |
| Bonn Climate Change Talks – May/June 2010 |
| Daily report for 3 June 2010 |
| Bonn Climate Change Talks – May/June 2010 |
| Summary report, 4–9 October 2010 |
| Tianjin Climate Change Talks – October 2010 |
| Daily report for 4 October 2010 |
| Tianjin Climate Change Talks – October 2010 |
| Daily report for 1 December 2010 |
| Cancún Climate Change Conference – November 2010 |

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| Daily report for 4 December 2010 |
| Cancún Climate Change Conference – November 2010 |
| Summary report, 7–8 March 2011 |
| UNCSD 2nd Session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom II) |
| Summary report, 3–8 April 2011 |
| Bangkok Climate Change Talks – April 2011 |
| Daily report for 8 June 2011 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2011 |
| Daily report for 11 June 2011 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2011 |
| Daily report for 13 June 2011 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2011 |
| Daily report for 16 June 2011 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2011 |
| Summary report, 1–7 October 2011 |
| Panama City Climate Change Conference – October 2011 |
| Summary report, 28 November – 11 December 2011 |
| Durban Climate Change Conference – November 2011 |
| Daily report for 7 December 2011 |
| Durban Climate Change Conference – November 2011 |
| Summary report, 14–25 May 2012 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2012 |
| Summary report, 14–25 May 2012 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2012 |
| Summary report, 5–7 June 2012 |
| 42nd Meeting of the GEF Council |
| Daily report for 27 November 2012 |
| Doha Climate Change Conference – November 2012 |
| Summary report, 3–14 June 2013 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2013 |
| Daily report for 11 November 2013 |

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| Warsaw Climate Change Conference – November 2013 |
| Daily report for 12 November 2013 |
| Warsaw Climate Change Conference – November 2013 |
| Daily report for 16 November 2013 |
| Warsaw Climate Change Conference – November 2013 |
| Summary report, 4–15 June 2014 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2014 |
| Daily report for 14 October 2014 |
| CBD COP 12 |
| Daily report for 1 December 2014 |
| Lima Climate Change Conference – December 2014 |
| Summary report, 1–14 December 2014 |
| Lima Climate Change Conference – December 2014 |
| Daily report for 2 December 2014 |
| Lima Climate Change Conference – December 2014 |
| Daily report for 9 December 2014 |
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| Lima Climate Change Conference – December 2014 |
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| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2015 |
| Daily report for 1 June 2015 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2015 |
| Summary report, 29 November – 13 December 2015 |
| Paris Climate Change Conference – November 2015 |
| Daily report for 1 December 2015 |
| Paris Climate Change Conference – November 2015 |
| Summary report, 16–26 May 2016 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2016 |
| Daily report for 16 May 2016 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2016 |
| Daily report for 17 May 2016 |

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| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2016 |
| Summary report, 24–28 October 2016 |
| 2nd Meeting of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Ad Hoc Expert Group (AHEG2) Established Pursuant to Paragraph 48 of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 2015/33 |
| Summary report, 7–18 November 2016 |
| Marrakech Climate Change Conference – November 2016 |
| Daily report for 7 November 2016 |
| Marrakech Climate Change Conference – November 2016 |
| Daily report for 8 November 2016 |
| Marrakech Climate Change Conference – November 2016 |
| Daily report for 14 November 2016 |
| Marrakech Climate Change Conference – November 2016 |
| Summary report, 1 May 2017 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2017 |
| Daily report for 8 May 2017 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2017 |
| Daily report for 17 May 2017 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – May 2017 |
| Summary report, 6–17 November 2017 |
| Fiji / Bonn Climate Change Conference – November 2017 |
| Daily report for 15 November 2017 |
| Fiji / Bonn Climate Change Conference – November 2017 |
| Summary report, 30 April – 10 May 2018 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – April 2018 |
| Daily report for 2 May 2018 |

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| Bonn Climate Change Conference – April 2018 |
| Daily report for 3 May 2018 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – April 2018 |
| Summary report, 4–9 September 2018 |
| Bangkok Climate Change Conference – September 2018 |
| Summary report, 2–15 December 2018 |
| Katowice Climate Change Conference – December 2018 |
| Daily report for 8 December 2018 |
| Katowice Climate Change Conference – December 2018 |
| Daily report for 11 December 2018 |
| Katowice Climate Change Conference – December 2018 |
| Daily report for 12 December 2018 |
| Katowice Climate Change Conference – December 2018 |
| Summary report, 17–27 June 2019 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2019 |
| Summary report, 2–15 December 2019 |
| Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference – December 2019 |
| Summary report, 12 December 2020 |
| Climate Ambition Summit 2020 |
| Summary report, 17–26 February 2021 |
| Informal Session for the 24th Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA-24) |
| Summary report, 8–14 March 2021 |
| Informal Session for the 3rd Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI-3) |
| Summary report, 3 May – 9 June 2021 |
| 24th Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA-24) |
| Summary report, 31 May – 17 June 2021 |
| 2021 Sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies |

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| Summary report, 23 August – 3 September 2021 |
| 3rd Meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework |
| Summary report, 31 October – 12 November 2021 |
| Glasgow Climate Change Conference |
| Daily report for 8 November 2021 |
| Glasgow Climate Change Conference |
| Daily report for 11 November 2021 |
| Glasgow Climate Change Conference |
| Daily report for 22 March 2022 |
| 4th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Minamata Convention on Mercury (2nd Part) |
| Summary report, 6–16 June 2022 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2022 |
| Daily report for 6 November 2022 |
| Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference – November 2022 |
| Summary report, 6–20 November 2022 |
| Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference – November 2022 |
| Daily report for 5 June 2023 |
| Bonn Climate Change Conference – June 2023 |

APPENDIX B: Examples of identified patterns of indignation-hope expressions

| **Indignation (UNFCCC; Actors and policies violating climate justice principles)** |
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| '*So if I have to name a dominant feeling, in me in this space, this is, I'm mad. I am furious and mad because there are people out there that are not…. <…> I'm not sure if, even if they're able to actual, to feel, to be conscious about the situation.*' |
| '*So yeah, sometimes I feel disappointed. Other times I feel more hopeful. Uh, most of the time I feel mad and furious. <…> like, "okay, I feel that way, but what can I do now?"*' |
| '*And there are people in very high positions that they're supposed to know some things about climate change. And we were talking, and they… they couldn't understand some things, like, we were talking about, we wanted badges to go to COP, and we wanted to establish a youth delegation program. They didn't know how Greece is forming a delegation for COP. They didn't know! I mean, if they don't know, who knows? Where can I ask? I mean… they also didn't know that in climate education, the climate education is a separate thing from environmental education. <…> They're not even able to discuss on climate in the level that we're talking right now. They don't know how climate negotiations works. <…> Yeah, it's the disappointment and… the anxiety that if we're not planning to do something really big… I think that climate change is progressing much faster than we do, than our mechanisms, political and social mechanisms are progressing. That's why you see, in Indigenous communities or people from islands in the Pacific, that it's a matter of life and death for them.*' |
| '*I think that there, there is an ignorance there. Like, consciously ignorant. Conscious ignorance. For example, the European Union, okay, "we are very like progressive and we have the European green deal and stuff", but for who? Like how honest is this and how is it really making an impact?'* |
| '*And again, they didn't know the process. Like you had to explain to them that it's this article from here and this is what you should do and badges exist. They didn't know even the difference between badges. They literally learn last minute because probably somebody from UNFCCC sends them an email of like, these are the badges that you have, this is what it means. They have no clue, absolutely no clue. So in that moment you feel, okay, obviously I'm much more qualified to participate, I just don't have the, you know, we don't have the political legitimisation, because obviously we're not elected, and we don't belong in a party or a government. <…> So again, you get angry of, you have so much power, just by being there.*' |

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| '*<…> they have something to benefit for themselves, they don't really care about the issue anyways. I feel like that's absolutely ridiculous. I think, again, it creates this sense of "we're screwed"*.' |
| '*I think there's an excitement about part starting to participate in those events, so there's definitely happiness about being there, but at the same time, I think the moment you arrive <…>* |
| *'<…> you're supposed to see the best of people working on climate, you're supposed to see concessions…'* |
| *'I mean, like, when they say just transition, they would mean slower transition, while we mean radical fast transition that takes into account the weakest and blames mostly like the ones that profit from a slow transition.'* |
| *'I think the more you take part, the more I think predetermined are your emotions and reactions.'* |
| *'When we're observing, we always have like the side eye of looking at each other being like, did you really hear this? Like, this is really happening? Are we here? Like, are we at the UN? Are we in Egypt? What, what is this? Is this another like oil company meeting? What is going on? So I think it's an anger. Surprise, absolutely. And I think sometimes, especially if you're for a long time in the game, there's a sense of irony of, ah, of course, you know, like, of course they're gonna talk about this and of course nobody's gonna mention <…>'* |
| *'I think when you start the more formal meetings where mostly youth participants are usually put in, like, the observer position, I think that's when people start to get angry. I feel like I usually start to get more angry <…>'* |
| *'<…> you usually see arguments about what you thought was the minimum agreement. So I would say… It's more like emotions… I think transition throughout. <…>*' |
| *'<…> officials are gonna use the same vocabulary. So yeah, I think that causes a lot of, you know, nervous, nervous laughter, some, some anger and that also we hear some of our arguments being turned against what we mean.'* |
| *'<…> particularly during COP, such as meeting national delegations, and they have this idea of who are you, and immediately you feel attacked as if there, there's such a hierarchical structure that you're not even supposed to interact.'* |

| **Hope (Civil society NGOs; Promoting change)** |
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| *'Hope comes from other activists and other non-state actors. I think that I can… I wouldn't be able to do solo activism, for example, that I am motivated by the thought that there are many, many other people out there like me with the same feelings and with the same interests and they're doing something.'* |
| '*I think there is strong hope… if there were no hope, I would not know how to handle it. Hope raises me up. <…> But at the same time, I think it is extremely important that you experience this hope not alone, that you feel other activists around you who also have this hope. Then it becomes much stronger. It moves you to another level of motivation.*' |
| '*So I think those events [COP side events] are the strongest in my memory of like a positive boost of positive emotions <…> I think it motivates a lot of activists. Because, again, sometimes the situation is so dire.*' |
| *'So everything is on the hands of NGOs and people that care. So I felt, I felt hopeful…'* |
| *'This movement [climate justice], this political change, because this is the right name… is actually giving me a lot of motivation. Because I see that those people who have, for the last ten years or even more, that have been advocating for real climate action, for real investments, that their work really, you know, paid out in the end.'* |
| *'For example, in Stockholm, when we drafted a youth statement, and it was included in the dialogues and in the negotiations. It was a really big step and it's not like that we were only a separate table. We are in there. We participated in the dialogues anyway, and we drafted responses and suggestions for the dialogues. So, I am kind of hopeful for the role of youth and all that.*' |
| '*So imagine like this network of, especially with ENGOs, this network that builds on this capacity throughout multiple months, gathers all the anger, gathers all the excitement, gathers all the solidarity one possibly can have, in order to face, you know, technocrats most of the time.'* |
| *'And they're doing something, I'm doing something, we are something. I think that's what motivates me.'* |

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| *'But I would say that I'm mostly positive because we believe in what are campaigning for. We really believe in our cause. <…> And you know, this last few years of just pushing, pushing, pushing all of them really created this space for the governments to maybe be more encouraged to climate education. <…> Now we can be more positive. Maybe we can bring even more energy because we're more motivated, you know, because we now see that.'* |
| '*So one thing is that I'm mad, I am furious and I'm anxious…because if there are no people able to do something right now, I know my generation or our generation will be able, as the next generation of policy makers… will be able to do something.*' |
| *'<…> and then I said, "well, what can I do? Other than riding a bicycle, I can't go bicycling everywhere." So I started studying and taking courses and then guilt transformed into responsibility. Like I must do something about this.'* |
| *'So I started to transform the guilt into responsibility. I need, I have to do something about it. I know this. I have tools. I need to use them towards this problem.*' |
| |
| *'So my emotions have changed in this aspect. That's, first of all, because I see a change in my own field [climate education]… and honestly, I believe that I have put a little piece to this change of perspectives from the last three years up to now. In general, I think that, when you look at the climate action for the last three or five years, maybe for the last three… this is how long I'm really, you know, observing this, a lot has changed, and, I think, in a good way.'* |
| '*People are going to solve the problem. We are going to solve the problem. So, yeah… I felt like even more responsibility. <…>*' |
| '*So we had to read it and make suggestions were like 450 pages. Nobody pays you for that. You are doing it because you love what you do. And then I shared that document for other NGOs that I was like, I had to represent our voices.<…> So I felt I had the responsibility to, to talk about that.'* |
| '*I was like, okay, these people are doing something about that and what I'm doing about that?*' |

# SANTRAUKA

## Problema ir jos aktualumas

Šioje disertacijoje nagrinėjama, kaip ir kokios emocijos tampa klimato teisingumo normos formavimosi proceso dalimi, susitelkiant į pilietinės visuomenės nevyriausybinių organizacijų (NVO) advokacijos atvejį Jungtinių Tautų bendrosios klimato kaitos konvencijos (JTBKKK) kontekste. Klimato teisingumas – klimato kaitos kaip teisingumo klausimo suvokimas – yra besiformuojanti tarptautinio klimato kaitos bendradarbiavimo norma, kurios principai vis labiau atsispindi įvairiuose tarptautiniuose klimato kaitos susitarimuose, pavyzdžiui, Paryžiaus susitarime dėl klimato kaitos (Gach 2019; Wiener 2023; Lefstad and Paavola; Schlosberg and Collins 2014). Tokia samprata atkreipiamas dėmesys į tai, kad klimato kaitos padariniai labiau paveikia pažeidžiamas gyventojų grupes, aplinkosauginių sprendimų išlaidos paskirstomos netolygiai, taip pat ir poreikį atkreipti dėmesį į žmogaus teises ir įtraukesnį bendradarbiavimą formuojant klimato kaitos politiką (Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Schlosberg 2012; Sultana 2021; Porter et al. 2020). Čia taip pat kvestionuojamas išsivysčiusių šalių dominavimas formuojant tarptautinę klimato politiką ir kritikuojamas šių veikėjų vengimas prisiimti atsakomybę už klimato kaitos padarinius. Pilietinės visuomenės NVO atlieka svarbų vaidmenį skatindamos šią normą: klimato teisingumo principų atsiradimas yra siejamas su šių veikėjų aktyvesniu įsitraukimu į klimato kaitos bendradarbiavimo institucijas (Schlosberg and Collins 2014c; Gach 2019; Pandey 2015); be to, NVO veikėjų vaidmuo tarptautinėse institucijose iš esmės siejamas su normų ir moraliai teisingo elgesio formavimu tarptautinėje bendruomenėje (Clark 2001; Betsill and Corell 2007; Ilgit and Prakash 2019; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 1998). NVO, kaip normų formuotojų, vaidmuo ir emocijomis grindžiamas normų skatinimas yra plačiai tirtas įvairių tarptautinių normų, pavyzdžiui, tokių kaip žmogaus teisės ar atsakomybė ginti, kontekste (Clark 2001; Labonte 2013; Ilgit and Prakash 2019; Buntinx and Colli 2022). Šie veikėjai aktyviai pasitelkia emocines prieigas ir pasisakymus siekdami skatinti moraliai teisingą elgesį tarptautinėje bendruomenėje, pavyzdžiui, susijusius su gėdos jausmo skatinimu (angl. *Naming and shaming)* (Franklin 2015; Ilgit and Prakash 2019; Szent-Iványi and Timofejevs 2021). Būtent dėl tokio elgesio NVO mokslinėje literatūroje yra įvardijamos kaip „emocionalios veikėjos“, siekiančios atstovauti teisingo elgesio principams tarptautinėje bendruomenėje remiantis emocinėmis prieigomis (Ilgit and Prakash 2019). Vis dėlto emocijų vaidmuo klimato diplomatijos institucijose

besiformuojančioms normoms, tokioms kaip klimato teisingumas, išlieka mažai aptartas. Be to, tyrėjai atkreipia dėmesį į vyraujantį poreikį plačiau nagrinėti emocijų vaidmenį tarptautinėse klimato bendradarbiavimo institucijose (Koschut 2014).

Šioje disertacijoje siekiama atliepti neatskleistą emocijų vaidmenį klimato teisingumo normos formavimosi procese ir atkreipiamas dėmesys į tai, kad klimato teisingumo klausimo kėlimas tarptautinėse institucijose, tokiose kaip UNFCCC, yra neišvengiamai susijęs su tam tikromis emocijomis. Siekiant tą atskleisti pasirenkama žvelgti iš aktyviai šią normą skatinančių (pilietinės visuomenės NVO) veikėjų perspektyvos ir nagrinėti jų diskursą JTBKKK ir klimato kaitos (COP) derybose kaip pagrindinėje tarptautinėje klimato kaitos bendradarbiavimo institucinėje aplinkoje. Šiose institucijose NVO įsitraukimas, įskaitant aplinkosaugos, jaunimo, vietinių gyventojų, kitaip čiabuvių (angl. *Indigenous peoples*), moterų, žmonių su negalia organizacijų, yra itin aktyvus ir vis labiau matomas (Müller et al. 2021). NVO veikėjus JTBKKK institucijose vienijanti skėtinė organizacija – Klimato veiksmų tinklas (angl. *Climate Action Network*) – aiškiai pabrėžia klimato teisingumo idėjų skatinimą, kaip vieną iš esminių savo tikslų: siekiama ginčyti nelygiateisį klimato kaitos naštos pasiskirstymą tarp išsivysčiusių ir besivystančių valstybių, atkreipiamas dėmesys į pažeidžiamų visuomenės grupių interesus formuojant atsaką į klimato kaitą, žmogaus teises, kritikuojamas išsivysčiusių šalių atsakomybės už sukeltus klimato kaitos padarinius vengimas, skatinamas įtraukus ir skaidrus tarptautinių klimato institucijų bendradarbiavimas (‘About CAN’). Tad JTBKKK, kaip pagrindinė tarptautinio bendradarbiavimo klimato srityje sutartis, yra institucinis kontekstas, kuriame pilietinės visuomenės NVO gina klimato teisingumą jau nuo 1992 metų, o Klimato veiksmų tinklas (CAN) veikia kaip šių NVO skėtinė organizacija. Besiformuojančios klimato teisingumo normos procese NVO tampa šios normos *advokatėmis,* kitaip *normų antreprenerėmis*[447], kurios, kaip nurodoma vyraujančiuose aiškinimuose, dažnai pasitelkia emocines prieigas skatindamos kitus veikėjus įtikinti priimant naujas normas tarptautinėje bendruomenėje (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Sanchez Salgado 2021; Salgado 2018). Čia ir kyla poreikis atskleisti, kaip ir kokios emocijos, reprezentuojamos NVO diskurso JTBKKK instituciniame kontekste, tampa klimato teisingumo normą formuojančiu veiksniu.

[447] Normų antrepreneriais vadinami veikėjai, grupės ar organizacijos, siekiančios įtikinti kitus veikėjus priimti socialines normas, kaip moraliai teisingo elgesio taisykles. Taip pat žr. https://www.vle.lt/straipsnis/antrepreneris-1/

**Disertacijoje teigiama, kad būtina įtraukti tam tikras emocijas kaip klimato teisingumo normą formuojančius veiksnius, atkreipiant dėmesį į pilietinės visuomenės NVO advokaciją, kuria siekiama šią normą įtvirtinti pagrindinėse klimato kaitos bendradarbiavimo institucijose, pavyzdžiui, JTBKKK kontekste. Siūlomas *emotyvais grįstas transformuojančio įtikinėjimo modelis*, konceptualizuojantis šį emocijų vaidmenį. Pritaikius modelį NVO klimato teisingumo normos advokacijai JTBKKK kontekste, atskleidžiama pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijų reikšmė įtikinėjant tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti klimato teisingumo normą.**

Tokia analizė svarbi dėl kelių priežasčių. Visų pirma reikšmingai papildomas tarptautinės klimato teisingumo normos formavimosi supratimas įtraukiant emocijų dėmenį. Kitaip tariant, darbe parodoma, kaip emocijos tampa šios normos formavimosi dalimi ir padeda ugdyti supratimą tarptautinėse institucijose, kad klimato kaitos krizė turi būti sprendžiama laikantis teisingumo principų. Čia pateikiamas konceptualus modelis, integruojantis emocijas į tarptautinių normų formavimosi procesą ir paaiškinantis, kaip emociniai pasisakymai padeda tokiems veikėjams kaip NVO įtikinti tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti tam tikrus principus. Šis modelis yra pritaikomas analizuojant NVO klimato teisingumo normos advokaciją JTBKKK instituticiniame kontekste ir atliekant šių veikėjų emocinio diskurso analizę ir interviu. Taip yra atskleidžiama tokių emocijų, kaip antai vilties ir pasipiktinimo, reikšmė. Tad šiuo darbu pabrėžiamas reikšmingas emocijų vaidmuo tarptautinėje politikoje kylančiai klimato teisingumo normai ir pasiūlomas jos formavimosi aiškinimas žvelgiant būtent iš emocijų perspektyvos, konkrečiau išplėtojant pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijų reikšmę.

Darbe taip pat atkreipiamas dėmesys į pilietinės visuomenės NVO veikėjų vaidmenį klimato kaitos bendradarbiavimo institucijose, kuris dažnai siejamas su emocionaliomis prieigomis. Pastarųjų reikšmė yra plačiai pripažinta literatūroje, aiškinančioje, kaip emocijos tampa svarbiu veiksniu formuojant NVO veikėjų sutelktumą ir politinio veikimo strategijas tarptautinėje politikoje (Jasper 2011; 2011; Rodgers 2010; Sanchez Salgado 2021; Salgado 2018; Ilgit and Prakash 2019). Šio darbo metu atlikti interviu su NVO atstovais, analizuoti kartu su kitais jų poziciją perteikiančiais dokumentais, išplečia supratimą apie jų iššūkius ir emocijomis grindžiamas prieigas jiems spręsti tarptautinėse klimato kaitos institucijose. Darbe taikoma emocinio diskurso analizės prieiga leidžia giliau interpretuoti emocinių frazių vartojimą atkreipiant dėmesį į konteksto specifiką (Koschut 2017; 2020). Tai leidžia ne

tik atpažinti, kokie emociniai posakiai, frazės vyrauja analizuotame diskurse, bet ir pateikti santykio su kitais veikėjais bei JTBKKK institucine aplinka (pvz., atkreipiant dėmesį į ją, kaip iš esmės prieštaraujančią klimato teisingumo principams) interpretacijas. Taigi šio darbo metu surinkti duomenys taip pat papildo supratimą apie pilietinės visuomenės NVO veikėjų dalyvavimą tarptautinėse klimato bendradarbiavimo institucijose, atkreipia dėmesį į specifinių emocijų vaidmenį šiame procese.

**Tyrimo tikslas ir uždaviniai**

Disertacijos tikslas – atskleisti, kaip ir kokias emocijas pilietinės visuomenės NVO naudoja siekdamos skatinti klimato teisingumo normą JTBKKK kontekste, taip klimato bendradarbiavimo institucijas kreipdamos klimato teisingumo normos link. Pagrindinis tyrimo klausimas: kaip ir kokias emocijas sukelia NVO siekdamos įtikinti kitus veikėjus priimti klimato teisingumą kaip normą pagal JTBKKK?

Pagrindiniam tyrimo tikslui pasiekti formuluojami trys pagrindiniai uždaviniai:

1. Sukurti konceptualų modelį, leidžiantį analizuoti emocijas, kaip skatinančias klimato teisingumo normos formavimą remiantis pilietinės visuomenės NVO diskursu JTBKKK kontekste.

Modelis formuojamas analizuojant literatūrą šiam darbui aktualiuose teminiuose laukuose:

- Kas yra klimato teisingumas ir kodėl jis laikomas besiformuojančia norma tarptautinėje bendruomenėje (t. y. kokias elgesio taisykles jis apima)?
- Kodėl pilietinės visuomenės NVO gali būti laikomos normų formuotojomis klimato teisingumo srityje?
- Kaip normų formuotojai įtikina tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti naujas normas ir kodėl šiame procese svarbios emocijos?

2. Nustatyti vyraujančias emocijas pilietinės visuomenės NVO diskurse JTBKKK instituciniame kontekste.

- Vyraujančių emocijų identifikavimas remiasi suformuotu konceptualiuoju modeliu ir jo prielaidomis, kurios apibrėžia emocijas kaip diskursyvias išraiškas, t. y. emocijos atpažįstamos analizuojant veikėjų diskursą (NVO, veikiančių JTBKKK aplinkoje) ir identifikuojant jame emocinius pasisakymus.
- Atliekant emocinio diskurso analizę (EDA) ir interviu, išskiriamos dažniausiai pasikartojančios emocijos, t. y. tiesioginiai ir netiesioginiai

referavimai į emocijas, iškylantys NVO klimato teisingumo diskurse, vyraujančiame JTBKKK aplinkoje. Remiantis metodologiniais žingsniais, interpretuojama pasikartojančių emocijų reikšmė JTBKKK instituciniame kontekste.

- Išryškėjusios emocijos analizuojamos remiantis susijusia literatūra ir emocijų apibrėžimais, taip siekiama išskirti pagrindines emocijas, vyraujančias nagrinėjamame diskurse.

3. Paaiškinti, kaip išskirtos emocijos prisideda prie klimato teisingumo kaip normos kūrimo.

- Identifikavus vyraujančias emocijas, analizuojama, kaip jų išraiška susijusi su tarptautinių normų įtikinėjimo mechanizmu: interpretuojama, kaip šios emocijos padeda NVO veikėjams formuoti tarptautinės bendruomenės supratimą, kad klimato teisingumo principų laikymasis yra moraliai teisingas elgesys. Remiantis konceptualiame modelyje išskirtomis prielaidomis, identifikuotos emocijos yra siejamos su įtikinėjimo mechanizmo aspektais, paaiškinančiais, kaip normų advokacija užsiimantys veikėjai tarptautinėje politikoje įtikinėja kitus veikėjus priimti normas siekdami rezonuoti (t. y. atliepti, susieti) su vyraujančiais moraliai teisingo elgesio principais ir įsitikinimais.
- Išskiriamos konkrečiomis emocijomis paremtos prieigos, kurios išryškėja pilietinės visuomenės NVO klimato teisingumo normos advokacijoje JTBKKK institucinėje aplinkoje.

**Tyrimo dizainas**

Tyrime pirmiausiai yra formuojamas modelis, konceptualizuojantis emocijas kaip integralią tarptautinių normų formavimosi proceso dalį, kuris vėliau taikomas analizuojant pilietinės visuomenės NVO klimato teisingumo advokaciją JTBKKK kontekste. Pirmoje tyrimo dalyje remiamasi literatūra, nagrinėjančią šiuos aspektus: tarptautinių normų formavimąsi; klimato teisingumo normą ir NVO veikėjų vaidmenį šios normos formavimosi procese; emocijų sampratą ir vaidmenį formuojant tarptautinę politiką. Remiantis iš šios literatūros kylančiomis prielaidomis, suformuojamas konceptualus ***emotyvais grįstas transformuojančio įtikinėjimo modelis***, paaiškinantis, kaip emocijos tampa normų įtikinėjimo mechanizmo dalimi, padedančia keisti veikėjų įsitikinimus. Kitaip tariant, modelis paaiškina, kaip normų antreprenerių, šiuo atveju NVO, diskurse vyraujančios emocijos padeda įtikinti tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti tokias normas, kaip antai

klimato teisingumas, siekiančias keisti nusistovėjusį tam tikrų veikėjų dominavimą tarptautinėse institucijose.

Antroje tyrimo dalyje suformuotas *emotyvais grįstas transformuojančio įtikinėjimo* modelis yra pritaikomas analizuojant pilietinės visuomenės NVO klimato teisingumo advokaciją JTBKKK kontekste: pasitelkiama tarptautinių santykių disciplinoje taikoma emocinio diskurso analizė (EDA) ir interviu su pilietinės visuomenės NVO atstovais, užsiimančiais klimato teisingumo advokacija tarptautinėse institucijose. Taip siekiama identifikuoti jų diskurse dominuojančias emocijas ir interpretuoti atpažintų emocijų reikšmę formuojant klimato teisingumo normą JTBKKK kontekste. Tokiai analizei atlikti išskiriamos šios pagrindinės sąvokos ir jų apibrėžimai:

Emocijos

Emocijos įprastai laikomos psichologine patirtimi ir yra siejamos su individu bei kūno fiziologiniais pokyčiais, tačiau šiame darbe pasitelkiamas tarptautinių santykių disciplinoje plačiai taikomas ir iš socialinio konstruktyvizmo kildinamas emocijų apibrėžimas, pabrėžiantis emocijų kolektyvumą, santykį su socialine aplinka ir išraišką kalboje (Crawford 2014; Mercer 2014; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Koschut 2017; 2020). Ši samprata pasitelkiama remiantis *emocinio posūkio* tarptautiniuose santykiuose tyrimų lauku, ypač Simono Koschuto metodologine prieiga, aiškinančia emocijų ir diskurso sąsają tarptautinėje politikoje (Koschut 2017; 2020).

Šiame darbe emocijos apibrėžiamos kaip per diskursą išreiškiamos emocinės būsenos, darančios įtaką veikėjų įsitikinimams ir suvokimui. Emocijos analizuojamos ne kaip psichologinės individualios būsenos, susijusios su fiziniu kūnu, o kaip kolektyvios tam tikrų veikėjų būsenos, kurios išreiškiamos kalba ir gali būti apčiuopiamos analizuojant diskursą: emocijos atpažįstamos tekstuose identifikuojant pasakymus, kurie tiesiogiai arba netiesiogiai referuoja į tam tikras emocines būsenas (Bleiker and Hutchison 2017; Koschut 2017). Remiantis socialinio konstruktyvizmo prieiga, šiame darbe daroma prielaida, kad klimato teisingumo norma yra kuriama per pilietinės visuomenės NVO diskursą, kuriame vyrauja tam tikros emocijos. Šios emocijos padeda kurti bendrą supratimą apie klimato teisingumą kaip normą, kurios turėtų laikytis tarptautinė bendruomenė.

Emocinio posūkio tarptautinių santykių disciplinoje yra pabrėžiamas emocijų konceptualizavimo sudėtingumas, t. y. tai, kad nėra bendro plačiai vartojamo emocijų apibrėžimo (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Crawford 2014). Siekdami spręsti šią problemą, tyrėjai suformavo metodologines prieigas, leidžiančias apibrėžti ir nagrinėti emocijų vaidmenį su tarptautine politika

susijusiuose procesuose (Sangar and Clément 2018; Bleiker and Hutchison 2018). Čia pabrėžiama, kad emocijos nebūtinai turi būti siejamos su individu ir konkrečiu kūnu, bet gali veikti ir kolektyviniu lygmeniu ir yra susijusios su socialine aplinka (Bleiker and Hutchison 2017; Sangar and Clément 2018; Mercer 2014). Kitaip tariant, emocijos gali būti formuojamos per sąveiką su kitais veikėjais ir remiantis socialine patirtimi, taip pat jas išreiškiant kalba. Tai reiškia, kad emocijos gali būti tiriamos ne tik analizuojant individų psichologines būsenas ir su kūnu susijusius pokyčius, bet ir identifikuojant, kaip emocijos yra perteikiamos per diskursą, kultūrines praktikas ar simbolinius ritualus tam tikruose politiniuose kontekstuose (Sangar and Clément 2018). Remiantis šiomis prielaidomis emocinio posūkio tarptautiniuose santykiuose lauke tyrėjai pasiūlė metodologinius įrankius, leidžiančius apčiuopti, kaip emocijos veikia tarptautinės politikos įvykius per diskursą (Koschut 2017; 2020; Bleiker and Hutchison 2018). Čia teigiama, kad tarptautinės politikos veikėjų diskursas yra persmelktas emocijų, kurios atlieka svarbų vaidmenį formuojant kolektyvinius įsitikinimus, tapatybę, taip pat galios dinamiką pasaulio politikoje.

Be to, svarbu paminėti, kad emocijos tarptautiniuose santykiuose interpretuojamos plačiau, t. y. jų analizė nebūtinai turi remtis psichologijos mokslų disciplinoje pateikiamu ribotu emocijų sąrašu, kuriame išskiriamos kelios pagrindinės emocijos (džiaugsmas, liūdesys, pasibjaurėjimas, baimė, nuostaba ir pyktis). Tarptautinių santykių disciplinoje taip pat analizuojama empatija, pasipiktinimas, pasitikėjimas, teisingumas ar kiti jausmai, kurie nebūtinai patenka į ribotą emocijų sąrašą, bet vis tiek yra analizuojami kaip su emocijomis susijusios būsenos (Crawford 2014; Mercer 2010; Head 2012; Wolf 2020). Pavyzdžiui, Neta Crawford teigė, kad emocijos gali veikti kaip institucionalizuoti veiksniai tarptautinės politikos struktūrose, ir savo teiginį iliustravo empatijos institucionalizavimo diplomatinėse institucijose pavyzdžiu (Crawford 2014). Taigi, emocijos tarptautiniuose santykiuose tiriamos neapsiribojant mažu pagrindinių emocijų sąrašu, bet nagrinėjant platesnį ir įvairesnį emocinių būsenų spektrą.

Klimato teisingumo norma

Tarptautinės normos apibrėžiamos kaip „tinkamo elgesio standartas veikėjams, turintiems tam tikrą tapatybę“ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Pagal Finnemore ir Sikkink, normos įkūnija „privalomumo“ savybę ir bendrą moralinį vertinimą (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Jos formuojasi socialinių sąveikų ir bendro valstybių bei kitų tarptautinių veikėjų supratimo pagrindu. Klimato teisingumas laikomas tarptautine norma, o tai reiškia, kad

tarptautiniai veikėjai vis labiau priima bendrą supratimą, kad klimato kaita yra teisingumo klausimas (Gach 2019).

Šiame darbe remiamasi klimato teisingumo norma, ji suprantama kaip besiformuojantis lūkestis, kad visos šalys, dalyvaujančios sprendžiant klimato kaitos klausimus, turėtų skatinti ir atsižvelgti į tai, kad klimato kaitos krizė būtų sprendžiama remiantis teisingumo principais, lygiu įsipareigojimų pasiskirstymu, žmogaus teisių laikymusi ir dėmesiu pažeidžiamiausių visuomenės grupių interesams (Gach 2019; Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Schlosberg 2012; Sultana 2021). Remiantis atliktais tyrimais, daroma prielaida, kad pasaulinė klimato kaitos samprata evoliucionuoja klimato teisingumo normos link, t. y. šie principai yra atpažįstami įvairių veikėjų, dalyvaujančių klimato diplomatijos institucijose, diskurse ir tiek valstybių, ir svarbiausiuose tarptautiniuose klimato kaitos susitarimuose, pavyzdžiui, tokiuose kaip Paryžiaus susitarimas (Gach 2019; Wiener 2023).

Disertacijoje susitelkiama į JTBKKK kaip pagrindinę institucinę aplinką, telkiančią tarptautinius veikėjus bendradarbiauti sprendžiant klimato kaitos krizę. JTBKKK ir jos kontekste vykstančios COP derybos yra svarbiausia pasaulinė klimato bendradarbiavimo institucija, kurioje klimato teisingumą aktyviai gina tokios suinteresuotosios šalys kaip pilietinės visuomenės NVO. Remiantis jų aktyvia klimato teisingumo principų advokacija, galima daryti prielaidą, kad šių veikėjų dalyvavimas prisideda prie klimato teisingumo diskurso stiprinimo svarbiuose pasauliniuose klimato bendradarbiavimo kontekstuose, pavyzdžiui, JTBKKK.

Pilietinės visuomenės NVO

Pirmasis normų atsiradimo etapas priklauso nuo normų antreprenerių (angl. *norm entrepreneurs*), kurie pasitelkia įtikinėjimą, įvairias komunikacijos priemones ir kitas strategijas, siekdami įtikinti tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti naujas normas (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Normų advokacija užsiimančių veikėjų diskursas tampa svarbiu veiksniu, formuojančiu tarptautinės bendruomenės supratimą apie moraliai teisingo elgesio principus. Darant prielaidą (žr. prieš tai), kad klimato teisingumas yra nauja tarptautinė norma, reiškia, kad normų kūrėjai siekia įtikinti kitus veikėjus priimti elgesio taisykles, atitinkančias klimato teisingumo principus. Remiantis tyrimais, rodančiais, kad klimato teisingumo idėjos atsirado iš pilietinių judėjimų ir pilietinės visuomenės NVO, šiame darbe daroma prielaida, kad jie veikia kaip klimato teisingumo normų formuotojai. Kitaip tariant, pilietinės visuomenės NVO, savo diskursu atstovaujančios klimato teisingumo principams, veikia kaip šios normos kūrėjai.

Analizė sutelkta į šias pilietinės visuomenės NVO, kurias JTBKKK instituciniame kontekste vienija minėtas Klimato veiksmų tinklas (ang. *Climate Action Network*): aplinkos apsaugos NVO (ENGOs), vaikų ir jaunimo NVO (Youth NGOs) bei čiabuvių organizacijos (*Indigenous Peoples' organizations*). Pilietinės visuomenės NVO „išsiskiria savo normatyviniu aspektu, nes pozicionuoja save kaip remiančios tokias vertybes kaip lygybė, teisingumas ir solidarumas“ ar kitus moraliai teisingo elgesio principus (Sanchez Salgado 2021). Šio tyrimo kontekste pilietinės visuomenės NVO klimato teisingumą teigia esant savo pagrindiniu tikslu ir siekia atstovauti pažeidžiamų visuomenės grupių interesams, pavyzdžiui, čiabuvių bendruomenėms. Nors NVO COP derybose skiriasi savo forma ir prioritetais, jas, kaip pilietinės visuomenės organizacijas, vienija siekis skatinti klimato teisingumo principus ir užtikrinti jų laikymąsi formuojant tarptautinę klimato politiką.

*Metodologija*

Taigi disertacijoje pasitelkiamas Simono Koschuto siūlomas emocinio diskurso analizės metodas (EDA) ir interviu, taip siekiant identifikuoti emocijas, vyraujančias NVO klimato teisingumo normos advokacijoje JTBKKK aplinkoje. Emocinio diskurso analizė yra vis plačiau taikoma tarptautinių santykių disciplinos tyrimams, kuriais siekiama atpažinti tam tikras emocijas ir paaiškinti jų svarbą tarptautinės politikos procesams. Kitaip tariant, EDA siūlo konkretų būdą, kaip galima įrodyti, kad tam tikros emocijos gali būti apčiuopiamos analizuojamoje medžiagoje ir suteikia gaires interpretuoti jų vaidmenį politiniams procesams tarptautinėse institucijose, įskaitant ir klimato teisingumo normos formavimą. Tyrime taip pat pasirenkama atlikti interviu, atliepiant emocijas nagrinėjančių tyrėjų įžvalgas apie interviu kaip svarbų metodologinį įrankį tokio tipo tyrimuose. Tad šioje disertacijoje pasitelkiami trijų tipų duomenys:

1. Tarptautinių klimato kaitos derybų (COP) santraukos iš „Earth Negotiations Bulletin“ duomenų bazės, pateikiančios derybų išrašus, įskaitant ir pilietinės visuomenės NVO pasisakymus JTBKKK institucinio mechanizmo rėmuose vykstančiuose susitikimuose.
2. Pilietinės visuomenės NVO naujienlaiškiai (ECO *Newsletters*), pateikiami vykstant COP deryboms ir pristato šių veikėjų pozicijas bei požiūrį į tarptautines klimato kaitos derybas.
3. Dešimt interviu su pilietinės visuomenės NVO, dalyvaujančių tarptautinėse klimato derybose, atstovais, įskaitant aplinkosaugos NVO, jaunimo organizacijas ir įvairių šalių čiabuvių organizacijas.

Tyrime į emocijas žiūrima kaip į diskursyvias išraiškas, o ne individualias psichologines būsenas, pritaikant emocinio diskurso analizėje išskirtus metodologinius įrankius: tekstuose ieškoma emocijas reprezentuojančių kalbos priemonių, tokių kaip emociniai terminai, emocinės konotacijos, metaforos ir analogijos. Interviu pasisakymai naudojami gilesnei emocijų reikšmės analizei ir interpretacijai. Identifikuotų emocijų reikšmė yra interpretuojama išryškinant jų vaidmenį klimato teisingumo normos formavimo procesui JTBKKK kontekste.

**Ribotumai**

Tyrime emocijos yra analizuojamos ieškant jų reprezentacijų dokumentuose ir interviu, tačiau neįtraukiama vizualių elementų, kurie taip pat gali perteikti tam tikras emocijas. NVO dažnai pasitelkia įvairias kampanijas (pvz., protestus, akcijas ir kitus komunikacijos būdus), kuriose gausu vizualių priemonių, perteikiančių įvairias emocijas, taip siekiama patraukti dėmesį į atstovaujamus principus, pavyzdžiui, klimato teisingumą. Vis dėlto pasirinkimas siaurinti duomenų lauką ir analizuoti emocijas, išreiškiamas dokumentuose ir interviu, nesutrukdo įgyvendinti pagrindinio tikslo dėl kelių priežasčių. Pirma, analizei atrinkti dokumentai yra pagrindinės NVO priemonės, kuriomis šie veikėjai komunikuoja savo idėjas ir principus. Derybų išrašų analizė įtraukia šių veikėjų atstovų pasisakymus oficialiuose susitikimuose, o leidžiami ECO naujienlaiškiai taip pat pristato jų viešai komunikuojamas pozicijas ir principus. Tad šie dokumentai leidžia suprasti, kaip NVO siekia įtikinti kitus veikėjus priimti klimato teisingumo principus, atkreipiant dėmesį į emocinius pasisakymus kaip šio įtikinėjimo prieigą. Be to, atlikti interviu leidžia giliau suvokti dokumentuose identifikuojamų emocinių pasisakymų kontekstą ir su tuo susijusius išsamesnius pasakojimus. Tad trys duomenų tipai, nors ir neapima vizualių elementų, leidžia tinkamai apčiuopti vyraujančias emocijas ir plačiau interpretuoti jų vaidmenį klimato teisingumo advokacijoje.

Identifikavus dominuojančias pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijas, tyrime nėra interpretuojama kitų emocinių pasisakymų reikšmė. Nors labiausiai išryškėja referavimas į pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijas, pavyzdžiui, gilesnė atjautos analizė galimai suteiktų papildomų įžvalgų apie NVO taikomas advokacijos prieigas tarptautinėse institucijose. Vis dėlto pasirinkimas susitelkti į labiausiai išryškėjusių pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijų reikšmę neneigia kitų emocijų vaidmens, bet veikiau pasiūlo gilesnę jų interpretaciją.

Galiausiai, kokybinė tyrimo prieiga kelia iššūkių dėl galimo subjektyvumo analizuojant duomenis ir pateikiant siūlomas interpretacijas. Šiuos iššūkius

siekta atliepti viso tyrimo metu kritiškai reflektuojant tyrėjo vaidmenį ir potencialų subjektyvumą, taip pat jį aprašant ir disertacijos metodologinėje dalyje. Atliekant analizę buvo siekiama tinkamai pritaikyti metodologinius įrankius, pavyzdžiui, laikytis nuoseklumo tiksliai atliepiant emocinio diskurso analizės metodo išskiriamus aspektus, kuriais yra atpažįstamos emocijos analizuojamuose tekstuose.

**Teorinė prieiga**

Darbe remiamasi socialinio konstruktyvizmo prieiga, aiškinančia tarptautinių normų formavimosi procesą ir potencialų emocijų vaidmenį jame. Atsispiriant nuo šios prieigos, daroma prielaida, kad normos tarptautinėse klimato kaitos institutcijose yra formuojamos per veikėjų diskursą. Kitaip tariant, normų advokaciją užsiimantys veikėjai pasitelkia diskursą, kuriuo yra formuojamas supratimas, kad tarptautinė bendruomenė turėtų paklusti tam tikroms elgesio taisyklėms. Vadinasi, šio atvejo kontekste daroma prielaida, kad pilietinės visuomenės NVO diskursas, pasitelkiamas JTBKKK, konstruoja supratimą, kad tarptautinė bendruomenė turėtų laikytis klimato teisingumo principų bendradarbiaujant dėl klimato kaitos.

Socialinio konstruktyvizmo prieiga taip pat leidžia integruoti emocijų vaidmenį į klimato teisingumo normos formavimosi aiškinimą. Emocinio posūkio tarptautiniuose santykiuose lauke vyraujančiais aiškinimais pabrėžiama, kad emocijos, reiškiamos per diskursą, tarptautinėje politikoje gali formuoti veikėjų įsitikinimus ir santykius (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Koschut 2020). Emociniai pasakymai, atpažįstami veikėjų kalboje, reprezentuoja kitų veikėjų ir jų elgesio vertinimą. Tad analizuojant emocinius pasisakymus galima suprasti, kaip per emocijas yra formuojami supratimai ir įsitikinimai apie tinkamą elgesį tarptautinėje bendruomenėje, įskaitant ir tarptautines normas, tokias kaip klimato teisingumas.

Siekiant integruoti emocijomis paremtą aiškinimą į tarptautinių normų kūrimo procesą ir suformuoti konceptualų modelį, darbe derinami konkretesni aiškinimai, atliepiantys šiuos aspektus:

- Emocinis aspektas tarptautinių normų advokacijoje, t. y. modelis turėtų apimti emocijas kaip svarbų NVO argumentų už klimato teisingumą elementą. Šiam aspektui atliepti pasitelkiami aiškinimai, susiję su emocijų vaidmeniu tarptautinėje politikoje ir NVO prieigose.
- Įtikinėjimas, kaip būdas, kuriuo NVO skatina normas tarptautinėje politikoje, t. y. diskursas, kuris rezonuoja su tarptautine bendruomene, nes referuoja į *universalias* vertybes ir įtvirtintas moralės normas. Šiam aspektui atliepti pasitelkiami aiškinimai, nurodantys įtikinėjimą kaip svarbų normų

advokacijos būdą, kurį dažnai pasitelkia tam tikras normas skatinantys veikėjai siekdami rezonuoti su jau vyraujančiais moralės principais.

**Pateikiamas *Emotyvais grįstas transformuojančio įtikinėjimo modelis***

Darbe siūlomas konceptualus modelis, į normų įtikinėjimo mechanizmą integruojantis emocijas kaip veiksnius, kurie padeda formuoti veikėjų įsitikinimus: emotyvais (žodžiai, kurių reikšmė turi vertinamąjį emocinį komponentą) grįstas įtikinėjimas, transformuojantis veikėjų įsitikinimus ir sąveikas. Modelis labiausiai remiasi į tarptautinių santykių disciplinoje vyraujančius aiškinimus apie emotyvus ir emocijų išraišką diskurse (Ariffin 2016; Koschut 2020; Bleiker and Hutchison 2017), kuriomis gali būti keičiami veikėjų įsitikinimai ir sąveikos; ir įtikinėjimo specifiką, paaiškinančią, į kokius aspektus normų antrepreneriai fokusuoja savo diskursą siekdami formuoti normas tarptautinėse institucijose (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Labonte 2013):

- *Emocijos yra neatsiejamos nuo tarptautinės politikos procesų ir atlieka tam tikras funkcijas,* kurios daro įtaką veikėjų įsitikinimams, supratimui ir elgesiui. Įtikinėjimo mechanizmo apibūdinimas kaip emocinio reiškia, kad jis grindžiamas emocijomis, kurios išreiškiamos tam tikrų veikėjų (šiuo atveju pilietinės visuomenės NVO) diskursu ir turi performatyvias funkcijas (Ariffin 2016): jos siekia kurti prasmes, išreikšti požiūrį ir sukelti tam tikrus padarinius. Remiantis Ariffin įžvalgomis teigiama, kad emocijų vaidmenį klimato teisingumo advokacijoje galima analizuoti nagrinėjant, kaip NVO diskurse yra pasitelkiami tam tikri emotyvai, t. y. per kalbą atskleidžiami specifiniai emociniai vertinimai.
- *Emocijos veikia kaip transformuojantys veiksniai, galintys keisti veikėjų įsitikinimus ir socialines sąveikas.* Kitaip tariant, kalba išreiškiamos emocijos gali formuoti įsitikinimus ir vertinimus apie tam tikrus veikėjus ir taip prisideda prie reikšmingų tarptautinės politikos pokyčių (pvz., pykčio ar baimės išraiškų reikšmė kariniuose konfliktuose, atjautos ir empatijos reikšmė taikos derybose arba atsakomybės ginti normos kontekste). Remiantis Simono Koschuto prieiga, akcentuojančia emocijų, diskurso ir galios tarptautinėje politikoje sąsają (Koschut 2020), teigiama, kad NVO diskurse mobilizuojami emotyvai padeda transformuoti veikėjų įsitikinimus klimato teisingumo principų link, t. y. pabrėžiant pažeidžiamų veikėjų interesus ir priešinantis, kad išsivysčiusios šalys dominuotų JTBKKK kontekste.
- *NVO pasitelkia įtikinėjimą, kaip būdą skatinti tam tikras normas ir elgesio taisykles tarptautinėje bendruomenėje, kuriame vyrauja tam tikros*

*emocijos, skatinančios moralinius principus ir universalias vertybes*. Remiantis Melisos Labonte prieiga (Labonte 2013), pritaikyta aiškinant NVO advokaciją atsakomybės ginti normos kontekste, teigiama, kad NVO veikėjai, formuodami normas tarptautinėje politikoje, pasitelkia specifinę argumentavimo logiką, kuria siekiama rezonuoti su vyraujančiais *universaliais* ir įtvirtintais moraliniais principais, pvz., žmogaus teisėmis. Labonte aiškinime pateikiamos rezonanso sąlygos (Labonte 2013, 156) (specifiniai aspektai, į kuriuos normų antrepreneriai fokusuojasi siekdami įtikinti tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti tam tikras elgesio taisykles), yra pritaikomos io darbo kontekste.

Toliau pateikiamoje iliustracijoje demonstruojama siūlomo modelio logika (1 paveikslas): emocijos konceptualizuojamos kaip sudedamoji klimato teisingumo normos dalis, pasireiškianti normų antreprenerių – pilietinės visuomenės NVO diskursu JTBKKK institucijose. Šiuo diskursu yra įtikinėjami kiti veikėjai priimti klimato teisingumo principus kaip tarptautinio klimato kaitos bendradarbiavimo normą. Kitaip tariant, įtikinėjant pasitelkiami argumentai, rezonuojantys su tarptautinėje politikoje vyraujančiomis vertybėmis ir moraliai teisingo elgesio principais. Remiantis Melisos Labonte prieiga, išskiriamos konkrečios rezonanso sąlygos, nurodančios, į kokius aspektus turėtų fokusuotis normų antreprenerių argumentai, rezonuojantys su tarptautine bendruomene ir padedantys įtikinti kitus veikėjus priimti naujas elgesios taisykles. Šios sąlygos yra pritaikomos pasirinkto analizuoti atvejo kontekste, t. y. siekiama rezonuoti telkiant argumentus į šiuos aspektus: pateikiant neigiamo poveikio ir žalos, kurią sukelia klimato teisingumo principų nesilaikymas, įrodymus; brėžiamos sąsajos tarp klimato teisingumo principų nesilaikymo ir žmogaus teisių; tam tikriems veikėjams priskiriama atsakomybė už daromą žalą ir nurodomos nukentėjusios grupės; pabrėžiamas potencialus pokytis, atspindintis tarptautinės klimato kaitos politikos formavimą atsižvelgiant į pažeidžiamų grupių interesus, įtraukias ir teisingumu paremtas prieigas.

*Konceptualus modelis: Emotyvais grįstas transformuojantis įtikinėjimas*
(NVO advokacijoje už klimato teisingumo normą)




*1 paveikslas*

Analizuojant normų antreprenerių diskursą, ieškoma emocijų, kurios padeda atliepti išskirtas rezonanso sąlygas. Taigi analizuojamas pilietinės visuomenės NVO diskursas JTBKKK instituciniame kontekste, kuriuo siekiama įtikinti tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti klimato teisingumo principus kaip naujas normatyvines nuostatas. Taikant emocinio diskurso analizę, identifikuojamos dominuojančios emocijos ir interpretuojamos NVO pasitelktos advokacijos prieigos, grindžiamos išryškėjusiomis emocijomis.

**Ginamieji teiginiai**

Disertacijoje siekta atliepti nepakankamai paaiškintą emocijų vaidmenį besiformuojančios klimato teisingumo normos kontekste, sutelkti dėmesį į pilietinės visuomenės NVO, kaip šios normos formuotojų, diskursą JTBKKK instituciniame kontekste. Sukurto konceptualaus modelio pritaikymas analizuojant pasirinktą atvejį leidžia formuluoti šiuos ginamuosius teiginius:

Pirma, emocijos yra neatsiejama JTBKKK kontekste besiformuojančios klimato teisingumo normos dalis, pasireiškia pilietinės visuomenės NVO diskursu: jų diskurse vyraujantys emociniai pasisakymai formuoja bendrą

supratimą apie klimato teisingumo principus kaip moraliai teisingą prieigą tarptautinėse klimato bendradarbiavimo institucijose. Šis procesas konceptualizuojamas kaip **emotyvais grįstas transformuojantis įtikinėjimas**, kurį pilietinės visuomenės NVO pasitelkia advokatuodamos klimato teisingumo principus. Tokia advokacija atkreipia dėmesį į normų antreprenerių diskursą, kaip sukeliantį emocijas, kurios padeda rezonuoti ir įtikinti tarptautinę bendruomenę priimti elgesio principus, metančius iššūkį tam tikrų veikėjų dominavimui tarptautinėse institucijose.

Antra, pritaikius *emotyvais grįsto transformuojančio įtikinėjimo* modelį NVO klimato teisingumo advokacijai JTBKKK kontekste, **viltis** ir **pasipiktinimas** išryškėja kaip vyraujančios emocijos. Į pasipiktinimą ir viltį referuojantys pasakymai NVO leidžia pabrėžti, kas turi būti keičiama (pasipiktinimo frazėmis išryškinant vyraujantį neteisingą elgesį), ir kartu tikėjimą pokyčių galimybe (vilties pasisakymais pabrėžiant pozityvų pokytį ir skatinant klimato teisingumo principų laikymosi pažangą) bei sutelkiant bendruomenę, galinčią šiuos pokyčius įgyvendinti (veikėjus, kurie laikosi klimato teisingumo principų ir juos skatina klimato kaitos bendradarbiavimo institucijose). Tad pasipiktinimo emocija šiame diskurse atlieka ribų nubrėžimo funkciją: pasipiktinimą pabrėžiančios frazės padeda tam tikrus veikėjus, pavyzdžiui, išsivysčiusias šalis, stumti už moralinės bendruomenės ribų, nes pasipiktinimą sukeliančiais pasakymais yra formuojamas tokių veikėjų, kaip moraliai neteisingų, neprisiimančių atsakomybės ir vengiančių laikytis klimato teisingumo principų, įvaizdis. Tuo tarpu viltis atlieka bendruomenės telkimo funkciją: į viltį referuojama kalbant apie veikėjus, kurie laikosi klimato teisingumo principų arba aktyviai juos skatina, taip telkiant juos į bendruomenę, kuri vaizduojama kaip atspindinti pozityvų ir viltį suteikiantį pokytį.

Trečia, klimato teisingumo normos antrepreneriai, pilietinės visuomenės NVO, veikiantys **JTBKKK kontekste, šią institucinę aplinką laiko iš esmės neteisinga, reprodukuojančia elgesį, kuris prieštarauja klimato teisingumo principams**. Šiame kontekste pasipiktinimo ir vilties skatinimas tampa NVO emocine advokacijos prieiga. Pasipiktinimu ir viltimi paremta advokacija gali būti taikoma dvejopai dėl išryškėjusių skirtingų vilties emocijos tipų (pasyvios ir aktyvios): **pasipiktinimo ir pasyvios vilties prieiga arba pasipiktinimo ir aktyvios vilties prieiga**. Pirmoji prieiga, orientuota į pasyvią viltį, pabrėžia pilietinės visuomenės NVO ir pažeidžiamų visuomenės grupių silpnumą ir bejėgiškumą. Antroji prieiga, orientuota į aktyvią viltį, pabrėžia klimato teisingumo normai atstovaujančių veikėjų gebėjimą formuoti pokyčius ir keisti JTBKKK institucijose vyraujantį elgesį, prieštaraujantį klimato teisingumo principams.

**Mokslinis reikšmingumas**

Šioje disertacijoje atskleidžiama emocijų reikšmė tarptautinės klimato teisingumo normos formavimosi procese, atkreipiant dėmesį į pilietinės visuomenės NVO kaip svarbias šio proceso veikėjas. Tokia analizė reikšminga dėl kelių priežasčių. Pirma, darbe suformuojamas modelis pasiūlo būdą analizuoti emocijas normų advokacijoje tarptautinėse institucijose, pabrėžiant emocijų raišką diskurse ir jų svarbą transformuojant įsitikinimus teisingumo principų link. Šiame darbe siūlomas konceptualus emotyvais grįsto transformuojančio įtikinėjimo modelis gali būti naudojamas analizuojant emocijomis grįstą normų advokaciją tarptautinėse institucijose, ypač tokiuose kontekstuose, kur vyrauja neteisybės jausmas dėl tam tikrų veikėjų dominavimo. Modelio pritaikymo galimybė analizuojant NVO klimato teisingumo advokaciją JTBKKK kontekste, taip atskleidžiant specifinių emocijų svarbą būtent šios normos formavimosi procese.

Identifikuojamos pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijos papildo aiškinimus apie emocionalias normų advokacijos prieigas, įprastai taikomas NVO veikėjų. Dauguma atliktų tyrimų telkiasi į gėdinimo strategijas (pvz., *naming and shaming*), o šioje analizėje išryškėja pasipiktinimu ir viltimi paremta advokacijos prieiga. Svarbu ir tai, kad čia atkreipiamas dėmesys į kelis vilties tipus, t. y. aktyvią ir pasyvią viltį, pateikiančius skirtingas implikacijas apie NVO veikėjų veiksnumą arba kitaip agentiškumą (angl. *Agency*). Kitaip tariant, klimato teisingumo advokacijoje išryškėja naujos emocinės normų formuotojų prieigos, kurių reikšmė gali būti plėtojama ir kitų normų formavimą aiškinančiuose tyrimuose, pavyzdžiui, atstovaujant čiabuvių bendruomenių, žmonių su negalia interesus.

Pasipiktinimo ir vilties analizė taip pat papildo emocinio posūkio tarptautiniuose santykiuose lauką detaliai išanalizuojant šių emocijų vaidmenį formuojant klimato bendradarbiavimo normas. Vyrauja nemažai tyrimų, kuriuose nagrinėjama baimės, pykčio, pasididžiavimo ar gėdos jausmų svarba tarptautinės politikos procesams, tačiau pasipiktinimo ir vilties derinys naujai papildo šį tyrimų lauką, ypač aiškinant tarptautinėse klimato bendradarbiavimo institucijose besiformuojančias normas. Nors pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijos yra nagrinėtos socialinių judėjimų ir mobilizacijos tyrimų lauke, darbe yra telkiamasi į kitą jų vaidmenį, t. y. formuojant klimato teisingumo normą tarptautinėse institucijose. Identifikavus pasipiktinimo ir vilties emocijas kaip vyraujančias NVO advokacijoje, disertacijoje yra giliau interpretuojamos šių emocijų funkcijos ir taip išsamiau atskleidžiama jų reikšmė tokiems procesams kaip klimato teisingumo normos formavimas.

Disertacijoje gilinantis į pilietinės visuomenės NVO perspektyvą ir jų diskurse vyraujančias emocijas yra išryškinamas šių veikėjų dalyvavimo JTBKKK institucijose kompleksiškumas. Svarbu ir tai, kad atlikti interviu papildo empirinį emocijų tarptautinėje politikoje tyrimų lauką ir leidžia giliau pažvelgti į NVO atstovų patirtį dalyvaujant šiuose instituciniuose mechanizmuose. Viena vertus, pasipiktinimo frazėmis pabrėžiami šio mechanizmo trūkumai ir neveiksnumas pažeidžiamų veikėjų atžvilgiu. NVO atstovų istorijos ir pasisakymai iš interviu atskleidžia svarbių aspektų, formuojančių pasipiktinimo jausmą. Kita vertus, į viltį referuojančios frazės pabrėžia tikėjimą šio mechanizmo pokyčiu klimato teisingumo principų link ir pilietinės visuomenės NVO dalyvavimo poreikį siekiant formuoti šį pokytį. Taip atskleidžiama vilties, kaip mobilizuojančios šių veikėjų bendruomenę, emocijos reikšmė JTBKKK instituciniame kontekste. Taigi pasipiktinimo ir vilties junginys reprezentuoja tam tikrą emocinę įtampą, vyraujančią NVO prieigose dalyvaujant tarptautinėse klimato kaitos institucijose. Tą parodo ne tik dokumentų analizėje identifikuoti emociniai pasakymai, bet ir interviu su NVO atstovais, kuriuose pasipiktinimas ir viltis išryškėja kaip svarbus emocinis junginys, atspindintis jų klimato teisingumo advokaciją JTBKKK institucijose.

Taigi šiuo darbu yra papildomas teorinis laukas išryškinant emocijų vaidmenį besiformuojančios klimato teisingumo normos procese ir pateikiant konceptualų modelį, leidžiantį analizuoti emocijas tarptautinių normų formavimosi procese, ypač kontekstuose, kuriuose vyrauja neteisybės jausmas. Pritaikius modelį NVO advokacijai už klimato teisingumą JTBKKK institucijose, atskleidžiamas ir konkrečių emocijų – pasipiktinimo ir vilties (pasyvios ir aktyvios) – funkcijos ir išryškėjusios NVO emocinės prieigos. Šių prieigų interpretacija suteikia ir praktinių įžvalgų formuojant NVO advokacijos prieigas ir kituose kontekstuose, ypač atkreipiant dėmesį į aktyvios vilties svarbą pabrėžiant jų agentiškumą ir galimybes prisidėti formuojant pokyčius. Atlikti interviu su NVO atstovais papildo ir empirinį lauką, nes leidžia giliau pažvelgti į šių veikėjų patirtis ir iššūkius užsiimant advokacija politinėse institucijose.

# ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author of this dissertation has published two articles based on her PhD research and two additional articles on other topics within the field of Political Science and International Relations. Neringa Mataitytė has also presented her research at six international conferences and workshops. She completed academic internships at Sciences Po University (France), Zeppelin University (Germany), and Stellenbosch University (South Africa), and received training in methods courses focusing on discourse analysis (The European Consortium for Political Research, Methods School) and interpretive research methods (National University of Singapore, Annual Summer School, Social Science Research Methods). She also completed courses on an introduction to cognitive psychology (University of Oxford), and international negotiations and conflict management (Vilnius University). As part of her academic experience, she worked as a junior research assistant in the project "Mobility, Migration and the COVID-19 Epidemic: Governing Emergencies in Lithuania and Poland" (Vilnius University). Neringa Mataitytė currently serves as a member of the Research Ethics Compliance Committee at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University.

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# PUBLICATIONS

*Publications based on PhD research:*

Mataityte, Neringa. 'Emotions in Climate Change Negotiations: Emotional Approach of NGOs to the Issue of Loss and Damage': *Négociations*, vol. n° 39, no. 1, Dec. 2023, pp. 105–35. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.3917/neg.039.0105.

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