| Abstract [eng] |
In order for a state to perform its public functions, it is necessary to ensure the collection of sufficient financial resources; therefore, the tax system constitutes one of the main instruments of public finance. One of the most significant elements of this system is corporate income tax, which is imposed on the results of legal entities’ activities. Different states, seeking to implement fiscal and economic policy objectives, adopt different models of corporate income taxation, which determine not only the distribution of the tax burden but also the formation of the business environment. This master’s thesis analyses the legal regulation of corporate income tax in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the aim of identifying the essential differences between the models applied in these countries, their underlying logic, and their practical implications. The research establishes that corporate taxation systems may be based on different approaches to the moment of taxation: the classical model applied in Lithuania is oriented towards taxing profit at the moment it is earned, whereas in Estonia and Latvia the system is based on the taxation of distributed profits, where tax liability arises only upon the distribution of profits. It has been determined that the classical corporate income tax model is characterised by a more complex legal regulation, involving a detailed system for determining the tax base, rules on allowable and non-allowable deductions, and various tax incentives. In contrast, the distributed profit taxation model significantly simplifies the taxation process by eliminating the need for detailed regulation of taxable profit calculation; however, it shifts the moment of taxation and has a different impact on investment decisions. The research also reveals that the application of corporate income tax is not based solely on national legal rules. European Union law has a significant influence in this field, as it sets limits on national tax systems through case law and directives, particularly in ensuring compliance with the freedoms of the internal market and combating tax avoidance. Consequently, states are not entirely autonomous in choosing their corporate taxation models. In conclusion, it is established that different corporate income tax models do not reflect varying levels of efficiency but rather different policy choices. The classical model allows for more flexible regulation through legal norms but results in greater complexity, while the distributed profit model ensures simpler application and encourages reinvestment, yet alters the formation of the tax base. For these reasons, corporate income taxation must be regarded as a complex legal and economic phenomenon, the functioning of which is determined by both national regulation and the broader international legal context. |
