| Abstract [eng] |
This Master’s thesis is titled Ukraine’s Resilience Strategies Against Information Attacks in the Context of Russian Aggression: Lessons and Adaptability for Lithuania. Its object is Ukraine’s information resilience strategies developed in response to Russian information attacks from 2014 to 2025 and their adaptability to Lithuania. The research problem is that Ukraine is often presented as a successful case of resistance to Russian information aggression, yet it remains unclear which elements can be adapted to Lithuania. Many Ukrainian practices emerged during the full-scale war, while Lithuania is a peacetime democracy that must preserve freedom of speech, media independence and political pluralism. The thesis thus asks how a democratic state can strengthen information security without undermining the principles it seeks to defend. The main research question is how Ukraine has shaped information resilience strategies under Russian aggression and which of them can be adapted in Lithuania. The thesis assumes that Ukraine’s experience is relevant but cannot be transferred mechanically; it must be adjusted to Lithuania’s political, legal, institutional and societal context. The aim is to analyse Ukraine’s information warfare strategies and assess which measures Lithuania could adapt. The study examines Ukraine’s response from 2014 to 2025 and Lithuania’s information security situation, compares both cases through interviews, documents and academic literature, and identifies the possibilities and limits of adaptation. The theoretical framework combines constructivism and societal resilience. Constructivism explains information warfare as a struggle over narratives, identities, norms and threat perceptions. The resilience approach assesses how institutions, civil society, media and citizens resist hostile information influence. The thesis develops a five-component model covering identity and norms, security agenda-setting, institutional coordination, civic resilience, and international/adaptive resilience. The empirical analysis is based on thirteen expert interviews and document analysis, and the cases are compared using a qualitative 0–3 scale. The analysis shows that Ukraine’s information resilience is based on a hybrid model combining centralized strategic communication with decentralized civic action. Its strengths include rapid response, wartime narratives, presidential communication, strategic communication institutions, digital state infrastructure, OSINT communities, fact-checking, volunteer networks and international advocacy. However, this model was formed under wartime mobilization and raises risks related to centralization, information control and platform vulnerabilities. The comparison shows that Lithuania already has important resilience assets: awareness of Russian hybrid threats, strategic communication capacities, democratic legal standards, active civil society, investigative journalism, fact-checking, media literacy projects and international cooperation. However, its system remains partly fragmented, cooperation between institutions, NGOs, media and experts is not always sufficiently institutionalized, and some mechanisms remain more crisis-oriented than permanent. Lithuania therefore needs to strengthen trust, civic preparedness, media literacy and coordination before a crisis. The thesis concludes that Ukraine’s experience should be adapted selectively. Adaptable practices include faster reaction to hostile narratives, proactive measures, better data exchange, stronger international narrative-building and crisis communication training. The main recommendation is to strengthen Lithuania’s whole-of-society approach by institutionalizing cooperation between state institutions, civil society, media and expert organizations. Lithuania should also develop rapid-response protocols, crisis communication scenarios, expert networks, literacy programs and deeper cooperation with Ukrainian partners. |
