| Abstract [eng] |
This master’s thesis analyses the development of Lithuania’s strategic culture in 2004-2026. It is based on the premise that security and defence policy cannot be explained solely by changes in the security environment, material capabilities, or rational adaptation to objective threats. Strategic choices are also shaped by historically formed ideas, norms, identities, institutional practices, and dominant interpretations of national security. Therefore, the thesis applies the theoretical approach of strategic culture to examine whether changes in Lithuania’s security and defence policy reflect only adaptation to a changing security environment or indicate a deeper transformation of strategic thinking. The thesis uses an analytical model for studying Lithuanian strategic culture. Drawing on strategic culture theory and previous research on Lithuania’s security policy, the model identifies five main analytical categories: threat perception, the elitism of the security community and the dominant role of the state, the role of military power, consensus in security and defence policy, and the relationship between national and collective defence. In addition to earlier studies of Lithuanian strategic culture, this thesis introduces threat perception as a separate analytical category. This makes it possible to assess not only how Lithuania responds to threats, but also how these threats are defined and politically interpreted. The study combines qualitative content analysis of strategic state documents with semi-structured interviews, assessing both formally institutionalized security priorities and their interpretations among political and expert actors. The key continuities of Lithuania’s stategic culure include the Euro-Atlantic orientation, NATO as the central pillar of national security, Russia as the main long-term threat, and the strong role of the state in the security system. However, the meaning and practical expression of these orientations have changed. Russia is increasingly perceived not only as a geopolitical challenge, but also as a long-term military threat, while the threat environment has expanded to include the dimension of non-conventional means. The role of military power has also strengthened. It has become a central foundation of national security, with growing emphasis on deterrence, high readiness, reserve forces, infrastructure, host-nation support, and total defence. At the same time, military security is increasingly linked to societal mobilization and civil resistance. The study also shows that consensus in defence policy is strong but not homogeneous, while the elitism of Lithuania’s security community has somewhat decreased. Security debates have become more open to a broader range of actors, and defence is increasingly presented as a shared responsibility of the state and society. The thesis also identifies a shift in the relationship between national and collective defence. Collective defence remains central, but NATO is no longer perceived only as an external guarantee. Its effectiveness is increasingly understood as dependent on Lithuania’s own preparedness. Thus, national defence is not an alternative to collective defence, but a guarantee of its credibility and effectiveness. Thus, during the period 2004-2026, Lithuania’s strategic culture became more oriented towards resilience, preparedness, and action, rather than merely towards membership in security structures. If in the earlier period security was primarily associated with belonging to Western organizations and the guarantees they provided, now increasing importance is attached to what the state itself can do. Therefore, the Lithuanian case is best described as a combination of continuity and significant change in strategic culture: although the core assumptions remain stable, their practical expression changes during the period under analysis. |
