

# SHAPING THE BORDERLANDS OF THE *PAX SOVIETICA* COMMONWEALTH IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: THE COMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR\*

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## Introduction

My aim in this paper is to shed a new light on the question of how the configuration of post-war Central and Southeastern Europe was shaped during the Second World War by the USSR through its relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (the CPY). Relationships between the CPY and the Soviet Union in 1941–1945 depended on the concrete military situation in Europe, and on the diplomatic relationships between the Soviet Union and the

other members of the Alliance. For that reason, the Soviet Union and the CPY were co-operating in two directions during the Second World War. The concrete military situation in the battleground of the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the “Barbarossa” in June 1941, and, the Soviet political plans after the end of war in terms of the reorganisation of Europe determined their interconnections.

The complexity of relationships between the Soviet Union and the CPY has to be seen through the diplomatic relations between the USSR and the officially Moscow recognised Yugoslav government-in-exile located in London. Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia was divided into two spheres. The first concerned the CPY and the second involved the Yugoslav government in London. Soviet–Yugoslav relations depended primarily on Moscow’s relations with London and Washington, particularly in regard to the question of the opening of a second military front in Europe. During the course of the war, when the opening

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of a second front in Europe was being debated, the Balkans were mentioned as a likely place, but the arguments in favour were more political than military. For the Soviets, the opening of a second front was to be the prelude to final military operations, during which the strategy for shaping postwar Europe would have to be decided upon. However, for each member of the Alliance it was clear that any hasty step might have caused new rifts among the allies, especially between London and Moscow. In view of this fact, one can amply understand the complexity of CPY–Soviet relations during the war years.

The CPY–USSR relationships were carried out by *The Executive Committee* of the Comintern. The direct link between the CPY and the Comintern was the secret radio connection between Josip Broz Tito (appointed by Stalin as General Secretary of the CPY in 1937), and George Dimitrov, the General Secretary of the Comintern. On the other hand, relations between the USSR and the Yugoslav government-in-exile were officially conducted by legations<sup>1</sup>.

Relations between the CPY and the Soviet Union during the Second World War developed gradually. They started with the supply of military and medical materials for the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army, led by the Yugoslav communists, and continued in direct military cooperation in 1944–1945. The main purpose of this Soviet support was to ensure the success of the CPY in taking power and introducing socialism in Yugoslavia. The fundamental aim of Moscow's Yugoslav policy, i. e. its support of Tito's partisans and his CPY, was to bring socialist Yugoslavia into the post-

war Central-Southeastern European community of *Pax Sovietica* controlled and governed by the USSR. For that reason, although the other members of the Alliance, the USA and the UK, supported both Tito's partisans (communist forces) and Draža Mihailović's četniks (royal forces), the Soviet Union supported only the Yugoslav communists and their People's Liberation Army, especially during the final stage of the war. Even though a second front was not opened in the Balkans, the final operations could not bypass this part of Europe since the local people, particularly from Yugoslavia, had been fighting there from 1941. The Soviet Red Army made use of the Yugoslav resistance movement under communist leadership and during the last eight months of the war succeeded through military co-operation to put Yugoslavia under its own political protectorate. It should be said that for Moscow, the Yugoslav resistance movement and armed fighting led by Tito had more political than military significance. In a new guise and in new historical circumstances, Central-Southeastern Europe once more found itself directly in the sphere of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers. Throughout the war, the allies clashed in their Central European and Balkan policies and in their attempts to influence the national liberation struggles within this portion of Europe. The members of the Alliance were convinced that they could resolve matters by striking bargains among themselves. The result of this conviction was the division or "tragedy" of Central and Southeastern Europe designed in Teheran and confirmed in Yalta and Potsdam<sup>2</sup>.

Relations between the CPY and the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945 are variously explained in Yugoslav and Soviet historiography.

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<sup>1</sup> N. Popović. Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945). Beograd, 1988. S. 7; B. Petranović. Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945. Beograd, 1992. S. 622–632.

<sup>2</sup> M. Kundera. The Tragedy of Central Europe // New York Review of Books. New York, 1984. P. 33–38.

In the first, the chief conclusion is that Tito's partisan movement was independent, in other words, not under the supervision of Moscow. The CPY and its partisans were not a "prolonged hand" of Stalin and they did not pursue the Soviet policy of spreading the socialist revolution around the world. Besides, Yugoslav historiography pointed out that the military help of the USSR given in autumn 1944 to Tito's partisans was not the decisive factor which crucially helped the CPY to take political power in Yugoslavia. The main proponent of this view is Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) himself, whose war memoirs, published in his *Sabrana djela*, (*All Works*, Belgrade, 1979), has the main aim of showing Tito's independence from Stalin. The best representatives of such an attitude in Yugoslav historiography are: Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988*, (*History of Yugoslavia 1918–1988*) second volume, Belgrade, 1988; Miodrag Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Južnoslovenski državni san i java (Yugoslavia 1918–1992. South-Slavic state dream and reality)*, Belgrade, 1993, and Vladimir Velebit, *Sjećanja (Memoars)*, Zagreb, 1983.

As opposed to Yugoslav historiography the most common Soviet and popular version of those relations hold that the CPY during the whole war strongly depended on Moscow. The actions of Yugoslav communists were directed by Stalin in order to carry out his policy of "world socialist revolution." According to this historiography, it was only Soviet military help given to Tito in October 1944 which enabled him to win political power over all of Yugoslavia. One of the main defects in both of these historiographies is that they minimised the role of the Yugoslav Royal government-in-exile, and of US and British diplomacy in relations between Tito and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. This defect was only par-

tially overcome in the book: *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945)*, (*Yugoslav-Soviet Relations during the Second World War (1941–1945)* Belgrade, 1988, written by Nikola B. Popović.

In this essay I will undertake an analysis to explore relations between Yugoslav communists and the Soviet Union in the years 1941–1945 setting out three new hypotheses which are based on Yugoslav and Soviet historical sources from the Second World War. Firstly, the communist uprising in Yugoslavia in 1941 was ordered by the Comintern and organised in favour of the Soviet Union. This hypothesis derives from the view that Tito was sent from Moscow in 1937 to Yugoslavia as a new General Secretary of the CPY with the purpose of preparing the party for taking power in Yugoslavia with Soviet help. This was to be carried out under the pretext of resisting the occupiers. The actual goal was to carry out Stalin's policy of spreading Soviet influence in Central-Southeastern Europe under the pretext of "people" (socialist) revolution. The final result of Stalin's policy was to be the *Pax Sovietica* within the eastern portion of Europe. Secondly, Tito's partisan movement was infact independent from Moscow far until 1944 as material and military support is pointed. I came to the conclusion that there were two reasons for this: 1) Stalin could not give real military support to Tito before 1944 because of his relations with the UK and the USA and 2) only in 1944 the appropriate transport conditions for Soviet support delivered to Tito were established. However, as will become evident, Tito was receiving overwhelming material support from Moscow in 1944 and 1945 in what turned out to be the crucial situation of conquering Belgrade in October 1944 and after that to take political power in all of Yugoslavia. Thirdly, the main character and aim of

Tito's partisans' fight was a socialist revolution. What I am in effect arguing is that this aim under instructions given from the Comintern was not so publicly propagated by Tito's partisans in order to avoid upsetting Moscow's western allies.

### Origin of the Yugoslav Uprising and Civil War and the Soviet Union

In occupied Yugoslavia (partitioned by Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy after twelve days of the April War of 1941) popular resistance to the invading forces took the form of an armed uprising. This uprising followed by the Yugoslav civil war initiated early in July 1941 when the Central Committee of the CPY called upon the peoples of Yugoslavia to take up arms, and in the course of that same year the uprising spread to all parts of Yugoslavia, but in the first instance to the parts of the country settled by Serbs. The proclamation of the uprising of all Yugoslav people was populated by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY on July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1941, the day after Stalin's speech to the Soviet people on the radio. This proclamation became an inspiration to transform previous sabotage actions to the partisan war against occupiers<sup>3</sup>. From that moment the passive conduct of the CPY, influenced by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1939) was transformed into a "mobile state". Considerable territory in western Serbia was liberated. After proclamation of the liberated territory as the Užice Republic, the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans under Tito's command established itself there.

<sup>3</sup> B. Petranović. *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988*. Beograd, 1988. T. II, s. 78-79; V. Dedijer, I. Božić, S. Čirković, M. Ekmečić. *Istorija Jugoslavije*. Beograd, 1973. S. 478.

The CPY had direct radio communication with the Comintern which was facilitated by Josip Kopinič, a very good friend of J. B. Tito. J. Kopinič was sent by the Comintern to Yugoslavia in February 1940 to "carry out a special task"<sup>4</sup>. The headquarters of this radio was located in Zagreb and J. Kopinič was sending his reports to Moscow from there until 1944. Tito started to use this radio from January 1941 in order to inform Moscow personally<sup>5</sup>.

This radio was part of a Soviet agency in Yugoslavia which was established in summer 1940. The Soviet military attaché in Yugoslavia set apparatus with a secret code to the correspondent of the *United Press*, Miša Brašić, in June 1941, when the Soviets left Belgrade after the German attack on the USSR.

After the outbreak of Tito's partisans' uprising in July 1941 this radio-apparatus was used by the Supreme Headquarters of the partisan units<sup>6</sup>. Moreover, in the summer of 1941 the CPY maintained connections with Moscow with three independent radio-apparatuses operated by Josip Kopinič in Zagreb, Mustafa Golubić and Miša Brašić in Belgrade. It is generally acknowledged that due to them, the Comintern collected very important information about the political and military situation in Yugoslavia during the critical period of the German attack on the Soviet Union (June-December 1941).

The Soviet Union was the only country which broke off diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav government-in-exile (May 1941).

<sup>4</sup> J. B. Tito. *Sabrana djela*. Beograd, 1979. T. VII, s. 41; B. Petranović. *Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu 1939-1945*. Beograd, 1992. S. 64, 161-162, 180.

<sup>5</sup> M. Bosić. *Partizanski pokret u Srbiji 1941. godine i emisije radio-stanice "Slobodna Jugoslavija", NOR i revolucija u Srbiji 1941-1945*. Beograd, 1972. S. 167; J. B. Tito. *Sabrana djela*. Beograd, 1979. T. VII, s. 48.

<sup>6</sup> N. Popović. *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941-1945)*. Beograd, 1988. S. 39-40.

Acting in this way, the USSR recognised *de facto* the occupation and partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by Italy, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. However, in July 1941 the Soviet Union restored diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav Royal Government in London. Consequently, it was beneficial for Moscow to have double relations with Yugoslavia: one was public and legal (with the Yugoslav government in London) and the other one was secret and nonofficial (with the CPY as one of sections of the Comintern). Soviet historiography claimed that the Comintern, as an international organisation, was independent (did not work under orders from the Soviet government). However, Yugoslav historiography disagrees with this opinion. It stresses the fact that the Comintern was located in the Soviet Union which was dominated by Stalin and that the Comintern was an "extended hand" of the official Soviet government. Yugoslav historians have concluded that the policy of the Comintern was precisely the policy of the Soviet government.

Moscow interfered and supported any resistance movement in Europe which could weaken German military pressure on the Eastern front, and bring advantage to the military situation of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Balkans, Yugoslavia and the CPY, were seriously taken into consideration by Stalin, the Comintern and the Soviet government. The Soviet Union's policy, based on Stalin's desires, to destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia because being a member of the "Versailles system" Yugoslavia maintained to stop Soviet influence in Europe. Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia was carried out through the Comintern, in fact through the CPY as member of Comintern<sup>7</sup>. The Comintern required

from the other communist parties to undertake all measures necessary in order to weaken the Nazis' attacks on the Soviet Union. It was implicitly emphasized immediately after the outbreak of "Barbarosa" in June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1941 when the Executive Committee of the Comintern sent a message to the Central Committee of the CPY informing it that the defence of the Soviet Union was the responsibility of the other enslaved nations and their leaders – the Communist parties. The Comintern required that during the war any local contradictions and conflicts be postponed and replaced with the fight against Fascism<sup>8</sup>. This Comintern demand implied that the CPY should temporarily halt the call for class struggle and unite all forces for the fight against Nazism and Fascism<sup>9</sup>.

I would argue, on the basis of historical sources, that the uprising in Yugoslavia, organised by the CPY in the summer of 1941, was ordered by the Comintern (the Soviet government behind it) to reduce Nazi military pressure on the Eastern front. This was manifested in a telegram of the Comintern sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia at the end of July 1941. This telegram answered Kopinić's reports to Moscow about the situation within the Communist Party of Croatia. The Comintern stated that all members of the CPY were obliged to join the army, to defend the Soviet Union if it would be necessary and to give their lives for "the freedom of the Soviet Union". Every member of the party was expected to be a soldier of the Red Army<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> B. Petranović. *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988*. Beograd, 1988. T. II, s. 78–79.

<sup>9</sup> R. Bulat (urednik). *Ostrožinski Pravilnik 14. XII 1941*. *Historijski Arhiv u Karlovcu-Skupština Općine Vrginmost*. Zagreb, 1990; V. Dedijer, I. Božić, S. Čirković, M. Ekmečić. *Istorija Jugoslavije*. Beograd, 1973. S. 474.

<sup>10</sup> N. Popović. *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945)*. Beograd, 1988. S. 55.

<sup>7</sup> V. Vinaver. *Ugrožavanje Jugoslavije 1919–1932 // Vojno-istorijski glasnik*. Beograd, 1968. S. 150.

In the Announcement to the Montenegrin people at the end of June 1941 issued by the Provincial Committee of the CPY for Montenegro, Sandžak and Boka Kotorska it was written that "the biggest guarantee for success for national freedom in the fight against the occupiers is the powerful and almighty *Red Army* and the revolutionary forces of the international proletariat"<sup>11</sup> The Comintern, during this period of the war, even required from Yugoslav partisans that they collaborate with Mihailović's royal četnik forces in order to be able to fight the Germans<sup>12</sup>. Thus, Tito attempted to enlist cooperation of the četniks under Colonel (later General) Draža Mihailović who was located in a nearby part of Serbia in joint fighting against the enemy. However, the četniks supported by the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile in London and the UK went back on their word and even attacked the partisan detachments during the German offensive against the liberated territory in November and December 1941.

The British strategy concerning Yugoslav affairs (i. e. the civil war) was to give support to that movement that would ensure restoration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the war. The enigma, which liberation movement official London would support, was resolved in the autumn of 1941 when Great Britain was beginning to send military missions to the četnik high command. Not a single British or Soviet mission at that time was sent to the Supreme Headquarters of the partisan detachments<sup>13</sup>. Nevertheless, the British attitude about the Yugoslav civil war (i. e. the struggle

between the partisans and the četniks) changed after the Soviet victory over the Germans in the Stalingrad battle early 1943. As it became clear for London that after Stalingrad the Red Army would drive further toward Central Europe and the Balkans, the British government decided to make direct contacts with Tito in order to increase its own and decrease Soviet influence among Yugoslav partisans. The purpose of this revised British policy in Yugoslavia was not to allow Moscow to establish its full domination over postwar Yugoslavia. Consequently, in April 1943 the first British mission was sent to the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (the NLAY), but afterwards they continued to arrive regularly and included even American military officers. The competition over Yugoslavia among the allies continued in early 1944 when the Soviet Union also sent a military mission to Tito<sup>14</sup>.

### **Moscow and the Question of Socialist Transformation of Yugoslav Society**

The intention of the Yugoslav communists to achieve a social transformation of Yugoslav society as their final goal in the war in Yugoslavia (1941–1945), was stimulated by Stalin's speech on November 7<sup>th</sup>, 1941, when he predicted the end of the war the following year. Stalin's statement was instigated by successful Soviet counterattack in the battleground of Moscow.

Tito considered Stalin's speech to be a signal to prepare the CPY for taking power in Yugoslavia before the end of the war. However, Tito's partisans faced defeat by the German Nazis in Western Serbia in December 1941, which postponed achievement of his

<sup>11</sup> Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije. Borbe u Crnoj Gori 1941. Vojno-istorijski institut jugoslovenske armije. Beograd, 1950. T. III/1, s. 14.

<sup>12</sup> M. Zečević. Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Južnoslovenski državni san i java. Beograd, 1993. S. 105.

<sup>13</sup> E. Kardelj. Sećanja. Beograd, 1980. S. 25–40.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., s. 50–54.

ultimate political aims in Yugoslavia<sup>15</sup>. Nevertheless, J. B. Tito always emphasised that the CPY in its struggle for power in Yugoslavia would get support only from Moscow<sup>16</sup>. In order to encourage partisan units after their failure with Nazi troops, Tito continued to believe that he would gain a quick victory by the Soviet Union against the Germans. This influenced Tito to rearrange the organisational structure of the Yugoslav Communists and partisan units according to the Soviet model. Partisan units were shaped according to Soviet norms with Soviet symbols and a political-commissar structure. In liberated territory (the Užice Republic in Western Serbia) the People's Liberated Councils were formed on the model of the *soviets* in the USSR<sup>17</sup>. Specific features of the war of liberation and the reintegration of Yugoslavia include the fact that the territories liberated by Tito's partisans became established as the communities of a nation at war, which had no direct links with the previous local authorities in the old system of government that had collapsed. The CPY as one of the mobilizing and organising forces for the uprising and war of liberation, adopted the principle of the *soviets* in order to elaborate a strategy for the emancipation and reintegration of Yugoslavia in the course of its liberation. In many parts of Yugoslavia (Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) the local committees of national liberation (or national liberation and revolution-

ary councils) were created on the liberated territories to perform government functions. But, all of them were organised and functioned according to the Soviet model. Consequently, on November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1941 the Supreme National Liberation Committee of Serbia was set up on liberated territory of the Užice Republic. Likewise on February 1942 the National Liberation Committee of Montenegro was formed on liberated territory of Montenegro. Furthermore, the creation of a military unit called "The First Proletarian Brigade" was formed on Stalin's birthday (December 21<sup>st</sup>) in the Bosnian village of Rudo in 1941. Such actions by Tito were criticised by the Comintern which, orchestrated by the Soviet Union, tried to stop Tito's "socialist revolution" at that moment, since the Soviet government attempted to keep positive diplomatic relations with its western allies. This caused distant relations between the USSR and the CPY for the latter's achievement in "the socialist revolution" in Yugoslavia. The Comintern took all responsibilities to detach Tito's actions from Soviet policy in order not to deteriorate the British and American relations with the Soviet Union. This Comintern position was dispel to disband the suspicions of Great Britain and the USA about the partisans' socialist revolution and its communist character in Yugoslavia.

Relationships between the Soviet government and the Yugoslav Royal government-in-exile in London, which in the eyes of the allies represented the legal government of Yugoslavia, became seriously complicated in the summer of 1942. The reason for this was the question of the četnik movement in Yugoslavia, led by General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović and officially supported by the Yugoslav government-in-exile. On August 1<sup>st</sup>, 1942 the Soviet government published the *Resolution*, which was mistakenly represented as written by the

<sup>15</sup> Dj. Vujović. O lijevim greškama KPJ u Crnoj Gori u prvoj godini Narodnooslobodilačkog rata // Istorijski zapisi. Titograd, 1967. S. 79; B. Petranović. Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945. Beograd, 1992. S. 319–328.

<sup>16</sup> J. B. Tito. Sabrana djela. Beograd, 1979. T. VIII, s. 35.

<sup>17</sup> Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije. Vojno-istorijski institut jugoslovenske armije. Beograd, 1950. T. I/20.

“patriots” from Montenegro, Boka Kotorska and Tjentište. This document detailed the “collaboration and treachery” of General Draža Mihailović. For the first time, the Soviet media published such resolution. Previously Soviet newspapers described only the partisans fight and their military successes, but nothing was mentioned about the četniks and their “treacherous activities”<sup>18</sup>. The Yugoslav Royal Government officially protested to the Soviet ambassador in London. This diplomatic protest inspired the Soviet government to write the *Memorandum* handed to S. Simić, the Yugoslav ambassador in Kujbishew on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1942. Presenting this *Memorandum*, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs overtly uttered its opinion that General D. Mihailović had been a collaborator. The *Memorandum* provided the “facts”, received from Tito’s partisans, about Mihailović’s collaboration with the Germans and the Italians in Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro<sup>19</sup>. This announcement of the Soviet government indicates the recognition of its relationships with the CPY, on the one hand, and the changing relationships with the Yugoslav Royal government, on the other. The counter-*Memorandum* of the Yugoslav Royal government (August 12<sup>th</sup>, 1942) explained the četniks’ activities against the occupiers and tried to improve the deteriorating diplomatic relations with Moscow<sup>20</sup>. However, the Soviet government decided to rupture relations with officials of the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile.

<sup>18</sup> Труд. Москва, январь 12 1942; Большевик. Москва, 1942. Т. 2; Красная звезда. Москва, июнь 12 1942; Правда. Москва, июль 19 1942; Л. Я. Гибанский. Советский Союз и новая Югославия 1941–1947 г. г. Москва, 1987. С. 49.

<sup>19</sup> В. Krizman (urednik). Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu 1941–1943. Dokumenti. Beograd–Zagreb, 1981. S. 334–335.

<sup>20</sup> J. Marjanović. Draža Mihailović između Britanaca i Nemaca. Beograd, 1979. S. 278.

In 1942, J. B. Tito requested permission from the Comintern to discredit publicly the Yugoslav government-in-exile and its protege in Yugoslavia – General D. Mihailović. Tito’s final intention was to receive international support in order to replace Yugoslav Royal government in London as the representative of the Yugoslav people. The leader of the Yugoslav partisans had been waiting the reply from Moscow during the whole of 1942 and 1943. Nevertheless, in the meantime, a favourable moment for public dismissal of General D. Mihailović and his proponents in London did not occur. Ultimately, Tito decided to make use of the meeting of the “big-three” at the Teheran conference for his political aim to present himself and his partisan movement as the real and moral representatives of the Yugoslavs. Tito organized the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (the ACNLY) in the Bosnian town Jajce (November 29<sup>th</sup>–30<sup>th</sup>, 1943), exactly coinciding with the sessions of the Teheran conference. The ACNLY, when it was formed in November 1942 in the Bosnian town of Bihać, did not have any prerogatives of a supreme organ of government because of foreign policy considerations. But, one year later, conditions were changed and the second session of the ACNLY adopted far reaching decisions connected with the establishment of the new (socialist) Yugoslavia. The deputies of the ACNLY decided to create the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (the NCLY) which would play the role of new Yugoslav government. At the same time, the ACNLY was transformed into the people’s assembly. The return of the Yugoslav king and Royal Karadjordjević dynasty to Yugoslavia was forbidden until the war was over. The question of the political structure of the state (republic or monarchy) was supposed to be discussed after the liberation. The fed-



eral structure of the future Yugoslavia was proclaimed in advance. The federal internal structure of Yugoslavia, instead of centralist model, was propagated by Yugoslav communists even before the war broke out. For Yugoslav communists, federalisation of the country was designed from 1937 onward as one of the crucial achievements of socialism. They took the Soviet Union's federal model of internal state organisation as an example for the federal organisation of socialist Yugoslavia<sup>21</sup>. For Yugoslav communists, a federal organisation of Yugoslavia was a cornerstone of a new union of liberated nations<sup>22</sup>.

While Moscow disapproved the creation of the ACNLY (November 26<sup>th</sup>–27<sup>th</sup>, 1942) because of possible negative reactions from the Anglo-American side<sup>23</sup>, a convocation and the legislative work of the second session of the ACNLY a year later were supported by Moscow<sup>24</sup>. From the very beginning of the war J. B. Tito strongly insisted that the Soviet government would recognise the partisan units in Yugoslavia as the regular army of all Yugoslav nations. In Tito's mind this recognition was supposed to be followed by a Soviet military mission sent to the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans' National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia<sup>25</sup>. Tito's main diplomatic goal in the autumn of 1943 was to obtain from Moscow public recognition of the alliance between the Soviet government and the CPY.

To be sure, according to relevant historical sources, Tito utilised the preparation for the

Ministerial Conference in Moscow between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (held from October 19<sup>th</sup> to October 30<sup>th</sup>, 1943) to present his war aims in Yugoslavia to the Soviet government. The leader of the Yugoslav partisans sent a message to G. Dimitrov (October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1943) informing the Soviet government that: 1) the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement recognises neither the Yugoslav Royal government in London nor the Yugoslav king because they supported D. Mihailović – “a collaborator and traitor of the Yugoslav nation”; 2) the National Liberation Movement would not allow Yugoslav government-in-exile and Yugoslav king to return to Yugoslavia because their arrival in Yugoslavia could give rise to civil war in the country; and 3) “the sole legitimate government at the present time is represented by the national liberation committees, headed by the Anti-Fascist Council”<sup>26</sup>. Tito in the same telegram presented his main revolutionary (socialist) claims to the Comintern as well. The message influenced the Soviet government and during the Moscow Ministerial Conference Soviet foreign minister Molotov demanded from the USA and the UK two approvals: 1) to send a Soviet military mission to the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia and 2) to establish military base in the Middle East in order to supply war materials to Tito's partisans<sup>27</sup>.

Tito's telegram, sent to Dimitrov, proves for me at last that the Soviet government was well acquainted with the revolutionary aims of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. In the autumn of 1943 Moscow recog-

<sup>21</sup> B. Petranović, M. Zečević. *Agonija dvc Jugoslavije*. Beograd, 1991. S. 45.

<sup>22</sup> E. Kardelj. *Sećanja*. Beograd, 1980. S. 42–43.

<sup>23</sup> V. Dedijer. *Interesne sfere*. Beograd, 1980. S. 352.

<sup>24</sup> N. Popović. *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945)*. Beograd, 1988. S. 108.

<sup>25</sup> J. B. Tito. *Sabrana djela*. Beograd, 1979. T. XVI, s. 153.

<sup>26</sup> V. Dedijer. *Interesne sfere*. Beograd, 1980, s. 312.

<sup>27</sup> B. Petranović (urednik). *Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu 1943–1945. Dokumenti*. Beograd–Zagreb, 1981. S. 291.

nised the revolutionary claims of the CPY<sup>28</sup> giving Tito a "green light" to prepare the Jajce's session of the ACNLY. I believe after detailed investigation, that the official Soviet government in Moscow was using the Comintern for its political purposes. Because the Comintern did not answer Tito negatively about his intention to hold the ACNLY's session in Jajce with a previously designed schedule of work and prepared decisions, one can only conclude that the Soviet government sustained Tito's intention to change the political system in Yugoslavia by revolutionary means<sup>29</sup>. For that purpose, regular reports of Soviet officials on this region expressed the view that the CPY appeared like the only political power in this country which was capable of restoring the Yugoslav state. In the backing of this Soviet policy to manipulate the CPY in order to create a new satellite, a socialist Yugoslav state, was the Soviet claim to establish political dominance over Central and Southeastern Europe. Socialist Yugoslavia would play a very important role in Stalin's concept of the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth* as the country connecting Central and Southeastern Europe's territories under Moscow's control and guidance.

There are indications from the sources that Stalin designed for Yugoslavia a leading role among postwar Balkan member-countries of the Soviet commonwealth. Such indications can be found in Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo's memoirs *Borba za Balkan (Struggle over the Balkans)*. Specifically, from March 1943 onwards (i. e. immediately after the Red Army defeated the Germans at Stalingrad) Tempo was working to set up a joint Balkan head-

quarters to coordinate military operations in the border regions of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece against the Germans and Italians. The command of the joint Balkan liberation forces would be given to the Yugoslav communists, a sign that postwar Yugoslavia would play a chief role among other Balkan members of the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth*. Tempo was working in haste "especially considering the fact that the landing of allied troops from Africa in the Balkan Peninsula was expected any day, and this would have greatly affected the balance of power in each Balkan country. There was no time for delay!"<sup>30</sup> However, developments did not take the expected course, since Anglo-American forces invaded Sicily and later on southern Italy but not the Balkans. The idea of a Balkan Union under the Soviet supervision seemed to be realized in 1946–1947 when Tito and Dimitrov negotiated upon a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Confederation. At last, the idea turned out to be quite illusory in 1948–1949 with the Tito-Stalin confrontation and the Yugoslav departure from the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth*.

### **The Soviet Union Increases its Domination Over the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia**

One of the important agreements of "the big three" in Teheran was to give aid to Tito's NLAY which practically meant that assistance to General Mihailović and his royal četnik movement was ended. The western allies obviously reversed their attitude towards events in Yugoslavia in view of the successes of the NLAY. The British as well were at that time becoming more interested in the liberation movements in other Balkan countries with a

<sup>28</sup> N. Popović. *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945)*. Beograd, 1988. S. 111.

<sup>29</sup> J. B. Tito. *Sabrana djela*. Beograd, 1979. T. XVII, s. 54–70.

<sup>30</sup> S. Vukmanović-Tempo. *Borba za Balkan*. Zagreb, 1981. S. 80–88.

view to the opening of a second front. However, agreement on aid to the NLAY became beneficial mostly beneficiary to the Soviets since the Red Army could give this aid faster than the British or Americans. As a result, decisive Soviet influence in Yugoslavia at the last stage of the war was expressed by way of material support for the Yugoslav communists.

Soviet support given to Tito's combatants had four features: 1) war equipment and material; 2) medical aid; 3) financial support and 4) support for education of officers of the National Liberal Movement of Yugoslavia (the NLMY).

These Soviet provisions had a material and an ideological basis. During the war the NLMY did not have any factories for production of war material at its own disposition. Therefore that the CPY and the Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY applied for material support from the Allies. However, the NLMY could expect this support only from the Soviet government, because the USA and the UK favoured the četniks of General Mihailović until the summer of 1944. The ideological reason stay in the hopes of the Central Committee of the CPY that Moscow is the natural (political and ideological) ally of the Yugoslav communists.

Nevertheless, the first consignments and medical materials were received from the Anglo-American side as part of their anti-Nazi program in June 1943. The Soviet Union delivered its first material support to Tito's NLMY in March 1944<sup>31</sup>. It came after the visit of a Soviet military mission to the Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY on February 23, 1944 as the Soviet answer to Tito's requests<sup>32</sup>. The Soviet government was forced to react

to possible Anglo-American power in Balkans immediately, in order to prepare the soil for its own sphere of influence in Yugoslavia, Central and Southeastern Europe after the war.

A great success of Tito came when the Soviet State Committee of Defence decided on September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1944 that weapons and equipment for twelve infantry and two air-divisions would be transferred to the NLMY. This military aid was contemplated during the conversation between Tito and Stalin in Moscow from September 21<sup>st</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup>, 1944<sup>33</sup>. In order to fulfil this decision, the Soviet government organised a military base in Romania (Craiova). The Soviets continue to deliver war material to Yugoslav partisans from Bari and started to do it in autumn 1944 as well from Sofia (with trucks) and Craiova (with aircraft and trains). Some military help came also from the Headquarters of the third Ukrainian front. During October 1944, from all these Soviet military bases, 295.000 tons of war material were transferred to the NLMY. I claim that this huge Soviet military support, sent to the Yugoslav partisans in October 1944 played a crucial role in the battle for Belgrade (October 18<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup>). After "the Belgrade Operation" and the taking of the Yugoslav capital, and establishment of their own military and political control Tito's partisans finally won a victory over Mihailović's četniks. As a result, the Yugoslav civil war was resolved in the Tito's favour with great Soviet military support. After "the Belgrade Operation" the Soviet government started to send to Tito food shipments ordered by Stalin on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 1944. The first Soviet food aid, comprising of 50,000 tons of grain, was delivered to Yugoslavia at the begging of December 1944<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> P. Milošević. Iščekivanje sovjetske pomoći na Durmitoru 1942 // Istorijski zapisi. Titograd, 1970. S. 1.

<sup>32</sup> Arhiv Centralnog Komiteta Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije. KPJ – Kominterna. Beograd, 1944. S. 12.

<sup>33</sup> N. Antić, S. Joksimović, M. Gutić. Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1982. S. 487.

<sup>34</sup> Новые документы Великой отечественной войны // Коммунист. Москва, 1979. С. 80.

According to the Tito-Tolbuhin agreement signed on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 1944 in Belgrade, the NLMY received two air divisions and one air base with technical equipment, weapons and manpower from the Soviet side. From then until the end of the war, 350 Soviet aircraft were given to the Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY<sup>35</sup>. It is evident that these aircraft and war materials received from Moscow after the partisans entrance to Belgrade were used by the Yugoslav Army for the purpose of taking control over the whole territory of Yugoslavia as well as for entering Trieste on May 1, 1945. In April 1945 with Soviet support, forty two storming (IL-2) and eleven hunting (Jak-3) air divisions were formed and included into Yugoslav Army<sup>36</sup>. During 1944 and the first five months of 1945 the total Soviet support for the NLMY (from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1945 transformed into the Yugoslav Army) was: 96,515 rifles; 20,528 pistols; 68,423 machine guns and submachine guns; 3,797 anti-tank's rifles; 3,364 mortars; 170 anti-tank's guns; 895 field's guns; 65 tanks; 491 airplanes and 1,329 radio stations<sup>37</sup>. After the end of the war all Soviet aircraft from the Bari military base were given to the Yugoslav Army which became the fourth largest army in Europe in manpower and military equipment. The total Soviet air support of Tito's partisans during the whole war came to 491 aircrafts.

Soviet help in training Tito's army was also important. From autumn 1944 to February 1945, 107 Yugoslav pilots and 1104 techni-

cians were trained in the USSR. In April 1945 3,123 members of Tito's Yugoslav Army were in Soviet military schools. The total number of Yugoslav pilots and technicians trained in Soviet schools during the war was 4,516<sup>38</sup>.

Soviet medical support sent to the NLMY was variegated and voluminous. It comprised medical material, medicaments and hospitals. Soviet doctors gave help to approximately 11,000 soldiers of the NLMY including those soldiers who were hospitalised in Bari<sup>39</sup>. In Yugoslavia seven Soviet mobile and four surgical field hospitals were operating during the whole war<sup>40</sup>.

The first financial contract between the Yugoslav partisans and the Soviet government was signed in Moscow in May 1944. Stalin allowed financial support of \$10,000,000. In June 1944, Tito's General Velimir Terzić signed a new financial contract, also in Moscow. It was an interest free loan of \$2,000,000 and 1,000 roubles. This financial aid was given by Moscow in order to help the NLMY to develop and organise its own legations, missions and to make a new Yugoslav currency. In December 1944 the Soviet Union delivered three billion new Yugoslav dinar. On January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1945 the NLMY had \$1,233,480 and 300,000 roubles on its own account in Moscow's "Gosbank"<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> Советские вооруженные силы в борьбе за освобождение народов Югославии. Москва, 1960. С. 49.

<sup>36</sup> Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije. Vojno-istorijski institut jugoslovenske armije. Beograd, 1967. Т. X/2, с. 412.

<sup>37</sup> V. Strugar. Jugoslavija 1941–1945. Beograd, 1969. S. 311.

<sup>38</sup> А. Антосяк (редактор). Документі о советско-югославском боевом содружестве в годы второй мировой войны // Военно-исторический журнал. Москва, 1978, Но. V, с. 71.

<sup>39</sup> Советские вооруженные силы в борьбе за освобождение народов Югославии. Москва, 1960. С. 50; S. L. Spasić. 1976. Jugoslovensko-sovjetske medicinske veze u Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu // Acta historica medicinae pharmaciae, veterine. Beograd, 1976. Т. XVI–1, с. 59.

<sup>40</sup> А. Н. Ратников. В борьбе с фашизмом, о совместных боевых действиях, советских и югославских войск в годы второй мировой войны. Москва, 1974. С. 105.

<sup>41</sup> Arhiv Centralnog Komiteta Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije. Jugoslovenske vojne misije u Sovjetskom Savezu. Beograd, 1944. S. 371–375.

## The Victory of the Socialist Revolution in Yugoslavia and Moscow

The Second Session of the ACNLY held in the Bosnian town Jajce (November 29<sup>th</sup>–30<sup>th</sup>, 1943) showed overtly that socialist transformation of Yugoslav society was the main aim of the CPY and its fight against the occupiers. The conclusions of this session were used by Moscow for its own political purpose in relations with its western allies and the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Moscow refused to sign the Yugoslav-Soviet pact of friendship and cooperation proposed by Yugoslav Prime Minister Božidar Purić on December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1943 with the explanation that the Soviet government did not see any possibility for negotiations with the Yugoslav Royal government because of the “totally confused, unclear and unresolved situation in Yugoslavia”. However, real reason for such a Soviet attitude toward the Yugoslav government-in-exile was Moscow’s intention to recognise Tito’s government, established in Jajce, as the only legal government of Yugoslavia. For the same reason Moscow rejected the British initiative that the USSR and the UK should pursue a common policy toward Yugoslavia. The Soviet government recognised the changes in the political organisation of Yugoslav society in the case of communist victory during the war with a public proclamation of all decisions of the Second Session of the ACNLY via the *Free Yugoslavia* radio station located in Moscow and controlled by the Comintern and the Soviet government. At that time, Ralph Stevenson, the new British ambassador at the Yugoslav court, observed that it was not possible to think that the Soviet government could allow anything to be proclaimed on the radio station *Free Yugoslavia* that was not in accordance with Soviet policy<sup>42</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> D. Biber (urednik). Tito – Churchill. Strogo tajno. Beograd-Zagreb, 1981. S. 67.

British policy toward Yugoslavia during the war was to help the Yugoslav king, Petar II Karadjordjević to return to his country in order to combine the partisan and četnik movement. The leadership of these united forces would be shared between Tito and the king. This was proposed by Churchill in a letter sent to Tito on February 5<sup>th</sup>, 1944<sup>43</sup>. This proposal Tito delivered to G. Dimitrov in order to get a piece of advice from Moscow. Tito received Dimitrov’s answer on February 8<sup>th</sup>, 1944 with the Soviet decisions: 1) the Yugoslav government-in-exile had to be dismissed together with General Mihailović; 2) the Yugoslav government in the country (the National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia) should be recognised by the British government and other members of the Alliance as the only Yugoslav government; 3) the Yugoslav king had to be subordinated to the laws issued by the ACNLY and 4) cooperation with the king would be possible only if Petar II would recognise all decisions proclaimed by the ACNLY in Jajce<sup>44</sup>.

The Soviet government recognised the NCLY as the only legal Yugoslav government in May 1944 with the signing of the first financial contract with the NCLY’s mission in Moscow. It was the first international contract which was signed between the NCLY and a foreign government. This contract was a result of the new Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia which was quite different from Moscow’s attitude toward the Yugoslav political and military situation at the beginning of the war.

Soviet diplomacy during the autumn and winter of 1941 required that Tito cooperate

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., s. 83–84.

<sup>44</sup> M. Dželebdžić (urednik). Dokumenti centralnih organa KPJ, NOR i revolucija (1941–1945). Beograd, 1986. T. XV, s. 449.

with Mihailović's četniks. General Mihailović was officially appointed to the position of Minister of Defence by the Yugoslav Royal government in London in the winter of 1941. The reason for this Soviet policy at that time was Moscow's wish to cooperate with the British and the Yugoslav governments in consideration of the difficult position of the Red Army right near the Soviet capital. As the position of the Red Army was much better in the summer and autumn of 1942, Moscow started to change its policy toward Yugoslavia by publishing "information" about collaboration between the četniks and the occupiers in Yugoslavia. This "information" was sent by Tito's partisans to the Comintern. Such kinds of "information" the Soviet government continued to receive from the Supreme Headquarters of partisan units in Yugoslavia and after the abolishment of the Comintern in the summer of 1943. During the whole war the Soviet government was very well informed about the military situation in Yugoslavia, particularly about the balance of power between the two domestic but ideologically and politically antagonistic resistant movements: Mihailović's četniks and Tito's partisans. After the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, when the USSR won two crucial victories in the war and became the supreme partner in relationships with the USA and the UK, Moscow gradually improved its relations with Tito. Officially, Moscow supported the British policy of compromise in Yugoslavia. It was a great encouragement for Churchill to force the Yugoslav government-in-exile to find a *modus vivendi* with Tito, but only under the condition that General Mihailović would be dismissed and that the Yugoslav Royal government would recognise all decisions issued by the ACNLY in Jajce.

The British government was well aware that supporting Tito its relations with the Yugoslav government-in-exile would be deteriorated

tremendously. The British vision of the political and military situation in Yugoslavia was expressed in the *Memorandum* from the British Foreign Office submitted by Anthony Eden to the cabinet on June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1944. In this document Tito was seen as the victor in the Yugoslav civil war but quite surprisingly a leader who would pursue an independent policy after the war! According to the authors of the *Memorandum* Great Britain should support Tito in order to benefit later from his policy of independence from Stalin. At the same time, the Soviet Union was trying to exploit its ideological bonds with the CPY and its national liberation movement. Surely, in the summer of 1944 London saw in its joint Yugoslav policy with Moscow the best means to reduce Stalin's influence on the Yugoslav partisan leader. This, in my opinion, can be confirmed by the above mentioned British *Memorandum* where full support to the Yugoslav communist-led movement was proposed in order to influence Tito "to follow a line which would suit us, thus taking the wind off the Russian sails". It was necessary if Great Britain was planning to play an active role in Yugoslav (and Greek) internal affairs. The new British policy regarding Yugoslavia was verified by Churchill who proposed to Tito during their meeting in Naples in the summer of the same year that allied (Anglo-American) military forces, in cooperation with the NLAY would enter Istria.

This common Soviet-British policy of compromise in Yugoslavia achieved a full success when the Tito-Šubašić agreement was signed in the island of Vis on June 16<sup>th</sup>, 1944 which Tito negotiated in the name of the NCLY and Ivan Šubašić in the name of the Yugoslav government-in-exile as its Prime Minister. This agreement was a great victory for Tito's partisans, supported by the Soviet government which announced the conditions of the agreement on radio *Free Yugoslavia*. The "Tito-

Šubašić agreement” required: 1) federal organisation of the future Yugoslavia; 2) recognition of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (led by Tito) by the Yugoslav Royal government; 3) that the NCLY and Yugoslav government in London would create a common Yugoslav government; 4) all anti-fascist fighting forces in Yugoslavia would be united with the NCLY and 5) that the question of monarchy in Yugoslavia would be resolved after the war<sup>45</sup>. The Tito-Šubašić agreement gave official sanction to the ACNLY’s decisions and further consolidated the international position of the NCLY. This agreement was signed in full accordance with Soviet policy and diplomatic tactics. Formally, the Soviet government cooperated with the western members of the Alliance but in reality Moscow supported Tito in his fight to take a power in Yugoslavia. The Soviet press was overwhelmingly on Tito’s side in 1944 and 1945, charging Mihailović’s četniks with collaboration. Indirectly, Moscow charged the Yugoslav government-in-exile with the same collaborations with the Germans because General Mihailović was under its protection.

Finally, a turning point in relations between the Soviet government and the CPY occurred in September 1944 when Tito for the first time during the war visited Moscow. In three meetings with Stalin (September 21<sup>st</sup>-28<sup>th</sup>) Tito made a deal with the Soviet leader to send the Red Army across the Danube in order to support Tito’s partisans to take the Yugoslav capital before Mihailović’s četniks would do so<sup>46</sup>. Likewise, Soviet troops were allowed to operate against the Germans in a limited part of

Yugoslav territory. Officially, the Soviet government asked Tito for permission to cross the Danube and to enter Yugoslav territory. This Soviet “application” was interpreted by the Americans and the British as the Soviet *de facto* recognition the NCLY as the legal Yugoslav government. The NCLY’s prohibition of the British navy to use Yugoslav sea ports became a part of the Tito-Stalin agreement. With full Soviet military support Tito’s partisans conquered Belgrade on October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1944. The Yugoslav Royal government and its exponent in the country, General D. Mihailović lost the civil war against Tito. To conclude, the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia achieved a victory through extensive coordination between Tito’s communists and the Soviet government.

British diplomacy tried at the last moment to save what could be saved in the Balkans by direct negotiations with the Soviet government. For that purpose, the British Premier went to Moscow in October 1944 and had a meeting with the Soviet leader. On this occasion Stalin and Churchill decided on a division of spheres of interests (in percentage) in Southeastern Europe: in Yugoslavia and Hungary 50:50, in Rumania 90 for the Soviets, in Bulgaria 75 for the Soviets and finally in Greece 90 for Great Britain. Without any doubt an important consideration for London in granting such concessions to Moscow was the Soviet penetration into the eastern portion of the Balkans and the real possibility that the Red Army would move rapidly into Central Europe. Thus the question of Yugoslavia became once again very important in the minds of the creators of the postwar division of spheres of influence. At first sight it looked like Churchill lost the battle over Yugoslavia with Stalin as immediately after the war Tito followed Stalin’s policy of incorporation of the new Yugoslavia into the Soviet block. Even in March 1945 Churchill complained in vain to Stalin that

<sup>45</sup> J. B. Tito. Jugoslavija u borbi za nezavisnost i nevrstanost. Sarajevo, 1977. S. 114-122; E. Kardelj. Sećanja. Beograd, 1980. S. 59-61.

<sup>46</sup> V. Strugar. Jugoslavija 1941-1945. Beograd, 1969. S. 265-268.

Marshal Tito had taken power in Yugoslavia completely, and a little bit later, that Great Britain's influence in Yugoslav affairs was reduced to less than 10 percent. However, it turned out in 1948–1949, that Tito's Yugoslavia left Stalin's community of people's democratic countries and continued its existence with substantial western help to get out of the borderlands of the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth*<sup>47</sup>. In fact, the Cold War started in Central and Southeastern Europe with Tito–Stalin split 1948–1949 and lasted till the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I would conclude that the first serious “cleft” in the building of the Soviet international communist empire was made by Tito's separation from the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth* in 1948–1949, backed by the western material, political, financial and military support, that was followed later by similar attempts by Hungarian (in 1956), Czechoslovak (in 1968) and Polish (in 1956 and 1980–1981) national communist leaderships.

## Conclusion

The Soviet Union had two types of relations with Yugoslavia during the Second World War. The first type comprised relations with the Yugoslav Royal government, which was in exile and located in London. These relations were officially set up on the diplomatic level and carried out through legislation. The other type comprised relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. These relations were secret and illegal, carried out at the beginning by radioapparatus and later by military missions.

The radiconnections between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Soviet gov-

ernment were carried out through the Comintern until its abolishment at the summer of 1943 and after that personally with G. Dimitrov. These relations were various but the most important was Soviet material support given to the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. The turning point in these relations occurred in September 1944 when Tito made a deal with Stalin in Moscow about real military support by the Red Army in order to help Yugoslav partisans to take power in the country.

Approaching the question of the social revolution in Yugoslavia the Soviet government had a two-fold policy (or Soviet policy went through two stages). During the first half of the war (until the summer of 1943) Moscow basically supported the British position that both resistance movements (led by J. B. Tito and General D. Mihailović) should be united in Yugoslavia into one anti-fascist alliance. During this period the Comintern required from the Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY that it give up socialist propaganda and the revolutionary way of taking power. After the great victories of the Red Army (Stalingrad and Kursk) the behaviour of the Soviet government was radically changed. From the autumn of 1943 onward, Moscow supported the new (communist) government in Yugoslavia, and pointed its “Yugoslav” policy toward revolutionary (socialist) changes in the country. Evidently, the Yugoslav partisan resistance movement and the spread of the war of liberation in Yugoslavia by Tito's NLMY were factors which in the eyes of Stalin, the Comintern and the Soviet government fitted with their own objectives, more in a political than in a military sense. In other words, Tito's military efforts were used by Moscow for Soviet political purposes, for which they were often manipulated. The roots of this Moscow policy in Central and Southeastern Europe run deep, back

<sup>47</sup> J. B. Tito. Jugoslavija u borbi za nezavisnost i nesvrstanost. Sarajevo, 1977. S. 13; J. Ridley. Tito. Biografija. Zagreb, 2000. S. 288–317.



to established Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s and implemented by the Comintern in the 1930s. This Soviet policy of domination would ensure the obedience of communist parties in other countries and more importantly to exert direct Soviet influence over foreign and domestic affairs of those countries under communist leadership, by their incorporation into Moscow's political system of a *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth*. According to Stalin's conception of postwar Europe, Yugoslavia would become one link in a Soviet chain composed of Central and Southeastern European socialist countries.

The četnik movement, led by General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, was the source of the main discord in relationships between the Soviet government and the Yugoslav government-in-exile supported by the British government. In these relations, a distinctive turning point occurred in December 1942 when Moscow overtly required from London that it influence the Yugoslav Royal government to change its policy toward the četnik movement.

The crucial support which during the entire war the CPY obtained from outside Yugoslavia was that which it received from Moscow. That was the principal reason that the Yugoslav civil war was resolved in the favour of Tito's Yugoslav communists. Finally, this policy of Moscow towards Tito's partisans

ultimately benefited the USSR in fixing the Central and Southeastern European borderlands of *Pax Sovietica* on the eastern littoral of the Adriatic and the eastern Alps. Consequently, "the bridge" connecting Europe and Asia was immediately after the Second World War divided between "Eastern" and "Western" political-military blocks since the major portions of the Balkans and Southeastern Europe were left under Soviet control while Asia Minor and Greece were dominated by the western alliance. Furthermore, historical Central Europe was also divided between the Soviets and the Westerners in East Central Europe and West Central Europe. And finally, the political, military and economic division of Europe – *Pax Sovietica* and *Pax Occidentalis* – was sanctioned by the "big three" at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. In conclusion, it is obvious that during the Second World War the allied plans were not as concerned with the contribution made by resistance movements to the overall war effort as with the political importance such movements might acquire, to the detriment of the interests of some of the Great Powers and their agreements. The fighting for the liberation of the Yugoslav people from 1941 to 1945, and the politics of the allies, especially of the USSR, regarding this resistance serve as an ample illustration.

#### **SANDRAUGOS PAX SOVIETICA RIBŲ SUSIDARYMAS VIDURIO IR PIETRYČIŲ EUROPOJE: JUGOSLAVIJOS KOMUNISTŲ PARTIJA IR SOVIETŲ SAJUNGA PER ANTRĄJĄ PASAULINĮ KARĄ**

**Vladislav B. Sotirović**

Santrauka

Straipsnyje aptariamos sovietų pastangos sukurti *Pax Sovietica* Vidurio ir Pietryčių Europoje naudojant liaudies pasipriešinimo judėjimus nacių okupuotose šalyse. Nagrinėjamas Jugoslavijos atvejis. Autorius analizuoja sovietų vyriausybės ir Kominternio santykius su Jugos-

lavijos komunistų partija, kuri buvo įtakingiausia karinio antinacistinio pasipriešinimo organizatorė, ir sovietų požiūrį į oficialiai pripažįstamą Jugoslavijos vyriausybę tremtyje (išsikūrusią Londone) ir jos karines pajėgas Jugoslavijoje – četnikus bei ryšius su jais. Straips-

nyje kritikuojama tiek Jugoslavijos istoriografija, aiškinanti, kad Tito partizaninis judėjimas buvo nepriklausomas ir neprižiūrimas iš Maskvos, tiek sovietinė istoriografija, teigianti, kad Jugoslavijos komunistų partija per visą karą stipriai priklausė nuo Maskvos. Autoriaus manymu, abi istoriografinės tradicijos nepagrįstai sumenkina karališkosios Jugoslavijos vyriausybės tremtyje ir JAV bei Didžiosios Britanijos diplomatijos vaidmenį Tito ir Sovietų Sąjungos santykiuose Antrojo pasaulinio karo metu. Straipsnyje iškeliamos trys naujos hipotezės: 1) 1941 m. komunistinis sukilimas Jugoslavijoje buvo tvarkomas Kominternu ir organizuotas dėl Sovietų Sąjungos interesų; 2) Tito partizaninis judėjimas buvo faktiškai nepriklausomas nuo Maskvos iki pat 1944 m., kada buvo pradėta teikti materialinė ir karinė pagalba; 3) pagrindinis Tito partizaninių kovų tikslas buvo socialinė revoliucija, nors tai nebuvo viešai propaguojama, siekiant nepykdyti Maskvos sąjungininkų Vakaruose.

Autorius daro išvadą, kad Sovietų Sąjunga Antrojo pasaulinio karo metais palaikė dvejopus santykius su Jugoslavija: oficialius diplomatinis su karališkąja Jugoslavijos vyriausybe Londone ir slaptus nelegalius su Jugoslavijos komunistų partija ir Jugoslavijos nacionaliniu išsilaisvinimo judėjimu. Pastarųjų santykių pasikeitimas įvyko 1944 m. rugsėjį po Tito susitarimo su Stalinu dėl realios karinės Raudonosios armijos paramos, padėjusios komunistiniams Jugoslavijos partizanams paimti valdžią šalyje. Četnikų judėjimas, vadovaujamas generolo D. Mičailovičiaus, buvo pagrindinis nesutarimų tarp sovietų vyriausybės ir Jugoslavijos vyriausybės tremtyje, remiamos britų, šaltinis. Esminis šis santykių pokytis įvyko 1942 m. gruodį, kai Maskva atvirai pareikalavo Londono paveikti Jugoslavijos karališkąją vyriausybę, kad ši pakeistų savo politiką četnikų atžvilgiu. Autoriaus teigimu, Jugoslavijos komunistų partija esminę paramą iš užsienio per Antrąjį pasaulinį karą gavo iš Maskvos. Tai buvo pagrindinis veiksnys, nulėmęs Jugoslavijos pilietinio karo baigtį Tito Jugoslavijos komunistų naudai. Galiausiai ši Maskvos politika įtvirtino Vidurio ir Pietryčių Europos *Pax Sovietica* pasienio sritį rytinėje Adrijos pakrantėje ir rytinėse Alpėse. Taigi, anot autoriaus, „tiltas“, jungiantis Europą ir Aziją, buvo iškart po Antrojo pasaulinio karo pasidalytas tarp „Rytų“ ir „Vakarų“ politinių-karinių blokų: didžioji dalis Balkanų ir Pietryčių Europos liko sovietų kontroliuojama, o Mažoji Azija ir Graikija tapo vakariečių sąjungininkų įtakos zona. Panašiai ir istorinė Vidurio Europa buvo padalyta į Vidurio Vakarų Europą ir Vidurio Rytų Europą tarp sovietų ir vakariečių. Galiausiai šis politinis, karinis ir ekonominis Europos padalijimas į *Pax Sovietica* ir *Pax Occidentalia* buvo

sankcionuotas „didžiųjų trijų“ Jaltos ir Potsdamo konferencijose 1945 m. Apibendrinamas autorius teigia, kad Antrojo pasaulinio karo metu sąjungininkų planai buvo susiję ne tiek su realiu pasipriešinimo judėjimų indėliu į karo veiksmus, kiek su galima šių judėjimų politine svarba po karo ir potencialia jų daroma žala kai kurių didžiųjų valstybių interesams bei susitarimams.

## Lietuvos istorijos horizontas plečiasi

Lietuvos istorijos horizontas plečiasi. Negalime svarsdyti mūsų valstybės XX a. patirtų sukretimų nenusimandydami apie platesnį Vidurio Europos kontekstą, o Pietryčių Europa yra kone *terra incognita*. Tačiau akivaizdu, kad ten vykę istoriniai procesai yra sudedamoji mūsų regiono raidos dalis. Straipsnio autorius, naudodamasis Jugoslavijos pavyzdžiu, parodo, kaip buvo realizuojama nuosekli Vidurio Europos visuomenių komunikacijos politika. Tyrinėdamas Antrojo pasaulinio karo įvykius Jugoslavijoje, jis pateikia šaltojo karo genezės Vidurio Europoje prielaidas. Analizuojant sovietų ir sąjungininkų – anglų bei amerikiečių interesus pokario pasaulio tvarka išaiškėja, kad Jugoslavijos komunistų partija, vadovaujama Josifo Broz Tito, tapo skirtingų politinių blokų įrankiu dar pasaulinio karo metu. Abu blokai nuolat teikė karinę, materialią ir politinę pagalbą minėtai partijai nuo 1943. Sovietai siekė kontroliuoti Jugoslavijos komunistinę valstybę kaip ir kitas į jų valdžią patekusias šalis. Sąjungininkai taip pat turėjo savo interesų panaudoti komunistinę Jugoslaviją išvaduojant iš sovietų dominavimą komunistines Vidurio Europos valstybes. Vakarų sąjungininkai savo propagandoje skelbė, kad Jugoslavija, būdama komunistine valstybe, išlaikė savo suverenitetą ir gerus santykius su Vakarais. Toks pavyzdys turėjo skatinti Vidurio Europos komunistines šalis išsivaduoti iš sovietinės priklausomybės ir, nepakeitus komunistinio režimo, savarankiškai tvarkyti šalių vidaus ir užsienio politiką. Šaltojo karo genezės kontekste skatinamas naujas požiūris į Antrojo pasaulinio karo įvykius, pasipriešinimo judėjimą bei jų vertinimus Rytų ir Vidurio Europos šalyse, kurias sovietai kontroliavo iki paskutiniojo XX a. dešimtmečio.

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