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Naming and Shaming to Protect Civilians During Peacekeeping: Lessons from South Sudan

Gary Uzonyi[1,2]

[1]University of Strathclyde, School of Government and Public Policy

[2]Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science

Correspondence
Gary Uzonyi, University of Strathclyde, 16 Richmond St, Glasgow, G1 1XQ, UK, +44 (0) 141 548 2733.
Email: gary.uzonyi@strath.ac.uk

Abstract

What can the United Nations do to strengthen the protection of civilians when it fails? When missions struggle to protect civilians, high-level naming and shaming of non-responsive units within the operation can occur to reorient the operation. Shaming helps rehabilitate the operation and achieve the protection of civilians. Using an interrupted time-series design, I test this claim in the context of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which provides a hard test for the proposition as it occurred during mass atrocities and is often seen as a failure. Isolating short-term versus long-term effects helps illustrate that even in the hardest of cases, shaming can improve civilian protection.

Zusammenfassung

Was können die Vereinten Nationen tun, um den Schutz von Zivilpersonen zu stärken, wenn er nicht gewährleistet werden kann? Wenn Missionen beim Zivilpersonenschutz an ihre Grenzen stossen, kann ein hochrangiges Anprangern (*naming and shaming*) nicht reagierender Einheiten innerhalb der Operation eingesetzt werden, um die Mission neu auszurichten. Dieses Anprangern trägt dazu bei, die Operation zu rehabilitieren und den Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung zu gewährleisten. Mithilfe eines unterbrochenen Zeitreihendesigns (*interrupted time-series design*) teste ich diese These im Kontext der Mission der Vereinten Nationen im Südsudan (UNMISS). Dieser Fall stellt eine strenge Prüfung für diese Hypothese dar, da er sich während schwerer Massengräueltaten ereignete und häufig als Misserfolg bewertet wird. Die Isolierung von kurz- und langfristigen Effekten verdeutlicht, dass ein Anprangern selbst in den schwierigsten Fällen den Schutz von Zivilpersonen verbessern kann.

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Résumé

Que peuvent faire les Nations Unies pour renforcer la protection des civils lorsqu'elle échoue? Lorsque les missions peinent à protéger les populations civiles, une dénonciation publique (*naming and shaming*) à haut niveau des unités défaillantes au sein de l'opération peut être mis en œuvre afin de la réorienter. Cette dénonciation contribue à réhabiliter l'opération et à assurer la protection des civils. À l'aide d'une méthode à séries temporelles interrompues (*interrupted time-series design*), je teste cette hypothèse dans le contexte de la Mission des Nations Unies au Soudan du Sud (MINUSS). Ce cas constitue un test exigeant pour cette proposition, parce qu'il s'inscrit dans un contexte d'atrocités de masse et est souvent considéré comme un échec. L'isolement des effets à court et à long terme permet de démontrer que, même dans les cas les plus difficiles, la dénonciation peut améliorer la protection des civils.

Riassunto

Che cosa possono fare le Nazioni Unite per rafforzare la protezione dei civili quando quest'ultima fallisce? Quando le missioni faticano a proteggere i civili, l'esposizione pubblica ad alto livello (*naming and shaming*) delle unità non reattive all'interno dell'operazione può essere utilizzata per riorientare la missione stessa. Tale denuncia aiuta a riabilitare l'operazione e a conseguire la protezione dei civili. Utilizzando un disegno a serie temporali interrotte (*interrupted time-series design*), verifico questa tesi nel contesto della Missione delle Nazioni Unite nel Sudan del Sud (UNMISS). Questo caso rappresenta un test severo (hard test) per l'ipotesi formulata, poiché si è verificato durante atrocità di massa ed è spesso considerato un fallimento. Isolare gli effetti a breve e a lungo termine evidenzia come, anche nei casi più complessi, l'esposizione possa migliorare la protezione dei civili.

KEYWORDS

Civil War, Civilian Protection, Naming and Shaming, Peacekeeping, United Nations

INTRODUCTION

United Nations (UN) peacekeepers are often mandated to protect civilians from violence. While they succeed in many cases, they fail in others (e.g., Hultman et al., 2013; Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Fjelde et al., 2019; Carnegie & Mikulaschek, 2020). And when they fail, the UN is often slow, or ineffectual, in responding to the failures in civilian protection (e.g., Autesserre, 2019; Costalli, 2014; Phayal & Prins, 2020; Ruggeri et al., 2017). What can the UN do to strengthen the protection of civilians (PoC) when it fails?

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I begin with the observation that peacekeeping mandates are not static but evolve in terms of goals and size throughout a mission (e.g., Allen & Yue, 2014; Benson & Tucker, 2022). The leadership of missions can change, too, as states jockey for prestigious positions and control in the organization (e.g., Oksamytna et al., 2021; Lundgren et al., 2022). Peacekeeping contributors change, as well, with troop contributing countries evaluating the benefits of their involvement each month (e.g., Uzonyi, 2020). While these changes may help at the *mission* level to address original shortcomings in mission design, it is important to underscore that the protection of civilians is done at the *unit* level. It is the decision of individual peacekeeping units—under the direction of their national governments—within the broader mission to leave their base and respond to reports of active fighting and civilian victimization (see Paddon Rhoads, 2019). Even the best designed missions are dependent on these units achieving the PoC mandate. When units fail in their duty, the UN must find a way to change the incentives of the ineffective units and refocus the mission on PoC.

I posit that high-level naming and shaming of non-responsive units is one way to reinvigorate operations that are failing in their PoC mandates. I define this process as publicly identifying the unit that failed its PoC responsibilities ("naming") and bringing direct pressure upon that unit and its home country to perform better ("shaming") in future periods of the operation. General criticism of the overall mission's failing (e.g., UNAMIR) or peacekeeping entity (e.g., the UN) do not fit this definition. Furthermore, I focus specifically on "high-level" naming and shaming of units because criticism from outside the organization (e.g., academics, news organizations, NGOs) may have little pressure on the unit if it is shielded by its home country and the peacekeeping organization more broadly (Comstock, 2024). Within the UN system, for example, high-level naming and shaming may come from the Secretary-General, Security Council, or the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

I argue that naming and shaming of failing units can reinvigorate operations that are failing in their PoC mandates because this public technique works directly on the problematic unit and indirectly on the entire mission. The direct mechanism is to shame the unit into not repeating such behavior in the future. The indirect mechanism is that the shaming clarifies what is unacceptable, that punishment will occur, and thus helps to refocus and reinvigorate the operation. Following naming and shaming, struggling missions should perform PoC better and see a reduction of civilian deaths under their watch.

I test this claim in the context of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This case provides a hard test for the naming and shaming proposition. The peacekeeping mission occurred against the backdrop of mass atrocities (Pinaud, 2022), is seen as a failure (e.g., Murphy, 2017; Kilroy, 2018; Sundberg, 2020), and previous case studies have suggested that the effects of the shaming on civilian protection paled compared to battlefield dynamics (see Day et al., 2019). Using an interrupted time-series analysis, I can isolate the immediate effect of the shaming compared to its long-run effects. Isolating these varying effects is important as the analysis reveals that the shaming did not have an immediate effect, like previous narratives have described; however, the shaming did help reduce civilian deaths in the following months independent of other battlefield and mission-level events. Thus, even in the hardest of cases, where missions are failing, naming and shaming has the potential to reorient and reinvigorate a peacekeeping mission to better protect civilians in the war zone.

This article contributes to our understanding of political violence and international organization in four key ways. First, it highlights the dynamic and strategic nature of international organizations in conflict zones. While previous scholars note that the success of peace operations is tied to their mandate structure (e.g., Hultman et al., 2013), the entities that draft these mandates do not go dormant (see Gray, 2018). Instead, they react strategically to how the missions unfold. Poorly crafted missions—or those that struggle to perform for reasons beyond their structure—can be saved. Second, while there is a large literature on naming and shaming (e.g., Hafner-Burton, 2008; Krain, 2012; Murdie & Dursun, 2014), it tends to focus

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on how organizations and states shame bad actors outside themselves. However, this project demonstrates that, when tied to the reorganization of a mission, naming and shaming *within* the operation can help signal to the remaining peacekeepers what types of behaviors will no longer be tolerated. Thus, naming and shaming does not need to be an outward looking tool to change international behavior. Third, this project adds to the growing chorus that peacekeeping can help protect civilians (e.g., Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Fjelde et al., 2019; Carnegie & Mikulaschek, 2020). However, it also demonstrates that considering average effects of missions can be misleading. The success of these missions changes over time and can depend on critical junctures that average effects may smooth over. Finally, it underscores that scholars need to pay more systematic attention to the *units* involved in civilian protection during peacekeeping because such efforts—and their success or failure—is conducted at the unit level, not the mission level, once the mission is underway.

NAMING AND SHAMING IN THE CIVILIAN PROTECTION PROCESS

A government or rebel group targets civilians during civil war when the party believes that such attacks are the lowest cost option to help it gain at the expense of the other side (e.g., Valentino, 2004; Downes, 2006; Wood, 2014; Gibilisco et al., 2022; Uzonyi, 2023). Scholars expect peacekeepers to help protect civilians by raising the costs of these attacks through one of two mechanisms. First, the presence of peacekeepers to monitor the situation and act as a buffer between the belligerent parties may reduce active combat. The reduction in combat lowers the probability that civilians will be targeted during active fighting. Second, peacekeepers may use force to actively deter direct acts against civilians. They may do this by policing behind the frontlines, controlling access to vulnerable populations, or creating safe zones in which civilians can seek shelter. Each of these mechanisms requires three elements. First, the peacekeepers must be armed to help deter violence. Second, there must be enough peacekeepers to influence the decision calculus of the warring parties. Third, the peacekeepers must be active in going to where they are needed in deterring the violence from occurring. When these three elements are in place, peacekeeping then works by raising the costs to targeting the civilian population (e.g., Hultman et al., 2013; Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Fjelde et al., 2019; Carnegie & Mikulaschek, 2020).

But even when there are large numbers of armed peacekeepers on the ground, successful protection of civilians (PoC) is not guaranteed as illustrated in cases such as Bosnia, Rwanda, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Previous research has highlighted various reasons that PoC may fail. For example, missions that are heavily dependent on the government for permission to operate in the country, for access to particular areas, or for transportation to various sites, are likely to struggle in halting violence against civilians that is perpetrated by the regime or its loyalists (e.g., Phayal & Prins, 2020). More broadly, peacekeepers struggle to protect civilians where either side has a large ethnic power asymmetry over the other party because, in this situation, the peacekeepers are likely swamped by combatants who have incentive to escalate violence and cannot be easily separated from "the other" (see Di Salvatore, 2020). And, overall, when the peacekeepers must fight their way to peace, rather than keep it, they often find themselves outgunned and outmanned, making peace enforcement and civil protection a dangerous and difficult task (e.g., Costalli, 2014).

The situation in which peacekeeping is faltering, and civilian death is mounting, is where naming and shaming can occur. Scholars who highlight the success of peacekeeping tend to focus on how the significant presence of armed peacekeepers deters attacks by making them more difficult. Scholars who highlight the difficulty of peacekeepers protecting civilians tend to focus on the limits placed on the *mission*. While such systemic issues certainly influence

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the success and failure of peace operations, often the decisions and actions that result in the success or failure of missions occur because of individuals faced with specific situations. For example, if civilians are fleeing violence and attempt to scale the walls of a secure UN base, the peacekeepers must decide whether to let the people in. Similarly, when requested to protect locations outside these bases, the peacekeeping units must decide whether to accept or deny the call (see Paddon Rhoads, 2019). An internal UN review of its PoC efforts (2014) revealed two common patterns in this decision-making process across units when civilians are attacked: (1) units responded immediately in only 20% of incidents and (2) "force was almost never used" in these responses. The lesson learned from these evaluations is that the United Nations, and other peacekeeping entities, need ways to incentivize rapid, forceful response to protect civilians at the *unit* level.

Units are under the direct command of their country, when in the field of the UN mission, and thus respond to the incentives of that specific UN member's views on the importance of PoC. Thus, much, but not all, of the variation in unit behavior may be explained by how its costs/benefits are associated with how the country's military command is interpreting and weighing the troops' involvement versus care for the local population (e.g., Karim et al., 2016). However, when emergency situations occur, each unit must act in the moment. Thus, there are times in which given units must decide whether the situation at hand fits with the larger benefit structure under which they have been operating (see Paddon Rhoads, 2019). Here, units face a dilemma when called upon to protect civilians. Units are tasked with protecting civilians. Successful protection earns a unit military accommodation and praise, along with psychological benefits of a job well done. However, protecting civilians places a unit's personnel in direct personal danger, as they may encounter government or rebel actors employing force against the population and any peacekeepers who attempt to protect those civilians (Salverda, 2013; Fjelde et al., 2016; Duursma, 2019). Units that avoid leaving their bases to answer the call of civilian protection have begun to see the costs of civilian protection outweigh their individual benefits of these actions.

When defection by a unit occurs, it is at the unit-level, then, rather than the country-level, that corrections to priorities must take place. The task for the UN is to find a way to realign the unit's interests such that it—and other units deployed in the mission—come to see protecting civilians as less costly than not protecting civilians so that this "shirking" of responsibility does not spread to other units (e.g., Moncrief, 2017). While one can never take away the physical danger associated with these operations, the United Nations often attempts to offset these differences in costs by praising peacekeepers for a job well done. For instance, Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix (2017) emphasized, "We should not forget that our peacekeepers – civilian, police, men and women, military personnel – are saving lives every day. They are protecting civilians and they are helping peace processes be implemented… It is important to recognize the added value of peacekeeping and what we bring to the societies and nations that are destabilized." However, such praise is too general, applied to peacekeepers broadly, and obscures the units that freeride on the protective actions of others in the mission or throughout the UN system more broadly.

An alternative approach is to employ high-level naming and shaming of the shirking units. Here, top-level officers (e.g., Secretary-General) and/or organs (e.g., Security Council) publicly identify the specific unit ("naming") that did not answer the call and pressures them for the specific time that they failed to act ("shaming"). I posit that naming and shaming of non-responsive units in this way can reinvigorate operations that are failing in their PoC mandates through both a *direct mechanism* that works through the costs placed on the shirking unit and an *indirect mechanism* that works through reminding other units of their duties and signaling to these other units that such costs will be applied to them for similar shortcomings.

First, consider the direct mechanism of naming and shaming. Here, the high-level entity influences the costs of the unit by publicly identifying its failure in the field, highlighting how

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the unit let down the civilians, other units in the mission who are risking their lives, and the unit's home country by acting dishonorably. Naming and shaming, in this instance, works to increase the costs of inaction by harming the reputation of the unit. Harming the reputation of the unit shifts the costs of non-action for soldiers in the unit through four pathways. Each of these pathways works together to increase costs on the targeted unit and change its behavior in the future.

First, is a psychological pathway. Many military members report a "calling" to serve (see DiRenzo et al., 2022). During combat—or in situations in which peacekeepers are called to act—though, this calling to serve may come into conflict with other psychological processes, such as stress or fear, causing inaction or shirking in the field (e.g., Kellett, 2013). When the underperforming soldier is identified as failing in their duty, this creates great psychological pain for them. For this reason, soldiers seek to avoid action that external actors, such as military, political—or here—UN officials can identify as being counter to a motivation to serve, thus creating a stronger combat motivation (Newsome, 2003). In this way, naming and shaming works as a direct psychological cost imposed by an external actor.

Second, is a professional pathway. Future military promotions are tied to success on the battlefield (e.g., Reiter & Wagstaff, 2018), as well as reputations for courage and obedience in those engagements, which soldiers carefully maintain—including at the expense of those who do not show valor (e.g., Sarkesian, 1972). During the fog of war, soldiers may underperform for several reasons. Naming and shaming, however, underscores that, regardless of whatever reasons may be offered, the behavior of the peacekeepers was far below professional. Having a public mark of incompetence or dissatisfactory behavior on the soldiers' resume will likely hinder their ability to advance in the soldering profession (e.g., Wielsma, 1996; Stolzenberg, 2017). Wishing to avoid further demerits, or rehabilitate its image, the unit will seek to change its behavior and perform its expected duties.

Third, is an intra-mission pathway. Peacekeeping units work with each other, as well as other actors in the conflict space, to achieve mission success. Cohesion in the military-space is premium (e.g., King, 2015). Units that are seen as dishonest, conflictual, or problematic are avoided or encounter difficulties in receiving help or accommodation from these other actors (e.g., Ramarajan, 2004). This makes their job harder and puts both their professional success and lives in further jeopardy. Generally, units want to avoid poor cohesion (e.g., Käihkö, 2018). When one unit observes another underperforming, it has firsthand knowledge of its problematic behavior. However, it is rare that any one unit has good information on all units across a peace operation at any one time. Information does flow across units due to interunit mixing (discussed later); however, naming and shaming—because of its public nature—provides information about the underperforming unit to all other units in the mission at one time. This sudden announcement of the unit's problematic behavior creates costs for members of the unit by causing others to limit their help and support for the unit in difficult situations, causing them further jeopardy.

The fourth pathway is through the unit's connection back to their country's military and political command. While the troop contributing country (TCC) may shield the unit and call the shaming a scapegoating, the TCC wants to avoid a negative view of its personnel. A TCC whose personnel are known for poor performance may be asked *not* to contribute to further missions (Aboagye, 2016). Beyond the shame and reputational effects this has on the TCC, providing personnel to peace operations—especially when through the United Nations—comes with monetary compensation (e.g., Bobrow & Boyer, 1997). Furthermore, peacekeeping missions often face a shortfall in mandated troop levels, leaving global or regional powers scrambling to generate a force through quid pro quo deals with a TCC that can bring more resources—economic, military, or otherwise—to the state for additional personnel. However, these powers generate forces from countries with whom they have good relationships and trust in a peacekeeping capacity (see Henke, 2016). A TCC known to have units that have shirked on

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their responsibility may struggle to work with the UN in the future and thus have incentive to punish units who avoid their duties while in country—especially if those units are named and shamed for others to know and understand their failings.

Now that the direct mechanism has been specified, I consider the indirect mechanism. The indirect mechanism builds from the costs imposed on the identified unit in the direct mechanism to influence the mission's ability to achieve its PoC mandate, more generally. By reminding other units what is expected of them, demonstrating that there will be consequences, and underscoring that no unit will be allowed to shirk on this important task, the naming and shaming of one unit should reinvigorate other units to accomplish their duty when called upon. Across organizations, when poor performers are visibly punished, other units increase their performance to avoid similar consequences (e.g., Schnake, 1986; Malouff et al., 2009; Peterson, 2024). Furthermore, punishing poor performers increases the morale of those units who have been consistently working hard to accomplish their tasks in difficult circumstances (e.g., Price et al., 2002; Forret & Love, 2008).

Within the peacekeeping context, the indirect mechanism works through two pathways. The first pathway is deterring other units who may be on the cusp of shirking or who have become less vigilant in responding when called. These units now know that the organization is watching, will name poor conduct and will shame units that fail in their duty. By deterring these units from shirking, the overall mission's success in preventing civilian death should increase. The second pathway is through boosting the morale of units who have been responding when called. Observing that their peers do not go unpunished for poor performance helps boost the morale of other units, reinvigorates their commitment to the mission, and helps create an atmosphere of confidence in the organization—akin to changing the culture of a failing business (see Luo, 2005). Together, these pathways drive the units to recuperate the mission.

Each pathway of the indirect mechanism relies on other units within the peacekeeping mission learning of the shirking unit being named and shamed. This is a key tenet of high-level naming and shaming—it is public pressure brought down upon the specific unit. The public nature of the naming brings shame, in part, because other units bear witness to these failings *and* the naming of the unit. However, the public informational effects of the naming and shaming are amplified and reinforced by the linkage of units across the operation. First, units engage in joint training and planning sessions pre- and during- deployment that allow for informal transmission of information and gossip between soldiers (e.g., Winslow, 2008). Second, unit commanders and force leaders higher in the military hierarchy of the operation frequently meet for background briefings where they learn about the state of the operation and the state of various units throughout the mission (e.g., Sığrı et al., 2017). Third, in-field, units come together at various points in a mission to accomplish tasks (e.g., Rietjens, 2007). This interunit support allows units to observe each other and to also pass on news about developments elsewhere in the operation.

Combined, the direct and indirect mechanisms of naming and shaming shirking units suggest that:

> **Hypothesis:** Following naming and shaming of a shirking unit, civilian deaths will decrease during the peacekeeping mission.

My expectation is that civilian deaths will decrease, on average, for all units in the peacekeeping mission following the naming and shaming of a shirking unit. However, there is likely to be variation in how long this effect lasts across units and across missions that depend on specific unit and mission contexts that are outside the scope of this specific project. The existence of these caveats, however, are important to note theoretically. Empirically, not specifying each of these specific conditions, means that any average effects found across units are conservative because they are bundling non-responsive units in with more-responsive units across time periods.

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THE UN'S NAMING AND SHAMING OF PEACEKEEPING UNITS

Despite the occurrence of PoC failure, and the potential to rehabilitate missions through naming and shaming the shirking units, the United Nations tends not to single-out specific units for poor performance. There are two reasons for this decision. The first is that many peacekeeping missions are already operating at a personnel shortfall, and UN leadership—the Secretary General (SG), Security Council (SC), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)—are hesitant to push away willing troop contributing countries (Passmore et al., 2018). Second, during the fog of war, it is sometimes difficult to determine what went wrong in the immediate aftermath of an emergency situation without a full autopsy of the surrounding events, that may take several months or years to unpack.

Instead of naming and shaming, the UN leadership tends to engage in other forms of analyzing and criticizing PoC failure. The DPKO conducts broad internal evaluation of missions to assess success/failure in which it does not name or shame specific units in the field (e.g., UN, 2014). And, when DPKO promises to remove underperforming units after PoC failure, it does so without mentioning the specific units or their TCCs (e.g., Africa News, 2024). Similarly, the SC will sometimes criticize missions, as a whole (e.g., Darfur, DRC), but it does not name specific units. To date, only the Secretary General has named and shamed specific units for PoC failure. The most direct case of this high-level naming and shaming occurred in the case of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. For this reason, I will test my hypothesis in the case of UNMISS.

However, two notes are important to highlight. First, as will be discussed more fully in the case description below, the SG's naming and shaming of the shirking unit caused its home country—Kenya—to withdraw the peacekeepers. This means that I will be able to test the indirect mechanism, but not the direct mechanism. However, this should make for a more difficult test of my hypothesis because this is the more diffuse connection between the unit-costs of the naming/shaming and how it is felt upon the peacekeepers in-field. Second, some observers see the UNMISS case as a steppingstone towards using this tactic more often (e.g., Gorur & Vellturo, 2017). However, this likely depends on whether the tactic proved effective, which other observers have doubted (e.g., Day, 2019). This analysis will help adjudicate between these competing views.

The Case of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan gained independence from Sudan. In anticipation of this independence, the United Nations Security Council had authorized the formation of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) the previous day (July 8) through Resolution 1996. UNMISS' mandate provided support for the country in consolidation of peace, the government in its capacity to provide security, the rule of law, and provide security and justice. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the mandate also charged the peacekeepers to support the government in protecting the civilian population. Under this initial mandate, UNMISS called for up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 civilian police, plus additional civilian components. Yet, it would take over a year for the mission to attract and deploy even half that many soldiers, which would significantly hamper its civilian protection mandate.

Indeed, from its inception, protecting civilians was a constant test for UNMISS. Both rebel and government forces often attacked civilian targets, with major incidents—and UNMISS successes—occurring in 2012 (see Felix da Costa & de Coning, 2015). By 2013, though, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir began accusing UNMISS of supporting the opposition and demanding access to UNMISS camps. In December of this same year, the

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government committed the Juba Massacre in which the President's Tiger Battalion rounded up and killed between 15,000 and 20,000 ethnic Nuer civilians throughout the capital (see AU, 2015).[1] According to Pinaud (2022), this massacre began the first atrocity phase of the—until then—simmering civil war. The spiraling human rights situation also put additional stresses on UNMISS because civilians displaced by the violence fled to UN compounds. By January 2014, nearly 70,000 people sought shelter in these bases (UN OCHA, 2014) and by May of 2014, the Security Council reconfigured UNMISS to stop its state-building functions to more impartially focus on the protection of civilians (see Paddon Rhoads, 2019).

During this period, the UNMISS operation also received criticism for its failure to protect civilians. However, these criticisms were not high-level unit-specific naming and shaming events that could shift the costs and benefits of any specific actors on the ground. Rather, more generally, academics, think tanks, and other observers highlighted the failings of the mission and the structural issues it faced holistically in its ability to conduct a PoC mission (e.g., Gordon, 2014; Jok, 2014). By placing the emphasis on the structural design of the mission, and the difficulties the operation faced on the ground, such criticisms effectively shifted blame onto the UN system rather than the units responsible for shirking their duties.

Fighting intensified between the government and rebels until August 2015 when the parties signed a peace agreement, which allowed Riek Machar to return to Juba as vice president. However, peace did not last. Instead, Machar's return to Juba set the stage for a repeat of the Juba Massacre. This time—in July 2016—government troops again battled with Machar's rebels inside Juba and massacred ethnic Nuer civilians (see Martell, 2019: Chapter 14). As much of the violence happened in the vicinity of UN peacekeepers, international observers were quick to chastise UNMISS for its failure to prevent the violence, halt the episode, and do more to help protect the civilians in the area (see HRW, 2016). After condemning the attacks, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon requested an independent investigation into the events of the battle and the response taken by the peacekeepers in and around Juba. He concluded that the response in Juba suffered from a lack of leadership, was chaotic, and thus ineffective. The peacekeepers abandoned their posts and thus failed to protect the civilians. In response, Ban named and shamed the Kenyan peacekeepers responsible for protecting civilians in the area and called for "the immediate replacement of the force commander," Kenya's Lieutenant-General Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki (see Al-Jazeera, 2016a). Calling this naming and shaming a scapegoating, Kenya declared that it would withdraw all its troops from UNMISS. The problem, it said, was the mission's systemic dysfunctionality and not Ondieki's leadership (see Al-Jazeera, 2016b). By removing the shirking unit from the field, Kenya limited the ability for UNMISS to rehab its protective activities through the direct mechanism, thus making this an even tougher test of the hypothesis by only allowing for the activation of the indirect mechanism.

Battlefield violence and attacks against civilians continued after the incident in Juba (e.g., Blanchard, 2018). However, the question for international observers—in both this case and more broadly—is whether naming and shaming can help the PoC mandate or harm it. Initial interviews and studies surrounding the effects of the UNMISS shaming of the Kenyan unit concluded that variations—and any subsequent decreases—in civilian deaths were more likely due to broader conflict dynamics (see Day, 2019). However, while valuable, these perspectives are unable to either isolate the effect of the naming and shaming or compare its short-term verse long-term effects. To truly understand how naming and shaming affects such missions, such comparisons are needed. To provide these comparisons, I turn to an econometric analysis that considers civilian protection by UNMISS before and after the shirking *unit* was named and shamed.

[1]Estimates for the number of Neur killed range widely (see Pendle, 2020).

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RESEARCH DESIGN

The unit of analysis in this study is each month from July 2011 to December 2022. UNMISS was established in July 2011, setting the start date of the analysis. I draw data on civilian deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 23.1 (Davies et al., 2023), which provides these data at the monthly level ending in December 2022 thus setting the end date of the analysis. The dependent variable is the count of civilian deaths each month. This count ranges from 0 in several months (e.g., July 2011) to 786 (December 2013) and has a high rightward skew. Thus, I use its log, ***Log(Civilian Deaths)*** in the models that follow.

The naming and shaming during UNMISS occurred in November 2016, as discussed previously. I employ an interrupted time-series analysis (ITSA) to evaluate the effect of this naming and shaming on the rate of civilian deaths during UNMISS and thus test my proposition. The ITSA is a quasi-experimental design that addresses the autoregressive features of the underlying data-generating process. It is akin to a difference-in-difference design for a single case, in which it will estimates the trajectory of civilian deaths before and after the UNMISS naming and shaming to evaluate whether the intervention had an immediate influence on the dependent variable (a change in the intercept of *Log(Civilians Deaths)*), an influence on the dependent variable over time (the slope of *Log(Civilian Deaths)* after the shaming), or both. In this design, the ITSA assumes that any unmeasured time-varying confounders are slow moving compared to the potential change in *Log(Civilian Deaths)* following the naming and shaming by UNMISS (see Linden, 2015). However, the ITSA is a flexible estimator that allows multivariate analysis and a wide range of lag structures.

Therefore, while I begin with a parsimonious model, I then include several additional independent variables meant to capture the conflict dynamics that may confound the effect of the shaming or better explain any change in the slope or intercept of civilian deaths during UNMISS. I include six such variables. First, I include an indicator variable of 1 to capture the ***Juba Massacre*** in December 2013, which initiated the first atrocity phase of the war—and thus a large spike in civilian deaths (see Pinaud, 2022); 0 otherwise. Second, I include an indictor variable of 1 to capture the government's ***Capture of Bentiu*** in May 2014, which may have pacified some violence against civilians; 0 otherwise. Third, I include an indicator variable of 1 to capture the ***SPLA's move into Leer*** in May 2015, as this move instigated a new area of fighting; 0 otherwise. Fourth, I include an indicator variable of 1 to capture the government's move to rely more heavily on ***Militias*** beginning in July 2015 (0 otherwise), since militias are correlated with more violence against civilians (e.g., Stanton, 2015; Koren, 2012). Fifth, I include an indicator variable of 1 to capture the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (***ARCSS***) in August 2015 since the agreement was expected to quell violence; 0 otherwise. Sixth, I include an indicator variable of 1 to capture the war's ***Return to Juba*** since this fight reignited violence against civilians and prompted the naming and shaming of the Kenyan unit in UNMISS; 0 otherwise.

The ITS design has five key assumptions that apply in this case. First, *trend predictability* such that the pre-intervention trend would have continued unchanged if the intervention had not occurred. The ITSA uses the pre-trend line as the counterfactual benchmark for the analysis of the treatment's effect. As Figure 1A-D suggests, there was an upward slope in *Log(Civilian Deaths)* prior to the shaming, suggesting an unchanged slope and thus trend predictability in the data for this case. Second, *no event confounders* occurring at the *exact* same time as the intervention. This assumption holds in the UNMISS case as the UN did not enact a major change to the mission in the same month as the naming and shaming. Since there are no exact event confounders, the ITSA can isolate the treatment of the shaming in this period. Third, *stable composition* of the study population means that the population under study did not change during the analysis (pre- or post- intervention). Throughout this study, only one

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


FIGURE 1 The effect of the UNMISS shaming on civilian deaths in South Sudan.

case—UNMISS in South Sudan—is studied, meaning that there is not a selection effect as to which peacekeeping missions are studied pre- and post- intervention. Fourth, *intervention sharpness* such that we know exactly when the intervention occurs, which we do given the public nature of the naming and shaming. Knowing this timing means that we know the cause precedes the effect and we do not fear reverse causality in the design. Fifth, *no instrumental changes*, such that the data collection process about the case is constant throughout. Such measurement stability rules out artificial effects. This assumption is met, as UCDP provides the civilian death data throughout.

RESULTS

I begin my analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the following model:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_1 + \beta_2 X_t + \beta_3 X_t T_t + \varepsilon_t$$

Here, Y_t is the number of civilian deaths in each month (t), T_t is time, X_t is the UNMISS shaming, and $X_t T_t$ is the interaction between time and the shaming. β_0 is the intercept, which is the number of civilians deaths when the analysis begins in July 2011. $\beta_1$is the linear trend in civilian deaths over time before the naming and shaming in UNMISS occurs. β_2 is the immediate change in the level of civilian deaths from the month immediately preceding the naming and shaming to the month following it. β_3 is the change in slope from the pre-shaming trend of civilian deaths to the post-shaming trend of civilian deaths. Finally, ε_t is the error term, which the ITSA assumes to suffer from autocorrelation and potentially heteroskedasticity.

Table 1 provides the results of my analysis. Each of the four models presents the OLS coefficient and standard errors for each variable. I also provide the coefficient and standard error for the linear combination of the pre-shaming trend and the change in that trend following the

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TABLE 1 ITSA of civilian deaths during UNMISS.

	Model 1: Base Coefficient (Standard Error)	Model 2: Controls Coefficient (Standard Error)	Model 3: Base + Prais Coefficient (Standard Error)	Model 4: Controls + Prais Coefficient (Standard Error)
Pre-shaming trend	0.026* (0.010)	0.022* (0.010)	0.028 (0.014)	0.025 (0.014)
Shaming	0.014 (0.520)	0.326 (0.526)	−0.090 (0.720)	0.138 (0.703)
Shaming*time	−0.056* (0.014)	−0.052* (0.014)	−0.058* (0.019)	−0.054* (0.018)
Post-shaming trend	−0.030* (0.009)	−0.030* (0.010)	−0.029* (0.012)	−0.029* (0.011)
Juba Massacre		4.696* (0.238)		3.997* (1.379)
Capture of Bentiu		2.194* (0.241)		0.738 (1.379)
SPLA's Move into Leer		1.184* (0.288)		1.359 (1.382)
Militias		0.785* (0.300)		1.287 (1.382)
ARCSS		−0.491 (0.313)		−0.626 (1.383)
Return to Juba		2.103* (0.387)		0.1722 (1.390)
Constant	1.380* (0.401)	1.329* (0.390)	1.314* (0.532)	1.284* (0.514)
Rho			0.330	0.317
R^2			0.065	0.148
N	138	138	138	138
Durbin-Watson (Original)			1.336	1.440
Durbin-Watson (Transformed)			2.002	2.018

*$p < 0.05$.

naming and shaming $\left(\beta_1 T_1 + \beta_3 X_t T_t \right)$. The linear combination indicates the post-shaming slope of civilian deaths.

Model 1 is the baseline parsimonious model. Here, I find that the pre-shaming trend for *Log(Civilian Deaths)* is positive and statistically significant, with 0.026 (logged) civilian deaths per month. However, the naming and shaming is statistically insignificant. This means that there was not an immediate decrease in the number of civilian deaths in November 2016. This is not surprising, though. It likely takes time for the effect of the shaming to be felt, mission wide. Indeed, that is what the post-shaming trend indicates. In Model 1, the post-shaming trend reveals a −0.056 reduction in (logged) civilian deaths. Therefore, following the naming and shaming, UNMISS saw a significant reversal from its earlier trend. Furthermore, considering the linear trend presents further evidence in support of the important effect of the naming and shaming of the shirking Kenyan unit. Here, the linear trend is −0.030 indicating that the slope in civilian deaths remained negative following the naming and shaming in UNMISS through December 2022 when the data on civilian deaths ends.

Model 2 introduces the control variables and presents similar patterns to Model 1. The pre-shaming trendline indicates a positive and statistically significant increase in civilian deaths each month until the UMISS naming and shaming (0.022). The naming and shaming did not have an immediate influence on the rate of civilian deaths. However, the shaming did have the intended effect moving forward. Both the post-shaming trendline (−0.052) and linear trend (−0.030) support the conclusion that the UNMISS naming and shaming of the Kenyan unit helped the mission reduce civilian deaths and maintain a negative slop of civilian deaths through December 2022.

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Models 3 and 4 re-estimate the first two models but with a Prais correction for autocorrelation. These models largely replicate the findings of Models 1 and 2: the shaming did not have an immediate effect, but it did decrease civilian deaths moving forward and maintained fewer civilian deaths relative to the pre-shaming trend through the end of 2022. The one exception was that in Models 3 and 4 the pre-shaming trend is no longer statistically significant, suggesting that the pre-shaming period did not see an increasing number of civilian deaths in each month. Indeed, Figures 1A-D (which correspond to Models 1–4) show a pre-shaming trendline that fluctuates, especially in the models that include the control variables. A similar effect occurs for the control variables. In Model 2, all the control variables except for the *ARCSS* are statistically significant and increase civilian deaths. However, once I apply the Prais correction for autocorrelation in Model 4, all variables except the *Juba Massacre* become statistically insignificant. My inclusion of these control variables and their statistical insignificance indicates that (a) the effect of the naming and shaming is robust to the consideration of conflict dynamics contrary to previous analyses (e.g., Day et al., 2019) and (b) that none of these conflict




FIGURE 2 The growth in UNMISS.

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dynamics alone drove the civilian deaths. Instead, civilian victimization tends to build upon itself as parties in a war target each other's populations in response to previous targeting (e.g., Wood, 2010; Gibilisco et al., 2022).

Testing an Alternative Explanation: UNMISS's Increased Troop Presence

In response to its failure in Juba, the United Nations increased its troop presence in UNMISS following the naming and shaming of the Kenyan unit, as illustrated in Figure 2A. An alternative explanation for the patterns found in Table 1 is that the naming and shaming did not drive these results but rather the subsequent growth in the mission did. I consider this alternative explanation in two steps. First, using ITSA, I show that while UNMISS did experience a growth in troop levels following the naming and shaming, this change was not statistically significant, as the mission had continued to grow since its inception (Figure 2B). Second, I re-estimate the fully specified Models 2 and 4 from above with the inclusion of the mission's troop levels to gauge whether mission-level effects month-to-month, and following the naming and shaming incident, alter the results presented previously.

As the results presented in Table 2, and illustrated in Figure 3A and B, indicate, my initial results remain robust to the inclusion of these mission-level considerations. Again, I find that while the naming and shaming did not have an immediate decrease in the number of civilian deaths in November 2016, the post-shaming trend reveals a reduction in civilian deaths and a sustained negative slope in civilian deaths through the end of the data. Furthermore, this analysis indicates only mixed support for the claim that the increased UNMISS troop count is associated with fewer civilian deaths. In Model 5, the effect of *Troop Count*—a −0.000 reduction in (logged civilian deaths)—is statistically significant, but much smaller than that of

TABLE 2 UNMISS troop count robustness check.

	Model 5: Controls	**Model 6: Controls + Prais**
	Coefficient (Standard Error)	**Coefficient (Standard Error)**
Pre-shaming trend	0.070* (0.025)	0.074* (0.031)
Shaming	0.583 (0.489)	0.404 (0.636)
Shaming*time	−0.101* (0.022)	−0.103* (0.030)
Post-shaming trend	−0.030* (0.009)	−0.029* (0.011)
Troop Count	−0.000* (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Juba Massacre	4.239* (0.372)	3.879* (1.370)
Capture of Bentiu	2.021* (0.281)	0.877 (1.366)
SPLA's Move into Leer	2.506* (0.290)	1.674 (1.368)
Militias	1.080* (0297)	1.334 (1.369)
ARCSS	−0.272 (0.303)	−0.493 (1.370)
Return to Juba	2.057* (0.383)	1.737 (1.379)
Constant	2.944* (0.913)	2.935* (0.949)
Rho		0.245
R^2		0.219
N	133	133
Durbin-Watson (Original)		1.537
Durbin-Watson (Transformed)		1.945

*$p < 0.05$.

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


FIGURE 3 UNMISS shaming on civilian deaths after controlling for troop count.

the naming and shaming. Conversely, in Model 6, *Troop Count* has a statistically insignificant effect on civilian deaths during the UNMISS mission once the naming and shaming and other battlefield events are considered.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper demonstrates that (1) naming and shaming of shirking units occurs when peacekeeping struggles to halt civilian deaths, (2) shaming these units may not have an immediate effect on limiting civilian casualties, but (3) it can decrease civilian deaths moving forward. The immediate implication of this study is that it helps bridge, and make sense of, two divergent perspectives on peacekeeping success in relation to civilian protection within the United

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Nations where on one hand it trumpets the work its peacekeepers do protecting civilians (see UN, 2024), but also internally questions the effectiveness of its missions (see IHPPO, 2015). Here, I note that part of this divergence stems from observing missions as a whole versus a focus on critical junctures/moments in the lifecycle of an operation. Highlighting these critical junctures helps provide a path forward for understanding what the UN can do to strengthen PoC.

There are, though, three limitations to this current study that provide clear avenues for future study. The first is that there are four pathways through which the direct mechanism of naming and shaming works, and two pathways of an indirect mechanism, as well. Future scholars may find it fruitful to isolate which of these pathways has the greatest effect on this process or if naming and shaming works differently depending on the characteristics of the TCC (e.g., autocracy vs. democracy or poor vs. wealthy), host country (e.g., targeting civilians or protecting them), or the organization that is deploying the mission (United Nations vs. regional organization). The second limitation worth noting is that units may be able to rehabilitate their image. In the UNMISS case, the Kenyan unit was removed without this chance. The naming and shaming mechanism suggests, though, that a shamed unit should act differently in subsequent calls if it is given the chance. In the Kenyan case, UN and Kenyan officials met to renegotiate new Kenyan units deploying to South Sudan three months later (Africa News, 2019) and the strength of Kenya's commitment to peacekeeping broadly helped it later spearhead peacekeeping efforts to stabilize Haiti beginning in 2024 (e.g., Mohor et al., 2024). While this is some evidence that naming and shaming may have had an effect at the country level, more analysis is needed at the unit level. The third avenue for future research is to broaden the number of cases studied. The advantage of this study is in its strong internal validity by clearly isolating the effect of naming and shaming on the change in civilian deaths during UNMISS. However, we need more external validity of the shaming hypothesis. This can be achieved by testing the shaming hypothesis across other cases in which it has occurred. However, in the context of PoC, this possibility is limited by the hesitation of UN leadership being willing to name and shame units directly. One place in which this is beginning to change is in the case of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). For example, in 2021, Secretary-General António Guterres shamed and repatriated a Gabonese unit from MINUSCA for SEA violations (UN 2021). While SEA is outside the scope of this project, considering how direct, high-level shaming of specific units influences these patterns is likely a fruitful avenue of research for future scholars.

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data that supports the findings of this study are available in the supplementary material of this article.

ORCID
Gary Uzonyi https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6006-993X

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Dr. **Gary Uzonyi** is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government & Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde. His research focuses on domestic and international political violence, civil war, genocide, mass atrocities, and how international organizations and peacekeeping operations respond to state-sponsored human rights abuses.

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