| Abstract [eng] |
Although the debate between legal positivism and the natural law theory remained a central rift for many years in the philosophy of law, it appears that recently legal positivism has been taking the edge in contemporary discussions over the nature of law. However, contemporary theories of legal positivism disagree about what should constitute an important and significant factor defining the function of legal rights. It is important to note that theories of legal positivism declare the aim to describe law as it is, and not as it should be. Yet, different positivist conceptions of legal rights keep criticising one another and seek to base the description of the function of legal rights on one principle. For this reason, it is important to examine whether these theories do not violate the fundamental assumptions of legal positivism and whether they are consistent with the main aims of this paradigm of the philosophy of law. At the same time, the on-going discussion between different positivist conceptions of legal rights poses a broader question: is the positivist conception of legal rights possible at all? Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to analyse the different conceptions of legal rights presented in contemporary theories of legal positivism and to ascertain whether the positivist conception of legal rights which does not entail internal contradictions and which does not conflict with the fundamental assumptions of legal positivism is possible at all. More specifically, the dissertation seeks to explore whether theories of legal positivism can properly justify the difference between legal rights and legal norms and to define the function of legal rights based on references to certain social facts without using normative arguments. |
