

IN SEARCH OF THE INNER MIND: OLD ENGLISH GESCEAD AND OTHER LEXEMES FOR HUMAN COGNITION IN KING ALFRED'S *BOETHIUS*

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The article discusses the Old English terminology for human cognition in King Alfred's translation of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy. The Old English lexemes for human mind, soul, and intellect are investigated with respect to their immediate context in the vernacular, as well as the broader tradition of medieval Latin terminology that underpins the Anglo-Saxon rendering of the treatise. The study argues that although no exact relationship can be established between the vernacular and the corresponding Latin set of terms, the Old English rendering does succeed in conveying the essential structures of Boethius' thought, thus transmitting Late Antique heritage to the ninth-century philosophical discourse of Anglo-Saxon England.

1. Introduction¹

The present study inquires into the Old English terminology for human cognition employed by the Anglo-Saxon translator of Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*. The aim of this research is to investigate Old English lexemes for human mind, soul, and intellect with respect to their immediate context in the vernacular, as well as the broader tradition of medieval Latin terminology that underlies the Anglo-Saxon rendering of the treatise.

Produced in Anglo-Saxon England under the aegis of King Alfred the Great (850–899), the Old English *Boethius* survives as the first attempt to translate the Latin *Consolation* into a vernacular tongue. Ever since its introduction into the court of Charlemagne, the Latin *Consolation* was an immensely popular book on the Continent: widely copied and commented upon, the *Consolation* was used as a school text by several generations of Carolingian teachers—Alcuin, Lupus of Ferrières, Remigius of Auxerre, and possibly John Scottus Eriugena, to name but a few (Courcelle 1967, Marenbon 2003). Yet it was only at Alfred's court that the treatise

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first received a vernacular rendering, and thus an immediate experience of the intellectual and linguistic capacities of its receptive milieu. A work profoundly Neoplatonic in character, the *Consolation* was no easy text for the ambitious translator, who was confronted with a unique synthesis of allusions to Classical and Late Antique thought. Besides, the Boethius that reached Alfred's England was a text accompanied with glosses and commentaries, often anonymous and compiled from a variety of other sources, offering sometimes even contradictory notes to the original work of the writer (Bolton 1977). Seeing this complex historical, textual and philosophical background of Alfred's translation encourages us to read and to investigate the work as a rare witness to the ninth-century philosophical discourse in a vernacular tongue.

I will argue that the systematic use of the Old English *gescead*, together with other nouns for 'reason' and 'mind' (OE *mod*, *andgi(e)t*, and *gewitt*), closely corresponds to the division of the human cognitive powers in Boethius' original terminology. The investigation is by no means complete, but a closer look at the contexts in which the terms appear does open up some new vistas for the mapping and the interpretation of the semantic field of human cognition in Old English.

2. Previous scholarship

Alfred's translation of Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* is not a word for word paraphrase of the Latin text; consequently, numerous studies have discussed the ways in which the Anglo-Saxon rendering differs from its original (Bately 1984, Bolton 1986). Alfred's terminology for human cognitive powers, however, has received rather limited scholarly attention with Kurt Otten's *König Alfreds Boethius* (1964) and Malcolm Godden's "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind" (1985) remaining the most significant treatments of the subject.

In his study, Otten analyses 1) the vernacular expression of the Boethian notions 'spirit' and 'soul,' 2) the range of meaning of Old English *mod* and *sawol*, and 3) the Alfredian terminology for Latin *ratio* as *sensus*, *imaginatio*, and *intellegentia*. Otten observes that the correspondence in terms for 'spirit' and 'soul' between Latin and Anglo-Saxon is especially inconsistent, which allows a wider choice of Anglo-Saxon terms compared to "bestimmte Begriffe festgelegte Sprache der Philosophie" (Otten 1964, 165). Consequently, OE *mod* covers a very wide area of meanings including both 'spirit' and 'soul,' yet it does not embrace the *anima* of wild beasts. In its core meaning, it corresponds to Latin *mens* and *animus*, but also to *cogitatio*, *ratio*, and *intellegentia*: "Mod' ist aber das Organ des Bewusstseins und das verantwortliche Organ des Menschen zum Guten und Bösen, der Sitz der Seelenkräfte und des Willens, und darum wendet sich die 'Philosophia' an 'Mod.'" (Otten 1964, 167) On the other hand, OE *sawol*, according to Otten, allows Alfred to express the religious connotations of the concept of 'soul' in Boethius: "Wo bei Boethius die Gesamtheit der Seelenkräfte gemeint sein muss, sieht Alfred das Religiöse des Seelenbegriffs als ausschlaggebend." (Otten 1964, 173) Finally, Otten discusses OE *gesceadwisesnes* as a term corresponding to the Boethian *ratio* when the latter stands for the unique capacity of *mens*, the highest power of human spirit (*Cons.* V.5,17), and the discursive reason which grasps abstracted forms existing in individuals (*Cons.* V.4,82) (Otten 1964, 177).

Godden's article, similarly, addresses the correspondence between the Boethian ideas on human mind and their linguistic expression in Alfred's translation. Godden observes that "Alfred attributes a very high status to the mind" (1985, 276), and rightly draws attention to those passages in the translation which suggest that, for Alfred, the duality of man is essentially

between the body and “the rational inner self”—in OE called *mod* or *sawl*—which also embraces the highest type of understanding, the Boethian *intellegentia*, which in Alfred’s rendering becomes common to wise men and angels, and not only to God.

To summarize, both Otten and Godden observe certain discrepancies between the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon uses of terms for human cognition in the *Consolation*; both authors also indicate the human mind as the area which receives the most unexpected linguistic expression in the vernacular, yet apart from a few rather general remarks, neither of the authors attempts to explain these differences in terminology.

3. OE *gescead* in Alfred’s *Metre 20*

In Old English, human cognitive powers receive a variety of terms—*andgi(e)t*, *gescead*, *gesceadwisnes*, *gewit*, *mod*, *inneward mod*, *rædels*, (*fore*)*þonc*, (*inge*)*þonc*, etc., whose meanings in modern dictionaries frequently overlap leaving the impression of the lexical field being exclusively fluctuant and complicated.² A more reliable method to discern the differences between the terms, therefore, is to look at their contexts, consider (in our case) the correspondence with their Latin counterparts, and from the text itself to try and determine the meanings acquired there by the term in question.

Our starting passage comes from *Metre 20*, a vernacular rendering of the famous *O qui perpetua* (*Cons.* III, m.9), an impressive hymn to the Ruler of the universe.³ In the quote, the human attempt and endeavour to apprehend the divinity is described as an action performed exclusively by the mental powers of man, i.e. OE *gescead*, the human reason, ascending to the divine:

- (1) . . . [*Hio*, i.e. *monnes saule*] *scriðende færð*
hweole gelicost, hwærfð ymb hi selfe.
þonne hio ymb hire scyppend mid gescead smeað,
hio bið up ahæfen ofer hi selfe;
ac hio bið eallunga an hire selfre
þonne hlo ymb hi selfe secende smeað;
hio bið swiðe fior hire selfre beneoðan,
þonne hio þæs lænan lufað 7 wundrað
eorðlicu þing ofer ecne ræd. (Met. 20, 214b–224)

(“[The soul] travels gliding, like a wheel, turns around itself. When about its Creator it reflects with reason, then it is raised up over itself, but it is entirely within itself when it reflects searching about itself; it is far beneath itself when it loves and admires these transitory, earthly things more than the law eternal.”)⁴

² Hall 1993 offers definitions as: *andgiæt* ‘understanding, intellect’; *gescead* ‘discretion, understanding, argument, reason’; *sceadwisnes* ‘sagacity, reason, discrimination’; (*ge*)*wit* ‘knowledge, consciousness, conscience’; *mod* ‘heart, mind, spirit, ‘mood,’ temper’; *rædels* ‘imagination, conjecture, interpretation’; (*ge*)*þanc* ‘thought, reflection, idea, mind.’

³ Thematically, the *O qui perpetua* hymn is a succinct summary of creation from Plato’s *Timaeus*. As such, it was identified already in the early Middle Ages, which undoubtedly contributed to its popularity among the medieval commentators. Henry Chadwick calls the hymn “a nodal point in the work as a whole” (1992, 234), and Joachim Gruber points to its metrical centrality in the *Consolation*: various other meters of the poems in the book are grouped and ordered symmetrically around the *O qui perpetua* (1978, 16–19).

⁴ Quoted from Sedgefield 1968. For prose sections, references are given to the chapter, page, and line number in this edition. The Modern English translation is mine. I also underline the analysed words.

The human soul in Alfred's metre is represented as an essentially mobile element, capable of existing on three different levels of reality: either dwelling in itself, ascending to the divine realm, or plunging down to the transitory things of this world. While the perception process as a whole is not further specified, the soul's ascent to the divine is said to be performed through reason (OE *gescead*): it is with *gescead* that the soul reflects and becomes elevated to God. Many questions arise: what more can be said about this *gescead*, how similar (or different) was it to other terms denoting human mental powers, and to what specific type of reason could it refer in Alfred's translation of the Boethian metre?⁵ Yet before we consider the context in greater detail, and attempt to arrive at a more precise definition of the OE *gescead*, let us make a necessary excursus into the structures of the Boethian terminology for the soul and intellect.

4. Boethian terminology of cognition

For the discussion of Boethius' terms for human cognitive faculties I shall rely on John Magee's study *Boethius on Signification and Mind* (1989). His investigation of the Boethian theory of *significatio* is based on a detailed analysis of Boethius' translation of Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* and his subsequent commentary on the Aristotelian theory of semantics.

In his commentary, Boethius addresses the question of how the four things named in Aristotle's passage on signs (*PeriH* 16a3–9), namely, *res*, *intellectus*, *vox*, *litterae*, should be ordered in the process of cognition. In other words, what operations take place in the mind until statements are spoken aloud.

What Magee discovers is that behind the classical schema of *res—intellectus—vox*, the middle element of *intellectus* embraces a series of activities or faculties that can be attributed to lower stages of cognition. However, careful with his terminology, Boethius uses only *intellectus* as a technical term pertinent to the theory of signification. The author maintains that "*sensus*, *imaginatio*, *passio animae* and *similitudo* are all forms of *intellectus*," and further concludes that "there is also a close affinity between *intellectus*, *ratio* and *intellegentia*" (Magee, 1989, 114–15).

According to Magee, *sensus* in the logical commentaries of Boethius means the acts, the contents, or the faculties of sense-perception (e.g. sight and seeing). *Sensus* differs from *intellectus*, and can be more precisely defined as the origin of the intellect: the faculties of perception have a direct access to the material objects of cognition, and can make initial judgments about them, which are then transmitted to the higher levels of cognition.

Similar to *sensus* is *imaginatio*, responsible for images and forms which come to the soul. It is very visual, for it brings into the soul pictures of the things outside, or is even capable of creating inner images of nonexistent things such as chimeras, four-footed birds, and the like. Both *sensus* and *imaginatio* are closely connected levels of cognition. For Boethius, *sensus* is activated by a *res*, whereas *imaginatio* is "a secondary movement of *sensus*"; therefore, both are often substituted by *intellectus*, as two lower levels covered by the "umbrella" of a broader term.

⁵ Noteworthy, the Latin verse contains no corresponding line that could immediately be taken as the original of this passage. It is probably not an original invention of Alfred himself, either, and some ecclesiastical treatise or a commentary passage cannot be excluded as a possible ancillary source for the translator in his work.

Ratio, however, has to be explained in the light of yet another relationship that holds between various terms of cognition. Boethius in his commentaries seems to make a distinction between two forms of intellect, the active and the passive, which is an essentially Neoplatonic distinction.⁶ *Ratio* could, therefore, be understood as the lower, or passive intellect, which receives the illumination and which “reflects the empty images of things as in a mirror” (Magee, 1989, 129). Its complementary notion is the active intellect, capable of making judgements, actively separating and combining notions, and finally, thinking “universally.”

5. OE *gescead* vs. OE *gewitt*, *mod* and *andgit*

Could our *gescead* be equated to Boethius’ *ratio*—the passive intellect? By no means so. Reason in Alfred’s passage is the innermost part of the human soul engaged in an intense cognitive activity, and thus should be understood as a faculty that enables the soul to seek *actively* the object of its reflection.

Now what is interesting, is that in his study Magee also suggests that *ratio* in Boethius’ logical works differs from the *ratio* in the *Consolation of Philosophy*, where it acquires the meaning of the discursive human reasoning as opposed to *intellegentia*, intuition, or the divine way of knowing things: *Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus* (Cons. N. 6, 17). The following passage illustrates how peculiarly Alfred’s translation adheres to this distinction:

- (2) . . . *Se an man ongit þ þ he (on) oðru ongit synderlice; he hine ongit þurh þa eagan synderlice, þurh þa earan synderlice, þurh his rædelsan synderlice, þurh gesceadwisnesse synderlice, þurh gewiss andgit . . . Ða men ðonne habbað eall þ we ær ymbe spræcon, 7 eac to eacan þa micle gife gesceadwisnesse. Englas þon habbað gewiss andgit. (Bo 41.145.27–32; 146.8–10)*

(‘. . . This one man understands that he perceives the other in a special way; he perceives him in a special way through his eyes, in a special way through the ears, in a special way through his imagination, in a special way through reason, certainly, [in a special way] through intellect . . . So men have all that we spoke earlier about, and in addition [they have] that precious gift of reason. Whereas angels have intellect.’)

The Latin original behind this quotation is one of the most complicated arguments treated at length in the *Consolation* book 5. The discussion centers round the notion of the divine foreknowledge, and the way it may or may not affect human freedom. Much of the obscurity, says lady Philosophy, arises from the fact that human reason cannot attain (*ammoveri*) the simplicity of the divine foreknowledge. In the course of the argument, she elaborates on the doctrine of a fourfold division of powers of cognition: Philosophy argues that knowledge should be judged not according to the nature of its object, but according to the mental powers of those who perform the act of cognition. To illustrate the point, she gives an example of senses discovering some spherical surface: in a single moment our sight, even from a distance, grasps the totality of the form, whereas the sense of touch has to touch the object it wants to know. Similarly, she says, a human being is known differently by each of the four ways of cognition: *Ipsam quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur* (Cons. V.4, 27).

⁶ Cf. Plotinus’ distinction between *νοῦς*, pure intuitive and instantaneous apprehension pertinent to the divine mind, and *διάνοια*, a strictly human capacity, the power or reasoning and judgement that extends through time. See Blumenthal 1971, 100–111.

Alfred seems to make a straightforward choice when he renders the passage from the point of view of a human being knowing another human being. In the original, the logical knower is deliberately not specified: the grammatical subjects *sensus*, *imaginatio*, *ratio* and *intellegentia* metaphorically stand for various living beings at four distinct levels in the hierarchy of cognition. Philosophy explains that different ways of knowing pertain to different substances (*differentibus substantiis*); thus, shellfish and other simple sea-creatures have only sense perception, *imaginatio* pertains to other more complex creatures that can move, *ratio* is distinctively a human property, and *intellegentia* as the supreme way of knowing belongs only to God: *Ratio vero humani tantum generis est sicut intellegentia sola divini* (*Cons.* V.5, 3–4).

In addition, Philosophy speaks of a *scale* of cognition, the lower levels of which cannot reach the higher. Consequently, beings with *sensus* only cannot reach the level of *imaginatio*, and those with *imaginatio* cannot attain *ratio*. In contrast, the higher powers encompass the lower ones, so for example, humans, who have *ratio*, also have *sensus* and *imaginatio*. This is rather faithfully reflected in Alfred's translation, when he says that the shellfish have sense, other beasts have desire, humans have *gescead*, but only angels (i.e. the purely spiritual beings) have *andgi(e)t*, presumably, the highest level of intelligence. Indeed, Alfred in his translation speaks about the *unwriogende andgi(e)t*, the undoubting intellect, possessed by angels, as well as *se hehsta andgi(e)t*, the highest intellect, to which Wisdom calls the mind.⁷ However, how do we account for his implication that humans can know other humans with *andgi(e)t*, which by definition belongs only to angels? A few lines later Alfred again confirms that although human *gescead* and angelic *andgi(e)t* are distinct, wise men can attain this supreme level of intelligence:

- (3) *Ac þæt is earmilc þ se mæsta dæl monna ne secð no þ þ him forgifen is, þ is gesceadwisnes; ne þ ne secð þæt him ofer is, þ is þæt englas habbað 7 wise men; þ is gewis andgiet.* (*Bo* 41.146.14–16)

(‘But it is miserable that most people do not seek after that which is given to them, that is, rationality nor do they seek after that which is above them, what angels and wise men possess, namely, intelligence.’)

We must understand the wide gulf that separates human *ratio* and divine *intellegentia* in Boethius' work to fully comprehend the implications of these changes in Alfred's version. Historically, the distinction between discursive and intuitive thought can be traced back to works of Plato and Aristotle, yet it becomes fully elaborated in Plotinus, who brings out a glaring contrast between a single timeless vision of Intelligence and the laborious process of discursive thought of the Soul. Boethius describes *intellegentia* as a thought of the purest mind (*pura mentis*) that glances as if from above and in a single momentary *flash* (*illo uno ictu mentis*) perceives pure forms of things (*Cons.* V.4, 32). Human mind, in contrast, is bound to time; thus it can only move from things it does not know to things it gets to discover. Magee in his study points out that human cognition is essentially discursive and linear, dissecting and combining objects it grasps, and so in consequence formulating only logical definitions of things understood (Magee, 1989, 142–143).

In the Old English translation, it is *gewitt* that seems to most resemble this kind of mental state. The following contexts will help us to understand its nature better. The first context is the vernacular rendering of the passage where Philosophy questions Boethius about his origin:

⁷ In other passages, however, *andgi(e)t* extends its semantics to signify intellect as a soul faculty that belongs to humans, and even cattle, which underlines the all-pervading nature of intelligence that even the lowest creatures can participate in. Cf. *Bo* 5.146.20–26.

- (4) *Da cwæð se Wisdom: Hu mæg þæt bion, nu þu ðæt angin wast, þæt ðu eac ðone ende nyte; forðæm sio gedrefednes mæg þ mod onstryan, ac hio hit ne mæg his gewittes bereaftan. Ac ic wolde þæt þu me sædest hwæþer ðu wisse hwæt þu self wære. Hit þa andwyrde 7 cwæð: Ic wat þ ic on libbendum men 7 on gesceadwisum eom 7 þeah on deaddlicum. Ða andwyrde se Wisdom 7 cwæð: Wastu auhtþres bi þe selfum to secganne buton þ þu nu sædest? Ða cwæð þ Mod: Nat ic nauht oðres. (Bo 5.13.7–15)*

(“Then Wisdom said: How may it be that now that you know the beginning, you do not know the end? For a trouble can disturb the mind, but it cannot deprive [it] of reason. I would like you to tell me whether you know what you are yourself. [The Mind] then answered and said: I know that I am [one] of the living, rational, yet mortal men. Then Wisdom responded and said: Do you know anything else about yourself besides what you now have told? Then the Mind said: No, I know nothing else.”)

“A trouble can disturb the mind, but it cannot deprive [it] of reason.” The Latin original mentions neither ‘mind,’ nor ‘reason’; it simply says that the strength of troubles lies in their power to distract the man from the course of life. However, troubles cannot crush him completely: *Verum hi perturbationum mores, ea valentia est, ut movere quidem loco hominem possint, convellere autem sibi que totum exstripare non possint. (Cons. I.6)*. In Alfred’s passage, *gewitt* appears to be more stable than *mod*, which suggests its higher status in the hierarchy of cognitive faculties.

Another passage that illustrates *gewitt* as the basic human capacity to reason comes from the story of Ulysses in chapter 38 of Alfred’s translation. The companions of Ulysses are transformed into wild beasts: they eat like beasts, roar like beasts, and resemble beasts, yet their mind remains human: *Næfdon hi nane anlicnesse manna ne on lichoman ne on stemne, 7 ælc wisse þeah his gewitt swa swa he ær wisse*. ‘They had no likeness of human beings neither in their body, nor in their voice; however, each knew his [own] mind just as before.’ (Bo 38.116.23). In short, humans retain *gewitt* despite various afflictions in which they still can define themselves as human beings. However, from the *Consolation* it is clear that this level of intellect is “somehow fettered.” Magee observes:

That in book I Boethius (the Boethius of the *mise en scène*) relied upon definitions of this sort was, Philosophia observed, the mark of his lingering weakness and oblivion of his true origin. When questioned as to his knowledge of his own nature, “Boethius” could do no more than to offer the logical definition, “rational, mortal, animal.” This response served as the beginning of Philosophia’s diagnosis of his illness: he had for the moment ceased to “know himself” (1989, 143).

This way of self-discovery starts with the soul’s ascent to the divine. For indeed, the consolation in the *Consolation of Philosophy* is that the gap between human reason and divine intellect can be crossed. “What must be noted is that the references to prayer implicitly secure once and for all the possibility of some form of contact between human *ratio* and divine *intelgentia*, even if they leave it unexplained” (Magee 1989, 149).

Alfred’s version of the *Consolation* is an explicit translation of this message. The inheritor of a complex tradition of Christian Neoplatonism, Alfred believes that there is something of the divine in the human soul that is capable of coming into contact with its Creator. Augustine’s writings could be a very likely source for Alfred on this issue, for as Gérard Mathon suggests, Augustine’s view of the soul would in principle allow the medieval writer to gain access to the Plotinian distinction between $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, a contrast between the lower soul with memory and senses, and the intuitive spirit capable of elevating itself to God and contemplating the

eternal truth (1964, 43–55).⁸ Paul Szarmach (1980) observed that it is *Ratio—Geseceadwisness* which leads the pupil of the OE *Soliloquies* to the contemplation of God. The *gesecead* from *Metre 20* behaves very much alike, and I believe it is precisely because Alfred has this Augustinian/ Plotinian distinction in mind that he is capable of dissecting the single term *ratio* in Boethius and to use two different terms, *gewitt* and *gesecead*, instead. Synonymous on the surface as the two words are, they nevertheless differ, and whenever Alfred wants to convey the meaning of the human mind rising to contemplate God, he uses *gesecead*.⁹

6. Conclusion

To sum up, the preliminary analysis of the Old English lexemes for human cognitive elements suggests an intricate structure in terminology, which becomes more transparent when the terms and their contexts are singled out and compared against their intellectual background. The analysis has led us to discover OE *gesecead* as perhaps one of the key terms in Alfred's translation, a term that once situated within its semantic field gradually discloses its underlying notions of the inner powers of human mind aspiring to the divine. The contexts of OE *gesecead* and its complementary terms (*gewitt*, *mod*, *andgi(e)t*) define this transition even more precisely, as they allow the mind fettered in the dungeon darkness to start to search with reason for the One, and to fly to him in prayer, which Plotinus memorably defines as a *φυγή μόνου πρὸς μόνον*, an escape in solitude to the solitary one (*Enn.* VI.9.51).

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⁸ In his analysis of the Augustinian structure of the soul, Mathon clearly singles out the superior part of the soul that is able to receive divine illumination: *C'est parce que l'âme est image de Dieu qu'elle est aussi capable de recevoir la priviège de l'illumination. Et ces deux caractères s'appliquent à la partie supérieure de l'âme, quel que soit le nom qu'on lui donne: intellectus, mens, ratio, ou quelque autre encore si on le juge plus adéquat* (1964, 43). Mathon further specifies the terminological change from Augustine's exegetical writings to more philosophical works in which Augustine has to deal with Stoic and Neoplatonic heritage: *Ce passage se caractérise par la substitution du terme MENS à celui de Spiritus avec la relative dévalorisation de ce dernier et l'absorption des autres: ratio et intellectus à celui qui deviendra le mot-clef du vocabulaire mystique: le Mens, avec ses composants: acies mentis, arx mentis, oculus mentis, etc.* (1964, 45). Alfred's specification that the soul contemplates the divine with the help of reason would, in this case, be a clear indication that in Anglo-Saxon England Boethius was read within the framework of Augustine's philosophical thought.

⁹ A really synonymous expression for *gesecead*, then, would probably be the *inneweard mod*, an Old English rendering of Boethius' *mens profunda*: *Swa hwa swa wille dioplice spirigan mid inneweardan mode æfter ryhte, 7 nylle þ hine ænig mon oððe ænig þing mage amerran, onginne þon secan oninnan him selfu, þ he ær ymbutan hine sohte, 7 forlæte unnytte ymbhogan swa he swiðost mæge; 7 geæðerige to þam anum, 7 gesecege þon his anu mode þ hit mæg findan oninnan him selfum ealle þa god þe hit ute secð. (Bo 35.94.27–95.4)* ('He who desires to search deeply for the truth with the inward mind, and desires that no man or thing might hinder him, let him search within himself for that which before he sought outside himself, and [let him] forsake vain care as best as he can, and concentrate on this alone, and say to his mind that it may find inside itself all the good which it seeks outside.')

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SIELOS MĄSTYMO IR PAŽINIMO LEKŠINĖ RAIŠKA BOETIJĀUS VERTIME Į SENĄJĄ ANGLŲ KALBĄ

Rūta Šileikytė

Santrauka

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama sielos mąstymo ir pažinimo leksinė raiška Boetijaus 'Filosofijos paguodos' vertime į senąją anglų kalbą. Senosios anglų kalbos žodžių, reiškusių protą, sielą, intelektą bei mąstymą, reikšmės tyrinėjamos atsižvelgiant į bendrą kūrinio kontekstą, kartu stengiantis pastebėti ir sąsajas su lotyniškąja viduramžių terminologijos tradicija, kuri neišvengiamai įtakojo anglo-saksiškąjį traktato vertimą. Tyrinėjant pastebėta, jog nors ir nesama tikslaus atitikimo tarp lotynų ir senosios anglų kalbos terminų, karaliaus Alfredo vertimui pavyksta savitai perteikti svarbiausias Boetijaus filosofijos idėjas leksiniame kūrinio lygmenyje. Tuo būdu šis Boetijaus traktato vertimas tampa svarbiu devintojo amžiaus šaltiniu, tautine kalba perteikiančiu vėlyvosios Antikos palikimą viduramžių kultūrai.