| Abstract [eng] |
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to “negative cooperation” create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace. |
