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**UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GIANT?
RUSSIA'S SOFT POWER TOWARDS MOLDOVA**

MASTER'S THESIS

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MASTER'S THESIS FLYLEAF

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I confirm that I am the author of submitted *Master's Thesis: Under the influence of giant: Russia's soft power towards Moldova*, which has been prepared independently and has never been presented for any other course or used in another educational institution, neither in Lithuania, or abroad. I also provide a full bibliographical list which indicates all the sources that were used to prepare this assignment and contains no un-used sources.

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Summary: This thesis analyzes Russia's soft power towards the republic of Moldova. The theoretical part of the thesis provides the main arguments of the soft power theory and explains Russia's soft power perception. The empirical part of the thesis examines Russia's soft power tools and effects towards Moldova. The research tries to cover the most recent period, which is the last ten years. The thesis investigates the influence of Russia's culture, the attractiveness of Russia's values, the attractiveness of Russia's foreign policy and the influence of Russia's economy.

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INTRODUCTION

In contemporary world politics countries are increasingly using soft power in order to influence others, create attractive image, spread values and make changes without using force. This Master's thesis analyzes Russia's soft power towards the Republic of Moldova. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia seeks to maintain dominant position and authority in the post-Soviet space as well as to keep Moldova in the zone of influence. This thesis is going to investigate Russia as a major power and a key player in Moldova through the lens of soft power theory. Soft power is the ability to achieve the desired result in international arena by using attraction and influence rather than coercion and force. In contemporary world political power is not static, it changes, evolves, grows, expands or decreases. In many cases power relations are not equal and the balance of power is better defined as unevenly balanced relationship among countries. In comparison to other major players such as the European Union or the United States, Russia came late to the soft power games in the post-Soviet region, but this did not stop Russia from attempt to expand its soft power and use it successfully in order to bring countries closer. Moldova became a target for Russia's soft power activities. It is important to emphasize that after the last elections in November 2016 the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon won the presidential post in Moldova. It seems that the country might shift towards Russia. Therefore, the present situation requires further research in order to discover whether Russia's soft power is effective towards Moldova.

Novelty of the thesis. The topic of Russia's soft power is controversial, complicated and provokes discussions among scholars, because of Russia's soft power efficiency and effectiveness in international relations. Russia began to use soft power resources and instruments for influencing and attracting post-Soviet countries. This Master's thesis relates to other soft power researches, because it explains the theoretical features of Russian soft power. In addition, this study is new and valuable, because it not only investigates the soft power concept or potential soft power of a country, but also examines the practical expression of soft power in reality. Also, a research model will be developed and used in the study in order to measure Russia's soft power capability towards Moldova. Moldova has recently become a subject of discussion. After the presidential elections in 2016, Moldova is experiencing sharp changes in domestic and foreign politics that favors Russian integration. This gives the opportunity for Russia to influence and affect the ideological change and geopolitical orientation of the country. The study allows to test the soft power theory in selected case study while formulating goal of the thesis, creating a model for measuring soft power, collecting evidences, and getting original

conclusions. The outcomes of the study are expected to provide an explanation on how Russia's soft power has been changing in Moldova during the last ten years. In addition, Moldova is rarely selected country to perform a case study and it also provides a novelty for the Master's thesis.

The problem of the thesis. During the last decade Moldova was trapped between EU and Russia, and the two giants tried to influence, attract and bring Moldova closer to their own side. The last presidential elections symbolized a victory of pro-Russian forces in Moldova. This raised a question whether a victory of socialist leader signaled the country's shift towards Russian integration, especially considering the fact that the electoral campaign was aimed to break the Moldovan alliance with the EU and improve relations with Russia. This circumstance raises the issue whether Moldovan attractiveness to Russia has been increasing during the last ten years even though the country was ruled by pro-European, pro-Western coalition. Most importantly, Russia seeks to create an attractive image, maintain political influence, expand economic ties and bring Moldova towards Russian side and towards Russian integration. Russia aims to ensure that it has a special, dominant and supremacy role towards post-Soviet countries. The problem emerges concerning the presence of a specific Russian perception of soft power, which derogates from a classical theory and therefore is worth investigating. Also, there are a limited number of empirical researches carried out to assess whether Russia's soft power is effective in practice. This creates an open field for implementation of this research.

The problem begs **the research question:** How is Russia's soft power changing towards Moldova?

The object of the research is Russia's soft power tools and effects towards Moldova.

The goal of the thesis is to examine the change dynamics in the attractiveness of Russia from the Moldova's point of view.

The tasks of the thesis:

1. To discuss the soft power theory and provide the main arguments.
2. To explain Russia's perception of soft power.
3. To construct a conceptual framework for measuring soft power.
4. To examine Russia's soft power tools and effects towards Moldova.

Study design

Study design in the Master's thesis will be composed of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches (mixed method) in order to test the soft power theory in a selected case study. The thesis will invoke this research model, because it is flexible, fits well with the theory, goal of the thesis and selected case study of Moldova.

Case selection. Moldova was chosen as a case study, because the country became an area for geopolitics, competition and international influence not only for the neighboring Romania, but also for other major players such as Russia and the European Union. It was observed that Russia uses soft power in order to attract Moldova and make it change its political direction in favor for Russia. Despite the fact that pro-Russian candidate won the presidential election in November 2016, the country is still hesitating whether to choose Russian or Western path of integration. However, the clash between the EU and Russia in Moldova leads to stagnation and political deadlock. Furthermore, the author of the thesis has chosen to perform the investigation on Russia's soft power particularly towards Moldova, because after the analysis of the scientific literature it was observed that Moldova is not such a common case study and this stimulates the academic curiosity. It is necessary to emphasize that the Transnistrian region of Moldova will not be included in this research.

Research instruments. In order to investigate Russia's soft power towards Moldova different research instruments are going to be invoked in the Master's thesis. The combination of analysis of scientific literature, document and legal acts analysis, secondary data analysis and discourse analysis help to answer the research question in the best way.

- *Analysis of scientific literature* will be used in order to analyze the scientific literature about the soft power theory and provide the detailed description of it as well as give the main arguments of the theory. Also, while investigating Russia's soft power resources, instruments and strategies academic articles are also going to be analyzed.

- *Document and legal act analysis* is going to be used in order to analyze the Russia's foreign policy towards Moldova. It is also important to identify Russian soft power characterization in the official documents.

- *Secondary quantitative data analysis* method is one of the most important in the research. It is dedicated to determine the evolution of data over selected period of time. Most importantly, data will be analyzed in order to examine whether Russian soft power resources (culture, political values, foreign policy and economy) are successfully employed in order to influence and compel Moldova. This method will assist to construct various graphs, figures and tables according to

the data, which was generated and provided by the “The National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova”, “National Republican Institute”, “Institute for Public Policy”, “Pew Research Center”, “Gallup”, and other international organizations. This helps to illustrate the thesis and visually present necessary indicators that are included in soft power measurement framework.

- *Discourse analysis* will be used to analyze the content of selected elite speeches in order to reveal the perception of Moldovan elite on Russia’s foreign policy orientation.

Time-frame of the study. Time-frame of the thesis is determined from 2007 till 2017. Russia faced a challenge to maintain its influence in Moldova as well as in other post-Soviet countries. For this reason, soft power became a significant tool for Russia in order to compel countries to stay close. During the last ten years Russia has been trying to master and involve soft power instruments in its foreign policy. Particularly this time-frame is chosen because it is necessary to find and explore all soft power resources and instruments that were used by Russia as well as to perform deep analysis and determine the changes of Russian soft power towards Moldova.

Literature review: What is already known about Russia’s soft power?

First of all, after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia did not form its foreign policy on the soft power principles, because it faced many internal and external challenges. When Vladimir Putin came to power Russia’s foreign policy changed and became multi-faceted. Putin tried to increase Russia’s power in international arena by employing hard and soft power tools. Fiona Hill argues that Russia invoked economy, culture and values together with energy resources in order to preserve and strengthen its influence in the former Soviet republics¹. Andrei P. Tsygankov declares that Russia has significant potential to use soft power in international arena. Russia’s economy, history, culture and language could be employed in order to attract post-Soviet countries. Russia’s soft power has increased after Putin came to presidency. Author criticizes the fact that Russia seeks to restore the empire and says that Russia wants to ensure security and stability in this region as well as get benefits for itself while becoming a region-builder. Tsygankov argues that the aims of Russia’s soft power can be compatible with the aims of the West, which consists of maintaining stability, facilitating economic development, respecting political pluralism and religious tolerance². Anna Mkhoyan studied Russian language as a resource of Russia’s soft power. The author asserted that post-Soviet countries have strong social, historical, cultural, economic and military ties with Russia, but the domination of Russian

¹ Fiona Hill, “Moscow Discovers Soft Power”, *Current History*, 2006, 30(2), 341-347.

² Andrei P. Tsygankov, “If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2006, 58(7), 1079-1099.

language in the region is over: “Russian is promoted in a multicultural environment – alongside English, French, German or Chinese – which reflects the new geopolitical reality”³. In sum, researchers agree that the potential of Russia’s soft power is significant and Russia is able to employ soft power in order to affect, appeal and attract other countries. Although, there is a gap in the existing research, because these authors did not try to measure Russia’s soft power or investigate how the Russian soft power actually works towards other countries. This research is going to fill this shortcoming by providing innovative model, which tries to measure Russia's soft power towards the target country.

Secondly, other part of literature tries to find the limitations of Russia’s soft power. According to Vasile Rotaru, Russia has a large capacity and great potential to use soft power in the post-Soviet area: “The common history, the Russian language, the Russian diaspora, the Orthodox Church, and Russian high and popular culture should in theory “produce attractiveness” in the near abroad”⁴. However, the author added that Russia fails to successfully exploit its soft power, because instead of attracting countries to its side, Russia diminishes the soft power potential, discourages and demotivates countries to follow. In addition to that, Peter Rutland and Andrei Kazantsev suggest that Russia’s soft power is not successful due to the decline in Russia’s international prestige after the events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. Authors state that it is difficult to associate Russia with soft power: “The lingering effects of the Soviet legacy, plus the disruptive Russian experiences with the transition to market economics and democracy in the 1990s, combine to make soft power a hard sell for Russian leaders”⁵. Although scholars claim that Russia’s soft power is declining, the author of this thesis argues that Russia’s soft power is unfairly underestimated among scholars. Scholars are too strict for Russia as they do not research and consider countries such as Belarus, Armenia and other Central Asian countries which have a positive attitude towards Russia. In addition, Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Syria changed the attitude towards Russia as it was considered to be a powerful player in the international arena⁶. By engaging in the Syrian conflict Russia has increased its soft power because it contributed to conflict settlement.

Thirdly, literature review suggests that Russia’s soft power is different from Joseph S. Nye theoretical model and from Western understanding of soft power, because Russia understands soft power in a broader sense. Russia tries to use soft power in order to strengthen authority in the region,

³ Anna Mkhoyan, “Soft power, Russia and the former Soviet states: a case study of Russian language and education in Armenia”, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 2016.

⁴ Vasile Rotaru, “Forced Attraction? How Russia is Instrumentalizing Its Soft Power Sources in the “Near Abroad”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 2017, 00(00), 1–12.

⁵ Peter Rutland & Andrei Kazantsev, “The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’”, *Journal of Political Power*, 2016, 9(3), 395-413.

⁶ Hanna Smith, “Russian Power: Domestic Challenges”. *Assessing Russia’s Power: A Report*. Natasha Kuhrt and Valentina Feklyunina (eds.), King’s College London and Newcastle University, 2017, 43-45.

counter Western influence, promote Russian history, culture, language, religion, values, strengthen Russian media, support Russian population that live abroad. Tomila Lankina and Kinga Niemczyk declare that Russia's soft power is focused on the 'Sovereign democracy' ideology that rejects liberal democracy and promotes Russian traditional values and Russian political model"⁷. Moreover, the colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan forced Russia to strengthen its soft power in order not to lose the impact, influence, power and authority towards the neighboring countries. Russia's soft power contradicts with the Joseph S. Nye's original statements, because "much of the Kremlin's 'soft power' strategy has relied on state-driven and state-financed campaigns to systematically develop, promote and amplify Russia's attractiveness to domestic and external constituencies while simultaneously discrediting the moral edge of the alternative, Western liberal democratic order"⁸. Also, Alexander Sergunin declares that Russian interpretation of soft power is instrumentalist, pragmatic and interest-centric⁹. It must be stressed that Russia's case is interesting and unique, because Russia forms its soft power around conservative values and authoritarian governance. Another important point is that the topic of soft power remains relatively neglected among Russian academicians since there is a limited number of empirical researches. The author of the thesis agrees that Russia has a different logic of soft power and seeks to contribute to the analysis of Russian-style soft power.

Fourthly, Russia is using soft power towards Moldova, and since there are other actors operating in Moldova (such as the EU), the country becomes an interesting study object. Victoria Bucataru examined the confrontation of EU and Russia towards Moldova, arguing that they have different ambitions towards the country. EU and Russia are trying to attract Moldova to their own side, but the author believes that Russia is losing the fight for Moldova: "Being guided by geopolitical interests and an expansionist foreign policy Russia did not manage to raise its attractiveness in Moldova to a level that would change the European foreign policy course of the country"¹⁰. However, it still remains unclear whether Russia seems unappealing to Moldova or the situation has changed in favor for Russia? This topic requires to be empirically studied. This creates an open field for investigation and for writing the Master's thesis. In addition, the research of this thesis fits into the existing research context since it provides the investigation of Russia's soft power towards Moldova (there is a limited number of research made to investigate Moldova, which makes this case relatively

⁷ Tomila Lankina and Kinga Niemczyk, "Russia's Foreign Policy and Soft Power". Book: David Cadier and Margot Light (eds.), *"Russia's Foreign Policy Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations"*. Basingstoke & New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 97-113.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Alexander Sergunin, Leonid Karabeshkin, "Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy", *Politics*, 2015, 35(3-4), 347-363.

¹⁰ Victoria Bucataru, "Moldova Still at a Crossroads: Is the European Path Irreversible?". Book: Toms Rostoks and Andris Spruds (Eds.), *"The different faces of "soft power": the Baltic States and Eastern Neighborhood between Russia and the EU"*. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2015.

under-researched). The thesis is going to argue that Russia seeks to influence Moldova with Russian-style soft power. Therefore, the effectiveness of Russia's soft power is going to be studied exclusively. Moreover, this thesis improves the existing soft power research base by adding the conceptual framework for measuring soft power and applying it to test the impact of Russia's soft power towards Moldova. Eventually, the proposed principle for soft power measurement might be employed in the following soft power studies and further investigations of other cases.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section is designated to construct a theoretical framework for the thesis. The soft power theory is invoked in this thesis in order to provide the literature review of central importance, revise the definition of soft power concept, investigate the relationship between hard and soft power, and explore resources of soft power. Soft power theory will be explored by analyzing the books and articles written by Joseph S. Nye, who is a developer of this term together with other authors' interpretations of the soft power. Soft power is the ability to achieve the desired result in international arena by using attraction rather than coercion. On the contrary to hard power, soft power is based on having influence, making impact, exercising persuasion, creating effect, distributing rewards, creating attractive image, setting agenda, shaping perception, spreading values, disseminating culture and setting beliefs¹¹. Theoretical framework is essential in characterizing the active process, stimulating the research and is important in later investigation of selected case study.

1.1. Theoretical definition of Soft Power

Soft Power theory was first developed by Joseph S. Nye in 1990s. Joseph S. Nye argued that power is changing and evolving in the field of international relations, because "the factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important"¹². Globalization and information revolution lead to transformation of world politics and centers of power together with the blurring national boundaries, growing number of powerful non-state actors (international organizations, non-governmental organizations) and creation of global networks¹³. This change of power leads to creation of new balances between countries and between other actors in

¹¹ Joseph S. Nye, "*Soft power: the means to success in world politics*". New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

¹² Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, Twentieth Anniversary, No. 80, 1990, 153-171.


¹³ Joseph S. Nye, "The Future of Power", New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

international system that are based not only on hard, but also on soft power principles, which are increasing in the world politics. Joseph S. Nye described soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”¹⁴. The country seeks to achieve its goals not by using force, but by persuading and convincing other countries to change the behavior. Additionally, the soft power concept can be confusing and diverse. The definition of soft power is composed of several parts that complement each other. Soft power can be described as:

- the ability to shape the preferences of others;
- the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence;
- the ability to get others to want the outcome you want because of your cultural or ideological appeal;
- country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries - admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness - want to follow it;
- a key element of leadership. The power to attract - to get others to want what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda¹⁵.

The following figure no. 1 portrays the possible definitions of soft power.

Figure No. 1 Definitions of Soft Power



Created by the author, based on Ying Fan, “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?”, *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2008, 4(2), 147–158.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, “*Soft power: the means to success in world politics*”. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.11.

¹⁵ Ying Fan, “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?”, *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2008, 4(2), 147–158.


In other words soft power appears when country A and country B creates relationship where country A influences country B to pursue the same goals. Over time country A brings the country B closer due to the attraction, persuasion, formation of the political agenda and creation of positive image of its culture, political ideals and foreign policy. Country A shapes, changes the behavior and intentions of country B, then country B starts to follow country A. Country A can further influence country B without using force. Finally, countries A and B want to achieve the same result.

1.2. Relationship between hard and soft power

Joseph S. Nye did not reject the presence of hard power, which is based on military capabilities, military security, threats, force, sanctions, payment, military operations, interventions, deterrence but criticized it: “The appropriate response to the changes occurring in world politics today is not to abandon the traditional concern for the military balance of power, but to accept its limitations and to supplement it with insights about interdependence”¹⁶. According to the basic understanding of power concept¹⁷, hard and soft power are related to each other, because both of them are seeking the same result - to affect the behavior of other country. Although hard and soft power are better understood as the opposite of each other. What separates them are the different power resources and nature of behavior. According to Joseph S. Nye the hard power is associated with command power while the soft power is associated with co-optive power¹⁸.

The next figure no. 2 is created by Joseph S. Nye and illustrates the spectrum of hard and soft power.

Figure No. 2 Spectrum of hard and soft power



Created by Joseph S. Nye, “Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power”, New York: Basic Books, 1990.

¹⁶ Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power.” *Foreign Policy*, Twentieth Anniversary, No. 80, 1990, 153-171.

¹⁷ Definition of Power according to Robert A. Dahl, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power” , *Behavioral Science*, 2(3), 1957, 201-215.

¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye, “Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power”, New York: Basic Books, 1990.

The core aim of soft power is to shape the interests, preferences and behavior of other countries according to dominant country's wishes, but without the use of hard power. Soft power is used in order to influence countries, but not to control them as it is a basis of hard power: "The ability to physically manipulate another actor is the most common way to use hard power to change the behavior of another actor"¹⁹. Soft power occurs when a dominant state can reach a desired result, because other states want to follow it and accept the directions of it. Soft power is expressed when a state can set other countries to prefer what it wants. Also, soft power occurs when a state can make other countries to construct their interests that are beneficial to it²⁰. After this explanation it is clear that soft power opposes hard power concept, because hard power occurs when a country orders or forces other countries to do what it wants.

However, ideal types of hard and soft power are shown in this thesis, because in the real world the distribution of power is more complex.

The following table no. 1 represents the major differences between hard and soft power.

Table No. 1 Comparison of Hard and Soft power

Power	Hard	Soft
The main approach	Influence other countries by force.	Influence other countries without using force.
Explanation of the approach	Using military capabilities, military security, threats, military operations, interventions, deterrence, and physical coercion, employing economic power, sanctions, and payments.	Creating an attractive image, getting other countries to want the same outcomes, shaping other countries' perception, sharing common values and norms, changing country's behavior, attracting other countries, getting respect in international arena, using culture as a mean of power, promoting cooperation in international system.

Created by the author.

¹⁹ Steven B. Rothman, "Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power?", *Journal of Political Power*, 2011, 4(1), 49-64.

²⁰ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, Twentieth Anniversary, No. 80, 1990, 153-171.

1.3. Resources of Soft Power

Resources of soft power are often non-material, but are used to generate attraction. According to Joseph S. Nye soft power rests primarily on three basic resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)”²¹. By invoking soft power resources country can influence others, because other countries perceive the culture of dominant country attractive and see institutional norms, political values and foreign policy legitimate or having higher authority. As Joseph. S. Nye explained: “If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of other, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms consistent with the society, it is less likely to have to have to change. If it support institution that make other states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power”²². Later Joseph S. Nye broadened the concept of soft power and added that economic resources can also produce soft power as well as the hard power²³. Academic literature provides more soft power resources that exist outside those three pillars.

G.M. Gallaroti divided soft power resources into international and domestic groups. International resources consist of respect for international laws, norms, and institutions, fundamental reliance on multilateralism, respect for international treaties and alliance commitments, willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good and creation of liberal foreign economic policies²⁴. These resources are associated with international leadership. Domestic sources of soft power include culture and political institutions that provide values and norms²⁵. International and domestic soft power resources contribute to the promotion of attraction, influence, persuasion, affection of international community in order to attract countries and avoid confrontations. When these resources are employed by the country the soft power can be used instead of hard power in relationship with other countries.

Steven B. Rothman declared that the resources of soft power rise from institutions and suitable rhetoric (discourse)²⁶. While creating prevailing discourse country can shape the agenda-

²¹ Joseph S. Nye, “*Soft power: the means to success in world politics*”. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

²² Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power” *Foreign Policy*, Twentieth Anniversary, No. 80, 1990, 153-171.

²³ Joseph S. Nye, “The Future of Power”, New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

²⁴ Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Soft power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use”, *Journal of Political Power*, 2011, 4(1), 25-47.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Steven B. Rothman, “Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power?”, *Journal of Political Power*, 2011, 4(1), 49-64.

setting, effect decision-making and change policy implementation. Discourse is invoked in order to effect international community: “Strategically utilizing rhetoric or creating new rhetoric and symbols of a particular discourse allows actors to influence world politics through soft power”²⁷.

Leigh Armistead argued that information is a source of soft power²⁸. Information becomes a source of soft power that on the one hand can be used to create valuable data and message or on the other hand to spread propaganda. Information is employed in order to change the attitude and perception of other countries.

Joshua Kurlantzick stated that soft power is exercised through sophisticated diplomacy, which transforms international relations²⁹. In addition to that Joseph S. Nye also argued that soft power can be expressed through public diplomacy. Public diplomacy involves three dimensions: “The first and most immediate dimension is daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions. The second dimension is strategic communication, in a set of simple themes is developed, much like what occurs in a political or advertising campaign. The third stage of public diplomacy is the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels”³⁰.

For Garry Jenkins international philanthropy is a form and tool of soft power³¹. Philanthropy is expressed by creating foundations for support and as well to influence other countries.

The next figure no. 3 presents various soft power resources that are provided by different scholars. It is clear that soft power has multiple resources that can be used in international relations in order to influence, persuade, attract and induce countries into a common political system.

²⁷ Steven B. Rothman, “Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power?”, *Journal of Political Power*, 2011, 4(1), 49-64.


²⁸ Leigh Armistead, “*Information Operations– Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*”, Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2004.

²⁹ Joshua Kurlantzick, “*Charm offensive: how China’s soft power is transforming the world.*”, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

³⁰ Joseph S. Nye, “*Soft power: the means to success in world politics*”. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

³¹ Garry Jenkins, “Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy”, *North Carolina Law Review*, Vol. 85, Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 80, Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies Working Paper Series No. 53, 2007, 774-846.

Figure No. 3 Resources of Soft Power



Created by the author.

2. THE LOGIC OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER

This section of the thesis is going to explain Russia's perception soft power. Russia develops a unique soft power model, which is specific and much broader than the original soft power concept. This thesis tries to prove that according to Russia's understanding soft power is the ability to influence and effect not only on the basis of three classic resources (culture, political values, and foreign policy) but also on other non-military resources (for example, economy).

In comparison to other great powers, Russia came late to soft power games in the post-Soviet region. At first, Russia ineffectively used its soft power resources that remained after the collapse of the USSR³². The colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan showed that Russia cannot be confident with the loyalty of the post-Soviet states and these events forced Russia to develop soft power strategy in order not to lose the impact, influence, power and authority towards the neighborhood, renew the relationship with neighboring countries, as well as restore the attractive image in international arena. The concept of soft power came into use with the start of Putin's third presidential term in 2012, when Putin declared that soft power instruments are more efficient in

³² Andrei Mikhailovich Bobylo, "«Myagkaya sila» v mezhdunarodnoy politike: osobennosti natsional'nykh strategiy" // Vestnik Buryatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, № 14. С, 2013, 129-135.

contemporary world politics³³. Putin also emphasized the importance of conservative traditional values in the near abroad and put Russia as an example and guardian of these values. The promotion of the conservative values puts Russia against the West that tries to foster universal and more liberal values. The soft power notion was officially presented into Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept in 2013 as an important tool to achieve foreign policy goals³⁴. Although Russia emphasizes the importance of soft power, during the last decade, Russia did not avoid to use hard power (the case of Georgia in 2008, the case of Ukraine in 2014), which resulted in creation of negative international image. Moreover, European Union's soft power expressed in post-Soviet area created competition for Russia to attract and influence countries. Russia has engaged in a soft power contest in order to counter the EU, preserve the dominant position and maintain influence in the post-Soviet region: "Thus, by applying soft power techniques Russia hopes to improve its international image and increase its attractiveness to both elites and societies in the CIS countries"³⁵.

Most importantly, Russia is trying to create its own multidimensional soft power model, which would allow Russia to become a leader that could shape preferences of other countries, create a balanced decision making world system based on Russian culture, political values and convincing foreign policy objects³⁶. Moreover, the soft power notion in the case of Russia is understood in a broader sense: "For these Russian theorists, the hard power strategy is associated with military power while soft power is linked to non-military attributes such as a viable economy, political strength, a healthy society, sustainable ecology, attractive culture and efficient public diplomacy"³⁷. Deviation from the classical theory occurs since Joseph S. Nye attributes economic resources and payments to hard power, while Russian version of soft power involves all non-military resources including economic power. Russian state is the main actor that controls soft power resources and creates soft power programs in order to influence the targeted countries: "Most of the instruments in this field are government-controlled, and the NGOs involved are in reality semi-governmental"³⁸. Russia applies the Soviet style governance while trying to construct the soft power and restrain the

³³ Vladimir Putin, "Vystupleniye na soveshchanii poslov i postoyannykh predstaviteley Rossii", Presentation in the conference "«Rossiya v menyayushchemsya mire: preymstvennost' prioritetov i novyye vozmozhnosti»", Moscow, 9 July 2012, <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/15902>.

³⁴ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/2542248.

³⁵ Alexandre Sergunin, Leonid Karabeshkin, "Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy", *Politics*, 35(3-4), 2015, 347-363.

³⁶ Ivan Aleksandrovich Chikharev, Oleg Vladimirovich Stoletov, "K voprosu razumnogo ispol'zovaniya myagkoy sily vo vneshney politike Rossii", *Geopoliticheskiy zhurnal*, No. 4, 2014, 55-71.

³⁷ Alexandre Sergunin, Leonid Karabeshkin, "Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy", *Politics*, 35(3-4), 2015, 347-363.

³⁸ Gudrun Persson, "Russian Influence and Soft Power in the Baltic States: the View from Moscow". Book: Mike Winnerstig (ed.), *Tools of Destabilization Russian "Soft Power" and Non-military Influence in the Baltic States*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2014, 17-30.

post-Soviet countries with its influence³⁹. In Nye's view Russia misunderstands the soft power concept thinking that the state has to interfere and control its soft power⁴⁰. As regards more specifically, Russia has created Russian-style soft power that involves a wide range of resources and instruments. Russia's soft power is composed of four major pillars - culture, values, foreign policy, and economy. Each pillar will be discussed below in further detail.

RUSSIAN CULTURE AS A TOOL OF SOFT POWER. Russian culture consists of the Great Russian history, The Russian language, The Russian Orthodox Church, Russian and Pro-Russian media, Russian education system, and tourism⁴¹. Russia created institutions for the supervision such as *Rossotrudnichestvo* and *Russkiy Mir* to promote Russian language, stimulate education, contribute to international development and create attractive image of Russia in other countries⁴². The institutions support Russians that live abroad, encourage studying Russian language and fostering Russian culture by financing cultural programs abroad⁴³. The name of the latter organization the "Russian World" does not refer to the geographical boundaries of Russia, but goes deeper to the cultural, linguistic aspects, which create an imaginary Russian community in the region. Russia focuses on culture and language, because these resources are considered to be the key components of Russia's identity and they are the main elements used to attract the external audience⁴⁴. *The Russian Orthodox Church* has a high level of public trust, unites the believers as well as attracts them to the Russian world through a common religion: "The ROC maintains both strong residual loyalties and an institutional presence (churches, parishes, hierarchies, all technically part of the ROC) in at least five of the 15 post-Soviet states"⁴⁵. The state and church are very closely integrated in the case of Russia, which helps Russia to use the church as a tool in order to influence people. Also, info-space is heavily influenced in order to make changes in peoples' minds. Russia restructured the media network while putting control on it and ensuring that only Russian-friendly messages will reach the internal and external audience. *Russia Today* (RT) television program is orientated towards a Western audience, and was created with a purpose to influence the public opinion, create an appealing image of Russia, explain Russia's actions in international arena, present Putin as a moral leader and demonstrate Russian attitude towards

³⁹ Jeanne L. Wilson, "Soft Power: A Comparison of Discourse and Practice in Russia and China", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2015, 67(8), 1171-1202.

⁴⁰ Joseph S. Nye, "What China and Russia don't Get About Soft Power", *Foreign policy*, April 29, 2013. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/>.

⁴¹ Andrew Wilson and Nicu Popescu, "Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 9(3), September 2009, 317-331.

⁴² About Rossotrudnichestvo <http://www.rs.gov.ru/en/about>

⁴³ About Russkiy Mir Foundation <http://www.russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php>

⁴⁴ Jeanne L. Wilson, "Soft Power: A Comparison of Discourse and Practice in Russia and China", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2015, 67(8), 1171-1202.

⁴⁵ Andrew Wilson and Nicu Popescu, "Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 9(3), September 2009, 317-331.

international events⁴⁶. Putin has managed to create a narrative and disseminate it through the media, which would justify Russia's actions in the global arena. Russia created a certain agency named *EduRussia* to attract international students to study in Russian education system.⁴⁷

RUSSIAN VALUES AS MEANS OF SOFT POWER. Russia presents distinctive values and promotes them in the region. Russia develops conservative and illiberal governance model, but what is the most important, this does not reduce Russia's soft power capacity, because Russian conservative, traditional values have an unrecognized power of attractiveness⁴⁸. Russia develops a distinctive ideological model that creates competition to the Western model and invites other countries to follow the Russian example. Russia tries to send a message of 'sovereign democracy' to neighboring countries saying that countries have to be strong at home in order to be strong abroad. In this way Russia tries to create an image of a strong state that is deserved to be a leader and a great power⁴⁹. Also, Russia frames the underlying values, such as conservatism, traditions, spiritualism, and morality.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS A TOOL OF SOFT POWER. What concerns foreign policy, Russia supports the vision of a multipolar world, perceives Western powers as threats, therefore, seeks to preserve a rightful role and create power balance in the region. Russia forms anti-EU, anti-US and anti-NATO orientation, provides support for pro-Russian leaders in other countries (for example, during the elections), promotes Moscow-controlled non-governmental organizations and civil society actors that assist in creating proxy groups for Russia. Russia created a web of organizations and institutions to disseminate soft power abroad: "Russia's proxy groups focus their efforts mostly on the post-Soviet space, especially on 'swing states' such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, where public opinion has traditionally been divided between support for integrating with Russia or with the West"⁵⁰. Russia created a network of non-state actors to promote Russia's image in the region. The proxy groups range from Pro-Russian institutions (World Congress of Russian Compatriots, Institute of CIS), Russian history foundations (Foundation for Historical Perspective, Historical Memory Foundation), Think-tanks, research institutes (Centre for Social and Conservative Politics, Institute for Civic projects, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies), Pro-Russian youth associations (Eurasian Youth Movement, Foundation or International Youth Exchanges),

⁴⁶ Jeanne L. Wilson, "Soft Power: A Comparison of Discourse and Practice in Russia and China", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2015, 67(8), 1171-1202.

⁴⁷ Rosa Becker, Renze Kolster, "International student recruitment: policies and developments in selected countries", 2012, Nuffic, The Netherlands <https://www.nuffic.nl/en/publications/find-a-publication/international-student-recruitment.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Vincent Charles Keating, Katarzyna Kaczmarek, "Conservative Soft Power: Liberal soft power bias and the "hidden" attraction of Russia", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, (article not assigned to an issue), 2017, 1-27.

⁴⁹ Ingmar Oldberg, "Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev", *UI Occasional papers*, 2010, No. 1-23.

⁵⁰ Orysia Lutsevych, "Agents of the Russian World Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood", Research Paper, *The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House*, 2016, 1-43.

religious Orthodox organizations, charities (Day of Baptism of Rus, Association of Orthodox Experts), and GONGO's for democracy and human rights (Moscow Bureau for Human Rights)⁵¹.

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC ATTRACTIVENESS. Russian economic attractiveness is perceived as a soft power resource⁵². For neighboring countries Russia proposes access to the Russia's trade and labor markets, provide credits, loans and preferential energy prices.


In summary, there is a difference between Nye's concept of soft power and Russia's understanding of it. In Nye's view, soft power is indirect, non-governmental, involves civil society and rises mainly from three resources: culture, political values and foreign policy. In the case of Russia, soft power has a broader understanding and exceeds these three basic resources. All non-military resources and instruments are perceived as a soft power (Russia even uses instruments such as pseudo-NGOs, propaganda techniques to increase its influence). Russian culture is exploited at full capacity involving the Russian language, The Russian Orthodox Church, Russian and Pro-Russian media, Russian education system, and tourism. Russia rejects Western values that were emphasized by Nye and instead of them proposes Russian political values such as conservatism, traditions, spirituality, and morality. Russian foreign policy focuses on anti-Western pragmatism. Russian economic and energy sectors are used as a source of soft power. Russian soft power mostly differs from Nye's concept, because it is state-driven and state-funded. It should be stressed that for the neighboring countries Russia offers Russian rules of the game that consists of moving away from democratic principles (for example, promoting anti-gay strategy, oppressing civil society, using personalized connections, employing politics of fear as in the case of Khodorkovsky's imprisonment and trial), having Russia as the most important actor in the region that influences other countries and imposes Russia's vision on the neighborhood. This raises a question whether Russian soft power can be called soft at all.

The following figure no. 4 represents Russia's soft power tools that are used to form a positive image, become a center of influence and raise the attractiveness in the post-Soviet area.

⁵¹ Orysia Lutsevych presents a comprehensive list of proxy groups that are active in Post-Soviet region, See more in Orysia Lutsevych, "Agents of the Russian World Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood", Research Paper, *The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House*, 2016, 1-43.

⁵² Vasile Rotaru, "Forced Attraction? How Russia is Instrumentalizing Its Soft Power Sources in the "Near Abroad", *Problems of Post-Communism*, 2017, 00(00), 1-12.

Figure No. 4 Russia's soft power tools



Created by the author.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING SOFT POWER

This part of the thesis presents the conceptual framework for measuring Russia's soft power towards Moldova⁵³. Moldova is found to be a perceiver of Russia's soft power⁵⁴.

Although the soft power notion and resources are widely described in academic literature, there is no unanimous opinion on how to measure it. In addition, Joseph S. Nye declared that it is difficult to measure soft power in reality. The measurement of soft power is dependent on time, space, context and researcher. Also, it is problematic to estimate the influence of soft power towards other country, unless there is a striking change in targeted country's behavior in international arena. Besides, this causes a problem, because each case should be analyzed individually. However, the argument that soft power is difficult to wield does not diminish the attempt to analyze it, but provides a challenge and encourages a further research on assessing the effectiveness of soft power in reality. This Master's thesis suggests original, self-developed soft power measurement model. The author is going to measure the soft power indicators, which were explained after the analysis of scientific literature (culture, political values, foreign policy and economy).

⁵³ The conceptual framework is constructed by the author in order to measure country's soft power efficiency towards another country.

⁵⁴ Transnistrian region is not included in this Master's thesis.

To estimate the influence of Russia's culture towards Moldova, author will evaluate the role of the Russian language, influence of Russian media, power of Orthodox Church, attractiveness of Russia's education system and the popularity of tourism to Russia. To measure the influence of Russian language in Moldova, the author will use the statistical data on ethnic structure of population, structure of population by mother tongue and structure of population by language usually used for communication⁵⁵. To estimate the influence of the Orthodox Church power in Moldova, the author will analyze the statistical data on population by religion, public trust on the Church as an institution and public opinion on the Orthodox Church⁵⁶. To assess the role of media, the author will analyze the statistical data on the number of users of the Russian media, most popular sources of information among Moldova's society, importance of Russian media in Moldova, public trust in Russian media, correlation between support of Russia's actions and trust in media, public opinion about the information from Russian media about the events in Crimea and Ukraine⁵⁷. To measure the influence of Russia to Moldova's education system, the author is going to investigate the number of pupils in education institutions by study language, the number of students in higher education institutions by study language and statistical data on pupils that are studying foreign languages. Also, attractiveness of Russia's education system will be explored by analyzing the number on Moldovan students in Russia⁵⁸. To assess the tourism to Russia, the author will analyze the statistical data on Moldovan tourist in Russia⁵⁹. This part of the research will reveal whether Russia's culture is attractive for Moldovans.

To assess the attractiveness of political values, the author is going to estimate the Moldovan elite and public attitude towards Russian traditional, conservative, moral and spiritual values and public opinion on homosexuality, marriages of the same sex, gender equality, drug use, prostitution, abortion, divorce and contraception⁶⁰. Moldovan elite and public must be included in the

⁵⁵ The data will be observed from The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, "Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova", May 12-25, 2014.

⁵⁶ The data will be observed from The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, "Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova", May 12-25, 2014 and from the International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

⁵⁷ The data will be observed from the International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", February – March, 2017, and from Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, "Assessing Russia's Influence in its Periphery", February 4, 2016.

⁵⁸ The data will be observed from the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Education in the Republic of Moldova Statistical Publication 2016/2017", Chişinău, 2017 and from International Organization for Migration, Mission to Moldova, "Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova 2007–2012", Analytical Report, Chisinau, 2014, and International Organization for Migration, Mission to Moldova, "Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova 2009–2014", Analytical Report, Chisinau, 2016.

⁵⁹ The data will be observed from The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova.

⁶⁰ Information will be obtained from the Institute for Public Policy, Sociological survey, "The phenomenon of discrimination in The Republic of Moldova: view of citizens" ("Fenomenul discriminării în Republica Moldova: percepția cetățeanului"), Chisinau, 2014. http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Evenimente/Sondaj_nediscriminare_pentru_prezentare.pdf; Pew Research Center, "Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe", (Social views and morality in central and Eastern Europe), May 10, 2017;

research, because they both are affected by soft power and it is crucial to find the opinion of both soft power recipients. This part of the study is going to discover whether Russia's political values are appealing to Moldovan elite and society.

To measure the attractiveness of the Russian foreign policy, the author will analyze Moldovan elite opinion on Russia's foreign policy orientation, public opinion on the relationship with Russia, public opinion on the greatest economic partner/threat, political partner/threat, public opinion on the choice between the EU and EAEU, public opinion on the most popular foreign politicians and public opinion on Russia's foreign policy orientation and Russia's actions in Ukraine and Crimea⁶¹. This part of the research will reveal whether there is compatibility in perceptions of both countries what constitutes legal, legitimate and 'right' goals of foreign policy and to what degree Russia's foreign policy is attractive to Moldova.

To estimate economic attractiveness, the author is going to measure statistical data on Moldova's exports to Russia, Moldova's imports from Russia, Moldova's top 5 trade partners, the number of Moldovan emigrants to Russia, Moldova's labor force migration to Russia and most popular destination countries of emigrants. This part of the study is going to discover to what degree Russia's economic soft power resource works towards Moldova⁶².

The following table no. 2 represents a conceptual framework, which was created by the author of this Master's thesis, for measuring Russia's soft power towards Moldova.

Christopher Rudolph, "Moldova's President Opposes LGBT March, Organizes "Traditional Family" Festival", Newnownext, 2017 05 19, <http://www.newnownext.com/moldova-president-lgbt-march/05/2017/>.

⁶¹ Information will be obtained from the Joint news conference with the Vladimir Putin and Igor Dodon following the Russia-Moldova talks, The Kremlin, Moscow, January 17, 2017 <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/37>.; from The International Republican Institute, "Moldova National Voter Study, September 29 - October 21, 2015; from the International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", February – March, 2017.

⁶² The data will be obtained from The National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Moldova in Figures 2017 Statistical pocket-book", Chisinau, 2017; the data from National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova; and from National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Moldova in figures statistical pocket-book 2017", Chisinau, 2017.

Table No. 2 Framework for measuring Russia's soft power towards Moldova

Resource of Soft power	Culture	Political values	Foreign policy	Economy
Object of assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Influence of Russian language • Influence of Orthodox Church • Influence of Russian media • Attractiveness of Russia's education system • Popularity of tourism to Russia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dominant values in the country • Influence and attractiveness of Russian traditional, conservative, moral, spiritual values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attractiveness of Russia's foreign policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia's economic attractiveness
The principle of measurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statistical data on ethnic structure of population • Statistical data on structure of population by mother tongue • Statistical data on structure of population by language usually used for communication • Statistical data on population by religion • Public trust on the Church • Public opinion on Moldovan Orthodox Church • Statistical data on the number of users of Russian media • Most popular sources of information • Importance of Russian media • Trust in Russian media • Correlation between support of Russia's actions and trust in media • Opinion about the information from Russian media about the events in Crimea and Ukraine • Pupils in education institutions by study language 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public attitude towards Russian values • Elite opinion on Russia traditional values • Public opinion on homosexuality, marriages of the same sex, gender equality, drug use, prostitution, abortion, divorce, contraception 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moldovan elite opinion on Russia's foreign policy orientation • Moldovan public opinion on the relationship with Russia • Moldovan public opinion on the greatest economic partner/threat, political partner/threat • Moldovan public opinion on the choice between the EU and EAEU • Moldovan public opinion on foreign politicians • Moldovan public opinion on Russia's foreign policy orientation and Russia's actions in Ukraine and Crimea 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statistical data on Moldova's export to Russia • Statistical data on Moldova's import from Russia • Moldova's Top 5 trade partners • Statistical data on Moldovan emigrants to Russia • Statistical data on Moldova's labor force migration to Russia • Most popular destination countries of Moldovan emigrants

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Students in higher education institutions by study language • Statistical data on pupils studying foreign languages • Number of Moldovan students in Russia • Number of Moldovan tourist in Russia 			
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Created by the author.

4. RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER IN MOLDOVA: ANALYSIS

This section of the Master’s thesis is going to examine Russia’s soft power tools and effects towards Moldova. Russia’s influence on Moldova will be investigated according to the conceptual framework assuming that culture, values, foreign policy and economy are the most important resources of Russia’s soft power. The study will help to answer the main question of the Master’s thesis - how is Russia’s soft power changing towards Moldova (whether Russia’s soft power expanding or declining in Moldova and in which areas the change is the most visible). Also, the overall picture of Russia's soft power in Moldova will be revealed. This analysis of Russia’s soft power towards Moldova will fill the gap in the existing knowledge.

4.1. The influence of Russia’s culture

To begin with, it is essential to investigate the role of the Russian language and the Orthodox religion in Moldova. Ethnic, linguistic and religious indicators contribute to the measurement of Russia’s soft power, because they show the size/scale of Russian potential to influence the country, and helps to get an overall picture of Moldova. Furthermore, the measurement of Russia's influence towards the Moldovan media, Russia’s influence on education system and tourism to Russia will show the effect of Russia’s soft power and Russia’s popularity in Moldova.

4.1.1. Russian language

Moldova’s society consists of different ethnic groups. According to The Population and Housing Census of 2014, there were 2.9 million people in Moldova, of which 75.1% declared that they were Moldovans, 7.0% – Romanians, 6.6% – Ukrainians, 4.6% – Gagauz, 4.1% – Russians, 1.9%

– Bulgarians, 0.3% – Roma, 0.5% - belonged to other ethnic groups⁶³. While in 2004 there were 3.4 million people in Moldova, of which 76.1% declared that they were Moldovans, 2.2% – Romanians, 8.4% – Ukrainians, 4.4% – Gagauz, 6.0% – Russians, 1.9% – Bulgarians, 0.3% – Roma, 0.7% - belonged to other ethnic groups⁶⁴. The number of ethnic Russians decreased by 1.9% over ten years.

Data about the structure of population by mother tongue in 2014 showed that 56.7% of Moldova's population declared that Moldovan language is their mother tongue, 23.5% said that Romanian language is their mother tongue, 9.7% considered Russian language as their mother tongue, 4.2% - Gagauzian, 3.9% - Ukrainian and 1.5% - Bulgarian⁶⁵. According to this census, the majority of Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz people declared the language of their nationality as their mother tongue, but every second Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Gagauz usually speaks Russian⁶⁶. Moldovans who usually speak Russian form 5.7% of the total number of population⁶⁷. According to the older census of 2004, 60.2% of Moldova's population declared that Moldovan language is their mother tongue, 16.6% said that Romanian language is their mother tongue, 11.3% considered Russian language as their mother tongue, 4.1% - Gagauzian, 5.5% - Ukrainian and 1.6% - Bulgarian⁶⁸. The number of people, who declared Russian language as their mother tongue decreased by 1.6% over ten years.

Information about the structure of population by language usually used for communication from the census of 2014 revealed that 54.6% of people declared that they most often speak Moldovan, 24.4% - Romanian, 14.5% – Russian, 2.7% – Ukrainian, 2.7% – Gagauzian, 1.0% - Bulgarian, 0.3% - other language, 0.2% - Romani, 3.0% - other language⁶⁹. In 2004 59.0% of people spoke Moldovan, 16.5% - Romanian, 16.1% – Russian, 3.1% – Ukrainian, 2.7% – Gagauzian, 1.1% - Bulgarian, 0.3% - other language, 0.2% - Romani, 3.0% - other language⁷⁰. The number of people, who usually use Russian language for communication decreased by 1.6% over ten years.

The next table no. 3 illustrates ethnic structure of population, structure of population by mother tongue and structure of population by language usually used for communication in Moldova in 2004 and 2014.

⁶³ The National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova", May 12-25, 2014.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Table No. 3 Percentage of ethnic structure of population, structure of population by mother tongue, structure of population by language usually used for communication in Moldova, according to the census of 2004 and 2014

	% declared ethnicity		% declared mother tongue		% declared language usually used for communication	
	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014
Moldovan	76.1	75.1	60.2	56.7	59.0	54.6
Romanian	2.2	7.0	16.6	23.5	16.5	24.0
Moldovan/Romanian	78.3	82.1	76.8	80.2	75.5	78.6
Russian	6.0	4.1	11.3	9.7	16.1	14.5
Ukrainian	8.4	6.6	5.5	3.9	3.1	2.7
Gagauzian	4.4	4.6	4.1	4.2	2.7	2.7
Bulgarian	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.1	1.0
Romani	0.3	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.2
Other	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.3

Created by the author, based on The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, "Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova", May 12-25, 2014.

In summary, there are two dominant linguistic categories in the country: *Moldovan/Romanian speakers* and *Russian speakers*. Not only ethnic Russians but also other ethnic minorities belong to Russian speakers' category such as Ukrainians, Gagauzians and Bulgarians, who frequently use Russian language instead of the official Romanian language. Also, according to the legislation in force the Russian language still has the status of inter-ethnic language of communication⁷¹. However, during the period from 2004 till 2014 the number of ethnic Russians has been dropping, also the number of people, who declared Russian language as their mother tongue has been decreasing, and as well the number of people, who usually use Russian language for daily communication has been declining. This tendency shows that Russian language is losing its status in Moldova, because the popularity of Russian is decreasing. Consequently, the Russian language as a resource of soft power is also becoming less influential.

4.1.2. Orthodox Church

The Moldovan Orthodox Church is a part of the Moscow Patriarchate. Moldovan Orthodox Church is a supporter of Russia's world view and acts as an advocator for Russian traditional, conservative, spiritual and moral values in a country. In addition, the head of the Moldovan Orthodox

⁷¹) "Conceptia politicii nationale a Republicii Moldova", Republic of Moldova, Parliament, legislation No. 546, 19.12.2003
<http://lex.justice.md/md/312846/>

Church is Vladimir (Cantarean), who is a permanent member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and is delegated to Moldova from Moscow. He is a messenger, who acts on behalf of Moscow. His figure helps to strengthen ties between Moldovan and Russia. Also, statistical data on population by religion from the census of 2014 revealed that 96.8% considered themselves Christian Orthodox⁷². Belonging to the Orthodox Church expands Russia's power to influence, establishes cultural linkage between countries, and creates an opportunity for Russia to transmit its values to Moldovan society. The next table no. 4 shows Moldova's population by religion according to the 2014 census.

Table No. 4 Population by religion, according to the 2014 census

Population by religion	% of total population that declared religion	
	2004	2014
Year		
Christian Orthodox	95.5	96.8
Christian of old rite	0.2	0.1
Catholic	0.2	0.1
Evangelic of Augustan confession	0.04	0.1
Christian evangelic Baptist	1.0	1.0
Evangelic Christian	0.2	0.2
Seventh day Adventist	0.4	0.3
Penticostal	0.3	0.4
Jehovah's Witnesses	-	0.7
Other religious groups	0.9	0.13
Agnostic	2.0	0.02
Atheist	0.4	0.2


Created by the author, based on The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, "Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova", May 12-25, 2014.

Furthermore, the barometer of public opinion evaluated the public trust in Church and revealed that 86% of the population in 2014 showed a high level of trust in the Church as an institution, 74% - in 2015, and 78.6% - in 2016⁷³. Also, the Orthodox Church is rated most favorably among all other institutions and organizations of the country, including army, Romanian Orthodox Church, local authorities, government, parliament and president's office. The figure No. 5 illustrates the public trust in Church in Moldova.

⁷² The National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova", May 12-25, 2014

⁷³ The National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova", May 12-25, 2014.


Figure No. 5 Public trust in Church as institution



Created by the author, based on the Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, Republic of Moldova 2014, 2015, 2016.

Moreover, public opinion surveys provided the ability to evaluate the attitude of Moldovan society towards the Orthodox Church from 2014 to 2017. The survey revealed that 60% of Moldova’s population had a favorable opinion towards the Orthodox Church in 2014, 59% - in 2015, 64% - in 2016 and 65% - in 2017⁷⁴. The figure No. 6 shows the public opinion on Moldovan Orthodox Church.

Figure No. 6 Public opinion on Moldovan Orthodox Church



Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

⁷⁴ International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

In general, numbers that were presented above indicate that in terms of religion Moldova is induced into a common Orthodox world. Moldovan public shows a high level of trust in the church authority, which enables Moldovan Orthodox Church and Metropolitan Vladimir to affect the public while sharing common values and norms to create cultural links with Russia.

4.1.3. Russian and pro-Russian media

Russian media has strong ties with Moldovans, knowing that there is a large part of population that could understand the Russian language. The research, which was made by Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) together with GALLUP in 2014 revealed that although there is only 4% of ethnic Russians in Moldova, even 81% of the population can be called Russian-speakers (Russian speakers are defined as those who say they could understand most or all of a radio or TV broadcast in Russian language)⁷⁵. According to this research, 69% of Moldova's total population and 85% of Russian speakers use Russian-media for news⁷⁶. Moldova society use different platforms in order to access the media. TV is the most commonly used media platform to get information about politics followed by internet, radio, newspapers⁷⁷. Social media, mail, billboards meetings with politicians, magazines are lagging behind. The figure no. 7 illustrates the percentage of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in Moldova, figure no. 8 represents the percentage of Russian media users in Moldova and figure no. 9 shows media sources that are used by Moldovan population to get information about politics according to the popularity.


⁷⁵ In this part of the Master's thesis the author will assume that 81% of Moldova's population could understand the Russian language. This data is presented in the study of Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) together with GALLUP.

⁷⁶BBG Research Series: Assessing Russia's influence in its periphery, *Broadcasting Board of Governors*, 2016. <https://www.bbg.gov/2016/02/04/assessing-russias-influence-in-its-periphery-is-russia-really-winning-an-information-war/>.

Presentation <https://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2016/02/Presentation-for-Posting-Russia-Research-Series-Final-FMN-v6.pdf>


⁷⁷ Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, "Assessing Russia's Influence in its Periphery", February 4, 2016. Presentation <https://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2016/02/Presentation-for-Posting-Russia-Research-Series-Final-FMN-v6.pdf>

Figure No. 7 Russian speakers and Ethnic Russians in Moldova




Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", February - March, 2017.

Figure No. 8 Users of Russian media



Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", February - March, 2017.

Figure No. 9 Sources of information




Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, February – March, 2017.

However, more respondents find domestic media more important for forming opinions on current events than Russian media or international media⁷⁸. Trustworthiness in media is low regardless of whether it is local, Russian or international (42% of population trust domestic media, 42% trust Russian media and 45% trust international media)⁷⁹. Skepticism and distrust in media prevail in Moldova’s public. Figure no. 10 demonstrates the importance of domestic, Russian and international media in Moldova, while figure no. 11 evidences the level of trust in domestic, Russian and international media in Moldova.

⁷⁸ Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, “Assessing Russia’s Influence in its Periphery”, February 4, 2016. Presentation <https://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2016/02/Presentation-for-Posting-Russia-Research-Series-Final-FMN-v6.pdf>


⁷⁹ Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, “Assessing Russia’s Influence in its Periphery”, February 4, 2016.

Figure No. 10 Importance of Domestic, Russian and International media in Moldova



Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", February – March, 2017.

Figure No. 11 Trust in Domestic, Russian and International media in Moldova




Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", February – March, 2017.

Furthermore, it is necessary to discuss the correlation between the public opinion about Russia's actions in Ukraine, domestic policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Putin's

international policies, and the trust in Russian media. In Moldova, society does not even need to use Russian media to support Russia's actions in Ukraine, domestic policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Putin's international policies, because the level of support was similar between those, who use and trust Russian media (64%) and those, who do not use Russian media (60%)⁸⁰. Among those who use, but do not trust Russian media, support was much lower (36%)⁸¹. However, percent that use and trust Russian media from the total population is low (only 29%)⁸². Figure no. 12 presents the correlation between support for Russia's actions, domestic and international policies and trust in media,

Figure No. 12 Correlation between support for Russia's actions, domestic and international policies and trust in media



Created by the author, based on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, "Assessing Russia's Influence in its Periphery", February 4, 2016.

Moreover, greater part of Moldovan society used Russian media for getting information about the events in Ukraine instead of Western media. 45% of Moldova's population found Russian media to be a reliable source of information about the events in Ukraine while 32% found it to be unreliable, 8% did not use Russian media to get information about the events in Ukraine⁸³. In addition, only 22% found Western media to be a reliable source of information about the events in Ukraine, 27% found it to be unreliable and even 37% did not use western media to get information

⁸⁰ Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, "Assessing Russia's Influence in its Periphery", February 4, 2016.


⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

about the events in Ukraine⁸⁴. Therefore, people that used both Western and Russian media to get information about the events in Ukraine found Russian media more reliable than Western media (58% compared to 44%)⁸⁵. Figure no. 13 shows Moldova’s public opinion about the information from Russian and Western media about the events taking place in Crimea and Ukraine, and figure no. 14 indicates the level of trust in the media among people who use both (Russian and Western) sources.

Figure No. 13 Opinion about the information from Russian and Western media about the events taking place in Crimea and Ukraine




Created by the author, based on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, “Assessing Russia’s Influence in its Periphery”, February 4, 2016.

⁸⁴ Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, “Assessing Russia’s Influence in its Periphery”, February 4, 2016.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Figure No. 14 Trust in the media among people who use both sources



Created by the author, based on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup, “Assessing Russia’s Influence in its Periphery”, February 4, 2016.

All in all, due to the fact that many people belong to the Russian-speaking category Russian media plays an important role in Moldovan society. Majority of the total population uses Russian media and find it more reliable than Western media. Russia uses media sources to spread pro-Russian discourse to Moldovan society and create an appealing image of Russia. Consequently, it can be said that Russian and pro-Russian media remains important and influential in forming people’s opinion, because majority of people, who use and trust Russian media tend to support Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Putin’s domestic policies and Putin’s international policies. Drawing conclusions from the data it is obvious that Russian media as a resource of Russia’s soft power has significant effect on Moldovan society.

4.1.4. Russia’s influence on education

In terms of education, there are 1,291 general schools, 45 secondary vocational schools, 41 postsecondary vocational schools and 30 higher education institutions with a total of 457,246 students in Moldova⁸⁶. Moldova balances between two main study languages having Romanian as a dominant language and Russian as a minor language. Romanian language dominates in primary and secondary schools as a study language, but a high percent of pupils still study in Russian

⁸⁶ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Social statistics, Education, Educational institutions by types of institution and forms of ownership, 2000/01-2016/17.

language (80% of pupils study in Romanian language, 19% study in Russian language)⁸⁷. Table no. 5 represents pupils in institutions of primary and secondary education by study language. In higher education institutions the situation is quite similar. 85% of students study in Romanian language while 12% study in Russian language⁸⁸. Table no. 6 shows students in higher education institutions by study language

Table No. 5 Pupils in institutions of primary and secondary education, by study language

Academic year	Romanian language	Russian language	Other language of instruction	Total number of students
2010/11	313 694	80 756	629	395 079
2011/12	301 522	77 913	785	380 220
2012/13	290 867	74 223	903	365 993
2013/14	281 643	69 454	956	352 053
2014/15	273 744	65 409	783	339 936
2015/16	268 762	63 923	745	333 430
2016/2017	267 551 80,4%	64 582 19,4%	558 0,2%	332 691

Created by the author, based on the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, “Education in the Republic of Moldova Statistical Publication 2016/2017”, Chişinău, 2017.

Table No. 6 Students in higher education institutions, by study language

Academic year	Romanian language	Russian language	English language	French language	Other language of instruction	Total number of students
2010/11	84,500	21,021	1,431	583	278	107,813
2011/12	84,764	17,135	1,337	512	208	103,956
2012/13	84,615	16,039	1,034	517	253	102,458
2013/14	81,873	13,504	1,151	544	213	97,285
2014/15	75,065	12,554	1,103	603	204	89,529
2015/16	69,181	10,429	1,400	512	147	81,669
2016/17	63 665 85,2%	9 242 12,4%	1 217 1,6%	461 0,6%	141 0,2%	74 726

Created by the author, based on National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, “Education in the Republic of Moldova Statistical Publication 2016/2017”, Chişinău, 2017.

However, the situation is unfavorable to Russia when it comes to choosing a foreign language among students. According to the Education code Russian language is not a compulsory discipline as it was a decade ago. Education code provides a list of foreign languages that can be optionally studied: “The state shall ensure the conditions for training and development of communication skills in English, French and Russian languages in all public institutions of general

⁸⁷ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, “Education in the Republic of Moldova Statistical Publication 2016/2017”, Chişinău, 2017. http://www.statistica.md/public/files/publicatii_electronice/Educatia/Educatia_RM_2017.pdf

⁸⁸ Ibid.

education”⁸⁹. Statistical data shows that in 2016/2017 school year 297665 students have been learning a foreign language from which 61.8% have been learning English language, 36.3% - Russian language, 36.1% - French language, 2.4% - German language, 0.3% - Spanish language, 0.9% - other language⁹⁰. This data shows that Russian language remains more popular than French, German and Spanish languages. Nevertheless, English language dominates among young people in Moldova and overcomes all other foreign languages including Russian language. Table no. 7 evidences students studying foreign languages in primary and general secondary schools.

Table No. 7 Students studying foreign languages in primary and general secondary schools

Academic year	English language	French language	Russian language	German language	Spanish language	Other language	Total number of students that are studying foreign languages
2010/11	197349	190316	-	10652	2683	2457	357230
2011/12	197023	178288	-	10512	2520	2353	343128
2012/13	196427	164338	-	9397	2141	2371	329905
2013/14	194748	150059	-	7469	2157	2676	317381
2014/15	195214	136896	-	7336	1774	2930	306406
2015/16	198541	127823	-	7128	1683	3171	299921
2016/17	205704 61,8%	120168 36,1%	120707 36,3%	8116 2,4%	1161 0,3%	2963 0,9%	297665 89,5%

Created by the author, based on National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, “Education in the Republic of Moldova Statistical Publication 2016/2017”, Chişinău, 2017.

Emigration for studies shows that a significantly higher number of Moldovan citizens goes to study in Romania than in Russia. In 2014, there were 5,469 Moldovan citizens that were studying abroad, from which about 91% of Moldovan citizens were studying in Romania, 6.0% were in the Russian Federation and 2.1% were in Bulgaria⁹¹. In 2013, 93% of Moldovan citizens were studying in Romania, 2.4 – in Bulgaria, 1.8% - in Russian, 1.8% in Ukraine⁹². These numbers suggest that Romanian education system is more attractive to Moldovans in comparison to Russian education system. The following table no. 8 illustrates the number of Moldovan citizens studying abroad by country from 2007 to 2014.

⁸⁹ Education code of the Republic of Moldova, Chapter III. Access to education, language of training and educational outcomes, Article 9. Access to education, The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Document No. 152 dated July 17, 2014, Published on October 24, 2014 in the Official Gazette no. 319-324, article no. 634. Date of entry into force: November 23, 2014
http://edu.gov.md/sites/default/files/education_code_final_version_0.pdf

⁹⁰ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, “Education in the Republic of Moldova Statistical Publication 2016/2017”, Chişinău, 2017.

⁹¹ International Organization for Migration, Mission to Moldova, “Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova 2009–2014”, Analytical Report, Chisinau, 2016.

⁹² Ibid.

Table No. 8 Number of Moldovan citizens studying abroad by country from 2007 to 2014

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total number of students studying abroad	2341	2371	2408	4009	4270	5356	5891	5469
Romania	2000	2000	2000	3600	3800	5000	5500	5000
Russia	110	110	160	110	110	97	105	328
Ukraine	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	-
Bulgaria	70	90	95	110	194	131	140	114
Turkey	40	40	30	40	40	-	-	-
Czech Republic	8	13	13	15	13	13	10	10
China	3	3	3	10	6	6	9	10
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
Greece	5	10	2	10	-	-	-	-
Sweden	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	2	4	8	7
Estonia	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-

Created by the author, based on International Organization for Migration, Mission to Moldova, “Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova 2007–2012”, Analytical Report, Chisinau, 2014; International Organization for Migration, Mission to Moldova, “Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova 2009–2014”, Analytical Report, Chisinau, 2016.

Altogether, the Russian language loses its dominant status in the educational institutions in Moldova. Russian language is no longer a compulsory study subject. The numbers demonstrate that when it comes to choosing a foreign language the English and French languages are more popular than the Russian language among Moldovan youth. English language triumphs all other foreign languages that can be optionally studied. Also, Russia fails to attract Moldovan students to study at Russian universities. During the last decade much more Moldovan students have chosen to study in Romania rather than in Russia. Although Russia with its soft power attempts to influence Moldovan educational system and attract students to study at Russian universities, but it fails to succeed.

4.1.5. Tourism to Russia

In terms of tourism, Russia is also not very attractive to Moldovan society. In recent years, the number of Moldova visitors in Russia has dropped sharply compared to what it was a decade ago. In 2016 the number of Moldovan tourists in Russia was 550, 574 – in 2015, 469 – in 2014⁹³. These numbers can be compared to the year of 2003 when 6577 persons were in Russia for tourist

⁹³ The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, Economic Statistics, Tourism, Travel agencies and tour-operators activity, Departures of Moldovan visitors abroad by Destination countries and Years.

purposes and the year of 2006 when 4530 tourists came to Russia⁹⁴. Contrary to Russia, the number of Moldovan tourists in EU increased every year during the time period from 2006 to 2016 and reached 873,709 in 2016⁹⁵. The next table no. 9 represents Moldovan tourism to Russia, CIS countries and EU from 2000 to 2016.

Table No. 9 Departures of Moldovan visitors to Russia, CIS countries and to EU from 2006 to 2016

Year	Russia	CIS countries	EU
2006	4530	18,025	31,600
2007	3147	20,531	32,711
2008	750	16,674	30,506
2009	196	12,398	40,056
2010	1294	12,534	45,300
2011	341	12,039	65,391
2012	326	10,037	77,219
2013	429	9,606	82,160
2014	469	3,434	107,436
2015	574	3,880	105,026
2016	550	5,487	873,709

Created by the author, based on The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, Economic Statistics, Tourism, Travel agencies and tour-operators activity, Departures of Moldovan visitors abroad by Destination countries and Years.

Overall, the statistical data allows to make a conclusion that Russia as a destination country for Moldovan tourists is not attractive. The number of Moldovan tourists in Russia has been decreasing every year during the time period from 2006 to 2016. Russia with its soft power fails to attract travelers, because Moldovan tourists prefer EU over Russia.

4.2. The attractiveness of Russia's values

Russia tries to spread traditional, conservative and spiritual values in order to influence Moldovan society and raise its attractiveness among the public⁹⁶. Russian values are involved into ideological confrontation against Western values. However, persistently high rates of poverty, political instability due to the disagreements between political parties, high level of corruption, disappointment of reforms, and fraud scandals in banking sector decreased public trust in the European Union and at the same time in European values. This resulted in growing nostalgic feelings for Soviet

⁹⁴ The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, Economic Statistics, Tourism, Travel agencies and tour-operators activity, Departures of Moldovan visitors abroad by Destination countries and Years.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Vincent Charles Keating, Katarzyna Kaczmarska, "Conservative Soft Power: Liberal soft power bias and the "hidden" attraction of Russia", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, (article not assigned to an issue), 2017, 1-27.

regime in the country and created favorable conditions for Russia to spread its values. Slightly more than half of the Moldova's population (52%) sees that there is a conflict between their country's traditional values and those of the West⁹⁷. In addition, respondents who agree with this statement are more likely to agree (71%) than disagree (47%) that Russia is necessary to balance the influence against the West⁹⁸. It means that the society is divided into two parts where one part favors Western values while another part supports Russian values.

The attitude of Moldovan society towards homosexuality, marriages of the same sex, gender equality, drug use, prostitution, abortion, divorce and contraception will be further explored in order to reveal the fact that Moldovan society supports traditional, conservative and moral values. Sociological study, which was conducted by Institute of Public Opinion in 2014, revealed that Moldovan attitude towards homosexuality is unfriendly and hostile. Even 83% of Moldovan population agree that homosexuality is immoral and unethical, 86% would not accept homosexual as their neighbor, 92% would not want an LGBT educator in their children's classroom, 91% would offend if they knew that their friend or a co-worker is homosexual, 90% would not want to have a homosexual friends, 87% would be offended if they need to work with homosexual person, 92% would be would be dissatisfied if they found out that their family member is homosexual⁹⁹. The figure no. 15 shows Moldova's public opinion and attitude towards LGBT people.

The same negative attitude prevails over the marriage of the same sex. 74% of Moldova's population supports the idea that homosexuals would not be able to marry, 77% agree that homosexuals should be prohibited to adopt children and 56% go even further and agree that homosexual relationship should be punished¹⁰⁰. The figure no. 16 demonstrates Moldova's public opinion and attitude towards same-sex marriage.

Moldovans still have traditional understanding towards gender equality. 84% of public believe that man is the head of the family, 79% agree that it is rather women's duty to do housework, 61% still state that women is not fulfilled if she does not have children, 84% accept that it is rather men's duty to support the family, 91% agree that men should do the physical work¹⁰¹. However, the number of support is lower for the statement that women are less capable and cannot hold

⁹⁷ Pew Research Center, "Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe", (Social views and morality in central and Eastern Europe), May 10, 2017.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Institute for Public Policy, Sociological survey, "The phenomenon of discrimination in The Republic of Moldova: view of citizens" ("Fenomenul discriminării în Republica Moldova: percepția cetățeanului"), Chisinau, 2014. http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Evenimente/Sondaj_nediscriminare_pentru_prezentare.pdf


¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

managerial positions (32%) and for the statement that women have no place in politics (30%)¹⁰². The figure no. 17 illustrates Moldova’s public opinion and attitude towards gender equality.

Societal view on drug use, prostitution, and abortion, drinking alcohol, divorce and contraception remains conservative. 93% of Moldovan public agrees that using drugs is morally wrong, 91% agree that prostitution is immoral, 66% accept that abortion is shameless, 41% support the idea that divorce is morally wrong and 32% agree that using contraception is unethical¹⁰³. The figure no. 18 shows Moldova’s public opinion and attitude towards drug use, prostitution, abortion, drinking alcohol, divorce and contraception.

Figure No. 15 Moldova’s public opinion and attitude towards LGBT people




Created by the author, based on the Institute for Public Policy, Sociological survey, “The phenomenon of discrimination in The Republic of Moldova: view of citizens” (“Fenomenul discriminării în Republica Moldova: percepția cetățeanului”), Chisinau, 2014.

¹⁰² Institute for Public Policy, Sociological survey, “The phenomenon of discrimination in The Republic of Moldova: view of citizens” (“Fenomenul discriminării în Republica Moldova: percepția cetățeanului”), Chisinau, 2014.


¹⁰³ Pew Research Center, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe”, (Social views and morality in central and Eastern Europe), May 10, 2017.

Figure No. 16 Moldova’s public opinion and attitude towards same-sex marriage




Created by the author, based on the Institute for Public Policy, Sociological survey, “The phenomenon of discrimination in The Republic of Moldova: view of citizens” (“Fenomenul discriminării în Republica Moldova: percepția cetățeanului”), Chisinau, 2014.

Figure No. 17 Moldova’s public opinion and attitude towards gender equality



Created by the author, based on the Institute for Public Policy, Sociological survey, “The phenomenon of discrimination in The Republic of Moldova: view of citizens” (“Fenomenul discriminării în Republica Moldova: percepția cetățeanului”), Chisinau, 2014.

Figure No. 18 Moldova’s public opinion and attitude towards drug use, prostitution, abortion, drinking alcohol, divorce, contraception



Created by the author, based on the Pew Research Center, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe”, (Social views and morality in central and Eastern Europe), May 10, 2017.

While analyzing the attitude of Moldovan political elite towards the Russian values it is clear that pro-Russian elite and especially the president Igor Dodon supports traditional, conservative values in Moldova. The president has a negative perception of LGBT community and even opposed LGBT March, which was organized in May 2017 in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova. Dodon expressed his rigorous view by writing opinion of his facebook page: “I am expressing my categorical position against holding an LGBT march. I informed the extraordinary and plenipotentiary U.S. ambassador to Moldova James Pettit that it is not only my personal position, but the position of the vast majority of Moldovan citizens. I very clearly stressed that such actions contradict our traditional values, Orthodox faith, and morals. They cannot be, and will be accepted neither by me personally nor by society as a whole”¹⁰⁴. In order to counteract LGBT March the president initiated “Traditional Family festival”, which took place simultaneously as LGBT March in Chisinau. It can be said that the president also supports conservative and traditional values.

To summarize, sharing common values helps Russia to establish connection with Moldova. The results presented above demonstrate that conservative values, which are component of Russia’s soft power, are attractive for Moldovan society. The majority of Moldova’s population has

¹⁰⁴ Christopher Rudolph, “Moldova’s President Opposes LGBT March, Organizes “Traditional Family” Festival”, *Newnownext*, 2017 05 19, <http://www.newnownext.com/moldova-president-lgbt-march/05/2017/> [accessed on 2017 07 18].


traditional and conservative viewpoints on sensitive social issues. This analysis suggests that Moldova and Russia emphasize similar values, which creates conditions for Russia to influence, appeal and induce Moldovan society into a common Russian world¹⁰⁵.

4.3. The attractiveness of Russia’s foreign policy

4.3.1. Attitude towards Russia

Firstly, in terms of trust in political leaders of other countries Vladimir Putin was elected as the most popular politician according to the barometer of the public opinion in 2016. 62% of Moldova’s population declared that they mostly trust Vladimir Putin, 34% trust the president of Romania Klaus Iohanis, 30% trust Angela Merkel, 25% trust Barack Obama and 19% trust Francois Hollande¹⁰⁶. Also, according to the barometer of the public opinion in 2015 Putin was also chosen as the most trusted leader¹⁰⁷. The figure no. 19 represents Moldovan’s attraction to international political personalities.

Figure No. 19 Moldovan’s attraction to international political personalities



Created by the author, based on the Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, Republic of Moldova, 2016


¹⁰⁵ There is a limited number of public surveys related to values, therefore, it is difficult to show whether the public attitude towards the traditional, conservative, moral values has been changing during the last ten years. The author agrees that this is a limitation of the thesis.

¹⁰⁶ Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, Republic of Moldova, 2016.

¹⁰⁷ Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, Republic of Moldova, 2015.

Secondly, Moldovan society was asked to evaluate the relationship with each of the major players in Moldova such as Russia, European Union and Romania in order to determine, which country was considered the most attractive. According to the last public opinion survey 58% of Moldova’s respondents evaluated the relationship with Russia country as good, 66% evaluated relationship with EU as good and 65% view relationship with Romania as good¹⁰⁸. Even though Russia has been evaluated at a lower score than European Union or Romania, but when looking only in Russia’s evaluation, it is noticeable that in 2017 Russia has made a great improvement, received the highest score since 2010 and dramatically reduced the gap with the EU and Romania. The figure no. 20 shows Moldova’s relationship with EU and Romania.

Figure No. 20 Assessment of the relationship with the biggest players in Moldova



Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. From January 2012 till June 2014, IRI did not conduct polls in Moldova.


Thirdly, Moldovan society is divided into almost equal parts when it comes to deciding into which economic union they would like to be accepted. According to the last public opinion survey 43% of people would like to join the Customs Union/Eurasian Union and 42% would vote for becoming a member of European Union¹⁰⁹. The same tendency when Moldova’s society is divided into almost equal parts, but maintains an opposite direction prevails since 2014 when this

¹⁰⁸ International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, February - March, 2017.

¹⁰⁹ International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, February – March, 2017.

question appeared in public opinion survey. These results show that Moldovan society is undecided and trapped between Russian or European integration. The figure no. 21 demonstrates the attitude of Moldovan public between joining the European Union and The Customs Union/Eurasian Union.

Figure No. 21 The choice of Moldovans between the European Union and The Customs Union/Eurasian Union



Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, February – March, 2017.

Fourth, the latest public opinion survey, which was conducted in 2017, shows that Russia is being seen as the greatest economic partner, the greatest political partner, but also as the biggest economic threat and the biggest political threat. 69% of Moldova’s total population considered Russia as a greatest economic partner, while 64% assumed European Union to be a greatest economic partner and 51% believed that it is Romania¹¹⁰. 30% of Moldova’s public considered Russia as a greatest economic threat, 16% assumed EU as a greatest economic threat and 15% believed that it is Romania¹¹¹. The same result is obtained while evaluating public opinion about the greatest political partner and greatest political threat. 64% of Moldova’s public declared that Russia is a greatest political partner, 60% believed that it is EU and 47% though that it is Romania¹¹². However, 33% of Moldova’s society believed that Russia is a greatest political threat, 18% though that it is EU and 15% stated that


¹¹⁰ International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, February – March, 2017.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

Romania is a greatest political threat¹¹³. The figure no. 22 represents Moldovans evaluation of the greatest economic partner, economic threat, political partner and political threat.

Figure No. 22 Moldovans evaluation of the greatest economic partner, economic threat, political partner and political threat



Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, February – March, 2017”.

4.3.2. Opinion on Russia’s foreign policy

What concerns attractiveness to foreign policy Moldovan society still balances between the European Union and Russia despite the fact that the president Igor Dodon, who replaced the pro-European, pro-Western government, supports the direction of Russia’s foreign policy and highlights his pro-Russian and anti-EU attitude. When he came to power, relations between Moldova and Russia recovered, for instance, during the conference together with Putin the president of Moldova Igor Dodon emphasized the need for “strategic partnership” with Russia: “Last year Moldovan citizens cast their votes for the values the President of Moldova will uphold. They opted for maintaining our statehood and neutrality, for reintegration, for settling the Transnistrian issue and preserving our traditional Orthodox Christian values. These three aspects are of fundamental significance and cannot be protected or promoted outside strategic partnership with the Russian Federation”¹¹⁴. Also, the

¹¹³ International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, February – March, 2017.

¹¹⁴ Joint news conference with the Vladimir Putin and Igor Dodon following the Russia-Moldova talks, The Kremlin, Moscow, January 17, 2017 <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/37>.

president expressed his anti-NATO attitude regarding the opening of the NATO office in Moldova and advocated for the preservation of Moldova's neutrality: "I spoke out against this not only at this stage but also when I was a lawmaker. That's very interesting. They rushed to open this office before I assumed office, realizing that I would block this move... I believe that was a mistake, Moldova is a neutral state"¹¹⁵. These testimonies show that the president is against the integration of the EU and NATO.

Questions regarding Russia's foreign policy and actions in the region appeared in public opinion polls during the time of Ukrainian crisis. 56% considered Russia's actions in Crimea negatively in 2014¹¹⁶. This revealed that Moldovan society was concerned about Russia's actions in the region and when they were asked who they believed was responsible for the current crisis in Ukraine, 26% believed that Yanukovych regime was responsible for crisis in Ukraine, 28% said that Russia was responsible¹¹⁷. 10% believed that certain groups of Ukrainian people were responsible, 9% though that the new Ukrainian government was responsible and only 8% believed that the European Union was responsible¹¹⁸. Similar attitude prevailed in public opinion survey, which was conducted in September 2014. 23% believed that Yanukovych regime was responsible for crisis in Ukraine, 40% stated that Russia was responsible. 8% believed that certain groups of Ukrainian people were responsible, 9% believed that the new Ukrainian government was responsible and only 8% believed that the European Union was responsible. The public opinion did not change after a year. In October 2015 27% believed that Yanukovych regime was responsible for crisis in Ukraine, 23% said that Russia was responsible. 7% believed that certain groups of Ukrainian people were responsible, 13% though that the new Ukrainian government was responsible and only 8% believed that the EU was responsible for crisis in Ukraine¹¹⁹. Moldova's society did not support Russia's actions in Ukraine and Crimea. The figure No. 23 shows Moldovan public opinion about the Ukrainian crisis.

¹¹⁵ "Russia's Orbit – Moldova's President Dodon Promotes Strategic Partnership With Russia During Visit To Moscow", *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Special Dispatch No.6765, January 31, 2017.


¹¹⁶ International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova", September 29 - October 21, 2015.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

Figure No. 23 Moldovan public opinion on crisis in Ukraine



Created by the author, based on the International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova”, September 29 - October 21, 2015.

To conclude, Russia as a role model does not have a definite advantage over the European Union, because Moldova society is divided into almost two equal parts of which one part supports the European Union and European integration while another part supports Russia and would choose the path of Russian integration. The same result can be seen when Moldovan society chooses political and economic partner because the EU and Russia are perceived as almost equally enticing. Despite the fact that Moldovan society has a high level of trust in Putin’s authoritative figure and his personality, they do not support Russia’s foreign policy direction. Moldovan society did not support Russia’s actions in Ukraine and even believed that Russia was responsible for the crisis in Ukraine. Offensive Russia’s foreign policy and aggressive actions in the region did not create an attractive image and were not appealing to Moldovan public. It can be said that in terms of foreign policy Russia’s soft power becomes not so soft and does not create an attractive image at all. For this reason Moldova balances between East and West and cannot decide which side tempts and attracts more.

4.4. The influence of Russia's economy

4.4.1. Trade relations

In 2017 Moldova has acquired observer status in Eurasian Economic Union. This decision can influence the public agenda and lay the foundations for further Russian integration, however, Moldova's trade relations is still unfavorable to Russia¹²⁰. In terms of economic attractiveness the biggest competitors for Russia is the European Union and it is significantly ahead of Russia. In 2016 the share of exports of goods to the European Union was 65.1% in total exports (61.9% - in 2015)¹²¹. The share of exports to Russia was significantly smaller and covered only 11% in total exports (12% - in 2015)¹²². In 2016 the share of imports of goods from the European Union was 49.1% in total imports (49.0% - in 2015)¹²³. The share of imports from Russia was 13% (14% - in 2015)¹²⁴. Trade flows between Moldova and Russia have a downward trend. And even Moldova's trade flows with Romania are bigger than with Russia. In 2016 the share of exports to Romania was 65.14% in total exports (22.69 – in 2015) and the share of imports from Romania was 13.72% (13.44% - in 2015)¹²⁵.

While analyzing Moldova's trade flows with Russia over the last 10 years, it becomes clear that from 2007 till 2012 Moldova's export of all products to Russia have been increasing, but since 2012 exports to Russia have been decreasing every year. In 2016 exports of all products were – 233, 2 million US dollars, 2015 – 240,6 million US dollars, 2014 – 423,7 million US dollars, 2013 – 631,9 million US dollars, 2012 - 655,1 million US dollars¹²⁶. The same situation remains with Moldova's imports from Russia. From 2007 till 2010 Moldova's imports of all products from Russia have been fluctuated, however, since 2011 to 2016 Moldova's import from Russia have been gradually decreasing¹²⁷. In 2016 imports of all products were 535,2 million US dollars, 2015 – 535,7 million US

¹²⁰ Presidency of the Republic of Moldova, "Igor Dodon și Tigran Sargsyan au semnat la Chișinău Memorandumul de cooperare între Comisia Economică Euroasiatică și Republica Moldova", 03 April 2017,

<http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/igor-dodon-si-tigran-sargsyan-au-semnat-la-chisinau-memorandumul-de-cooperare-intre-comisia-economica-euroasiatica-si-republica-moldova>.

¹²¹ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Moldova in Figures 2017 Statistical pocket-book", Chisinau, 2017, http://www.statistica.md/public/files/publicatii_electronice/Moldova_in_cifre/2017/Moldova_in_figures_en_2017.pdf.

¹²² National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, "Moldova in Figures 2017 Statistical pocket-book", Chisinau, 2017.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Economic Statistics, External trade, Export, import, trade balance, Annual series, Export by Countries and Years, http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/pxweb/en/40%20Statistica%20economica/40%20Statistica%20economica_21%20EXT_EXT010_seri%20anuale/EXT010200.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=b2ff27d7-0b96-43c9-934b-42e1a2a9a774.

¹²⁷ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Economic Statistics, External trade, Export, import, trade balance, Annual series, Imports by Countries and Years,

dollars, 2014 – 717,2 – million US dollars, 2013 – 788,0 million US dollars, 2012 – 816,9 US dollars, 2011 – 822,7 million US dollars¹²⁸. From the statistical data it is clear that imports and exports have been gradually decreasing during the last 5 years. The following figure no. 24 illustrates Moldova's exports to Russia and EU from 2007 to 2016, figure no. 25 shows Moldova's imports from Russia and EU from 2007 to 2016, figure no. 26 demonstrates Moldova's top 5 trading partners in 2015 and in 2016.

Figure No. 24 Moldova's export to Russia and EU from 2007 to 2016




Created by the author, based on The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Economic statistics, External trade.

http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/pxweb/en/40%20Statistica%20economica/40%20Statistica%20economica_21%20EXT_EXT010_serii%20anuale/EXT010300.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=b2ff27d7-0b96-43c9-934b-42e1a2a9a774.

¹²⁸ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Economic Statistics, External trade, Export, import, trade balance, Annual series, Imports by Countries and Years,


http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/pxweb/en/40%20Statistica%20economica/40%20Statistica%20economica_21%20EXT_EXT010_serii%20anuale/EXT010300.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=b2ff27d7-0b96-43c9-934b-42e1a2a9a774.

Figure No. 25 Moldova's imports to Russia and EU from 2007 to 2016



Created by the author, based on The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Economic statistics, External trade, 2007-2016.

Figure No. 26 Moldova's TOP 5 trading partners in 2015 and in 2016



Created by the author, based on The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Economic statistics, External trade.

4.4.2. Emigration to Russia

Russia attracts Moldovan emigrants. According to statistics, 857 Moldovan citizens immigrated to Russia in 2016, 961 – in 2015, 778 – in 2014, 684 – in 2013, 772 – in 2012, 858 – in 2011, 1162 – in 2010, 1886 – in 2009, 2663 – in 2008, 3110 – in 2007, 2890 – in 2006¹²⁹. In addition, when comparing the number of immigrants to Russia and immigration to other countries, it is clear that Russia remains the most popular destination country for Moldovan migrants. 34.18% of total emigrants have chosen Russia as their destination country in 2016, 42.98% - in 2015, 33.19% - in 2014 and 26.45% - in 2013¹³⁰. Russia attracts Moldovan citizens, who have chosen to leave their motherland. Other countries that attract fewer labor immigrants are Austria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Kazakhstan, USA and Ukraine. The table no. 10 shows most popular destination countries of Moldovan emigrants.

Table No. 10 Most popular destination countries of Moldovan emigrants

Years	Total	Austria	Belarus	Czech Republic	Germany	Israel	Kazakhstan	Russia	USA	Ukraine
2006	6685	42	222	27	253	201	22	2890	612	2350
2007	7172	13	187	24	253	140	20	3110	695	2663
2008	6988	1	122	40	195	137	14	2663	588	3163
2009	6663	10	125	77	264	278	31	1866	899	2952
2010	4714	15	100	57	220	232	33	1162	523	2227
2011	3920	22	74	43	179	204	27	858	538	1827
2012	3062	21	48	56	218	198	29	772	245	1360
2013	2585	28	72	48	256	169	17	684	160	1054
2014	2374	32	82	6	223	210	28	788	285	602
2015	2236	28	64	3	253	174	28	961	287	312
2016	2507	42	28	2	285	181	18	857	623	375

Created by the author, based on the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Population and demographic processes, Migration, Emigrants by country of destination, sex and age group, 2001-2016.

The situation is even more favorable to Russia when it comes to Moldovan labor migration. Between 2007 and 2016 migration of the labor force to Russia remained high, considering that about 200 thousand people immigrated to Russia every year¹³¹. This testifies to the fact that the


¹²⁹ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Population and demographic processes, Migration, Emigrants by country of destination, sex and age group, 2001-2016.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Social statistics, Labour force and earnings, Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey), Labour force migration, Population aged 15 years and over, working or looking for work abroad by country of destination, level of education, age groups, level of education, sex and area, 2000-

Russian labor market is appealing to Moldovans and attracts them to work in Russia. The next figure no. 27 demonstrates the number of Moldova's labor force migration to Russia.

Figure No. 27 Moldova's labor force migration to Russia



Created by the author, based on the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical databank "Statbank", Social statistics, Labour force and earnings, Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey), Labour force migration, Population aged 15 years and over, working or looking for work abroad by country of destination, level of education, age groups, level of education, sex and area, 2000-2016.

All in all, Moldova's trades with Russia remains significantly lower than with the European Union. Trade relations data highlights that Moldova is far more integrated with EU than with Russia. However, Russia has been successful in attracting Moldovan emigrants. Russia remains the most popular destination for Moldovan labor migrants. Also, labor migration to Russia contributes to the development of relationship between countries and promotes evolvement of connection between people.

CONCLUSIONS

This Master's thesis provided the main arguments of the soft power theory, found Russia's perception of soft power, developed an alternative way to measure the intangible soft power resources, and evaluated the effect of soft power in a practical case study.

To summarize, soft power has become an important force that is being used by countries to increase their influence and ensure leading role in international arena. Ideally, soft power opposes hard power and can be described as the ability to influence the behavior of other countries and encourage them to follow your example by using attractiveness and persuasion.

Russia, as well as other major players in the region such as the EU and US, develops soft power. The reasons for Russia to use soft power are as follows: to become a center of influence in order to strengthen the authority over the post-Soviet countries; induce countries into a common Russian world that is based on Russian culture, political values, convincing foreign policy objectives in order to maintain control and stability in the region; improve Russia's attractive and appealing image in the eyes of societies and elites in order to confront the democratization of the neighboring countries as it is a threat to Russia's internal regime. In fact this thesis draws a conclusion that Nye's soft power and Russia's soft power are at the opposite poles. Russian soft power and its practical use are not in line with Nye's model as it exceeds the limits of classical soft power theory. Differently from the original concept that was presented by Nye, Russian-style soft power is understood in a much broader sense, involves a wide range of non-military resources and is mainly controlled and financed by the state.

Furthermore, it seems that Moldova's geographical position in the world map is determined by the fact that the country falls into Russia's zone of influence. Moldova's fraud scandal, public distrust in pro-European forces and European values, reforms that resulted in disappointment, corruption, oligarchic system and territorial fragmentation created favorable conditions for Russia to push even harder in order to impose its will on the country. However, the results of the research demonstrate that Russia struggles to attract and influence Moldova with the help of soft power instruments. The real picture of Moldova remains complicated.

The analysis of Russia's culture as a resource of soft power provided mixed results. On the one hand, influence of the Orthodox Church and influence of the Russian media have been increasing over the last ten years. While on the other hand, influence of the Russian language, attractiveness of Russia's education system and popularity of tourism to Russia have been decreasing during the same period.

The assessment of Russia's values as a resource of soft power showed that both countries share similar values. Moldovan society has a positive attitude towards Russia's conservative, traditional, spiritual, moral values. Therefore it can be concluded that Russia's conservative values are attractive to Moldovan society.

The findings indicate that from Moldova's point of view both the European Union and Russia are considered to be almost equally important political partners, however, Russia's foreign policy is not attractive to Moldovan society. This study revealed that actions in Ukraine diminished the image of Russia as a soft power. Moldovan public had a negative opinion about Russia's actions in Ukraine and found Russia responsible for the emergence of critical situation in Ukraine.

The evaluation of Russia's economy as a resource of soft power revealed that trade relations with Russia are unattractive. Nevertheless, Russia is still able to attract work-related emigrants.

All things considered, the empirical analysis of the case of Moldova showed that the country remains undecided and trapped between the EU and Russia. Results of the research revealed that Russia's attempt to use soft power did not provide expected benefits. Tendency shows that Russia is becoming less influential in Moldova. The overall conclusion is that Russia's attempt to intensify the use of soft power did not work when it was used together with the hard power in relations with other countries. Instead of creating an attractive image Russia tried to impose Russian rules and vision on the neighborhood. Because of this reason Russia drifted away from the concept of soft power and failed to use it successfully. Russia's actions in the region destroyed its soft power image and provided the opposite result than it was wanted – instead of attracting countries closer Russia scared them away.

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SUMMARY

The title of the Master's thesis – Under the influence of giant: Russia's soft power towards Moldova. The Master's thesis analyzes Russia's soft power towards the republic of Moldova. In contemporary world politics countries are increasingly using soft power in order to influence others, create attractive image, spread values and make changes without using force.

The problem of the thesis. During the last decade Moldova was trapped between EU and Russia, and the two giants tried to influence, attract and bring Moldova closer to their own side. The last presidential elections symbolized a victory of pro-Russian forces in Moldova. This raised a question whether a victory of socialist leader signaled the country's shift towards Russian integration, especially considering the fact that the electoral campaign was aimed to break the Moldovan alliance with the EU and improve relations with Russia. Another problem emerges concerning the presence of a specific Russian perception of soft power, which derogates from a classical theory and, therefore, requires more thorough investigations.

The problem of the research: How is Russia's soft power changing towards Moldova?

The object of the research is Russia's soft power tools and effects towards Moldova.

The goal of the thesis is to examine the change dynamics in the attractiveness of Russia from the Moldova's point of view.

The tasks of the thesis:

1. To discuss the soft power theory and provide the main arguments.
2. To explain Russia's perception of soft power.
3. To construct a conceptual framework for measuring soft power.
4. To examine Russia's soft power tools and effects towards Moldova.

The main conclusions of the Master's thesis.

Soft power has become an important force that is being used by countries to increase their influence and ensure leading role in international arena. Ideally, soft power opposes hard power and can be described as the ability to influence the behavior of other countries and encourage them to follow your example by using attractiveness and persuasion. This thesis draws a conclusion that Nye's soft power and Russia's soft power are at the opposite poles. Russian soft power and its practical use are not in line with Nye's model as it exceeds the limits of classical soft power theory. Differently from the original concept that was presented by Nye, Russian-style soft power is understood in a much broader sense, involves a wide range of non-military resources and is mainly controlled and financed by the state.

Moldova's geographical position in the world map is determined by the fact that the country falls into Russia's zone of influence. Moldova's fraud scandal, public distrust in pro-European forces and European values, reforms that resulted in disappointment, corruption, oligarchic system and territorial fragmentation created favorable conditions for Russia to push even harder in order to impose its will on the country. However, the results of the research demonstrate that Russia struggles to attract and influence Moldova with the help of soft power instruments. The real picture of Moldova remains complicated. Firstly, the analysis of Russia's culture as a resource of soft power provided mixed results. On the one hand, influence of the Orthodox Church and influence of the Russian media have been increasing over the last ten years. While on the other hand, influence of the Russian language, attractiveness of Russia's education system and popularity of tourism to Russia have been decreasing during the same period. Secondly, the assessment of Russia's values as a resource of soft power showed that both countries share similar values. Moldovan society has a positive attitude towards Russia's conservative, traditional, spiritual, moral values. Therefore it can be concluded that Russia's conservative values are attractive to Moldovan society. Thirdly, the findings indicate that Russia's foreign policy is not attractive to Moldovan society. Actions in Ukraine diminished the image of Russia as a soft power. Moldovan public had a negative opinion about Russia's actions in Ukraine and found Russia responsible for the emergence of critical situation in Ukraine. Fourthly, the evaluation of Russia's economy as a resource of soft power revealed that trade relations with Russia are unattractive. Nevertheless, Russia is still able to attract work-related migrants.

The empirical analysis of the case of Moldova showed that the country remains undecided and trapped between the EU and Russia. Tendency shows that Russia is becoming less influential in Moldova. The overall conclusion is that Russia's attempt to intensify the use of soft power did not work when it was used together with the hard power in relations with other countries. Russia's actions in the region destroyed its soft power image and provided the opposite result than it was wanted – instead of attracting countries closer Russia scared them away.

SANTRAUKA

Magistro darbo pavadinimas - Milžino įtaka: Rusijos minkštoji galia Moldovoje.

Šiame magistro darbe tyrinėjama Rusijos minkštosios galios tema daugiausiai dėmesio skiriant Moldovos atvejo analizei. Šiuolaikinėje pasaulio politikoje šalys vis dažniau naudoja minkštąją galią siekdamos didinti įtaką, kurti patrauklų įvaizdį ir skleisti vertybes.

Tyrimo problema. Paskutiniai Moldovos prezidento rinkimai simbolizavo pro-rusiškų jėgų pergalę, nors pastaruosius dešimt metų šalį valdė pro-europietiška, pro-vakarietiška koalicija. Dėl to kilo klausimas, ar socialistinio lyderio pergalė parodė šalies perėjimą prie Rusijos integracijos, ypač atsižvelgiant į tai, kad rinkimų kampanija buvo siekiama nutraukti Moldovos aljansą su ES ir pagerinti Moldovos santykius su Rusija. Kita problema kyla dėl specifinio rusiško minkštosios galios suvokimo, kuris nukrypsta nuo klasikinės teorijos ir dėl to reikalauja vis naujų mokslinių tyrimų.

Tyrimo klausimas: Kaip Rusijos minkštoji galia keičiasi Moldovos atžvilgiu?

Tyrimo objektas yra Rusijos minkštosios galios priemonės ir jų poveikis Moldovai.

Tyrimo tikslas yra išnagrinėti Rusijos patrauklumo pokyčių dinamiką iš Moldovos perspektyvos.

Tyrimo uždaviniai:

1. Aptarti minkštosios galios teoriją ir pateikti pagrindinius argumentus.
2. Išnagrinėti Rusijos minkštosios galios suvokimą.
3. Sukurti minkštosios galios matavimo sistemą.
4. Ištirti Rusijos minkštosios galios priemonių poveikį Moldovai.

Pagrindiniai tyrimo rezultatai.

Minkštoji galia tapo svarbia jėga, kurią šalys naudoja norėdamos padidinti savo įtaką. Idealiu atveju minkštoji galia prieštarauja kietajai galiai ir gali būti apibūdinama kaip gebėjimas daryti įtaką kitų šalių elgesiui ir paskatinti jas sekti savo pavyzdžiu, naudojant patrauklumo ir įtikinėjimo metodus. Tačiau Rusijos minkštosios galios suvokimas ir praktinis jos panaudojimas neatitinka klasikinio minkštosios galios apibrėžimo, kuris buvo suformuluotas mokslininko J.S. Nye, nes viršija originalios teorijos ribas. Rusijos minkštoji galia yra suprantama žymiai plačiau, apima platų nekarinių resursų pasirinkimą. Rusijos minkštoji galia labiausiai skiriasi nuo klasikinės teorijos, nes yra valstybės kontroliuojama ir finansuojama.

Moldovos geografinę padėtį pasaulio žemėlapyje lemia tai, kad šalis patenka į Rusijos įtakos zoną. Sukčiavimo skandalas, visuomenės nepasitikėjimas pro-europinėmis jėgomis ir Europinėmis vertybėmis, reformos, kurios sukėlė nusivylimą, korupcija, oligarchinė sistema ir teritorinis suskaldymas sukūrė palankias sąlygas Rusijai primesti savo valią šalyje. Tačiau tyrimo rezultatai rodo,

kad Rusijai nepavyksta pritraukti Moldovos naudojant minkštosios galios instrumentus. Reali Moldovos situacija išlieka sudėtinga. Pirma, Rusijos kultūros kaip minkštosios galios šaltinio analizė parodė mišrų rezultatų. Viena vertus, stačiatikių bažnyčios įtaka ir Rusiškos žiniasklaidos įtaka didėjo. Kita vertus, per tą patį laikotarpį Rusų kalbos įtaka, Rusijos švietimo sistemos patrauklumas ir turizmo į Rusiją populiarumas mažėjo. Antra, vertinant Rusijos vertybes kaip minkštosios galios šaltinį paaiškėjo, kad didžioji dalis Moldovos visuomenės palaiko tradicines vertybes, kurių puoselėtoja dedasi Rusija. Moldovos visuomenė teigiamai vertina konservatyvias, tradicines, dvasines, moralines vertybes. Todėl galima daryti išvadą, kad konservatyvios Rusijos vertybės yra patrauklios Moldovos visuomenei. Trečia, tyrimo rezultatai atskleidžia, kad Rusijos užsienio politika nėra patraukli Moldovos visuomenei. Veiksmai Ukrainoje sumažino Rusijos kaip minkštosios galios įvaizdį. Moldovos visuomenė neigiamai vertino Rusijos veiksmus Ukrainoje ir netgi tikėjo, kad Rusija yra atsakinga už kritinės situacijos atsiradimą šalyje. Ketvirta, Rusijos ekonomikos kaip minkštosios galios šaltinio tyrimas parodė, kad Moldovai prekybiniai santykiai su Rusija nėra patrauklūs. Nepaisant to, Rusija vis dar išlieka populiariausia šalis, pritraukianti daugiausiai Moldovos darbo emigrantų.

Empirinė Moldovos atvejo analizė parodė, kad Rusijos bandymas naudoti minkštąją galią nesuteikė naudos, kurios buvo tikimasi pasiekti. Tendencija rodo, kad Rusija tampa vis mažiau įtakinga Moldovoje. Rusijos bandymas sustiprinti minkštosios galios naudojimą neveikė, kadangi minkštoji galia buvo naudojama kartu su kietąją galia santykiuose su regioninėmis šalimis. Rusijos veiksmai regione sugriovė minkštosios galia įvaizdį ir davė priešingą rezultatą, nei buvo norėta - užuot pritraukus šalis prie savęs, Rusija jas tik išgąsdino.