



Vilnius University

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Eastern European and Russian Studies Program

LUKAS ANDRIUKAITIS

2nd year

Right Sector's Goals: Greed and Grievance Theories

MASTER THESIS

Tutor: Dr. Deividas Šlekys

2017

Vilnius

Confirmation

I confirm that I am the author of submitted term paper: *Right Sector's Goals: Greed and Grievance theories*, which has been prepared independently and has never been presented for any other course or used in another educational institution, neither in Lithuania, or abroad. I also provide a full bibliographical list which indicates all the sources that were used to prepare this assignment and contains no un-used sources.

Lukas Andriukaitis

MASTER'S THESIS FLYLEAF

Conclusions of the tutor of the Master's thesis (concerning the public defence):

.....
.....
.....

.....
(date)

.....
(name, surname)

.....
(signature)

The Master's thesis has been submitted to the Commission of Defence:

.....
(date)

.....
(signature of the secretary of the Commission of Defence)

Reviewer of the thesis:

.....
(name, surname)

Evaluation of the Commission of Defence:

.....
Head of the commission:

.....
Members of the commission:

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ENTRY

Surname, Name: topic of the thesis: Andriukaitis, Lukas. Master in Eastern and Central European studies program, Master thesis / Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science; tutor: Dr. Deividas Šlekys. Vilnius, 2018. – 62 pages

Key words: Far-right party, Right Sector, para-military, Greed theory, Grievance theory.

Summary:

This thesis analyzes the Right Sector organization of Ukraine, who fight with separatists in Donbas, but who also have political aspirations in the country itself. The Right Sector consists of two different wings under the same banner: the political and the paramilitary. Research aims to find out the motives and goals the two wings of the organization.

Greed and Grievance theories are used in this research, in order to find out whether economic factors (Greed) or justice factors can be used to explain their behavior. For operationalization needs, the following set of criteria has been applied: financing, recruitment, geography, relative deprivation, polarization, horizontal inequality. The Right Sector was split into two categories – political wing and para-military wing.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	6
1.1. Research problem.....	7
1.2. Literature review.....	9
1.2.1. Right Sector as a Radical-Right Party.....	9
1.2.2. Right Sector as a Paramilitary Group.....	11
1.3. Research objective.....	13
2. Theoretical framework.....	14
2.1. Greed and Grievances Theories in Violent Internal Conflict.....	14
2.2. The Greed or Natural Resource Based Explanation Argument.....	16
2.3. Grievances and Horizontal Inequality as Conflict Drivers.....	17
2.4. Methodology and research model.....	18
2.4.1. Greed theory criteria.....	19
2.4.2. Grievances theory criteria:.....	21
2.5. Greed and Grievances Research Model Visualization.....	22
3. Research.....	23
3.1. The Split Between Right Sector’s Political and Paramilitary Wings.....	23
3.2. Right Sector as a Paramilitary Organization.....	26
3.2.1. Greed theory:.....	26
3.2.2. Grievance theory:.....	31
3.3. Right Sector as a Political Party.....	36
3.3.1. Greed theory:.....	36
3.3.2. Grievance theory:.....	40
4. General Overview.....	45
4.1. Paramilitary Wing:.....	45
4.2. Political Wing:.....	49
5. Conclusions.....	53
6. Literature/Bibliography.....	55
7. Summaries.....	60
7.1. Summary (English).....	60
7.2. Summary (Lithuanian).....	61

1. Introduction

There seems to have never been such a sudden rise in popularity of a previously little known marginalized political force/organization in the history of contemporary Ukrainian politics. The Right Sector broke into political life so fast that it was a surprise for its members themselves.¹

Since the Maidan Revolution, Right Sector has maintained only marginal public support. Currently, the party holds just one seat in the parliament of 422. Nevertheless, as the group has become more outspoken against the current Petro Poroshenko administration, its numbers have risen drastically. From 1.8 percent in October 2014, the group's popular support stood at 5.4 percent in late 2015. Dmytro Yarosh addressed a crowd of over 5,000 on July 21, calling for a nationwide no-confidence referendum against President Poroshenko, who, along with his prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, is steadily losing public support.² Despite barely having representation in the Rada Verkhovna, Right Sector has played a significant role in providing paramilitary support for Ukrainian troops in the Donbas. The group is the last militia force to operate in the east independent of the government--controlled army. Right Sector militants fight for their own doctrine, one of ultra--nationalism and conservative values. As Poroshenko's popularity declines, Right Sector has an opening to derail U.S. objectives in the region, ultimately and ironically helping President Putin protect Russian interests.³

Right Sector played an important role in overthrowing former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in the Euromaidan revolution of February 2014. The militant group has since maintained a complicated, contentious relationship with the new pro-Western government in Kiev. Although the group has cooperated with regular Ukrainian security forces in eastern Ukraine, even fighting alongside them, elements of Right Sector have clashed with conventional Ukrainian personnel in other areas.⁴

These events in Ukraine might be seen a signal of future start of big problems. When the disturbances in Eastern Ukraine will settle, the ever - growing support for this right - wing nationalistic group will most likely stay intact and the "Right Sector" will try

¹ Stanislav Byshok, Alexey Kochetkov, "NEONAZIS & EUROMAIDAN: From Democracy to Dictatorship", [Third edition], 2014, 130

² Julia Embody, "Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector", *The National Interest*, August 12, 2015

³ Ibid

⁴ David Stern, "Ukraine clashes raise questions over Right Sector militia", *BBC*, 15 July, 2015

and look for new objectives for the organization. To better understand this organization and its political aims, we ought to take an in-depth look towards the organization and post—Maidan events. The questions still stand: Is the victory of the Maidan also the victory of the political ultra right?⁵

Does the Ukrainian ultra-nationalism have a strong support in the society, according to the results of the elections? What kind of future does the far right have in the new Ukrainian political reality? And how does the “Right Sector” perceives Ukrainian state?

1.1. Research problem

“Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!” These Euromaidan claims were chillingly tested in late November and early December 2013, when an increasingly desperate Yanukovich sent Interior Ministry special forces to clear Independence Square. Yanukovich's willingness to try and remove protestors with armed force marked a critical turning point, both for his ill-fated government and for the Euromaidan movement.⁶ Into the ranks of the protestors moved a mix of ultranationalist and assorted far right paramilitary groups, who were disputing the progressive idea of Euromaidan. The largest group of these activists was - Svoboda, which even possessed a well-defined political program, also having earned parliamentary seats in 2012 by winning a tenth of votes cast in nationwide elections. Several existing paramilitary groups coalesced to form Right Sector, the declared goal of which was not closer ties with Europe but to "build a nationalist Ukrainian state and stage a nationalist revolution."⁷

Unable to muster popular support — Right Sector's Dmytro Yarosh managed only 0.7% in the May 2014 presidential elections, and Svoboda lost significant ground in the October 2014 parliamentary elections — both nevertheless wield outsized political power by virtue of large, well-armed paramilitaries.

As the conflict in eastern Ukraine escalated through 2014, the newly elected Poroshenko government in Kyiv found itself dependent upon paramilitary forces as the

⁵ Vyacheslav Likhachev, “The “Right Sector” and others: The behaviour and role of radical nationalists in the Ukrainian political crisis of late 2013 – Early 2014”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume 48, Issues 2–3, June–September 2015, p. 257–271

⁶ John R. Haines, “Ukraine: The Squandered Renaissance?”, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, E-notes, October 2015, 3

⁷ John R. Haines, 3

sharp end of Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression. The paramilitaries exploited this to demand significant concessions from the Kyiv government, which well short of exercising a monopoly on armed force within the country was not even the preponderant force.⁸ Today, as the Poroshenko government seeks a détente in eastern Ukraine, paramilitaries that have borne the brunt of the fighting are increasingly vocal in opposing any accord with the separatists. This poses a significant, and in the author's view, disconcertedly underrated, dilemma for the Poroshenko government: how to prevent well-armed, anti-democratic forces within the country — vociferously opposed to both European integration and any accommodation with Russia and its (in their view) proxy forces in the east — from destabilizing Ukraine's fragile democracy?⁹

Currently, Ukraine is facing a fight on two fronts and losing on both. First front — the military clashes in the east with the separatists of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where fighting began after the failed negotiations to produce agreement on a proposed 30km-wide demilitarized zone along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine. Even though the current situation can be called cease-fire, the Ukrainian economy suffers 5 million US dollars a day.¹⁰ The other front that Ukrainian government is facing is the increased lawlessness from ultra-nationalist and fascist paramilitaries, including some that allegedly have aligned with organized crime syndicates. One of the most known examples is the event, when the militant nationalist group Right Sector attempted to destabilize the Poroshenko government by forcing a nationwide no-confidence referendum. Parliamentary group Opposition Bloc, which is known for its pro-Russian position, called for parliament to dissolve after a recent armed clash between Right Sector's Ukrainian Volunteer Corps and local police in the city of Mukachevo¹¹. The incident took place near the border with Hungary, when a Right Sector "reserve battalion" opened fire on

⁸ John R. Haines, 4

⁹ Ibid, 3

¹⁰ Ibid, 3

¹¹ *On July 15th, 2015 in the city of Mukachevo, around 20 members of the ultra-nationalist Right Sector volunteer battalion exchanged gunfire with police and the security detail of a local politician. At least three people were killed, two of whom were from Right Sector, and 13 were wounded. Details were extremely murky over what happened in Mukachevo. Right Sector members say they were cracking down on the illicit export of contraband cigarettes into the European Union, which generates millions of dollars and contributes to local corruption. Others say that Right Sector is itself involved in the illegal cigarette trade, and has become entwined with criminal interests. Still others say the group has been infiltrated by Russian special services and is engaged in carrying out provocations to destabilize the country. None of the proponents of these scenarios have provided any conclusive evidence, however. What seems clear is that Right Sector possesses an impressive collection of firepower - which they were capable of employing in a corner of Ukraine furthest from the fighting in the east.* / David Stern, "Ukraine clashes raise questions over Right Sector militia", BBC, July 15, 2015, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33523869>>

Opposition Bloc supporters in eastern Ukraine's Kharkiv.¹²

1.2. Literature review

1.2.1. Right Sector as a Radical-Right Party

Contemporary cultural, economic and racial challenges within Europe have allowed extremists to become more active once again. They have particularly spurred the growth of extreme nationalism and closer trans-European cooperation among extreme-right groups. The enabling mechanisms also allow the move to violence. In these developments the European extreme right has been influenced by, and has copied, its counterparts in the U.S.¹³ Yet at the same time they have also opposed the globalizing and Americanizing influences on Europe which were regarded as a danger to European ethnic and cultural identity. The outward manifestations of youth cultures should not be seen as a threat in themselves. Nevertheless, the disparate and often confrontational nature, and historical tendency to splinter within the extreme right, might be seen as emerging trans-European threat. In these activities the extreme right is achieving some of its goals and developing the realities that early proponents sought, but failed to realize.¹⁴

The legacies of the radical right in regions and countries like Austria, Flanders and Italy consisted of relatively strong nationalist foundations—political parties, associations and networks dominated by collaborators after the Second World War, most of whom possessed some degree of political and social legitimacy. The post-war nationalist landscape in several other countries was dominated instead by extremist and anti-democratic factions. In these countries, radical right parties emerged entrenched in extremist subcultures.¹⁵ Several radical right groups in regions and countries like the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, Sweden and Wallonia were built upon small networks of extremists, many openly espousing Nazism and fascism or nostalgia for war. Other radical right parties, like the Danish People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party and the Swiss People's Party, originated entirely independently from nationalist underpinnings

¹² Ibid, 3

¹³ Michael Whine, "Trans-European Trends in Right-Wing Extremism", Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe, *Routledge*, 506

¹⁴ Ibid, 507

¹⁵ Institute for Strategic Dialogue, "The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe", Briefing Paper, 2012, 16

and fascist histories, emerging as protest movements and developing through party transformations. These parties were dominated by moderates and contained virtually no extremists, as many members had not initially joined because of their stance on immigration.¹⁶

In the Central and Eastern European context, radical right parties emerged as a post-communist phenomenon, largely addressing post communist issues, such as corruption, minorities and EU enlargement. These parties tend to be far more authoritarian, and have mobilized anti-EU sentiments, anti-Semitism and hate against other ethnic groups, particularly the Roma. They also tend to be less organized than their Western European counterparts, more anti-democratic and more militant. Finally, in recent years a handful of radical right parties have emerged without any pre-existing foundations or party structures. A recent example, the Dutch Party for Freedom, was founded in 2005 by Geert Wilders, formerly a member of the mainstream conservative party. It quickly grew to become the third - largest party in the country, currently supporting the minority government led by the mainstream right.¹⁷

Ukrainian “Right” Sector emerged directly from the Maidan demonstrations, where it was in the vanguard of street fighting toward the end of the three- month protest. The group includes nationalist veterans who fought in Chechnya against Russian troops in the 1990s, while some more recent recruits, movement leaders say, are from organized football hooligan gangs.¹⁸ “Right Sector” might be seen as a more radical force than political party Svoboda. It rejects democracy, has no interest in the EU and routinely describes the mainstream Maidan protesters as part of the system, or part of the problem. It is equally dismissive of Svoboda, which it accuses of abandoning ultranationalist ideas in favor of organized crime.¹⁹

Taking a closer look into the Ukrainian Right Sector, it might be said that rather unprecedented processes are starting to take place. Dmytro Yarosh and Olga Bogomolets have become two most impressive representatives of civil society after Maidan. Now both are being transformed from civil activists into leaders of political movements. As uncorrupted heroes of Maidan, they may radically change political landscape of the country. Leader of Praviy Sector already declared that the movement undergoes transformation into a political party, which will participate in elections of all levels and

¹⁶ Ibid, 17

¹⁷ Ibid, 17

¹⁸ Igor Burdyga, “A Step to the Right”, *Reporter*, 25 March, 2014

¹⁹ International Crisis Group, “Ukraine: Running out of Time”, *Europe Report N°23*, 14 May, 2014, 10

offer its candidate for presidential post.²⁰ Dmytro Yarosh promotes the idea of systemic reset of government instead of using existing institutions for political gains of a new leadership. Negative image of Praviy Sektor is being created both by political opponents and the Kremlin, which needs radicals to represent the scapegoat threat for Russian-speaking people in Ukraine and Russia. Praviy Sektor tries to counteract informational campaigns and promptly respond to challenges. Transformation into a party requires deeper structuring, which already started with exclusion of Biliy Molot organization and creation of a structural unit in the East.²¹

To sum up, it might be said, that the “Right Sector” has a lot of similarities with other European, especially Eastern-European, radical Right-wing organizations. Nevertheless, differently from the other European organizations, the “Right Sector” currently faced enormous increase in support, mainly due to Maidan events. Being one of the keenest supporters in the Maidan Barricades, group members were nationally appreciated and supported. Furthermore, organization is undergoing a process of politicization in order to become an active political force in Ukraine. Therefore, this research will analyze the ideas and the process of changing of the “Right Sector”. This research will not only be theoretical, but also will be complemented by interviews from the organization members.

1.2.2. Right Sector as a Paramilitary Group

Semi-militarism is not a new term. This kind of organizations were present even before World War I and they take many forms and perform varied functions. Such organizations can be placed in three general categories: legally established entities, organizations that are opposed to a particular regime, and groups that support certain aspects of the regime but exist outside the law, such as death squads.²² Organizations in the first two categories are regarded as “semi-military”, and the third category is characterized as “paramilitary.” Entities that were established legally can be further divided into: those that are intended to support the armed forces through the provision of various services; and those that are designed to supplement or substitute for the armed forces in order to keep the

²⁰ International Centre for Policy Studies, “Inside Ukraine”, March 14th, 2014 №2 (13), 3

²¹ Ibid, 4

²² Benjamin R. Beede, “Semi-Military and Paramilitary Organisations”, *Military History*, August 2013, <<http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/obo/9780199791279-0100>>

military services focused on defence against foreign threats and, further, to free them from tasks such as suppression of internal unrest or enforcement of controversial laws.²³

Semi-military organizations may vary from those that have comprised little more than concealed armies to those that consist of unarmed men and women who have been recruited for largely humanitarian duties. Organizations, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, a major New Deal program to combat the Great Depression set up by the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt in the United States, and Organisation Todt, a large labor service force in Nazi Germany, are omitted. Military Contractors and Mercenary Forces and Proprietary Airlines may be seen as serving armed forces. Border Security Forces and the various categories of police organizations can be viewed as substituting for armed forces. Paramilitary Organizations have a position of their own. They may be linked to the armed forces, but unofficially. They often operate in a clandestine fashion.²⁴

Since the conclusion of Maidan, politically motivated private security actors operating in parallel with the Ukrainian government have played an integral part in the country's security issues. Some of them have been cooperating with Ukrainian authorities, but the others experience great friction with the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior Affairs, undermining the formal security structures of the Ukrainian government. It seems that political and military power have become inseparable at the unit level, with many battalion commanders also being career politicians or parliamentary members.²⁵ The term "volunteer battalion" is very common in the context of post-Maidan Ukraine. While the term may seem straightforward to anyone with a basic familiarity of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, it encompasses a wide range of units active and inactive in the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone today. Effectively, these units can be viewed along an axis of patronage, with those relying on the government as the primary patron representing the formal units, and those that rely on civil society representing the independent units.²⁶

A persistent issue facing Kyiv originates in its own complacency, and to some degree the ambivalence of the Ukrainian people towards security institutions. The two largest groups that represent this phenomenon are the Right Sector Ukrainian Volunteer Corps and the Ukrainian Volunteer Army militias.²⁷ The volunteers have become hardened

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Michael Sheldon, "Ukraine Needs to Address Its Paramilitary Problem", *The National Interest*, July 19, 2017

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Ibid

nationalists, with their time spent in intense combat at the front. Many disapprove of the way their government has handled this war, which they still refuse to acknowledge as such, instead referring to it as the anti-terrorist operation. They view their government's willingness to accept onerous ceasefire terms as nothing short of treason, asking if this justifies the sacrificed lives of their comrades. They believed the Maidan revolution of 2014 would bring about a new Ukraine, and when separatists started the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, they went to fight for what they thought they had won at Maidan - a more just Ukraine. But looking around, they say they see the same old Ukraine, with many of the same players, simply reorganized.²⁸

1.3. Research objective

Research question: The aim of the research is to assess Ukrainian “Right Sector’s” goals using the Greed and Grievance theories. Which wing of the organization is driven by Greed and which by Grievance motives?

Main question: What are the main factors that drive activities of different “Right Sector’s” composing groups (Political party wing and Paramilitary wing): greed or grievance?

First of all, I consider that it is necessary to make a distinction between two different sides of the Ukrainian “Right Sector”: political wing and paramilitary wing. These are the different sides of the same organizations with no clear institutional cut, nevertheless with different leaders and goals. It should be noted that the cut between these two wings might be debatable and that no single theory would be fully answering the question, more likely a list of criteria would show which wing is leaning more to each side of the greed vs. grievance argument.

After all I intend to raise a **hypothesis**, which goes as following:

Paramilitary wing of the Right Sector is more prone to be explained by using the Greed theory criteria and Political wing of the Right Sector is more prone to be explained by Grievance theory criteria.

²⁸ Christian Borys, “Ukraine's angry volunteer brigades at the war front”, Aljazeera, October 19, 2016, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/10/ukraine-angry-volunteer-brigades-war-front-161017082634137.html>>

The idea behind this hypothesis is that greed-based groups are unlikely to facilitate transition since their main motivation is gaining profit often at the account of state. At the same time, if a group is more motivated by grievances, then it has political structures, claims to power and that they are likely to enter into politics.

Research goals:

1. Discuss the nature of Greed and Grievance theories, how and why were they created and their applicability;
2. Discuss the phenomenon of the Right Sector and it's split between the Political and Military wings;
3. Construct a theoretical model based on Greed and Grievance theories to assess the Right Sector's Military and Political wings.;
4. Analyze Right Sector's Military and Political wings using the model, evaluate using the model and arrive to conclusions about the goals and motives of both wings.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Greed and Grievances Theories in Violent Internal Conflict

Civil wars and other violent internal conflicts are not a homogenous phenomenon – their origins, motivations and objectives vary tremendously. Discussion of these internal unrests points to four broad types: genocides, revolutions or rebellions against the state, secessionist wars and internationalized wars (where adjoining states or the great powers get involved).²⁹ Besides civil wars, there are other forms of large scale organized violence, where the perpetrators have a very different motivation compared to participants of civil wars. In addition, we also have routine and sectarian violence where the state is not a direct protagonist (hence they are not civil wars).³⁰ According to the rational choice theories, conflict is a result of choice. It can also be said that conflict is a special form of non-cooperative behavior. Less destructive forms of cooperation are also available and superior

²⁹ Syed Mansoob Murshed, "Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict", *Journal of International Development*, Volume 21, Issue 1, pages 87–111, January 2009, 88

³⁰ Ibid

to costly non-cooperative interactions. However, there are plenty of circumstances (poverty, institutional failure, constraints), mistrust (coordination failure), impatience (discounting the future) that influence the choice of non-cooperation, thus rendering the violence the optimal choice.

Recently the two phenomena are being used to explain the origins of the conflict amongst the academics: greed or grievance. The greed theory is most famously associated with the works of Paul Collier and is usually more popular amongst economists. This view suggests that conflict reflects elite competition over valuable resource rents (most usually natural resources), concealed with the feeling of public grievance. Also one should have in mind that the rebels require financial viability. Usually the finances are gathered through natural resource rents (oil or diamonds), or when supporting diasporas provide the required finances. Also it was asserted that inequality plays no significant part in increasing the risk of war.³¹ Collier et al emphasize the poverty trap – poverty, above all, makes the act of soldiering more attractive, thus lowering the opportunity cost of war in these nations. Therefore, the war influences perpetuate poverty due to the damages and losses of war. These ideas are further supported by Fearon and Laitin, who also argue that diversity, be it religious or national, make little contribution to the start of conflicts. The main cause of the conflicts in poverty stricken, failed states are venal, corrupt and inept regimes.³²

The other academic camp of intellectuals put forward the grievance idea as the main cause of conflicts. There is a long-standing position in political science that relative deprivation and grievance that it produces fuels internal violence. Olson discusses it as the collective action problem. It is rather difficult to mobilize large groups to undertake collective action, due to the fact that there is a sense of mutual mistrust amongst them, monitoring difficulties and the free-rider problem.³³ Ethnic identities, regardless if they are based on race, language, religion, tribal affiliation or regional differences, may serve as a more effective source for the purposes of group formation, compared to other forms of more transient difference that are traditionally stressed by Marxist writers, such as socioeconomic class.³⁴ The formation of group identities are therefore central to mobilizing groups, including the machinations of conflict entrepreneurs who organize men to fight each other. Conflict cannot proceed without the presence of palpably perceived group differences, or grievance, which may have historical dimensions. More recently, Frances

³¹ Ibid, 2

³² Francis Stewart, “Root causes of violent conflict in developing countries”, *The BMJ*, February 2002, 342

³³ Syed Mansoob Murshed, 2

³⁴ Ibid, 3

Stewart has introduced the notion of *horizontal inequality*, the inequality between groups, rather than the inequality that may exist amongst an ethnically homogenous population (vertical inequality). This might be the case that vertical inequality in a homogenous population, despite the class differences it engenders, does not seriously increase the risk of conflict. But that could still leave a role for group inequality, which these authors choose to ignore.³⁵

2.2. The Greed or Natural Resource Based Explanation Argument

The greed motivation behind the conflict or civil war has been popularized by empirical work on the causes of civil war where a cross-section of conflicts in different nations is analyzed together econometrically, and greed is proxied by the availability or abundance of retrievable natural resource rents.³⁶ In Collier and Hoeffler works, in the case of civil wars, the conflict stems from the greedy behavior of a rebel group in organizing an insurgency against the government. Greed is about opportunities faced by the rebel group; the so called opportunities can be disaggregated into three components: financing, recruitment and geography. The most common sources of rebel finance are the appropriation of natural resources, donations from sympathetic diasporas residing abroad, contributions from foreign states (hostile to the government) or multinational companies interested in the region.³⁷ Natural resource wealth is the main source amongst the three in terms of its relative importance. Recruitment is about the opportunity to induct fighting manpower (it is easier to recruit, when proportion of young unemployed males in population is high, in a setting of endemic poverty and poor education). Geographical situations favorable to rebel group are mountainous terrain and other safe havens for insurgents.³⁸

To sum it up, greed simply means the so called “economic opportunity” to fight, and should be distinguished from socio-political grievances. Collier and Hoeffler’s empirical findings conclude that the set of variables representing rebel opportunity or greed akin to loot-seeking are the main reasons for civil war. By implication, the alternative

³⁵ Ibid, 3

³⁶ Ibid, 3

³⁷ Francis Stewart, 343

³⁸ Syed Mansoob Murshed,, 3

hypothesis of grievance (justice-seeking) focusing on ethnic religious divisions, political repression and horizontal inequality is dismissed, although its validity is not currently formally tested for. Natural resource rents have been used to emphasize the greed or criminal motivation for civil war. Most important to the Collier and Hoeffler's empirical testing for the greed hypothesis is the role of primary commodities in the economic structure. They measure the dependence on natural resources by the share of primary commodity exports in GDP, and the validity of this metric as well as the statistical robustness of the relationship between resource rents and the risk of conflict has been called into question. Nonetheless, the combined Collier and Hoeffler greed and Fearon and Laitin messages about greed and state failure causing rebellion or civil war has had an immense influence on thinking about the origins of conflict.³⁹

To put it short, violence is one means of appropriating the resources of others. It is important to stress, that armed conflict implies the absence of contractual interaction, and is in great contrast to the alternative method of benefiting from the endowments of others via peaceful and voluntary exchange between economic agents, groups or nations. This implies that we also need to specify the conditions under which violence becomes a viable or more attractive option relative to other alternatives.⁴⁰

2.3. Grievances and Horizontal Inequality as Conflict Drivers

In the context of civil war or rebellion, grievance is sometimes described as a justice-seeking motivation. The discussion on grievances begins with grievance based theories of conflict before moving on to measurement issues. Central idea to the grievances is identity and group formation. An individual's utility may be related to his identity, specifically the relative position of the group he identifies with in the social pecking order. An individual may derive utility from certain normative forms of behavior appropriate to his identity but considered deviant by other groups, and may even face sanctions from like-minded group members if he deviates from them (bonding with the group).⁴¹ This type of behavioral paradigm may be related to solving the collective action problems, without which organized, large-scale violence is impossible, even if we believe conflict is primarily motivated by greed.

³⁹ Ibid, 4

⁴⁰ Arvind Ganesan, Alex Vines, "Engine of War: Resources, Greed, and the Predatory State", *Human Rights Watch World Report*, 2004

⁴¹ Syed Mansoob Murshed, 4

Frances Stewart argues that horizontal inequality refers to “differences in groups’ access to economic, social and political resources”. She argues that horizontal inequalities are a powerful cause of civil wars and thus aligns herself with the grievance camp. This position is predicated on the supposition that when economic, social and political power differentials exist between heterogeneous groups whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious or other categorization, the outbreak of conflict motivated by grievances can be predicted. the horizontal inequality explanation of conflict is based on the view that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this can cause deep-rooted resentments that may lead to violent struggles”.⁴² Therefore the lack of level playing fields among diverse groups in the economic, social and political life of a social life of a polity may be a salient precursor to a conflicting relationship between the powerful and the less powerful groups premised on an unexaggerated sense of grievance. It goes without saying that when severe political, economic and social horizontal inequalities exist in a society that becomes essentially polarized, the leadership and the deprived population at large will usually have the perfect motive for mobilization.⁴³

The subdivision of the theories of grievance that the author uses is: relative deprivation, polarization and horizontal inequality. While it is important to differentiate them, some overlap among the three definitions are inevitable.

2.4. Methodology and research model


In order to define the goals and motives that drive the two wings of the Right Sector, both theories will be used for analyzing both wings and the same criteria will be used for assessment.

Given the fact that the motives, actions and official claims and interpretations can be used differently for political purposes, the broad analysis will be used not only of the political/official statements of the groups and their leaders but also the real actions that can be assessed through media, news and reports. The very idea behind this method is that there will most probably be no clear depiction which theory explains the motives of the organization perfectly; it will most probably be a mixture of both. Before the research is carried out, it seems that the paramilitary wing of the party is more prone to greed and Political wing is more prone to grievance criteria. The criteria are going to be used in a

⁴² Mintehbaa, “Is grievance or greed the main cause of conflict? What can be done to prevent conflict?”, May 18, 2014 <<https://mintehbaa.wordpress.com/2014/05/18/is-grievance-or-greed-the-main-cause-of-conflict-what-can-be-done-to-prevent-conflict/>>

⁴³ Ibid

form of a table and methodically applied throughout. The criteria used in the research is provided below. The criteria were selected from works of different authors, including Francis Stewart, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Syed Mansoob Murshed.



Picture No. 1: Research out-line.

2.4.1. Greed theory criteria

Financing

Taking into account, who is major financial contributor, on it relies the organization wings motivation and actions they undertake. In case it is supported by state or ordinary civilians it is more likely these groups would be interesting in improving state capacities, even if their attitude toward authorities is quite ambiguous. On the other hand, if the funds are mainly gained from oligarchs, political parties, some certain officials the group is expected to follow rather their own agenda or at least need to take into consideration

vested interests. Another possible source of financing are foreign investors, which might influence the groups to seek their goals, or the goals of their respective countries.⁴⁴

Recruitment

Recruitment is about the opportunity to induct fighting manpower; something made easier when there is a high proportion of young unemployed males in population, in a setting of endemic poverty and poor education. A high enrolment rate of males in secondary school also reduces the conflict risk. History also matters; if a country experienced a conflict recently the risk of recurrent conflict is high, however, this risk falls proportionately to the length of the peace period. Sustained peace makes renewed rebellion less likely.⁴⁵

Contrary to the 'grievance' theory, social fractionalization, measured as religious and ethnic diversity, lowers the risk of conflict. Typically rebel organizations recruit their members from similar backgrounds and diversity may make it more difficult to generate a large rebel force and to maintain cohesion during the war. Diversity would therefore reduce the risk of conflict and massive mobilization to the rebel groups. We also control for geographical characteristics since they are likely to influence combat strategy and thus the relative military capability of the regular and rebel forces. We find the risk of civil war to be higher in more mountainous nations and countries in which the population is unequally distributed.⁴⁶

Geography

In addition to revenues and costs, a further observable factor which can be expected systematically to affect the military feasibility of rebellion is geography. Forest cover may provide rebels with a safe haven. American efforts at defoliation in Vietnam suggest that this is at least perceived as militarily important.⁴⁷ Other sorts of inaccessible geographical terrain might also be important, such as islands, mountains, swamps etc.

Geographic dispersion of the population may make military control more difficult: Herbst suggests that Zaire is intrinsically prone to rebellion because its population lives around the edges of the country, in contrast, say, to Egypt.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Sudip Pandit, "Greed Versus Grievances Theories in "Economics of Conflict", *Academia*, 2016, 1

⁴⁵ Paul Collier, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", *Centre for the Study of African Economies*, 2002, 1

⁴⁶ Paul Collier, 1

⁴⁷ Collier, 9

⁴⁸ Collier, 11

2.4.2. Grievances theory criteria:

Relative deprivation

The notion of relative deprivation dates back to the work of Ted Gurr, who defines it as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually believe they can get; in short the disparity between aspirations and achievements. Thus, educational achievements may raise the aspirations of young people, but they will become frustrated if unemployed, occasionally venting their feelings in mass political violence.⁴⁹ Gurr puts forward the following hypothesis, ‘the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity’. This lays down the notion of relative deprivation as the micro-foundation for conflict. Relative deprivation is considered to be a major cause of civil war, as well as sectarian and routine violence.

Polarization

A related notion is that of polarization, which occurs when two groups exhibit great inter-group heterogeneity combined with intra-group homogeneity. Economic polarization, along with high vertical income inequality) can occur in societies that are culturally homogenous. Ethnic polarization could, in principal, exist along with a degree of economic equality. A hybrid concept combines identity and economic polarities. In Esteban and Ray work, original and seminal concept of polarization focus on the identification and alienation framework. Their main idea is as follows: polarization is related to the alienation that groups of people feel from one another, and such alienation is fuelled by the feeling of within-group identity.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Esteban and Ray argue that the traditional measures of inequality are only concerned with interpersonal alienation, but fail to capture the dimension of group identity. When a society has a very large number of identities, then the term ethnic fractionalization is more appropriate, than polarization. Polarization effect is more related with two identities. Therefore, polarization is what may matter for conflict, rather than fractionalization and/or overall vertical (inter- individual) inequality. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol find that ethnic polarization is a significant explanatory variable for

⁴⁹ John R. Haines, 4

⁵⁰ John R. Haines, 4

civil war onset, while ethnic fractionalization is not.⁵¹

Horizontal inequality

The notion of horizontal inequalities between groups, classified by ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences, tribal affiliations etc., is thought to be an important cause of contemporary civil war and sectarian strife, but not routine violence. The idea of horizontal inequality may overlap with the notion of relative deprivation and polarization as will be indicated by alternative measures discussed below. The expression, horizontal inequality, originates in the work of Frances Stewart and should be distinguished from vertical inequality, which is the inequality within an otherwise homogenous population.⁵² Four sources of horizontal inequality may be highlighted:

- Discrimination in Public Spending and Taxation;
- High Asset Inequality;
- Economic Mismanagement and Recession;
- Grievances Related to Resource Rents.

After all I intend to raise a hypothesis, which goes as following:

The observable gap between two different wings of the same organization appeared due to the different goals and motivations. The paramilitary wing is more prone to the motives that might be addressed as greed and the political wing is more likely to be guided by the grievance. This is the main reason of the ambiguity and division between the two wings.

2.5. Greed and Grievances Research Model Visualization

The above discussed criteria can be put into a table for visualization purposes. The table can be seen below and it represents the steps in which the research will be carried out.

⁵¹ Ibid, 4

⁵² Sudip Pandit, 1

Right Sector (Goals, Motives, Actions)			
Political Wing		Paramilitary Wing	
<u>Greed theory</u>	<u>Grievance Theory</u>	<u>Greed theory</u>	<u>Grievance Theory</u>
Financing	Relative Deprivation	Financing	Relative Deprivation
Recruitment	Polarization	Recruitment	Polarization
Geography	Horizontal Inequality:	Geography	Horizontal Inequality:

Every single criterion will be evaluated using a simple evaluation system, judging if the information (from news, articles, texts) about the Right Sector can be applied. The evaluation system is simple, it applies 5 different test scores, according to the information about the Right Sector and how strongly it applies: Strongly Applies: +2; Applies: +1; N/A: 0; Does Not Apply: -1; Strongly Does Not Apply: -2. The added scores will signify how much can each theory fits to explain about different wings of the Right Sector. The final evaluation will be added to the Overview part of the thesis.

3. Research

3.1. The Split Between Right Sector's Political and Paramilitary Wings

To begin with the research, it is worth analyzing the split between the Right Sector's two main wing: Political and Paramilitary. As this research assumes, one of the ways to assess it is by analyzing the leaders. By knowing the key figures in the organization, different groups working under the Right Sector's banner can be traced.

Right sector positions itself as a nationalist movement and declares the need for a "Ukrainian national revolution." The ultimate goal of this revolution is the reformation of Ukraine into a full nation-state, which would be built based on Christian moral norms and principles of social justice. According to them, the main task of the state is still the preservation of national identity of Ukrainians. Also, the Right Sector declares the need to struggle against Russian imperialism and its agents of influence inside Ukraine. The

organization is also characterized by an ambivalent attitude towards integration to European Union and towards NATO membership. On the one hand, the possible accession to NATO and the EU is seen as a positive step, as the country's exit from the zone of influence of Russia.⁵³ Whatever their ideological differences, the groups, factions, and groupuscules associated Right Sector were active in the pro-EU protests—whether non-violently or violently.⁵⁴ The active participation of Ukraine's far-right movement in the democratic, pro-European Union Maidan protests seems to present an enigma. The European Union's official values and principles are implicitly if not explicitly anti-nationalist. The Right Sector's ambivalent, soft, or even positive stance toward the European Union and NATO made it an outlier among similar European parties. In both the European Union and Russia, far-right parties tend to be vocally anti-liberal, plainly anti-American, and more or less anti-European Union.⁵⁵

Right Sector made its big appearance in Ukraine, during the Maidan, where radical organizations like, Trident, Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People's Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO), Ukraine's Patriot, White Hammer and other nationalist groups from around Ukraine organized themselves into the general movement. On December 1st, 2013, Right Sector took part in the unsuccessful assault on the Presidential Administration. Initially, at that time, the leader of the parliamentary opposition (including the head of the "Freedom" - Oleg Tyahnybok) distanced themselves from these radicals. But the more the growing movement of the Right Sector, the more powerful they become. As a result, the head of the Right Sector - Dmitry Yarosh even personally met with the President in that time - Viktor Yanukovich, and after the Maidan he was offered the post of Deputy Head of the National Security Council, which he refused. In March 2014, on the basis of the movement - Right Sector political party was founded. In autumn, the party split, as a result, on 11th of November 2015, Yarosh resigned as the party leader.⁵⁶

In early 2014 Dmitry Yarosh announce that there are 10 000 members of the Right Sector. Already in 2015, the organization show that about 20-25 thousand members. This data showed to be excessive.⁵⁷ According to an article by Andreas Umland and Anton

⁵³ Politeka, “Готов ли «Правый сектор» к своей «октябрьской революции»”, July 24, 2015, <<https://politeka.net/news/51963-gotov-li-pravyj-sektor-k-svoej-oktyabrskoj-revoljutsii/>>

⁵⁴ Anton Shekhovtsov, Andreas Umland, “Ukraine's radical Right”, The Maidan and Beyond, *Journal of Democracy*, July 2014, Volume 25, Number 3, 59

⁵⁵ Ibid. 60

⁵⁶ Denis Rafalskiy, “Свобода”, Правый сектор и Нацкорпус Билецкого могут создать единое движение”, Strana.ua, February 17 2017, <<https://strana.ua/articles/analysis/56304-22-fevralya.html>>

⁵⁷ Politeka, “Готов ли «Правый сектор» к своей «октябрьской революции»”

Shekhovtsov⁵⁸, at the end of January 2014 group had about 300 members. According their data, the total number of Right Sector was about 2,000 personnel, including 700 soldiers are at the front and 1300 - in reserve battalions. Given that we do not have more precise data, we state the assumption that the total number of members in the militias, and outside of these units did not exceed 10 thousand people in 2015.⁵⁹

Right Sector claimed that two of its members were killed after being set upon by police in the town of Mukachevo, western Ukraine. The Interior Ministry said the group had fired first. Just after the incident, Right Sector demanded the resignation of the interior Minister and threatened to send battalions of fighters to Kiev. Ukraine's government says that Right Sector and other groups have to decide whether they want to be political groups or combat battalions, but cannot be both. However though, battalion commanders have political views and that can hardly be changed.⁶⁰

Up till recently, the Right Sector was lead by Dmitro Yarosh - leader of nationalist Trident organization, also a politician who the deputy of Verkhovna Rada and holds the position of advisor of the Chief of Staff of Ukrainian Army. Only last year, in November 11 2015, Dmitro Yarosh has resigned from the position of Right Sector leader. Yarosh stated that internal tensions and fragmentation is not allowing him to lead the organization properly. It is worth noticing that Yarosh still has strong support from various Right Sector fractions.⁶¹

At least for now, the glory days of the volunteer fighting units of the ultra-nationalist Right Sector organization are coming to an end. The controversial group has been riven by disagreements over politics, and the need to integrate with Ukraine's military command structure. While there are two splinter groups still operating independently in the war zone, around 130 former Right Sector fighters are now contracted soldiers in the Ukrainian army proper. The original Right Sector unit was fiercely independent, and formidable in battle.⁶² A group of 130 Right Sector fighters initially signed up with Ukraine's 54th Mechanized Brigade, on the condition that they remain together as a company. However, after only a year the army split the group up and posted them to six different units. About 40 of the fighters

⁵⁸ Anton Shekhovtsov, 60

⁵⁹ Ibid, 60

⁶⁰ Elizabeth Piper, Sergiy Karazy, "Ukraine struggles to control maverick battalions", *Reuters Special Report*, Kiev, 2015 July 29, 6, <<http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/15/07/UKRAINE-CRISIS:BATTALIONS.pdf>>

⁶¹ UNIAN, "Yarosh steps down as leader of Right Sector – claims lack of authority", November 11, 2017, <<https://www.unian.info/politics/1180517-yarosh-steps-down-as-leader-of-right-sector-claims-lack-of-authority.html>>

⁶² Illia Ponomarenko, "Former Right Sector fighters keep volunteer spirit alive in regular army", *Kyiv Post*, November 2, 2017, <<https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/former-right-sector-fighters-keep-volunteer-spirit-alive-regular-army.html>>

managed to stay together in the army's Donbas-Ukraine Battalion, deployed near the stronghold city of Mariupol some 620 kilometers southeast of Kyiv, protecting nearly 500,000 people.⁶³

3.2. Right Sector as a Paramilitary Organization

3.2.1. Greed theory:

Financing:

There are various public opinions on where does the Right Sectors paramilitary fighters receive the financing from. The possible supporters allegedly vary from USA agents, to the Kremlin itself, depending on the source.

The militias are allies of Ukraine's central government, and most coordinate with it, but they are not under its full control. The Azov Battalion, for instance, answers to the Ministry of the Interior, and receives considerable government support. By contrast, the unaffiliated Right Sector operates independently, and has refused to even register with the government. Therefore the Right Sector receives no official financial support from Ukrainian Government.⁶⁴ There are a lot of different claims in media regarding foreign support for the organization. It is quite common to hear from the pro-Russian media that CIA, FBI and other US services are supporting and training Right-Sector militants.⁶⁵ One of the claims is that the Right Sector might be financed directly by Kremlin together with other European Radical-Right parties and organizations.⁶⁶ None of these claims can be confirmed by official open-source data, nonetheless if they were to be true organization would be discredited amongst the supporters.

The official position regarding the Right Sector's funding is that the organization is donation-based. One of its fundraising locations is its headquarters on Kiev's Maidan, the

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Amanda Taub, "Pro-Kiev militias are fighting Putin, but has Ukraine created a monster it can't control?", VOX, February 20, 2015, <<http://www.vox.com/2015/2/20/8072643/ukraine-volunteer-battalion-danger>>

⁶⁵ Kurt Nimmo, "Color rebolution collaboration began soon after engineered fall of Soviet Union", Info-Wars, May 27, 2014, <<http://www.infowars.com/soros-admits-responsibility-for-coup-and-mass-murder-in-ukraine/>>

⁶⁶ Politnavigator, "Правый сектор» финансируется Путиным, — советник министра культуры Украины", December 7, 2015, <<http://www.politnavigator.net/pravyjj-sektor-finansiruetsya-putinyim-sovetnik-ministra-kultury-ukrainy.html>>

dilapidated site of the recent protests.⁶⁷ As an addition to the donations and assistance of volunteers, the Right Sector is organizing events and concerts in order to gather additional funds. At the same time, Right Sector receives unofficial support – individuals simply forward cash or other necessary items. Volunteers help to obtain everything from food to uniforms and night-vision goggles. The main shortage that Right Sector is struggling with are the weapons. Due to the unapproved status in Ukraine, it is hard to officially buy or obtain weapons of any sort. Bartell-trade is one of the ways that Right Sector’s volunteers obtain them – especially from regular military units. Front-line captured enemy weapons are exchanged to cigarettes, spirits and other goods. Weapons of fallen Ukrainian army comrades are taken and reported as missing in action. The ammunition is harder to keep track on therefore they are more easily acquirable.⁶⁸ It can be assumed that Right-Sector militant fighters are well-respected amongst Ukrainian Military soldiers if they are willing to risk facing criminal charges for their illegal support, despite their non-recognition by Ukrainian Officials.⁶⁹

Nonetheless, Right-Sectors relative financial independence from Government Institutions give them opportunity to be a wild-card in the Ukrainian Crisis. Most of the volunteer battalions are already incorporated into Military or National Guard structures and are under command of the Army Officers. Right Sector’s militia squads are independent, under the command of organization leaders. Taking into account inside fractures of organizational leaders, various groups may be unpredictable. One of the most iconic examples of such insurgencies occurred on July 11 2015, when violence broke out in Mukachevo, just east of the Slovakian and Romanian borders. The dispute began when local police accused the ultranationalist Right Sector group of smuggling cigarettes. Right Sector members are no ordinary citizens—they have military-grade weapons and serve independently on the front lines against Russian-backed rebels. The conflict remains unresolved, with Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh accusing Kiev of attacking its own, rather than focusing on the war in the east. As Right Sector surfaces once again, it is helpful to revisit the group’s origins to examine the impact the group may have on the conflict in the Donbas.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Hanna Kozłowska, “The Fascists Are Coming, the Fascists Are Coming!”, *Foreign Policy*, June 2, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/02/the-fascists-are-coming-the-fascists-are-coming/?wp_login_redirect=0>

⁶⁸ Mykhailo Hlukhovskiy, “Right Sector fighter: regular army arms us, bypassing official system”, *Euromaidanpress*, December 20, 2014, <<http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/12/20/right-sector-battalion-fighter-the-regular-army-finds-ways-around-the-official-system-to-arm-us/>>

⁶⁹ *Ibid*,

⁷⁰ Julia Embody, “Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector”

Recruitment

“I feel quite comfortable being at war because I have prepared for it for twenty years, physically and psychologically” – a direct quote from Dimitry Yarosh. For years, many far-right activists had devoted much effort to military training and sports, rather than concentrating on the political activity per se. There are certainly tendencies of individuals joining the ranks of the Right Sector.⁷¹

During the first weeks of Maidan, Radical nationalists were prominent in street clashes with Pro-Russian demonstrators, but when military operations began in the Eastern Ukraine – a lot of them went to the front without caring too much in which unit to fight. At the same time several organizations, however, set about establishing their own volunteer militant formations. By forming their own units, they could remain relatively independent, fight as pre-prepared units and make use of their presence in the rear to raise money and equip the detachment. These action also earned a name for them.⁷² According to Vyacheslav Likhachev, these units could have been established in three main ways: 1) as territorial defense battalions (BTD) – who are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, 2) as part of the National Guard – who are set up as a result of reforms to the Internal Troops of Ukraine and are subordinate to the Interior Ministry, or 3) as special purpose units of the Interior Ministry. Or, they could just start fighting without having a legal status. This was the way for the Right Sector, when they set up the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps. Some of the battalions are still not officially recognized while being used for more than three years in battles. There were several reasons why these battalions were not incorporated into the structure of Ukrainian Armed Forces: 1) battalions were reluctant to lose their autonomy and independence, 2) they distrusted Ukrainian armed forces authority in general, and 3) they simply lacked structure and organization.

The materialization of these battalions had propaganda value during the conflict, especially in the beginning. Likhachev argues that media exaggerates the role of volunteers in the war effort. They have never played a bigger role than supporting the Ukrainian Army's Units. Regular army and special police units bore the brunt of war. Regarding the structure of these battalions, fighters with previous party experience constituted only a minority. The main leaders and activists were surrounded by a wider circle of newcomers who sympathized with their nationalist ideology and were attracted by the extremists' robust rhetoric while still

⁷¹ Vyacheslav Likhachev, “Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector”, July 2016, page 11, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnv95_uk_likhachev_far-right_radicals_final.pdf>

⁷² Ibid

on the Maidan. The third even wider circle of support gathered around those once the war began, came to see the nationalists as a resolute force ready to repel the invaders. This last group did not hold far right views, at least in the beginning. They wanted to join Right Sector's Ukrainian Volunteer Corps since for them it was simply a way to fight for their country and make the biggest impact. There is even evidence that some left-wing activists went to fight in these units. On the other hand, newcomers to these units were gradually indoctrinated with radical nationalist views, including xenophobia.⁷³

Right-Sector's Ukrainian Volunteer Corps have 11 battalions, three of which are in reserve and one is constantly deployed at the front. There are around 500 soldiers per battalion. Due to its specific structure, individuals come and go and the numbers of fighters constantly vary. In addition, there are members of Right-Sector organization fighting in the ranks of Aidar, Azov, Donbas, with even more to be found in Dnipro-1. Recruitment is not a hard task for the Right-Sector's Ukrainian Volunteer Corps.⁷⁴ As with many things in Ukraine, the far right's numbers, as well as the extent of Kiev's control over their battalions, remains nebulous. In July 2015, Right Sector's Dmytro Yarosh was able to call up around 5,000 members for a march in Kiev, though how many of the participants were fighters as opposed to party supporters is unclear.⁷⁵ The size of Right Sector is difficult to gauge. Its press secretary, Artem Skoropadsky, boasts of membership "in the thousands," and Yarosh has claimed that the organization could mobilize 10,000 through its regional chapters. Most experts, however, place the total number at somewhere between 300 and 500.

Svoboda's active participation and Right Sector's formation from pre-existing groups attests to the importance of examining on the ground processes of social mobilization in-between electoral cycles. From the vantage point of electoral politics and elites, scholars have only a partial view of the political process and the emergence of challenger groups. By exploring the on the ground processes of political mobilization from the perspective of activists, future research can extend the insights of this study to understand the evolution of the radical right in Ukraine and other post-Communist countries. Exploring what motivates individuals to join radical movements ultimately illuminates why radical right parties succeed or fail at the polls.⁷⁶

⁷³ Ibid, page 14

⁷⁴ Mykhailo Hlukhovskyyi, "Right Sector fighter: regular army arms us, bypassing official system"

⁷⁵ Lev Golinkin, "Winter Is Coming. And So Is Ukraine's Far Right.", *Foreign Policy*, October 8, 2015, <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/08/ukraines-far-right-threat-poroshenko-imf-austerity-winter/>>

⁷⁶ Alina Polyakova, "From the provinces to the parliament: How the Ukrainian radical right mobilized in Galicia", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 2, June 2014, 223-224

Geography:

To answer the logic behind the geography of the Right-Sector support it is needed to take a deeper look into the nature of Ukrainian nationalism. Nationalism was born out of the oppression of the Ukrainian nation, directed primarily against the oppressors and present among virtually all political movements. In most cases it took moderate forms as in the case of Ukrainian Social-Democrats in the East, National-Democrats in the West and populists on both sides of the border. It might be argued that it was simply a political expression of the problem of economic dependency. The economic dependence was to an extent a national problem, but nationalism always coexisted with other narratives focusing on its socioeconomic aspects.⁷⁷

Whenever nationalism came to the fore and took more extreme forms, it was a form of retaliation to the increased repression and threats to Ukrainian autonomy. One of such cases was the clear shift to the right in the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Republic when Soviet Russia established a rival Ukrainian government in Kharkov and advanced into the country. The most extreme form of Ukrainian nationalism was promoted by the fascist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists became prominent mostly due to the combination of repression by the Polish government in the West and the Stalinist terror in the East. The current rise of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist-inspired Svoboda and Right Sector in the Western regions of nowadays Ukraine was similarly a result of the perception that Russian-speaking oligarchy from the East dominated the country politically. The nationalists in the East, although in a different Greater-Russian flavor, similarly gained momentum once it became clear that the new government in Kiev represents interests of the Western Ukraine.⁷⁸

As long as the current conflict is decided by military means and foreign intervention nationalism will rise and dominate. The far-right seem to have lost ground in the efforts to create a certain national unity but a collapse of the Kiev government due to Russian intervention would most likely lead to a nationalist fervor in the West. Western intervention and support will continue to inspire the Great-Russian nationalism in the East. Once some stability returns to Ukraine and the external threats are no longer immediate people across

⁷⁷ RS21, "Ukraine: between East and West", July 2, 2014, <<https://rs21.org.uk/2014/07/02/ukraine-between-east-and-west/>>

⁷⁸ Ibid

Ukraine will have a better chance of challenging the government over corruption, poverty and austerity policies and organize freely around issues important for both East and West.⁷⁹

3.2.2. Grievance theory:

Relative Deprivation

Euromaidan started as a peaceful protest against the decisions of the ruling elites that tried to suppress the will of the people that was portrayed as a new chapter in the narrative of far-right nationalism in Ukraine and was primarily associated with a long desired (by certain external forces) transformation of Ukraine into a “fascist state”. Nevertheless, I would argue that this period simultaneously became an hour of triumph and a major graveyard of currently existing far-right political parties and movements in Ukraine.⁸⁰

The radicalization of events during Euromaidan substantially inflated the and the Right Sector (which consisted of several semi-militarized groups and was in fact one of many “units” that comprised the “Maidan self-defense”) putting them at the forefront of the events in Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti). The reportedly astounding success of these ultranationalist forces was greatly owed to the enormous efforts of the international mass media. Actually, the reality was very different to how it looked on the TV screens. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that it was Euromaidan that in many respects dealt a severe blow to the image of Ukrainian far-right nationalism. Violent provocations, explicit anti-Semitism (and indiscriminate ethnic nationalism), outrageous populism, the inability to put forth political demands based on Ukrainian national interests – all these factors disqualified the Right Sector as a political force. In this respect the main indicator to look at is the level of public support received by two forces in the electoral process. In presidential and parliamentary elections that took place in the year 2014 the Right Sector suffered a complete and humiliating defeat that clearly signified the real extent of ultra nationalism’s popularity as an ideology in Ukraine. Right Sector managed to obtain 0.7% and 1.8% of the popular vote during parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively. On the one hand, the growth in popularity of the ultra-right groups is primarily related to their populist

⁷⁹ Ibid

⁸⁰ Alla Hurska, “Far-right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs. Weak Essence”, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, February 2016

agendas, which seem to have appealed to many Ukrainians who are sick and tired of worsening economic conditions and the disarray in which Ukraine has been submerged since Euromaidan. Similarly, one should keep in mind that the mentioned success also stemmed from the decreasing popularity of the ruling political forces that (for obvious and quite understandable reasons) have not been able to produce a miracle and rapidly achieve economic stabilization.

The prominent participation of the Right Sector in the democratic, pro-European Union Maidan protests might present an ideological puzzle.⁸¹ The most obvious explanation for this active participation in the Euromaidan might be the primary goal shared by all Ukrainian nationalists: to liberate Kyiv from the Moscow's hegemony. The signing of the European Union Association Agreement has been understood by most Ukrainian nationalists - as a choice between the West and Russia. The more Ukraine integrates with the European Union the less will Russia have influence on Kyiv. This fundamental consideration has been enough to turn most of the far-right into supporters of the Association Agreement. Unshackling from Kremlin influence was seen as a crucial step for an independent evolution of the Ukrainian nation and even prosperous economy.⁸² Ideologically, neither the Right Sector, nor other far right groups are not pro-European Union, but their social conservatism, heterosexism, and populist nationalism - all attitudes commonly found among Europe's far-right parties. Yet, most of the right wing groups featured in the Euromaidan together with the a broad alliance reaching even the radical left.⁸³

Taking into account the main criteria ultranationalists have always represented weak and unpopular margins of Ukrainian society. Likewise, it should be kept in mind that nationalists (even though their ideologies do/did converge to a certain extent) have never been able to assume common positions. In the end, historical evidence suggests that various forces are prone to engaging in mutually destructive competition rather than finding a common denominator.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Anton Shekhovtsov, 60

⁸² Ibid, 60

⁸³ Ibid, 61

⁸⁴ Alla Hurska, "Far-right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs. Weak Essence"

Polarization:

Ukrainian radical nationalists tried to create a sense of dichotomy in the state since early 1990's with their appeals to strengthen the role of the Ukrainian language and to separate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow patriarchate. Such ideological platform of most Ukrainian ultranationalists gave the impression of being outdated to the general public. Furthermore, the specter of Russian imperialism, which far-right activists used to scare Ukrainians, did not look in the least frightening in the 1990s. On the basis of an ethnocentric and exclusive understanding of nationhood, the radical right demanded changes to the linguistic, cultural and religious status quo that had emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their claim of descent from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists might have won the sympathy of some people in Ukraine's Western regions (especially Galicia) but by slavishly repeating the slogans of last century's independence fighters, Ukrainian far-right activists showed themselves for the general public to be out of date. Attempts to use these slogans to fire up a population that was intent on surviving in difficult economic conditions proved unsuccessful.⁸⁵

Efforts to update the stock of nationalist ideas and slogans fared even worse. Borrowing anti-immigrant slogans from Western Europe and applying them to Ukraine just would not do. The aggressive xenophobia of these radical nationalists was also a turn-off for the general population, as was their predilection for violence. Political violence might be considered the main criterion for characterizing nationalist organizations as radical. Violence and street fights with the police and political opponents might have attracted a racist teenage subculture, which was trying to imitate Western and especially Russian Nazi-skinheads, but they did not win over voters.

The main changes occurred after Viktor Yanukovich coming to power in 2010. The "Kharkov agreements" which, provided for the lease of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol to be extended, as well as other steps taken by Yanukovich, led many people to fear for Ukraine's national security and sovereignty. Before, the radical-nationalist idea that the fight for real independence was still happening appeared to be an anachronism, but as the context changed, it became topical again. At a time when the confrontation between society and the authorities was escalating quickly, many saw the radical nationalists as uncompromising, thus credible opponents. This is what explains the unprecedented success

⁸⁵ Vyacheslav Likhaev, "Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector", 8

of Oleh Tyahnybok's radical right-wing party "All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda" in the elections to the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) at the end of 2012. With 10.44% of the vote, Svoboda easily surpassed the election threshold and formed its own parliamentary faction. In the run-up to the Maidan, it became the main radical right-wing political force in Ukraine, although it was soon to lose its monopoly on ultra-nationalism.⁸⁶

During the events of Mukachevo, there were two opposing views on what actually happened. The Right Sector claimed that their soldiers were fighting smuggling in the area and they were treacherously lured to a meeting with one of the local authority personnel, which was ambushed with the by an armed gang working in the region (Йовбак – also known as титущка – a violent group member, acting against authorities in Ukraine) that ended with the murder of two Right Sector members. At the same time, the law enforcement authorities claimed that Mukachevo events were just a fight for control over the flow of contraband in the Carpathian region, which resulted in gang violence.⁸⁷ The most important part about this confrontation was the split of the understanding what happened and different groups trying to rely on a particular segment of the civil society. Some authors argue, that around this event two sides crystalized: the Ukrainian citizens, who can be called "legitimists" and the "revolutionaries". The first group insisted that loyalty to the state and its leaders was a necessary condition for the preservation of the state in terms of invasion. Accordingly, any reforms should be carried out under the control of the political leadership, and should not be rushed. Any acts of civil disobedience should be equated as treason. For the revolutionaries, the most important factor was in the first place is not an abstract legitimacy of the government, but what could be seen as the legacy of the "spirit of the Maidan."⁸⁸

Horizontal Inequality:

The growth in popularity of the ultra-right groups is primarily related to their populist agendas, which seem to have appealed to many Ukrainians who are sick and tired of worsening economic conditions and the disarray in which Ukraine has been submerged since Euromaidan. Similarly, one should keep in mind that the mentioned success also stemmed from the decreasing popularity of the ruling political forces that (for obvious and quite understandable reasons) have not been able to produce a miracle and rapidly achieve

⁸⁶ Ibid, 8-9

⁸⁷ Politeka, "Раскол общества после", July 14, 2017, <https://politeka.net/news/46212-raskol-obshhestva-posle-mukachevo/?utm_source=read_also>

⁸⁸ Ibid

economic stabilization. Moreover, sound populist proclamations find a vivid response within broad layers of Ukrainians when it comes to the situation in the south-east of the country – these forces tend to offer simple solutions to very complicated and sensitive issues, thereby giving a good pretext for accusing the incumbent president and government of indecisiveness and treasonous behavior.⁸⁹

Ultrationalists have always represented weak and unpopular margins of Ukrainian society. Likewise, it should be kept in mind that nationalists (even though their ideologies do/did converge to a certain extent) have never been able to assume common positions. In the end, historical evidence suggests that various forces are prone to engaging in mutually destructive competition rather than finding a common denominator. In 2014 March and April, the depreciation of the hryvnia has significantly affected Ukraine's economic activity. The uncontrolled fluctuations of the currency's exchange rate caused panic among import-export businesses. At the same time, the macroeconomic situation in Ukraine continued to carry a number of long-term risks.⁹⁰ According to the authors of a report in the quarterly Investment Capital Ukraine, during 2014 the key factors of the economic crisis were as follows:

- Losses from foreign aggression. The annexation of Crimea and the Russian military threat has forced businesses and the public to suspend investing and actively start a policy of saving. According to Investment Capital Ukraine, this meant a loss of about 4.3% of GDP in 2014. Added to the further loss of 3.7% due to the annexation of Crimea.
- The rising costs of servicing the public debt.
- The increase in the number government funded banks and State Owned Enterprises.
- The price of Russian gas which will determine the level of deficit for the state oil and gas company Naftogaz Ukraine.
- An extremely important factor has been the reduction of traditional Russian markets for Ukrainian heavy industry goods. This is due to three main reasons: political and military conflict between the two countries; imposed trade restrictions by the Russian side and Moscow switching to other suppliers of imported goods. Experts cite that the main reasons for low production among Ukrainian businesses are due to the lowering

⁸⁹ Alla Hurska, "Far-right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs. Weak Essence"

⁹⁰ Vyacheslav Likhahev, "Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector", 16

of Russian demand for Ukrainian products.⁹¹

3.3. Right Sector as a Political Party

Right Sector transformed into a political party in spring 2014. It received widespread attention in the Ukrainian and Russian media, both positive and negative, although it remained an extremely weak association, full of internal conflicts, scandals and fighting for power. The party's attitude towards the new, post-revolutionary, authorities was among the most disputed issues, as well as the question of the party's working practices which also caused serious disagreements. In addition, several leaders of the groups that had initially joined Right Sector had their own strong political ambitions and never accepted D. Yarosh's leadership.⁹² Ukraine's government says that Right Sector and other groups have to decide whether they want to be political groups or combat battalions, but cannot be both. Inevitably, though, battalion commanders have political views.⁹³

3.3.1. Greed theory:

Financing:

The current laws for example, allocate State funding only for those parties that have passed the 5% threshold to enter the Verkhovna Rada under the proportional representation part of the (current) electoral system. As such, those parties that are new, for example Khvylya, or are not such as the Civic Platform or Dem Alliance that gathered 2 or 3% in the last election, get nothing for their forthcoming electioneering campaigns from the State. The same applies to the Right Sector.⁹⁴ small and/or developing parties are generally without, or hardly benefit from, oligarchy interest and sponsoring – *ergo* they are poor – and neither do they currently count among their ranks and friends unaffiliated media moguls that will donate large amounts of air time to their electoral campaigns for free/cheap – unlike most that will get State electioneering funding.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Oleg Grytsaienko, "The Crisis in Ukraine: An Insider's View", June 2014, <file:///Users/pro/Downloads/ifri_rnv_78_ukraine_oleg_grytsaienko_june_2014_eng_0.pdf>

⁹² Vyacheslav Likhahev, "Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector"

⁹³ Elizabeth Piper, Sergiy Karazy

⁹⁴ Nikolai Holmov, "10 political parties adhere to the State funding requirements – Ukraine", Odessatalk, July 10, 2016, <<http://www.odessatalk.com/2016/07/10-political-parties-adhere-state-funding-requirements-ukraine/>>

⁹⁵ Ibid

There is currently no information regarding the campaign budget of the the Right Sector political party, but the best educated guess is that the organization is using the same funds as for their military groups. As the Leadership of NLM “The Right Sector” declared in their official statement before the 2015 local elections: “At this stage it is also inappropriate to spend our strength and resources on an attempt to change the system by integrating into one of its layers. This would not benefit Ukraine, and would cause reputational damage to our political force”. This statement clearly depicts that resources are scarce and most probably are rather spent in military operations.⁹⁶

Furthermore, on April 2017, Pechersk District Court of Kiev fined the head of the Right Sector Andrei Tarasenko for 5 thousand UAH for violations in the financial statements of the party. This was stated in the court ruling of March 22.⁹⁷ The National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption established that Tarasenko, being the head of the Right Sector political party, violated the established procedure for submitting a financial report on property, income, expenses and financial obligations. In particular, in November 2016, "Right Sector" filed a financial report from 22 local party cells, at the same time it was indicated that the Right Sector has 66 local cells.⁹⁸ Thus, there were no reports on the financial performance of 44 local party cells.

Recruitment

“No political force should have, and will not have, any kind of armed cells. No political organization has the right to establish ... criminal groups,” Poroshenko said on July 13th. The president said he might legislate for emergency powers to deal with armed groups, and that anyone armed who was not a member of the law enforcement agencies “will be classed as a terrorist.” But interviews with members of volunteer battalions and Ukraine officials suggest it will not be easy for Poroshenko to impose his will. Some battalion leaders, while ostensibly under the control of the government, are increasingly critical of Ukraine’s political leaders. They want to press them to sack judges seen as favoring the rich and

⁹⁶ Провід НБР "Правий сектор", “Political party "The Right Sector" does not support any candidate in the upcoming local election.”, December 12, 2015, <<http://sectorpravdy.com/en/news/news-uvc/1310-political-party-the-right-sector-does-not-support-any-candidate-on-the-upcoming-local-election>>

⁹⁷ Ukranews, “Главу "Правого сектора" оштрафовали на 5 тыс. гривен за нарушения в фінотчетности партии”, 10th April, 2017, <<https://ukranews.com/news/491014-glavu-pravogo-sektora-oshtrafovaly-na-5-tys-gryven-za-narushenyya-v-fynotchetnosty-partyy>>

⁹⁸ Ibid

powerful, to oust oligarchs who control much of the economy and to prosecute the riot police accused of killing more than 100 people during protests early last year.⁹⁹

As a political party, the Right Sector is ideologically quite different from the movement under the same name that was formed during the 2014 revolution; the party is less radical than the movement, so the term “national conservative” could be used as a more relevant one.¹⁰⁰ The Right Sector party has mainly held rallies in support of ATO and selective direct grassroots actions against certain officials. After the developments in Mukachevo, the party announced a nationwide campaign to change government and announced the deployment of agencies to prepare a nationwide referendum. No practical action in this area ever followed. The party also announced its participation in local elections.¹⁰¹ During the 2014 Parliamentary elections, Party “Right Sector” has received more votes than its leader in presidential elections, but the result is quite low (1.8 percent). Best performance was in Western Ukraine, Kyiv city and Oblast, and in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in the 39th constituency, in which party’s leader Dmytro Yarosh was elected to parliament.¹⁰² These ambivalent results show a dichotomy between how Right Sector Party and Right Sector organisation are perceived. Even though the organisation is supported throughout the country, their political claims are far less supported, even if the political agenda is less radical.

It seems that for the Right Sector the the actual rise to power is not the only way of implementing their ideological goals. Constant threats of the “Third Maidan”¹⁰³ is a leverage that seems to be working. This is a way of implementing pressure on the authorities to preserve the possibility of the existence of informal militias. It is noticeable that radicalism of the Right Sector is amplified in periods of acute conflict with state law

⁹⁹ Elizabeth Piper, Sergiy Karazy, 2

¹⁰⁰ Anton Shekhovtsov, “Ukraine’s Parliamentary Elections and the Far Right”, The Interpreter, October 26, 2014, <<http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraines-parliamentary-elections-and-the-far-right/>>

¹⁰¹ Razumkov Center, “Party System Of Ukraine Before And After Maidan: Changes, Trends, Public Demand”, National Security & Defence, π 6-7 (155-156), 2015, 32

¹⁰² Andriy Gorbal, Serhij Vasylychenko, “The new political landscape of Ukraine”, *Euromaidan press*, 2015/04/24, <<http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/04/24/the-new-political-landscape-of-ukraine/#arv1bdata>>

¹⁰³ *As the Russia-sponsored separatist war in its eastern region of Donbass continues, there is an increasingly widespread perception among Ukrainians that their government lacks the political will to fight corruption, which has plagued the country ever since it declared independence in 1991. As popular disillusionment with the post-Maidan trajectory has increased, populists of all stripes and temperaments have been brought to the surface of Ukraine's turbulent political waters. What unites them all is their argument that President Petro Poroshenko and the government are "hopelessly mired in their corrupt ways" and nothing short of another (this would be a third) Maidan revolution could rescue Ukraine. Though garnering a pretty modest support - a mere few percent of the electorate . / Peter Zalmayev, “Is Ukraine on the brink of another Maidan?”, Aljazeera, December 14, 2017, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ukraine-brink-maidan-171213123711934.html>>*

enforcement agencies, such as after the murder of Sasha Bilogo or in connection with the events in Mukachevo, and actually not a lot depends on the Ukrainian domestic political agenda. The idea of the national referendum could be also treated as a way to show Right Sector's mobilizing abilities and to present itself as an important force in domestic politics. The idea of such referendum can be used more than once, without actually happening, to implement their political agenda.¹⁰⁴

Geography:

Alina Polyakova in her study considers the region of Galicia - the historical "heartland" of Ukrainian nationalism. Prior to Right Sector and Svoboda, all national democratic parties, such as Rukh in the early 1990s, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine in the 2000s, and Tymoshenko's BYuT in 2010-2012, received high support in Galicia. More radical ethnic nationalist parties, such as Svoboda's predecessor, the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU) and the short-lived Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO) in the 1990s, have also benefitted from Galicia's historical links with nationalist movements during the inter-war era, particularly OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Independence Army), which was most active in Galicia. As Galicia's largest city, L'viv has been at the center of organizational and ideological activity for nationalist radical right movements for two reasons: historical legacy of ultra-nationalism and Galicia's active and civically engaged political culture. These two elements have made the nationalist radical right message, as opposed to a leftist one, particularly appealing in the region in the post-Orange Revolution period. In addition to a historical legacy of nationalism, Galician political culture is particularly conducive to political mobilization. Previous studies have noted differences in civic and political culture between Galicia and the rest of Ukraine.¹⁰⁵

Consequently, all radical right successor parties of the post-Soviet period, such as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) and Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO), and Svoboda's predecessor, the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), received disproportionately high electoral support in Galicia even though they failed to gain national representation. While national democratic parties and movements,

¹⁰⁴ Politeka, "Готов ли «Правый сектор» к своей «октябрьской революции»"

¹⁰⁵ Alina Polyakova, "From the provinces to the parliament: How the Ukrainian radical right mobilized in Galicia"

such as Rukh, were more popular in Galicia than radical right parties, when compared to other Ukrainian regions, radical right parties received greater electoral support in Galicia¹⁰⁶

The view that Ukraine's radical right movements were bound to remain a localized Galician phenomenon was common in my interviews with political analysts and local academics. In Fall 2011, when asked about Svoboda's electoral prospects, a common reply from academics, journalists, and political analysts was that Svoboda's support in Galicia was expected given the region's historical and cultural specificity. Its ideological stance being too radical for most Ukrainians, Svoboda, like its predecessors, would remain a Galician party without much prospect for expansion to the national level. Of course, the 2012 parliamentary elections signaled that the movement had expanded beyond the Galician heartland into neighboring western regions and Kyiv. Party "Right Sector" has received more votes than its leader in presidential election, but the result is quite low. Best performance was in Western Ukraine, Kyiv city and region, and in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, in the 39th constituency, in which party's leader Dmytro Yarosh was elected to parliament.¹⁰⁷

3.3.2. Grievance theory:

Relative Deprivation

On February 22, 2017 a rally of the three right-wing party (Right Sector, Freedom and National Corps) supporters happened.¹⁰⁸ The rally was called the "March of national dignity" and the were leaders of the three nationalist parties voiced their demands to the authorities of Ukraine. These demands give a clear glimpse to the ideas that the voters of the right-wing parties actually support. The leaders demanded an end to trade with Russia and the territories to the east, beyond the control of Kiev, as well as to fulfil the requirements of Euromaidan: to "de-oligarchise" the country, to get rid of corruption and punish the killers of the Heavenly Hundred. Speakers of the parties at the rally said that the Maidan ended, but the revolution continues. A representative of the demonstrators - Andrei Biletsky - read out in parliament their demands - to sever diplomatic relations with Russia. In addition, nationalists were seeking to ban selling and privatizing strategic enterprises.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Ukraine Center for Social Data, "New political landscape of Ukraine: Geographical peculiarities of presidential and parliamentary elections of 2014", May 31, 2016, <<http://socialdata.org.ua/en/new-political-landscape-of-ukraine-geographical-peculiarities-of-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections-of-2014/>>

¹⁰⁸ Deutsche Well, "Українські націоналісти провели "Марш достоїнства" в Києві", February 22, 2017

They required for a "new policy, which would be based on the priority of national interests, as well as the dissolution of Parliament and new elections."¹⁰⁹

Polarization:

The Right Sector declaratively assumed responsibility for the violent confrontation with the police, and it became identified in the media with an active part of the protest movement. This contributed, on the one hand, to the demonization of the Right Sector in the media hostile to the Ukrainian revolution, and on the other hand, to the relative popularity of the party in the eyes of the supporters of the Maidan. However, the leader of the "Right Sector" Дмитро Ярош was unable to convert this popularity into electoral support. Tyahnybok and Yarosh received miniscule support of voters in the presidential elections - 1.16% and 0.7% respectively.¹¹⁰ These indicators testify to the lack of a serious electoral potential among ultranationalists. For an adequate understanding of this result, it suffices to add that the president of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, Vadim Rabinovich, about whom the society knew only that he is a businessman, a Jew and a communal figure, received 2.25% of the vote - more than both nationalistic policies combined.¹¹¹

However, in the conditions of the *de facto* incursion and the loss of part of the territory in the society, there is a demand for populism. This demand was met in 2014 by the leader of the Radical Party О. Lyashko, who won 8.37% of voters. His team included representatives of national radical groups, such as the Social-National Assembly, and its popularity was based on real actions against the separatists and their Russian allies in the Donetsk region.

In July first news that "Freedom", "Right Sector" and "National Corpus" can come together in the upcoming elections to the Verkhovna Rada appeared. If this will be true during the elections, the nationalists would be able to form their own faction in parliament.¹¹² According to the data of a sociological survey, the major political forces are losing support of Ukrainians who did not want to vote for Poroshenko, nor Tymoshenko

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Sova Center, "Правый сектор» и другие: национал-радикалы и украинский политический кризис конца 2013 – начала 2014 года", < <http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2014/09/d30175/>>

¹¹¹ Ibid

¹¹² Life, "«Правый сектор» и «Азов» рвутся в Раду", July 30th 2017, <https://life.ru/t/%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0/1030914/pravyi_siektor_i_azov_rvutsia_v_radu>

nor for the former Regions" in the face "of the opposition bloc."¹¹³ The support of Freedom party, in 2012 was 10.45% and won 37 seats in the Verkhovna Rada, in 2014 elections the party won only 4.71% of the vote. According to the July polls, the support dropped to 4.3% of the voters. The support of the Right Sector also dropped from 1,80% of votes in 2014 to 0.6% in 2017.¹¹⁴ The loss of support, to some extent, happened due to departure of Dmitry Yarosh at the end of 2015, who created his own movement – The Statist Initiative of Yarosh (“Государственническую инициативу Яроша”), partly to the collapsing of the organization from within. The movement currently has a support of 1.7% voters. The newly created right-wing radical party - "National Corpus", would get 0,3% of vote in 2017. But this new party, even holding only 0.3% has its chances for success.

On March 16, 2017, the three parties signed a document to merge under the name of "National Manifesto" for political purposes. "Tomorrow, when the power will belong to Ukrainian nationalists, we are implementing this manifesto," - said the leader of "Freedom" Oleg Tyahnybok. According to him, the party will not only coordinate, but also will "jointly achieve their common goals." He stressed that the party will not be easy to coordinate efforts and work together for political purposes. In turn, the leader of the "National Corpus" Andrey Biletsky said that this manifesto is "the beginning of the parties' crusade against this government."¹¹⁵ The manifesto stated that Ukraine should focus its efforts on the creation of the Baltic-Black Sea Union, to return the nuclear status to Ukraine, break off diplomatic relations with Russia, to allow citizens to own firearms. In addition, the parties intended to cultivate Ukrainian traditional values, to strengthen criminal penalties for corruption, to effectively combat illegal immigration, to create a single local church with its centre in Kiev. The party also promised to introduce a procedure of impeachment of the President and the recalling of parliamentarians, together with judges and local officials.¹¹⁶

If the radical-right parties would actually go to election united, summing latest polls, the parties could collect 5.2% and to pass the barrier to the Verkhovna Rada. This would be a logical move, since this decision would attract more support, radical right supporters would not feel as throwing out their voices. Also, "National Corpus" is

¹¹³ ZN, “На досрочных выборах в Раду могут пройти семь-восемь партий”, July 27 2017, <https://zn.ua/POLITICS/na-dosrochnyh-vibrah-v-radu-mogut-proyti-sem-vosem-partiy-255633_.html>

¹¹⁴ Ibid

¹¹⁵ TSN, "Свобода", "Правый сектор" и "Национальный корпус" решили объединиться Больше читайте здесь”, March 16, 2017, <<https://ru.tsn.ua/politika/svoboda-pravyu-sektor-i-nacionalnyu-korpus-reshili-obedinitysya-823378.html>>

¹¹⁶ Ibid

especially important in this potential alliance, as it is the only party on the and is acquiring new voices, while the Right Sector and the Freedom Party are stagnant and lose them. Currently these parties seem to aim for just that. On October 23rd of 2017, these parties appeared in the polls as one movement – the Unification of right-wing parties (Объединение правых партий) and potentially received 4.2% of the voter's support. Even though this number is lower than expected, nonetheless it gives a chance for the three parties to breach the 5% barrier.¹¹⁷ These parties tried to unite more than once. For example, in the autumn of 2015 the leader of the party Right sector - Dmitry Yarosh, and the head of the Freedom party Oleg Tyahnybok even discussed the actual steps for merging the two parties, and then Tyagnibok invited members of the Right Sector to go to the polls on the Freedom. And during the creation of the National Corpus in the autumn of 2016 Andrey Biletsky admitted association with the Right Sector.¹¹⁸

Another important factor in the polarization of the right-wing parties was the resignation of the Right Sector's leader Dmitry Yarosh in November of 2015.¹¹⁹ This unexpected resignation shown that the the Right Sector *de facto* has no interest not only to those who created it, but also the sponsors of the organization. From the very start of creation of the organization, he served as a symbol and a leader. Since the beginning of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, he went to the front, and the party he created began to live its own life, regularly finding themselves at the epicentre of various scandals. It testifies about one thing – the Right Sector was left without a centralized supervision and organizational terms, they were never engaged.¹²⁰ In fact, the party played against other factors as well. Firstly, Yarosh has never been a good organizer - his whole experience of this kind of work was in leading positions in the patriotic organization "Trident". Secondly, in the creation of the Right Sector Igor Kolomoyski played a big role. And it seems that at a certain stage Kolomoyski decided not to develop this project, taking his bet on the "Dill" (Укроп). This was clearly seen in July, 2015 when an official refusal of the Right Sector to participate in local elections was announced. According to some authors this step had largely decided the fate of the organization. Of course, *de jure*, it will continue to exist, but

¹¹⁷ UNIAN, “В случае проведения выборов в ВР партии Порошенко и Тимошенко получили бы больше всего голосов – опрос”, October 23, 2017, <<https://www.unian.net/politics/2203021-v-sluchae-provedeniya-vyiborov-v-vr-partii-poroshenko-i-timoshenko-poluchili-byi-bolshe-vsego-golosov-opros.html>>

¹¹⁸ Rafalskiy

¹¹⁹ DS News, “Ярош Отказался Быть "Свадебным Генералом" Пс И Сложил С Себя Полномочия Проводника”, November 11, 2017, <<http://www.dsnews.ua/politics/yarosh-otkazalsya-byt-svadebnyu-generalom-ps-i-slozhil-s-11112015145800>>

¹²⁰ DS News, “Почему Коломойский закрыл "Правый сектор", November 11 2017, <<http://www.dsnews.ua/politics/pochemu-kolomoyskiy-zakryl-pravyy-sektor-11112015170000>>

it would never play a significant role as a party again. The organization is likely to become a tool for manipulation or provocation in the hands of those who need the services of thugs in masks, who know how to fight well.¹²¹ Nonetheless, the new leader of the Right Sector is of different opinion. On an interview, in March 23, 2016, the new Right Sector leader Andrei Tarasenko said that they will partake in every election: in municipal elections, regular elections and early parliamentary elections. Also, Tarasenko did not see the departure of Yarosh as dramatic, he commented that it is a natural political process.¹²²

Horizontal Inequality:

On July 22, 2015, the Right Sector held a gathering after which Yarosh, at the Independence Square with the participation of thousands of supporters of the party, declared the change of the status of the movement from the "politico-military" to "national liberation." This was done in the light of alleged failure failure of the political forces to participate in future local elections and actual declaration not to run at the municipal elections.¹²³ At the same place, Yarosh announced initiating a national referendum to solve the four main issues: the distrust of the current authorities, the change of status of the anti-terrorist operation to the state of war with Russia, the complete blockade of occupied Ukrainian territories and legalization of the fighting volunteer units.¹²⁴ According to Evgeniy Magda (Евгений Магда), an expert at the Public Relations Center (Центр общественных отношений) argues that these issues rally only a small part of the actual Ukrainian population. The renaming of the movement's status from military-political to the national liberation movement was also criticized. The Ukrainian legislation does not define the latter term: there can only be be either politicians or the military, which are non-partisan. In this respect, the Right Sector "combined business with pleasure".¹²⁵

Talking about the cells of the party, they are available across the country. but they are created on the basis of a sort of "franchise". It is a brand of the Right Sector and is used by people on the ground. In this case vertical of power is present but the integrated party

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Liga News, "После Яроша. Интервью с новым лидером Правого сектора", March 23, 2016, <http://news.liga.net/interview/politics/9667383posle_yarosha_intervyu_s_novym_liderom_pravogo_sektora.htm>

¹²³ Forbes UA, "Правый поворот: что ждет дальше партию Дмитрия Яроша", July 22, 2015, <<http://forbes.net.ua/opinions/1398812-pravyj-povorot-cto-zhdet-dalshe-partiyu-dmitriya-yarosha>>

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Ibid

structure is not existent.¹²⁶ Only the creation of the party cells in every district center will not make the Right Sector to succeed if only because that the mainstream parties with a long history and the best organization will have no influential representatives in these districts. Traditional political forces will continue to have more weight due to their organization capabilities. The very decision not to run in the municipal elections suggest that the "Right Sector" will continue to exist on the political map of Ukraine due to the fact that it will continue to have enough patriot in their ranks, to defend the country with arms.

The failure of properly organizing the national referendum also shows that the Right Sector does not properly reciprocate the issues of the Ukrainian population. For example, the "the recognition of war with Russia" is not an appealing issue for the population, which is not translated by other mainstream parties. The legalization of volunteer units also ("Ukrainian Volunteer Corps" of the Right Sector) were the only volunteer units which were not integrated into the military organization of Ukraine. And these questions instead of mobilizing the society, actually present the Right Sector as a military organization of patriots rather than an actual organized political organization.¹²⁷ The only actual question that was substantive – was the blockade of the occupied territories. It was then actually in the public inquiry, and the Right sector to use it as a rallying point.¹²⁸

4. General Overview

4.1. Paramilitary Wing:

Financing:

Even though there are various public opinions about Right Sector's paramilitary fighters receiving their finances from USA agents, or the Kremlin itself, none of these claims can be confirmed by official open-source data. The unaffiliated Right Sector operates independently from the government, therefore it receives no official financial support from Ukrainian Government.¹²⁹, The official position regarding the Right Sector's funding is that

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ Amanda Taub, "Pro-Kiev militias are fighting Putin, but has Ukraine created a monster it can't control?"

the organisation is donation-based.¹³⁰ As an addition to the donations and assistance of volunteers, the Right Sector is organizing events and concerts in order to gather additional funds. At the same time, Right Sector receives unofficial support – individuals simply forward cash or other necessary items.

Due to the Right-Sector's relative financial independence from Government Institutions, or international actors give them opportunity to be an independent wild-card. One of the most iconic examples of such unexpected insurgencies occurred in Mukachevo.¹³¹ Therefore, according to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Finance criteria scores +2.

Recruitment

During the first weeks of Maidan, Radical nationalists were prominent in street clashes with Pro-Russian demonstrators, but when military operations began in the Eastern Ukraine – a lot of them went to the front without caring too much in which unit to fight. These action also earned a name for them.¹³² They could just start fighting without having a legal status. The main leaders and activists were surrounded by a wider circle of newcomers who sympathised with their nationalist ideology, on the other hand they were gradually indoctrinated with radical nationalist views, including xenophobia.¹³³

The actual size of the Right Sector's militants is difficult to gauge. Yarosh has claimed that the organization could mobilize 10,000 through its regional chapters. Most experts, however, place the total number at somewhere between 300 and 500. Nonetheless, being not a major group, it is an indoctrinated, like-minded and willing to act. According to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Recruitment criteria scores +1.

Geography:

The current rise of Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalist-inspired Svoboda and Right Sector in the Western regions of nowadays Ukraine was similarly a result of the perception that Russian-speaking oligarchy from the East dominated the country politically. The far-right seem to have lost ground in the efforts to create a certain national unity but a collapse of

¹³⁰ Hanna Kozłowska, "The Fascists Are Coming, the Fascists Are Coming!",

¹³¹ Julia Embury, "Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector"

¹³² Vyacheslav Likhachev, "The Far Right in the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine", July 2016, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnv95_uk_likhachev_far-right_radicals_final.pdf>

¹³³ Ibid, 14

the Kiev government due to Russian intervention would most likely lead to a nationalist fervour in the West. Western intervention and support will continue to inspire the Great-Russian nationalism in the East.

Once some stability returns to Ukraine and the external threats are no longer immediate people across Ukraine, the nationalism might lose its edge, but currently the Western Ukraine is a region which can be seen as the right-winged people's bastion.¹³⁴ Even though, these ideas and ideal are prevalent in Western Ukraine and serves as the main source of Right Sector's fighters, it is not common throughout all of Ukraine. According to to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Geography criteria scores +1.

Relative Deprivation:

Euromaidan started as a peaceful protest against the decisions of the ruling elites that tried to suppress the will of the people that was portrayed as a new chapter in the narrative of far-right nationalism in Ukraine and was primarily associated with a long desired (by certain external forces) transformation of Ukraine into a "fascist state". Nonetheless, the main argument for the fighters was to remove the Kremlin influence out of the country. The signing of the European Union Association Agreement has been understood by most Ukrainian nationalists - as a choice between the West and Russia. The more Ukraine integrates with the European Union the less will Russia have influence on Kyiv. Ideologically, neither the Right Sector, nor other far right groups are not pro-European Union, but their social conservatism, heterosexism, and populist nationalism - all attitudes commonly found among Europe's far-right parties.

Taking into account the main criteria ultranationalists have always represented weak and unpopular margins of Ukrainian society. Likewise, it should be kept in mind that nationalists have never been able to assume common positions.¹³⁵ Right Sector's fighters failed to appeal to a majority of population, thus successfully addressing only the threat of Russia. According to to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Relative Deprivation criteria scores +1.

¹³⁴ RS21, "Ukraine: between East and West"

¹³⁵ Alla Hurska, "Far-right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs. Weak Essence"

Polarization:

Ukrainian radical nationalists tried to create a sense of dichotomy in the state since early 1990's with their appeals to strengthen the role of the Ukrainian language and to separate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow patriarchate only giving the impression of being outdated to the general public. The Russian did not look in the least frightening in the 1990s. On the basis of an ethnocentric and exclusive understanding of nationhood, the radical right demanded changes to the linguistic, cultural and religious status quo that had emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts to use these slogans to fire up a population that was intent on surviving in difficult economic conditions proved unsuccessful.¹³⁶ More interestingly, during the events of Mukachevo, there were two opposing views on what actually happened,¹³⁷ causing the split of the understanding in the civil society. Some authors argue, that around this event two sides crystalized: the Ukrainian citizens, who can be called "legitimists" and the "revolutionaries".

Once again, the idea of the Russian threat was the main rallying agenda point and in this case especially strongly drawing the line between us and them. According to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Polarization criteria scores +2.

Horizontal Inequality:

The growth in popularity of the ultra-right groups is primarily related to their populist agendas, which seem to have appealed to many Ukrainians who are sick and tired of worsening economic conditions and the disarray in which Ukraine has been submerged since Euromaidan. Similarly, one should keep in mind that the mentioned success also stemmed from the decreasing popularity of the ruling political forces that have not been able to produce a miracle and rapidly achieve economic stabilisation.¹³⁸

Nonetheless, these issues were not of the most crucial for the support of the Right Sector's Paramilitary Wing. Ukrainians joined the ranks of the Voluntary Corps first of all because of the Russian threat. The ranks of the Voluntary Corps were also formed regardless of the financial well-being, privileges – any patriotic Ukrainian could have joined it. According to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Geography criteria scores: -1.

¹³⁶ Vyacheslav Likhachev, "The Far Right in the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine", 8

¹³⁷ Politeka, "Раскол общества после Мукачево"

¹³⁸ Alla Hurska, "Far-right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs. Weak Essence"

4.2. Political Wing:

Financing:

The current laws for example, allocate State funding only for those parties that have passed the 5% threshold to enter the Verkhovna Rada under the proportional representation part of the (current) electoral system. Those parties that gathered 2% or 3% in the last election, get nothing for their forthcoming electioneering campaigns from the State. The same applies to the Right Sector.¹³⁹ There is currently no information regarding the campaign budget of the the Right Sector political party, but the best educated guess is that the organization is using the same funds as for their military groups. Furthermore, on April 2017, the head of the Right Sector, Andrei Tarasenko for 5 thousand UAH for violations in the financial statements of the party.

It is expected, that Right-Sector's political wing is using the same finances as the paramilitary. Nonetheless, the actual financial capabilities are not exactly known, as the recent financial scandal shows. Furthermore, going into elections with the other right-wing parties, the Right Sector has a high chance passing the 5%. This would influence Right Sector's financial independence to a certain degree. Therefore, according to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Finance criteria scores +1.

Recruitment

As a political party, the Right Sector is ideologically quite different from the movement under the same name that was formed during the 2014 revolution; the party is less radical than the movement, so the term "national conservative" could be used as a more relevant one.¹⁴⁰ The ambivalent results show a dichotomy between how Right Sector Party and Right Sector organization are perceived. Even though the organization is supported throughout the country, their political claims are far less supported, even if the political agenda is less radical. Also it can be said, that for the Right Sector the the actual rise to power is not the only way of implementing their ideological goals. According to to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Recruitment criteria scores +1.

¹³⁹ Nikolai Holmov, "10 political parties adhere to the State funding requirements – Ukraine"

¹⁴⁰ Anton Shekhovtsov, "Ukraine's Parliamentary Elections and the Far Right"

Geography:

Alina Polyakova in her study considers the region of Galicia - the historical “heartland” of Ukrainian nationalism. As Galicia’s largest city, L’viv has been at the center of organizational and ideological activity for nationalist radical right movements for two reasons: historical legacy of ultra-nationalism and Galicia’s active and civically engaged political culture. In addition to a historical legacy of nationalism, Galician political culture is particularly conducive to political mobilization.¹⁴¹ While national democratic parties and movements, such as Rukh, were more popular in Galicia than radical right parties, when compared to other Ukrainian regions, radical right parties received greater electoral support in Galicia¹⁴²

Right Sector party has received more votes than its leader in presidential election, but the result is quite low. Best performance was in Western Ukraine, Kyiv city and region, and in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, in the 39th constituency, in which party’s leader Dmytro Yarosh was elected to parliament.¹⁴³ There is no significant difference between military wing and political wing in terms of support – both groups are widely supported by Western Ukrainian territories, and support drops moving eastwards. According to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Recruitment criteria scores +1

Relative Deprivation:

During the "March of national dignity", the leaders of the three nationalist parties voiced their demands to the authorities of Ukraine. These demands give a clear glimpse to the ideas that the voters of the right-wing parties actually support. The leaders demanded an end to trade with Russia and the territories to the east, beyond the control of Kiev, as well as to fulfil the requirements of Euromaidan: to “de-oligarchise” the country, to get rid of corruption and punish the killers of the Heavenly Hundred. In addition, nationalists were seeking to ban selling and privatizing strategic enterprises. They required for a "new policy, which would be based on the priority of national interests, as well as the dissolution of Parliament and new elections.¹⁴⁴

Differently than the paramilitary wing, the political party’s claims appeal to a much wider strata of the society. The main demands, to an extent, are not as radical and bolster a

¹⁴¹ Alina Polyakova, “From the provinces to the parliament: How the Ukrainian radical right mobilized in Galicia”

¹⁴² Ibid

¹⁴³ Ukraine Center for Social Data

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

certain amount of population. Combining forces with the other parties will only increase the scope of their agenda, prolonged war with separatists in the East most likely will add to it. According to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Relative Deprivation criteria scores: +2.

Polarization:

The Right Sector declaratively assumed responsibility for the violent confrontation with the police, and it became identified in the media with an active part of the protest movement. This contributed, on the one hand, to the demonization of the Right Sector in the media hostile to the Ukrainian revolution, and on the other hand, to the relative popularity of the party in the eyes of the supporters of the Maidan. However, the leader of the "Right Sector" Дмитро Ярош was unable to convert this popularity into electoral support. However, in the conditions of the *de facto* incursion and the loss of part of the territory in the society, there is a demand for populism.

On March 16, 2017, the three parties signed a document to merge under the name of "National Manifesto" for political purposes. If the radical-right parties would actually go to election united, summing latest polls, the parties could collect 5.2% and to pass the barrier to the Verkhovna Rada.

Another important factor in the polarization of the right-wing parties was the resignation of the Right Sector's leader Дмитрия Ярош in November of 2015.¹⁴⁵ This unexpected resignation shown that the the Right Sector *de facto* has no interest not only to those who created it, but also the sponsors of the organization. The polarization amongst the right-wing groups remains significant. Nonetheless, the current rallying under the "National Manifesto" flag could be a breaking point for Right Sector's ideas. According to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Relative Deprivation criteria scores: +2.

Horizontal Inequality:

Talking about the cells of the party, they are available across the country. but they are created on the basis of a sort of "franchise". It is a brand of the Right Sector and is used by people on the ground. In this case vertical of power is present but the integrated party

¹⁴⁵ DS News, "Ярош Отказался Быть"

structure is not existent.¹⁴⁶ The very decision not to run in the municipal elections suggest that the "Right Sector" will continue to exist on the political map of Ukraine due to the fact that it will continue to have enough patriot in their ranks, to defend the country with arms. And these questions instead of mobilizing the society, actually present the Right Sector as a military organization of patriots rather than an actual organized political organization.¹⁴⁷

There are no concrete evidence that the supporters of the Right Sector could represent an actual societal group measured by financial well-being, privileges, age, etc. – the supporters tend to rally under the political/patriotic statements. According to to the theoretic model, the Right Sectors Paramilitary Wing in Geography criteria scores: -1.

Assesment	
Paramilitary Wing	
Greed Theory Assesment:	Grievance Theory Assesment:
Financing: +2	Relative Deprivation: +1
Recruitment: +1	Polarization: +2
Geography: +1	Horizontal Inequality: -1
Total: +4	Total: +2
Political Wing	
Greed Theory Assesment:	Grievance Theory Assesment:
Financing: +1	Relative Deprivation: +2
Recruitment: +1	Polarization: +2
Geography: +1	Horizontal Inequality: -1
Total: +3	Total:+3

*Strongly Applies: +2; Applies: +1; N/A: 0; Does Not Apply: -1; Strongly Does Not Apply: -2.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

¹⁴⁷ Ibid

5. Conclusions

The hypothesis, which was raised in this paper, was the following:

Paramilitary wing of the Right Sector is more prone to be explained by using the Greed theory criteria and Political wing of the Right Sector is more prone to be explained by Grievance theory criteria

As we can see from the results of this research, the paramilitary wing of the Right Sector can be more easily explained using the Greed theory criteria, which suggest that this part of the organization is more greed than grievance driven (evaluation of +4 and +2 accordingly). In case of political wing of the Right Sector, both theories received the same evaluation (+3 and +3 accordingly), suggesting that both factors play a role in the behavior of this wing. The results of this research partly coincide with the hypothesis raised before carrying out the research – the paramilitary wing is more driven by the Greed theory criteria, but the political wing is driven equally by both Greed and Grievance. This result is particularly interesting, because it suggests that the political wing of the party is a particularly complex and different organization. This interesting effect might be due to the fact that part of the members of the political wing are the members or ex-members of the military wing. The influence of these members might have given an extra push for political wing's Greed criteria. Another explanation for this effect could be the ambivalent actions of the political wing, signifying a certain loss of direction for this part of organization. It is extensively interesting to see how these criteria would change after unification process with the other parties.

The use of Greed and Grievances theories is well suited for provides analyzing opposing arguments on the causes of civil wars and armed conflicts within the country. Neither the rise of the Right Sector, nor Maidan events, nor the war sparked by the Separatists in the East fit under the label of civil war, but a proxy war initiated by Russia. Nonetheless, this theory of collective action provides some useful insights into the organization of rebellion. This theory gives insides and suggestions how these two parts of the same organization could be judged by their goals and motives. Despite the claims of fighting for ideas, the paramilitary wing of the Right Sector fit sunder the economical (Greed) criteria better, raising questions about legitimacy of their claims. At the same time,

the theories fail to simply explain which criteria are leading the way for the political wing. Even though the theories in this case present limitations (such as, not designed specifically for a conflict like in Ukraine, or designed to explain more of an armed group behavior), it still provides valuable insights of the nature of the Right Sector.

The research was carried out at a crucial time for the Right Sector, when the political wing is right on the edge of merging with other political parties and when the ex-leader Yarosh split from the organization. It would be interesting to do a similar research after a period of time, when these changes would start taking effect to organization. A recommendation for future researchers could be to use similar methodology in assessing different Ukrainian political parties and paramilitary groups and compare these results with the Right Sector's results of this research. The theoretical model might also be more adapted to the specific case of Ukrainian conflict and additional criteria might be added to better fit the political party wings.

To sum up, it can be said that there are differences between the goals of Right Sector's paramilitary and political wings. Two groups, under the same banner and having a lot of similarities (interconnected finances, some members belonging to both wings, etc.) are different in their goals. As it was assumed in the hypothesis, the paramilitary part of the Right Sector is more prone to Greed criteria i.e. economical factors. The theoretical model suggests that both Greed and Grievance criteria evaluate the motives of the political wing the same. The results of this research suggest, that assessing the activity of the both wings of the organization, different explanations can be used. This is particularly interesting having in mind the fact, that both wings are considered to work under the banner of one organization.

6. Literature/Bibliography

1. Beede, Benjamin R., "Semi-Military and Paramilitary Organizations", *Military History*, August 2013, <<http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/obo/9780199791279-0100>>;
2. Berdal, Mats, Malone, David M., "GREED & GRIEVANCE Economic Agendas in Civil Wars", Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000;
3. Borys, Christian, "Ukraine's angry volunteer brigades at the war front", *Aljazeera*, October 19, 2016, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/10/ukraine-angry-volunteer-brigades-war-front-161017082634137.html>>;
4. Burdyga, Igor, "A Step to the Right", *Reporter*, 25 March, 2014;
5. Byshok, Stanislav, Kochetkov, Alexey, "NEONAZIS & EUROMAIDAN From Democracy to Dictatorship", [Third edition], 2014;
6. Collier, Paul, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", *Centre for the Study of African Economies*, 2002;
7. Deutsche Well, "Украинские националисты провели "Марш достоинства" в Киеве", February 22, 2017;
8. DS News, "Ярош Отказался Быть "Свадебным Генералом" Пс И Сложил С Себя Полномочия Проводника", November 11, 2017, <<http://www.dsnews.ua/politics/yarosh-otkazalsya-byt-svadebnyu-generalom-ps-i-slozhil-s-11112015145800>>;
9. DS News, "Почему Коломойский закрыл "Правый сектор", November 11 2017, <<http://www.dsnews.ua/politics/pochemu-kolomoyskiy-zakryl-pravyu-sektor-11112015170000>>;
10. Embury, Julia, "Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector", *The National Interest*, August 12, 2014;
11. Forbes UA, "Правый поворот: что ждет дальше партию Дмитрия Яроша", July 22, 2015, <<http://forbes.net.ua/opinions/1398812-pravyj-povorot-cto-zhdet-dalshe-partiyu-dmitriya-yarosha>>;
12. Ganesan, Arvind, Vines, Alex, "Engine of War: Resources, Greed, and the Predatory State", *Human Rights Watch World Report*, 2004;
13. Golinkin, Lev, "Winter Is Coming. And So Is Ukraine's Far Right.", *Foreign Policy*,

- October 8, 2015, <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/08/ukraines-far-right-threat-poroshenko-imf-austerity-winter/>>;
14. Gorbal, Andriy, Vasylychenko, Serhij, “The new political landscape of Ukraine”, *Euromaidan press*, 2015/04/24, <<http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/04/24/the-new-political-landscape-of-ukraine/#arvlbdata>>;
 15. Grytsaienko, Oleg, “The Crisis in Ukraine: An Insider’s View”, June 2014, <file:///Users/pro/Downloads/ifri_rnv_78_ukraine_oleg_grytsaienko_june_2014_eng_0.pdf>;
 16. Haines, John R. Ukraine: The Squandered Renaissance?, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, E-notes, October 2015;
 17. Hlukhovskiy, Mykhailo, “Right Sector fighter: regular army arms us, bypassing official system”, *Euromaidanpress*, December 20, 2014, <<http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/12/20/right-sector-battalion-fighter-the-regular-army-finds-ways-around-the-official-system-to-arm-us/>>;
 18. Holmov, Nikolai, “10 political parties adhere to the State funding requirements – Ukraine”, *Odessatalk*, July 10, 2016, <<http://www.odessatalk.com/2016/07/10-political-parties-adhere-state-funding-requirements-ukraine/>>;
 19. Hurska, Alla, “Far-right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs. Weak Essence”, *Barcelona Centre for International Affairs*, February 2016;
 20. Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe”, *Briefing Paper*, 2012;
 21. International Centre for Policy Studies, “Inside Ukraine”, March 14th, 2014 №2 (13);
 22. International Crisis Group, “Ukraine: Running out of Time”, *Europe Report N°231*, 14 May, 2014;
 23. Kozłowska, Hanna, “The Fascists Are Coming, the Fascists Are Coming!”, *Foreign Policy*, June 2, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/02/the-fascists-are-coming-the-fascists-are-coming/?wp_login_redirect=0>;
 24. Life, ““Правый сектор” и “Азов” рвутся в Раду”, July 30th 2017, <https://life.ru/t/%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0/1030914/pravyi_siektor_i_azov_rvutsia_v_radu>;
 25. Liga News, “После Яроша. Интервью с новым лидером Правого сектора”, March 23

2016,

<http://news.liga.net/interview/politics/9667383posle_yarosha_intervyu_s_novym_liderom_pravogo_sektora.htm>;

26. Vyacheslav Likhachev, “Beware Ukraine's Rising Right Sector”, July 2016, page 11, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnv95_uk_likhachev_far-right_radicals_final.pdf>;
27. Likhachev, Vyacheslav, “The Far Right in the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine”, July 2016, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnv95_uk_likhachev_far-right_radicals_final.pdf>;
28. Likhachev, Vyacheslav, “The “Right Sector” and others: The behavior and role of radical nationalists in the Ukrainian political crisis of late 2013 – Early 2014”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume 48, Issues 2–3, June–September 2015;
29. Mintehbaa, “Is grievance or greed the main cause of conflict? What can be done to prevent conflict?”, May 18, 2014 <<https://mintehbaa.wordpress.com/2014/05/18/is-grievance-or-greed-the-main-cause-of-conflict-what-can-be-done-to-prevent-conflict/>>;
30. Murshed, Syed Mansoob, “Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict”, *Journal of International Development*, Volume 21, Issue 1, pages 87–111, January 2009;
31. Nimmo, Kurt, “Color revolution collaboration began soon after engineered fall of Soviet Union”, Info-Wars, May 27, 2014, <<http://www.infowars.com/soros-admits-responsibility-for-coup-and-mass-murder-in-ukraine/>>;
32. Pandit, Sudip, “Greed Versus Grievances Theories in “Economics of Conflict”, *Academia*, 2016;
33. Piper, Elizabeth, Karazy, Sergiy, “Ukraine struggles to control maverick battalions”, *Reuters Special Report*, Kiev, 2015 July 29, <<http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/15/07/UKRAINE-CRISIS:BATTALIONS.pdf>>;
34. Politeka, “Готов ли «Правый сектор» к своей «октябрьской революции»”, July 24, 2015, <<https://politeka.net/news/51963-gotov-li-pravyj-sektor-k-svoej-oktyabrskoj-revolyutsii/>>;
35. Politeka, “Раскол общества после Мукачево”, July 14, 2017, <https://politeka.net/news/46212-raskol-obshhestva-posle-mukachevo/?utm_source=read_also>;
36. Politnavigator, “Правый сектор» финансируется Путиным, — советник министра

- культуры Украины”, December 7, 2015, <<http://www.politnavigator.net/pravyjj-sektor-finansiruetsya-putinym-sovetnik-ministra-kultury-ukrainy.html>>;
37. Polyakova, Alina, “From the provinces to the parliament: How the Ukrainian radical right mobilized in Galicia”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 2, June 2014;
38. Ponomarenko, Illia, “Former Right Sector fighters keep volunteer spirit alive in regular army”, *Kyiv Post*, November 2, 2017, < <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/former-right-sector-fighters-keep-volunteer-spirit-alive-regular-army.html>>;
39. Rafalskiy, Denis, “Свобода”, Правый сектор и Нацкорпус Билецкого могут создать единое движение”, *Strana.ua*, February 17 2017, <<https://strana.ua/articles/analysis/56304-22-fevralya.html>>;
40. Razumkov Center, “Party System Of Ukraine Before And After Maidan: Changes, Trends, Public Demand”, *National Security & Defence*, п 6-7 (155-156), 2015;
41. RS21, “Ukraine: between East and West”, July 2, 2014, <<https://rs21.org.uk/2014/07/02/ukraine-between-east-and-west/>>;
42. Shekhovtsov, Anton, Umland, Andreas, “Ukraine’s radical Right”, *The Maidan and Beyond*, *Journal of Democracy*, July 2014, Volume 25, Number 3;
43. Shekhovtsov, Anton, “Ukraine’s Parliamentary Elections and the Far Right”, *The Interpreter*, October 26, 2014, <<http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraines-parliamentary-elections-and-the-far-right/>>;
44. Sheldon, Michael, “Ukraine Needs to Address Its Paramilitary Problem”, *The National Interest*, July 19, 2017;
45. Sova Center, “Правый сектор» и другие: национал-радикалы и украинский политический кризис конца 2013 – начала 2014 года”, < <http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2014/09/d30175/>>;
46. Stern, David, “Ukraine clashes raise questions over Right Sector militia”, *BBC*, July 15, 2015, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33523869>>;
47. Stewart, Frances, “Root causes of violent conflict in developing countries”, *The BMJ*, February, 2002;
48. Taub, Amanda, “Pro-Kiev militias are fighting Putin, but has Ukraine created a monster it can’t control?”, *VOX*, February 20, 2015, <<http://www.vox.com/2015/2/20/8072643/ukraine-volunteer-battalion-danger>>
49. TSN, "Свобода", "Правый сектор" и "Национальный корпус" решили объединиться

- Больше читайте здесь”, March 16, 2017, <<https://ru.tsn.ua/politika/svoboda-pravyu-sektor-i-nacionalnyu-korpus-reshili-obedinitsya-823378.html>>
50. Ukranews, “Главу "Правого сектора" оштрафовали на 5 тыс. гривен за нарушения в финансовости партии”, 10th April, 2017, <<https://ukranews.com/news/491014-glavu-pravogo-sektora-oshtrafovaly-na-5-tys-gryven-za-narusheniyya-v-fynotchetnosty-partyy>>;
51. Ukraine Center for Social Data, “New political landscape of Ukraine: Geographical peculiarities of presidential and parliamentary elections of 2014”, May 31, 2016, <<http://socialdata.org.ua/en/new-political-landscape-of-ukraine-geographical-peculiarities-of-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections-of-2014/>>;
52. UNIAN, “В случае проведения выборов в ВР партии Порошенко и Тимошенко получили бы больше всего голосов – опрос”, October 23, 2017, <<https://www.unian.net/politics/2203021-v-sluchae-provedeniya-vyiborov-v-vr-partii-poroshenko-i-timoshenko-poluchili-byi-bolshe-vsego-golosov-opros.html>>;
53. UNIAN, “Yarosh steps down as leader of Right Sector – claims lack of authority”, November 11, 2017, <<https://www.unian.info/politics/1180517-yarosh-steps-down-as-leader-of-right-sector-claims-lack-of-authority.html>>
54. Whine, Michael, “Trans-European Trends in Right-Wing Extremism”, Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe, *Routledge*;
55. Zalmayev, Peter, “Is Ukraine on the brink of another Maidan?”, Aljazeera, December 14, 2017, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ukraine-brink-maidan-171213123711934.html>>;
56. ZN, “На досрочных выборах в Раду могут пройти семь-восемь партий”, July 27 2017, <https://zn.ua/POLITICS/na-dosrochnyh-vibrah-v-radu-mogut-proyti-sem-vosem-partiy-255633_.html>;
57. Провід НВР "Правий сектор", “Political party "The Right Sector" does not support any candidate in the upcoming local election.”, December 12, 2015, <<http://sectorpravdy.com/en/news/news-uvc/1310-political-party-the-right-sector-does-not-support-any-candidate-on-the-upcoming-local-election>>;

7. Summaries

7.1. Summary (English)

Master thesis “Right Sector’s Goals: Greed and Grievance Theories” has been purposed to analyze a topical issue of the Right Sector’s goals and motivation in Ukraine, who fight with separatists in Donbas, but who also have political aspirations in the country itself. The Right Sector consists of two different wings under the same banner: the political and the paramilitary. Research aims to find out the motives and goals the two wings of the organization. Greed and Grievance theories are used in this research, in order to find out whether economic factors (Greed) or justice factors can be used to explain their behavior.

Since the Maidan Revolution, Right Sector has maintained only marginal public support. Currently, the party holds just one seat in the parliament of 422. Nevertheless, as the group has become more outspoken against the current Petro Poroshenko administration, its numbers have risen drastically. From 1.8 percent in October 2014, the group’s popular support stood at 5.4 percent in late 2015. The “Right Sector” has a lot of similarities with other European, especially Eastern-European, radical Right-wing organizations. Nevertheless, differently from the other European organizations, the “Right Sector” currently faced enormous increase in support, mainly due to Maidan events. In March 2014, on the basis of the movement - Right Sector political party was founded showing first concrete actions to achieve their political aspirations.

The greed motivation behind the conflict or civil war has been popularized by empirical work on the causes of civil war where a cross-section of conflicts in different nations is analyzed together econometrically, and greed is proxied by the availability or abundance of retrievable natural resource rents. Meanwhile, in the context of civil war or rebellion, grievance is sometimes described as a justice-seeking motivation. Central idea to the grievances is identity and group formation. These theories of collective action provide some useful insights into the organization of rebellion. These theories give insides and suggestions how these two parts of the same organization could be judged by their goals and motives.

For operationalization needs, the following set of criteria has been applied: financing, recruitment, geography, relative deprivation, polarization, horizontal inequality. The Right Sector was split into two categories – political wing and para-military wing. After the research, a conclusion was reached that the Right Sector’s paramilitary wing can be more

easily explained using the Greed theory criteria, which suggest that this part of the organization is more greed than grievance driven (evaluation of +4 and +2 accordingly). In case of political wing of the Right Sector, both theories received the same evaluation (+3 and +3 accordingly), suggesting that both factors play a role in the behavior of this wing. The results of this research partly coincide with the hypothesis raised before carrying out the research – the paramilitary wing is more driven by the Greed theory criteria, but the political wing is driven more by Grievance theory.

7.2. Summary (Lithuanian)

Magistro darbas “Dešiniojo sektoriaus tikslai: Godumo ir Nuoskaudos teorijos” buvo atliktas siekiant išanalizuoti svarbų Dešiniojo Sektoriaus organizacijos tikslų Ukrainoje klausimą. Ši organizacija ne tik aktyviai kariauja su separatistais šalies rytuose, tačiau turi ir politinių aspiracijų. Dešinįjį sektorių sudaro dvi celės: politinė ir paramilitarinė. Šiuo tyrimu siekiama ištirti organizacijos skirtingų celių motyvus ir tikslus. Tyrime pasitelkiamos godumo ir nuoskaudos teorijos, siekiant išsiaiškinti ar ekonominiai faktoriai (godumas) ar teisybės ieškojimas (nuoskauda) gali paaiškinti jų elgesį.

Nuo pat Maidano revoliucijos pradžios, Dešinysis Sektorius buvo remiamas tik mažos populiacijos dalies. Šiuo metu, partija turi vieną vietą 422 mandatų Parlamente. Kuomet grupė pradėjo reikšti nepasitenkinimą Prezidento Petro Porošenkos valdymu, rėmėjų skaičius pradėjo stipriai augti. Partija turėjusi 1,8 procentų palaikymą 2014-ais metais, 2015-aisiais jau turėjo 5,4 procento. Dešinysis Sektorius turi daug panašumų su kitomis Europos radikaliomis dešinosiomis organizacijomis, tačiau jos populiarumas stipriai išaugo po Maidano įvykių. 2014-ųjų kovą, Dešinysis sektorius paskelbė steigias partiją ir taip pademonstravo pirmąsias savo politines aspiracijas.

Godumo motyvacija konflikte ar pilietiniame kare buvo išpopuliarinta empirinių darbų nagrinėjančių pilietinių karų priežastis, tiriant skirtingų šalių konfliktų priežastis ir kartu analizuojant ekonometrinius duomenis. Godumo kriterijus atsiranda esant natūralių resursų rentos pertekliui. Tuo tarpu pilietinių karų ar sukilimų kontekste, nuoskauda dažnai apibrėžiama kaip tiesos ieškojimas. Pagrindinė idėja nuoskaudų teorijoje yra identiteto ir grupių formavimasis. Šios kolektyvinio veiksmo teorijos suteikia naudingų įžvalgų analizuojant konfliktų atsiradimo motyvaciją, taip pat padeda suprasti kaip dvi skirtingos vienos organizacijos celės gali būti vertinamos pagal jų tikslus ir metodus.

Siekiant užtikrinti aiškią tyrimo operacionaliziją, šie teorijų kriterijai buvo panaudoti: finansavimas, geografija, sąlyginis nepriteklus, poliarizacija, horizontali nelygybė. Dešinysis Sektorius kaip organizacija buvo atskirtas į dvi celes: politinę ir paramilitarinę. Atlikus tyrimą buvo prieita išvados, kad paramilitarinės Dešinio sektoriaus celės motyvacija geriau paaiškinama Godumo teorijos kriterijais, nei Nuoskaudos (įvertinimas +4 prieš +2). Tuo tarpu, Dešiojo Sektoriaus politinės celės motyvaciją vienodai paaiškina tiek Godumo, tiek Nuoskaudos teorijos (+3 ir +3 atitinkamai), šis rezultatas sufleruoja kad abiejų teorijų faktoriai turi įtakos. Tyrimo išvados dalinai sutampa su prieš tyrimą atliekant iškelta hipotezė, jog paramilitarinės celės motyvaciją geriau paaiškina Godumo teorija, o politinė Nuoskaudos teorija.