| Abstract [eng] |
In the present paper, an attempt is made to reveal the premises and intentions of the famous thesis of Plato concerning the relationship between the good, being, and knowledge. The paper starts by considering the context of the appearance of Plato's Republic. The Republic is interpreted as an effort to regulate the social circumstances of philosophising. Such a view in its turn presumes that Greek philosophy proceeds in a natural way, i.e. thematises its contents upon the emergence of favourable external circumstances. Therefore, the Republic is treated as a theoretical construction by means of which the social origins of philosophy are being revealed. A philosopher who has constructed an ideal republic for philosophy can determine, in retrospect of his construction, the constituent meaning of the constructing value - the good - upon the construction, i.e. the being. A theoretically thinking philosopher sees the being as an entity of theoretical origin, i.e. as a world of ideas, hence the good is regarded as constituting the being as knowledge - or as the essence — and thus engaging its cognition. However, the value of good itself remains unattainable for theoretical cognition, and Plato declares the good as being beyond the being. Thus, for the first time in Western philosophy, the boundaries of theoretical thinking are set. Consequently, the ideal republic of Plato embodies a triumph of philosophy by revealing its social origin and vocation, while at the same time exposing its failing expressed in its limited theoretical cognition. |
