| Abstract [eng] |
This article, as first of set of publications, analyses international tax competition, its common aspects and measures that countries take to counteract its harmful effects on national income from taxes, trying to prove, that, despite apparent political inspirations, tax competition is also relevant legally. It is proposed, that real tax competition is not complex tax policy decisions (to reduce rates, introduce flat rate or progressive ones etc.) in order to encourage different economic or social processes, but those, aimed at non-resident taxpayers, when taxes become the main or even only reason for their certain business or investment decisions. International tax competition is discussed using two basic categories offered by the OECD and widely accepted by international community - "preferential tax regimes" and "tax havens", also acknowledging, that phenomenon besides pure tax regulation also includes different regulations for financial services and business as a whole, limits of authority of state institutions etc. It is concluded, that clear identification of mentioned above is relevant not only politically, but legally as well, because that not only shows states' "competitive orientation" but also directly influences effectiveness and functionality of measures used to counter its harmful effects. |
