| Title |
Ar heterofenomenologija įveikia autofenomenologiją? / |
| Translation of Title |
Does heterophenomenology surmount autophenomenology? |
| Authors |
Molotokienė, Ernesta |
| DOI |
10.15388/Problemos.2010.0.1900 |
| Full Text |
|
| Is Part of |
Problemos / Vilniaus universitetas.. Vilnius : Vilniaus universiteto leidykla. 2010, t. 77, p. 70-79.. ISSN 1392-1126 |
| Keywords [eng] |
Heterophenomenology ; Autophenomenology ; Consciousness ; Intentionality ; Experience |
| Abstract [eng] |
Daniel C. Dennett’s heterophenomenological method for analyzing the experiences of one’s consciousness using the third person approach, as well as an analysis of the argument correctness of its superiority over the autophenomenology or introspective method of the first person approach applied in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology are presented. By introducing the third person perpective, Dennett seeks to bestow the impartiality which is typical of the nature sciences, to heterophenomenological method. Tthe Husserl autophenomenology project had failed in this field because of its inevitable subjectivity. Therefore, Dennett provides the subject’s messages about experiences of consciousness with the conviction status, which is legitimated not by the subject but by the observer (the heterophenomenologist), and in this way he carries out the scientific research of the subject’s convictions about the experiences of consciousness. But can the subject’s convictions be neutral, without a shell of subjective interpretation, as Dennett expects them to be? The article argues that the ambitious heterophenomenologic method of Dennett is unable to avoid the subjectivity typical of Husserl’s phenomenology, because Dennett interprets Husserl incorrectly by twisting his ideas, but is unable to elude the drawbacks of autophenomenology. |
| Published |
Vilnius : Vilniaus universiteto leidykla |
| Type |
Journal article |
| Language |
Lithuanian |
| Publication date |
2010 |
| CC license |
|
