Title Metaetika kaip romantizmo forma /
Another Title Metaethics as a form of romanticism.
Authors Jokubaitis, Alvydas
DOI 10.15388/Problemos.2013.0.831
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Is Part of Problemos.. Vilnius : Vilniaus universiteto leidykla. 2013, t. 83, p. 86-95.. ISSN 1392-1126. eISSN 2424-6158
Keywords [eng] metaethics ; romanticism ; critique of metaethics
Abstract [eng] This paper presents a critique of metaethics. It is an attempt at deepening the critique proposed by Ronald Dworkin, which is in some respects limited and inconsistent. Dworkin is right in saying that metaethics is based on the epistemological premises of the Enlightenment, but it has to be pointed out that he overlooks the influence of Romanticism. Metaethics can be understood as a form of romantic thinking. There is a widespread consensus according to which this discipline is linked with the ideas of the Enlightenment. The aim of this paper is to prove that metaethics is based on premises which are romantic. Philosophers doing metaethics cut off all links between established concepts, revolt against common sense, retreat into a realm of ideas, strive for novelties and originality, get lost between incompatible viewpoints and antinomies. They want to find something new and unexpected behind daily phenomena. Works of metaethics are different from impressionistic pieces of art, but their guiding attitude is the same. The main difference is that the artists do not deny their relationship with Romanticism, whereas philosophers doing metaethics never openly talk of such relations. Metaethics is a disguised form of Romanticism. The principle that Carl Schmitt called “subjectified occasionalism” is operational in both cases.
Published Vilnius : Vilniaus universiteto leidykla
Type Journal article
Language Lithuanian
Publication date 2013
CC license CC license description