| Abstract [eng] |
In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage - a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially "covered" by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast - the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region. In the article are presented concrete cases revealing how this mechanism of a Russian hostage functions in political practice: by involving the Kaliningrad exclave into the "high politics" to create the air of its peculiarity, and at the level of the "low politics, though keeping alive hopes of peculiarity in the exclave, by preventing them from being realised in... [to full text]. |
